Conflict dynamics in irregular armed conflict
A comparative case study of Israel, Lebanon, Namibia and Sri Lanka
Capstone project of the MSc Crisis and Security Management Supervisor: Dr. Alastair Reed Second reader: Prof. Edwin Bakker Participants: - Namibia: Jyrki Helminen (s1632434) - Lebanon: Kyra Luchtenberg - Israel: Vincent Nieuwpoort - Sri Lanka: Lotte Westra Date: 15-01-2016 Abstract Many factors cause and influence the dynamics of irregular armed conflict. Research has been done on single drivers influencing conflict dynamics, or on either the causes or the final de- escalation of the conflict. Additionally, popular discourses in conflict studies of a certain time period influence the way conflicts have been framed. In order to provide a broad and detailed overview of all the factors that could have driven the dynamics of escalation and de-escalation, a holistic analytical framework has been developed. The overall purpose of this project has been to create a framework that is applicable to all irregular armed conflicts.
The development of the analytical framework has been done by exploring the literature on conflict. The framework identified several factors that influence the dynamics of conflict: social cleavages; popular support; grievances; local politics; national politics; international politics; natural disasters; state action – coercive force; state action – policy solution; state capacity; strong/weak government; strategy of armed groups; capacity of armed groups; factionalisation; criminalisation.
The framework has been applied to four historical cases, conflicts which experienced periods of escalation and de-escalation. The historical analysis offered in-depth knowledge on the changing dynamics in the following conflicts: the Israeli Independence War (1947-1948), the Lebanese Civil War (1975-1990), the Namibian Independence War (1966-1990) and the Sri Lankan Civil War (1983-2009). Information about the cases has been gathered by analysing primary sources and secondary literature, and conducting interviews. To structure the analysis, the conflicts have been divided into characteristic conflict phases. In order to gain new insights and improve the analytical framework, a comparative analysis has been performed.
The comparative research offered several new insights. First, regional politics was considered to play a significant role in changing the dynamics in all four cases. Second, geography influenced the dynamics in both the case of Lebanon and Sri Lanka. Therefore, these factors have been added to the analytical framework. Third, the comparative research indicated that the factors influenced the dynamics of the conflicts in different ways. Fourth, the significance of the factors differed per conflict. Still, several factors played a significant role in all four cases, for example, social cleavages, popular support, regional politics. A combination of factors explained the direction of the conflict in most of the phases, which makes the focus on a single driver or discourse incomplete. This shows the importance of using a holistic approach.
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The research has also revealed several limitations of the analytical framework. First, it must be noted that the analytical framework offers limited insights with regard to the direction of the interaction. Second, a combination of factors might influence the dynamics rather than one factor on its own, for instance, armed groups use grievances, caused by social cleavages, to acquire new recruits. The analytical framework might cause too much focus on individual factors rather than interaction between them. Third, the exploratory nature of the research does not yet allow to generalise the outcomes, hence further research is necessary to improve and generalise the framework.
Keywords: conflict studies, irregular armed conflict, conflict dynamics, the Israeli Independence War, the Lebanese Civil War, the Namibian Independence War, the Sri Lankan Civil War.
Table of content Abstract ...... 2 Table of content ...... 3 1. Introduction ...... 5 2. Literature review ...... 7 2.1. Conflict emergence ...... 8 2.1.1. Greed and grievance ...... 8 2.1.2. Greed or grievance ...... 8 2.1.3. Weak and failed states ...... 9 2.1.4. Motives for rebellion ...... 10 2.1.5. Civil war organisation ...... 11 2.1.6. Social cleavages: a sociological approach ...... 11 2.1.7. Contagion ...... 12 2.1.8. Geography ...... 13 2.2. Changes in conflict dynamics: escalation and de-escalation ...... 14 2.2.1. Socio-political factors ...... 14 2.2.2. Wartime political order ...... 15 2.2.3. War economies ...... 16 2.2.4. Public support ...... 17 2.2.5. State sponsored terrorism ...... 17 2.2.7. Counterinsurgency ...... 19
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2.2.8. Criminalisation of a conflict ...... 21 2.2.9. Natural disasters ...... 23 2.3. Dispute settlement and conflict resolution ...... 24 2.3.1. Settlements and peace processes ...... 24 2.3.2. Spoilers ...... 24 2.3.3. Governmental policies ...... 26 2.4 Conflict theory ...... 26 2.4.1.Theoretical foundations ...... 26 2.4.2. Modern approaches ...... 27 2.4.2.1. Shared framework ...... 28 2.4.2.2. Multilevel model ...... 29 2.4.2.3 Sociological institutional analysis ...... 30 2.5 Conceptualisations ...... 30 2.5.1. Conflict and civil war ...... 31 2.5.2. Irregular warfare, insurgency and terrorism ...... 33 2.5.3 State-building ...... 39 3. Methodology ...... 39 3.1 Quantitative or qualitative methods ...... 39 3.2 Comparative historical analysis ...... 42 3.3 Single case study or comparative case studies ...... 42 3.4 Empirical or theoretical case studies ...... 43 3.5 Method of data-gathering ...... 44 3.6 Analytical framework ...... 45 3.6.1 Grounded theory approach ...... 45 3.6.2 Structuring the analysis ...... 46 3.6.3 Three realms of analysis ...... 47 3.6.3 Operationalisation of the factors ...... 49 3.7 Case selection ...... 56 3.8 The utility of using phases ...... 60 4. Namibian Independence War ...... 61 4.1. Introduction ...... 61 4.2. Case description ...... 66 4.3. Case analysis ...... 94 4.4. Conclusions & Discussion ...... 123
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Abbreviations ...... 131 Bibliography ...... 132 Appendix I: Namibia – Interview of Prof. dr. Jan-Bart Gewald ...... 134 Appendix II: Namibia – Interview of Lalli Metsola ...... 136 Appendix III: Namibia – Interview of Dr. Marion Wallace ...... 138 Appendix IV: Namibia – Interview of Dr. Henning Melber ...... 140 Appendix V: Namibia - United Nations General Assembly Resolution 65 (1946) ...... 149 Appendix VI: Namibia - United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2145 ...... 152 Appendix VII: Namibia - United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3111 (1973) ...... 154 Appendix VIII: Namibia - United Nations General Assembly Resolution 146 (1976) ...... 158 Appendix IX: Namibia - United Nations Security Council Resolution 385 (1976) ...... 162 Appendix X: Namibia - United Nations Security Council Resolution 435 (1978) ...... 165 5. Comparative analysis ...... 167 5.1 Context ...... 167 5.2 State ...... 174 5.3 Non-state ...... 178 6. Conclusion ...... 180 6.1 Context ...... 180 6.2 State ...... 182 6.3 Non-state ...... 183 6.4 Analytical framework ...... 184 7. Discussion ...... 184 8. Bibliography ...... 186
1. Introduction
The post-cold war world has been marked by a number of high profile irregular wars, starting with the Balkan wars during the 1990s, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan during the 2000s and the ‘Arab Spring’ or ‘Arab Revolt’ that began during 2010. The total number of conflicts is much higher. This research will focus on finding what factors drive the dynamics of irregular armed conflicts. Which factors contribute to escalation or de-escalation of the conflict?
Post-Napoleonic interstate wars have received a relative high interest from scholars, researching all mechanisms and variations of conflicts, contributing to a still evolving and
5 developing academic discipline. Irregular armed conflicts on the contrary, are less studied and draw less attention in the scholarly debate. Notwithstanding, the body of knowledge on irregular armed conflicts is evolving and growing. Most research on conflicts focusses on causes and reasons, and some to the mechanisms that influence or contribute to the end of the conflict. Comparatively, little research has been done on the dynamics during an irregular armed conflict. This appears to be an understudied research field.
Irregular armed conflicts are often intrinsically complex occurrences, making any attempt at analysis of current day irregular armed conflicts prone to failure. Current academic literature demonstrates a gap in literature in regard to a major, holistic analytical framework. Some research has been done on single drivers and their effects on an often small number (or even single cases) of cases. This research project aims to provide insights that contribute to narrowing this knowledge gap in irregular armed conflicts dynamics. Increased knowledge on this subject might contribute to more effective policies regarding irregular armed conflicts. It is expected this research will benefit future researchers endeavouring further into the subject, and analysts that work in the field of irregular armed conflicts. Furthermore political decision makers, either representing state or non-state actors, might benefit from an improved understanding of the effects of policies on irregular armed conflicts.
The primary research question that this research aims to answer is: What are the causal mechanisms that drive the dynamics of escalation and de-escalation in irregular armed conflict? This research project will be designed as a comparative historical case study, in which four historical cases are selected, researched and analysed, followed by a comparative analysis. Four historical cases have been selected, and comprise the civil war in Lebanon, the civil war in Sri Lanka, the civil war in Israel and the Nubian independence war.
This research follows the following structure: the research starts with the extensive literature review, giving a broad overview of the existing academic literature on conflict studies and more specifically on contemporary approaches to the emergence and termination of conflicts. This is followed by the methodology chapter, where methodological choices, data gathering, analytical framework formation and case selection are explained. Here, the final analytical framework will be presented. This is followed by individual case descriptions and analyses. After this, the comparative analysis of the four conflicts is conducted, and the main findingsare presented. The research concludes with the conclusions of the comparative
6 analysis, and the discussion, which includes experienced limitations of the analytical framework and recommendations for future research.
2. Literature review
A review of the extensive body of literature on conflicts shows that the Cold War is a turning point in the history of conflict studies. The occurrence of conventional wars with states fighting states, such as World War II, is minimising over time, while another type of conflict characterises the post-Cold War period: unconventional conflicts (also called irregular armed conflicts or civil wars). Despite the fact that civil wars have been the most common type of armed conflict since the 19th/20th century, experts on conflict studies were focusing mainly on interstate warfare during the Cold War period. In the 1990s, a wave of civil conflicts took place (figure 1) that, in combination with the end of the Cold War, shifted the focus of conflict studies (Duyvesteyn, 2012, p. 601). These conflicts have received increased attention from scholars since then, which leads to a wide range of literature, theories and conceptualisations. All this research aims to find out what factors cause conflicts and, to a smaller extent, what factors explain their dynamics (Ouellet & Pahlavi, 2011; Pahlavi & Ouellet, 2012; Fearon & Laitin, 2003).
Figure 1. Number and percentage of countries with ongoing civil wars by year from 1945 to 1999 (Fearon & Laitin, 2003, p. 77).
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2.1. Conflict emergence 2.1.1. Greed and grievance
A growing number of unconventional conflicts created an interesting question for further research: what causes these conflicts? The conceptual distinction between greed and grievance created probably one of the most influential theoretical debates in conflict studies. Paul Collier analysed statistical data of civil wars since the mid-1960s and concluded in 1999 that the grievance-based explanations of civil war were wrong. The focus should be on greed aspects in order to understand the causes of civil war (Berdal, 2005, p. 687). This greed thesis of Collier defines the circumstances under which greed driven wars are likely to break out, namely: a state that relies on primary commodity exports, in which the unemployment rate is high, and young, poorly educated men are in abundance. If such a state also experiences a period of rapid economic decline, a conflict is likely to break out. However, unconventional conflicts cannot be explained by economic factors only. They interact with grievances of socio-economic and political nature, which triggers the outburst of warfare (Berdal, 2005, p. 691). Grievance can cause a war when certain actions of a state create a large feeling of grievance among a minority population. When a minority experiences a high level of exploitation for a long time, they can decide to start a rebellion. These grievances can be experienced politically, such as the absence of suffrage, but also economically and socially (Collier & Sambanis, 2002, p. 4; Fearon & Laitin, 2003, p. 88).
2.1.2. Greed or grievance A further perspective on conflict dynamics is given by Paul Collier and Nicholas Sambanis, whose book (two volumes) consists of 18 case studies of internal insurgencies. Collier and Hoeffler, and Fearon and Laitin concluded that there was a significant correlation between country's dependency on primary commodity export and civil war, and the role of the ethnicity. The main analysis of Collier and Sambanis suggested that these conclusions needed to be revised. Broadly, their findings indicated that "resource predation might be the result of pure ‘greed’ or only a side product of ‘grievance" (Tarrow, 2007, p. 595). This led to a clear, twofold conclusion. First, resource predation is not a correlation but a mechanism. Second, the correlation between the presence of natural resources and civil war is compatible with several alternative mechanisms (Tarrow, 2007, p. 595). Collier and Sambanis’ other major finding relates to the issue of ethnicity and its role in triggering civil war. In contrast to earlier
8 quantitative studies, which suggested that ethnic fractionation was not important in triggering civil war, several of their case studies provided different results. When ethnicity is operationalised into ethnic fractionation and ethnic dominance, the former can even contribute to peace by increasing the costs of coordinating rebellion across ethnic lines, whereas the latter can increase the risk of civil war. Tarrow explained this contradicting finding by using the work of Collier and Sambanis, and other researchers to define three possible mechanisms: mutual recognition between members of the same, and/or different, ethnic groups; fear of victimisation or exclusion, especially when ethnic divisions overlap with class cleavages; and civil society segmentation or interaction, where ethnic differences are bridged by instrumental interdependencies among ethnic groups, while their interactions undercut political entrepreneurs’ calls for ethnic mobilisation (2007, p. 595). In addition to resource predation and ethnicity, Collier and Sambanis indicated other possible relevant factors that might complicate the analysis even more. Examples are neighbourhood and spill- over effects, as a nearby insurgency might spread to countries whose internal indicators do not predict disturbances. Furthermore, civil wars may be part of regional cycles of violence (Tarrow, 2007, p. 595). Finally, Collier and Sambanis promoted the following hypothesis: "government repression increases opposition and, if repression is incomplete, it can lead to violence" (Collier and Sambanis, 2003, vol. 1, p. 318, referred by Tarrow 2007, p. 595).
2.1.3. Weak and failed states Fearon and Laitin wrote that decolonisation creates financially, bureaucratically and militarily weak states. Poverty, state weakness, instability and large populations are factors that increase the risk of insurgent wars. They argued that these factors are better predictors of insurgent wars than ethnic or religious diversity, or measures of grievances such as economic inequality, lack of democracy or civil liberties, or state discrimination. They concluded that economic growth may correlate less with civil wars, but that the best change for preventing civil wars is to make sure that the government is well-financed and administratively competent (2003, p. 88).
Rotberg focused on the dynamics of nation-state failure. A state fails due to internal violence and the inability to ensure political goods to the public (2010, p. 10). The government loses its legitimacy, and the public does no longer see the nation state as legitimate. Rotberg distinguished strong from weak states. The capacity of a state is defined by the level of effective delivery of political goods to the public. Strong states have control over their
9 territories and deliver a variety of high quality political goods to the public, such as the political good of security. In contrary, in weak states the ability to provide an adequate measure of political goods is diminished (2010, p. 4). Overall, the idea is established that weak states are at risk of transforming into failed or collapsed states, which increases the risks of a civil war.
François and Sud (2006, p. 143) reinforced this idea that fragile states involved in civil wars are at risk of a conflict trap: a civil war causes the collapse of an economy and compromises the state system, which increases the level of conflict. Berdal (2005, p. 697) states that the appearance of a conflict trap may actually be the evolution of a state. An alternative system of power might occur at a local level that takes over the core functions of government. While the international community perceives the state as fragile, the state is establishing a new social order amidst the chaos.
2.1.4. Motives for rebellion Two other researchers who have focused on the dynamics of contention in civil wars are Jeremy Weinstein and Stathis Kalyvas. Weinstein’s book Inside Rebellion represents a rational choice institutionalism approach, as it focuses on the organisation of rebellion by analysing the recruitment strategies of insurgency groups. Weinstein argued that recruitment strategies depend for a great deal on the incentives that are likely to motivate individual participation. To make a distinction, he called highly committed individuals investors, and poorly committed individuals consumers. He argued that individuals make rational choices reflected by deliberate decisions, designed to maximise payoffs (Weinstein 2006, pp. 8-9). Weinstein presented two major types of insurgency based on a horizontal paired comparison between two forms of organisation of insurgency: activism and opportunism. - The first is opportunistic rebellions, where participation involves fewer risks, short-term gains are more likely, and low-commitment participants resemble consumers, whose commitment to the organisation is weak and who expect to be rewarded immediately for their involvement (Weinstein 2006, pp. 9-10). The second type is called the activist rebellions. Here, participation is risky, short-term gains are unlikely, and high-commitment participants resemble investors dedicated to the cause of the organisation and willing to make costly investments of time and risk-taking in return for the promise of rewards in the future (Weinstein 2006, pp. 8-9). These different insurgency types produce two different relations to
10 the resident population, either looting and indiscriminate violence, or co-operation and selective violence (Weinstein 2006, p. 7).
2.1.5. Civil war organisation Kalyvas analysed vertical relationships between centres and peripheries within civil wars. That is, relationships between the central ideological/political cleavage at the macro level, and the congeries of local conflicts and violence which these relationships either trigger or adapt to. Like Weinstein, Kalyvas refused to reduce his actors to people who join insurgencies either to satisfy their greed or to right their grievances (Kalyvas 2006, p. 376). Instead, he sought to explain civil war organisation by two parallel classical disciplines: a Hobbesian model and a Schmittian model. The Hobbesian model is "stressing an ontology of civil wars characterised by the breakdown of authority," (p. 376) in which violence is privatised. The Schmittian model "entails an ontology of civil wars based on abstract group loyalties and beliefs", which "stresses the fundamentally political nature of civil wars and its attendant processes" (Kalyvas 2006, p. 376). As Tarrow (2007) pointed out, Kalyvas found both Hobbesian and Schmittian elements in the civil wars he studied (p. 592). His major finding detects the peculiar dynamic and extreme brutality of civil war violence and results from the Hobbesian and Schmittian interaction. As Tarrow summarised, Kalyvas saw violence as a process linking core cleavages and peripheral actors, which are connected despite the differences in their motives and alignments, by a set of alliances.
Perhaps a more general contribution regarding the methodological discussion that both Weinstein and Kalyvas made, is the recognition that there is a wide variety of motives that animates participants in civil wars (Tarrow, 2007, p. 592). This reaches beyond the ‘greed and grievances’ approach, necessitating a rich combination of methods for their detection.
2.1.6. Social cleavages: a sociological approach Social cleavages derive, for instance, from religious, ethno-linguistic, center-periphery, and urban-rural differences. Any society has a cleavage structure. If the cleavage is not accommodated by responsive policies of the government, the divisions can lead to civil war or other types of severe conflict (Eagles & Johnston, 2008, p. 219). Rotberg (2010, p. 5) argued that most civil wars stem from or have roots in hostility between ethnic, religious or linguistic communities. The presence of social cleavages within a society creates horizontal inequality, which leads to resentment or demands for equity. The lack of inclusiveness makes the costs of insurgency acceptable, increasing the probability of conflict. Reynal-Querol (2002, p. 29)
11 confirmed that (religiously) divided societies are more prone to social-ethnic conflict. Disputes among religiously divided societies are particularly difficult to mediate, raising the probability of conflict. Religious differences, more than other social cleavages, can generate violence due to the exclusivity of religion (2002, p. 32). A person can only have one religion, whereas a person can speak multiple languages. Østby (2008, p. 144) argued that if the group aspect of inequality is considered, it can be observed that inequalities between ethnic or religious cleavages enhance both grievances and group cohesion, thereby facilitating the breeding ground for conflict. These systematic inequalities between societal groups reflect socio-economic polarisation, and can be defined as horizontal inequalities. He argued that horizontal inequalities increase the potential for a violent conflict (2008, p. 155).
In recent years, studies of civil war seem to have concluded that inequality created by social cleavages is not increasing the risk of civil war (Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Hegre, Gissinger & Gleditsch, 2003; Collier & Hoeffler, 2004). Other factors than ethnic or religious divisions are mentioned to explain the causes of civil war, such as economic variables, political systems, and geographical conditions that favour insurgency.
2.1.7. Contagion According to Forsberg (2009), contagion effects in internal armed conflicts can be defined as a process whereby an internal conflict in one country affects the likelihood of a new internal armed conflict erupting in a neighbouring state at a later point in time (p. 9). Historical and recent examples clearly demonstrate that intra-state armed conflicts are often connected to each other. Among many examples are the civil wars fought in West Africa. Forsberg pointed out that several studies demonstrate that having one or several neighbouring states with an on- going civil war is an important predictor of civil war in a given country. This finding, often referred to as the neighbourhood effect of civil conflict, is considered empirically robust. In fact, it has been shown to be one of the most important predictors of civil war. Forsberg argued that this validates a growing consensus: one cannot focus exclusively on the domestic attributes of countries to explain civil wars. Modelling events and factors external to the countries experiencing civil war may be just as important (2009, p. 13). Forsberg focused in her study on when, how, why, and where conflicts generate contagion effects. Her analysis concluded that, given an on-going ethnic conflict among a set of neighbouring countries, those that share members of the groups involved in conflict are more likely to be targets than those lacking such bonds (the effect of transnational ethnic kinship linkages) (2009, p. 31).
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Furthermore, given an on-going internal conflict (ethnic or non-ethnic), the variation in refugee flows to different neighbouring countries is related to which neighbouring states are most likely targets of contagion effects. In addition, countries that are ethnically polarised, in the sense that there are a few equally (or roughly equally) strong contenders, are more likely targets of contagion effects. Finally, there was no support for the claims that concessions granted to rebel groups inspire other groups to rebel (2009, p. 32). Her other findings suggest that contagion is not limited to direct spill-over from conflict areas, but may be the result of inspiration and conflict by example. It may even indicate that the latter type of contagion process is more salient (2009, p. 33). Kathman (2010) approached the question of civil war contagion from a third-party intervention point of view to find out what explains contagion. He stated that civil wars have a tendency to be geographically contagious. Neighbouring third parties thus face the threat of being infected by another civil war’s hostilities ( p. 990). According to Kathman, the robust finding in the study of conflict processes is that violence tends to diffuse geographically. Research on the diffusion of inter-state war is well established. War is not randomly distributed across space. Rather, conflict tends to infect those states with links to the original belligerents. These links may include shared borders, a military alliance, or an adversarial relationship, leading wars to attract more participants. Therefore, civil wars exhibit a distinct interstate dimension, as the ramifications of civil conflicts are rarely confined to the original war state (p. 992). Kathman pointed out that more recent work has uncovered a number of causal factors for the geographic diffusion of civil conflicts. Unrest tends to follow the flow of refugees. Cross-border ethnic ties also create opportunities for wars to spread. The territorial aspirations of rebel groups are also relevant, as secession breeds similar violence in contiguous territories, civil war creates demonstration effects for potential rebel groups in proximate countries, and civil war causes regional economic recessions. This can make rebel ideologies more attractive to recruits in neighbouring states (p. 992).
2.1.8. Geography In three of the case studies in this research, geography appeared to be an important influence on conflict dynamics. Fearon and Laitin (2003) identified several factors leading to internal conflict in countries since 1945. They argued that ethnic or religious differences do not lead to conflict. Instead, they argued that the existence of conditions that enable rural insurgency cause the onset of a conflict. These include poverty (1) political instability (2) and geography (3). Geography, mountainous and rough territory in particular, is highly related to the onset of
13 a conflict. The countries with mountainous or rough terrain had a higher probability (a doubled risk) of civil war onset than countries with flat terrain. With geography Fearon and Laiton (2003) referred to mountainous and rough terrain, in which insurgents can take refuge. In most cases, the insurgents are numerically weak in comparison to the state's security forces. Meaning, they need to be able to hide from the security forces and gain public support for their strife. Swaps and jungles, poorly served by roads, can be considered rough terrain that can be favourable to insurgents. Other aspects that might influence the conflict are the population distributions or food availability in mountainous areas. Do and Lyer (2010) reached a similar conclusion: geography is a predictor of conflict, since it influences the ability of the state to control insurgencies and the ease with which insurgents can start mobilising. Additionally, they argued that geography causes the intensity of the conflict to escalate after it has started, as the insurgency is able to persist. In this way, geography influences the persistence of rural insurgency.
2.2. Changes in conflict dynamics: escalation and de-escalation As the previous chapter shows, many scholars are focusing on the causes of irregular warfare. However, the study of conflict dynamics is emerging. The extensive amount of research on the causes of irregular wars has created the careful assumption that both greed and grievance can cause conflict. Some presume that by applying these theories to the dynamics of warfare, the clarification of the continuation of violence is possible. However, this seems to be too optimistic. Most of the ideas about escalation of civil wars come from Cold War research, but more and more research has been done to find out what factors explain escalation and de- escalation in irregular warfare (Duyvesteyn, 2012, p. 601-603). The next chapter will explicate theories on factors that might influence conflict dynamics.
2.2.1. Socio-political factors Toft choose the factors ethnicity, nationalism, secession and self-determination to explain the onset of violence, how violence affects the dynamics of the conflict, and how violence ends (2012, p. 582). She concluded that groups that live in a self-claimed ethnic homeland and constitute the majority of the population are most apt to make ambitious claims about secession. If their claims are not accepted, they are most likely to use violence. Additionally, she also looked at the ending of conflicts. On this point, she concluded that in the case of secession wars, a negotiated settlement will only stop the conflict if the agreement includes a
14 credible threat of harm, should one of the parties infringe the settlement. Additionally, there should be credible guarantees of economic, diplomatic, and administrative support for the parties to keep their word. Toft concluded with the statement that these inclusive settlements are the only way to stop the violence and to prevent violence from coming back. The settlements should include these conditions in order to de-escalate the conflict (2012, p. 594- 595).
2.2.2. Wartime political order Staniland (2012) argued that "bargains, deals, and tacit understandings between states and insurgents are common in civil wars. This fascinating mix of conflict and cooperation shapes patterns of politics, governance, and violence" (p. 243). According to Staniland, wartime political orders vary according to the distribution of territorial control and the level of cooperation between states and insurgents. Orders range from collusion and shared sovereignty, to spheres of influence and tacit coexistence, to clashing monopolies and guerrilla disorder (2012, p. 243). Staniland continued that state and non-state actors both have cooperative and conflictual relationships that create dramatic variation in who rules, and how, in war. In turn, these wartime political orders shape patterns of violence against civilians, governance and economics, and post-war politics (2012, p. 243). Staniland (2012) proposed a construction of a conceptual typology of six distinct wartime political orders (relationship between an armed group and a state): 1) active cooperation / shared sovereignty: a negotiated form of political order in which the insurgent organisation retains autonomy and standing structures of coercive capability. Violence between the forces is minimised and institutionalised mechanisms for achieving joint goals are devised, even with no monopoly of violence); 2) active cooperation / collusion: a situation in which the state actively cooperates with non-state armed actors that are geographically intermeshed with its areas of operation. The violence that accompanies these orders will be different than a purely adversarial clash of wills. It is coordinated to target mutual enemies and reflect the political bargains made between the relevant actors; 3) passive cooperation / spheres of influence: segmented areas of control in which the state and its armed group agree to limit the boundary violations across each sphere. Ceasefire, informal truces, and agreements about where and when state and insurgent forces will tread are intended to manage spirals of escalation; 4) passive cooperation / tacit coexistence: involves the interweaving of state and non-state violent organisations in the context of fragmented, overlapping control. This order involves
15 careful attempts to limit the degree of active conflict and violence between states and non- state armed groups in intermixed daily life. Violence follows the implicit rules of engagement about what is and is not acceptable to each side; 5) No cooperation / clashing monopolies: order characterised by violent competition between the state and an armed actor that each control a distinct territory. Politics shape war aims, but this contest is a primarily military struggle with an emphasis on logistics, manpower, and arms; 6) No cooperation / guerrilla disorder: situation of fluid violence in which there are few clear norms or rules about the infliction of lethal violence when insurgent and state forces are intertwined in the same physical spaces. Violence is an embedded part of political, economic, and social life, lacking clear or institutionalised rules for the management of lethality (2012, p. 248-253). Staniland concluded that the distribution of control and level of cooperation between states and non- state armed groups vary considerably, creating different forms of wartime order (2012, p. 255).
Mukherjee (2014) examined why the longest insurgencies are usually characterised by low violence. By analysing several insurgencies based on minority ethnic groups aspirations, Myron Weiner found that in the medium capacity states, given resource constrains, the political leaders of the state prefer to ‘live with’ an insurgency that is less threatening, rather than forcibly suppress it. This causes some of these conflicts to have both long duration and low severity (p. 173). Mukherjee elaborated that those insurgencies that occur in peripheral regions of the country and fight for these aspirations, are the ones for which their medium capacity states follow a policy of containment, resulting in a low-level equilibrium of persistence violence (2014, p. 173). In turn, while the rebels do not really quit the fight, they keep their level of violence below a threshold level and thus help maintain a low-level equilibrium of violence (2014, p. 184).
2.2.3. War economies The greed and grievance debate of the 1990s is built upon by, amongst others, Malone and Nitzschke (2005). They made a deeper analysis of the economic framework of irregular armed conflicts, and analyse the ‘war economies’, as they refer to it, and their links with international actors. While Colliers' ‘greed thesis’ is partially supported, Malone and Nitzschke (2005) argued that the correlation in the data is not a direct one, as bad governance is a common explaining factor. While greed might not be directly related with the onset of conflict, the analysis of Malone and Nitzschke (2005) showed that there is a big influence on
16 conflict dynamics. These influences are direct, as, for instance, a grievance based conflict transforms and becomes difficult to terminate for economic reasons. This transformation also changes the dynamics of actors. If large amounts of revenue are easily accessed and claimed, this might result in factionalisation and spread of interests, increasing Stedman’s (1997) spoiler issues. An important policy implication is that, in order to create peace, it needs to be more profitable than war. Relating to this is 'military fiscalism', which implies that there is a functional relationship between increasing military expenditure and economic growth. Emile Benoit was one of the scholars that found this correlation in developing countries (1978). This situation can influence conflict dynamics, for instance, when military employment creates more stable socio-political conditions and it becomes beneficial for the state to prolong the war.
2.2.4. Public support In her book, Elisabeth Wood (2003) analysed El Salvador’s civil war by applying a wide range of methods from historical ethnography, supported by comparative analysis, to the micro level study. She focused on how collective action from below was sustained in the face of state violence. Her analysis suggested that the repression of legitimate and deeply felt grievances leads to support for armed insurgency when superior armed force is used indiscriminately (Tarrow, 2007, p. 593). However, her analysis also revealed that no standard economic or social measures predict which areas will support the guerrillas, and which will either remain neutral or support the government (Wood, 2003, p. 17-18, referred by Tarrow, 2007, p. 593). Wood explained this by arguing that "an emergent insurgent political culture was key to generating and sustaining the insurgency despite its high costs" (Wood 2003, p. 225, as referred by Tarrow 2007, p. 593), meaning that people who joined the insurgency had a shared view/idea of justification and were willing to give the ultimate sacrifice.
2.2.5. State sponsored terrorism Bapat (2012) started his work with this acute question: "why do some states engage in coercive diplomacy by sponsoring militant violence against their rivals?" (2012, p. 1). This might give militant groups’ sponsors bargaining power, but also may produce moral hazard, because it can empower groups to a level that sponsors cannot control anymore. To answer this dilemma, Bapat applied a game theoretical model of state sponsorship. He argued that state sponsorship represents a form of costly signalling that is useful in coercive bargaining,
17 as sponsorship increases the difficulty a target government will have in repressing the militants. This added difficulty can create a situation in which the government prefers making some policy concessions if the sponsor agrees to cease the militants’ attacks. However, with their new-found power, state-sponsored militants may be less willing to negotiate, and may punish the sponsor for making deals they believe are unacceptable. The increased risk of militant punishment can provide sponsors with substantial bargaining power (2012, p. 1).
The theoretical model argues that state sponsorship serves to signal the tying of hands in bargaining with rival governments in two possible ways. First, sponsorship decreases the probability of a militant group being repressed, thereby increasing the probability that the group will be effective in accomplishing the sponsor’s policy objective. This enables the sponsor to demand more in negotiation by improving the sponsor’s value for the outside option associated with bargaining failure. Secondly, sponsorship gives the militants the power to punish the sponsor if it negotiates an unfavourable deal, enabling the sponsor forces to demand considerable concessions from the target government in exchange for abandoning the militants. (2012, p. 26). Bapat concludes by stating that, while the previous literature supports the major power prediction, the empirical test in this study provides evidence that sponsorship is more likely to occur if the potential sponsor is moderately weak (2012, p. 27).
According to Byman (2007), there are many different reasons why states support terrorists. Starting from a historical context, he referred to an observation made by Boaz Ganor. Until the mid-1990s, international terrorism was generally considered to be state-sponsored, as two competing super-power blocs, USSR and USA, fought the cold war by supporting terrorist groups ´belonging´ to their ideological camp. These organisations were perceived as proxies, an inexpensive tool to promote the superpower´s interests around the world and in conflict areas in particular. For other states, such as Iran, Syria, and Libya, terrorism was considered a low-risk tool that could achieve various goals inexpensively in both the international and regional arenas (Byman, 2007, p. 87). Byman argued that among the reasons why states support terrorists, is that terrorists offer alternative means for states to influence their neighbours, topple a hostile adversary regime, counter U.S. hegemony, or achieve other aims of the state. Support for terrorism is cheaper than developing conventional military capabilities, and it allows states to influence events far beyond their borders. Supporting terrorists can also serve a broader range of regime objectives from domestic to ideological (2007, p. 88).
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Byman emphasised the need to make a distinction between different levels of state involvement in terrorism. He offers six categories of state support to terrorism: 1) strong supporters, 2) weak supporters, 3) lukewarm supporters, 4) antagonistic supporters, 5) passive supporters, and 6) unwilling hosts, each of them having its unique set of interaction dynamics. However, this co-operation might have negative consequences for the proxy organisations. They may find that they pay a high price for the support that they receive from a state, while losing their credibility, if it is perceived as being controlled by a foreign power. Furthermore, Byman concluded that a state’s influence sometimes leads a terrorist group to moderate its activities or become more pragmatic (2007, p. 88).
2.2.6. Terrorism and transnational criminal organisations
The decline of state sponsored terrorism led many scholars to believe that terrorists and transnational criminal organisations will engage in strategic partnerships. Dishman (2001, p. 43-56) reflects on the probability of cooperation between terrorist groups and transnational criminal organisation. He argued that the transformation from terrorist group to transnational criminal organisation takes place in different degrees (2001, 47). Some terrorists might only pursue criminal activities to financially support their political activities. Other terrorists might shift their goal to profit-driven criminal acts due to the financial gain. In order to understand these transformations, Dishman looked into their aims and interests, and made the observation that terrorists pursue a political goal, while transnational criminal organisations aim for profits (2001, 44). The conclusion is made that the two groups will not intensively cooperate with each other due to their different aims and interests. The terrorist group is searching for a revolution or an independent territory, while the transnational criminal organisation aims to benefit from illegal activities. Therefore, terrorist groups do not want to engage in activities that portray them as criminal, and transnational criminal organisations do not seek unwanted attention and pressure of the government (2001, 50). Thus, the groups are more likely to use their so-called 'in-house' capacities to undertake criminal or political acts.
2.2.7. Counterinsurgency As Gventer (2014) pointed out, Douglas Porch’s book Counterinsurgency: Exposing the myths of the new way of war (2013), makes a powerful case study in the perils of using historical analogies to derive recipes for today’s problems: a practice embraced by too many counterinsurgency converts during and after the Iraq Surge (Gventer, 2014, p. 250). Porch
19 argued that current counterinsurgency strategies make every person a possible insurgent, because these strategies lack the skills and knowledge to determine to which group citizens belong. This leads to an unfortunate result: making the people the object of the conflict will also make them its most likely victim (Gventer, 2014, p. 249). Even in Iraq, studies revealed that the upward spiral of violence had coarsened attitudes among US troops toward Iraqi civilians whom many saw as complicit with the insurgency (Porch, 2013, p. 299). Gventer pointed out that the stated purpose of the Iraq Surge and the alleged implementation of COIN techniques was to give ‘breathing space’ to the country’s warring factions so that they could reach a peaceful, political settlement. Instead, it seems to have facilitated a consolidation of power by the country’s leading Shia factions and their Iranian patrons. Meanwhile, true ‘reconciliation’ remains out of reach as the country’s internal conflicts simmer away (Gventer 2014, p. 250).
Solomon (2015), proponent of critical terrorism studies, argued that success (in using traditional counterinsurgency campaigns) in a traditional realist sense is far from assured. Traditional counterterrorism measures are actually counter-productive since these refuse to acknowledge the underlying complexity, which is giving rise to radical Islamist movements. Therefore, traditional counterterrorism would only serve to perpetuate conflicts in these countries further, as is the case with, for example, the Nigerian government’s counterinsurgency campaign against Islamist sect Boko Haram. Despite the enactment of an anti-terrorism bill, the closure of border, the establishment of curfews and the deployment of 30,000 security guards, the carnage in Nigeria continues (p. 219-220). Solomon aptly noted that the traditional counterterrorism perspective is short-sighted at best, as it has not served to ameliorate the terrorist threat in Africa (2015, p. 230). In Nigeria, not only has the Nigerian state been unable to resolve Boko Haram’s challenge military, but its own counterterrorism violence has also rendered even more illegitimate in the eyes of northern Nigerians (2015, p. 231). Solomon argued that states are using the terrorist label to maintain the status quo and attract foreign support. This form of ‘othering’ allows states to delegitimise these non-state actors. The terrorist label also serves to deny the context and conditions that give rise to such movements. Additionally, it allows one to ignore the complexity and the individual character of each of the movements under discussion (2015, p. 231). According to Solomon, the lack of knowledge about the real grievances driving Al Shabab, makes it impossible to make the distinction between sub-state terrorism (terrorism directed at local goals) and international
20 terrorism, or instance a global Islamic Caliphate pursued by Al Qaeda. When international actors do not distinguish between the two and support an illegitimate state with military training and equipment as well as intelligence and financial assistance, these groups often turn to the likes of Al-Qaeda to provide them with the means to conduct their attacks against the state. In this process, sub-state terrorism then morphs into international terrorism (2015, p. 231).
2.2.8. Criminalisation of a conflict To discover how international and national criminal law impacts insurgencies, McKnight (2015) analysed the various responses to violations in Uganda, focusing on, for instance, the Amnesty Act, International Criminal Court indictments, and International Crimes Division. She pointed out that "the conflict in northern Uganda presents a unique study of international criminal law and different responses to prolonged conflict, as seemingly every tactical and ideological method that has been implemented to instil and secure justice has failed to achieve either goal" (McKinght 2015, p. 193-194). As McKnight pointed out, in general the problem of bonding rebel groups to human rights treaties is the fact that those laws are established by state consent. Nevertheless, some human rights treaties place explicit obligations on non-state armed groups, such as the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child specifically applies to armed groups (2015, 198).
Any activity falling outside applicable treaties or humanitarian provisions may still constitute a violation of customary international law and jus cogens crimes, such as the acts of torture (McKnight, 2015, p. 198-199). In case of Uganda and the atrocities committed by LRA (Lord's Resistance Army), the International Criminal Court (ICC) opened an investigation in 2004 and issued arrest warrants for crimes against humanity and war crimes. As McKnight pointed out, these were targeted only against few central LRA personnel, leaving out all other insurgency groups, and government officials who had also violated humanitarian laws. This led to a decade of claims against ICC of ineffectiveness and failure (2015, p. 199-202).
Furthermore, McKnight pointed out the ICC´s incapability to enforce its decisions, as one week after the ICC announced the opening of its investigations, the LRA killed 50 civilians in a refugee camp in Lira (2015, p. 206-207). This was followed by a creation of International Crimes Division, a national institution prosecuting international crimes through domestic
21 legislation. When the organisation started prosecuting criminals who had originally received amnesty, public trust and respect towards this institution was also put in question (McKnight 2015, p. 205). McKnight drew the conclusion from these observations that putting justice first, can lead to the impossibility of peace, as an insurgency leader feels he has to fight not only the government, but also the entire international community. Furthermore, careful timing and effective execution seems to be among crucial elements when international or national juridical processes are planned against insurgencies (2015, p. 207).
Dudouet (2011) examined the impact of anti-terrorist legislation, in particular the so-called ‘blacklisting’ regimes, on targeted entities as well as on third parties interacting with them for peaceful and constructive ends, and argues their impact to be ambivalent (p. 1). She pointed to the fact that the vast majority of contemporary armed conflicts are typically asymmetric in nature, with internationally legitimised state actors opposing non-state armed groups, often labelled or legally proscribed as ‘terrorist organisations’ (2011, p. 3). She described how one of the most immediate responses to the New York and Washington attacks was the establishment of so-called terrorist lists by the US government and the UN Security Council (and subsequently UN member states and the EU). Dudouet pointed out that, as there is no internationally-accepted legal definition of ´terrorism´, the task has been left to individual UN member states, which have interpreted it according to their diplomatic agendas or domestic interests (2011, p. 5). This received criticism, for example, from human rights lawyers, who have denounced blacklisting as an ideological and politically-biased tool that is blurring the distinctions between acts of violence against civilians and legitimate struggles for democracy or self-determination, by turning unarmed activists and their communities into ´terrorists´ (2011, p. 5-6). Dudouet argued that the behaviour of non-state actors, such as underground guerrilla organisations, is less likely to be affected by international sanctions, as they already perceive themselves as stigmatised and isolated. In fact, some organisations might consider proscription by their ‘enemies’ as a badge of honour (2011, p. 4). Furthermore, proscription can fuel radicalism and create direct impediments for humanitarian or political negotiations (2011, p. 5). As an example, Dudouet described that while terrorist lists are supposed to encourage armed movements to adopt peaceful strategies, the proscription of such actors in Sri Lanka, Turkey, Colombia, the Philippines, Palestine, and Nepal took place precisely while they were demonstrating their readiness to engage in dialogue and consider non-violent political strategies, inevitably leading to their re-radicalisation (2011, p. 5). Therefore she concludes that the banning and criminalisation of unarmed political or social movements
22 associated with blacklisted organisations has severe consequences for the peaceful resolution of conflicts, by granting these organisations an air of ´victimhood´ and increase their popular support (2011, p. 7). Hence, when applied unwisely, terrorist lists might interfere with efforts to find a political solution to asymmetric intra-state conflicts (2011, p. 1).
2.2.9. Natural disasters Gaillard, Clavé and Kelman (2008), and Beardsley (2009) looked at the influence of natural disasters on conflict dynamics. Beardsley focused on how natural disasters can influence the trajectory of conflict and peace processes in intra-state conflict. He stated that if the insurgent group is depending on local support, it will be more responsive to community needs and therefore welcome disaster relief and diplomacy after a disaster. This will advance the peace process (2009, p. 641-642). Gaillard, Clavé and Kelman stated that after a disaster, informal networks are created, and disaster relief and diplomacy will occur. These will influence peace talks positively. On the other side, if, for instance, relief aid is distributed unequally, the conflict can escalate again (2008, p. 515). Although natural disasters do not occur frequently during conflicts, there are some important examples that show hows disasters change conflict dynamics, such as the 1998 drought in Sudan, the 2001 and 2005 earthquakes in India/Pakistan, and the 2004 tsunami in Aceh and Sri Lanka (Gaillard, Clavé & Kelman, 2008, p. 515).
Devit and Tol (2012) pointed out that "existing empirical research on the role of climate change in violent conflict is limited and inconclusive. There is a consensus, however, that other, non-environmental factors dominate" (p. 130). Researchers refer to the findings of Collier and Hoeffler (1998), who were the first to suggest an ‘economic theory’ of civil conflict (rent-seeking by violence) and to test their predictions with data (Devit & Tol, 2012, p. 130). According to this strand of literature, people may fight over resources that are highly valuable and easy to smuggle, for instance diamonds, but they tend not to fight over bulky goods such as water and food. Climate- and weather-sensitive resources are therefore less conflict-prone (2012, p. 130-131). In an attempt to test this assumption, Devit and Tol developed a simulation model for the three-way interaction between civil war, climate change and development, in which they analysed civil wars in Sub-Sahara Africa. Their results indicated a clear statistical correlation between climate change and occurrence of civil war,
23 therefore leading researchers to suggest that at least in certain situations and regions, climate change increases the probability of civil wars (2012, p. 141).
2.3. Dispute settlement and conflict resolution 2.3.1. Settlements and peace processes
Stedman (1997) and Toft (2012) are not the only ones who have written about settlements and peace processes ending irregular wars. Duyvestein and Schuurman (2012, p. 678-687) identified three paradoxes of negotiating with terrorist or insurgent organisations. The first paradox refers to the misuse of negotiations by the insurgents to stall time, in order to prepare for a next offense. It should be noted that the state can also misuse negotiations to stall for time. This abuse of negotiations is most likely to occur in the mid-phase of an irregular conflict, in which the state failed to defeat the insurgents, despite its advantages in power and resources. Insurgents misuse the negotiations to increase its military strength to ensure a decisive victory (2012, p. 678-681). The second paradox implies that negotiations may also lead to disagreements within the terrorist organisation, as not every member sees negotiations as a positive development. Thereby, negotiations can cause the group to split into factions, each subgroup defending their sphere of influence. The subgroups excluded from the negotiations might use violence to frustrate the process (2012, p. 682-684). Patrick Johnston (2007) suggested that some governments actually seek to fraction terrorist groups in order to exploit the largest factions, using them to combat the remaining subgroups. The third paradox relates to the durability of negotiated settlements. Negotiations sometimes lead to temporary peaceful settlements, but in most cases bring about lengthy peace processes. Also, parallel to the negotiations process, terrorist continue violent acts to increase their power. Therefore, it can be argued that military victories might offer better prospects for stability (2001, p. 685- 687).
2.3.2. Spoilers Stephen Stedman (1997) also studied the dynamics of the peace processes, and looked specifically into the factors that influence the peace process in a negative way, which he called ‘spoilers of the peace process’. Because conflicts are seldom straight forward proceedings with simple aims, Stedman argued that the negotiations to settle for peace are often seen by some actors as against their interest. This makes peace-making a dangerous and
24 difficult endeavour. If spoilers succeed, the results of ongoing conflict are often disastrous. Examples given by Stedman (1997, p. 5) are Angola in 1992 and Rwanda in 1994, where the casualty numbers of the ongoing conflict were multiple times higher than the number of casualties of the original conflict. Stedman argued that in order to prevent spoilers from succeeding, a thorough analysis and strategy is needed to deal with them. He categorised spoilers based on their position, inside or outside the peace process, the number of spoilers, and the type of spoilers. The ‘type of spoilers’ is further divided into three types: limited, greedy or total. The framework also categorises strategies for coping with spoilers, inducement, socialisation and coercion. Choosing the right strategy is hampered by uncertainty in the analysis of the spoiler. Multiple factors should be taken into account when dealing with spoilers, amongst others, which are: the strategic goals of the spoiler; the intent of its actions; the degree of commitment to the peace process; the degree of command and control on followers; and the degree of unity within the spoiler. There is often uncertainty regarding these factors and assessments have to be made based on intelligence. A peacemaker has to take these complex factors into account and assess the effect of actions on the spoiler, other engaged actors and external stakeholders.
Reiter (2015) researched the occurrence of spoiling attempts during peace processes. He stated that the literature on civil wars notes the extreme difficulty of maintaining civil war peace agreements. Within this context, spoiling, defined by Reiter as: "actions taken to disrupt, undermine, hinder, or delay a peace process" (p. 92), has been identified as a major threat to civil war peace agreements. For instance, Angola and Rwanda experienced catastrophic violence when peace agreements failed (p. 90). Reiter’s analysis finds that spoiling intended to terminate an agreement is not typically assumed as common, but still plagues a sizeable number of peace agreements.
According to Reiter (2015, p. 89), when spoiling does pose a threat to peace, it does so under specific circumstances, such as the moment powerful actors initiate a peace process, or when paramilitaries and/or state security forces have been excluded from the peace agreement. He concluded that the vast majority of spoiling is often dangerous and disruptive for society. However, most actors who resort to the spoiling strategy typically fail in their goals and pose little risk to signed peace agreements (2015, p. 105). Finally, Reiter referred to recent research, which shows that the way the events are perceived by the public, influenced by media
25 coverage, has a profound impact on the ultimate effect of spoiling, making the population either more or less willing to accept the loss of human lives as a cost of peace (2015, p. 107).
2.3.3. Governmental policies The United States Institute of Peace´s special report addresses the following question: what are the most successful governmental policies aimed at ending terrorism? This research is conducted by drawing experiences from several civil conflicts. The report suggests that one of the most efficient approaches might be to apply strategies aiming to diminish popular support for the terrorists, hence reducing their strength (1999, p. 1). The report stresses the importance of understanding how the terrorist organisation and its decision making process works, which is crucial in choosing the right governmental policies (1999, p. 11). According to Martha Crenshaw, this can be attempted by analysing terrorist groups’ internal factors on the one hand, such as decision making, internal psychological dynamics, and external factors on the other hand, such as organisation’s strength compared to government forces, motivation (ideological or ethnical) and ties with external support. In addition, other factors to analyse are the tools that a government uses to respond to terrorism, such as deterrence, criminal justice, enhanced defence, and negotiations (1999, p. 2-3). Based on these factors, Crenshaw described that the end of terrorism may result from situations as success of terrorists, preliminary success, organisational breakdown of the terrorist group, dwindling support, and new alternatives (other options for political change emerge) (1999, p. 3). She pointed out that governments’ ‘get-tough’ approach can possibly only create more violence, leading to protracted conflict (1999, p. 4). Crenshaw emphasised the importance of a right timing for the peace process, ideally when the government is strong and the terrorist organisation is undergoing a period of introspection (1999, p. 1, 11).
2.4 Conflict theory 2.4.1.Theoretical foundations According to the literature scan, the conflict theory domain can be divided into classics and contemporary scholars. The foundation of the conflict theory is commonly associated with Marxism (Hungerford, 2008, p. 29-31), as Marx´s dialectical materialist account of history predicted that capitalism would inevitably produce internal tensions leading to its own destruction by a proletarian revolution, therefore emphasising the economic factors (Marx 1859, 1977). Two other classical conflict theorists are Ludwig Gumplowicz and Lester Ward, who introduced a more ethnological perspective to conflict. Gumplowicz´s approach emphasised that large complex human societies are evolved from war and conquest
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(Gumplowicz 1884, 1963), whereas Ward´s approach gave more attention to the ´human factor´ and emphasised that the root of the societal conflicts lies in the human conflicted nature itself (Ward 1897). Further classicists are Émile Durkheim and Max Weber. Durkheim´s approach focuses on crime, which he saw as the chief form of the social conflict. He stated that "crime plays a role in the evolution of morality and law" (Durkheim, 1938, p. 70-81). Whereas Marx emphasised the importance of "social structure", Weber emphasised the importance of "social action". This is the ability of individuals to influence the nature of their social relationships in sociologically significant ways (Livesay, 2015).
C. Wright Mills is usually credited as the founder of the modern conflict theory (Knapp, 2015). Central in his writing is the concept of 'power elite', as the 'national upper class' owns most of the country´s wealth. Mills was also concerned of the rise of militarism among the elites, because according to him, the rise of the military state serves the interests of the elite of industrial societies (Elwell, 2013). Another contemporary theorists is Gene Sharp, who argued that the source of any ruler´s political power derives from those over whom (s)he rules. Furthermore, the cooperation of those around a ruler is essential if (s)he is to have any power at all (Sharp, 2013). Finally, contemporary conflict theorist William Hulius Wilson emphasised the impact of racial inequality and rising economic inequality as a source of societal conflict (Wilson, 2003, p. 1096-1114). As a conclusion, Guy Hungerford presented a useful overview of the whole conflict theory domain by describing that conflict theorists see "that the society is made up of different groups who have competing or conflicting interests", and history "as the product of struggle" (Hungerford, 2008, p. 29). Furthermore, conflict theorists believe the main engine of change to be the "changing balance of power between different groups and especially different classes" (Hungerford, 2008, p. 29).
2.4.2. Modern approaches While classic approaches have focused on certain factors as sources of conflict, modern conflict mapping recognises the need of analysing complex conflict systems. As pointed out by Ramsbotham (2011), this has been integral in the conflict resolution field from the beginning (p. 118). However, this does not mean that there is one overarching approach agreed upon by all the researchers of the field. On the contrary, there are several parallel and colliding approaches, emphasising different perspectives, factors and levels of analysis. This research attempts to combine the most essential approaches, and to present a holistic model coming together of different transdisciplinary frameworks. In the following part several
27 interpretative frameworks for conflict analysis from established researchers will be presented, such as Wallensteen, Ramsbotham, and Pahlavi and Ouellet, to serve as the basis of this research's theoretical approach, which will be presented at the end.
2.4.2.1. Shared framework According to Wallensteen (2007), the different modes of conflict analysis can be categorised under three headings, according to what kind of approach they emphasise: 1) conflict dynamics, 2) needs-based conflict origins, and 3) rational-strategic calculations (p. 31-32).
A classic understanding of conflict regards conflict as a dynamic phenomenon: one actor is reacting to what another is doing, which leads to further action (Wallensteen, 2007, p. 32). The dynamic perspective on conflict analysis has been approached by two famous analytical tools, both developed in the 1960s: the game theory and Johan Galtung´s conflict triangle. The game theory is a way of illustrating how parties act within the confines set up by the game itself. If the parties follow the rules, the outcomes are predictable. However, it also raises the possibility that actors can change the dynamics by making particular moves or even breaking some of the 'rules' that the conflict has generated (2007, p. 32). Galtung´s model suggests that a conflict moves among the triangle´s three corners, where corner A refers to conflict attitudes, B to conflict behaviour and C to the conflict or contradiction itself (the incompatibility) (2007, p. 33). According to Wallensteen, understanding dynamics is the most important aspect in order to understand the transformational nature of conflict (2007, p. 33). However, this dynamic perspective is limited. As Wallensteen pointed out, the dynamic perspective is weak in its understanding of why conflicts starts, as the underlying assumption is that they begin with conflicting attitudes, without taking into account the possibility that such attitudes could be a result of previous behaviours and pre-existing incompatibilities (2007, p. 36).
The third perspective, represented by, for example, William Zartman, assumes that actors have their own rationality, form their own judgements, make decisions, pursue strategies and, thus, initiate the chain of events that lead to war (Wallensteen, 2007, p. 42). This leads to the assumption that the parties initiate wars to win them. They make internal calculations showing that the benefits outweigh the losses when escalating a conflict to a violent confrontation. As time passes and nobody wins, the initial calculations are affected and have to be revised. The potential benefits from victory are reduced as the costs increase. At the
28 same time, the fact that so much time, energy, resources and human lives have been invested, makes it difficult not to continue, until the final moment of victory is reached. If the parties find this stalemate to be painful, it may lead them to strategic rethinking (Wallensteen, 2007, p. 42-43).
As Wallensteen points out, living with or dissolving incompatibility is a central element in conflict analysis, which has been learned from the dynamic approach to conflict as well as from the rational calculation approach (2007, p. 54). Wallensteen emphasised the focus on the needs and perceptions of parties, and the history behind the conflict (2007, p. 54). According to Wallensteen, these three approaches illustrate different elements in the conflict process, having many shared features, and are all useful, promoting a shared framework for the analysis (2007, 54).
2.4.2.2. Multilevel model Ramsbothan et al. (2011, p. 111) recommended a five-level model focusing on the different levels of the conflict phenomena. These five levels comprise two 'international' levels (global and regional, and contextual factors), one 'state' level divided into functional sectors (structural factors), and two 'social' levels (conflict party and elite/individual, and relational factors). Global and regional levels represent contextual sources of conflict. The global level points at the global factors as a potential source of a conflict, such as the geopolitical transitions, global economic division, environmental constrains, weapon proliferation and ideological contestations (Ramsbothan et al., 2011, p. 111). The importance of integrating a transnational perspective to the study of civil war is also emphasised by other researchers, such as Forsberg (2009, p. 35).
The regional level refers to the fact the several sets of conflict data show clear regional differences in contemporary conflicts. Therefore, regional factors, which can be both outwards, such as spill-over effects, and inwards, such as intervention, should be carefully taken into account. In addition, internal wars can have external effects, for example, in the form of diaspora. Conversely, regional instability can affect the internal politics of states through, for example, patterns of clientage (Ramsbothan et al., 2011, p. 112).
The state level, which represents structural factors of conflicts, is divided into social, economic and political functional sectors. The social sector focuses on the major types of social division around which conflict fault lines may develop. The economic sector refers to the assumption that protracted conflict tends to be associated with patterns of
29 underdevelopment or uneven development. The political or governmental sector refers to the issues of political controversies, government legitimacy and state control (law and order and security sector) as potential sources of conflict (Ramsbothan et al., 2011, p. 116).
Conflict party and elite/individual levels represent relational sources of conflict. While conflict party level focuses on the group mobilisation and intergroup dynamics, the elite and individual levels point at the importance of leaders and individual advocates of action (Ramsbothan et al., 2011, p. 117).
2.4.2.3 Sociological institutional analysis Pahlavi and Ouellet (2011) used a sociological institutional analysis to gain insight in the logic of stability and dynamics of change in irregular warfare. They distinguished three dimensions for their research: the regulative, the normative and the cognitive dimension. They looked at the interaction between these dimensions, which includes values, norms, ideas, worldviews, rules and policies. Although their main goal was to find new insights on the military approach of fighting an insurgent enemy, they made some interesting conclusions on studying irregular warfare. It shows that using a more holistic approach will result in finding out more factors that influence the dynamics of a conflict. Looking further than logistics, doctrines and material resources, shows that what they call ‘soft factors’ are giving more insight. Changing values or worldviews can change a conflict drastically. The problem with their conceptual framework of institutional analysis was that it was hard to divide the factors between the three dimensions. Using these factors can be interesting, but will be more effective by applying another conceptual framework (Ouellet & Pahlavi, 2011; Pahlavi & Ouellet, 2012).
2.5 Conceptualisations This research focuses on conflict dynamics, more specifically, on violent conflicts between state and non-state actors. Although it seems as if 'war' would be the most encompassing concept, 'irregular armed conflict' as a type of war is more suitable, as the research focusses on conflicts that involve non-state actors as a combating party. Nevertheless, it is necessary to start from the founding concepts of conflict and civil war, and continue with the terms of irregular warfare, insurgency and terrorism. The ambiguity of these concepts requires a clear conceptualisation.
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2.5.1. Conflict and civil war The heart of this research is civil war and its dynamics, of which four cases are selected. A clear and precise definition of conflict and civil war is needed to sustain the understanding of this research. The definitions of conflict and war guide the types of information any research will collect (Wallensteen, 2007, p. 18). According to Wallensteen, a good definition should: 1) be sufficiently general, 2) capture conflict both between and within states, 3) be precise, so as to guide data collection (operationalisation), and 4) delimit a particular conflict in time and space (beginning and ending) from other conflicts (Wallensteen, 2007, p. 18).
To make things more complicated, there are three major competing or at least parallel projects within the peace research community, which all present their own approach and definition to civil war, subsequently to the reasons why conflicts occur or how they can be terminated. These projects, which are continuously mapping armed conflict patterns, are: Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), (Uppsala University); Causes of War program (AKUF), (University of Hamburg); and Correlates of War (COW), (University of Michigan).
Basic to COW is the delineation of an international system consisting of states. Thus, wars are conflicts between states, where at least two states are a member of the international system. In addition, there are extra-systemic conflicts, where only one state is a member. The COW defines these civil wars as having a minimum of two parties, where one is a government, and causing at least 1000 battle fatalities per year, including civilian casualties. Therefore, COW focuses on understanding inter-state conflict by applying realist thinking with empirical approach, dealing with factors such as balance of power, military capabilities, interdependence and other variables of importance for the working of the international system. COW starts from the notion of a system that consists of a large number of independent states. Therefore, the problem is found in the strategies for survival used by different states (Wallensteen, 2007, p. 18-21).
On the contrary, according to the AKUF project definition, the membership of the international system is not a required condition for a conflict,. However, it does require that a state is an actor on at least one side in a conflict. The actors should have, at a minimum, central command and practical control over the fighting. It is also stipulated that there has to be a measure of continuity in battle. There is no requirement for a particular number of deaths, which produces a broader set of cases than COW. The AKUF project draws from a fairly
31 coherent theoretical approach, as it relates the onset of war to the development of capitalist societies and sees conflicts as a result of the new forms of production, monetarisation of the economy and the resulting dissolution of traditional forms of social integration. AKUF starts, on the contrary, from an understanding of an international system that is fairly integrated, almost having a purpose of its own, which is to promote a market economy and democracy. It is a highly hierarchical world, centred around the strongest actors in the system: the Western countries. This international system penetrates around the world, creating instability and pushing aside traditional forms of social relations (Wallensteen, 2007, p. 18-21).
The UCDP uses the concept of 'armed conflict' and its definitions and understandings of conflict can be placed somewhere between the AKUF and COW projects. The conflicts included are those that have at least one state or government as a party. It covers conflicts from a threshold level of 25 battle-related deaths in a conflict in a year. There are two thresholds (25 and 1000 battle-related deaths), resulting in three categories of intensity: 1) minor armed conflicts: conflicts with more than 25 deaths but less than 1000 for the year and for the duration of the conflict; 2) intermediate armed conflicts: conflicts with more than 25 deaths and less than 1000 for a year, but more than 1000 for the duration of the conflict; and 3) wars: conflicts with more than 1000 battle-related deaths in one year. The UCDP requires that the conflict should have an issue, an incompatibility, therefore drawing a clear line between political and non-political violence. The project includes only those events that concern control over government or territory, as armed conflicts. Control over government means that the issue is who should rule a particular state and demands for change include the change of rulers. Control over territory means that demands by one state for territory in another state, even the occupation of another state, are included, as are rebellions inside a state to achieve autonomy, independence or the joining of a particular territory to the neighbouring state. The inclusion of incompatibility into the conflict definition has theoretical reasons, as conflict theory suggests that parties act for particular purposes Thus, they need to be taken at face value (Wallensteen, 2007, p. 22-23).
In this work, the definition of civil war that draws from the UCDP is used, namely the definition by Doyle and Sambanis (2000), providing deeper elaboration of the civil war complexities. According to Doyle and Sambanis, a civil war is an armed conflict that meets the following conditions:
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1) Causes more than 1000 deaths overall and in at least a single year; 2) challenges the sovereignty of an internationally recognised state; 3) occurs within the recognised boundary of that state; 4) involves the state as a principal combatant; 5) includes rebels with the ability to mount organised armed opposition to the state; 6) has parties with the prospect of living together in the same political unit after the end of the war. (2000, p. 783).
This is based on the definition of civil war as given by Small and Singer (1982), who define war simply as a violent conflict with at least a 1000 deaths. Internal war is a violent conflict that occurs on state territory. The second condition is that the government that is in power at the beginning of the conflict, is an involved actor. Thirdly, there must be effective resistance, to distinguish a war from for instance genocide.
2.5.2. Irregular warfare, insurgency and terrorism ‘Modern warfare’, according to Boot (2015), refers to warfare where specifically trained, disciplined and deployed soldiers fight against other soldiers under a hierarchy. This first appeared around 3100 BC in het Fertile Crescent, and thus has a long history. Boot argued that irregular warfare is an evolution of tribal and nomadic warfare, which share many characteristics. He stated that the modern irregular guerrilla has inherited the tactics of small unit warfare, and linked those to an ideological agenda. This notion is shared by Pahlavi and Ouellet (2012), who found that irregular armed conflicts have a highly political nature. Two paradoxes are noted by Boot (2015). First, irregular forces are prone to become regular forces if great military success is achieved. Secondly, ever since the mid-19th century Taiping wars in China and the American Civil War most wars have seen elements of both regular and irregular armed forces. While elements of both might be found in most wars, both types of conflict can still be set apart, although their distinction remains unclear.
This long historic background is largely corroborated by Vacca and Davidson (2011), who argued that irregular warfare is actually a faulty term, because is sets irregular warfare conceptually apart from regular warfare, which it is not. Vacca and Davidson (2011) argued that irregular warfare is not only an integral part of the general warfare domain, it shares many characteristics with regular conflict. Underlining the notions of Boot (2015), they argued that irregular and regular warfare can occur within the same conflict, sometimes at the same time, while at other times during different phases of the conflict. By creating and accepting this artificial divide between both types of conflict, researchers are exposing
33 themselves to both deductive as well as inductive logical failures, as they are not using the general body of knowledge according to Vacca and Davidson (2011).
While Boot (2015) and Vacca and Davidson (2011) seem to argue the existence of a more ‘mixed’ form of warfare, Jeffrey White (1996) has found nine dimensions in which irregular warfare can be set apart from modern or regular warfare. The first dimension regards the organisation characterisation. Modern warfare is characterised by formal hierarchies, while irregular forces often use a less formal or even informal organisation structure, for instance, on a clan, company, or religious or territorial basis. A hierarchical organisation is often perceived by military scholars as the stronger military alternative. While the informally organised groups are often not able to achieve a military victory, they can still deal a blow to a regular force. The second dimension is technology. While technology plays a significant role in regular forces and regular conflicts, irregular units often use simple technology and light weapons, such as assault rifles and improvised explosive devices. This is exemplified by the Taliban, after the United States intervened in Afghanistan. Irregular forces might use, by exception, improvised, donated, captured or stolen heavy equipment. This has certain implications for the third dimension, logistics, as a lack of large troop formation and heavy military equipment means irregular forces are not as depended on or limited by logistical factors. This also reduces their vulnerability to strategic attacks.
The lack of military equipment and formal hierarchies also influences the fourth dimension of command and control (White, 1996). While conventional forces usually have a national authority that commands them, irregular forces are usually not directly commanded, but are far more loosely connected to the central leadership, if exists it at all. Command and control is often executed by local leaders with crude means, such as walky-talkies. The fifth dimension considers the doctrine, the way the actor fights, how they will deploy, what weapons will be used, and their effect at the strategic, operational and tactical level. Irregular actors often only have a limited doctrine. Yet, it does not prevent them from achieving tactical successes. The doctrinal dimension shows that regular forces, especially in the west, prefer to have a quick and decisive military victory, while irregular forces can usually not mount enough forces to decisively win a war in one large battle. Irregular forces are often more prone to responsive engagements, using their tactical mobility and knowledge of the environment to choose the moment of engagement. The seventh dimension makes a distinction between the soldier and the warrior, and focusses mainly on the recruitment process. While a soldier enlists and is
34 taken out of civil life and transformed into a soldier, a warrior is part of a local culture, integrated in his society and fights with the equipment available to him.
Another differentiating dimension (White, 1996) is that of the allies or accomplices. While alliances in regular conflicts are usually based on shared long-term interest and trust, in irregular conflicts allies can be hard to understand. An example given by White (1996) is that of the Arab allies to General Allenby, while fighting the Ottoman Empire in the Middle East coming from a totally different culture and striving for different goals than the British military. Another risk that exists to a regular party in an irregular conflict, is that an (accidental) alliance with an irregular party might make you an accomplice, making it harder to gain legitimacy in the eyes of some parts of the population. The final dimension considers the relationship between the societies and the wars that they wage. While a regular conflict is often something that is segregated from society, constituting a front line and a hinterland, an irregular conflict is often waged throughout the society, forming an integral part of it. While Boot (2015) handed an analytical tool to organisationally set irregular and regular conflicts apart, he did merely that, and did not capture the essence of what makes irregular warfare.
Setting irregular warfare apart from regular warfare is however an important step in finding the essence of the concept. This is also acknowledged by Gustafson (2014), who argued that a clear definition might not even be needed. While many sub-definitions exist, the broadest view is that "war is war, although the character of activities in the operational environment differ" (Gustafson, 2014, p. 42). While this hints to a traditional Western military perspective, it is also a broadening of the concept to overcome the difficulties in setting regular conflict apart from irregular conflict. Gustafson argued that while irregular conflict gained prominence in the military research community after 2006, it remained a less clear and more diffuse concept as opposed to more specific concepts such as (counter-)insurgency, protracted war, and revolutionary warfare. Gustafson further argued that irregular warfare:
is characterised by limited, physical structures and greater mental goals and drivers, the endurance and will of the people, limited physical military power, extensive knowledge and use of concepts difficult to detect, requiring skills and capabilities for covert, clandestine and low visibility operations. (2014, p. 46)
He continued to argue that parties in irregular wars are often not prioritising Western thought and standards when it comes to human rights. He stated that people are the target to be
35 controlled by the irregular warfare actors, but does not differentiate between different forms of irregular warfare.
The United States Army has a likewise conception of irregular warfare. They argued in their Field Manual 3-05.130 (Department of the Army, 2008) that irregular warfare is not as much about achieving military objectives by attaining a technological and military advantage, but by understanding the local politics and social structures. At the same time the notion exists that winning the population requires the specific resource of time, as irregular conflicts are often long and drawn out conflicts, which also require a long and substantial presence, both after conflicts and before conflicts erupt. This is one of the reasons for the U.S. Army to engage in long term partnerships with actors around the globe. Irregular warfare is seen as a broad overarching concept that harbours 14 core warfare activities. These activities include the waging of insurgencies, counter-insurgency, foreign internal defence and psychological operations (Department of the army, 2008, p. 1-5). One of the core aims of an irregular warfare is to acquire the support of the population or to assure that another actor loses the support of the population. Irregular warfare is defined as “A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations” (Department of the army, 2008, p. 1-8).
According to Larson, Eaton, Nichiporuk and Szayna (2008), irregular warfare can be divided into two distinct types. The so called ‘population centric irregular warfare’ and ‘counter terrorism operations’ (Larson et al., 2008, p. 14). The first one is said to focus on creating support among local populations for U.S. policy. This is a political goal rather than a military goal, such as the destruction of an opposing forces formation. The second type of irregular warfare, counter terrorism, is aimed at combatting small jihadist terrorist cells around the world. This does not require a large military footprint or a political effort. This type of warfare is mostly fought by special units, within the military but also from civilian institutions, such as the police and intelligence apparatuses. A big issue with this definition is that it is, just as the Department of the Army, United States centric.
A distinction between two types of irregular warfare is also made by Duyvesteyn and Fumerton (2009), which it is in some ways close to the one made by Larson et al. (2008). Duyvesteyn and Fumerton (2009) argued that the distinction between the two forms of irregular warfare should not be made at the tactical level or at the organisational level, but at
36 the strategic level, as both are strategies in waging irregular war. Like the population centric irregular warfare (Larson et al., 2008), an insurgency strategy aims at capturing the population, which is to be used to affect political power. This means the support of the population for the insurgency is of great importance, as this is needed to give the actor the political strength and legitimacy as well as provide resources for the militant units. A traditional aim of the insurgency is to acquire control over all or part of the state functions, for instance, through secession or by a reorganisation of the state in general, as happens with federalisation. Less formal ways of control, or governance, can also be exerted. These do not entail the formal declaration of a state, or a settlement, but consolidation of some acquired powers, possibly by negative enforcement through intimidation. The ambition of an insurgence force to acquire governance in some form over a population and territory can result in the transformation of the irregular forces into a regular military force.
Duyvesteyn and Fumerton (2009) pointed out that starting an irregular war with the insurgency strategy requires certain pre-set conditions, as control over population and territory requires a certain threshold minimal of conditions. This could, for instance, be modified by failing or collapsing of a state and its institutions, resulting in a power vacuum that can be taken advantage of by insurgent actors. If the relative strength needed for starting an irregular war with insurgency strategy lack, a terrorist strategy might be followed. The major advantage of a terrorist strategy according to Duyvesteyn and Fumerton (2009), is that it requires relatively little resources to start, as a few people with simple weapons can commit terrorism. The aim of terrorism is not the overthrowing of a state or controlling a population, but is meant as a provocation or 'propaganda by deed' (p. 30). The terrorism strategy aims to provoke other actors into taking actions that the fighter desires, or not taking an action that is seen as damaging the interest of the terrorist forces, in which case any other action is preferable. This means in case of terrorism it is not the act itself that will bring the desired result, but the response of the provoked opposing actor. The population itself does not necessarily have a role and large popular support is not necessary for executing a terrorist campaign. Duyvesteyn and Fumerton (2009) argued that often the strategy of terrorism is chosen because the actor lacks the political and military power to force the desired political change, and thus chooses a strategy that brings about change to a more favourable situation in which the end goal can be achieved. It should also be noted that terrorist tactics are not the explicit domain of actors that employ a terrorist strategy. Actors that are engaged in an insurgency can still use terrorist tactics, yet do this within the frame of the larger insurgent
37 strategy. It will be obvious that an actor that follows a terrorist strategy cannot employ an insurgent tactic. As said before, a terrorist actor lacks the needed competences to wage an insurgency, which is often the reason in the first place that the terrorist strategy is pursued.
Schuurman (2013) has noted that a generally, academically accepted, definition of terrorism does not exist, thus hampering any research in the field. He however used the often used 2011 definition of Schmid and Jongman:
Terrorism refers on the one hand to a doctrine about the presumed effectiveness of a special form or tactic of fear generating, coercive political violence and, on the other hand, to a conspiratorial practice of calculated, demonstrative, direct violent action without legal or moral restraints, targeting mainly civilians and non-combatants, performed for its propagandistic and psychological effects on various audiences and conflict parties. (Schuurman, 2013, p. 5).
He applied a framework consisting of five counterterrorism measures. First is ‘doing too little’, in which a government does not respond adequately or even ignores the issue. Another category is a policy of reconciliation, trying to appease the terrorist by taking a root-cause solution. ‘Legal reforms’ is a measure of changing the laws, giving the government more capabilities in fighting terrorism. The fourth category is about restricting the terrorist forces, disrupting their organisational capabilities. The last category consists of the hardest countermeasures, using violence to eliminate the opposing forces. Schuurman (2013) argued that whichever policy category is employed, the public support does influence the outcome of the operation. This is true in his cases, Italy, Northern-Ireland and Canada, not only for the response by government supporters, but also for the effect it has on the supporters of the oppositional actors. If an actor uses more violence than the supporters deem necessary or legitimate for achieving its goals, a loss of legitimacy and support of the actor, be it government or oppositional actors, occurs. At the same time, if an actor is following a low activities policy to prevent alienation of the constituency of the opposite actor, it risks losing its own constituency as it might be perceived as not doing enough.
In this research the concepts as presented by Duyvesteyn and Fumerton (2008) will be used, since these have a neutral framework and allow, due to the focus on strategy instead of tactics or organisation, to explain possible changes in the organisation and policy of the actors that will be investigated in the four case studies.
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2.5.3 State-building State-building is an important concept in conflict studies. First, a weak state-building process of a state can prelude and cause internal conflict. Second, a state-building project can be established by an insurgent movement during a conflict as a first step towards the secession of their 'state'. Therefore it is important to include a clear conceptualisation of state-building.
State-building coheres with the capacity of the state. Hendrix (2010, p. 273) divided state capacity in three different capacities: military capacity, the bureaucratic/administrative capacity and the quality and coherence of political institutions. Sobek and Thies (2015, p. 52) distinguished several relations between state-building and civil wars. Civil wars reveal underlying grievances. Therefore they see a civil war as an opportunity of the state to redress these grievances, which will result in a stronger state. According to them, an important part of state-building is the capacity of the state to address its population’s grievances.
A state-building process can be implemented by a government within its own state; implemented by other states or the international community within another state; and within a region in a state, implemented by an insurgent group. In the first situation, the state-building process is implemented by the state itself, which, for instance, happens after independence. Fukuyama gives a clear and concise definition of state-building for these kind of situations: "a process by which new governmental institutions are created and existing ones strengthened" (2004, p. 17). Migdal has a corresponding definition, although his is more complete: "to denote the various dynamic formal and informal processes and the shifting linkages between the state (or state institutions) and society'"(Migdal, 2001, p. 11). This definition will be used as addition to the definition of Fukuyama. In the second situation, state-building is mostly implemented by Western countries in other states, where the concept can be defined as "the attempt to create stable, self-sustaining democratic governments in foreign countries that can survive the withdrawal of external support" (Monten, 2014, p. 175-176). In the last option, state-building can de conceptualised as in the first situation. However, here the implementation is done by a group that wants self-determination and the state-building process might be the start of a successful secession.
3. Methodology 3.1 Quantitative or qualitative methods After the Cold War, existing theories in conflict studies were reconstructed in order to explain the phenomena of civil wars. Simultaneously, new theories emerged, such as the greed theory
39 that focused on the causes of wars. Many studies used a statistical analysis, which does not provide a deeper understanding of the conflicts (Duyvesteyn, 2012, p. 602). Many scholars used Paul Collier's theory on greed as a trigger to war (Kalyvas, 2001; De Soysa, 2002; Regan & Norton, 2005). Collier's method and theory have been criticised. David Keen argued the weaknesses of Collier’s work in his article greed and grievance in civil war (2012). His criticism focused in particular on the quantitative method that Collier used. The quantitative method in conflict studies includes the use of databases that are, especially in poor and conflict-ridden countries, not completely reliable. Keen argued that the problem of missing data has been the exception rather than the rule (2012, p. 767). Duyvesteyn added to this point that research cannot rely on data from the state-level only, as it cannot explain sub-state violence. Therefore, a scholar needs reliable data from, for example, the local level to investigate the role of resolution, negotiation and settlement in the final stages of armed conflict (Duyvesteyn, 2012, p. 602). Collier even admitted himself in his book Understanding Civil Wars, which he wrote together with Nicholas Sambanis, that the main shortcoming of the Collier-Hoeffler model is the lack of data. Despite this shortcoming, the model would still give information about the dynamics that cause violence or peace. The advantage of the comparative case study design is that it enables to look at the interaction of variables over a specific timespan within a case and compare it to other cases in order to find out more about the processes that drive conflicts. This way, similarities and differences between cases and even patterns of frequent occurrence can be identified (Collier & Sambanis, 2005, p. 1-2).
Mats Berdal (2005) also questioned the use of the quantitative method in conflict studies. In his opinion, the truly interesting questions regarding violent conflict remain unanswered when quantitative method is used. A statistical analysis offers limited insight in the identification of factors that trigger and sustain civil war, the interaction between these factors, and the mutation of these factors over time. In order to gain a deeper understanding of conflict dynamics, one can use the qualitative method. A quantitative approach can be interesting for research looking for a precise percentage, such as the chance the returning of a conflict. Unfortunately, it offers limited knowledge on the specifics of individual cases or the actual conflict dynamics. Another important limitation of the quantitative method that Berdal (2005, p. 690) mentioned is the requirement to choose empirical data that might leave out highy relevant factors of the case. In order to gain a deeper understanding of a conflict and its
40 dynamics, one should select a small N and consider many variables. It calls for a qualitative approach.
Karen Ballentine and Jake Sherman (2003) confirmed that statistical methods can be used to identify key variables across cases, which only highlight part of the situation. It proves a correlation between two factors, such as economic factors and intra-state conflicts. The explanatory weight of statistical methods is limited, as to whether and how specific factors promote or sustain conflict remains unclear (Ballentine & Sherman, p. 5). Qualitative methods can be used to go beyond the revelation of correlation and identify causality. In contrast to the quantitative approach, which assesses the occurrence of specific factors in an isolated manner, these qualitative methods can be used to ascertain the causal impact on conflicts of specific factors (for instance economics) in relation to and combination with other possible significant factors (for instance culture, ideologicy or politics) (Ballentine & Sherman, p. 6). While a case-specific approach might lack the rigor of large-number quantitative studies, it does offer a more precise understanding of how specific factors ignite a conflict, the extent to which the factors explain a conflict, and the influence of other factors.
The latter is also confirmed in Tarrow’s article Inside Insurgencies: "[…] not quantities but interactions are the key to the dynamics of violence in civil wars" (2007, p. 596). In this article, Tarrow argued why he thinks the quantitative method is not right in conflict studies. He stated that much of the used data in quantitative conflict studies is over aggregated and that analytical distinctions are ignored, such as the distinction between civil wars as a whole and violence in civil wars as a variable. Secondly, the operationalisation of variables is often incomplete, using only crude, incomplete or indirect indicators. Thirdly, a variable can have different effects in different phases of the war or in other wars, which is often not taken into account in many of the conflict studies using the quantitative method. The fourth comment expresses the same concern as Keen (2012) and Duyvesteyn (2012) arued about the missing data from the subnational actors in civil war, since most the data is coming from state actors. Finally, Tarrow stretched the lack of extensive research into mechanisms or processes of civil war insurgencies, which is hard to measure using quantitative approach. Opposed to the quantitative study, a qualitative study enables better assessment of contextual factors, which gives more insight into the mechanisms and processes of irregular wars (Tarrow, 2007. p. 589).
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3.2 Comparative historical analysis Berdal (2005, p. 690) explained that case studies offer context related insights. The fundamental limitation of using statistical analysis is the incapability of capturing conflict dynamics. It has been claimed that statistical analysis is more objective in analysing a conflict and offers opportunity for generalisations. However, statistical methods lead to static research results, which lack cultural sensitivity and a historical background, as stated by Berdal (2005, p. 690). The outcome of statistical analysis also remains a description of the probability of risks, rather than factual descriptions of the dynamics of violent conflict.
In this research, the comparative historical analysis approach has been selected because of its beneficial features. Mahoney and Rueschemeyer (2008, p. 6) outline three features of comparative historical analysis: a concern with causal analysis, an emphasis on processes over time, and the use of systematic and contextualised comparison. These features make the comparative historical analysis suitable for research on conflict dynamics.
First, the comparative historical analysis focuses on explaining and identifying causal configurations that generate major outcomes of interest. In other words, the analysis concentrates on the causes of important outcomes. This feature conflates with this research's aim on conflict dynamics to unravel its causal mechanisms. Secondly, the comparative historical analysis recognises the influence of temporal sequences and the unfolding of events over time. The research objects are not static occurrences that took place at one point in time. These are rather processes that unfold over time and intersect with one another. This enables this research to consider the effects and timing of events in relation to each other. Thirdly, the comparative historical analysis enables systematic and contextual comparisons of either similar and contrasting cases. It reflects the aim to explore causal effects in different contexts rather than produce universally applicable knowledge. This type of analysis enables this research to explore how variables may have different causal effects on the dynamics of conflict across heterogeneous contexts (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer, 2008, p. 6-13).
3.3 Single case study or comparative case studies
Comparative historical analysis is applicable to both single case studies and a multiple case studies. Single and a multiple comparative case study have different possibilities. The advantage of a single case study is that the case can be intensively examined. However, the
42 outcomes of a single case study are less generalisable than outcomes of a multiple case study, since the last might provide the same information in more than one case (Lijphart, 1971, p. 691). Rueschemeyer (2008) elaborated on the possibilities of single case studies. He argued that a single historical case study can yield significant theoretical gains, as it can contribute to the generation of new hypotheses and test and re-test theories. A single case study does not imply that there is only a single observation, he stressed, as within-case comparison enables analysis of factors that have been returning in the case over time (Rueschemeyer, 2008, p. 332). Single case study offers the exquisite opportunity to find out empirical relationships among a couple of variables, while all other variables are held constant. This ceteris paribus condition strengthens the observation of causal mechanisms and related variables (Lijphart, 1971, p. 683).
As single and multiple comparative case studies both have their advantages and disadvantages, a combination of both provides the opportunity to combine the advantages of both methods in a single research project. This can be done by analysing the factors in a single case study first, followed by a cross-case analysis of similar cases. This combination has three advantages. First, it offers the possibility to explore complex interactions and causal mechanism while other factors remain the same. Secondly, it enables to trace multiple paths of causation. Thirdly, it dismisses the assumption of a linear relation between dependent and independent variables, thereby, allowing a multiple regression analysis (Rueschemeyer, 2008, p. 324).
3.4 Empirical or theoretical case studies
Lijphart (1971) discerned six types of case studies: the atheoretical, the interpretative, the hypothesis-generating, the theory-confirming, the theory-infirming and the deviant case study. The atheoretical case study and the interpretative case study are conducted due to an interest in a specific case. The former is a traditional single-case analysis and is mainly descriptive. This analysis does not have immediate theoretical value, as it is not led by established theoretical propositions or aimed to formulate hypotheses. The atheoretical case study is useful for data-gathering, which can contribute to theory-building in a later stage. The interpretative case study does make use of explicit theoretical generalisation and applies these to a specific case. The aim is to gain insight in the case rather than to improve the generalisation. The other four types of case studies have a theory-building purpose.
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Hypothesis-generating case studies start with a possible hypothesis and aim to formulate a definite hypothesis. Their goal is to develop theoretical generalisations in research areas where no sufficient theory yet exists. The theory-confirming and the theory-infirming case studies test established generalisations by analysing single cases. Finally, the deviant case studies focus on cases that deviate from established generalisations. These aim to weaken probabilistic hypotheses in order to identify unknown variables or refine known variables (Lijphart, 1971, p. 691-693).
This research has an exploratory character and aims to generate theoretical generalisations with regard to the escalation and de-escalation of irregular warfare. Theoretical insights are limited, as most scholars focus on a range of variables in an isolated way. Meaning, a theoretical model that explains the dynamics of a conflict is lacking. The existing theories focus on parts of the conflict, such as the outburst, the peace processes or the ending of a conflict. It is not yet possible to combine these theories into a theoretical model that can be used to answer the research question. Nevertheless, the established generalisations explain specific situations and mechanisms that might become visible in the case studies. This research contains two parts. The first part consists of the analysis of four, both a-theoretical and interpretative, single case studies. This offers the opportunity to gather more specific data on the specific cases, in which existing theoretical generalisations are used to create a better understanding of conflict dynamics. The single case analysis will compare factors along the timespan of the conflict. Nevertheless, these single case studies will function as hypothesis- generating case studies by comparing them with the other three cases. Hence, the second part consists of comparing the outcomes of the single case studies in a comparable cross-case study, with the aim of generating a holistic analytical framework for irregular armed conflicts.
3.5 Method of data-gathering
This research project consists of two separate parts, both using different methods of data- gathering. The literature study requires a literature review of different methods, theories and perspectives on studying irregular warfare. Reviewing this provides not only the opportunity to find the best method for studying conflicts, it also shows that there are many existing theories on escalatory factors. The ultimate aim will be to combine all these factors in one theoretical structure in order to generalise. By dividing these factors along three dimensions,
44 the state, the non-state and the context dimension, a clear framework of analysis is created. The aim of the first part of the project, the atheoretical and interpretative single case studies, is to gather new data and add knowledge about the specific case to academic resources of the conflicts. The gathering of data about the cases will be done in several ways. First, we will make use of secondary literature about the cases. This will help us in describing the conflict and we will combine information we find. Additionally, reviewing the secondary literature about the cases will show what the knowledge gaps and maybe even misperceptions are. From this point, we will start to gather information from primary sources to fill the gap(s). Newspaper articles, biographies, news films and interviews in documentaries or news shows will be used for this. Finally, we will try to conduct interviews with people that have experienced the conflict or are experts on the case, such as researchers, diplomats, or people from NGOs that have been to the conflict.
3.6 Analytical framework 3.6.1 Grounded theory approach This research is of explanatory nature. In order to answer the research question, parts of the grounded theory approach are used. Strauss and Corbin defined grounded theory as an approach for developing theory that is "grounded in data systematically gathered and analysed" (1994, p. 274). The approach consists of a flexible research design for a constant comparative analysis. A simplified explanation: the researcher starts with a phase of data collection and data analysis, which is followed by a phase of reflection on concepts or categories. These reflections influence the choices made in the next phase of data collection. The approach offers the researcher the possibility to switch back and forth between data collection and analysis, in order to gain in-depth knowledge on concepts or categories. The ultimate goal is the development of a substantive theory.
The literature review reveals that the theoretical insights on the dynamics in irregular warfare are limited, as most scholars focus on a single variable or a range of variables in an isolated way. Meaning, a comprehensive theoretical model that explains the dynamics of an irregular armed conflict is lacking. The existing theories only focus on parts of the conflict, such as the outburst, the peace processes or the ending of a conflict. It is not possible to combine these theories into a theoretical model that can be used to answer the research question. Nevertheless, the established generalisations explain specific situations that might become visible in the case studies. Therefore, the case studies will function primarily as hypothesis-
45 generating case studies. As discussed in the methodology chapter, the outcomes of the single case studies will be subjected to a comparable cross-case study with the aim of generating a holistic analytical framework.
In this way, elements of the grounded theory approach are used, as the researchers start with a phase of data collection and analysis, in which previously identified key factors that might influence conflict dynamics are analysed. This is followed by a phase of reflection, which includes a comparable cross-case study. This phase of reflection might offer new insights into the previously identified or new key factors. The outcomes can add to the final phase of data collection and analysis.
3.6.2 Structuring the analysis Extensive research has been conducted about the dynamics of conflicts. The literature review offers a broad overview, dividing the theories in causes of the onset of a conflict, causal mechanisms that drive the dynamics of the war, and conflict resolution. In this research, we will focus particularly on the dynamics of escalation and de-escalation of an irregular armed conflict. The aim is to find out the drivers of the dynamics. In order to identify these drivers, an integral approach is adopted, which will result into a comprehensive overview of the factors driving conflict dynamics. Stokke (2006) argued that the conflict resolution school only pays limited attention to the long-term developments of grievances, forces and strategies, focusing too much on negotiations and peace processes. Pahlavi and Ouellet underscore that using an integral approach, which will result in finding more factors that influenced the conflict. For instance, changing values, worldviews and strategies can change a conflict drastically.
The integral approach requires a certain degree of structuring, which is ensured by the following analytical framework. Stokke (2006) argued that conflicts should be approached broadly. However, he warned for becoming too vague and all-inclusive in analysing the conflict dynamics. The analytical framework was constructed to structure this study. Additions can be made after the single case, and the comparative analysis, because this grounded theory approach is used. The framework consists of factors that have either been identified in previous research projects or could be related to the state or the non-state dimension.
Thus, the analytical framework combines several theoretical insights that have been discussed in the literature review. By identifying the factors that influence the dynamics of a conflict, an
46 analytical framework is built. The framework has been translated into a conceptual model. Because of the qualitative nature of the study, the conceptual model is a schematic representation of the key factors that influence conflict dynamics, and how they relate to each other. The framework is divided into three realms: context, state perspective and non-state perspective. The framework will be applied to the cases and used to answer the research question. However, as explained before, since a grounded theory approach is used, the framework is not static. New findings in the case studies expanded the framework with two more factors. First, regional politics are distinguished from international politics, making it a separate factor. In all four cases it appeared that regional politics had a big impact on driving conflict dynamics. This new factor is added to the analytical framework, since these regional dynamics were significantly important in the four studied cases. Secondly, geography has been important in three of our cases. Geography played an important role in, for instance, determining strategy of armed groups, state action and social cleavages. This had a significant impact on conflict dynamics in three of the studied cases, which is why geography had been added to the analytical framework. Theoretical foundation of the two added factors has been added to the literature review afterwards. A visualisation of these realms is shown in figure 1, explanations follow below.
3.6.3 Three realms of analysis
State perspective
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The state is one of the principal actors when it comes to wars and politics in general. The concept of what the state is exactly, has famously been worked out as a political science concept by Garner (1910). A state is “a community of persons more or less numerous, permanently occupying a definite portion of territory, independent of external control and possessing an organised government to which the great body of inhabitants render habitual obedience” (p. 41). In order to grasp the role of state actors, first, the influence of governmental action on conflict dynamics will be considered. Sharkansky and Hofferbert (1969) explained that governmental action follows from the process of public policymaking. The outcomes are policy responses that take different forms (regulations, subsidies, quotas and laws), and are implement at different levels (local, regional and national level). Stewart (2002) explained how state actions in Aceh, Indonesia, and Guatemala fuelled and prolonged the conflicts. The analysis will also take into account the influence of the capacity of state actors on the conflict dynamics. Rotberg (2010) explained the dynamics of nation-state failure, and defined the capacity of a state by the level of effective delivery of political goods to the public. The underlying rationale is that a weak state is at greater risk of civil war.
Non-state perspective As non-state involvement is a crucial element of the concept of irregular warfare, it is needed to analyse non-state actors as an important factor in the conflict. The actions of militant insurgent group are assumed to change the dynamics of the conflict due to their characteristics. One observation that continues returning in the theories on insurgent groups is the criminalisation of the militant groups. This criminal behaviour consists of trafficking arms and narcotics and other smuggling related activities, extortion, robbing banks or houses, amongst other things (Clarke, 2011, p. 163). Militants groups can use criminal activities only for financial support, but they can also engage in strategic partnerships with criminal organisations (Dishman, 2001). This criminalisation can influence the conflict, for instance, when it becomes financially profitable for civilians to engage with the militant group, because of their lucrative criminal activities. Factionalisation is another characterising factor of the non-state actor that can influence the escalation and de-escalation of the conflict. Duyvestein & Schuurman (2012) explain that if an armed group splits into factions, each subgroup will try to defend and expand their sphere of influence, which could be through the use violence, and spark the conflict.
Contextual factors
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The contextual factors refer to the remaining factors that influence the dynamics of a conflict, which cannot be related to the actions of the state or the non-state actors.
The grievance-based explanations of civil war can be considered to explain a contextual factor. Tarrow (2007, p. 593) is one of the scholars stating that the repression of legitimate and deeply felt grievances leads to support for armed insurgency when superior armed force is used indiscriminately. Grievance will be considered as dissatisfaction or discontentment arising from acts that are perceived as unjust or unfair.
Rotberg (2010, p. 5) explains how conflicts may be rooted in hostility between ethnic, religious or linguistic communities. The existence of social cleavages creates horizontal inequality. Here, Neto and Cox's (1997, p. 152) definition of social cleavages will be used: "social differences that might become politicised, or might not, differences of ethnicity, religion, language or occupation […]".
The local, national, and international politics are also considered to be a contextual factors. As exemplified by Berdal (2005) substate polities, sometimes considered as fragile, may have the capacity to provide some of the core functions of government. This way, developments in local politics have explained the striking success of the disarmament and demobilisation of ex-combatants. One can also imagine how foreign support, as an outcome of international politics, might influence the dynamics of a conflict.
3.6.3 Operationalisation of the factors
3.6.3.1 Context
Social cleavages The presence of social cleavages within a society can result into inequalities between ethnic, religious or regional communities, which causes inter-communal tensions. Rotberg (2010) argued that civil wars stem from or have roots in hostility between ethnic, religious or linguistic communities. De Rouen (2007) identified the processes of dominance and polarisation in highly divided societies. The first occurs when one group forms an absolute majority; while the latter occurs when society is split into two groups. Internal divisions can spark sectarian violence and escalate the conflict, if the indifferences cannot be resolved peacefully.
Popular support
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Popular support, or lack of it, can be indicated both from state-actor and non-state actor perspective, offering both actors necessary bases to sustain their action, whether this is armed resistance (need of recruits, access to local resources etc.), or counterterrorism operations (support of the citizens for government action). According to Wood (2003), repression of legitimate and deeply felt grievances lead to support for armed insurgency when superior armed force is used indiscriminately. Crucial for this support is an emergence of insurgent political culture, providing a shared view/idea of justification and nurturing a will of ultimate sacrifice. From state-actor point of view, Schuurman (2013) argued that public support is an important factor in counterterrorism operations, as it legitimises the applied policy. However, it also sets boundaries to that same policy for both the state as the non-state actors. The rise and fall of public support for both the government and the oppositional actors can partly explain the developments in levels of violence.
Grievances Grievances are often invoked in a conflict as legitimation by parties in explaining the origin of the conflict or their motivation for continuing the conflict. Grievances, based on Collier and Sambanis (2002), can follow from different sources, such as economic, political or social basis, and are either objective or perceived. Objective grievances can be measured, such as the distribution of wealth according to the Lorenz curve. Perceived grievances are about the amount to which certain populations perceive the existence of a grievance that does not necessarily exist. Economic grievances constitute, for instance, the extent to which parties share in sources of national wealth. Political grievances are about power relations in communities, and can relate to for instance the legitimacy of the governance system, such as whether there is democracy, what form of democratic system applies, and whether there is a form of political exclusion. Social grievances consider social issues, such as ethnic or religious dominance forms of social exclusion. Grievances are not limited to current grievances, but can also be the result of perceived past injustices that have not been ameliorated.
Local politics Local political dynamics can be a casual mechanism for conflict dynamics, for example, new elections that change the political strategy of the region. It is also possible that the militants of a specific region are extremely divided, which can result in regional power struggles and rivalries between (political) leaders. Furthermore, when an insurgent group has the ambition of self-determination and secession, it is possible they begin a process of state-building in
50 their region during the conflict. This creates a separate political institution, with its own sphere of influence. Strong state-building can result in a larger cleavage between the insurgents and the rest of the population and it can increase the popular support for the insurgents, since they provide welfare and security (Stokke, 2006; Berdal, 2005; White, 1996).
National politics The significance of national politics in explaining civil wars is related to the question which system is better to implement in order to reduce conflict. Reynal-Querol (2001) observed that countries with alternative political systems have different probabilities of civil war. The central idea is that in a consociational, inclusive political system, the opportunistic cost of an insurgency rises, and lowers the probability of an insurgency. Therefore, besides the level of civil liberties and freedoms, the level of representation of the population in government can be analysed. In this way, the political system might have an explanatory power concerning the outbreak of a conflict. Additionally, the type of politics, for instance, coalition politics or patronage politics, can be observed to explain heightened levels of violence. Political turbulence can significantly impact the dynamics of the conflict, as a dysfunctional political system can cause significant tensions. From a different perspective, the political arena causes ongoing power struggles with great ramifications for society. In this way, national politics can also offer indications of a weak or strong government. At last, national political processes, such as elections, are an indicator for national politics.
Regional politics Regional politics, as opposed to the national and international politics, is defined by Dreyer (1994) as ranging from such phenomena as cross-border movements to regional diplomatic, economic and military strategies. Therefore, what includes to the domain of regional politics are actions and decisions that do not occur and are not focused solely on national level, but on regional level, involving neighbouring countries and actors. Indicators for regional politics are support for the insurgent movement, an intervention of the conflict, or pressure exercised by the regional power. Regional politics in the context of civil wars can be seen closely related to the neighbourhood effect of civil conflict, as pointed out by Forsberg (2009). Forsberg pointed out that several studies demonstrate that having one or several neighbouring states with an on-going civil war is an important predictor of civil war in a given country. Therefore, there is a need to analyse also external events and factors in civil wars, such as ethnic kinship linkages, the variation in refugee flows to different neighbouring countries, ethnical polarisation, and impact of inspiration and example of existing conflicts.
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International politics The conflict dynamics can often not be perceived as occurring in an international vacuum, and the nature of the interaction will influence the conflict for the state and often for the non-state actors as well. Wallensteen (2007) argued that the western dominated international system penetrates into all parts of the world, forming a distinct form of social relations which sometimes replaces the traditional local traditions. Dudouet (2010) argued that non-state actors are less sensitive to international sanctions, as they are already operating in an often isolated position. Concurrently, Byman (2007) argued that non-state actors can benefit from cooperation with state partners, but risk losing credibility with the local communities. Ramsbothan et. al. (2011) provided another indicator by arguing that irregular armed conflict can result in diasporas, that itself influence the conflict, for instance, by ideological or financial support. A more economic explanation is used by Malone and Nitzchke (2005), who argued that international actors often get involved in the war economy. Foreign military intervention is the most pervasive form of international politics influencing the conflict dynamics. Accordingly, Bapat (2012) added that state sponsorship can be a form of strategic communication, and result in an improved negotiation position for an international actor, but comes at the cost of potentially losing control over the supported non-state actor.
Natural disaster Gaillard, Clavé and Kelman conducted research about what influence a natural disaster can have on a conflict. Indicators for natural disasters can be tsunamis or volcano eruptions, but also drought. A disaster can de-escalate the conflict, for instance, because disaster relief and diplomacy can have a positive effect on the peace process. Both parties share grief caused by the same external factor that brings them together. However, natural disasters can also escalate the conflict, for instance,,with unfair distribution of relief aid.
Geography Fearon and Laitin (2003) implicated that geography influences the nature and the outcome of a conflict. They found that rugged terrain increases the probability of the onset of a civil war. This can be related to the strategic advantages that can be derived from geographical settings. In particular, rain forests and mountains complicate locating non-state armed forces. Thereby, the rugged landscape becomes an incentive to initiate a conflict. It also impacts the course of the conflict, as it influences the strategic choices of state and non-state actors. Another indicator for geography is the geographic diffusion (Kathman, 2010).
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3.6.3.2 State
State action – coercive force According to Schultz (1979), the core of this strategy is to employ ´pain and violence´ to make resistance ´terrible beyond endurance´. In the civil war setting, use of coercive force by the state actor against dissident groups is usually labelled as counterinsurgency (COIN) or counterterrorism. According to the United States Institute of Peace´s special report (1999), these tools that a government uses to respond to terrorism, including deterrence, criminal justice, enhanced defence, and negotiations. In this framework, negotiations will belong to state action – policy solution. In addition, Solomon (2015) mentioned the closure of borders, the establishment of curfews and the deployment of additional security troops. As pointed out by Wood (2003), coercive force used to repress deeply felt grievances can lead to support for armed insurgency when superior armed force is used indiscriminately. Also Collier and Sambanis (2003) promoted a hypothesis that government repression increases opposition, especially in the case when repression is not total, which can promote and lead to violent confrontations. Porch (2013) argued that current counterinsurgency strategies make every person a possible insurgent, because these strategies lack the skills and knowledge to determine to which group citizens belong. This leads to an unfortunate result: making the people the object of the conflict will also make them its most likely victim. Furthermore, Solomon (2015) argued that traditional counterterrorism measures are actually counter- productive since these refuse to acknowledge the underlying complexity giving rise to opposing movements.
State action – policy solution Policies adopted by states influence the dynamics of a conflict. Schuurman (2013) developed a framework of five categories in which policies can be determined. This framework can be useful in indicating policy solution used in the conflicts in this research, since it provides a broad picture of possible policies. The categories are: the lack of response, where the issue is ignored; reconciliation policies; legal reform policies, which consist of changing laws to increase the capability of the government to combat the terrorist groups, such as anti-terrorism legislation; policy that actively disrupts the terrorist group organisational capabilities; and active repression, including the use of violence to destroy a terrorist group. Is had to be noted that in our research, the last category is part of state action – coercive force.
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Complementary to these categories, Dudouet (2011) argued that proscription of non-state actors can result in increased radicalism, and is a direct impediment to negotiations and reconciliation. Adding to this, Mukherjee (2014) argued medium capacity states often prefer a containment policy, which could fit in several of the policy categories proposed by Schuurman (2011).
State capacity Besley and Persson (2010) analysed the cohesion of the capacity of state actors and conflict dynamics. They state that states with a low capacity, which they call weak states, have a higher risk of conflict. Conflict theories mainly consider state capacity as an exogenous factor. However, in this analysis it will be treated as part of the state and possible causal mechanism to drive conflict dynamics, for instance, the quality and quantity of the army, and the state’s economic situation. They also concluded that a conflict is an incentive to invest in state capacity. A larger state capacity will increase the state's chances to control the insurgent conflict. Rotberg (2010) defined the capacity of a state by the level of effective delivery of political goods to the public. This includes the capacity of providing security for its citizens.
Weak or strong state Fearon and Laitin (2003) argued that decolonisation creates financially, bureaucratically and militarily weak states. Poverty, state weakness, instability and large populations are factors that enlarge the risk of conflict. The capacity of a state is reflected by effective delivery of political goods to the public, which requires a well-financed and administratively competent government. This can be analysed by assessing the social services offered by the state, but also by reviewing the legitimacy of (para) military forces and the police. Other indicators for weak or strong state are weak or strong political coalitions, or the weak or strong control over the state apparatus.
3.6.3.3 Non state Strategy of armed groups Strategy of armed group in civil war context can be approached from the motivation perspective, as motives for rebellion can be argued to be represented in organisation´s strategy. According to Weinstein (2007), insurgency group´s recruitment strategies depend for a great deal on the incentives that are likely to motivate individual participation. Following this, Weinstein presented two major types of insurgency, namely opportunistic rebellions (less risky, possibility for short-term gains, low-commitment participants), and activist rebellions
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(risky participation, unlikely of short-term gains, high-commitment participants willing to contribute for future rewards). These different insurgency types produce two different relations to the resident population, either looting and indiscriminate violence, or co-operation and selective violence. Other used indicators for strategy of the armed groups are the use of terrorist tactics (Duyvesteyn & Fumerton, 2009), using peace processes, having ulterior motives (Stedman, 1997) and involving the international community to gain support for their cause. Nevertheless, researchers recognise that there are a wide variety of motives that animates participants in civil wars (Tarrow, 2007, p. 592).
Capacity of armed groups The capacities of the non-state actor can differ markedly from that of states. After all, as pointed out by Pearlman and Cunningham (2012):
The imperatives and possibilities of a collective striving to attain statehood, secede from a state, or seize control of a state are quite different from those of the duly constituted government of a state with a monopoly on violence and internationally recognised sovereignty (p. 4)
The capacity of non-state armed groups to effectuate authority and violence is determined by several factors. Legitimacy or public support is a factor in the capacity of armed groups, especially in relation to the policy of the non-state actor (Schuurman, 2013) or the relative legitimacy of the group versus the legitimacy of the government (Dudouet, 2011; Solomon, 2015). Furthermore, non-state actor´s affiliation with political organisations is an important indicator of its capabilities and motivation to push for policy change (Cunningham, Gleditsch & Salehyan, 2013, p. 521). In addition, according to Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan (2013) factors such number of troop size (p. 521), how capable the rebels are at procuring arms and at fighting (p. 522), and whether they have centralised command structure (p. 522), and do they control territory (p. 523), are essential indicators of the capacity of armed groups.
Factionalisation The factionalisation of an armed group can drive conflict escalation or de-escalation in several ways. Stedman (1997) and Toft (2012) described the possibility that armed groups split into factions, each defending its own sphere of influence. Groups might use violence to frustrate the process, for instance, when they are not invited for peace negotiations. Jonhston (2007) even stated that governments could seek to divide armed groups in order to exploit one or several of them to fight the others. The factionalisation of an armed group can also result in
55 the end of the conflict, when the factions have not the sufficient capacity to fight the state actor anymore. Duyvestein and Schuurman (2012) explained that if an armed group splits into factions, each subgroup will try to defend and expand their sphere of influence, which could be through the use violence, and spark the conflict.
Criminalisation Dishman (2001) reflected upon the transformation from terrorist group to transnational criminal organisation, which is believed to take place in different degrees (2001, p. 47). The terrorist groups might only pursue criminal activities to financially support their political activities. Other terrorists might shift their goal to profit-driven criminal acts due to the financial gain. In order to analyse the transformation, the aims and interests must be assessed. Terrorists pursue a political goal, while transnational criminal organisations aim for profits (2001, p. 44). Indicators for criminalisation of an armed group are, aside from the presence of criminal activities as, for instance, bank robberies and drugs smuggling, the change of nature or motive of the armed group from the political goal to crime.
3.7 Case selection Four cases are selected to provide insight into conflict dynamics. Similarities between the cases are required, in order to make a viable comparison. The selected cases are all irregular armed conflicts. They share the similarity of a conflict between a state and a non-state actor. The non-state actor is an insurgent group with the primary aim to control a territory and a population, which they try to achieve by using violence, including terrorism tactics. To ensure enough information can be found, the conflicts have been brought to an end for at least five years. Also, the conflicts should be recent, which means that they took place in the 20th and/or 21st century. Finally, all cases have a colonial history. The cross-case analysis will offer insight into the causal mechanisms of conflict dynamics in the four cases. The possibility of a deviant case is taken into account. The deviant case might point out a different causal factor, offering a new, unspecified explanation for changing conflict dynamics. If applicable to other cases, it could culminate into a general proposition.
Israeli Independence war
The Israeli independence war (1947-1948) can go by many names, showcasing its enduring effect even on modern day politics. The conflict took different forms, at times consisting of riots and use of terrorist tactics by some actors, growing into a full scale interstate war after initial insurgent successes. While many terrorist groups were active in the conflict, the main
56 non-state actors had clear insurgent goals, the capture of territory and people and the creation of a state. Various non-state actors had different war goals, for instance, the Jewish groups were fighting for a Jewish state, while Arab groups wanted an Arab state in one form or another.
The area has a long colonial past. In the early 1500s it was conquered by the Ottoman Empire, who maintained rule until the British conquest of the region during the Great War. At the end of the insurgency, rule of the British Empire had ended, and a new state was born. While the root of the broader conflict can be traced back to the late 19th century, the insurgent war started only during the 1940s, with the end of World War Two in sight and the beginning of the period of decolonisation.
Lebanese Civil War
The Lebanese Civil War started in 1975, after shots were fired at a church, and a bus filled with Palestinians was attacked by Phalangist gunman. However, it must be noted that Lebanon had already been struggling with ethnic and religious tensions since its independence. The sectarian tensions erupted in hostilities between military groups and factions. With the arrival of Palestinians, the Maronite Christians and Muslims interests were driven further apart, and the Lebanese state collapsed in a civil conflict. A coalition of Christians was placed against the joint forces of the PLO, leftist Druzes and Muslim militias. The civil war in Lebanon lasted for 15 years. In 1989, the Taif Accord is signed, establishing a relative equitable political system, in which Muslims are given a greater voice in the political process and sectarian divisions are further institutionalised.
The region of modern Lebanon came under the rule of the Ottoman Empire from 1516 to 1918. After World War I, the provinces constituting modern Lebanon were mandated to France. The French declared the Lebanese Republic in 1926. The colonial enclave was separated from Syria, but it was still administered under the French Mandate for Syria. In 1941, French and British troops occupied Lebanon out of fear that Germany would gain control of Syria and Lebanon. After Wold War II, the French dominance declined as a result of wartime losses and rising Arab nationalism. After 20 years of French mandate, Lebanon gained independence on the basis of the 1943 National Pact.
Namibian Independence War
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As British historian Marion Wallace (2011) has pointed out, Namibia is "one of Africa´s least understood and studied countries" (Wallace, 2011, p. 13). Namibia acquired its modern boundaries in 1884-1885 when the European emperors divided Africa amongst themselves at the Berlin Conference. The majority of Namibia went to the Germans and was given the name German South West Africa, while Britain held on to the tiny, natural deep-sea harbour of Walvis Bay. After the outbreak of the First World War, the South African army invaded Namibia and took control of the colony on behalf of the anti-German alliance. With the declaration of peace in 1918, South Africa was granted a League of Nations mandate to administer 'South West Africa'. By the end of the Second World War the United Nations took over responsibility for all League of Nations mandates with the purpose of leading the nations towards independence. In Namibia’s case these plans were thwarted by the rise to power in 1948 of the Nationalist Party in South Africa, which instead incorporated Namibia into South Africa as its fifth province. South African government imposed its policies of apartheid throughout the country, forcing indigenous population to live on segregated tribal 'reserves', providing only meagre resources for living, giving a first pulse for the resistance movement, later to become the leading liberation movement SWAPO, South West Africa People´s Organisation.
The first significant wave of black resistance to white minority rule emerged in December 1959, which South Africans responded by firing on unarmed demonstrators killing 12. Since then freedom fighters started to advocate Namibia´s independence for the United Nations. The UN called on South Africa to withdraw, but took no concrete action to back up this demand. Liberia and Ethiopia took Namibia´s case to the International Court of Justice in The Hague, but after four years of deliberation, the court dismissed the case in 1966.
After these continues setbacks and forceful oppression by South Africa, SWAPO launched the armed struggle in a bid to forcibly remove South Africa from Namibia. The first clash between Swapo´s armed wing, the People´s Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN) and the South African security forces took place on 26 August, 1966. This started the decades long violent independence struggle, ended only by the 1989 UNTAG-mission and subsequent independence in 1990.
Sri Lankan Civil War
The Sri Lankan Civil War officially started in 1983, after a violent riot that killed thousands of Tamils. However, the post-colonialisation period is already characterised by discriminatory
58 laws against minorities, non-violent demonstrations and eventually violent riots and terrorist attacks. The civil war began with several violent Tamil insurgent groups, but over the years the LTTE succeeded in eliminating the others. For 26 years, until the crushing 2009 military campaign by the Sri Lankan state, the Tamil Tigers fought their battle for secession against the government. They used terrorist tactics, such as political assassinations and suicide bombings, but they also stood out in conventional warfare practices. The LTTE had one goal: their own state called Tamil Eelam.
The island has a history colonisation by several Western powers. Portugal first discovered the island in 1505, calling it Ceilão. The stories about the fruitful island reached Holland and in 1658, the Dutch took over the island, which they called Zeylan. The British conquered Ceylon in 1796 and stayed until Ceylon became an independent state in 1948. The island’s population has always been diverse. However, after independence, peaceful coexistence became less easy because of several factors. The Ceylon Tamils benefitted from the British rule since they went to British schools, spoke English and worked together with the British occupier. Meanwhile, the Sinhalese population went to Sinhalese Buddhist schools and had a disadvantaged position compared to the Ceylon Tamils. The nationalist feeling of Sinhalese also rose because of the colonisation. The British occupiers slowly changed the political system from representation based on hierarchy to representation based on ethnicity, which declined political power of the minorities. This was the foundation of circumstances that eventually resulted in the irregular armed conflict in 1983.
Overview Period State vs Non-state Groups with Colonial Insurgent history strategies Israeli 1947-1948 British Empire vs. Found on both the Ottoman Independence Jewish non-state vs. Jewish and Arab Empire (1500s- War Arab foreign state side 1917) and and non-state actors British Empire (1917-1948) Namibian 1966-1990 South Africa vs. South African German South Independence SWAPO/PLAN security forces, West Africa War PLAN (1884-1914), South Africa
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(LN mandate 1915-1945, as a captured province 1948- 1990)
Lebanese Civil 1975-1990 Blurred lines Communal Ottoman War Empire (1517- between state and mobilisation along 1918) non-state: a pro- ethno-religious French status quo camp lines mandate (Christian-rightist (1920-1943) parties) vs. the anti- status quo camp (Muslim- leftistparties) Sri Lankan 1983-2009 Sinhalese Several Tamil By the Civil War goverment vs. insurgent groups, Portuguese several Tamil non- later all eliminated (1505-1658), state actors by the LTTE the Dutch (1658-1796) and eventually the British (1796-1948)
3.8 The utility of using phases Some conflicts have a timespan of more than 20 years. Other conflicts have a dense character with a high frequency in important events. To provide a clear picture of a conflict and to structure the analysis, the conflicts will be divided into phases. This gives the opportunity to study a smaller part of the conflict more intensive and to expose more details. Furthermore, breaking the conflicts down into smaller parts, also gives a structure for the within-case analysis. It emphasises the changing character of conflicts and will show the different influences the factors can have within a single conflict, in different phases.
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The division into phases will not be done on the basis of specific pre-determined factors, but this will be conflict-specific. The only condition will be that a new phase should herald a change in the nature of the conflict. For instance, when an actor’s strategy changes, or when elections have taken place and a new government has been installed. The division can also be based on a frequent returning factor, like peace processes or foreign support. The motivation or grievance behind the violence can change over the conflict, which can define phases. In each case the choice of basis of the division will be explained, using the in-depth study of the conflict.
4. Namibian Independence War
4.1. Introduction
As British historian Marion Wallace (2011) has pointed out, Namibia is "one of Africa´s least understood and studied countries" (Wallace 2011, 13). Namibia1 (map 1) acquired its modern boundaries in 1884-1885 when the European emperors divided Africa amongst themselves at the Berlin Conference. The majority of Namibia went to the Germans and was given the name German South West Africa, while Britain held on to the tiny, natural deep-sea harbor of Walvis Bay. After the outbreak of the First World War, the South African army invaded Namibia and took control of the colony on behalf of the anti-German alliance. With the declaration of peace in 1918, South Africa was granted a League of Nations mandate to administer "South West Africa". By the end of the Second World War the United Nations took over responsibility for all League of Nations mandates with the purpose of leading the towards independence. In Namibia´s case these plans were thwarted by the rise to power in 1948 of the Nationalist Party in South Africa, which instead incorporated Namibia into South Africa as its fifth province. South African government imposed its policies of apartheid throughout the country, forcing indigenous population to live on segregated tribal ´reserves´, providing only meager resources for living.
1 Until 1967 South West Africa. The name Namibia was not used until 1968, when the United Nations Council for South West Africa and the Organisation for African Unity adopted it. See Dobell 1998, 27.
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First significant wave of black resistance to white minority rule emerged in December 1959, which South Africans responded by firing on unarmed demonstrators killing at least eleven people2. As Wallace describes, this became pivotal movement for national resistance further radicalizing the population and uniting opposition against South African rule, in addition to pushing OPO´s (SWAPO´s predecessor) leadership into exile. Since then freedom fighters started to advocate Namibia´s independence for the United Nations. UN called on South Africa to withdraw, but took no concrete action to back up this demand. Liberia and Ethiopia took Namibia´s case to the International Court of Justice in the Hague, but after four years of deliberation, the court dismissed the case in 1966.
Picture 1: Geographical location of Namibia3.
After these continued setbacks and forceful oppression by the South Africa, SWAPO launched the armed struggle in a bid to forcibly remove South Africa from Namibia. The first clash between SWAPO´s armed wing, the People´s Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN) and the South African security forces took place on August 26, 1966. This started the decades long violent independence struggle, ended only by the 1989 UNTAG-mission and subsequent independence in 1990.
2 Wallace 2011, 254. 3 Source: Worldatlas, http://www.worldatlas.com/webimage/countrys/africa/na2.htm (28.11.2015).
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Sources
As British historian Marion Wallace points out in the forewords of her book of Namibia´s history, Namibia is “one of Africa’s least understood and studied countries.”4 Her book: “A History of Namibia. From the Beginning to 1990”, published in 2011, is the first concise presentation of the Namibia´s whole history, which combines the existing literature. The Europe´s leading archive of Namibia and SWAPO related publications, the Basler Afrika Bibliographien in Basel, Switzerland, describes in its collection guide, that since 1990, numerous articles and books dealing with various aspects of the Namibian liberation struggle have been published. Until now, Lauren Dobell´s book: “SWAPO´s Struggle for Namibia, 1960-1991: War by Other Means”, is the only attempt to write a complete history of the party from an academic perspective. In contrast, the aim of the collection of essays edited by Colin Leys and John S. Saul and published in 1995, “Namibia´s Liberation Struggle: The Two- Edged Sword”, is to provide the first postcolonial synthesis of various aspects of the liberation struggle. In general, however, the work of most writers focuses on specific topics or themes.5
Essential for this research are the publications of the actual military conflict itself, largely localized to southern Angola and northern Namibia. As pointed out by Miescher, there is as yet no comprehensive account of this war. The book published by Ronald Dreyer in 1994 on regional dynamics of Namibia´s decolonization comes closets to providing such a picture. There is also a lack of serious military histories that give full consideration to PLAN, the military organization of SWAPO. More general war historical account is provided by Denis Herbstein and John Evenson in their book “The Devils are Among Us – The War for Namibia”, published in 1989. Major academic research based on the field research and observations during the UNTAG process was published by a British-Namibian research team led by Lionel Cliffe in 1994. Further personal accounts include David Lush’s, a British journalist who worked in Namibia from 1988 to 1992.
There are several books focusing on the regional and external level of the Namibia´s independence process. These are book for example by Chester Crocker, who was serving as US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs between 1982 and 1989, and was main US representative in the Western Contact Group (WCG). He offers in-depth account to the crucial preceding years which laid the ground for the UNTAG and underlying Cold War dimension
4 Wallace 2011, 13. 5 Miescher 2006, Registratur AA.3, Guide to the SWAPO Collection in the Basler Afrika Bibliographien, 16.
63 of regional conflicts in and around Namibia. These studies have been followed in subsequent years by several academic papers, for example by Pushkina and Dzinesa, just to name few, focusing in analyzing the UNTAG process.
Nevertheless, none of these studies have focused specially on the dynamics of the SWAPO resistance war so importance of this case-study is clearly shown. As Wallace points out, “[…] the process of historicising the years 1946-90 […] has hardly begun”6.
In addition, to strengthen the approach based on the secondary literature sources, the author conducted five following interviews of Namibia experts: 1) Prof., Dr. Jan-Bart Gewald (Leiden University Institute for History), 2) Researcher Lalli Metsola (University of Helsinki, Department of Political and Economic Studies, Development Studies), 3) Dr. Marion Wallace (Lead Curator, African Collection, The British Library, and the author of the A History of Namibia (2011)), 4) Dr. Henning Melber (Senior Adviser and Director Emeritus of The Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation. Member of SWAPO since mid-1970´s), and 5) Martti Eirola (Desk Officer, improvement of the quality of development cooperation, Unit for Sectoral Policy, Ministry For Foreign Affairs of Finland). The full transcripts of interviews 1-4 are presented in the appendix. Fifth interview was more of a discussion, and is used as back ground material, but not cited at.
The Actors
The main actors of the Namibian conflict on state, non-state and contextual level are the following:
State level actors: the Republic of South Africa, led by Prime Ministers B. J. Vorster between September 1966 – October 1978, and by P. W. Botha between October 1978 – September 1984, after which he was elected as President and hold that position until 1989, Prime Minister F. W. De Klerk between August 1989 – May 1994; South African Defence Force (SADF); South-West Africa Territorial Force (SWATF); the Koevoet paramilitary organisation (counter-insurgency).
Non-state level actors: South West Africa People´s Organisation (SWAPO), led by President Sam Nujoma; People´s Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN, SWAPO´s armed wing); SWAPO Youth League (SYL).
6 Wallace 2011, 243.
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Contextual level actors: United Nations (UN); United Nations General Assembly (UNGA); United Nations Security Council (UNSC); The Western Contact Group (WCG), consisting of France, United Kingdom, United States, Canada and West Germany; Frontline States (FLS), consisting of Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe; Organisation of African Unity (OAU); The United States, during president Reagan´s administration between January 1981 – January 1989; The Republic of Angola, led by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA); The Republic of Zimbabwe, led by Robert Mugabe since 1980; The Republic of Cuba, led by Fidel Castro; The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, led by Mikhail Gorbachev between March 1985 – August 1991; United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG), led by SRSG Martti Ahtisaari.
Prologue
The 1990 were a good year for Namibia. Decades long liberation struggle for independence was finally rewarded, as the country declared independence from South Africa on 21 March 1990. Namibia´s (originally South West Africa) ´case´ had remained a spike in the Western ex-colonial power´s flesh, which had pride themselves with the post-WWII decolonisation. The old sins refused to be berried completely, as South Africa chose a different way and to cling on to its power over Namibia. Since 19467, Namibia´s case was addressed in different levels with different means locally, regionally and internationally. The armed rebellion, which started in 1966, was only part of the complex conflict.
Still many questions about the independence struggle remain unanswered. Some of these questions are more specific, some are more general in nature. Perhaps the most fundamental question, which probably will remain always open for debate, is to which extent the Namibia´s independence was achieved by SWAPO and in turn by Western countries (Western Contact Group).
The darkest unanswered questions are related to SWAPO´s internal power struggles and ´spy hunts´. Reportedly hundreds and even thousands SWAPO followers were tortured and killed by SWAPO´s internal action. Therefore there is a strong reason to believe that SWAPO itself committed serious human rights violations, but these questions were ignored by the Western powers during the post-independence inquiries.
7 The United Nations General Assembly Resolution 65 (1946) recommended that South Africa would place South West Africa under the UN Trusteeship System. See appendix 2.
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SWAPO´s archives, in unknown location, still remains closed to this day. Researchers are somewhat inclined to speculate or sceptical about their contest, and it remains to be seen whether they will be opened one day. It is possible that these records are unorganized and even in total chaos, as the material was produced in difficult situations over a lengthy period of time. What is expected is that they will most probably reveal at least something about the daily operations of the SWAPO´s military/refugee camps in Angola.
This study do not attempt to focus on those dark spots mentioned above, but to understand the prismatic complexities of the Namibia´s independence struggle´s conflict dynamics and share some light to the underlying factors. Therefore these is a humble attempt to contribute both to the research of Namibia and its independence process, and more generally to the conflict studies domain, to increase the understanding of the conflict dynamics.
4.2. Case description
Background
Pre-independent Namibia in regional context
Namibia’s vast natural riches of diamonds, copper, zinc, uranium, salt, ideal farming lands, seawaters laden with fish, and pool of cheap labor, have through history drawn foreign companies and powers to exploit them. Namibia acquired its modern boundaries in 1884-1185 when the European emperors divided Africa amongst themselves at the Berlin Conference. The majority of Namibia went to the Germans and was given the name German South West Africa, but Britain held on to the tiny, natural deep-sea harbor of Walvis Bay and its offshore islands, which were administered as part of the Cape Colony, 1200 kilometers to the south.
The indigenous Herero and Nama tribes revolted against the Germans between 190 and 1907, which was responded by Germans with mass killings, resulting estimated 80 000 dead Namibians – more than half the population of the central and southern regions, and seizure of all viable land by the European settlers.
The German rule ended by 1915, when after the outbreak of the First World War, the South African army invaded Namibia and took control of the colony on behalf of the anti-German alliance. With the declaration of peace in 1918, South Africa was granted a League of Nations mandate to administer “South West Africa”. South Africa continued German style of oppressive rule and overtaking Namibian’s lands, even denying citizenship.
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By the end of the Second World War the United Nation took over responsibility for all League of Nations mandates through the Trusteeship System with the purpose of leading them towards independence. Namibia was the only former Mandate territory that was not placed under the system because of South Africa´s refusal8. In Namibia’s case these plans were thwarted by the rise to power in 1948 of the Nationalist Party in South Africa, which instead incorporated Namibia into South Africa as its fifth province. South Africa government imposed its policies of apartheid throughout the country, forcing indigenous population to live on segregated tribal ‘reserves’, providing only meager resources for living, giving a first pulse for the resistance movement, later to become the leading liberation movement SWAPO, South West Africa People’s Organization.
First significant wave of black resistance to white minority rule, which South Africans responded by firing on unarmed demonstrators in Windhoek in December 1959, killing 12 and exiling the protest organizers. Since then the freedom fighters started to advocate Namibia’s independence at the United Nations. UN called on South Africa to withdraw, but took no concrete action to back up this demand. Liberia and Ethiopia took Namibia’s case to the International Court of Justice in the Hague, but after four years of deliberation, the court dismissed the case in 1966. Nevertheless, in the same year the United Nations General Assembly terminated South Africa´s Mandate over Namibia, and placed the territory under the direct responsibility of the United Nations9, but South Africa refused to accept this10.
After these continue setbacks and forceful oppression of the South Africa, SWAPO launched the armed struggle in a bid to forcibly remove South Africa from Namibia. The first clash between SWAPO’s armed wing and the South African security forces took place on August 26, 1966. Originally SWAPO had its base of operation in Zambia, because Angola was Portuguese colony sympathetic to the white minority South African government. After Angola gained its independence in 1975 due the coup in Portugal, its new left-wing MPLA government allowed SWAPO to move its headquarters to Luanda, granting guerrillas better access to Namibia.11
8 United Nations: ´Namibia – UNTAG. Background´, retrieved 14 January 2016, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/untagS.htm. 9 The United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2145 (1966). See appendix 2. 10 United Nations: ´Namibia – UNTAG. Background´, retrieved 14 January 2016, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/untagS.htm. 11 For the modern (political) historical background see for example Lush 1993; Wallace 2011.
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Picture 2: Namibia in regional context12.
Formation
What is defining for the Namibia´s independence struggle is that it co-existed and co- processed on different levels. National, regional and external levels are so entwined, that they cannot be separated from each other. During many situations and phases it can be argued that the faith of the Namibia was decided in the restricted rooms of UN headquarters or in the capitals of the Western members of the UN Security Council and not with and by SWAPO leaders and fighters on ground in Namibia.
Namibia was from a start an international case. Transferring from the jurisdiction of the League of Nations to United Nations, only to be forcibly annexed by the South Africa as its fifth province, made the international (legal) dimension an integral part of the Namibia´s independence struggle. As pointed out by Wallace, because of Namibia´s history as a League of Nations mandate, the UN remained a very important focus of the campaign for self- determination until independence in 199013.
The national resistance against South-African oppression and apartheid policies grew in four separate, but intermittently connecting, strands. In addition to the activities of the traditional
12 Source: Satellite City Maps.com, http://www.satellitecitymaps.com/africa-map/namibia-map/ (28.11.2015). 13 Wallace 2011, 247.
68 leaders and mounting discontent in the churches, migrant workers from the north became increasingly politicized, as did the tiny Namibian intelligentsia. The latter two groups were to form the backbone of the organized nationalist movement that emerged at the end of the 1950s.14 Organized political resistance to the South African regime manifested in form of two nationalist movements: South West African National Union (SWANU) and the South West African People´s Organization (SWAPO). SWANU was founded in 1959 by the Herero Chiefs´ Council (HCC) and the South West African People´s alliance (SWAPA), profiling mainly as to represent the prominent Herero-communities. On the other hand, SWAPO, which was formed as a result of the organizational structures emerging during the 1950s among the contract workers originating from the northern part of Namibia – Ovamboland – a region named after its population15, aimed bringing different ethnic groups together in an effort to develop a nationalist movement following the African National Congress (ANC) model, not a tribal organization.16 This fundamental difference in the core composition and aims of the organizations lead them evolve along divergent paths, as pointed out by Katjavivi17, leading SWAPO to develop a broad mass base that included migrant workers as well as educated elites and beyond18.
The Windhoek massacre of 1959, or the Old Location Uprising, as it came to be known, where South African police opened fire on the protesters, killing several and injuring tens of people19, first raised the question of the necessity for armed struggle in the face of South African brutality, and forced, during that same year established Ovamboland People´s Organization (OPO) leaders into exile, including its president Sam Nujoma20. Nujoma had founded OPO in April to serve as a base of nationalist activity among workers21. In fact, the decision to prepare for war probably stemmed from the early 1960s, as the first SWAPO group having begun military training as early as 1962 in China, where SWAPO adopted elements of the Maoist conception of guerilla warfare22.23 This was due to the SWAPO´s
14 Ibid. 2011, 245. 15 Melber 2003, 309; in Melber, Abbink et al. 2003. 16 Cliffe et. al. 1994, 17-18. 17 Ibid., 19, referring to Katjavivi 1988, 49. 18 Ibid. 19 NamibWeb.com – The online guide to Namibia (2016): ”History of Old Location and Katutura”, retrieved 7 February 2016, http://www.namibweb.com/hiskat.htm. 20 Dierks, K.: ”History of Namibia, 1959”, retrieved 7 February 2016, http://www.klausdierks.com/Chronology/101.htm. 21 Wallace 2011, 247. 22 Dreyer 1994, 61.
69 close ties and later membership at the transcontinental Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organization (AAPSO), established in 1957 as a platform for Soviet Chinese support for the anti-colonial and anti-imperialist struggle in the Third World24. This was again related to the recognition that SWAPO has received from the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1963, when OAU was created, as the sole Namibian liberation movement. Due this recognition, in 1967 SWAPO was accepted as a new member of the AAPSO, replacing the expelled SWANU, partly because of the fact that the former was willing to incorporate the armed struggle to its program, and later was not.25
Therefore the OAU Liberation Committee (LC) became the first organization, which started to campaign for southern African liberation movement´s recognition and support internationally. The 1967 Nicosia meeting sealed a new alliance of southern African liberation movements, namely MPLA, FRELIMO, PAIGC, ANC, ZAPU, and SWAPO. Presenting a common front in Africa and Europe, the six liberation movements also enjoyed recognition by international solidarity organizations, which set them apart from other southern African nationalist movements such as e.g. UNITA.26 Nevertheless, the AAPSO membership became more important for SWAPO, because it could help to secure material aid27, which the OAU could not provide28.
It is interesting to note, that SWAPO was never a banned organization like ANC and PAC in South Africa29, because of the international status of the territory30. It can be argued that this provided the advantage of allowing some kind of visible party apparatus in the country, but naturally also allowed the South African administration to keep the internal members under scrutiny, which were constantly harassed. Like many of the southern Africa movements, including ANC and SWAPO had their base in Tanzania, first one established at Kongwa in central Tanzania in 1962 to host of all liberation movements. Establishment of further camps followed as the number of freedoms fighters increased.31 Nevertheless, it is important to point out that even the SWAPO and ANC fought liberation struggles against the same government,
23 Cliffe et al. 1994, 20. 24 Dreyer 1994, 55-56. 25 Dreyer 1994, 58. 26 Ibid., 59. 27 Soviet aid, as China left AAPSO in 1967 due the Soviet Chinese rivalry and Chinese cultural revolution. 28 Dreyer 1994, 56. 29 Wallace 2011, 293. 30 Shillington 2013, 1071. 31 SWAPO Party 2009, retrieved on 23 November 2015, http://www.swapoparty.org/the_role_of_the_oau_liberation_committee.html.
70 current view among the scholars is that they fought separate, independent struggles and especially in the case of SWAPO and ANC, had reserved relations and little cooperation32. On the other hand, it is argued by Dreyer, that the AAPSO and OAU -recognized liberation movements had a varying level cooperation with different combinations33.
The resistance begins: 1966-1970
On contextual level, on 27 September 1966 The United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) voted to terminate the mandate and to declare the administration of South West Africa to be the responsibility of the United Nations. The South African government viewed this as illegal and unconstitutional, and proposed to ignore it. On 1 November UNGA established ad hoc Committee for South West Africa and decided that South Africa´s Mandate over SWA is terminated. On 20 December UNGA passed a draft Resolution indicating that the situation in South Africa constitutes a threat to international peace and that universally applied mandatory economic sanctions are the only means of achieving a peaceful solution. In addition on 26 April 1967 UNGA began pushing the Security Council to take action on its enforcement. Furthermore, UNGA established United Nations Council for South West Africa on 19 May to administer the Territory until independence. In 1968, the Council was renamed the United Nations Council for Namibia, when the Assembly proclaimed that, in accordance with the wishes of its people, the Territory would be thenceforth known as Namibia. In 1970, the Security Council declared for the first time that all acts taken by South Africa concerning Namibia after the termination of the mandate were “illegal and invalid”34.35
The South African policies of intensification of apartheid (The Odendaal Commission36) in Namibia tightened the tension in the country, which were brought to the crucial breaking
32 This was pointed out by Prof. J.B. Gewald during interview 12.11.2015. According to Gewald, one explanation could be cultural differences; ANC activist came mostly from academic background when on the other hand SWAPO activist had rural backgrounds, hence resulting a social gap between the groups. This view was in principle shared also by Lalli Metsola, interviewd in 20.11.2015 and by Dr. Marrion Wallace, interviewed in 21.11.2015. They all agreed that the relations between SWAPO and ANC would need future research. See appendix. 33 Dreyer 1994, 60-61. 34 United Nations: ”Namibia – UNTAG, Background”, retireved in 7th February 2016, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/untagS.htm. 35 South African History Online, retrieved in 25th November 2015, http://www.sahistory.org.za/topic/general- south-african-history-timeline-1960s. 36 South African government established a Commission of Inquiry into South African affairs, headed by Frans Hendrik Odendaal. In its final report on 12 December 1963, it recommended the intensification of apartheid in Namibia and the increased integration of Namibia´s government and civil service with that of South Africa. Wallace 2011, 261-262.
71 point by July 1966 when the International Court of Justice (ICJ) dismissed the case against South Africa´s illegal occupation of Namibia. It is plausible to argue, that this was the moment when SWAPO made the final decision to fight, as it stated that: “this relieved [our people] once and for all from any illusions which they may have harboured about the United Nations as some kind of savior in their plight…We have no alternative but to rise in arms and bring about our own liberation”37. The first armed clash between SWAPO/PLAN and South African forces took place in Omugulu-Gwombashe, some 40 kilometers east of Ogongo, northern Namibia, in August 1966, when SWAPO´s barely established first military base was discovered and destroyed by the South African Police. More than 200 SWAPO activist, including most of the internal leadership, were arrested or fled abroad, and 12 PLAN fighters lost their lives38.39 As Wallace points out, the first engagement was, in itself, a minor battle, and easily won by South Africa, but its effects were far-reaching. The battle became a symbolic focus for SWAPO´s mobilization in support its military campaign, but it also made war, and the strength of South African firepower, a reality for the first time in the north.40
As described by Wallace, the battle of Omugulu-Gwombashe was followed by widespread arrests and harassment in the north, but tensions throughout the country increased when the South African Prime Minister, Hendrik Verwoerd, was assassinated two weeks later, on 6 September 196641. The killer, Dimitri Tsafendas, working as a parliamentary messenger, had been diagnosed as being schizophrenic and was declared not guilty of murder by reason of insanity42. Therefore nothing suggests that SWAPO would have been involved. The new Prime Minister, B. J. Vorster, continued the implementation of intensified Apartheid legislation. These measures included the 13 October The General Laws Amendment Bill of 1966, providing enhanced detention powers for the police; 4 November General Law Amendment Act No 62 designed in response to guerilla activities on the northern borders of then South West Africa, increasing detention powers; 8 March 1967 Suppression of Communism Act; 21 June and 27 June 1967 Terrorism Bill and Terrorism Act, retrospective to 1962, in which terrorism was equated with treason and included most criminal acts, authorizing also indefinite detention; and 4 August 1967 general conscription to all white mail.
37 Ibid., referring to quotation by Katjavivi 1988, 61. 38 The Namibian 23.8.2013, retrieved on 6.11.2015, http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=113331&page=archive-read. 39 Leys and Saul 1995, 70. 40 Ibid., 268. 41 Ibid. 42 Time Magazine: ”The Tapeworm Murder”, 28 October 1966.
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South African government started increasingly implies that it was struggling against ´Red arms´ as opposed to purely ´Red ideology´.43
Over the next few years SWAPO continued its armed campaign with guerilla-style attacks, at a low level and mainly in the Caprivi, the northern narrow land stripe connecting Namibia to Central Africa, which was relatively accessible from the movement´s bases further north, but difficult for the South Africans to defend because road communications to the south were very poor44. Major events during this period included a May 1967 killing of Thomas Hainyeko, in charge of SWAPO´s military operations, on the Zambezi river, and in 1968 South African troops killing sixty-three civilians as an apparent reprisal after SWAPO attacked an army camp45.
By mid-1967, somewhere between 150 and 200 people had been arrested in Namibia and detained and tortured in South Africa. They included SWAPO´s fighters and most of organization’s internal leadership. In 1967, thirty-seven Namibians - twenty-seven combatants and ten members of SWAPO´s internal leadership - were brought to trial in Pretoria under the newly passed Terrorism Act, convicting most to life sentences. A string of other trials followed, for example in 1969, guerilla fighters were put on trial for the first time.46
As described by Leys and Saul, internal activity largely stopped during the period of the treason trial in Pretoria, where only few of the SWAPO activist received relatively short sentences. These persons, Maxuilili, Mutumbulua and Ya-Otto were released in 1968, but restricted to Walvis Bay, Windhoek and Ondangua respectively, gradually re-establishing these as SWAPO centers for the south and north respectively47. These centers became important for the soon emerging youth activity.
By the end of the decade SWAPO experienced internal disputes between its wings inside and outside Namibia. SWAPO in exile had gained considerable international support. Nevertheless, the external wing of the movement remained small, its organization rudimentary, and the resources devoted to the armed struggle minimal. This was criticized by the SWAPO´s armed wing, but these protests were treated as mutiny and violently quashed,
43 South African History Online, retrieved in 25th November 2015, http://www.sahistory.org.za/topic/general- south-african-history-timeline-1960s. 44 Wallace 2011, 269. 45 Ibid. 46 Wallace 2011, 269-270. 47 Leys and Saul 1995, 70.
73 stamping the authority of the movement´s president Sam Nujoma and his allies. Nevertheless, this controversy led SWAPO to hold its first Consultative Congress between December 1969- January 1970, which ratified the decision to adopt the armed struggle and set up a number of new structures such as a Youth League (SYL)48, which became important recruiting channel for youths49, ages ranged from mid-teens to mid-thirties50, to join PLAN as fighters51 and therefore increase SWAPO´s strength and resistance.
A new generation of black students, inspired by the struggles of South African students, the ´Leaguers´ used a newly radical rhetoric, calling on Namibians to campaign directly for their liberation rather than waiting for the UN to act52, declaring that: ´every Namibian must join in the struggle for freedom´53.
SWAPO transferred its headquarters from Tanzania to Zambia in 1970, enabled by the country´s independence in 1964 and President Kaunda´s support for the Namibian liberation movement.
The liberation struggle – the multiform national resistance: 1971-1974
In June 1971 the International Court of Justice (ICJ), following an application by an Ad Hoc Sub-Committee of the UN Security Council, reversed its stance on Namibia, declaring that the occupation was ´illegal´ and that South Africa was ´under obligation to withdraw its administration from Namibia immediately´. The General Assembly followed this with a resolution condemning the occupation.54 The first reaction in Namibia came from a surprising party, the Lutheran churches (ELOK and ELC), which had been supporting the opposition to South African rule. As a response to the ICJ´s ruling, churches send a letter to South African Prime Minister to protest at the occupation. This launched a more wider liberation support by the churches, which in turn catalyse mobilisation against the South African presence in Namibia, particularly among the youth. Youth protest and government’s harsh response to
48 Ibid., 271. 49 Also women were able to join SWAPO´s armed resistance, but women guerrillas did not go on missions but worked as mechanics, drivers and in similar critical back-up jobs. See Herbstein and Evenson 1989, p. 124-125 (picture text). 50 Herbstein and Evenson 1989, p. 22. 51 Ibid. 52 Wallace 2011, 278. 53 Katjavivi 1988, 78. 54 Wallace 2011, 274.
74 them in 1971, in turn, sparked a general strike of thousands contract workers, which broke out on 13 December 1971 and quickly spread across the country.55
In attempt to enforce the ICJ ruling, SWAPO formed a coalition in 1971, called the National Convention (NNC), with SWANU (South West African National Union), NUDO (National Unity Democratic Organisation), the Herero Chief´s Council, and smaller parties representing Nama and Damara groups and some Rehobothers56, as a main national coalition organization for the campaigning for independence57. However, tensions soon emerged between the leaderships of NC and external SWAPO, especially after December 1973, when the UN General Assembly recognised SWAPO as the ´authentic representative of the Namibian people´ in resolution 311158. As Melber describes, it thereby endorsed the exclusive status and political monopoly of SWAPO in the ongoing negotiations on behalf of the Namibian people59.
The war also intensified now, because of the outcome of the 1971-1972 strikes. South Africa responded to them by mass-firings and sending almost three-quarters of the non-farming workforce back north60. This resulted some 20,000 sacked workers to cross into exile to Zambia, swelling guerrilla ranks61, and SWAPO Youth League activity increased in the wake of the strike and NC´s slow progress62. As a response the South African government imposed in February 1972 a virtual state of martial law in Ovamboland, northern Namibia, banning public meetings and allowing indefinite detention without trial. This effectively banned SWAPO meetings and hundreds of their followers were detained and maltreated, introducing the increasing violence against civilians to the conflict dynamics63. Some of the local Namibian tribal chiefs, loyal to South African government, even called for help in 1972 to tackle the returning workers and the young SYL agitators.
Leys and Saul point out, that this four years phase of the SWAPO´s resistance struggle was mostly done by the SYL, which had occupied the vacuum created by the post-Omugulu-
55 Ibid., 274-275. See also Herbstein and Evenson 1989, p. 21. 56 Some of the major ethnic groups in Namibia. 57 Wallace 2011, 278. 58 Ibid., 278. 59 Melber 2003, 310; in Melber, Abbink, et al. 2003. 60 Herbstein and Evenson 1989, 20. 61 Ibid., 21. 62 Ibid. 63 Ibid.
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Gwombashe suppression of what had remained of the old SWAPO National Committee inside Namibia64.
The strike and unrest also influenced the United Nations Security Council, which passed a resolution calling for negotiations leading to self-determination in Namibia. As a response to these demands, the South African government proposed a new constitutional arrangement for Namibia, called Advisory Council, but as it fell far short of self-government and independence, the UN rejected it.65 Nevertheless, the move to ´self-government´ was met by a new wave of protest organized mainly by SYL, reaching its peak in 1973-1975. These were partly intensified by the UN General Assembly´s recognition66 of SWAPO as ´authentic representative of Namibian people´ in 197367. This also prompted SWAPO to officially establish its separate armed wing, naming it as the People´s Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN)68. In August 1973 a crowd of three thousand marched in Ondangwa to protest the trial of three activists, leading to a riot. At the same time SYL rally held in Katutura ended in mass arrests.69 In this period hundreds of SWAPO and SYL supporters were arrested, detained and tortured, in the north and beyond, and some of the leaders were tried in court70. By 1974 the increased internal and internal pressure nevertheless forced South Africa to initiate a new constitutional process aimed at a settlement for Namibia that it could promote as ´independence´, but would ensure that South Africa would retain sufficient control over the territory. This resulted the Turnhalle Constitutional Conference, which replaced the Advisory Council. Neither SWAPO nor SWANU, however, agreed to participate, as it didn´t promote the genuine independence. Opposition to Turnhalle process was led by SWAPO and it started to advocate in 1975 Western-style democracy, developing SWAPO into a more truly national movement, as it started to draw support from other community leaders, swelling SWAPO´s ranks.71 The South Africans responded by transferring responsibility for the Angolan border area from the police to the army, sending increasing numbers of troops to Namibia, and giving traditional leaders arms.72
64 Leys and Saul 1995, 71. 65 Wallace 2011, 277. 66 The United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3111 (1973). See appendix 2. 67 Ibid., 278. 68 Herbstein and Evenson 1989, 34. 69 Wallace 2011, 277-278. 70 Ibid., 278. 71 Wallace 2011, 286, 288. 72 Ibid., 276.
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SWAPO´s headquarters remained in 1974 still in Zambia, but its continued ability to conduct military action from there had been but in to question, because relations between Zambia´s President Kaunda and South African Prime Minister Vorster briefly improved73. These facilities were modest and huge flux of exiles posed a major logistical problem
In 1974 a major shift in the international situation led to the intensification of conflict both inside and outside Namibia. In April, the government of Portugal was overthrown in a coup, and its successors quickly moved to grant Portuguese colonies Angola and Mozambique independence. Subsequent events brought the conflict in Namibia into a new phase.
On non-state level, the opening of the Angolan front PLAN´s strategy changed from ´hit-and- run attacks´ in Namibia close to the border to cross the ´Red Line´74 into farming urban areas, increasing the reach of the war75.
Enter of regional dynamics: 1975-1977
On a state level, the fall of the Caetano regime in Portugal had taken the South Africans by surprise76. The prospect of Marxist governments in Angola and Mozambique galvanized South Africa77. By this far the main South African strategy had stressed the importance of the political solution via détente, did not see SWAPO and PLAN as a threat, and refused to believe in their growing strength in southern Angola78.
In the early days of the war, from 1966 to 1975, SWAPO´s armed wing, PLAN, had been forced to confine its activities to the eastern Caprivi Strip and occasionally the Okavango River area, as access could be secured only from bases in Zambia. The guerrillas made quick sorties across this remote northeaster border, engaged in small-scale actions with SADF or acts of sabotage, and then withdrew. This was interrupted when South Africa managed to strike a political deal with Zambian government to forbid SWAPO to use its territory as a base for military activities in September 1975.
Angolan Civil War
73 Ibid. 74 The veterinary cordon sanitaire dividing the Ovambo, Kavango and Caprivi regions along the northern border from the white farming areas. See Brown 1995, 24, in Leys and Saul 1995. 75 Brown 1995, 25, in Leys and Saul 1995. 76 Brown 1995, 25, in Leys and Saul 1995. 77 Herbstein and Evenson 1989, 26. 78 Brown 1995, 26, in Leys and Saul 1995.
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On a contextual level, although a plan for the transition to independence for Angola was agreed in January 1975, it broke down and civil war ensued between FNLA, UNITA and MPLA. South Africa and United States supported the FNLA and UNITA, while Soviet Union backed the MPLA. For several years the United States had been arming and training the FNLA in secret through the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)79. This support was put to an end in 1975 when clandestine action was exposed and arming of parties to the conflict was outlawed by U.S. Senate´s Clark Amendment. Angolan Civil War resulted large Cuban army presence, a direct reaction to South Africa´s invasion, which would be later used as pretext by Washington and Pretoria to delay Namibian independence80.
On a state level, South Africa, backed by the United States, intervened originally in secret to the civil war to counter the Marxist threat and to prevent the Angolan nationalist movements to provide safe passage to SWAPO81. SADF operated alongside UNITA and the FNLA in Angola since October 1975, but was repelled by the MPLA, with the help of Cuban troops (first troops arrived in November) and Soviet armaments82. Already in March 1976 South African troops, checked by the Cuban-MPLA army83, were forced to pull out, and the MPLA established itself as the first government of independent Angola. Even though SWAPO had briefly sided with UNITA, it quickly changed its alliance and established relations with MPLA.84 South Africa´s invasion, which became public knowledge in November 1975, and ignominious withdrawal caused no just a major diplomatic embarrassment but also unified other nationalist movements to support MPLA and forced the defeated UNITA to escape central parts of Angola, leaving southern parts free for SWAPO to base its operations85. For the next two years after the failed intervention in Angola, South Africa´s Prime Minister Vorster resisted his general´s urging of operations into Angola, and they had to make do with cross-border ´hot pursuit´86. The perceived threat of increased guerrilla threat inside Namibia lead South African government to start major militarization campaign, making Namibia the most militarized country on earth when comparing the number of the security forces per
79 Herbstein and Evenson 1989, 26. 80 Ibid., 27. 81 Ibid., 26. 82 Brown 1995, 26, in Leys and Saul 1995. 83 Herbstein and Evenson 1989, 27. 84 Wallace 2011, 279. 85 Brown 1995, 26, in Leys and Saul 1995. 86 Ibid.
78 capita87. But already by now, international observers were putting the numbers of South African troops in the north of the country at anywhere between fifteen and forty-five thousand88.
On a non-state level, the end of Portuguese colonial rule in Angola changed the situation also for SWAPO, as it resulted the opening of Namibia´s northern border by mid-1974, making it possible to send PLAN fighters directly into SWAPOs heartland of Owambo, where military action escalated from mid-197589. A flow to opposite direction also started as estimated 6,000 Namibian´s, mainly from country´s literate Oshiwampo-speaking youth, male and female, together with a minority of older people left the country into exile between June 1974 and early 1975. Further ´waves´ into exile occurred especially in 1976 and 1978. Many young people had been politicised through the war and the activities of the SYL, wishing to join the PLAN guerrillas. This large amount on new young, enthusiastic recruits naturally boosted PLAN´s capabilities, but paradoxically also caused the first major internal clash of SWAPO. Its level of operations reduced in Caprivi Strip area, as SWAPO was now able to concentrate on the Ovambo region and go on the offensive. PLAN attacks from Angola to Namibia escalated and by 1977 the SADF estimated, that contacts between security force patrols and PLAN were averaging about 100 a month90. The massive flow of young students from Namibia to join the SWAPO/PLAN ranks caused major confrontation inside the movement. SWAPO had its origin in uneducated workers and shun more educated people. In addition, these youngsters started to criticise the Sam Nujoma´s original leadership in exile of poor management and lack of support on ground.91 April 1976 tensions finally exploded and some 1,800 SWAPO members were detained with the help of Zambian army, mainly non-Ovambos and highly educated92, including SYL`s leadership93. However, this didn´t seem to reduce PLAN´s capabilities to conduct attacks, as according to Herbstein and Evenson: “In that one year [1976] SWAPO carried out three times as many raids as in the previous ten years”94.
87 Herbstein and Evenson 1989, 27. 88 Wallace 2011, 285. 89 Ibid. 90 Brown 1995, 27, in Leys and Saul 1995. 91 Interview of Melber (2015). See appendix. 92 Ibid. 93 Wallace 2011, 280. 94 1989, 29.
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SWAPO´s position was further endorsed by amendment in the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 31/146 of 197695, declaring SWAPO to be the ´sole and authentic´ representative. This conformed the SWAPO´s leading position among Namibia´s liberation movements, but also polarized national politics96. In the same year, the UN formally adopted the name ´Namibia´ for South West Africa. International political campaigning on behalf of the Namibia´s independence continued at the UN and in 1976 the UN Security Council passed Resolution 38597, which laid down arrangements for the transition to independence in Namibia and stipulated that UN authority would hold free and fair elections in Namibia, but South Africa did not agree to it, supported by some Western countries, who also wanted to see an independent Namibia sympathetic to their interests.98 Consequently, these same countries, that is, United Sates, Great Britain, France, West-Germany and Canada, the then five Western members of the UN Security Council, formed in 1977 the ´Contact Group´ for the specific purpose of negotiating Namibia´s independence with South Africa and the Front Line States99 (FLS)100. Nevertheless, South Africa´s subsequent attempts to destabilize the situation, which was becoming unfavorable to it, caused a new phase in the Namibian conflict.
Resistance intensifies – battle of Cassinga and after: 1978-1980
On contextual level, the newly established Western Contact Group was able to negotiate a new independence plan for Namibia, that South Africa was assent to agree. The difference to Resolution 385 was that South Africa government would conduct Namibia´s elections under UN supervision and was able to hold Walvis Bay deep-sea harbor. This was subsequently accepted by the Security Council as Resolution 435/1978. 101 SWAPO´s regional and international supporters were able to pressure organization to agree to restart negotiations with South Africa and to accept Resolution 435102. In addition, the Settlement plan was also devised by the Western Contact Group in April 1978, which called for the establishment of an UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) to supervise Namibia´s transition to
95 See appendix 2. 96 Wallace 2011, 289. 97 See appendix 2. 98 Ibid. 99 The frontline states comprised Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Zambia and Tanzania. See Forward to freedom, retrieved 7 January 2016, http://www.aamarchives.org/history/front-line-states.html. 100 Crocker 1992, 37. 101 Wallace 2011, 290. 102 Ibid., 291-292.
80 independence. However, it was state and non-state level events, which controlled the dynamics of this phase.
On state level, the year 1978 was a turning point in South Africa´s policies towards resistance. Powerful Defence Minister P. W. Botha became South Africa´s Prime Minister in September 1978, unleashing his ´total strategy´, which involved countering military opposition to South African rule in both that country and Namibia, as well as weakening and destabilizing the other southern African states politically and economically. Geopolitically South Africa was aiming to bring the countries of the sub-continent into a loose trading alliance dominated by the Republic´s economy, which would have also influenced neighboring countries to desist from aiding and comforting liberation movements. In this plan Namibia was the ´coveted beachhead into black Africa´. Therefore SWAPO and the Angolan government were barriers to be overcome.103
Already few months earlier, when Botha was still the Defence Minister, these strategies were put in to action on 4 May 1978 when South Africa launched Operation Reindeer, an air and ground attack on SWAPO bases in Angola. The main target was the refugee camp/military base at Cassinga, 250 km north of the Namibian border, killing over 1,200 people, mostly women and children.104 Even that South African Prime Minister Vorster had accepted the Western Contact Groups proposal (later Resolution 435) on 25 April 1978, only nine days later South Africa executed the Operation Reindeer. According to Herbstein and Evenson, South Africa wanted SWAPO to reject the Western plan, and that Botha was already following his soon-to-be ´total strategy´105. After the Cassinga, South Africa continued to increase its troops in Namibia-Angola border region.
The military wing of the South African state became so powerful that it was able to influence policy significantly, and at crucial moments the government was barely able to control it. The main element of the ´total strategy´ was military force, not diplomacy.106 Prime Minister Botha, advised by General Jannie Geldenhuys, the commander of all troops in Namibia, started to implement a threefold military strategy: to win the ´hearts and minds´ of the local population (especially in the northern warzone, were SWAPO operated), intensified counter-
103 Herbstein and Evenson 1989, 46. 104 Wallace 2011, 290. 105 Herbstein and Evenson 1989, 32. 106 Wallace 2011, 291.
81 insurgency, and destruction of SWAPO´s logistical bases and supply lines in Angola107. In the heart of the apparent contradictions in South African policy at this time, which resulted in a recurring pattern of delaying and destabilizing tactics, stemmed from the fact that the regime was trying to manipulate the international process towards the Nambia´s independence in a way, that it would be executed in a way, that South African interests would have been protected in the area.108 This was presented by the fact that, when SWAPO´s international supporters had managed to pressure the organization to be willing to start negotiations how to implement the Resolution 435, South Africa held internal elections in Namibia for a Constitutional Assembly at the end of 1978, in an attempt to push for its model of ´independent´ Namibia.
On non-state level, Cassinga engendered an upsurge of fury among all SWAPO supporters inside and outside the country109. As described by Wallace, the Cassinga massacre became a focal point of the memorialization of SWAPO´s struggle110. Cassinga was followed the end of the year 1978 local elections, which SWAPO boycotted, and which aggravated SWAPO to step up its armed struggle111. PLAN´s activity in Ovamboland continued to grow, peaking in 1978-80. PLAN fighters made attacks on the South African forces and planted mines in order to blow up convoys.112 However, new South African tactics made it increasingly difficult to maintain PLAN headquarters in southern Angola with any safety, as they were constantly under attack after it was bombed at Cassinga113. The SADF´s and the South West Africa Territorial Force´s (SWATF) – the local arm of the SADF - use of air attacks and mechanized column raids were escalating the conflict increasingly toward a conventional war. PLAN responded accordingly and started to change its military structures and tactics from operating in small mobile units to develop mechanized brigades, at least for defence.114 However, increased South African aggression by the 1980 rapidly diminished SWAPO´s ability to strike at will into the Ovambo area of Namibia. PLAN combatants were forced hundreds of kilometers back into the Angolan hinterland. As these long transitions with heavy equipment were possible only when water was available, PLAN operations became restricted to the rainy
107 Brown 1995, 28, in Leys and Saul 1995. 108 Wallace 2011, 291. 109 Brown 1995, 30, in Leys and Saul 1995. 110 2011, 290. 111 Dreyer 1994, 151. 112 Wallace 2011, 285. 113 Brown 1995, 31, in Leys and Saul 1995. 114 Ibid.
82 season between November and March. This also reduced PLAN fighters’ possibilities to continue their political work among the local population.115
Map 4: Map of SWAPO (red arrows) and South African (blue circles) operations, 1978-1980116.
In general, Namibia was increasingly becoming both a target of, and a base for, South African military operations. New security and emergency regulations, targeted at internal dissent as well as insurgency, were imposed in 1977, and in 1978 Ovamboland, the Caprivi, the capital Windhoek and five other towns were proclaimed ´security districts´, which extended detention rights. In 1979 a curfew was introduced in the north, including license to shoot violators. Furthermore, SWAPO leaders and members were imprisoned and maltreated into such extent that, although the organization was never actually banned, in June 1979 its deputy national chairman closed down its headquarters in Windhoek, and continued to operate informally in political context.117 By 1980 there were about 70-80,000 South African troops in the territory and South Africa had become the most heavily armed country in the southern African region. In 1980 South Africa started to form local battalions in the Namibia, based on the compulsory military service for all Namibian males, in an attempt to minimize white South African casualties, causing embarrassing funerals ´back home´ 118, making black
115 Brown 1995, 32, in Leys and Saul 1995. 116 Source: Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Angolan_Civil_War (28.11.2015). 117 Wallace 2011, 293. 118 Herbstein and Evenson 1989, 28.
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Namibians to fight against their countrymen 119 . According to SADF, the number of ´incidents´ had increased from 500 in 1978 to more than 900 in 1979, and that there had been more than 300 ´contacts´ with PLAN fighters, an increase of almost 100% as compared to 1978120. In May 1980 SADF launched a ground invasion of 2,000 troops against SWAPO bases more than a hundred miles into Angolan territory121.
As described by Wallace, by 1980, hopes for a swift transition to independence had been disappointed. The refusal of South Africa to engage with the UN process meant that war would intensify in the following years.122 Furthermore, changes in contextual level, mainly the emergence of new right-wing governments in the United Kingdom (1979) and the United States (1981), lead by Margaret Thatcher and Ronal Reagan, respectively, and their supportive approach towards South Africa, in combination with the Rhodesian independence settlement negotiated by Thatcher and the subsequent emergence of militantly nationalist, anti-South African Zimbabwe in 1980123, which contributed a new phase for the Namibian conflict.
Enter of Cold War dynamics - ´The Linkage´: 1981-1987
After Ronald Reagan had taken office in January 1981, the question about the Namibia´s independence became subjected to the United State´s policy to counter Soviet threat on global level and its application to the regional level. Reagan administration from January 1981, categorically ruled out the possibility of a SWAPO-led government in Namibia, as it was determined to “roll back” the communism around the world124. This Reagan´s Cold War approach was crystallised by the assistant secretary of state for African affairs, Chester Crocker, who composed the adapted policy, that the independence of Namibia should be tied to a withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola125.126 This view was not shared by the other members of the Western Contact Group, Britain, Canada, France and West Germany, and combined with the refusal of South Africa to engage with the UN process, in 1981, talks on the implementation of Resolution 435 effectively came to an end127. Subsequently, due the
119 According to Wallace, the war became ´Namibianised´. See Wallace 2011, 293. 120 Dreyer 1994, 151. 121 Wallace 2011, 297. 122 2011, 296. 123 Crocker 1992, 37. 124 Adebajo 2011, 106 125 See Crocker 1992, 40-41, also 66-67. 126 Dreyer 1994, 146. 127 Wallace 2011, 296.
84 increasing controversies, the Contact Group ceased to meet by 1985. Therefore, international mediation in the Namibian conflict became now dominated by the United States. Even that the other member countries continued to oppose the United States ´linkage´ policy, they realized that only Washington had the necessary leverage to put pressure to bear on Pretoria to compromise.128 The United States now embarked on a policy of ´constructive engagement´ with South Africa, which effectively removed the threat of sanctions129. As the Cold War confrontation intensified, Reagan´s government decided to repeal the Clark Amendment in 1985, following the Reagan Doctrine – American response to ´Soviet expansionism´ in the Third World, and to intervene directly in the Angolan civil war by funding and arming the UNITA from 1986130131.
During the 1980´s, which is described as the ´lost decade´132, because of the international dead-lock over the question of Namibia and South Africa´s delay tactics, the basis of South Africa´s policy continued to be to undermine SWAPO´s position and to promote political alternatives for it in Namibia133. Some sources suggest, that South Africa was using delay tactics to gain time to try to establish an indigenous administration and a viable political alternative to SWAPO, as its government was afraid of that too quick elections could have lead to same unfavourable outcome as in Zimbabwe134.
On state level, when the Reagan administration presented the linkage idea to the South African government in June 1981, Pretoria seized the opportunity to use it as a new delaying excuse. Linkage provided a justification for delaying UN supervised elections, and for strengthening an anti-SWAPO, and pro-South African power structure in Namibia. 135 Furthermore, it gave South African government an opportunity to describe itself as a bastion against the spread of communism in Africa136. As the South Africa´s aim for regional co- operation had collapsed by the emergence of independent Zimbabwe, SADF reverted to open destabilization of the region. Furthermore, as it had failed to suppress SWAPO militarily, it therefore increased its pressure on Angola, in order to force the Angolan government to
128 Dreyer 1994, 148-149. 129 Wallace 2011, 297. 130 For example in March 1986 Reagan´s administration announced, that UNITA would recieve stinger surface- to-air missiles. See Dreyer 1994, 165. 131 Dreyer 1994, 164. 132 Wallace 2011, 296. 133 Cliffe et al. 1994, 50-51. 134 Cliffe et al. 1994, 49-50. 135 Dreyer 1994, 149. 136 Wallace 2011, 296-297.
85 abandon its support for SWAPO137. In August 1981, the SADF launched their biggest military operation since Angola´s independence through Operation Protea, during which 5,000138 South African troops invaded all the main towns in the Cunene province in the southwest of Angola. Angolan governments troops were able to stop the SADF advance 110 km north of the Namibian border, but operation had already achieve its goal139: invasion of southern Angola, which lasted until end of August 1988 (partly through UNITA). Therefore, by 1981, South African had established its military supremacy in southern Angola, enabling it to increase its support for UNITA, which continued fighting against both Angolan government and SWAPO.140 SADF and SWATF continued operations and already in November 1981 launched the Operation Daisy, which targeted even more distant SWAPO bases, some 240 km north of the Namibian border. Active military campaigning continued on a rate of 2 (1986) - 8 (1983) operations per year141.
The fundamental reason, which prevented South Africa to proceed with the Resolution 435 without the assurance of withdrawal of the Cuban´s troops from Angola, was the South Africa military´s perennial fear of conventional attack on Namibia (South Africa) from Angola142. This fear was increased by the fact that the United Nations Security Council had imposed a mandatory arms embargo (Resolution 418) against South Africa already in November 1977, which was strengthened by Resolution 591 in November 1986, and was deteriorating SADF´s military capabilities. Commander of the SADF, General Viljoen warned that the Soviet build- up could easily ´tip the scales´ in Angola´s favour143. SADF´s capabilities were increased for its part by the creation of special counter-insurgency unit in 1979, named Koevoet, Afrikaans for crowbar, which started to terrorise mostly Namibia´s northern population, to intimidate them not to support the SWAPO144. The later 1980s South Africa also experienced major civil society uprisings in Namibia, in the form of expansion of trade union movements and student activism, and general strike, undermining South Africa´s ability to hold on to the
137 Dreyer 1994, 154. 138 Ncube argues, that the number of the troops were as high as 11,000 plus additional 30,000 in reserve. See Ncube 1991, 56, in Institute of Southern African Studies 1991. 139 Ncube 1991, 53, in Institute of Southern African Studies 1991. 140 Dreyer 1994, 150-151. 141 See the list of operations of the South African Border War, between 1975-1989. Wikipedia, retrieved 7 January 2016, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_operations_of_the_South_African_Border_War. 142 Dreyer 1994, 162. 143 Dreyer 1994, 162-163. 144 Wallace 2011, 295.
86 territory145. Also from late 1984, South Africa was contending with concomitant economic problems and the ´total strategy´ of destabilizing the region, as a defence against ´domestic subversion´ was demonstrably a failure, while international sanctions were beginning to bite146.
On non-state level, in terms of SWAPO´s original vision of the armed struggle as a means of increasing diplomatic leverage, the military developments of the early 1980s were heading towards a stalemate in the military arena, while the Reagan and Thatcher governments were to ensure years of deadlock in the diplomatic arena147. SWAPO was being drawn into the broader conflict, fighting in Angola, as well as sending soldiers across the border into Namibia. Although PLAN operations declined from their peak in 1978-80, hundreds of guerrillas were still able to operate during the first half of the 1980s148. However, South Africa´s push in the southern Angola and its increasing ability to hit more distant SWAPO´s bases had its toll on SWAPO-members moral. With the increased American support for the South African war efforts in Angola, SWAPO statements began to show that sooner or later SWAPO would be confronting either USA soldiers or weapons on the battlefield 149 . Especially after the United States repealed the Clark Amendment, American support started again to flow for UNITA, which joined the SADF-SWATF operations, PLAN´s resources became stretched150. Nevertheless, despite the increased pressure inside the Angola, SWAPO managed to intensify the armed struggle inside Namibia. According to SADF estimates, SWAPO had 6,000 troops, and it launched a general offensive in April 1982, which was described by the South Africans as the largest military operation ever mounted by the organisation. However, SWAPO was unable to establish ´liberated area´ on the white farming area of Tsumeb in northern Namibia that it invaded and was pushed back after two months of fighting.151 Activist within Namibia were drawn into sabotage and bombing operations152. Thus, although PLAN continued to be active in Namibia, the focus of the war by now was southern Angola.
145 Ibid., 303-304. 146 Brown 1995, in Leys and Seul 1995. 147 Ibid., 33. 148 Wallace 2011, 297. 149 Ncube 1991, 66, in Institute of Southern African Studies 1991. 150 Ibid., 67. 151 Dreyer 1994, 153. 152 Brown 1995, 34, in Leys and Saul 1995.
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Map 5: Map of SWAPO and South African operations, 1981-1984153.
From a political perspective, SWAPO rejected the ´linkage´ idea, and in September 1982 publish a joint communiqué with the presidents of the Front line states, that linkage constituted not only an interference into Angola´s internal affairs but it was an attempt by the United States and South Africa to obstruct the process of negotiations154. Even that SWAPO got support in holding out against linkage from 1982 to 1987, SWAPO and its supporters among the African and nonaligned countries started to become increasingly marginalized from the crucial negotiations and agreements, as they were conducted ether by the Western Contact Group or the United States with the South Africa155. Nevertheless, the financial, material, moral and diplomatic resources made available to the movement in exile during this period far exceeded, on a per-capita basis, that enjoyed by any other liberation movement in Southern Africa, including the African National Congress156.
SWAPO experienced during the 1980´s a ´spy crisis´, an internal persecution, which was partly a renewal of previous decade´s internal power struggle and partly provoked by the
153 Source: Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Angolan_Civil_War (28.11.2015). 154 Dreyer 1994, 153. 155 Cliffe et al. 1994, 53. 156 Dobell 1998, 62.
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South African propaganda and infiltration. SWAPO´s Security Organisation detained and tortured hundreds, and possibly thousands of its own members, accusing them of spying for South Africa. 157 According to Melber, these were mostly non-Ovambos and educated youth, deemed suspicious by the original leadership in exile158. However, this didn´t seem to have an impact on organization´s capabilities to continue its military operations.
In the end, changes in the military situation in southern Angola began to shift the diplomatic deadlock. 159 The turning point was reached in the Battle of Cuito Cuanavale160 between August 1987 and March 1988, after which the agreement was made for the Namibia´s independence, constituting the final phase in the Namibian conflict.
The end game – from Cuito Cuanavale to UNTAG and peace: 1988-1991
In the Battle of Cuito Cuanavale161 (map 6), Angolan-Cuban-PLAN troops, supported by the Soviet Union, confronted the South African-UNITA troops near the strategically important town of Cuito Cuanavale in southeastern Angola, 300 km north of the Namibian border, which served as a staging post for Angolan offensives against UNITA. There, massive artillery bombardments and fierce fighting bogged down both sides for over six months. South Africa was unable to reach it goal to push back the opposing forces and situation led to a stalemate, with both sides holding their positions.162
157 See Wallace 2011, 298. 158 Interview of Melber 2015, see appendix. 159 Wallace 2011, 299. 160 According to Herbstein and Evenson, the Battle of Cuito Cuanavale was the second largest battle on African soil since the El Alamein. See Herbstein and Evenson 1989, 173. 161 For more detailed account of the complicated battle, see for example Dreyer 1994, 169-173. 162 Brown 1995, 37, in Leys and Saul 1995.
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Map 6: Location of Cuito Cuanavale in Angola163.
On contextual level, the year 1988, described as the year of the “endgame” by Crocker164, facing the likely prospects of regional conflict escalating in southern Angola between South Africa and Cuba165 and because the coincided transformations in superpower relations166, negotiations between Angola, Cuba and South Africa finally reached more serious levels backed by mutual political will of US and Soviet Union. These negotiations led first to the agreements called ‘New York Principles’ 167 and ‘The Geneva Protocol’ 168, stating the principles for a peaceful settlement in South-western Africa, and the implementation of resolution 435 respectively. These steps were further confirmed in the subsequent ‘Brazzaville Protocol’169, which was followed a bilateral agreement between Angola and Cuba on Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola, and finally a ‘Tripartie Agreement’170 between Angola, Cuba and South Africa on the last days of 1988. 171 Therefore the international and regional political situation was ‘ripe’ for the UNTAG mission.
On a state level, the defeat in the Cuito Cuanavale had left South Africa to face a situation of 50,000 Cuban troops in the Angola and an inability to gain a military victory. The fierce battles had forced SADF to resort of white South African troops, and the subsequent casualties had finally revealed the extend of South African government´s action in Angola for the South African white public. Now, for the first time SADF had to admit that they were fighting alongside UNITA, not just against SWAPO, creating a massive public criticism.172 In addition, by May 1988, the Cubans had advanced to within 40 kilometers of Namibian border, and amassed 12,000 strong SWAPO-Cuban battalions. The offensive towards the border was expected at the latest by the end of July.173Furthermore, the South African economy was in
163 Source: Monthly Review, http://monthlyreview.org/2013/04/01/the-military-defeat-of-the-south-africans- in-angola/ (28.11.2015). 164 Crocker 1992, 410. 165 Lush 1993, xvi. 166 Crocker 1992, 410. 167 Can be retrieved: http://peacemaker.un.org/namibia-southafrica-ny-principles88. 168 Can be retrieved http://peacemaker.un.org/namibia-genevaprotocol88. 169 Can be retrieved http://peacemaker.un.org/angola-protocole-brazzaville88. 170 Can be retrieved http://peacemaker.un.org/angola-tripartite-agreement88. 171 Weiland and Braham 1994, 211-212. 172 Herbstein and Evenson 1989, 171. 173 Ibid., 173.
90 bad shape after major militarization, decades of war and international financial sanctions174. Still, South Africa resisted the international negotiations, even when already early 1988 Cuba and Angola had announced that they agreed the principle of Cuban withdrawal. Indeed, South African troops launched a new attack against Cuban troops in Techipa in June 1988, but were quickly defeated by the Cubans. 175 This final defeat was enough to bring the South African government, facing the possibilities of conventional war against Cuban troops and increasing economical sanctions, coupled with the emerging distrust towards the Total National Strategy and its fundamental assumption that South Africa could force the governments of neighboring countries to change their policies towards South Africa.176 Also, the ruling National Party had begun talks with the ANC in 1986 177. After complicated negotiations, South African withdrawal from Angola, and the principle of cease-fire, were agreed in Geneva Protocol reached in August 1988, ending the war between South Africa and Angola, setting out a timetable for the implementation of Resolution 435 in Namibia. South African withdrawal was completed by end of August 1988. Agreement of the Cuban withdrawal was reached in November, which was to be completed by July 1991.178
On a non-state level, SWAPO had been a part of the Angolan-Cuban coalition in the Battle of Cuito Cuanavale, but had again been left outside the final negotiations between South Africa- Angola-Cuba, hosted by the United States, as a result of South African demands, despite that SWAPO had affirmed its readiness to hold discussions with South Africa and was ready to sign a cease-fire179. After SWAPO had received assurances from Angola, Cuba, and the United States that there would be no peace settlement without the independence of Namibia, SWAPO´s president Nujoma readily conceded, that:
“as far as SWAPO is concerned, the only role we are interested in playing is to sign a cease-fire with South Africa, and start the implementation of 435. As far as Namibia is concerned, a formula is already agreed upon. It is up to the other parties to resolve all the other hurdles in order for us to proceed […]”180.
After the Geneva Protocol was reached, SWAPO reiterated its readiness to sign a formal cease-fire with South Africa to end the war in Namibia, but South Africa refused to sign a
174 Dreyer 1994, 175. 175 Ibid., 179. 176 Ibid., 174, 179. 177 Wallace 2011, 299. 178 Dreyer 1994, 181-182. 179 Ibid., 186-187. 180 Ibid., 187.
91 separate agreement with SWAPO, stating that the country was “not at war with SWAPO. We are dealing here with independent states, and with the United Nations181.” According to Melber, SWAPO had always experienced this kind of condescending treatment because it was rooted in the uneducated labor class182.
As Dreyer points out, this resulted a series of misunderstandings between SWAPO, South Africa and the United Nations that almost collapsed the forthcoming implementation of Resolution 435183.
UNTAG and independence
In Namibia, the transition to independence began on 1 February 1989, with the arrival of UN personnel in the country, under the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG), United Nations peacekeeping operation lead by the Special Representative (SRSG) Martti Ahtisaari184. Ceasefire had been agreed to start on 1 April, followed by the confinement to base and demobilization of both the SWATF and PLAN.185 The April 1 incident, caused by the PLAN fighters unexpected crossing the border into Namibia and subsequent battle with South African troops, was resolved by committee comprising Angola, Cuba, South Africa, the United States, and the Soviet Union. As a result, Angolan government persuaded SWAPO to confine its forces, over 5,000, beyond the 16th parallel186. According to South Africa, the SWAPO had acted contrary to the Geneva Protocol, which stipulated that SWAPO forces will be deployed to the north of the 16th parallel187. Despite several serious incidents and continues South African interference, with UN perseverance and monitoring, the elections in December 1989 were declared free and fair188189. The election was won by SWAPO, with 57.3 percent of the vote. As a result, SWAPO had not achieved a two-third majority of the vote, and therefore needed the cooperation of other parties in the talks. Independence was declared on 21 March 1990, and Sam Nujoma was sworn in as President.190
181 Ibid., 187-188. 182 Interview of Melber 2015. See appendix. 183 Dreyer 1994, 188. 184 Wallace 2011, 305. 185 Ibid. 186 Dreyer 1994, 190. 187 Ibid. 188 This is questioned by Cliffe and others based on the terror that Koevoet troops inflicted in Namibia during the transition process. See Cliffe et al. 1994, 89. 189 Wallace 2011, 306. 190 Ibid.
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SWAPO apparently decided, by the beginning of the UNTAG mission, that it needed to boost its negotiation position for the incoming independence process, and send hundreds of PLAN fighters across the border into Namibia in an attempt to claim that its fighters had been permanently based there during the civil war191. As it had not been a direct participant of the negotiations, it hadn´t had the opportunity to advocate this claim, which would have re- established its historical role an active participant in the liberation process from which it had been left out in the final stage192. PLAN fighters entered Namibia on 1 April 1989 breaking the cease-fire, intending to handing themselves in to the UN. SWAPO argued that the agreements between Angola, Cuba, and South Africa were not binding on SWAPO193. Even that the decision resulted deaths, it also most likely enhanced its status among its chief constituency, the Ovambo majority, as the residents blamed the security forces for the ensuing bloodshed and devastation194. In general, SWAPO believed that its strength in the coming elections would be its overwhelming popular support, and therefore was willing to participate into normal political election competition195.
South Africa saw the SWAPO/PLAN unannounced entrance into Namibia as ´invasion´ and Prime Minister Botha forced a permission for SWATF troops to contain the situation. Unprepared PLAN fighters were taken by surprise and more then 140 were killed. Nevertheless, international pressure was able to force the South Africa to continue with the independence plan.196 However, South Africa continued to disrupt the transition process, as the 1 April event gave it a justification to resort again strong-arm measures, leading for example to reactivation of the notorious Koevoet forces to intimidate the electorate. Also more serious terror occurred, resulting killings of a significant number of SWAPO members197. Cliffe and others suggests, that South Africa was trying to undermine SWAPO´s political status by for example exploiting of the scandal over the torture by SWAPO of its own members, and to create a viable political alternative preceding the elections198.
191 According to Melber, this was made in accordance to advice received from Zimbabwe´s President Mugabe. Interview of Melber 2015, See appendix. 192 Dreyer 1994, 190. 193 Ibid., 189. 194 Cliffe et al. 1994, 90. This view is also shared by Dreyer 1994, 192. 195 Cliff et al. 1994, 81-82. 196 Wallace 2011, 305-306. 197 Cliffe et al. 1994, 89. 198 Ibid., 83.
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4.3. Case analysis
The analysis reflects upon the most important factors present in the conflict that have influenced the dynamics of escalation and de-escalation over the lifespan of the conflict. The analytical framework is divided into a trinity of context, state actors and non-state actors, with each containing a series of key factors:
Context: Social cleavages; popular support; grievances; local politics; national politics; regional politics; international politics/foreign support. State actors: State action – coercive force; state action – policy solution; state capacity; strong government/weak government. Non-state actors: Strategy of armed groups; capacity of armed groups; fractionalization; criminalization.
Context
Social cleavages
The Namibian war for independence represents a very complex social phenomena, rather than a struggle in straightforward support of modern political ideologies, following the ideas of Van Walraven and Abbink199.
On contextual level, the uphold and increased social cleavages in Namibia by South Africa were acknowledged by the UNGA, which declared in 1966 that South Africa had failed to fulfil its obligations towards Namibia, and placed the territory under the direct responsibility of the United Nations200. These views were also supported by most of the Western community, leading increasing pressure against the South Africa, aggravated mostly by apartheid regime´s human rights violations201. On international level, majority of Namibia´s were members of the Christian churches, which resulted churches active participation in the conflict. As pointed by Steenkamp, “the role of the church in Namibia […] was shaped by, and in turn shaped the nature of that country´s liberation struggle.202
199 Van Walraven and Abbink 2003, in Abbink, de Bruijn and van Walraven 2003, 1-40. 200 United Nations: ´Namibia – UNTAG. Background´, retrieved 14 January 2016, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/untagS.htm. 201 Interview of Wallace 2015. 202 Steenkamp, P. 1995, 94, in Leys and Saul 1995.
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From South Africa´s perspective, as part of its apartheid policies, the state developed a new strategy of resurrecting and sponsoring ´tribal´ groups, with the objective of ensuring order and inaction. These ideologies of tribe began to permeate African groups and their self- understanding, but the extend of this re-identification varied greatly. However, the major social cleavages existed between the white settlers (or more precisely the white rule of law and administration) and the black population due the apartheid policies, not between the tribes. 203 What did however impact more, is the political division. From a political perspective, the South Africa´s nationalist government´s view was that Namibia was historically the fifth province of the Republic, with major national importance with its natural resources and geopolitically as a buffer zone against other countries204. In addition, political activism and opposition against South African rule in Namibia made controlling the territory increasingly difficult205. This was witnessed during the second and sixth phases, when opposition and criticism mainly by the churches, trade unions and student organisations increased societal upheaval, leading to suppression by the state actor.
From SWAPO´s perspective, it was rooted to the northern Ovambo tribe, which formed about the half of the population. There was no religious division, as Namibia was “the most Christian of African countries”, with almost 90% of the population belonging to the Christian churches206, due the Finnish missionary work, which started in 1870s207. What was more pressing was the lack of opportunities for black population to participate in politics and country´s decision making 208 . In addition, Namibia was treated as colonial territory, exploiting its resources and controlling its population, which was seen mostly as labour force. These conditions did contribute to the creation of resistance and radicalisation, but grievances contributed more to the formation of the conflict209. In addition to SWAPO, also other liberations movements were created, such as SWANU. However, liberation organisations remained split during the whole conflict, and despite their convergence of aims, the two movements were dogged by competition, particularly outside Namibia210. Nevertheless, it is suggested, that the split between SWAPO and SWANU might have been partly accidental and
203 Wallace 2011, 252-253. 204 Interview of Melber 2015. 205 Wallace 2011, 296. 206 Steenkamp, P. 1995, in Leys and Saul 1995, 40. 207 Kiljunen and Kiljunen 1980, 230. 208 Dreyer 1994, 29. 209 Ibid. 210 Wallace 2011, 259.
95 result of personal reason, reflecting “accidents of history” as much as political or doctrinal differences211. Also the SWAPO did not have any kind of co-operation with the South African ANC, because of the cultural differences212. All the major movements were brought (forced) together only during the last phase by the independence and multi party governance.
During the formation of the conflict, tribalism and ethnicity caused societal polarization, partly because of the traditional division and partly due the new tribal self-identifications advocated by the South Africa. Most of the original liberation movements of 1950s were ethnically divided, such as the Herero Chief´s Council (HCC), base on the Herero identity. During this forming period of national liberation movements, only SWAPO and SWANU emerged as an explicit form of nationalism in which the struggle for national independence was the unifying force, and ethnic differences were downplayed. 213 Nevertheless, it should be noted that Namibia has the second-lowest population density after Mongolia214, and therefore it can be questioned, how united and strongly the Namibian nationalism was experienced215.
In general, as in case of most African nations, the colonial borders of South West Africa and subsequent Namibia created partly an artificial political unit, as traditional tribal connections extended far across the borders that were imposed. Also the division of the country into the northern areas and the ´Police Zone´-the settlers-occupied area of the south and centre-was introduced by the apartheid period. Also most of the ethnic groupings now used to describe tribes (over ten), are colonial creations, as African societies were essentially constituted around powerful leaders and strongest ties were between these ´families and followers´.216
Popular support
Liberation movement and democratic State government both require a popular support to be able to secure required resources and to execute its policies.
On contextual level, SWAPO´s claims and actions enjoyed high support. In addition of official UN recognition, movement was also backed by vast group of international solidarity
211 Ibid., 250. 212 Interview of Melber 2015. See appendix. 213 Wallace 2011, 249-250. 214 Department of Economic and Social Affairs Population Division (2009): ´Wolrd Population Prospects, Table A.1”. Retrieved 10 February 2016, http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/wpp2008/wpp2008_text_tables.pdf. 215 Cliffe et al. 1994, 31. 216 Wallace 2011, 8, 11.
96 movements, which contributed in keeping the issue live through decades.217 SWAPO´s popular support was also important for it to become a reckoned liberation movement and to become accepted and supported by the 1963 established Organisation of African Unity (OAU) whose funding gave a tremendous boost to SWAPO´s military efforts218.
South African government´s apartheid policies and ´total strategy´ was supported by the white population, as it was presented to protect vital national interest and to counter national threats. Even when the international financial sanctions started to impact the national economy, support for the government policies and support for the Prime Minister Botha remained relatively strong, even that some of the financial circles were critical towards apartheid, as ´it was bad for business´219. However, South African government publicly admitted only that it was fighting a war against SWAPO, but kept it secret that it was also fighting a war alongside UNITA against Angolan government, inside Angola. When this was revealed due the Battle of Cuito Cuanavale, and white South African body bags started to arrive ´back home´, this turned the public´s opinion against the government policies and contributed for the end of the conflict in phase seven.220
SWAPO had its origin of support among Ovambos, constituting over 50% of population, but gradually became more broadly supported national movement. Especially the young radicalised students, who fled from Namibia into exile 1974 onwards to SWAPO`s bases in Angola, increased the organisation´s capabilities, and contributed the intensification of the conflict during the fourth phase, and onwards221. Nevertheless, even more crucial source of popular support for SWAPO was the international community, and from the very beginning it focused to achieve diplomatic relations and recognition of the UN and other states in general222. This support and especially the official recognition by the UN, that SWAPO was the ´sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people´, gave additional boost to SWAPO and intensified conflict during the phase four. Even though South African counter- insurgency troop Koevoet terrorised Namibian´s and heavily punished those who supported SWAPO, organisation still managed to remain and retain sufficient popular support in its
217 Wallace 2011, 284. 218 Herbstein and Evenson 1989, 14. 219 Interview by Melber 2015. 220 Herbstein and Evenson 1989, 171. 221 Wallace 2011, 280. 222 Dobell 1998, 32-33.
97 main operations areas in the north223. However, as SWAPO had been created by the Ovambos, some other tribes/ethnic groups and political parties shied away from it, due the prospect of “an independent Namibia dominated by an Ovambo majority”, therefore it did not enjoy undivided support224. Also South Africa was unable to mass anti-SWAPO electoral victories in Namibia during the conflict, because of SWAPO´s strong popular support225.
Grievances
On contextual level, existing grievances and South African policies, which obviously increased them, received increasing criticism and condemnation from both UN and international community, making South Africa an eyesore of international politics.
From South African perspective, apartheid emerged partly as a response to growing economic and social crises, caused by the increasing urbanisation. As the level of urbanisation was much lower in Namibia, and resistance was not at the same level in Namibia, as it was in South Africa, not all apartheid legislation was applied to Namibia. This was partly because the segregation and repressive policies had already become structural and were applied through informal discrimination.226 From South Africa´s colonial era perspective, Namibia was a source of vast natural riches and labour force. South Africa responded to increasing opposition and radicalisation in Namibia with harder policies and with ´total strategy´227, deepening the grievances in the territory. South Africa´s motivations lay deeper in the history, as it had originally conquered the country from Germans in 1915 and its troubles were afterwards awarded by the League of Nations Mandate to administer the territory, and to exploit its vast natural riches. With this background in mind, South Africa felt betrayed, when suddenly after the WWII when the United Nations decided to guide the former mandate- territories to independence. South Africa´s 1948 elected Nationalist Party responded to this by incorporating the Namibia as its fifth province, and hold its position through the whole conflict, until phase seven.228
From SWAPO´s perspective, grievances were at the heart of the Namibian conflict and directly contributed the formation of the conflict. The growth of protest in the decades
223 Wallace 2011, 285. 224 Cliffe et al. 1994, 39. See also Dreyer 1994, 160. 225 Saul and Leyes 1995, 57. 226 Wallace 2011, 251-252. 227 Dreyer 1994, 137. 228 Lush 1993, xii-xiii.
98 following the WWII resulted as much from the social and economic effects of South African policy within the territory as from the political debate over incorporation. Constitutional changes were bringing Namibia into closer alignment with South Africa, and African population were brought under much tighter direct control, securing political and economical control for the white community.229 In Namibia´s unequal economy, levels of discontent among workers were high, and strikes common230. Population growth and decreased access to land and resources increased the level of migrant labourers, among which as sense of solidarity developed – an emphasis on the importance of ´brotherhood´-which ultimately strengthen the impulse for nationalism231. Increasing state control further aggravated these migrant labour groups232. Therefore grievances were central in forming of the conflict and increasing suppressive and coercive state action increased the resistance during the conflict.
Local politics
On contextual level, emergence of different solidarity movements in support for SWAPO enhanced considerably its publicity campaigning, and assured, that the Namibian question remained known to the international public.
Local politics seems to have had minor role for the South Africa´s action during the conflict. South African policies were directed and controlled by the strong government and increasingly its military wing led by Prime Minister Botha, with strong public support, leaving little room for local politics influence233. Even that local financial elite was to certain extend against apartheid, as it was ´bad for business´234, these arguments did not impact the state actor´s actions before the final seventh phase, as part of the economical considerations to end the conflict235.
From SWAPO´s perspective, local politics had at certain times important supportive effect. Naturally, the organisation itself had it roots in the radicalisation of the migrant workers, were the nationalist movement emerged236. The local support of the churches in a form of publicly criticising the South African policies contributed the phase three, were resistance became
229 Wallace 2011, 250. 230 Wallace 2011, 258. 231 Ibid., 258. 232 Ibid., 255. 233 Crocker 1992, 307-308. 234 Interview of Melber 2015. 235 Dreyer 1994, 175, 177. 236 Ibid., 29.
99 nationalised237. Further local movements in a form of trade unions and student organisations increased the societal resistance and upheaval during the 1980s, contributing the emergence of phase seven238. Even though SWAPO experienced an internal power struggle in 1976 and period of ´spy hunt´- an internal repression and persecution – these event didn´t impact greatly to its military operations, and didn´t reduce its popular support until 1989 independence process, when these events became widely know for the first time239. The contributing factors for SWAPO´s ´spy hunt´ were internal criticism towards its leadership, increased South African pressure in forms of infiltration of spies, propaganda, disinformation and direct military attacks on its members, coupled with the increasing power of SWAPO´s internal Security Organisation and SWAPO´s long-standing authoritarian culture. It seems that in the heart of the conflict was the increased divisions within SWAPO, as educated people and non-Ovambos found themselves particularly targeted, experiencing detention, torture and killing in the level of hundreds or even thousands.240
SWAPO´s leadership in exile stayed in firm charge during the whole conflict, and the whole organisation with its national part intact, although partly internally divided241. Although that various liberation movements were competing with each other, as in the case between SWAPO and SWANU mainly on international level242, it didn´t seem to have impact on conflict dynamics.
National politics
On contextual level, South Africa and its National Party, which had since its emergence to power in 1948, erected a system that institutionalized white domination and advanced the political and economic interests of Afrikaners (ruling Southern African ethnic group descended from predominantly Dutch settlers), known as ´apartheid´, was generally viewed by Western countries as a world-class pariah. Indeed, its leaders seemed to be increasingly accustomed to behaving like one. Their generalized commitment to reform was linked to a shrill rejection of Western “interference” and a tough external policy.243 On regional level, South Africa´s politics and especially the emergence of strong, militarist Prime Minister
237 Wallace 2011, 274. 238 Ibid., 303. 239 Wallace 2011, 298-299. 240 Ibid., 298. See also interview of Melber 2015. 241 Ibid. 242 Ibid., 259. 243 Crocker 1992, 86-87.
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Botha (former Defence Minister), and his ´total strategy´ to engage South Africa´s regional enemies, led to the intensification of the conflict.
South African National Party stayed in power during the whole conflict. Strong nationalistic apartheid policies were implemented first under the premiership of Vorster (1966-1978) followed by the former Defence Minister and subsequent President P. W. Botha (1978-1989). Botha, who was described as an authoritarian, hardened political organizer, hypersensitive to criticism, a ´bully´ who was capable of reducing his cabinet colleagues to tears, built up an impressive party, military, and bureaucratic machinery as his base of power244. Already when he was Defence Minister, Botha and the Prime Minister Vorster were the two principal political decision makers who were to control South Africa´s military involvement in the Angolan war245. The result was a leadership that was at once tough and determined and, at the same time, unrealistic about its options246. The question of Namibia´s independence was unattractive to South African leadership for many reasons: loss of its vast natural resources and important buzzer zone; the negative political imagery of a U.N.-led transition that would favour SWAPO; the risk of SWAPO exploiting its UN, Soviet, Cuban and MPLA support effectively to coerce its way into power; the desire to avoid abandoning Pretoria´s black UNITA allies in Angola; the prospect of a chaotic exodus from Namibia of its white minority; and the loss of Namibian bases for projecting military power into neighbouring states. Furthermore, SADF and Prime Minister Botha himself would lose the means for continuing their ´total strategy´ in Angola. Therefore South African leadership did not see incentives to agree with Namibian independence, as it would have only meant “the red flag in Windhoek”247. South African government was convinced that SWAPO was ´Marxist´, and if in power, it would nationalize the entire country and cause civil war, an eventuality which would force South Africa to invade Namibia. South Africa would rather prefer an indefinite low-level conflict.248Therefore South Africa was not prepared to implement Resolution 435 because it would entail an election victory for SWAPO249.
National politics had direct impact on the formation of the conflict and many of its subsequent phases. South African government responded to SWAPO´s activities with increasing intensity,
244 Ibid., 111, 307-308. 245 Dreyer 1994, 92. 246 Crocker 1992, 87. 247 Ibid., 41. 248 Dreyer 1994, 152. 249 Ibid., 176.
101 finally launching Prime Minister Botha´s ´total strategy´, leading to intervention into Angolan civil war, which intensified the conflict and resulted the phase five250. The effects of national politics can be seen in all the phases: conflict started as a response to South Africa´s nationalist politics, its increasing discriminatory policies aggravated churches for opposition in phase three, and its delay and terror tactics during the 1980s kept conflict going. South Africa continued the same basic policies during the whole conflict. The change in the leadership in the middle of the conflict, when the former Defence Minister Botha became Prime Minister in 1978, increased the influence of the military in policy making significantly and introduced more aggressive ´total strategy´ against SWAPO and regional enemies251, intensifying and prolonging the conflict. From a political support perspective, South African governments and leadership enjoyed strong support of the ruling Nationalist Party.
From the SWAPO´s perspective, South Africa´s national politics per se were the main focus of resistance, but its political processes were a distant concern. Even that SWAPO was never officially banned by the South Africa, probably because in that way it was easier to monitor and keep under scrutiny, it was not recognized by the South African government as an official negotiating party. Therefore it was not part of the negotiations concerning the situation in Namibia. 252 In addition, it did not participate the national politics in any official way. This way it existed outside of the South African political sphere. SWAPO did not receive any national level political support, as the South Africa´s National Party was unanimously against it.
Regional politics
In Namibia the regional developments and power shifts, and role of neighbours in the conflict had utmost importance. To begin with, as SWAPO´s insurgency was based on northern border area and it lacked the military capabilities to secure any liberated areas, it had to depend on neighbouring countries to provide it permission to establish its bases on the territory253. Therefore PLAN guerrillas operated first from Zambia, and later from Angolan, partly because South African increasing pressure against Zambian government 254 and mainly because collapse of Angolan colonial rule presented an opportunity to establish bases in
250 Ibid., 151-153. 251 Ibid., 137. 252 Dreyer 1994, 187-189. 253 Ibid., 153. 254 Cliffe et al. 1994, 53.
102 logistically much favourable areas. Therefore these countries also became as targets of South African ´total strategy´ and destabilisation action255. SWAPO was also dependent on outside military material and financial aid, the former originating mainly from Soviet Union through OAU, therefore it was important for SWAPO to uphold good relations with all these parties256. After the independence of the Zimbabwe and its support for SWAPO, it also became a target of South African action257. The Front Line States (FLS), organisation of bordering countries opposing South Africa´s apartheid258, became one main party in the negotiations for the Namibian independence, and exercised major influence over SWAPO, due its total dependence of their support. This was clearly presented in 1978, when FLS and Angola and Zambia especially pressured SWAPO to agree with the proposal brokered by the Western Contact Group, which later became the Resolution 435, even that it was just preceded by the Cassinga massacre. 259 Furthermore, SWAPO was ordered to pause its military operations from their territories during 1978260. This confirmed the pattern of the Namibian negotiations, whereby SWAPO was given little chance to assert its own positions261. The role of the FLS had therefore crucial importance in forcing SWAPO to accept the agreements, which South Africa were at the end willing to accept as a principles for the transition to independence.
From South African perspective, Namibian territory was seen important also geopolitically, as a buffer zone against other countries262. This perspective was increased by the collapse of colonial powers in Angola and Zimbabwe and the rise of leftist, anti-South African governments. After the emergence of Angolan civil war, South African objective was to contain the spread of independence movements and to eradicate the guerrilla activities from the border area263. Later, the victory of Mugabe in Zimbabwe undoubtedly strengthened these containment sentiments and the arguments opposed to concessions in Namibia and, in
255 Dreyer 1994, 140-144. 256 Ibid., 54. 257 Ibid., 139. 258 South African History Online: ´Frontline States´, retrieved 14 January 2016, http://www.sahistory.org.za/organisations/frontline-states. See also Wallace 2011, 291. 259 Dreyer 1994, 130-132. 260 Ibid., 134. 261 Ibid. 262 Intervie of Melber 2015. Also interview of Wallace 2015. 263 Dreyer 1994, 104.
103 particular, to SWAPO coming to power264. South Africa´s core objective was to uphold its regional hegemony and to protect its interest in Namibian territory265.
By the beginning of the Angolan civil war in 1975, as SWAPO transfer its bases into Angola, it became involved in the emerging fighting, as it had to support the government to be able to secure its bases. The South African intervention into Angolan civil war made Angolan territory actually the main battle arena between SWAPO and SADF. Some of the bloodiest fighting between SADF and PLAN, some of the most decisive events that were finally to settle the future of Namibia, occurred not inside the country but in Angola266. The war in Angola clearly caused the phase four, as the both armed conflict and other forms of protest escalated after the decolonisation of Angola267, and made SWAPO a part of regional conflicts.
International politics / foreign support
From a start, Namibian conflict had strong international sphere.
On contextual level, the question of Namibia´s independence became to be seen as a pawn in regional Cold War confrontation. Cold War opponents supported organisations, which they saw to belong in their own ideological ´camp´. In Namibia´s case, SWAPO was seen Marxist and communist by the Reagan administration268. However, both the UN and most of the international community saw SWAPO as a victim of South Africa´s oppressive apartheid policies, and therefore it was receiving major funding from both East and West, while receiving military equipment from the Soviet Union. This provided it abundant resources to keep up its operations both on diplomatic and armed struggle level. As SWAPO´s prerequisite for the support was that it came with ´no strings attached´, it did not limit or control SWAPO´s activities269. SWAPO even received official UN recognition, as ´sole and authentic representative of Namibian people´, which guaranteed it a diplomatic credibility and position, unique among other liberation movements. Later, FLS started to see Namibia´s question also in wider context, as also part of the national survival, which led them to pressure SWAPO to accept the final Independence proposal. In addition, it was the International Court of Justice ruling in 1971, stipulating the South Africa´s occupation as illegal, that started the phase three,
264 Ibid., 137. 265 Ibid., 137-138. 266 Cliffe et al. 1994, 50 267 Wallace 2011, 285. 268 See Crocker 1992. 269 Ibid., 65.
104 as it offered a suitable momentum (legalistic) for churches to start criticising openly the South African government, leading to further civil uprisings in Namibia270.
Most importantly, the Namibian independence was made possible only when the two Cold War superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, became willing to end their regional conflicts and Soviets started to influence Angola to agree with the ´linkage´ policy and American push South-Africa to final negotiations271. Only then was the international diplomatic situation ripe for Namibian independence. Therefore it was the international politics that contributed importantly for the last phase.
From South African perspective, the international community and the UN were becoming increasingly hostile. UN and most of the world community condemn apartheid policies, and SWAPO´s liberation struggle had received massive international support. Only from Reagan´s Washington and Thatcher’s London, South Africa was able to find sympathetic support, and was later able to frame its war in Angola as part of America global fight against communism. As Crocker eloquently described it: “Ronald Reagan had not been elected to make Africa safer for Marxism […]”272. Reagan´s policy of ´linkage´ effectively prevented any solution for Namibia´s question without the Cuban withdrawal from Angola273. Therefore Cold War enemies had become bogged down in Angola, situation that was exploited by South Africa. Also American support of UNITA in Angola increased the conflict there274. Nevertheless, UN established arms embargo and financial sanctions were impacting the national economics, and increasing the cost of war. In Addition, Cuban military in Angola formed a realistic threat of conventional war on South African soil (in Namibia). These factors combined finally contributed for South Africa´s decision to seek negotiation resolution, and contributed the phase seven.
From SWPOS´ perspective, it had been the ICJ`s ruling in 1966 to declare the South African occupation illegal, which had finally convinced SWAPO to start the armed rebellion275, contributing the phase two. Early on, SWAPO´s leadership led by Nujoma had focused their efforts at the UN to implement the decision of Namibian independence, and generally
270 Wallace 2011, 274. 271 Dreyer 1994, 185. 272 Crocker 1992, 63. 273 Dreyer 1994, 144. 274 Dreyer 1994, 89. 275 Wallace 2011, 268.
105 campaigned for international support276. SWAPO opened delegations in many countries and anti-apartheid solidarity movements started to support its demand for independence. In one sense the legal foundation of their demands strengthened SWAPO´s hand and gave it diplomatic card to play in addition to its own struggle inside the country. But SWAPO´s reliance on the UN and on getting support of countries for such diplomatic action was also a measure of the limits to which it could take the armed struggle277. Also, as Namibian question became increasingly internationalised by the Soviet and American intervention into Angolan civil war and question of Namibian independence locked to Washington´s ´linkage´ policy, the role left for SWAPO was to keep its demands active to keep its armed struggle at the level to provide a bargaining counter278. American ´linkage´ demand was quickly adopted by the South African government, and gave a much-needed justification for its operations in Angola, which can be seen in phase six. Nevertheless, the 1978 UN recognition of SWAPO as the sole representative of the Namibian people, secured SWAPO´s role as leading national independence movement and gave additional boost to its operation both in diplomacy and armed struggle, which can be seen in phase five. Furthermore, the Cuban intervention into Angolan civil war tip the scale for Angola´s and SWAPO´s favour, and made it possible first to stop the South African advancement and later to reach a stalemate, which forced South Africa to accept Namibia´s independence.
Natural disasters
Only event that could be described as natural disaster during the formation of the Namibian conflict was the major drought in the late 1950s and early 1960s, which as it part contributed to the restlessness and radicalisation of the Ovambos279. Therefore it can be seen as one minor contributing factor for the formation of the conflict, but did not play any part during the conflict.
Geography
Geography, by imposing the environmental characteristics and limitations which the Namibian conflict took place, did not have crucial impact on the conflict dynamics, but certainly impacted the nature of the conflict and armed struggle.
276 Cliffe et al. 1994, 52. 277 Ibid., 52-53. 278 Ibid., 1994, 53. 279 Wallace 2011, 255.
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On contextual level, SWAPO and Namibia´s fight was surprisingly strongly on international agenda, and remained there for decades, when considering that usually African conflict tends to be seen faraway, distant events. Naturally, its location beside the South Africa, to whom the world gaze remained fixed due the apartheid, contributed to this fact. In Addition, its location by the Atlantic Ocean and existence of the deep-sea port of Walvis Bay made it also easily accessible, also making it relatively easy for foreign support to flow into region. On regional level, the existence of sympathetic neighbouring countries provided fortunate refuge for SWAPO, as it could not have conducted its armed struggle from Namibian soil, as it was not capable of securing any liberated areas280. Therefore it could be argued, that with out the possibility of bases outside of Namibia, SWAPO´s military struggle would have been crushed.
From South African perspective, main fighting was happening over comfortable distance, on Namibia´s northern border and inside Angola, but this did not limit SADF operations and reach, as it had established a multitude of bases to northern region. Since SWAPO had to turn to neighbouring countries for support, it was easy for South Africa to pursuit its ´total strategy´ of destabilising those countries. As South Africa knew that SWAPO was operating from Angola, and as the northern border presented a clear line on flat bush-covered land, it was easy to patrol. In 1976 South Africa also removed the Ovambo residents from a kilometre-wide strip of land running along the Angolan border, and manned the area with its troops.281
From SWAPO´s perspective, its resistance had grew up among the migrant workers originating from the northern border area, Ovampoland282, and as it was unable to base its military operations inside the country, it was forced to seek a refuge from then the only sympathetic bordering country, Zambia, accessible only through the narrow Caprivi Stripe283. Therefore its original guerrilla attacks were confined mostly to this area, which was relatively accessible from the movement´s bases further north, but difficult for the South Africans to defend because road communications to the south were very poor284. One can only speculated, could SWAPO had started the armed struggle at all, if Namibia would have been surrounded totally by countries ruled by colonial powers, not giving it possibility to establish bases
280 Dreyer 1994, 153. 281 Wallace 2011, 285. 282 Dreyer 1994, 29. 283 Wallace 2011, 279. 284 Wallace 2011, 268-269.
107 outside of Namibia, where it was unable to establish any liberated areas285. When colonial rule in Angola collapsed opening it borders, SWAPO quickly established its bases there, making it possible for its guerrillas to hit the northern regions of Namibia. On the other hand, dry conditions of the land on the border area could only support operations during the rainy season286. Nevertheless, non-urban desert and bush type of nature provided good setting for guerrilla type attacks and ambushes, facilitating the escape ´into the bushes´.
In more general, Namibia´s very sparse population density is explained by its harsh climate and extreme dryness, including two major deserts. Therefore the majority of population is centred on more viable areas of north of the country and in the chain of towns, running through the centre part of the county. 287 Therefore also SWAPO´s founding and development can be seen to have followed similar pattern, finding increasing popular support among the country´s majority group, northern Ovambos, and urban educated radicalised youths288.
State
State action – coercive force
On contextual level, the UN and international community in general recognised South Africa´s military capabilities and understood that its oppressive apartheid regime was based on its military superiority. Therefore the UN sanctioned arms embargo against South Africa, and later on the conflict, even increased it, which at the end contributed to the fact, that SADF could not match the Cuban forces in Angola and was caught in stalemate and faced the possibility of land attack inside Namibia. South African coercive force was also one of the main reasons for wide international front against South Africa and condemnation of its apartheid policies, as reports of constant human rights violations circulated in the media289.290
From South African perspective, State enforced its apartheid policies with increasing repressive action. South Africa security measures effectively militarized the Namibia during the 1970s, increasing the violence against both the SWAPO and black population. By the 1980s, South Africa had established its brutal Koevoet counter-insurgency troops, which
285 Dreyer 1994, 153. 286 Brown 1995, 32, in Leys and Saul 1995. 287 Wallace 2011, 2. 288 Dreyer 1994, 29. 289 SIPRI: ´UN arms embargo on South Africa´, retrieved 10 Janury 2016, http://www.sipri.org/databases/embargoes/un_arms_embargoes/south_africa. 290 See for example Dobell 1998, 65-66.
108 started to terrorise the black population in an attempt to prevent them of supporting SWAPO. 291 But even that the potential cost of this support became extremely high, it still continued292. Usually increasing level of force led to a cycle of retaliation by SWAPO. Only during the 1980s the South Africa´s increasing intervention in Angola was obviously straining SWAPO´s resources and military activity during the phase six. However, violent state action received strong international condemnation, isolating the country from the international community and making it as a target of international sanctions293.
From SWAPO´s perspective, the original violent action by the South Africa against Namibian protestors in 1959 was the moment of disillusionment, which further radicalised the population and further united the opposition to South African rule294, during the phase one. South African violent apartheid oppression also kept international sympathies firmly on SWAPO´s side.
South African troops were notorious of their brutal methods, which resulted massive amount of unrecorded tortures and killings. Also SWAPO ended up committing similar atrocities, but in much lower level, during its internal power struggle and period of ´spy hunt´. These actions were kept mostly in secret by both sides from their home audiences, and only after the end of conflict their level was realised as only small amount of captured persons ever returned295. It seems that SWAPO´s internal atrocities did not impact the conflict dynamics, as they were mostly kept in secret.
State action – policy solution
On contextual level, during the conflict, the UN became increasingly frustrated at South Africa´s continued intransigence, which partly resulted the UN General Assembly´s decision to recognise SWAPO as ´sole authentic´ representative of the Namibian people in 1976296. In addition, South Africa´s attempts to establish different kind of constitutional arrangements in Namibia, for example the proposal of an Advisory Council in 1972, received always a rejection by the UN297. Furthermore, it was because of the South Africa´s refusal to engage
291 Wallace 2011, 293-295. 292 Brown 1995, 34, in Leys and Saul 1995. 293 See for example SIPRI: ´UN arms embargo on South Africa´, retrieved 10 Janury 2016, http://www.sipri.org/databases/embargoes/un_arms_embargoes/south_africa. 294 Wallace 2011, 254. 295 Ibid., 295. 296 Ibid., 288. 297 Ibid., 277.
109 with the UN process by 1980s that intensified the conflict298. The UN enforced some level of sanctions against South Africa to enforce its Resolutions, but South Africa did not yield.
Still, Western world was not totally uniform in its criticism against South Africa´s national politics, as Reagan´s government adopted a policy approach, which was based on a view that the West failed to take seriously South Africa´s regional security issues299, becoming a strong supporter of country´s ´total strategy´ and action against Angola. The effects of the ´total strategy´ were felt in neighbouring countries, as South Africa targeted them by military and diplomatic means in attempt to force them not to support the SWAPO. This was partly successful, as Zambia during the conflict forbid SWAPO to use its territory. The worry for the survival of they own governments also contributed for the FLS decision to pressure SWAPO to accept the final independence proposal. When South African government adopted Reagan government´s ´linkage´ policy, all relevant parties, including SWAPO, OAU, FLS, and the other WCG countries, condemned it.300
During the Namibian conflict, South Africa applied tactics of delay and negotiations301. It did not recognise SWAPO as a negotiating party, and continued to negotiate only with the Western Contact Group and the U.S. Furthermore, South Africa did not agree with UN resolutions demanding Namibia´s independence, and instead focused on trying to establish its own alternative governance models in the territory, in attempt to undermine SWAPO´s appeal and to create a credible political alternative to it. National (Namibia) elections were held in 1973, 1975 and 1978 with the help of forced registrations and sheer force302. Nevertheless, they failed to provide viable solutions, and by 1983 they were dissolved and South Africa assumed direct rule over territory303. However, these tactics of undermining SWAPO´s position and promoting alternatives continued to be the basis of South Africa´s policy through the elections in 1989304.
The heavily militarized South African government introduced the Total National Strategy as a response to the rise of guerrilla warfare both by SWAPO and ANC. It aims was to preserve South African regional hegemony in defence of the status quo inside South Africa. In addition,
298 Ibid., 296. 299 Crocker 1992, 59. 300 Dreyer 1994, 152. 301 Cliffe 1994, 46. 302 Ibid., 37-38. 303 Dreyer 1994, 152. 304 Cliffe et al. 1994, 50-51.
110 neighbouring states would be pressed no to serve as springboards for liberation movements and kept politically and economically weak.305 This was put in action with the attack to Cassinga, which started the phase five. This continued as a militarization of Namibia, increasing the level of troops and establishing new local South West Africa Territory Force (SWAFT), composing mainly of black Namibians306. Also de facto martial law was extended from northern Namibia as far as south as Windhoek, covering practically half of the country, and effecting 80% of its population 307. During the conflict, South Africa introduced increasingly coercive legislations towards terrorism and insurgency, extending security force´s powers, including for example indefinite arrests, which increased opposition in Namibia. Definitely, South Africa´s insistence to its nationalistic apartheid policies, regional influence and perceived security threats match well with Reagan administrations goals and policies, and were kept up through the whole 1980s, keeping up the conflict308.
From SWAPO´s perspective, first of all, South Africa´s attempts to introduce different kind of administrative systems, representing semi-independence, were illegal attempts to dismiss the existing UN resolutions and ICJ ruling for Namibia´s independence. SWAPO refused all these attempts categorically and did not participate the elections. 309 Furthermore, it arranged a successful boycott against the 1973 elections and responded to the internal elections held at the end of 1978 by stepping up its armed struggle310, therefore escalating the conflict in the phase five. Even that SWAPO was signalling in several occasions during the conflict, that it was willing to negotiate with the South Africa these offers were ignored311. Even that SWAPO was never totally banned it remained unrecognised as a negotiating party, leaving the international diplomacy and the armed struggle as only methods to engage South Africa312. South Africa´s coercive policies were always opposed and met with resistance through the conflict. Naturally the formation of the Namibian conflict can be argued to be directly connected with South African policies of apartheid oppression. South Africa policies stipulated a hard reaction to any kind of opposition, leading to the violent clashed in Namibia
305 Dreyer 1994, 138. 306 Ibid., 152. 307 Ibid., 151. 308 Wallace 2011, 296-297. See also Dreyer 1994, 161. 309 Ibid., 288. 310 Dreyer 1994, 151. 311 See for example Dreyer 1994, 124. 312 Brown 1995, 33, in Leys and Saul 1995.
111 during 1950s and 1960s, and the emergence of the conflict.313 Also the national opposition, which increasingly emerged inside Namibia from 1971 onwards, was naturally aggravated by the South African policies, even though it was the ICJ ruling that actually sparked the phase three314.
State capacity
On contextual level, South Africa´s strong military and police forces made it clear, that country could not be forced easily against of its will to comply with the UN Resolutions stipulating the independence of Namibia. Also on regional level, other states could not challenge South Africa with their own inferior military capabilities, and therefore remained vulnerable to its pressure and needed to take it into consideration in their own regional strategies. Therefore, when the South Africa made intervention to Angola, Soviet Union had to send Cuban forces to counter and stop South African advance315. In joint Cuban-Angolan- PLAN forces South Africa encountered its match and was finally caught in a stalemate, forced to agree with Namibian independence316.
South African Defence Force had a great superiority in strength and capabilities over SWAPO/PLAN. South Africa also introduced a national conscription in Namibia to all males, and created a local force, South West Africa Territorial Force, mainly of black Namibians. South Africa was never military threaten by SWAPO during the conflict. This was clear during the whole conflict, and forced SWAPO to resort to guerrilla tactics.317
Through the conflict, South Africa had a strong leadership, and by the emergence of Botha as the Prime Minister, military wing of the governance became dominant318. From South African perspective, the problem was that it was facing traditional guerrilla activities, which were difficult to counter with traditional military force. With total trust in its military capabilities to destroy SWAPO and encounter regional enemies, South African government was convinced to use its might to bring the conflict to end319. In addition to the ´total strategy´, South African government coined a new military strategy to destroy SWAPO, including the attempt to win
313 See for example Wallis 2011, 252-255. 314 Wallace 2011, 274-276. 315 Herbstein and Evenson 1989, 27. 316 Dreyer 1994, 177. 317 Wallace 2011, 286. 318 Herbstein and Evenson 1989, 46. 319 Dreyer 1994, 153.
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´hearts-and-minds´ of local population, and to attack against SWAPO´s bases and logistics. The new strategies were put in action with the attack against Cassinga, which started the phase five, causing international condemnation and increasing SWAPO´s armed activities as a retaliation320. South African defence budget rose for example between 1984-85 over 21%, and the amount of troops in Namibia was estimated to be that time over 80,000321. The new strategy also included the establishment of regional battalions, which were formed of black Namibians, partly even Ovambos, and using their skills to track and fight PLAN. When Angola fell in to civil war, South African troops intervened to support the establishment of pro-South African government. SADF was able to invade the southwest part of the country, and through supporting UNITA, was in control of the whole southern region, therefore increasingly capable to attack against SWAPO bases and push it further in the Angolan territory.322 Only by the intervention of Cuba, SADF was forced to retreat and finally push in a stalemate. By the end of the conflict, SADF, partly due the UN arms embargo, could not achieve military victory over joint Cuban-Angolan-SWAPO forces, and faced the possibility of traditional land war in Namibia. Therefore, the lost of military superiority and the prospect of defeat, facilitated the last phase. This was impacted also by the worsening economical climate due the UN embossed financial sanctions.323
From SWAPO´s perspective, it couldn´t hope to force South Africa to agree with Namibia´s independence just by using armed force. It can be speculated was this reason why in the beginning SWAPO had not included armed resistance to its programme. It was adopted only when it was precondition to achieve OAU´s (and therefore Soviet) support.324 SWAPO was forced to seek refuge in neighbouring countries and resort hit-and-run type guerrilla tactics325. When South Africa started increasingly to use more conventional war tactics including air attacks and mechanized columns in Angola, PLAN respond accordingly and started to adopt more conventional military structures and tactics, at least for defence326. SWAPO responded to South Africa attack to Cassinga by increasing the armed struggle, which started the phase five. PLAN was also increasingly confronted with South Africa´s regionally formed SWAFT
320 Wallace 2011, 290. 321 Dreyer 1994, 161. 322 Ibid., 143-144, 149-151. 323 See Dreyer 1994, 175, 177, 179-181, 43. 324 Dreyer 1994, 61. 325 Brown 1995, 21, in Leys and Saul 1995. 326 Brown 1995, 31, in Leys and Saul 1995.
113 troops, consisting mainly of black Namibians, and even Ovambos, experienced in tracking.327 It seems that PLAN responded this by assassinating some local leaders, who had collaborated with South African froces328.
Strong/weak government (inc. Institutions)
On contextual level, strong South African state system and government presented a difficult counterpart in any negotiations, and strong political front of the Nationalist Party made it practically impossible to find sympathetic political operators to advocate a change inside the country.
From South African perspective, it had strong government and leadership, support by the Nationalist Party, through the whole conflict, giving it free hands to execute its policies329. South African judicial system convicted captured SWAPO/PLAN members in long sentences, often for life, and mostly send them to Robben Island prison330. South Africa established the notorious Koevoet counter-insurgency troops to terrorise the Namibian population and to reduce their willingness to support SWAPO. South African police in Namibia were used similarly to support the government´s policies. 331 Therefore in South African case, government policies were executed efficiently and the whole state apparatus served this purpose. State administration in Namibia favoured the whites, but this was mainly result of national policies, not corruption.
From SWAPO´s perspective, strong South African government and unyielding leadership presented a formidable enemy. The oppressive apartheid policies were ingrained to all level of state administration, which was one of the original reasons for the conflict. This same impact continued through the conflict.332
Non-state
Strategy of armed groups
327 Ibid., 28. 328 Wallace 2011, 294. 329 Crocker 1992, 307-308. 330 Wallace 2011, 270. 331 Ibid., 295. 332 Ibid., 251.
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On contextual level, SWAPO´s claims for Namibian independence, and strategy of both diplomatic and armed struggle were generally strongly supported by the Western international community and civil society organisations, especially Christian churches and anti-apartheid solidarity movements333. As SWAPO´s claims for independence were supported in principle by the UN decisions334, as the UNGA had also recognised the legitimacy of the armed struggle335, they had quite a unique legal basis. SWAPO was treated as a VIP-guest on international solidarity congresses 336 , and received the most support of all liberation movements337. SWAPO´s armed struggle was seen to provide it an extra legitimacy as it was not just a victim of South African repression, but also tried to oppose it338. As SWAPO became attached to the Eastern block through OAU channelled funding and arming, its fighters received training first in China and later in Soviet Union339. On regional level, recently independent ex-colonial countries supported SWAPO´s efforts against South Africa, but later due the increasing destabilisation activities by South Africa, some of them had to decrease their support and start to use their influence to moderate SWAPO´s policies in crucial moments and push it towards resolution340.
From South African point of view, as SWAPO´s guerrilla tactics of hit-and-run attacks were inflicting persistent damage on South African troops, it decided to increase its military presence in Namibia, leading to major militarisation of the whole country, and increased its operations in Angola341. By applying its ´total strategy´, combined with a new military strategy first manifested by the attack against Cassinga, South African action contributed the phase five342, by aggravating a fury among all SWAPO supporters inside and outside the country343. It was not able to cut SWAPO´s sources of support, as they came from both West and East, constituting increasing financial aid and arms from East block countries344. Also it
333 Dobell 1998, 62, 65-66. 334 See United Nations: ´Namibia – UNTAG. Background´, retrieved 10 January 2016, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/untagS.htm. 335 Dobell 1998, 66. 336 Interview of Melber 2015. 337 Dobell 1998, 62. 338 Wallace 2011, 286. 339 Dreyer 1994, 60-61. 340 Dreyer 1994, 122-123. 341 Ibid., 106, 154. 342 Herbstein and Evenson 1989, 31-32. 343 Brown 1995, 30, in Leys and Saul 1995. 344 Dobell 1998, 65-65.
115 was unable to prevent Namibians to flee into exile and to become PLAN fighters345. In response to PLAN´s guerrilla tactics, South Africa established regional forces of black Namibians for example with tracking skills to counter PLAN fighters, which later became the South West Africa Territory Force (SWATF) 346. In addition, South Africa established Koevoet counter-insurgency troops to terrorise Namibian population 347 . South African propaganda resulted for its part the SWAPO´s internal ´spyhunt´348. At strategic moment, South Africa tried to provoke SWAPO not to agree with the UNSC Resolution 435 for Namibian independence, but failed in it349. South Africa´s ´total strategy´ was trying to pressure neighbouring countries not to continue supporting SWAPO, partly succeeding. But this action also convinced the FLS to see the Namibian question in wider regional perspective, in which solution to the Namibian conflict would bring peace to the whole region, and therefore motivated them to pressure SWAPO to agree with the international proposals.350 Through the whole conflict South Africa tried to adjust its strategies to better counter the SWAPO´s modus operandi, and in times was very successful in it, but was still failed in its ultimate goal.
From SWAPO´s perspective, its main goal was complete national independence under an African government351. Even though that there is very little information available about SWAPO´s president Nujoma´s personal motives, SWAPO´s stated demands were: no political process could take place in Namibia while South Africa was administering the territory; elections could not take place while South African troops and the South African police remained in Namibia; that all armed groups such as citizen groups should be disarmed; and that Walvis Bay should be an integral part of Namibia352. SWAPO´s leadership in exile showed heavy-handed and authoritarian response to any internal criticism, enabling the President Nujoma and his supporters to stamp their authority on the movement353. One of SWAPO leadership´s major strength was its pragmatic adjustment to chancing circumstances
345 Wallace 2011, 280. 346 Wallace 2011, 294; See also Dreyer 1994, 106. 347 Dreyer 1994, 152. 348 Wallace 2011, 298. 349 Ibid., 290. 350 Dreyer 1994, 132-133. 351 Dobell 1998, 32. 352 Dreyer 1994, 124-125. 353 Wallace 2011, 271.
116 through the whole conflict, as it was flexibly allying with possible supporters and welcoming support from all possible sources354.
Following the example of ANC, SWAPO had from a start presented itself as national movement, not just of Ovambo people. Facing the South African persecution, its original main leadership was forced into exile already in the conflict, and thus became the ´leadership in exile´, focusing on diplomatic work in UN, but still retained its control over SWAPO´s and its military wing PLAN´s activities inside Namibia.355 Because of the South African military superiority, PLAN had to ably guerrilla tactics and establishes its bases in neighbouring countries, thus limiting considerably organization´s military reach and capabilities. Nevertheless, these attacks were able to inflict considerable damage on South African troops, forcing South Africa to increase its military presence through out the Namibia.356 However, PLAN was never able to pose a serious military threat for SADF, and was not able to secure any liberated areas inside Namibia. Nevertheless, during its peak time in late 1970s, it was able to attack deep in northern region, forcing white settlers to flee, before being pushed back by SADF.357
SWAPO´s original aim for its armed resistance was partly to increase its negotiation leverage in UN and international level, as it could not hope to force South Africa into agreeing with Namibia´s independence through military means. This view is supported by the fact that until the end of 1960s SWAPO´s exile leadership, focusing on their UN work, was devoting minimal resources to the armed struggle. By 1970s the focus on armed struggle increased.358 As PLAN fighters had had their original training in China, it was permeated by Mao´s guerrilla tactics, and structured its forces accordingly359. Like other national liberation movements, SWAPO sought to overextend and wear down its enemy by sustaining a protracted struggle, using mainly hit-and-run guerrilla tactics360. In addition, these guerrilla methods also involved mobilizing effective, widespread support among the population in operational areas, which would then supply intelligence about the regime´s troop movements and such, logistical support in terms of transporting and hiding equipment and arms, food, and
354 Dobell 1998, 33. 355 Wallace 2011, 249-250, 281, 304. 356 Dreyer 1994, 106. 357 Ibid., 153. 358 Wallace 2011, 270-271. 359 Dreyer 1994, 61. 360 Brown 1995, 21, in Leys and Saul 1995.
117 other resources, and in general a protective cover among which PLAN fighters could just disappear. 361
When SADF started to use more conventional military measures in Angola, PLAN also adapted the use of mechanized troops, at least for defence362. Its main source of troops was the Namibians who fled into exile after the Angolan borders opened363. This influx of radicalised young people continued through the conflict with varying intensity. It also managed to maintain adequate popular support in the northern region, which was its main operation area, despite of South African attempts to terrorise population364. When it comes to organization´s strategy, SWAPO ´simply´ wanted to press for Namibia´s independence mainly based on legal arguments referring to UN resolutions and ICJ ruling365. Armed struggle made it viable liberation movement and served its self-image and fundamental ´story´ of achieving Namibian independence ´through the barrel of gun´366.
When it comes to assess its possible strategic mistakes, one can conclude, that in the end at the critical places, external pressure prevented it making much of them, as SWAPO was pressured by the FLS to agree with the UNSC Resolution 435 for the transition to independence, even that Cassinga massacre had just took place367. It can be said, that FLS prevented SWAPO of making the strategic mistake of refusing the proposal, just what South Africa had hoped to achieve by attacking to Cassinga. It can only speculated whether SWAPO´s exile leadership´s decision to violently put down the internal criticism by the youths was its greatest mistake, and eradicated a lot of potential activism and young strength out of the movement368.
This can definitely be said about the 1980s ´spy hunt´ and killing hundreds or even thousands of its own followers369. In addition, the 1 April conflict caused by SWAPO in the beginning of the UNTAG mission was also crave strategic mistake, as it almost collapsed the peace process370. On political sphere, SWAPO did not participate the South African imposed
361 Cliffe et al. 1994, 21, 25. 362 Brown 1995, 31, in Leys and Saul 1995. 363 Wallace 2011, 279-280. 364 Brown 1995, 34, in Leys and Saul 1995. 365 Dobell 1998, 60, 66. 366 Interview of Melber 2015. 367 Dreyer 1994, 132-133. 368 Wallace 2011, 280. 369 Wallace 2011, 298. 370 Dreyer 1994, 188-189.
118 governance structures and categorically ignored them. Insisting always to the international law and UN resolutions, promising full independence371. This made SWAPO´s principal policies very consistent through the conflict, and most likely contributed to its UN and international recognition372. SWAPO was extremely depended on external support, and most of all of countries which allowed it to keep bases inside their territory (prominent members of FLS), and therefore was often forced by the FLS to consent under their pressure, not being able to convey its own positions, but was always able to cope this internally and move forward373.
Capacity of armed groups
On contextual level, SWAPO´s capabilities to oppose South Africa was seen important by the Eastern block, trying to spread the revolution and sphere of communist governments374. Therefore Eastern block became SWAPO´s main source of arms375. PLAN fighters were seen capable of producing considerable damage to South African troops, even that in times PLAN´s military activities were suppressed to very low level by South African countermeasures. Regionally SWAPO was able to support the MPLA government in Angola in its fight against South African troops, and became part of Cuban-Angolan-SWAPO coalition, which also the United States was trying to counter by providing arms to UNITA376.
From South African perspective, already from early on the conflict country´s security forces had recognised that SWAPO/PLAN was well-equipped guerrilla force. According to South African minister of police´s report of 1966, first encountered PLAN guerrillas “were equipped with Russian-manufactured sub-machine guns, automatic pistols and thousands of rounds of ammunition”377. First South Africa tried to counter PLAN guerrillas by conventional military force, but failed to suppress SWAPO militarily378. As a response South Africa established new military doctrine, basically targeting SWAPO/PLAN as well as population, both in Namibia and Angola, in attempt to reduce support to SWAPO379.380Because of the increasing intensity and casualties of war, and
371 Wallace 2011, 291-292. 372 Dobell 1998, 62-67. 373 Dreyer 1994, 122-123. 374 Ibid., 55-57. 375 Dobell 1998, 64-65. 376 Dreyer 1994, 100-101. 377 Herbstein and Evenson 1989, 15. 378 Dreyer 1994, 154. 379 Herbstein and Evenson 1989, 15. 380 Dreyer 1994, 154.
119 because it was mostly fought inside Angola, South Africa established local units of black Namibians to fight the war381. Also special counter-insurgency force Koevoet was established to terrorise Namibian population382.
From SWAPO´s perspective, there is no indication that it would have bee suffering from a lack of basic military equipment383. It was able to execute effective guerrilla attacks, assassinations and ambush military columns with mines384. What it was lacking is heavy armament and more sophisticated equipment, such as stringer missiles, which U.S. was providing to UNITA385. Therefore PLAN was unable to defend against South African Air Forces, making its bases vulnerable for aerial attacks. This was impacting PLAN´s activities especially during 1980s and reducing its attacks from their peak between 1978-1980386. SWAPO members were originally trained in China and later in Soviet Union, were they received traditional guerrilla training based on Mao´s principles387. After return, PLAN fighters continued training locals in guerrilla warfare388. Therefore PLAN was well equipped and trained for its armed struggle, constituting a real threat to South Africa, and forcing it to respond with increasing military activity. SWAPO and PLAN remained tightly under the control of original leadership in exile during the whole conflict, even that internal power struggle and disputes occurred389. It seems that they did not impact the conflict dynamics.
Factionalisation
On contextual level, SWAPO´s internal power struggle in 1976 involved the regional actors, as SWAPO´s leadership in exile resorted to the help of Zambian military to arrest the dissidents390. However, SWAPO´s original leadership remained in place and continued their diplomatic work in international level. The same took place during the 1980s ´spy hunt´ episode, only this time it was SWAPO´s own security unity that took care of the atrocities.391
381 Herbstein and Evenson 1989, 28. 382 Ibid., 61-64. 383 Accroding to South African minister of police´s report of 1966, first encountered PLAN guerillas “were equipped with Russian-manufactured sub-machine guns, automatic pistols and thousands of rounds of ammunition”. See Herbstein and Evenson 1989, 15. 384 Wallace 2011, 285-286. 385 Herbstein and Evenson 1989, 158. 386 Wallace 2011, 297. 387 Dreyer 1994, 61. 388 Herbstein and Evenson 1989, 15. 389 See Wallace 2011, 280-281, 298-299. 390 Wallace 2011, 280-281. 391 See Wallace 2011, 280-281, 298-299.
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Therefore, to the outside world, SWAPO´s leadership always personalized with President Nujoma and his control. SWAPO´s president Sam Nujoma remained always the leading figure on international and regional arena.392
From South African perspective, one of the aspect of the ´total strategy´ was to attempt to create genuine political alternative for SWAPO and thereby to reduce its power393. South Africa was also trying to establish different types of regional administrative systems inside Namibia and was able to lure over ten local political parties (representing different tribal groups), who were opposing SWAPO, into co-operation and to form a national assembly394. However, these attempts did not manage to acquire major popular support or divert support away from SWAPO395. Therefore South Africa was not able to cause division inside the movement or reduce its popular support considerably. SWAPO´s internationally active leadership in exile remained a permanent nuisance for South African government, which never recognised SWAPO as an official negotiating party396.
SWAPO´s leadership was tightly in the hands of its exile leadership, namely president Nujoma. Exile leadership controlled the activities of the SWAPO inside Namibia and PLAN. Even that SWAPO experienced internal power struggle in 1976, when new young PLAN fighters started to criticise the exile leadership of bad management, this was squashed with violence, leaving original leadership into power397. Later, internal dissidence and unwanted material´ was cleared away by 1980s ´spy hunt´, during which thousands of SWAPO/PLAN members, mostly non-Ovambos and highly educated398, were captures, tortured and in most cases killed. This episode also left the original leadership in power. Later, for example when FLS pressured SWAPO to agree with the UN Resolution 435 for independence, SWAPO had serious internal disputes, but again emerged out of them united and intact399. Therefore, SWAPO leadership´s resilience constituted for it part for organisation´s ultimate success, as SWAPO was never aloud to splinter or break down.
Criminalisation
392 See for example Wallace 2011, 271, 248. See also Dobell 1998, 32-33. 393 Cliffe et al. 1994, 49. 394 See Cliffe et al. 1994, 36, also Wallace 2011, 286. 395 Wallace 2011, 288. 396 Dreyer 1994, 188. 397 Wallace 2011, 280. According to Wallace, concerns were voiced about inefficiency and finance, the lack of a clear political programme and the unwillingness of SWAPO leaders to allow debate (2011, 280). 398 Interview of Melber 2015. 399 Dreyer 1994, 131.
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On contextual level, question of criminalisation did not play any role as SWAPO did not resort to criminal activities.
From South Africa´s perspective, naturally all SWAPO´s armed activities were illegal and seen as terrorism. Increasingly strict legislations were introduced during the conflict, describing most crimes against the State as terrorism400.
Criminalisation didn´t play a part in the Namibian conflict. Because of its massive international funding and material support, SWAPO did not ever have to resort on criminality, to rob the banks or to smuggle natural resources, to fund its activities. Both the international community and local population supported it.
Summary of main drivers per phase
Phase 1: During the first phase (formation) directly contributing factors were grievances (social, economic, political, historical, state actions leading to grievances), and coercive force (violent suppression of 1959 protests). Underlying indirect factors were policy solutions (apartheid), international politics / foreign support (original UN decision of Namibia´s road to independence), and national politics.
Phase 2: During the second phase (resistance begins, 1966-1970) directly contributing factors were international politics / foreign support (ICJ dismisses the case against South Africa), grievances, and popular support. Underlying indirect factors were social cleavages (political), policy solution, national politics, state capacity and in small extend natural disaster (draught).
Phase 3: During the third phase (multiform struggle, 1971-1974) directly contributing factors were international politics/foreign support (ICJ ruling) and local politics (opposition of churches and increased civil uprising). Underlying indirect factors were national politics, policy solutions, coercive force, and state capacity.
Phase 4: During the forth phase (regional dynamics, 1975-1977) directly contributing factors were regional politics (Angolan civil war giving SWAPO possibility to move its bases there), popular support (Namibian´s flee to exile in Angola to join PLAN), and capacity of armed groups. Underlying undirect factors were strategy of armed group
400 South African History Online, retrieved in 25th November 2015, http://www.sahistory.org.za/topic/general- south-african-history-timeline-1960s.
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Phase 5: During the fifth phase (Battle of Cassinga and after) directly contributing factors were policy solution (´total strategy´, local elections) and coercive force (attack to Cassinga). Underlying indirect factors were national politics, state capacity (air force -> long distance operation), and international politics (UN recognition of SWAPO).
Phase 6: During the sixth phase (Cold War dynamics, 1981-1986) directly contributing factors were international politics (US Reagan government´s war against communism and ´linkage´policy), and policy solution (´total strategy´ -> invasion of southern Angola). Underlying indirect factors were state capacity (e.g. strong leadership), and coercive force (increased civil society opposition and uprising).
Phase 7: During the seventh phase (end game, 1987-1990) directly contributing factors were coercive force (loss of power), international politics (détente of Cold War -> superpowers´ interest for resolution), and policy solution (South Africa´s new evaluation of the situation). Underlying indirect factors were grievances (declining national economics), and regional politics (FLS pressure over SWAPO).
Underlying indirect factors that were detected in every phase: geography (enabled SWAPO´s guerrilla war), state capacity (kept South Africa to pursuit/seek military solution), strong government (capable for strong, unyielding action), strategy of armed group (guerrilla war difficult to counter with conventional military), popular support (PLAN was always able to recruit enough fighters), and capacity of armed group (SWAPO received massive international funding and support to keep its activities going, and did not have to resort criminality, protecting its reputation and popular support).
4.4. Conclusions & Discussion
Direct factors
According to analysis several factors stand out in particular. The most frequently appearing factor was international politics / foreign support, which can be detected having direct impact on conflict dynamics in four phases. International politics / foreign support influence or actually the lack of it, as the ICJ´s dismissal of the case against South Africa´s illegal occupation of Namibia aggravated SWAPO to resort on armed struggle, contributed the phase two. Also the ICJ ruling which condemned the South Africa´s occupation, encouraged Christian churches in Namibia to start publicly criticise South African governance, which
123 again sparked wider societal protest wave, facilitating the phase three. Also, it was the Reagan government´s ´linkage´ policy that tied the Namibian conflict in Cold War dynamics, changing the nature of the conflict in phase six. In addition, American support contributed and encouraged South Africa to increase its military effort against Angola. Finally, it was only when Cold War superpowers reached common understanding to seek resolutions to their regional conflicts, that necessary international pressure was directed towards South Africa, forcing it to agree with the Namibian independence, for its part facilitating the phase seven.
The state actor´s policy solution can be detected having direct impact on conflict dynamics in three phases. In phase five, policy solution in a form of ´total strategy´ led South Africa to apply greater force and new tactics against SWAPO, aggravating SWAPO to retaliate with increasing violence. This was also observed in phase six, when policy solution led South Africa to invade southern Angola, increasing the level of war. Finally, in phase seven, policy solution in a form of new evaluation of the situation led South Africa to seek resolution to the conflict.
The state actor´s coercive force can be seen to have direct effect also in three phases. South Africa´s decision to suppress demonstrations with violence further radicalised the population and further united opposition to South African rule during the first phase. In addition, South Africa´s attack to Cassinga spark fierce retaliation from SWAPO, contributing the phase five. Finally, it was the reduced capability of coercive force which forced South Africa no re- evaluate its policies and to agree with the final independence negotiations.
Grievances can be detected to have direct impact in two phases. Social, economical and political grievances were in the core of the societal situations in which poor Ovambo migrant workers started to radicalise and to seek opportunities to improve their conditions, and to survive under the pressure of population growth and reduce availability of grazing land, during the formation of the conflict. In addition, increased grievances were essential conditions for the phase two, when societal uprising continued and escalated.
Popular support can also be detected in two phases in which they had direct impact to the conflict dynamics. Popular support contributed in the second phase the emergence of SWAPO, having its roots in the formed brotherhood between Ovambo migrant workers, and contributed the start of the organized resistance. During the phase four, increasing amount of radicalised Namibian´s fled into exile to Angola, to join the ranks of SWAPO/PLAN, which increased PLAN´s resources and increased the level of attacks.
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Local politics can be detected to play an important role in phase three, as it was the churches and civil society movements, which increased the societal uprising during the phase. Regional politics in turn have direct impact in phase four, as it was the collapse of the colonial rule in Angola, which made it possible for SWAPO to move its bases there, which again facilitated the increase of its reach and level of attacks to Namibia, contributing the increase of violence. Capacity of armed groups can be detected also a contributing factor in phase four, as increased capabilities resulted increased attacks and level of violence.
Indirect factors
Two factors can be seen to have indirect, underlying effect in four phases. These are national politics and state capacity. National politics can be seen having indirect effect in the first phase, as South Africa´s apartheid was creating civil society resistance. Its presence can also be detected in phase two with the same reason. In phase three, it contributed again the general societal condition that was resisted with increasing criticism. In phase five national politics led the formation of ´total strategy´, which again led to the attack against Cassinga. In the case of state capacity, South African security force´s strategy towards protest was underlying factor in phase two. It can also be seen having similar impact in phase three, where security force´s strategies had become object of increasing criticism. State capacity can be seen also in phases five and six to enabling South Africa´s action to resort harder military measures, which intensified conflict dynamics.
Coercive force ban seen as underlying factor in two phases. It was one of the underlying factors in phase three, which sparked increasing civil society protests. Coercive force also contributed the increasing civil society uprising during phase six, which made Namibia increasingly difficult to control.
Policy solutions occurred underlying factors in phases two and three, as the increased application of apartheid policies radicalised Namibian back population and civil society organisations, such as churches. International politics / foreign support can be seen underlying factor in phase five. UN recognition of SWAPO encouraged the movement, resulting increased level of violence in phase five. Grievance can be seen as underlying factor in phase seven, as bad economical situation inside South Africa was one contributing factor to its decision to agree with Namibian independence. Regional politics had also indirect effect in phase seven, as FSL pressured SWAPO to agree with the final independence proposal, facilitating the end of the conflict. Strategy of armed group can be seen as underlying factor in
125 phase four, as SWAPO decision to move its bases to Angola gave it possibility to increase its attacks to Namibia, and increased the level of violence.
Therefore, analyse indicated that the most frequent directly contributing factors impacting the Namibian conflict were policy solutions, coercive force, and international politics / foreign support. Namibian black population became radicalised as a response to South African apartheid policies and later during the conflict South African policies increased the pressure against SWAPO and the civilian population, to which SWAPO always responded with increasing violence. And only when South Africa finally was forced to change its fundamental policies, it was possible to achieve resolution. Coercive force radicalised population and estranged it further away form the South African government, resulting increased flux to the ranks of PLAN. Furthermore, increase level of coercive force led to cycle of retaliation, as SWAPO responded South African increase force accordingly. International politics and foreign support had strong impact. Namibian conflict had from a start an international level, as SWAPO´s resistance was partly based on the fact that UN had promised Namibia its independence and South Africa was refusing to respect that decision. Four that reason SWAPO´s liberation struggle had quite uniquely legal foundation, which became an important element and kept Namibia´s question in the limelight 24 years. Also international community funded SWAPO´s activities and kept it going through decades. Cold War dynamics took Namibia as ´hostage´ and postponed the process perhaps for decade. And finally international events and foreign pressure forced for its part South Africa to agree with Namibia´s independence.
Fundamental factors
If focus is given on one singular most contributing factor in each phase, by trying to go down and through the layers of different contributing and interacting factors, to reach the most fundamental factors, which can be argued to motivate the action, it seems that based on the historical case study, in phase one it was grievances, which motivated migrant workers to seek change in their situation and form a political movement. In phase two it was international politics / foreign support or actually the lack of it as the ICJ´s dismissal of the case against South Africa´s illegal occupation of Namibia pushed SWAPO to resort armed rebellion. In phase three it was again the international politics / foreign support, although in a form of international law, which gave the incentive and encouragement for Christian churches to start openly criticize the South African government, which led to the further uprising of the
126 civil society. In phase four, it was the regional politics, which changed the conflict dynamics, as Angolan borders opened for SWAPO to move its bases there and to reach Namibia more easily, which increased the level of violence. In phase five it was the coercive force, as South Africa´s attack to Cassinga and resulted massacre aggravated SWAPO to respond with increased level of military activity. In phase six it was the international politics / foreign support, as the United States new government declared that the question of Namibian independence was linked to the question of withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola, and supported South Africa´s increased war effort in Angola. And finally in phase seven, it was the coercive force, and especially the loss of it, that forced South Africa to accept the final negotiations leading to the independence of Namibia.
Discussion
As a concluding remark, it is important to focus on causal relationship and which factor lies at the core of the actor´s motivation and which are just preceding contributing factors. In most of the phases it seems that policy solutions preceded the coercive action, which was the fundamental aggravating factors, which motivated people ´on ground´ to act. Naturally policies were necessary pre-requisite, which formulated and legitimated the practical action. Then this brings us to those who executed these policies in practice. Security troops training, regulations and general operational culture was were the action stemmed. This leads us to realise, that these individuals were the products of their society and its culture and values; white South Africans believing in apartheid or black Namibian collaborators who were willing to agree with their racist policies for money. Also important is the judicial system and oversight of these troops. But if these sectors also serve the state´s leading principles, they are not willing to control violent action. This leads to conclusion that only way to prevent this kind of process, is through education and promotion of human rights in society, which would mitigate the level of racism.
Secondly, Namibian case shows clearly that it is difficult to encounter authorial government and try to force it to change its policies. The final phase of the Namibian conflict shows that this was only possibly when State lost its military capabilities, its national economy was in ruins, and it was facing a land attack. In addition, it was pressured by the only remaining superpower in the world. This favours strongly the use of military interventions as an important tool in humanitarian emergencies.
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Finally, one can ask who achieved Namibia´s independence? Was it SWAPO/PLAN, the UN, Cold War, The United States, or did South Africa just collapse? Analyse suggests, that it was complicated combination of these and other factors, which just came to place at the end. This uniqueness of Namibian conflict and its resolution was also recognized by its final negotiators and facilitators, including Martti Ahtisaari, director of the UNTAG mission, who pointed out later, that its lessons could not be copied or used again401. SWAPO´s diplomatic and military efforts kept the issue certainly in the international community´s consciousness, but it lacked necessary both diplomatic and military mussel to force the South Africa into concession. It took Angolan civil war and Cuban forces to wear it down, combined with international sanctions and embargos. And even then only American-Soviet pressure against their respective camps facilitated the final conclusion. And most of the time SWAPO was kept outside of all the crucial negotiations about Namibia´s future, as the relevant actors seem to have limited confidence into the ability of SWAPO, emerged from the uneducated Ovambo migrant workers, as an organisation and also into the ability of the leadership involved in the negotiations402. Nevertheless, these ´uneducated´ labourers were intelligent enough to base their claims and efforts on legal argument provided by the UN, as it is suggested that SWAPO´s armed struggle was more of a “armed propaganda”403. Therefore one can only conclude that Namibian´s independence was a shared achievement comprising actors on local, national, regional, and international level, even though that SWAPO always insisted that it had achieve it “through the barrel of gun”404.
Epilogue
In retrospective, three questions or observations emerge from the Namibian conflict. First, why so many black Namibian was willing to join South Africa´s regional forces and to fight against their countrymen? As Herbstein and Evenson points out, even the monstrous counter- insurgency unit Koevoet could not have been established without its black component, as the effective exercise of terror had to be backed by an understanding of local culture and daily life405. Also the SADF´s local arm in Namibia, the South West Africa Territorial Force (SWATF), employed by 1988 9,277 black Namibians, mainly from the north, who were
401 See Meriallio and Ruokanen 2011, also Weiland and Braham 1994. 402 Interview of Melber 2015. 403 Wallace 2011, 286. 404 Ibid. 405 1989, 69-70.
128 providing the necessary tracking skills and local knowledge406. Therefore the question remains, why? Literature suggests that the reason was mainly economical. The declining economical situation in the north of Namibia during the conflict, combined with the occational periods of draught, increased the attractiveness of these units because of the generous pay offered, resulting increasing dependence on the army. One can only speculate whether tribal segregation, or at least the feeling of difference between them, constituted a situation, were some tribes felt with each other as foreign as with white South Africans. Nevertheless, Namibian conflict clear shows that poverty and need of survival forces people in to desperate acts.
Secondly, there is the question of the cost of war. As the fighting took place in Angola, not inside Namibia, it was Angolan´s and in particular its civilian population that suffered the most, as the war devastated the southern regions of country. According to UN estimates, between 1980 and 1988 it caused the deaths of some 331,000 children in Angola. In the north of Namibia, although mortality was much lower, the population was confronted with daily violence. Nevertheless, we can only guess about the total cost of war, which atrocities were mostly done by undercover, un-recorded operations. One indicator is that during the independence process South Africa released only twenty political prisoners, so it seems that it held very few.407
Finally, how is the situation in Namibia in 2016? The picture acquired through more present literature and interviews is not a perfect one. Even though free elections have been arranged following the constitution, SWAPO has retained in power, by more or less democratic means. First President Nujoma was succeeded in 2005 by President Pohamba (SWAPO), but Nujoma still remains highly influential. Criticism against SWAPO or its regime is not welcomed. Therefore, SWAPO´s drive to retain control is clearly still in play. Henning Melber points out, that SWAPO has also refused to address its human right violations during 1976 internal power struggle and 1980s ´spy hunt´, and defence strongly its ´foundational myth´, that SWAPO achieved the independence ´through the barrel of gun´, contributing great sacrifices. However, it was the SWAPO´s leadership in exile, which emerged into power after independence, not the ones who had stayed inside Namibia and kept up the armed rebellion by risking their lives. This was cause of some resentment and caused some SWAPO members
406 Wallace 2011, 294. 407 Wallace 2011, 300, 295.
129 to split away and to establish their own opposition parties.408 Therefore it seems that Namibia´s journey to full democracy is still ongoing.
408 Wallace 2011, 311; interview of Melber 2015.
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Abbreviations
AAPSO Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organization ANC African National Congress ELC Evangelical Lutheran Church ELOK Evangelical Lutheran Ovambo-Kavango Church FLS Front Line States FNLA National Front for the Liberation of Angola FRELIMO Mozambique Liberation Front CIA Central Intelligence Agency HCC Herero Chief´s Council ICJ International Court of Justice LC Liberation Committee (of OAU) LN League of Nations MPLA Popular Front for the Liberation of Angola NNC Namibia National Convention OAU Organisation of African Unity OPO Ovamboland People´s Organization PAIGC African Independence Party of Guinea Bissau and Cape Verde Islands PAC Pan-Africanist Congress PLAN People´s Liberation Army of Namibia SADF South African Defence Force SRSG Special Representative of the Secretary-General SYL SWAPO Youth League SWANU South West African National Union SWAPO South West Africa People´s Organization SWATF South West Africa Territorial Force UN United Nations UNGA United Nations General Assembly UNSC United Nations Security Council UNTAG United Nations Transition Assistance Group USA United States of America ZAPU Zimbabwe African People´s Union WCG Western Contact Group
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Bibliography
Adebajo, A. (2011): UN Peacekeeping in Africa. From the Suez Crisis to the Sudan Conflict. Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
Cliffe, L., Bush, R., Lindsay, J., Mokopakgosi, B., Pankhurst, D., and Tsie, B. (1994): The Transition to Independence in Namibia. Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
Crocker, C. (1992): High Noon in Southern Africa. Making Peace in a Rough Neighborhood. New York and London: W. W. Norton & Company.
Dobell, L. (1998): Swapo´s Struggle for Namibia, 1960-1991: War by Other Means. Basel Namibia Studies Series 3. Switzerland: P. Schlettwein Publishing.
Dreyer, R. (1994): Namibia and Southern Africa. Regional Dynamics of Decolonization 1945-90. London and New York: Kegan Paul International
Herbstein, D. And Evenson, J. (1989): The Devils are Among Us. The War for Namibia. London and New Jersey: Zed Books Ltd.
Heywood, A. (1996): The CASSINGA event. An investigation of the records by Annemarie Heywood. Windhoek: National Archives of Namibia.
Institute of Southern African Studies (1991): Destabilization and Regional Security Concerns in Southern Africa. Roma and Lesotho: Institute of Southern African Studies.
Kiljunen, K. And Kiljunen, M.-L. (1980): Namibia – viimeinen siirtomaa. Helsinki: Tammi.
Leys, C. And Saul, J. (1995): Namibia´s Liberation Struggle. The Two-Edged Sword. London: James Currey, Athens: Ohio University Press.
Lush, D. (1993): Last Steps to Uhuru. An eye-witness account of Namibia´s transition to independence. Windhoek: New Namibia Books.
Myers, B. (ed.) (1997): Revolutionary Times, Revolutionary Lives. Personal accounts of the liberation struggles. London: Index Books.
Shillington, K. (2013): Encyclopedia of African History. Volumes 1-3. New York: Routledge.
Van Walraven, K. and Abbink, J. (2003): ´Rethinking Resistance in African History: An Introduction´, in Abbink, J., de Bruijn, M. and van Walraven, K. (eds.): Rethinking Resistance: Revolt and Violence in African History. Leiden: Brill.
Wallace, M. With Kinahan, J. (2011): A History of Namibia. From the Beginning to 1990. London: Hurst & Company.
Other literature
Bauer, G. (1998): Labor and Democracy in Namibia, 1971-1996. Oxford: James Currey Ltd.
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IDAF Publications Ltd. (1988): Review of 1988 Repression and Resistance in South Africa & Namibia. Fact Paper on Southern Africa No 16. London.
Melber, H. and Saunders, C. (2011): Transition in Southern Africa – Comparative Aspects. Two Lectures. Discussion Paper 10. Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikkainstitutet.
Merikallio, K. and Ruokanen, T. (2011): Matkalla. Martti Ahtisaaren tarina. Keuruu: Otava.
Mwakikagile, G. (2015): Namibia: Conquest to Independence. Formation of a Nation. Dar es Salaam: New Africa Press.
Schirch, L. (2013): Conflict Assessment & Peacebuilding Planning. Boulder and London: Kumarian Press.
Weiland, H. and Braham, M. (eds.) (1994): The Namibian Peace Process: Implications and Lessons for the Future. Freiburg: Arnold Bergstraesser Institut.
List of maps
Map 1: Namibia´s geographical location. Source: Worldatlas, http://www.worldatlas.com/webimage/countrys/africa/na2.htm (28.11.2015).
Map 2: Namibia in regional context. Source: Satellite City Maps.com, http://www.satellitecitymaps.com/africa-map/namibia-map/ (28.11.2015).
Map 3: Map of South African Defence Force incursions into Angola, 1978-1981, source: Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations_Transition_Assistance_Group#Fighting_begins (28.11.2015).
Map 4: Map of SWAPO and South African operations, 1978-1980. Source: Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Angolan_Civil_War (28.11.2015).
Map 5: Map of SWAPO and South African operations, 1981-1984. Source: Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Angolan_Civil_War (28.11.2015).
Map 6: Location of Cuito Cuanavale in Angola. Source: Monthly Review, http://monthlyreview.org/2013/04/01/the-military-defeat-of-the-south-africans-in-angola/ (28.11.2015).
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Appendix I: Namibia – Interview of Prof. dr. Jan-Bart Gewald
Interview of Prof. dr. Jan-Bart GEWALD, Leiden University Institute for History.
Interview was conducted in person in Leiden, the Netherlands, on 12.11.2015.
Different levels, national, regional and international, seems to be very interwoven in the Namibia´s independence struggle. How much was it about the Cold War dynamics?
The crucial defeat of the SADF happened already in 1988, in the battle of the Cuito Guinavale, so before the end of the Cold War. South Africa´s war in Angola had become increasing economical burden, and the defeat was the crucial moment when the raising cost of war reached its limits. The whole war was bad for SA´s economical interests. Already in 1985 South Africa had declared the ´state of emergency´, and had deployed the army in Angola and Namibian territory, overstretching its capabilities. Also the economical sanctions against the South Africa where hurting its economy. Therefore the final process for Namibia´s independence was finally able to start in 1989. Nelson Mandela, on his speech made during his visit to Cuba in 1991, also referred to SADF´s defeat in Cuito Cuanavale as a crucial moment for Namibia´s independence409.
Which other events you see having crucial impact to the SWAPO´s independence struggle dynamics?
The 1978 battle of Cassinga, as part of SADF´s ´Operation Reindeer´, which was a South African air force attack against the SWAPO´s refugee camp in Cassinga [southern Angola], resulting a massacre of hundreds of civilians, mostly women and children, which started a new phase of the conflict. SWAPO retaliated heavily against SADF´s bases and international opinion turned more against South Africa.
This was preceded by the 1977 murder of the South Africa´s Prime Minister, who was succeeded by P.W. Botha in 1978. As an ex-defence minister, he started a new, violent approach towards SWAPO.
What were the relations between SWAPO and ANC? They were fighting against the same government, but did they co-operate?
No. As SWAPO´s members were mostly not educated and ANC´s were, there seems to be a ´cultural division´ between these organizations and no natural communication. SWAPO was much closer with other regional liberation movements, namely Zimbabwe’s ZANU (Mugabe) and with Zambia’s government, where SWAPO´s troops moved to Angola in 1974.
Are there any statistics of the level of violence and casualties of SWAPO´s armed struggle? I have seen a figure of 1 million casualties mentioned in the literature.
No. The existence of statistics requires naturally that some entity would systematically collect the information, and in this case, South Africa did not do so. I would say that 1 million casualties is a modest estimation of what SADF´s operations caused in whole South Africa.
409The exact quotation from Mandela´s speech in Cuba on 38th anniversary of the start of the Cuban revolution Date, July 26, 1991: ”The defeat of the racist army allowed the struggling people of Namibia to finally win their independence.” Transcript retrieved from: http://www.walterlippmann.com/docs3733.html, (1.12.2015).
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What is your opinion of SWAPO´s role in the Namibia´s liberation struggle? Some sources (SWAPO´s) emphasize the importance and Westerns researchers emphasize more of regional and international factors.
Referring to Sam Nujoma´s [SWAPO´s leader, later Namibia´s president] ´memoirs´ published in 2001, I would call it propaganda. The book, which obviously had several ghost-writers, glorifies the SWAPO´s armed resistance and dismisses external factors.
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Appendix II: Namibia – Interview of Lalli Metsola
Interview of Lalli METSOLA, researcher, University of Helsinki, Department of Political and Economic Studies, Development Studies.
Interview was conducted via Skype on 20.11.2015
(Translated from Finnish by the author)
What were the relations between SWAPO and ANC? They were fighting against the same government, but did they co-operate?
SWAPO was more of a nationalistic liberation movement and had more co-operation and contacts with Angolan and Tanzanian movements, then with ANC, in which the South African Communist Party had acquire increasing influence. Both organizations had co-operation with Soviet Union. But they had different culture, due their different backgrounds. SWAPO´s leadership had to run into exile abroad, received their education through the ´life´s experience´.
What kind of impact did the SWAPO´s division to its external [exile] and internal fractions had to SWAPO´s resistance and to the process in whole?
It was the SWAPO´s leadership in exile who organized the armed resistance, but from Angola, from where since 1974 SWAPO/PLAN guerrillas were infiltrated to Namibia. SWAPO had moved there from Zambia. SWAPO´s ´old guard´ remained in Namibia. Actually many of them had received their education in Finnish missionary schools in Ovamboland [northern part of Namibia bordering Angola].
SWAPO´s exile leadership´s importance and role can be seen also after the independence, as it formed the leadership of the newly independent Namibia. This can be seen partly because SWAPO´s internal leadership´s position inside the country was extremely difficult, because of the constant persecution by South Africans, as they were either convicted to prison or forced into exile, preventing the consolidation of their action or personal role/reputation.
How important at the end was SWAPO´s armed struggle in gaining the independence?
SWAPO´s own armed action had modest impact to the final independence. Angola´s and Cuba´s roles were crucial. SWAPO´s armed resistance had more of a symbolic meaning, which its leadership has used ever since for its own political gains. When evaluating SWAPO´s military action in northern Namibia, it was never able to create freed areas there.
On the other hand, SWAPO had special acknowledgement by the United Nations as the ´sole and authentic representative of Namibian people´, giving it a unique position. Therefore its diplomatic action became important.
How much and in which ways Namibia´s independence struggle was about regional dynamics?
South African administration had no wish to change regional power politics. Therefore SA emphasized its joining the US Reagans administration´s fight against communism in the 1980´s. It was the Western Contact Group, which started to negotiate the implementation of the UNSC resolution for Namibia´s independence. SWAPO was not included in these negotiations. It was finally
136 the 1988 SADF defeat in the battle of Cuito Cuanavale, which pushed the negotiations further. There were also economical factors impacting, as SA´s economy was doing really badly because of the international sanctions.
What is your view about the published memoirs of the ex-SWAPO guerrillas, which have been emerging since the independence?
Autobiographies are really interesting as a genre. These memoirs are mainly written by different level SWAPO leaders, those who have been able to keep their position or have been fired. Therefore they are mainly political autobiographies, infiltrated with national ethos. Good example of this is the Sam Nujoma´s memoirs, where personal and national levels have been mixed. On the contrary, several other memoirs address the SWAPO´s negative role. Therefore these works should be critically assessed, but they can help to conceptualize certain events and actors.
Are there any statistics of the level of violence and casualties of SWAPO´s armed struggle? I have seen a figure of 1 million casualties mentioned in the literature.
I don´t think that South Africa was keeping any records about the violence. I remember seen some estimation that SWAPO´s armed wing PLAN`s casualties were around 20,000 in total. This tells the real volume of their armed resistance. It was mainly sporadic activities of small troops. Some estimates are presented in Susan Brown´s article in Leys and Saul book410.
It´s important to remember the huge disproportion of power relations between SWAPO and South African forces. It was so big for South African favour that it did not need to inflict massive casualties to SWAPO. The only time was the battle of Cuito Cuanavale (the first and last major confrontation).
It´s also important to remember that apart the South Africa´s own military operations and activity, it also supported UNITA operations in Angola and RENATO operation in Mozambique.
410 Susan Brown 1995, ´Diplomacy by Other Means – SWAPO´s Liberation War´, in Leys and Saul 1995, Namibia´s Liberation Struggle, London: James Currey; Athens: Ohio University Press. Brown (1995, 37) mentions, that official South African figures set the combat-related deaths at 715 security force members as against 11,291 PLAN fighters and Angolan soldiers. These figures (if accurate; SWAPO does not appear to have estimates) do not take into account non-combatants caused to disappear by both sides, though another South African estimate is that civilians killed in the course of the Namibian war number 2,000. Angolan estimates for a single year´s (1981, a year of major South African penetration into southern Angola) were some 2,000 dead and 160,000 homeless.
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Appendix III: Namibia – Interview of Dr. Marion Wallace
Interview of Dr. Marion WALLACE, Lead Curator, African Collection, The British Library, London, UK. The author (with John Kinaban) of the A History of Namibia (2011).
Interview was conducted via Skype on 21.11.2015
What is your general view/opinion about the existing Namibia research and literature? You mentioned in your book that the study of the political history and SWAPO´s struggle is only beginning…
I want to point out that my book was published in 2011, and I have not followed the research and literature after that. By then, the history was still about to be written. Some general histories and forensic research had emerged. Now some Namibia related PhDs are emerging for example from Basel, Kesler by Akawa (?), who worked in SWAPO camps. At University of Cape Point (South Africa) prof. Patricia Hayes has supervised several Namibia related PhDs and new ones are coming (Shigwha?). University of Namibia´s Press recently published a book containing essays of recent historical studies about Namibia. You should look these sources and also bibliography mentioned in my book.
SWAPO´s archives are still closed, even that they were supposed to open them. Do you have any view or educated guesses what they might reveal for the research?
Well, SWAPO was also running camps, providing education, healthcare etc. There might be information about these activities. But I don’t want to speculate. Naturally, South Africa had a lot of detained SWAPO members, which were mostly killed.
After the end of WWII Western countries started decolonizing the Africa, but the 1948 elected nationalistic government in South Africa decided to keep South West Africa (Namibia). Why you think South Africa went the other way?
Probably because Namibia had rich natural resources, and also because of the geopolitics, keeping Namibia as a buffer zone against the rest of Africa (and its influences).
Two liberation movements, SWAPO and ANC were fighting same time against same government. Did these organizations co-operate and what kind of relations these organizations had with each other?
These liberation movements cooperated on rhetorical level, but in practice…not really. Because of the historical situations, organizations had different ideological tendencies. In 1950s-60s SWAPO was mobilized as a liberal party, whereas ANC had background in socialism. SWAPO had alliance with Soviet Union, whereas ANC was aliened with China. ANC also saw SWAPO as insignificant organization. All this resulted that SWAPO´s fight was a separate one. These issues are discussed in Dag Hendrichsen´s (?) book of Namibian history. Also by Israeli researcher called Goldblat (?), who addresses the question of Herero elite sympathy in his book.
The SWAPO was divided into two groups, SWAPO in exile and SWAPO inside the Namibia. What impact this had to the dynamics of conflict and the process? Who was ´running the show´?
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It was the external SWAPO who was leading the struggle, but during 1980s civil society movements increased, challenging exile group (leadership).
SWAPO´s mid-1970s and 1980s ´spy hunt´ and internal power struggle. How did these impact the resistance struggle and armed operations?
They had very decisive and strong impact, but also South African propaganda machine was very effective in creating controversies inside SWAPO. But what especially tipped the balance was the battle of Cuito Cuanavale, which pushed South Africa to the settlement, not SWAPO´s armed resistance.
Action which almost destroyed the peace process and UNTAG-mission, was 1 April 1989, on the first day of UNTAG-mission, when Sam Nujoma [SWAPO´s president] ordered PLAN-fighters to Namibia, to show that SWAPO has always had bases in Namibia [to bolster SWAPO´s position in coming peace process and negotiations].
What is your view of Martti Ahtisaari ´s (head of UNTAG) action?
I can give you the view of solidarity movement from UK, which I was a member of. The view was that Ahtisaari was very weak against international pressure in crisis situations, such as responding to 1 April 1989 crisis.
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Appendix IV: Namibia – Interview of Dr. Henning Melber
Interview of Dr. Henning MELBER, Senior Adviser and Director Emeritus of The Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation. First white member of the SWAPO since 1970´s. Author of a social study textbook of SWAPO in exile.
Interview was conducted via Skype on 30.11.2015.
How do you see the current state of the Namibia research and if you think about the existing literature, which state you think it is and is there still some ´blind spots´, which have not been answered?
Well, I normally say that Namibia is rather well researched. There are some blind spots, but they are there because its very difficult, especially when its comes to exile politics, you are poking your nose into very sensitive issues, of course. Because it relates also to the human rights violations of SWAPO. And it that we have a few personal accounts, most likely trustworthy personal accounts of lately. But its not really that kind of literature which would merit to be called academically sound. You might have seen the PhD by Martha Akuna [?] on the role of women in exile, which was published by Baasel. And that shows a bit more the intricacies of exile situation in specially when it comes to the role of women and their discrimination on the basis of gender. So that might the kind of literature you could be interested for your own work. The problem is that if you would want to add something, you would have to rely also on some empirical work with interviews and people would not give you the interviews. That is the problem. On other militant movements and anti-colonial movements and see where there are similar mechanisms, how the military mind-set is reproduced, also in the post- colonial, heroic narrative. That’s something I´m often dealing with, but Jan-Bart deals that as well. So, coming back to your question, I think you are looking in to a aspect, which is not fully researched, but for reasons I tried to explain, where you really face some challenges.
I understood that the SWAPO´s archives are still closed, and even that the SWAPO was suppose to open them, they haven´t done so far. Do you have any educated guess what they might reveal for further studies?
No, I don´t, because I don´t really know what they are there to include. The fact that they didn´t open it, does not necessarily mean that they want to keep the documents secret. It just could also mean that they are completely disorganized. So in Namibia you don´t know. Because I think that, if they wouldn´t want to have documents in the archive, they wouldn´t put them there. And what I heard, based on hearsay was, that the SWAPO documents were in the shambles, completely. So it´s also doubtful, that those documents we would be most interested to see, are actually in the archives. So I wouldn´t draw any conclusions that keeping them closed means that there is top-secret material. It´s maybe more incompetence. And in the whole archive project, it was basically the non-SWAPO people, who were most interested in compiling it. So that already explains it why there is so little happening.
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Then when I think about the beginning of the Namibia resistance, and if you go back to end of the second World War, and the rise of the nationalist party in the South Africa in 1948, and their decision to hang on their colony, even that the rest of the Western world was decolonizing, why you think that South Africa wanted to choose that way…was it because of the natural riches or to keep the Namibia as buffer zone against the rest of the Africa and its independence movements or what?
I think there were several reasons. There was the economic interests, including not only the diamonds, but also the new fisheries industry, which was developed after WWII. But I think it was more then that. It was also…and there was the geostrategic interest of the buffer zone you mentioned. But that did not play a role in post-WWII, because that time South Africa could not have imagined, that neighbouring territories would then become independent…that was not the time yet. I think it was more..was more of this internalized understanding that the South-West Africa, as it was called this time, was indeed for the South African´s the fifth province. They had resettled the arme blankas, the blue whites, in the 1920´s-1930´s, as a farmers whit huge subsidies. South-West Africa was among the provinces. And but aside all geostrategic or other economic interests, it was more something of identity, I believe. I didn´t come to their minds that it wouldn´t be their property, already after the WWI, general von Schmartset [?] mandated its annexation except-to-made, so already then, even under the other governments, the understanding was this is add it to South African territory. So it’s a mixture of all, but I wouldn´t…I wouldn´t necklet that dimension.
Then the interesting question about the connection between SWAPO´s independence struggle and ANC in South-Africa. It is interesting, that of course they where fighting against the same government at the same time, but did they really co-operate and what kind of relations they had…because I haven´t found the answer from the literature?
I don´t think you will find the answer, because they really did not co-operate. I can base my experience only on the time I joined the SWAPO, which was in the mid-1970´s. But, okay, you came together in all these solidarity congresses and that kind of stuff. And you had the delegations. But the delegations hardly ever mingled. We all stayed among our selves. And, as a SWAPO, we always had the feeling that the ANC looked down on us. It was almost the same superiority complex like the whites had against the blacks. Because the ANC considered us like South Africa, like Pretoria, as the farmers from the rural area in the North. Illiterate and…I mean there are these differences between the South African complexity of society and the rather simple structure of the Namibian society. And you could almost feel it in every interaction that while they were talking about comradeship, they did not really take us as the same or similar. It was never said like that, but it was felt all the time, and we had sentiments in our own delegation that we thought who the hell they think they are. And I mean…its not so far fetched…they were very well educated people. They had long history of civil society, which is not even existed today in Namibia. The first Namibians who studied, studied in South Africa. And the first Namibians who matriculated in Namibia were as late as 1956. So there were this huge caps. And you could feel them all the time. Almost like invisible borderline or wall. And it didn´t really enhance collaboration or co-operation and the insurgency were let along different lines. And another dividing aspect was that SWAPO had the unique status among all solidarity org…among all anti-colonial movements. Being recognized as the sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people by the UN General Assembly. There was no other liberation movement in any other country that had similar exclusive status. ANC and MPAC were recognized, so there were
141 always at least two…and the situations in other countries were also different, like in Zimbabwe. So that might have contributed to the fact that we in SWAPO were little a bit in the margins. That’s at least my experience and I agree, looking in the literature, you find hardly anything. But I think simply because there was not more. There was no…anchored, systematic collaboration.
Was ANC then closer to SWANU…?
No, they were not close to the Namibian situation at all. I don´t think they had nothing to do with SWANU or any other organization.
Then the question of SWAPO´s external and internal factions. The leadership was mostly abroad in UN and engage with international campaigning, then the local leadership in the country was trying to organize the armed rebellion. How did this impact the dynamics---there was power struggle at some point…?
I was just wondering when you said the division…if the division is the right word. I know what you mean, but the division implies that there would be competing interests. Or even almost referring to the power struggle or something. I don´t think that was the case. I just think that exile SWAPO was involved in diplomatic and military struggle and they, at least for the long time until the mid-1970´s had hardly any reliable context to inside. So when in Namibia for example the contract worker´s strike was organized in end of 1971, I think SWAPO abroad was not even directly involved in that and they couldn´t explain the dynamics on the ground and when the SWAPO´s Youth League formed inside of the country, it was formed based on the local conditions. And the external SWAPO was out of touch with that. I think that to the crises 1974-1975 the mass exodus started and you had tens of thousands of mainly younger people joining SWAPO in exile and it was a clash of cultures and understanding. That’s where the vendetta started and the internal repression really got bad, because you had these people from the Youth League who were in demand of more internal democracy and challenged the old SWAPO leadership. And they couldn´t handle it. That was I think not so much of a result of division then it was more result of different political realities. And they never overcame it. And if you investigate the composition of the leadership in SWAPO in the exile faction of SWAPO still gives you comparative advantage over those who never left the country. And I think that is the striking phenomena until today. You have closely knitted bonds especially in the first generation of SWAPO, but then also in exile…then also the second generation of SWAPO in exile as from 1970´s, those who survived the dungeons or were not prosecuted. They joined that exile setting which was indeed different from the local conditions on the ground and lets face it…those who stayed in Namibia might have been considered not as militants but they were the ones who really took the risk, if you put aside really those who were really send to the battlefront, but those on the political leadership in exile, they were far more confortable then the political leadership at home. They were the ones who were arrested, they were tortured, they were send to Robbin Island. They actually paid the price. And I think that was another component, which is until the very day not fully explored, because of course no one from the internal ring would not say it as openly as I say it now, but I think its part of the reality. And they were not considered adequately in the political positions in the independent Namibian government. And some of them who were had rather tensions with the exile leadership returning and applying their own concept of politics. And they were out of touch with the people. The other thing maybe just when I think about it that also comes to the picture is that the SWAPO, I mean the dominant part of SWAPO, the exile faction, after independence co-opted local
142 institutions which might have been more autonomous, like the women´s movement and the treguilde [?] movement. And they made them integral parts of SWAPO, meaning of SWAPO which was situated with the political leadership with exile background. But by definition the women´s movement and the trade union´s movement, they were rooted and anchored in the social realities on the ground at home. But they were there more autonomous approach to those issues. Women issues and trade issues was abandoned in return of being co-optive.
And then the Youth League bringing young radicalised people in to the movement and leading to that class between the old leadership and youth´s ideas…
Yes, and that happened in mid-1970´s when they left for Angola and Zambia and challenged the old leadership. And I remember, I was last time in 1975 in Namibia before leaving to Zambia. I was then exiled right afterwards. But when I left 1975, few activists of the Youth League asked me to find out some peoples whose names they give you, because that was already when the first rumours spread in Namibia that something is going utterly wrong in exile and that some of their comrades had disappeared or are threatened or prosecuted or what else. So it was already then starting that people got very confused and didn´t realise what was going on, and that again speaks to lack of communication. They had really no idea what was happening in exile, and I think in exile they had no idea how the people in Namibia felt, where the younger ones who decided to join SWAPO with personal risk.
Which one contributed more for gaining the independence – SWAPO´s armed or diplomatic struggle? And what effect the regional conflicts, such as the Angola´s civil war and South Africa´s Bush War had to SWAPO´s struggle?
I think the arms struggle was important contributing factor but it was not decisive factor. It played mainly a psychological role already in the 1960´s because it gave SWAPO the upper hand over the SWANU, when SWAPO decided to undertake armed resistance for the liberation of Namibia. That was the turning point. Only then it gained more support internationally then SWANU. SWANU was before that as much recognised and connected as SWAPO was. So that was already decisive aspect giving SWAPO more credibility in the eyes of those who wanted to see a determined fight. That is the number one thing. The number two is that the armed struggle had an impact on South African society. Because if you follow the discourses there, a growing number of parents who asked why do we have to sacrifice our sons in a border war, which is not even a border of South Africa. So it also paved a way inside of South Africa to put the nationalist government under a pressure to come to terms with the negotiated solution. But I think this heroic narrative, which creates this impression that Namibia was liberated through the barrel of the gun, is just ideological humbug, because SWAPO would have never been able to win the war against the South Africans. The contributing factor was of course the Cuban presence in Angola and the decision by the Cuba to intensify the military presence in the late 1980´s, when the geostrategic situation sifted. So in that sense you could say if it all it were the Cubans who liberated the Namibia, which of course, while the Cubans are consider friends, is to much of a temporecity for the SWAPO leadership to admit. But Cuito Cuanavale was certainly marker, also putting increasing pressure on South Africa to consider whether it was worth to maintain the war at the border area, giving the internal opposition in South Africa. But it was more…I think that the decisive factor was the geostrategic sift with perestroika and the collapse of the Soviet Union you had this shared interest of the global players forming appeasement
143 strategy. And I think it was actually as simple as a plain deal. The Soviets would withdraw from Afghanistan, the Cubans would withdraw Angola, and the South Africans would withdraw from Namibia. And if a negotiated transition works and doesn´t risk the fundamental interest of the white minority and the Western world, then we can even try to have democratic elections in South Africa. I think it was as simple as that. And since the Namibia basically worked and none of the fundamental interests were sacrificed, it was a deal you get political self-determination but you maintain the socio-economic structures, meaning our interests. It worked, so there was no reason why it should not work in South Africa and as we know, the last twenty years, it worked in South Africa too, at the expense of the majority of the people who had actually expected that independence means more than civil and political rights, but also socio-economic and more equality. And they were the ones who were cheated out of it. It was an elite pact. I know that I´m one of the most critical observers on that, but in my point elite pact was it turned out to be. And that of course is not a official discourse if you want to apply part of the government. So you repeat the discourse that we liberated the Namibia single handily and sacrificed, and of course lot of people sacrificed. Not necessarily the political leadership. They were sitting in the fancy hotel rooms and were treated as VIPs on solidarity congresses. They were not the ones who took the risk. But they now say that we are the liberators and you owe us to Namibian people, because we risked our lives to liberate you. Meanwhile those who risked their lives to liberate the Namibian people, they are not the ones in high political positions. As anywhere else, of course. So, yes, the armed resistance played a role as contributing factor, but one should also but it in to a perspective where you say, come on – yes, it was a contributing factor, but decisive?... not necessarily.
What is extremely interesting with the Namibian conflict is that all the levels, national, regional and international are so intertwined and creates such a complex setting…
And remember the disastrous consequences of first April 1989, when the UN Resolution was implemented, and…I know that because that time I was in Harare and together with the Nujoma and the leadership. So I believe from what I saw my self and how they reacted. That actually preceding that disaster was they ordered to send them to Namibia. It´s debatable whether they deliberately knew that they would violate the ceasefire agreement. But the main attention was to, following the advice of Mugabe, to create the impression that SWAPO was militarily present in Namibia at the time of the implementation of the UN Resolution. Basically mislead the people, following the narrative that we are the liberators and we have been present with our troops in Namibia, which they were not.
And what happened is that the South Africa demanded to have a right to counter this intrusion and killed many of these ´attackers´…
And your poor fellow countrymen Ahtisaari, he had no choice. I mean it was very obvious…he either allows them to execute in cold blood or the implementation of the resolution becomes to a halt before it even starts. It was very obvious. He was basically confronted with ultimatum. And then the SWAPO leadership blamed him and tried to give him the responsibility, when meanwhile the responsibility was on the side of SWAPO leadership, quite honestly.
SWAPO´s 1970´s and 1980´s spyhunt…did it happen because of the internal power struggle or because of the South African propaganda spreading rumours?
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I think it´s a mixture of both, but I think what tricked it more was the internal pressure on the SWAPO leadership to be accountable. When it became really bad, or got from bad to worse, that was after Cassinga, when basically the military efforts by SWAPO were really under pressure and they were really not delivering. And of course, it is common knowledge in any of such movements that there are spies. It´s like a cancer that grows. If you start to try to investigate who are spies, it leads to nowhere, especially in the case of SWAPO, who applied torture to get those who are suspected of being spies some ´confessions´ and implicate others. And then you create evident which is in point of no return. And it was this obsession of security threats in the party who did two things. They eliminated unwanted internal criticism, especially from groups they didn´t trust. Anyway groups who were not Ovambo. Including also Ovambo people, but if you look at the list of those who didn´t survive after the witch hunt, then there were much higher proportion of non-Ovambos, and they were higher educated. Which comes in to that picture which we started of between the ANC and SWAPO, because in SWAPO is also has been always a kind of anti-intellectualism. And those younger generations who came from inside in mid-1970´s they came from high schools, from the secondary schools. And they came to study further. And that articulated in their language, in their discourse, in their demands, which made them unpleasant, pain, and suspicious. So I think it was more of a issue of internal elimination of unwanted elements, to but it this way. But in combination with of course this excuse, the fear of spies. But I think that was not the ultimate driving force. I think it was more the reason that they were looking to give it a legitimacy. I think it was very clearly an internal cleaning process by the old elite, or lets say the part of the old elite, because they also eliminated others. That goes back to the late 1960´s already and the early 1970´s. But one of the main targets from mid-1970´s onwards were the people in the Youth League who came from inside. And some of those who were fighting the war and they felt that the leadership couldn´t care less about their situation, because that was another interesting indicator that the arms struggle actually served a purpose, but not the purpose to liberate Namibia. It served a purpose to add legitimacy to the diplomacy of exile SWAPO. But the fight was on the ground, when ever respected in a way they deserved for risking their lives. And that was part, as far as I understand and are able to reconstruct, part of the internal protest in the early to mid-1970´s, where the guerrillas on the ground said we don’t get food, you don´t supply us with logistics, you are basically sending us into the certain deaths just to make the point we are fighting with arms for independence. And you have a number of so- called accidents of high-ranking SWAPO officials where until the very day a lot of people have a doubt that if these were really accidents. An interesting number of car accidents and similar cases where you say, okay, car accidents can happen for various reasons.
I have been trying to find some kind of statistics about the level of violence and casualties during the SWAPO´s independence struggle. There are some references of individual battles and their casualties but no systematic statistics. Do you know are there any statistics?
To my knowledge there are no reliable statistics.
About Mr. Ahtisaari-how do you see his influence for the Namibia´s independence process? He mentions in his resent memoirs about his decade long behind-the-seen diplomatic ground work that paved the way for the UNTAG mission and the independence.
I haven´t read his memoirs yet, they just published them in English translation. I haven´t red them, they are so big. I think Martti did a good job when he was in Namibia. It´s always difficult…now I
145 haven´t red the memoirs but I know him and I listen to him and we talk a lot. Of course you always have this when individuals remember their roles, that it is very difficult, and I am not saying its deliberately so, but it´s very difficult to maintain an objective look on your own work. So very often people tend to over estimate their own impacts. But, despite having said that, I think the way Martti tried to handle it had really a positive impact. I remember what he said to me, it might be in his memoirs as well, when he said that for him it was very important the informal exchange. He used his home for private social meetings to bring together the representatives of both sides; the South African administrations and of the SWAPO, in an atmosphere were you don´t need to negotiate, whit the deliberate intention that they become known with each other and realise that the others are not necessarily bad guys. You know, you can have a nice chat over a drink. You don´t have to careful because you are not negotiating any substantial positions. And that basically is of course now a recognised tool in mediation strategies that you need to find a way that those who are perceiving each others as enemies get an opportunity to realise that beyond the enemy there is a human being that you can in times even in a positive way to relate to. Like they are also parents, they care about their children, what ever you know, or they have a dog and I like it…you know what I mean. And I think that was really something Martti seems to have achieved in Namibia, that he had to create a trust and I think he had these informal ways of contributing to a climate and an atmosphere were trust was on personal bases enhanced. And that in it self is actually something very important. And then of course there are all the other factors where it doesn´t help if you good at, but which worked out basically in the context of Namibia. And again that was maybe more of political give-and-take, where you could on moral grounds differ…I was never happy whit the way the UN handled the ex- detain question. They stop…they really stop short of calling spade as spade. They should have done more when they got back the few hundred ex-detainees who survived after dungeons and through their mire presence in July 1989 showed that happened…the Un could have done more. But if they would have done more, it would have been considered as an intervention of anti-SWAPO and pro- South Africa. So this was the give-and-take, where moral and ethical grounds sometimes collide with political practicism. If you wanted to have a rather peaceful negotiated solution maybe it was the right decision, not to dick further to that ugly history. Maybe it was. I lost some friends there in the dungeons so it is really difficult to accept it. But I think its one of those bigger issues how do you justify it. I say it when I talk with Martti these days…well it sounds if we were close friends, we are of course not, but we know each other and we talk… he tends to too quickly want to forget about those tricky issues, and against I can understand him…if I would have been in his shoes, they are not necessarily something you want to talk about or you want to do some more intensive soul searching because the bottom line is it was overall a successful negotiated transition to the independence and we could say mission was accomplished. But there was unfortunately some of this infamous collateral damage. And I think that was the sad part of this story.
I have been reading from your article about the present political culture in Namibia and that SWAPO still continues to deny these crimes and refuses public discussion about them.
Yes, it´s true. For reasons I really fail to understand, because it wouldn´t risk to loose anything in their legitimacy or credibility…they would only gain. I just don´t understand it.
I noticed from the literature that SWAPO never took part to the negotiations about the Namibia´s independence…why is that?
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That is very noteworthy. Yes, even the negotiations after the April 1 at the Mount Etjo excluded SWAPO…it is mind-boggling. I think it goes a little bit into the direction of what I originally illustrated when you asked about the relations between ANC and SWAPO. Because it was not only the ANC that had…lets say limited confidence into the ability of SWAPO, as an organisation and also into the ability of the leadership involved in the negotiations. I think generally that was shared among frontline states, and shared also between Cubans and the Soviets. I remember, what must have been the late 1970´s or early 1980’s, I was once in a congress in East-Berlin at that time, and some one came and felt that he could trust me and came to me and asked can you please tell me how much is SWAPO really a socialist? Because they always…you know…there was always this feeling who is SWAPO, what is their policy, can we rely on them, and already when the Western Contact Group started their negotiations towards 435, as far we can establish, it was basically Obasanjo, then the military chief of Nigeria, and the front line states that talked and forced SWAPO into accepting the Resolution. SWAPO wouldn´t want to have it. And it was the other players in the region who were interested to find a way out of the war situation in Southern Africa. And that…you could actually say its kind of a sign symbolically as if SWAPO would have been a child. People like Sam Nujoma were [?], otherwise he couldn´t manage to stay in power in the liberation movement for all the time. He´s one of the very few how survived all the power struggles if you compare it with other liberation movements there is hardly anyone else who managed that. But I don´t think he has the repertoire of what you would call an elder states-man. You know…negotiation skills, intellectually being able to identify windows of opportunities, being able to negotiate compromises, and if you read his biography, which is not his biography, it is something he wanted to see, but that if we enforce…the title says where all others waivered, I think he is a very stubborn guy. And being a very stubborn guy it is not the best asset for entering the negotiations to find a solution in an impasse. And I think the others were a aware of that and basically imposed negotiated settlement to a certain extend to SWAPO. But I fully agree that it´s mind-boggling to see that SWAPO was not really the counterpart of South Africa…it was not. It was Western Contact Group, it was South Africa and then the front line states, the AU, the Cuba, and the Soviet Union were as important as SWAPO was.
All this despite the SWAPO´s unique position with UN recognition…?
Its absurd, it´s bordering the absurd. And its an other argument to be careful when it comes to this claim that Namibia was liberated through the barrel of the gun. Because you could say again…yes, it might have been a contributing factor, but it was liberated through negotiations, where actually even SWAPO played a subdued role. As harsh as it sounds. And of course the Cassinga was one of those events where South Africa tried to make it impossible for SWAPO…going back in history…making it impossible to SWAPO to accept the Resolution 435. And were the other parties who forced SWAPO to conceit. Because they also saw what the South Africa´s intentions were and by that they tricked South Africa, because South Africa relied…I think they very much relied on bombing the refugee camp and making it impossible for SWAPO to agree with the Resolution 435. And the others say no, we agree with the 435, and though that they sabotage the South Africa´s plan, because South Africa didn´t want to agree with 435, and since they couldn´t openly declare that, they wanted to force SWAPO not to agree with it. And the front line states and Obasanjo said no, you agree. And through that they played South Africa. And then basically it was Maggy Thacther and Ronald Reagan who came to rescue because USA elections and new foreign policy of the UK and the USA, they backed the South Africa and when the Geneva talks failed, when people voted for SWANU, which came as a total surprise, and those factors together prevented the fast implementation of the 435.
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What pushed the South Africa to the negotiation table at the end? Was it the defeat at the battle of Cuito Cuanavale, or perhaps the suffering national economics?
I think it was one of the several important factors [Battle of Cuito Cuanavale] of course. I don´t think there was one singularly decisive factor. There was several. Geostrategic peacement interest of all the big powers, Western countries increasing pressure on South Africa, saying hey come to terms – what you have to loose? I think it was combination of several things. And you shouldn´t forget that inside South Africa, the capital [business] since long already demanded to polish the apartheid because it was not in the interest of profit maximising. The white South African capital said since 1970´s apartheid is stupid. It cost us money instead of creating money for us. So there was a series of contributing factors. Economic aspects, and domestic policies were most likely as important as external pressure and other factors. And again, I mean everyone knew that when Namibia becomes independent it takes the South African Air Force half-an-hour to be in the territory and bombard the territory if something goes utterly wrong. And we knew it at independence. And we were so afraid at the independence if we don´t behave South Africans will punish us. Everyone knew it of course. Because there was still geostrategic interest of South Africa to protect. And part of it was that it’s a…change which still protects and secure the fundamental interest. In terms of security, in terms of property relations. And we did that as SWAPO government. And that meant in that situation…okay…then we can also have elections in South Africa, because if I might think of government honours fundamental principles as much as SWAPO does, we have nothing to loose, but only gain. And that’s exactly what happened.
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Appendix V: Namibia - United Nations General Assembly Resolution 65 (1946)
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Appendix V: Namibia - United Nations General Assembly Resolution 65 (1946)
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Appendix VI: Namibia - United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2145
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Appendix VI: Namibia - United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2145 (1966)
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Appendix VII: Namibia - United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3111 (1973)
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Appendix VII: Namibia - United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3111 (1973)
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Appendix VIII: Namibia - United Nations General Assembly Resolution 146 (1976)
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Appendix VIII: Namibia - United Nations General Assembly Resolution 146 (1976)
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Appendix IX: Namibia - United Nations Security Council Resolution 385 (1976)
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Appendix IX: Namibia - United Nations Security Council Resolution 385 (1976)
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Appendix X: Namibia - United Nations Security Council Resolution 435 (1978)
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Appendix X: Namibia - United Nations Security Council Resolution 435 (1978)
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5. Comparative analysis This section analyses the escalatory and de-escalatory role of the factors in the four cases, Israel, Lebanon, Namibia, and Sri Lanka, to illustrate the similar and different drivers found in these conflicts. The analysis is structured along the developed framework.
5.1 Context
Social cleavages In all four cases, social cleavages can be seen as a highly significant causal mechanism leading to the formation of the conflict. In the case of Sri Lanka, the social cleavage between the Tamils and the Sinhalese is the most important. However, the caste system created a hierarchical cleavage within each community, which also contributes to the onset of the conflict. On the other hand, in the case of Namibia social cleavage manifested itself in the form of political and centre-periphery divisions, originating from the South African oppressive apartheid-policies. Ideological division strongly influenced the social cleavage in the case of Israel, as there were two blocks with conflicting ideologies. In the case of Lebanon, ethno-religious sectarian cleavages existed between the numerous Christian and Muslim denominations. Additionally, the urban-rural cleavage created tensions within the Lebanese society. It can be observed that social cleavages played a significant role in all four cases facilitating the outbreak of the conflicts. In three cases, Lebanon, Namibia and Sri Lanka, the social cleavage also had an impact the conflict dynamics, in driving at least some of the (de)escalation of the conflicts. In Namibia social cleavages caused an internal power struggle within SWAPO between the younger and older generations. A similar trend occurred at the end of the Sri Lankan conflict, in which a social cleavage existed between the eastern and northern Tamil community. In Lebanon social cleavages escalated the conflict due to communal mobilisation along sectarian lines, which resulted in higher levels of inter- and intra-sectarian violence at several times.
Popular support
In all four cases popular support seems to be related to the conflict dynamics. However, popular support mostly appears to be an indirect influence, since changing levels of popular support did not necessarily lead to changing levels of violence. In three cases, Israel, Lebanon and Sri Lanka, the central government commanded a general low popular support (within a certain community), while the main oppositional actors enjoyed a high level of popular support. In Sri Lanka, the popular support of the non-Tamil population was not necessarily
167 low, but the population voted and supported along party lines, due to the rivalry between the two most important political parties. The idea of a central government was not challenged, but the policy concerning the insurgency was. This resulted in a lack of popular support for the actions of the state, sometimes resulting in anti-government riots. In the case of Lebanon, society was highly divided on the organisation of the state apparatus, but the idea of a central government was supported throughout the conflict. Militias did not call into question the legitimacy of the government. The conflict was more about the division of power within the government. In Israel, the central government lacked legitimacy due to British presence preventing the formation of an Israeli or Arab state. In contrary to the case of Namibia, whereas the central government of South Africa did enjoy popular support from the white voting electorate both in South Africa and Namibia. In the case of Namibia, South Africa´s occupation over Namibia was seen by white ruling minority as historical continuation.
Popular support for non-state actors could be argued to be a contributing factor to both the commencement and continuation of the conflict. In the case of Sri Lanka, the state-building project of the LTTE created a high level of popular support because of the provision of security. However, the majority believed their strategies to be too violent. A similar observation can be made in the case of Lebanon, where militias enjoyed popular support due to the protection they offered to their respective communities. Several militias pleaded for the division of Lebanon in different cantons, which was only supported by a small minority of the Lebanese people. In the case of Israel, all non-state actors enjoyed popular support amongst their constituencies. In contrary to Namibia, where the SWAPO did not offer any protection to communities, partly due to its limited military capacity, and mostly enjoyed popular support because of its non-biaze, all including nation-wide independence strife.
The direction of the relation between the two variables works both ways. On the one hand, high levels of violence can lead to lower levels of popular support. On the other hand, high levels of popular support for non-state actors can result in escalation of the conflict, while low levels can de-escalate the conflict.
Grievances
In all the four cases, grievances fuelled the motivation of non-state actors to escalate the conflict. Economic, political and social grievances played a role in the conflicts. Therefore, it had an enormous escalatory impact, mainly in the beginning of the conflict.
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In Namibia grievances can be linked to the apartheid. Oppression of the black population and their poor social and economic conditions caused political grievance. In the case of Israel, the main grievance involved with the escalation of violence was the obstruction by the central authority to comply with prior political commitments on power transfer. In Sri Lanka, the grievances mostly derived from discriminatory policies of the state against the Tamils, which resulted in political, economic and social grievances. For example, the Tamil language was not recognised as an official language. Even though the Tamils were seated in parliament, they had de facto a lack of influence. In the case of Lebanon, political and economic grievances existed amongst the Muslim denominations. The Lebanese confessional system had formalised the division of power, which caused political grievances. The Christian community was granted most political power, which seems to have also resulted in better economic positions, thereby, causing political and economic grievances amongst the Sunni Muslim community.
It can be observed that within communities, feelings of grievances can prevail. In Lebanon, the Shia Muslim community suffered from a low socio-economic status in comparison to the Sunni Muslim community. This is reflected in Sri Lanka by the caste system, which created differences and grievances within the Tamil community.
In Sri Lanka, Lebanon and Israel, grievances continued to be one of the main drivers of escalation and use of violence for the insurgent(s) throughout the conflict. In contrast to Namibia, where grievance lost its high impact on conflict dynamics, although new grievances arose, for instance, because of poor conditions in refugee camps, which resulted in internal power struggle within SWAPO. In Sri Lanka, for instance, the LTTE was excluded from peace negotiations, which intensified the feelings of exclusion. Additionally, the grievances were so high that decentralisation solutions were not believed to be possible, and they continued devoted to a separate state solution. In the case of Lebanon, the political grievances were deep-rooted and the confessional system hindered political reforms. The Muslim-leftist parties went to great lengths to change the political system. Additionally, the militias were not invited to the negotiation table for a long time, which fuelled their feelings of grievance. Another aspect is the cycle of retaliation, which continued to cause grievances and heighten the level of violence. In Israel, acts of retaliation and inflicted harm caused grievances amongst all actors driving further escalation of the conflict. Interestingly, in all cases acts of retaliation seems to have played a significant role in the escalation of the conflict.
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Local politics
Local politics can be linked to the onset of the conflict in three cases. In the case of Namibia, local politics in the northern region supported the emergence of the SWAPO´s liberation struggle, but it would not impact the conflict dynamics as SWAPO disregarded the local political dimension. Similarly, local politics in Sri Lanka can be regarded as an escalating factor in the beginning, since the rivalry between groups and local leaders resulted in a high level of violence. The LTTE turned out to be the strongest and became the only Tamil militant group for years. Their local political system enhanced public support from the community. Eventually, local political dynamics escalated the conflict again when a new leader started to participate. Likewise, in Lebanon local leaders played a significant role in the onset of the conflict, in terms of communal mobilisation. Lebanese community leaders continued to contribute to the escalation of violence as the conflict progressed by supporting and deploying their respective militia. With the collapse of the central government, communities increasingly relied on the traditional clan structures, in which the local community or clan leader controlled the local police or militia. In all three cases, local politics were highly interrelated with the existence of social cleavages, grievances and the level of popular support. The fourth case, Israel, showed less conclusive results on the specifics of local politics. This might have resulted from the fact that the conflict occurred in a region that is small in many respects, intertwining local and national politics. The Jewish actors maintained a centralised government, while the Arabs were divided more prominently along clan lines. The relevance of either the central government or the clan structures might explain the relative absence of historical accounts on local politics.
National politics
It can be argued that national politics played a role in all conflicts. In all four cases, the nature of the political system functions as a causal mechanism of conflict. In the case of Sri Lanka and Namibia, the national governments ignored the demands of the non-state parties and continued with their original problematic policies, leading to the outbreak of the conflict. In contrary to Israel and Lebanon, where the non-state actors were not ignored. In some instances, the government even cooperated with the non-state actors. In the Israeli case, for example, during the hunting season, the Hagana militia cooperated with the British in suppressing the other Jewish militias. In the case of Lebanon, the militias functioned as paramilitary wings of political parties. Militias of both the Christian-rightist and the Muslim-
170 leftist parties supported the Lebanese Army at different times in the conflict. The complexity derived from the fact that the militias' leaders could be involved in an armed struggle, while the political leaders were part of the same government. Both political and militias' leaders incited the use of mass violence. In the case of Sri Lanka, it seems that the national politics through national elections de-escalated the conflict due to changing policy in most of the times. Similarly, in Israel, the election of a perceived pro-Zionist government in London during the 1945 elections, influenced de-escalation of the conflict, as political goals could be achieved by cooperation. In contrary to Lebanon and Namibia, where national elections and a change of government mainly escalated the conflict. In Lebanon, political assassinations occurred after a new government had been formed, in order to destabilise the political situation.
Regional politics
All cases had a strong external dimension, in which the regional balance of power played a significant role in the dynamics of the conflict. In the case of Israel, regional politics resulted in a large scale military intervention in the conflict by regional actors. During 1948, the political objectives under consideration by various Arab governments regarding intervention in Palestine, were as much or more dominated by regional political considerations than the destruction of Israel. These regional considerations included maintaining popular support amongst the broader Arab public and increasing political standing, in a bid to become the leader of a Pan-Arab world. Positive considerations were combined with negative regional political considerations, such as preventing other regional actors from expanding territorially, or gaining influence. Regional politics resulting in large scale military interventions is an example of how regional politics can drive escalation. In the same way, foreign invasions of Lebanese territory caused escalation of the conflict. Both Syria and Israel invaded Lebanon multiple times, causing substantial higher levels of violence. Additionally, both states offered financial and material support to the militias, which contributed to prolonging the conflict. Likewise, in the case of Namibia, the Cuban intervention was seen as a major threat by South Africa, leading to its involvement. The South African government also tried to destabilise neighbouring countries, which were supporting and/or hosting SWAPO. Lastly, the support of India for the Tamil militants contributed to escalation of the conflict. Notwithstanding the escalatory role of regional politics, in Namibia, Lebanon and Sri Lanka, a foreign military intervention would eventually lead to de-escalation of the conflict. More specifically, India stopped the military campaign of the Sri Lankan government, which resulted in a three-year
171 ceasefire. However, escalation ensued the withdrawal of the Indian forces. In Lebanon, Syria launched a full-fledged military operation against General Aoun. After his removal, the Lebanese government could implement the Taif agreement, which ended the war.
International politics
International actors proved to be a major factor influencing the conflict dynamics in all four cases. Although, in all cases, international politics contributed to reaching a settlement, international politics often led to or contributed to escalation throughout the conflicts. This occurred as a result of direct military interventions or exercising pressure on the actors to join peace negotiations. In the case of Sri Lanka, the UN tried to pressure the government to find a diplomatic solution towards the end of the conflict, which failed. In the other cases, international negotiations were initiated by the international community. However, the impact of negotiations was dependent on local receptiveness. For example, in the case of Lebanon, militias who were not invited to the negotiations table, responded to international peace negotiations with fighting. This was not the case in Namibia, where SWAPO was also not included in the leading negotiation. However, they did not even take into account or responded to the international peace negotiations. Eventually, UN recognition for SWAPO as the sole and authentic representative of Namibian people would consolidate its national position.
In two cases, Israel and Lebanon, escalation occurred as a result of withdrawal of the foreign actor. In the case of Lebanon, the Multinational Forces supported the Lebanese government in the expulsion of the PLO. The withdrawal of the MNF would lead to severe attacks on several Palestinian refugee camps, as they no longer enjoyed protection from either the PLO or foreign troops. In the case of Israel, the withdrawal of Central British Authority caused escalation, as all parties started fighting to take control. Indirect involvement in the form of diaspora populations supporting specific actors occurred in all four conflicts. This contributed directly and significantly to the strength and capabilities of the supported actors.
Cold War dynamics played a major role in three conflicts. In the case of Namibia, it influenced the conflict dynamics by preventing the peace-building efforts and negotiations. SWAPO was dragged into the fight for communist backed by Angola. In general, it was caught in the middle of U.S. led war against Communism. In Lebanon, the Cold War dynamics became most apparent in the foreign support for militias. The nations offering support were clearly divided along Cold War lines. In the case of Israel, Cold War dynamics
172 are resembled in three different ways. First, British considerations included the strategic need for relations in the region, as being close to strategic supply routes, but also under consideration was the Arab oil, necessary for winning the coming war with the Soviet Union. Secondly, on a political level Soviet opportunism played a role, as British and American policies on the issue of Palestine differed, the Soviets actively pursued a strategy to increase friction on the issue between the two major western allies. Third, as much of the middle east was under British control, creation of the state of Israel, could serve to both impair British relations with the Arab countries. If Israel would successfully claim independence and statehood, this could possibly create a Soviet ally in the Middle-East possessing strategic Mediterranean ports, something the Soviet Union identified as a strategic necessity. In the case of Lebanon, cold war dynamics are mostly resembled in the foreign support militias received. The Christian-rightist camp sided with the West, while the Muslim-leftist camp sided with Soviet-aligned Arab states. In this way, the cold war dynamics accelerated the process of polarisation. In the case of Sri Lanka, other international developments, such as the war on terror, influenced the dynamics of the conflict. The international narrative framed the Tamil Tigers as terrorist, and supported the governmental coercive action against these 'terrorists'. It also declined the financial support of Tamil diaspora, which had a negative impact of the capacity of the LTTE.
In Sri Lanka, Norway led peace negotiations, which seem to have de-escalated the conflict at first. However, they failed to bring all the parties together, which resulted in escalation of the conflict. Likewise, in Namibia peace negotiations were held without SWAPO by the Western Contact Group, which led to escalation of the conflict. In the case of Lebanon, several foreign powers initiated peace negotiations. However, the attempts failed utterly, which resulted in higher levels of violence, and pushed the Lebanese government even more to the sidelines. In the last phase, foreign mediation led by Saudi Arabia led to the Taif agreement, which formally ended the civil war. In Israel, foreign mediation influenced the negotiations in the first phases, in order to gain a position of strength. In the last phase, foreign mediation resulted in three truces. However, the truces were misused to regroup for combat operations.
Natural disaster
Two of the four cases experienced a natural disaster during the conflict. Namibia had a serious drought and Sri Lanka was struck by a tsunami. However, the impact of the natural disasters differed. In Namibia, the drought changed the circumstances of the conflict. For
173 instance, the drought forced some tribes to work for the South African Defense Forces. Still, the drought is not considered to be a causal mechanism for escalation or de-escalation of the conflict. In Sri Lanka, it did influence conflict dynamics. The tsunami struck the island in times of relative peace. This united the population for a while, who all worked together in rebuilding the island. However, the rebuilding policy increased political tensions. This resulted in the collapse of the political coalition and increased the social tensions towards the Tamils. Eventually, this contributed to the escalation of the conflict. In Israel and Lebanon no natural disasters occurred during the conflicts.
Geography
In case of Israel, Sri Lanka, and Lebanon geographical settings prolonged the conflict, as the geography caused ethnic concentrations. The Sri Lankas thick jungle and the Lebanese mountainous terrain created an environment for ethnic segregation and bases for long resistance. Similarly, in Israel, segregated villages existed, providing both safe havens and clean targets. The remote and segregated villages provided secure bases for militias to operate from, controlling the village and much of the surrounding land and roads. Concurrently, this segregation also caused insecurity to the civilians, for it provided clean targets. allowing perpetrators to act relentless, as when attacking a village, no account had to be held for the safety of civilians of the own group. Additionally, geographical factors played a decisive role in the type of warfare, as exemplified by the guerrilla warfare in Sri Lanka and the Tamil Tigers controlling the coastlines in the East and the North, which increased their naval capacities. Similar warfare practices can be observed in the mountainous and urban areas of Lebanon.
In the case of Sri Lanka and Namibia a regional theatre of war occurred, leaving the rest (most) of the country to continue their more or less normal lives. In contrast, in the case of Namibia geographical setting naturally limited the reach of non-state actors armed operations. Since the operations were in the form of small-scale guerrilla attacks, it seems that geography did not impact the conflict dynamics. These attacks would also have taken place in a different environment, because non-state actor did not have resources for large-scale warfare.
5.2 State State action – coercive force
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In all four cases, the use of coercive force by the state actor contributed to escalation of the conflict. In Namibia and Lebanon, the use of coercive force proved to be a major contributing factor to the outbreak of the conflict. In Namibia, the violent breakdown of protests aggravated the population, and started the liberation movement. Similarly, the Lebanese Army was deployed against the Sunni Muslims to bring an end to the protests, which sparked the inter-sectarian fighting. For the remainder of the conflict, the Lebanese government was anxious to use coercive force, as it feared it would fuel sectarian tensions. Eventually, the state lost its method of coercion with the disintegration of the Lebanese Army. The role of the state was reduced to the side-lines and the rule of militia triumphed.
Likewise, in the case of Israel, the restrained stance on the use of coercive force by the state actor contributed to escalation of the conflict, as the non-state actors were able to freely combat other non-state actors. In both the case of Namibia and Sri Lanka, the use of coercive force resulted in a cycle of retaliation. In Sri Lanka, the state's coercive force can be regarded as a response to the violent acts of the Tamil Tigers, although state personal took part in the escalating anti-Tamil riots at the onset of the conflict. In Namibia, coercive force was used to reinforce the apartheid policies, which aggravated the feelings of grievance. In the last phase of the conflict in Lebanon and Sri Lankan, coercive force of the state would result in higher levels of violence on a short term, but de-escalate the conflict on a long term. In the other phases, the use of coercive force by the state resulted in escalation of the conflict. Additionally, it has been observed that the use of coercive force influenced the levels of popular support for the ruling government and militias. Extensive use of coercive force can lead to war weariness, in which the population gets tired from the casualties and costs of war.
State action – policy solution
Policy solutions of the state have similar effects on the four cases. In Lebanon, policy solutions in the form of peace negotiations failed, which led to escalation of the conflict. The warring factions were not able to find common ground due to their diverging objectives, and ordered their militias to continue their attacks. At other times, the negotiations failed because not all factions were seated at the negotiation table. Eventually, peace negotiations initiated by Saudi Arabia would lead to political consensus, ending the conflict. Similarly, in Sri Lanka peace negotiation attempts failed, as the parties failed to make comprises, had ulterior motives, or the LTTE felt excluded, after which the Tamil Tigers returned to their violent strategies.
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In Namibia independence negotiations were conducted on the international level without a non-state actor. South Africa made several attempts of self-governance in Namibia, allowing the creation of local parliaments. The SWAPO ignored these peace-making attempts and continued their strive for full independence. Eventually, the involvement of a foreign power and the UN led to de-escalation the conflict in both Lebanon and Namibia. In Israel, independence negotiations determined the strategies, thereby, influencing the dynamics of the conflict. It must be noted that the negotiations were also used as a strategy. The main armed group chose strategies aiming to de-escalate the conflict. While other armed groups, smaller factions, acted as spoilers.
Additionally, in all cases oppressive legislation was adopted to deal with the insurgent movements. In Namibia and Sri Lanka, the anti-terrorism act enlarged the repressive capabilities of the state, but resulted in more grievances among the minority population. In Israel, the same grievances resulted from the non-fraternisation act, forbidding any British citizen to economically or socially interact with a Jewish citizen. In Lebanon, the president ordered the Lebanese Army to search and capture illegal Palestinians. However, illegal Palestinians were defined as those who had arrived in Lebanon after 1948, which was estimated to be half of the refugees. This increased the feelings of grievance amongst the Palestinian population.
State capacity
In four cases the state capacity influenced the course of the conflict. The cases offer an insight in the effect of extensive and limited state capacity. In the case of Namibia and Sri Lanka, the extensive state capacity played an escalatory role in the conflict. This can be observed by the large military campaign that escalated the conflict in Sri Lanka sharply, and eventually ended thus de-escalated it. In Namibia, the SWAPO forces could not compete with the far greater military superiority of the South African Forces. Only at the end, the SWAPO-Cuban-Angola coalition was able to counter these forces.
This is in contrast to Lebanon, where the limited state capacity contributed to escalation of the conflict. The state lost its mean of coercion after the disintegration of the army leading to the rule of militia, which escalated the conflict. Additionally, the parallel economy of the militias diminished the financial means of the state, as it could only collect a small percentage of its revenues. However, in the case of Namibia, the diminished state's economic capacity led to de-escalation of the conflict. The state was finally willing, or forced, to negotiate due to the
176 deprived economic situation, high number of casualties, and weakened military capabilities. A related observation can be made in the case of Israel, where the British government withdrew partly due to the no longer economic viable situation. Furthermore, the British state´s capacity did not change throughout the first phases of the conflict. Yet, after the proclamation of Israel, the perception of it being a military weak state contributed other factions to attack, thereby escalating the conflict.
Weak or strong state
In the case of Sri Lanka and Lebanon, the unstable political coalition and political polarisation hindered reaching a solution. In both cases a weak state drove the escalation of the conflict, which prolonged the conflict. In Sri Lanka, political polarisation prohibited the government to agree upon solutions, which resulted in the collapse of political coalitions. In Lebanon, the political parties were highly divided on the power sharing agreements, leading to extreme political polarisation, escalating the conflict. Political consensus on political reforms would lead to the end of the conflict.
In the case of Namibia and Israel, the state actor represented a strong actor, enjoying strong public support. Both were colonial powers ruling a native population, but were mainly accountable to their respective voters, causing native popular and political support to be less relevant, or at least national politics to be taken into account. The South African government enjoyed public supported of the white South Africans voters residing in Namibia. Thereby, the popular support enabled the government to take coercive measures and counter international pressure, which escalated the conflict. Similarly, in the case of Israel, the British strong state could rely upon its popular support to counter international pressures. Additionally, South Africa had a strong state apparatus and institutions, which efficiently delivered its oppressive apartheid-policies against the black population group. Determined strong state action led to the escalation of the situation and the emergence of the conflict. Therefore, the Namibian case shows that a strong government, in contrary to the in certain phases weak government of Sri Lanka and Lebanon, can also prolong the conflict.
In all cases the state´s inability to control its security organisations led to escalation of conflict. This can be observed in the Namibian case, when the position of the defence forces became stronger and more independent in conducting operations, escalating conflict dynamics. In contrary to Lebanon, where the dissolving state institutions, including the disintegration of the army, escalated the conflict. Half of the military joined the militias, which would eventually
177 start to rule specific cantons. In Sri Lanka, the government could not control its security personnel and military from taking part in riots. The new proclaimed state of Israel also suffered from uncontrollable militias.
5.3 Non-state Strategy of armed groups
The strategy of the armed groups in all four conflicts contributed to dynamics of the conflict. The use of different strategies by the armed groups in the different time-frames and conflicts leads to the argument that the strategy chosen by the non-state actor can either escalate or de- escalate the conflict.
Both the conflicts of Namibia and Israel experienced the strategic use of violence in order to achieve strategic rather than tactical goals. In both the case of Israel and Namibia, armed groups used diplomatic efforts to gain recognition of their new states with help of the international community. Namibia was able to acquire recognition for their independence struggle, but human right violations were largely ignored. This relates to the Sri Lankan case, in which the Tamil Tigers tried to change the narrative to gain international support for their cause. The international community recognised the human rights violations of the state, but they did not act thoroughly.
In the case of Lebanon, the non-state actors focused on tactical rather than strategic goals. The militias fought a war of reciprocity and relative victories. Furthermore, the warring factions were highly dependent on the financial and material support from foreign powers, which prolonged the duration of the conflict. It can even be claimed that the end of the Cold War in 1991 contributed to ending the civil war in 1989, since militias were aware that they were no longer assured of support and could not continue fighting without it.
In Namibia, the political struggle was more important than the armed struggle. The latter can be regarded more as a symbolic to the actions taken on the political level of the independence struggle. In contrary to Lebanon and Sri Lanka, where the high levels of violence blurred and at times even replaced the political goal.
In the case of Lebanon and Sri Lanka, the non-state actor made strategic use of agreed ceasefires to improve its tactical position and regain strength, which resulted in escalation after ceasefires. A similar observation can be made in the Israeli case, where it was the state who misused the ceasefire in the last phase.
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In all cases, terrorist methods, such as suicide bombings and political assassinations, were used to direct attention to their goals. These methods were chosen because of their low cost and high impact. The acts of terrorism led to escalation, as they fuelled the cycle of retaliation.
In the case of Lebanon and Sri Lanka, the non-state actors adopted an alternative strategy to intimidate their opponents. They organised imposing military parades and exhibition of weaponry. The intention of the parades and exhibitions was also to increase popular support.
Capacity of armed groups
In three cases, Israel, Lebanon and Sri Lanka, the capacity of the armed groups grew over the conflict as they became more professionalised and began to resemble a conventional army, thereby, contributing to the escalation of the conflict. Israeli armed groups had air forces, and the LTTE had a strong naval unit, air force, and specialised fighting units. The militias were highly organised, which increased their capacity. One of the Christian militias in Lebanon even started introducing conscription. In Sri Lanka, the LTTE introduced a similar concept, as every family had to send one child to fight. In the case of Namibia, the militia remained a guerrilla type organisation throughout the conflict.
Namibia’s conflict escalated clearly when the non-state actors’ capacity was increased with the influx of radical young people escaping into exile from Namibia to SWAPO´s camps to Angola, also resulting an internal power struggle. A similar observation can be made in Lebanon, where the PLO recruited heavily in the Palestinian refugees camps in Lebanon. Militias capitalised on feelings of political, economic, social grievances. In all cases, the financial support of diaspores all over the world contributed significantly to the capacity of the armed groups. In Namibia, militias enjoyed a rather unique position, as they received financial support from the UN, since they were recognised as an official independence movement.
Factionalisation
In four cases, the internal dynamics of the militias influenced the dynamics of the conflict. In three cases, Israel, Sri Lanka and Lebanon, the factionalisation of armed groups played an escalatory role in the conflict, as it increased tensions between groups, which resulted in higher levels of violence. In the case of Israel, the splinter factions separated from the Hagana to follow a more violent path. This did mean that they had to acquire legitimacy. In the case of Lebanon, the levels of violence heightened due to factionalisation, as the militias not only
179 had to fight other sectarian militias, but also militias from their own confessional group. In Sri Lanka, it first escalated the conflict, as it created a battle on a new front. Later, factionalisation contributed to the collapse of the armed group, which contributed to the end of the conflict.
In the case of Namibia, the factionalisation did not seem to have influenced the conflict dynamics, as the armed struggle was centrally coordinated. Factionalisation led to internal power struggles and political division, as observed after the independence in the first voting. However, the internal power struggles did not influence the course of the armed struggle. In contrary to Lebanon, where internal power struggles contributed to higher levels of violence within the communities. This can be related to the significant role of local community leaders in the course of the conflict.
Criminalisation
In the case of Lebanon criminalisation played an escalatory role in the conflict, where higher revenues enabled greater capacity and prolonged the costly conflict. It can be argued that some of the militias started resembling criminal organisations, as they were seeking profit rather than reaching a political goal. Criminal acts of armed groups also took place in the case of Sri Lanka and Israel, but only in small-scale. In these three cases where criminal activities existed, they did not change the political objectives (nature, motivation and popular support) of the groups, as their main motivation and goals remained political. In Namibia criminalisation did not play a part during the conflict. SWAPO did not have to resort on criminality to fund its activities because of its massive international financial support.
6. Conclusion
6.1 Context Some factors appear to be an important prerequisite for all the four conflicts. For example, social cleavages, which existed in all four cases before the conflict began and contributed to the onset of the conflicts. During these conflicts, the social cleavages remained an underlying, important factor in all cases. The social cleavages created different kinds of grievances that directly motivated actors to start a conflict. In some cases, the grievances were so strong that they continued driving the conflict, for instance, by determining the strategy of the armed groups.
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Popular support is another contextual factor that has been a prerequisite for conflict. The lack of popular support for the government or, on the other hand, the growing popular support for an insurgent group, fuelled the conflicts. During the conflicts, this factor also contributed to changing conflict dynamics. Other than social cleavages or geography, popular support is a dynamic factor. Changing popular support changed the conflict dynamics most of the times. A common pattern that has been found in all the four studied cases is about war-weariness. When the level of popular support for the insurgent High level Low level of popular of violence group or the government is high, the level of violence support is likely to grow. A high level of violence leads to war-weariness among the population and eventually the popular support for the violent approach declines. Declining level of High level This leads eventually to a declining level of violence, popular of violence support since the insurgent group and the government need popular support for their strategy. Additionally, changing popular support influenced the change in other factors, such as a declining popular support for an insurgent group that caused the factionalisation of the group.
Politics has a large impact on conflict dynamics on a local, national, regional and international level. Local politics is intertwined with social Conflict dynamics Elections cleavages, popular support and grievances in all four change cases, for instance, when social cleavages within a community determine the local parties or the grievances determine the political agenda. National politics are an important factor in explaining conflict New New policy government dynamics. Again a common pattern has been found in three of the cases. Elections lead to a new government with a new policy, which leads to, depending on the nature of the new policy, the escalation or de-escalation of the conflict. New elections restart the cycle.
Regional politics appeared in all cases to be directly influencing the conflict, both escalatory and de-escalatory. This is also the case for international politics in three of the cases. All cases have a strong external dimension. In three cases, the conflict escalated when the external military involvement stopped. Additionally, international support from diaspora strengthened the insurgent groups in all our cases. Foreign mediation failed in all cases, which eventually resulted in escalating the conflict again after a small period of peace.
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Two cases experienced a natural disaster during the conflict, however, with a different impact. It depends on the circumstances and other factors if and how it influences the conflict dynamics. Geography appears to be a constant factor that determines warfare and strategy. It prolonged the conflict in three cases since rugged terrain and the adapted strategies made the warfare more complicated. Additionally, ethnic concentrations have strengthened social cleavages.
6.2 State The use of coercive force is strongly intertwined with popular support. War-weariness among the population can contribute to a declining level of popular support, which can result in the need for the state to change their policy. Coercive force influences the conflict, however, it depends on circumstances and other factors, such as the capacity and the strategy of the state, whether it escalates or de-escalates the conflict. Escalation of the conflict happened, for instance, when coercive force contributed to a cycle of retaliation. When the state succeeds to end the conflict using coercive force, it escalates the level of violence for a while, but de- escalates the conflict eventually. This happened in two cases. The restraint stance on the use of coercive force has also contributed to escalation in two cases.
Policy solutions also had different impact in driving the conflict dynamics. Failed peace negotiations resulted in escalating conflict dynamics in all our cases. They failed due to a lack of consensus, ulterior motives, or the exclusion of parties. Successful negotiations de- escalated the conflict by ending it in two cases. In three of the cases, the government implemented repressive legislation that resulted in grievances among a part of the population, which resulted in driving the escalation of conflict dynamics.
The state’s capacity determines its ability to use coercive force and the level of successfulness of these military campaigns. In several of our cases the coercive force did only escalate the conflict because a lack of capacity that was not enough to overthrow the other forces. Limited state capacity can also lead to the disability to use coercive force, which gives the opportunity to militias to take over control. In one of the cases, the military capacity of the state became high in the last phase, which created the ability to overthrow the other party and de-escalated the conflict by ending it. The weak or strong state factor is closely related to the state’s capacity. Dissolving institutions, for instance the army, led to escalation of the conflict in some cases, as it worked in advantage of the opposition. The lack of control over the state’s institutions contributed to escalation, and unstable political coalitions and political
182 polarisation prohibited reaching a solution in two cases. Here a ‘weak state’ drove the escalation of the conflict dynamics. However, in the other two cases, a ‘strong state’, exemplified by a strong state apparatus and institutions, escalated and prolonged the conflict. This factor depends on the circumstances and the state’s capacity and strategy whether it escalates or de-escalates the conflict.
6.3 Non-state There are many similarities between the strategies of the armed groups of all four cases. However, they had different outcomes. In three cases, the armed groups had an international oriented strategy in which they tried to gain international recognition of their cause. In two of these cases, they succeeded in acquiring the international recognition for their independence struggle. In the other case, human rights violations and maltreatment of the minority population by the government were acknowledged, but the independence struggle was not, since the main international narrative framed them as terrorists. Additionally, the armed groups focused on diaspora to get financial and moral support. The international strategy mostly prolonged the conflicts, although international recognition and support drove the escalation of the conflict partly in some phases. Additionally, in three cases the ceasefires were used strategically by the armed group to regain strength and resources. Almost every ceasefire resulted in the escalation of the conflict. In the fourth case, there were no ceasefires. In all cases the armed groups used terrorist measures to get attention for their cause. This fuelled the cycle of retaliation and resulted in escalation of the conflict.
The capacity of the armed groups is different. In three cases, the armed group became to resemble a conventional army at the end of the conflict, while in the other case the armed group remained a guerrilla type of organisation. Although the growing capacities broadened the opportunities of the armed groups, it is not necessarily considered as a driving factor of escalation, since the armed groups also managed to escalate the conflict with little resources. However, the growing capacity did prolong the conflict, as it enabled the armed groups to withstand the government forces.
Factionalisation of armed groups took place in all the four cases, however, they had a different outcome. In two cases, factionalisation led to the escalation of the conflict. In one case, factionalisation contributed to the escalation of the conflict dynamics at first, but later became one of the main factors that resulted in the end of the civil war, therefore driving the de-escalation of the conflict. In the fourth case, factionalisation is not considered to be
183 influencing conflict dynamics. Finally, in all cases the groups were taking part in criminal activities to get resources for their armed struggle. Only in one case some armed groups changed in their nature and motivation to some extent by criminalisation. This prolonged the conflict by a growing capacity for instance.
6.4 Analytical framework The analytical framework that has been created after the extensive literature review has been adapted after the case studies, since two new factors have been identified influencing the conflict dynamics in the case studies. Firstly, the case of Israel, Lebanon and Sri Lanka identified geography as a driving factor in the conflict. Although it is a static factor, it determined other factors, for instance, the strategy of the armed group. Secondly, a distinction is made between international and regional politics. In all cases, it appeared that the regional circumstances and balance of power highly influenced the conflict dynamics. Therefore, it is important to distinguish regional politics from international politics. A schematic overview of the new analytical framework is added in section 3.6.2. This analytical framework appeared to be equally applicable to the four studied cases and provided a holistic picture of the drivers of conflict dynamics. However, the direction of the impact and the significance of the factors differed per conflict. Some recommendations for further research and possible changes to the framework in future analysis are listed in the discussion.
7. Discussion In this research, an attempt is made to ´dissect´ four different civil wars to understand, ´what makes them tick´. Previous research has been focusing mainly on the origin of conflicts or their resolution. Additionally, scholars have developed frameworks to research conflict dynamics. The sociological-institutional analysis of Pahlavi and Ouellet presents a framework to research the internal factors influencing the dynamics of a conflict. They recommended to adopt a holistic approach, which motivated the broad range of factors used in this analytical framework. The limitation mentioned by Pahlavi and Ouellet was the division of factors between the three dimensions. In this research, the challenge was to link the specific events or mechanisms to the factors of the analytical framework. This calls for further development of the analytical framework. Other insights were derived from the multi-level model of Ramsbotham. He focused on different level-phenomena, for instance, the international, regional and contextual level. The multi-level approach led to the inclusion of external factors in the analytical framework.
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The focus of the research was on the individual factors that influenced the conflict dynamics. Nevertheless, the research showed that the factors also interact with each other. It is difficult to assess the direction of interaction and the correlation. For example, popular support can affect strategies of armed groups, and vice versa. Thereby, focusing on the escalation and de- escalation of conflict might lead to underestimation of the importance of underlying causal mechanisms in driving the conflict. Other underlying factors that have impacted the factors identified as influencing the conflict dynamics might be underappreciated in the analytical framework. This is related to the common deduction-induction problem in scientific research. The analytical framework is extensive, identifying three realms and 15 factors. During the research, new factors were identified possibly influencing the conflict. The factors were placed within the existing framework rather than adding a new factor, since their significance might be too small to create a separate factor. However, this might lead to underappreciation of these events.
The analytical framework has only been applied to a limited sample. The four cases that have been researched showed many similarities in their conflict dynamics, despite their differences in timespan, location and circumstances. A more extensive ´N´ is required to test and improve the analytical framework. During the research, several possibilities for improvement have already been found. For instance, the factor state strategy is dived in coercive force and policy solution. It is recommended to combine the two in, for instance, state strategy, since the research has revealed that the state actions are highly intertwined. For example, the implementation of anti-terrorism policy that resulted in the use of coercive force. Furthermore, the research found that the peace processes significantly influence the conflict dynamics. It is recommended to add peace process to the contextual factors, since it cannot be linked solely to one of the existing factors. Peace processes have now been placed under state action, policy solution, whereas peace processes can take place without involvement of the state, nut instead militias taking place at the negotiation table.
This well-developed analytical framework is of academic relevance, since it contributes to the understudied field of holistic approaches to study irregular armed conflict. In addition, the findings can also be relevant to practitioners in the field of conflict resolution. The framework points out factors that might contribute to preventing escalation and de-escalation of irregular armed conflict. In general, future research on irregular armed conflict should attempt to gather more systematic data on armed groups, as research on the dynamics of conflict is seriously hampered by a lack of it.
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