Journal of Namibian Studies, 2 (2007): 123–128 ISSN: 1863-5954

Review: Leo Barnard, (ed.), Grens- The rationale underlying most articles oorlog/Border War 1966-1989, Special clearly seems to be to highlight the edition of Journal for Contemporary military’s role as a disciplined, efficient History, volume 31, number 3, organisation that performed its role as a December 2006, University of Free frontline defender of the ‘people’ State. against the ‘forces of revolutionary communism’. The basic premise from which this publication operates is to This special edition of the Journal of contrast the implicitly sordid world of Contemporary History, titled Border diplomacy and politics with the work of War/Grensoorlog, sets out to cover the the military, clearly seen to be SA side of the war, in particular the role, occupying the moral high ground in the operations, tactics and strategy of the conflicts that raged in southern Africa South African Defence Force (SADF). until 1989. Border War/Grensoorlog, The editorial states that it represents an represents a spirited defense of the “honest attempt to provide a few SADF, not only of its war-time tactics insights into a topic that was regarded and strategy, but also of its ultimate as taboo for many decades” (preface). aims. Interesting perspectives are It can also “serve as a resource offered about military tactics, opera- publication, which may hopefully be tional shortcomings, military successes utilised as a guideline to clear up any and setbacks and the morale of people ambiguities and stimulate further involved on the SA side. What is lacking research”(ibid). However, for a reader though, is an analysis of the ideological hoping to find that the journal would lift underpinnings of the political system the the veil of secrecy and clear up at least military was instructed, and chose, to some ambiguities about the origins, defend. No attempt is made to define nature and aims of the ‘border war’, and contextualise the nature of the disappointment awaits. Coming on the perceived revolutionary threat and there back of another recent publication on is simply no mention of the fact that the the border war, Peter Stiff’s The Covert war/s in southern Africa entailed War: Operations 1979- struggles to end colonial rule and white 1989, which also appears to share at domination. The extent to which the least some of the weaknesses that SADF was part of a comprehensive characterises Border War/Grensoorlog, structure, designed to maintain white the latter clearly represents a missed domination, is never addressed, let opportunity.1 alone analysed. Thus, crucial issues are simply ignored, like the virtual state of war that existed 1 Peter Stiff, The Covert War: Koevoet Operations Namibia 1979-1989 , Johannesburg, Galago, in South African townships in the mid- 2005; Helao Shituwete, former Robben Island and late 1980s; the psychological and prisoner and author of Never follow the wolf, criticised several aspects of Stiff’s account, including his refusal to present accounts by the war. Cf. Insight Namibia, March 2005, ‘More Swapo and PLAN members about events during fiction than fact’: 37,39. Copyright © 2007 Otjivanda Presse.Essen Eckl & Hartmann GbR

moral dilemmas experienced by a required conditions for peace to be growing number of young white declared.” (p. 266). conscripts about the war; the damage It is with these observations in mind that inflicted by the military against one should assess the articles brought neighbouring countries in its counter- together in this publication. The articles insurgency campaigns; actions directed in the journal can, with one exception, against Ovambo civilians and finally, the be roughly divided into two groups: the manner in which the military operated first group deals with military strategy with impunity in neighbouring countries. during the war, the various Defence These actions occurred in often blatant Force sections (army, air force, navy), disregard of international attempts to and units of these sections (for peacefully negotiate an end to various example, armour, infantry, medical conflicts in southern Africa. Though corps), involved in the conflict, and there is the occasional attempt at personal accounts of battles and evenhandedness in the treatment of conditions in the theatre of war. The opposing forces, most contributions second group deals with personal happily refer to ‘terrorists’ and ‘the experiences and reminiscences of enemy’. This signifies a refusal to come soldiers and officers, as well as civilian to terms with the national liberationist efforts to provide an organisational and dimension of the struggles in the sub- moral support base for Defence Force continent and illustrates the extent to personnel. Though reference is made to which the SADF exclusively operated efforts to promote a degree of racial within the paradigm of a perceived integration in the SADF, with some revolutionary communist threat. sectors more successful (the navy) than This reviewer is inclined to argue that, others, what strikes one as peculiar is far from resolving ambiguities and lifting the sense of almost surreal idealism, the veil, this publication represents a patriotism and the justness of the renewed effort to perpetrate old myths. cause, that pervade most of the While several contributions stress the accounts of the war and events / military’s distance from the machi- developments that surrounded it. A few nations of the world of politics and selected examples will hopefully suffice diplomacy, they are also animated by to illustrate this tendency. In an article the belief that the military made about the South African Defence Force, possible the eventual peaceful Leo Barnard cites another article by him resolution to the war in Namibia and the entitled Bewakers van ons lugruim emergence of democracy in South (Guardians of our Air space). Annette Africa. Retired brig. genl. Dick Lord, in Strauss mentions in another article how his contribution to the volume, titled the sight and sound of marching troops “SAAF fighter involvement in the border on the parade ground caused many in war, 1965-1988”, stated unequivocally the crowd to shed a tear when listening that “(a)ctions of the entire SA Defence to the echoes of “we are the youth of (SADF), supported so well by the fighter .” Ig van Niekerk claims in force of the SAAF, produced the his article that the army served as the

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“protector of the people” during its military service and the socialisation of operations in townships in Soweto, white male youths into a culture of racial Sebokeng and Sharpeville. He intolerance is mentioned, but not furthermore argued that “there was a explored in detail. The impact of war on time when the SADF under the family structures, the results of apartheids regime valued life more than demobilisation and rationalisation after the present government does.” The the war and ecological damage are all almost surreal manner in which time, thrown together. Artificial linkages are space and the moral high ground are drawn between the war itself and its appropriated, is starkly at odds with the after-effects, such as social dislocation, complexities of South Africa’s tortuous resulting in analytical confusion. It would past and reflects a highly parochial and have been more useful if the historical largely ethnocentric perspective, suf- impact of -colonialism and fused with unreflected irony. capitalism had been analysed, and from A few articles go beyond discussions there to have proceeded to an about the evolution of technology, assessment of the nature and extent of weapon systems, types of vehicles and the military response to maintain white military tactics, and are therefore worth domination. mentioning. Leopold Scholtz, Die ontwikkeling van Rialize Ferreira & Ian Liebenberg, The die SA Leër in die Grensoorlog, 1966- impact of war on and South 1989 Africa: two Southern African case The author elaborates in this piece on studies the counter-insurgency doctrine applied This article attempts to probe a little by the army. As with other accounts in deeper into the effects and morality of the volume, the impression is created the war, but is not well-focused and that the army was very successful in the conceptualised – the focus shifts former SWA, esp. among the non- constantly from the role of apartheid- Ovambo element and that the South colonialism to the immediate as well as West Africa People’s Organisation long-term effects of war. The result is (SWAPO) was militarily neutralised (“n rather confusing, with no clarity geknakte mag wat … deur politieke emerging on whether the one or the ontwikkelinge gered is”, p.123). The other really caused the social and other explanation provided for Swapo’s forms of dislocation discussed in the political success is premised on the paper. The paper essentially contains a assumption that it was due to the check-list of social ills, but the complex arithmetic of demographic supremacy. interaction of apartheid and militari- No mention is made of SWAPO’s appeal sation is not investigated, neither the as a liberation movement, one that relationship between militarisation and challenged colonial domination, offering violence (esp. violent crime and an opportunity to restore African pride, household violence). The impact of self-confidence and agency.

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Gerhard Oosthuizen, Regiment room for doubt, at best the obligatory Mooirivier, Potchefstroom: Grens- ‘yes apartheid was wrong, but it was dienservaringe van ‘n Pantserburger- war’ (p. 366). Such references, mageenheid, 1975-1988 however, merely serve a rhetorical This contribution arrives at a similar function, and aim to demonstrate that conclusion, though it is more narrowly the opponents of the war were marginal focussed on a citizen force unit. Like or misguided figures. other similar units, Regiment Mooirivier, the author argues, played a decisive Leo Barnard, The battle of , 4 role in the border war and prevented May 1978: A historical reassessment. SWAPO from achieving a single success Part 1: The course of the battle and in any of the bigger confrontations ensuing controversy & The battle of during the war. This statement is not Cassinga, 4 May 1978: A historical premised on any thorough analysis of reassessment. Part 2: Interviews with war-time battles and their outcome and two SADF soldiers merely caps an anecdotal account of Barnard goes to considerable lengths to this unit’s border experiences. demolish the ‘myth’ that Cassinga was a refugee camp. Evidence is provided to Ig van Niekerk, Laaitie tot ‘n man – hoe indicate the militarised nature of the die weermag my van die lewe geleer het Cassinga basis and it is argued that This article depicts a typical young Cassinga was "PLAN’s most important conscript’s experiences during his training and logistic support base" (p. period of basic military training. The 145). However, the possibility that it descriptions of the physical exhaustion was a civilian centre for transient trainees had to endure, the drill aiming refugees, protected by SWAPO's to instill discipline, the rather crude and admittedly very well-armed forces, is not often funny language employed by esp. mentioned. Neither is it admitted that permanent force members and the the attack killed hundreds of civilians - gradual awakening of a sense of attested to by personal accounts of purpose, would seem to come straight survivors that had already been out of a Defence Force training manual. published at the time Barnard wrote his This article reflects a particular piece.2 approach to and attitude about military training and war, one that allows no scope for reflection and questioning. Furthermore, it appears to provide a secular justification for the militarisation of life, implying that the author became 2 Annemarie Heywood, The Cassinga event and a man, and obtained a sense of investigation of the records, , 1994; purpose in life because of his military Patricia Hayes, Jeremy Silvester and Wolfram Hartmann, “Picturing the past in Namibia: the training. His assessment of the conflicts visual archive and its energies”, in: Carolyn the military was involved in allowed no Hamilton et al., (ed.), Refiguring the Archive, Philip, Cape Town, 2002: 124-133. 126

Willem Steenkamp, The citizen soldier in and that it was effectively reorganised the border war from the 1960s onwards. Another This is the first article in the volume and feature was the integration of various it is suffused with strange notions about military units (armour, infantry, air which comment is rendered superfluous. force) into highly mobile, rapid According to Steenkamp the “so-called response fighting units. A serious border war” & SA involvement in Angola drawback however, was the lack of were “ultimately fuelled by the effective operational control over struggle between the Free World and operations. Decisions involving the army the Warsaw Pact” (p.1). He argues the simply moved from tactical to strategic concept of a citizen force derived from level, without an intervening operational deep in South Africa’s past: Basotho, input. As an example, he lists the last Boer commando’s, Oorlam Nama, fight of the border war, at Cuito Xhosa, Zulu and by 1910 “these odd Canavale, where generals and politicians bed-fellows had been thrown together in overruled the military into the Union of South Africa” (p. 2). planners, and opted for challenging “The 1960s style of insurgency was not FAPLA / Cuban forces in a head-to-head the same thing as the traditional [ . . . ] clash, instead of moving further west to resistance offered by inhabitants of a disrupt their supply lines. The result was territory which had been occupied in effective stale-mate. Scholtz argues that war-time. It was more of an undeclared this shortcoming was due to an anti- low-level civil war.” (p. 6). The delayed intellectual bias amongst the top brass entry of white youths into the job market in the military, with the few more far- due to national service “automatically sighted thinkers either being ignored or provided more opportunity for their not taken seriously. This resulted in a non-white counterparts” (p.7). “The lack of an overall strategic vision to commissioning of six officers of colour ensure that various operations were into the Permanent Force a few years coordinated. later was definitely an unintended but significant step towards the eventual Conclusion collapse of the system” (of apartheid) What emerges from a careful reading of (ibid). Koevoet was “. . . an organic this volume, is how successful the South counter-insurgency element.” (p. 10). African state and its institutions have been in their attempts to convince an Leopold Scholtz, Die Suid-Afrikaanse entire generation of Whites in general, Leër, 1966-1989 and Afrikaners in particular, of the This article provides an interesting ideological justification of the battle in overview of the strengths and weak- defence of Apartheid and white minority nesses of the South African Defense rule. The SADF managed to infuse Force. It was obviously written to prove, conscripts and standing force members again, that the SADF achieved great with clarity of purpose and a sense of successes in the field of tactical warfare esprit-de-corps that explains why it managed to conduct a relatively

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successful war. The construction of an ideological edifice to underpin the military conflict in defense of apartheid allowed little, if any scope for doubt. This volume provides evidence of how and why this was possible. Border War/Grensoorlog fails to effectively respond to the challenge to lift the veil on hidden aspects of the border war. There are a few references to political incompetence in managing the diplomatic and political sides of the conflict, but whatever value such observations may have is undermined by the failure to spell out what kind of dispensation the military would have preferred, if given the choice. The absence of critical reflection on and in- depth analysis of the ideological, politi- cal and socio-economic perspectives that animated the war in southern Africa, constitutes a lost opportunity. It does not serve the cause of presenting a truly revisionist perspective of war in southern Africa, nor did it advance the cause of historiography in general.

Christo Botha History Department University of Namibia

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