Zimbabwe Successfully Reintegrate Into the International Community?
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How can Zimbabwe successfully reintegrate into the international community? How can Zimbabwe successfully reintegrate into the international community? Steven Gruzd and Aditi Lalbahadur Author bio Steven Gruzd is the head of the African Governance and Diplomacy Programme at the South African Institute of International Affairs. He has an MSc in International Rela- tions from the London School of Economics and Political Science, and a BA (Hons) from the University of the Witwatersrand. Aditi Lalbahadur is the Programme Manager for SAIIA’s foreign policy work. She has an MLitt (with distinction) from the University of St Andrews, Scotland, and a BA (Hons) in Political Science from the University of Natal, Durban. Published by 26 Sandringham Drive - Alexandra Park P.O. Box 4325 Harare, Zimbabwe [email protected] Tel: +263 242 744602 Illustrations, Design & Layout OnaDsgn* [email protected] www.onadsgn.com In this Report Introduction 06 Background 07 Political Zimbabwe’s Zimbabwe’s Key Developments 10 Economy 18 International 26 Relationships Conclusion 40 Executive summary This report seeks to provide a better under- The report briefly examines the November 2017 standing of the dynamics and impediments to coup and the aftermath of the July 2018 elec- improving Zimbabwean relations with other tions, and reflects on the current situation in states, including those in the West. It makes rec- Zimbabwe. It explores both the political and ommendations for ways in which the country economic spheres, given that they are so closely could overcome the current political and intertwined. It looks at efforts to promote national economic impasse to re-engage more success- dialogue, as well as progress and setbacks in Zim- fully against the backdrop of the Zimbabwean babwe’s engagement with other countries – chiefly government’s efforts to build strategic alliances the United States (US), the United Kingdom (UK), that will support its economic recovery. In July the European Union (EU), China, South Africa and August 2019, researchers from the South and Southern African Development Communi- African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) ty (SADC). At this juncture, Zimbabwe is stuck visited Harare and conducted interviews with 18 in a logjam. Internally, the ruling Zimbabwe stakeholders, including representatives of both African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU major political parties, government officials, PF) is riven by factions and the heavy presence journalists, civil society activists, economists, of the military. The long-time leader of the oppo- and Western and non-Western diplomats. SAIIA’s sition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) fieldwork occurred exactly a year after the 2018 succumbed to cancer on 14 February 2018 and elections. Interviewees were pessimistic about the opposition is still splintered, despite attempts prospects under President Emmerson Mnan- to unify, leaving it in disarray. ZANU PF and the gagwa, and agreed that the mood and morale MDC do not appear to be ready to talk to each of the country was low. The report unpacks Zim- other, and Western donors are refusing to budge babwe’s political and economic landscape and on sanctions until there are genuine, irrevers- the government’s international engagement ible political and economic reforms. This paper strategy, as well as assessing the potential to attempts to understand these dynamics, and explore joint efforts (with the region, and tradi- propose a viable way forward. tional and non-traditional partners) that could support a meaningful political and economic reform agenda in Zimbabwe. How can Zimbabwe successfully reintegrate into the international community? Introduction This report seeks to provide a better understand- that the mood and morale of the country was low. ing of the dynamics and impediments to improv- This report analyses Zimbabwe’s political and ing Zimbabwean relations with other states, in- economic landscape and the government’s in- cluding those in the West. It makes recommen- ternational engagement strategy. It also assesses dations for ways in which the country could the potential to explore joint efforts (with the overcome the current political and economic region, and traditional and non-traditional impasse to re-engage more successfully against partners) that could support a meaningful polit- the backdrop of the Zimbabwean government’s ical and economic reform agenda in Zimbabwe. efforts to build strategic alliances that will support its economic recovery. The report briefly examines the November 2017 coup and the aftermath of the July 2018 elec- In July and August 2019, researchers from the tions, and reflects on the current situation in South African Institute of International Affairs Zimbabwe. It explores both the political and (SAIIA) visited Harare and conducted interviews economic spheres, given that they are so closely with 18 stakeholders, in- intertwined. It looks at efforts cluding representatives to promote national dialogue, as of both major political well as progress and setbacks in parties, government of- “ Zimbabwe’s engagement with ficials, journalists, civil interviewees were other countries – chiefly the US, society activists, econo- pessimistic about UK, EU, China, South Africa and mists, and Western and prospects under the Southern African Develop- non-Western diplomats. President Emmerson ment Community (SADC). In order to foster frank Mnangagwa, and agreed discussions on the situ- At this juncture, Zimbabwe is ation in Zimbabwe and that the mood and morale stuck in a logjam. Internally, the prospects for reinte- of the country was low. the ruling Zimbabwe African gration into the interna- National Union Patriotic Front tional community, all in- (ZANU PF) is riven by factions terviews were conduct- and the heavy presence of the ed on the basis of anonymity. This was sup- military. The long-time leader of the opposition plemented with desk research and interviews Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) suc- conducted in Pretoria and Johannesburg with, cumbed to cancer on 14 February 2018 and the among others, National Treasury, the Tanzani- opposition remain splintered, despite attempts an High Commission and South African analysts to unify, leaving it in disarray. ZANU PF and working on Zimbabwe. the MDC do not appear to be ready to talk to each other and Western donors are refusing to SAIIA’s fieldwork occurred exactly a year after budge on sanctions until there are genuine, ir- the 2018 elections. In the interviews, the inter- reversible political and economic reforms. This viewees were pessimistic about prospects under paper attempts to understand these dynamics President Emmerson Mnangagwa, and agreed and propose a viable way forward. 6 Konrad Adenauer Stiftung www.kas.de/simbabwe How can Zimbabwe successfully reintegrate into the international community? Background On 11 November 1965, the Cabinet of Rhodesia government, to invade and expropriate many of made a Unilateral Declaration of Independence the country’s white-owned commercial farms. from Britain and white minority rule continued These farm invasions, with their violence, disre- for the next 15 years, amidst a protracted lib- gard for property rights and democratic values eration war, with the country facing economic and abrogation of the rule of law, strained rela- sanctions and growing international isolation. tions with traditional partners in the West, par- When Zimbabwe finally achieved indepen- ticularly the UK, the US, the EU, and Common- dence from the UK on 18 April 1980 after this wealth countries such as Australia, Canada and long-standing armed and political struggle – New Zealand. Various restrictive measures and with a transition facilitated through the 1979 sanctions were applied to Zimbabwe as a result. Lancaster House Agreement – it rapidly began to forge diplomatic relations with the rest of the Mugabe railed against the sanctions imposed world.1 It established and maintained various by the EU and US at every opportunity, increas- formal political and commercial ties, prioritis- ing his invective and brinkmanship through the ing Southern Africa and the rest of the African evolution of the political crises in the 2000s. continent. It also extended relations to the UK, This – and an unending string of controversial its former colonial power, the US, European elections – served to simultaneously isolate countries and the forerunners of the European Zimbabwe from the West, while drawing it Union (EU), other Commonwealth countries and closer to states offering an alternative. These its erstwhile allies in the struggle for indepen- included China, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Russia dence, China and Russia. This represented a and Venezuela. ‘golden phase’ for Zimbabwe’s integration into the world as a newly independent nation. The economy, and particularly the agricultur- al and manufacturing sectors, began to dete- However, this changed rapidly after a stinging riorate, political repression by state forces in- defeat for President Robert Mugabe’s ZANU PF creased, and millions of Zimbabweans fled the in a referendum on a new constitution in 2000, country, raising tensions with its neighbours. which also coincided with the rise of the oppo- Along with countries like the UK, South Africa sition MDC from the labour movement. Frustra- was the recipient of several hundred thousand tion over the slow pace of land reform led the migrants – both legal and illegal – from its war veterans, with endorsement of the ZANU PF northern neighbour.2