DOCSLIB.ORG

Notice of OFAC Sanctions Actions Designated Pursuant to Section 2(A)(Iii) of Andrea Gacki, E.O

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Notice of OFAC Sanctions Actions Designated Pursuant to Section 2(A)(Iii) of Andrea Gacki, E.O 68412 Federal Register / Vol. 85, No. 209 / Wednesday, October 28, 2020 / Notices Third, 49 CFR 604.12(c) requires a SUMMARY: The Department of the interests in property are blocked pursuant to recipient, unless otherwise exempt Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets E.O. 13848. under 49 CFR 604.2, to submit on a Control (OFAC) is publishing the names 3. ISLAMIC RADIO AND TELEVISION UNION (a.k.a. IRTVU), Iran; Beirut, Lebanon; quarterly basis records of all instances of one or more persons that have been Kabul, Afghanistan; Additional Sanctions that the recipient provided charter placed on OFAC’s Specially Designated Information—Subject to Secondary Sanctions service. Nationals and Blocked Persons List [ELECTION–E.O. 13848] (Linked To: Fourth, 49 CFR 604.13 requires a based on OFAC’s determination that one ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS private charter provider to register on or more applicable legal criteria were (IRGC)-QODS FORCE). FTA’s Charter Registration website at satisfied. All property and interests in Designated pursuant to section 2(a)(iii) of http://ftawebprod.fta.dot.gov/ property subject to U.S. jurisdiction of E.O. 13848 for being owned or controlled by, CharterRegistration/ in order to qualify these persons are blocked, and U.S. or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, the ISLAMIC as a registered charter service provider persons are generally prohibited from REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS (IRGC)- and receive email notifications by engaging in transactions with them. QODS FORCE, an entity whose property or recipients that are interested in DATES: See SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION interests in property are blocked pursuant to providing a requested charter service. section for effective date. E.O. 13848. 4. ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD The rule requires that a registered FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: charter service provider must update its CORPS (a.k.a. AGIR; a.k.a. ARMY OF THE OFAC: Associate Director for Global GUARDIANS OF THE ISLAMIC information on the Charter Registration Targeting, tel.: 202–622–2420; Assistant website at least once every two years. REVOLUTION; a.k.a. IRAN’S Director for Sanctions Compliance & REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS; a.k.a. Currently, there are a total of 287 Evaluation, tel.: 202–622–2490; IRAN’S REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS; a.k.a. registered private charter service Assistant Director for Licensing, tel.: IRG; a.k.a. IRGC; a.k.a. ISLAMIC providers. Registration has consistently 202–622–2480; or Assistant Director for REVOLUTION GUARDS CORPS; a.k.a. decreased over the years. Regulatory Affairs, tel.: 202–622–4855. ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY CORPS; a.k.a. Lastly, 49 CFR 604.7 permits ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS; a.k.a. recipients to provide charter service to SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS Qualified Human Service Organizations Electronic Availability CORPS; a.k.a. PASDARAN; a.k.a. (QHSO) under limited circumstances. PASDARAN–E INQILAB; a.k.a. PASDARN–E The Specially Designated Nationals ENGHELAB–E ISLAMI; a.k.a. QHSOs that do not receive Federal and Blocked Persons List and additional REVOLUTIONARY GUARD; a.k.a. funding under programs listed in information concerning OFAC sanctions REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS; a.k.a. SEPAH; Appendix A to Part 604 and seek to programs are available on OFAC’s a.k.a. SEPAH PASDARAN; a.k.a. SEPAH–E receive free or reduced rate services PASDARAN ENGHELAB ISLAMI; a.k.a. website (https://www.treasury.gov/ofac). from recipients must register on FTA’s SEPAH–E PASDARAN–E ENGHELAB–E Charter Registration website (49 CFR Notice of OFAC Actions ESLAMI; a.k.a. SEPAH–E PASDARAN–E ENQELAB–E ESLAMI; a.k.a. THE ARMY OF 604.15(a)). On October 22, 2020, OFAC Respondents: State and local THE GUARDIANS OF THE ISLAMIC determined that the property and REVOLUTION; a.k.a. THE IRANIAN government, business or other for-profit interests in property subject to U.S. REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS), Tehran, Iran; institutions, and non-profit institutions. jurisdiction of the following persons are Syria; Additional Sanctions Information— Estimated Annual Respondents: 2,180 blocked under the relevant sanctions Subject to Secondary Sanctions [FTO] respondents. [SDGT] [NPWMD] [IRGC] [IFSR] [IRAN–HR] Estimated Annual Burden on authorities listed below. [HRIT–IR] [ELECTION–E.O. 13848]. Respondents: 403.3 hours (0.05 hours Entities Designated pursuant to section 2(a)(i) of for each of the 1,676 Recipient E.O. 13848 having directly or indirectly 1. BAYAN RASANEH GOSTAR respondents under 49 CFR 604.4. 1.25 engaged in, sponsored, concealed, or INSTITUTE (a.k.a. BAYAN GOSTAR MEDIA otherwise been complicit in foreign hours for each of the 90 Recipient INSTITUTE; a.k.a. BAYAN RASANE interference in a United States election. respondents under 49 CFR 604.12, 0.50 GOSTAR INSTITUTE), Iran; Additional 5. ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD hours for each of the 90 Recipient Sanctions Information—Subject to Secondary CORPS (IRGC)-QODS FORCE (a.k.a. AL respondents under 49 CFR 604.14. 0.50 Sanctions [ELECTION–E.O. 13848] (Linked QODS; a.k.a. IRGC–QF; a.k.a. IRGC–QUDS hours for each of the 37 non-profit To: ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD FORCE; a.k.a. ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY respondents, and 0.50 hours for each of CORPS (IRGC)-QODS FORCE). GUARD CORPS–QODS FORCE; a.k.a. the estimated 287 for-profit Designated pursuant to section 2(a)(i) of JERUSALEM FORCE; a.k.a. PASDARAN–E respondents. Executive Order 13848 of September 12, ENGHELAB–E ISLAMI (PASDARAN); a.k.a. Frequency: Annually, bi-annually, 2018, ‘‘Imposing Certain Sanctions in the QODS (JERUSALEM) FORCE OF THE IRGC; Event of Foreign Interference in a United a.k.a. QODS FORCE; a.k.a. QUDS FORCE; quarterly, and as required. States Election,’’ 83 FR 46843, 3 CFR, 2018 a.k.a. SEPAH–E QODS; a.k.a. SEPAH–E Nadine Pembleton, Comp., p. 869, (E.O. 13848) for having QODS (JERUSALEM FORCE)), Tehran, Iran; directly or indirectly engaged in, sponsored, Syria; Additional Sanctions Information— Director Office of Management Planning. concealed, or otherwise been complicit in Subject to Secondary Sanctions [FTO] [FR Doc. 2020–23782 Filed 10–27–20; 8:45 am] foreign interference in a United States [SDGT] [SYRIA] [IRGC] [IFSR] [IRAN–HR] BILLING CODE P election. [ELECTION–E.O. 13848]. 2. INTERNATIONAL UNION OF VIRTUAL Designated pursuant to section 2(a)(i) of MEDIA (a.k.a. IUVM), Iran; Additional E.O. 13848 having directly or indirectly engaged in, sponsored, concealed, or DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY Sanctions Information—Subject to Secondary Sanctions [ELECTION–E.O. 13848] (Linked otherwise been complicit in foreign interference in a United States election. Office of Foreign Assets Control To: ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS (IRGC)-QODS FORCE). Dated: October 22, 2020. Notice of OFAC Sanctions Actions Designated pursuant to section 2(a)(iii) of Andrea Gacki, E.O. 13848 for being owned or controlled by, Director, Office of Foreign Assets Control, AGENCY: Office of Foreign Assets or having acted or purported to act for or on U.S. Department of the Treasury. Control, Treasury. behalf of, directly or indirectly, the ISLAMIC [FR Doc. 2020–23807 Filed 10–27–20; 8:45 am] ACTION: Notice. REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS (IRGC)- QODS FORCE, an entity whose property or BILLING CODE 4810–AL–P VerDate Sep<11>2014 18:29 Oct 27, 2020 Jkt 253001 PO 00000 Frm 00128 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 9990 E:\FR\FM\28OCN1.SGM 28OCN1 jbell on DSKJLSW7X2PROD with NOTICES.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • The IRGC in the Age of Ebrahim Raisi: Decision-Making and Factionalism in Iran’S Revolutionary Guard
    The IRGC in the Age of Ebrahim Raisi: Decision-Making and Factionalism in Iran’s Revolutionary Guard SAEID GOLKAR AUGUST 2021 KASRA AARABI Contents Executive Summary 4 The Raisi Administration, the IRGC and the Creation of a New Islamic Government 6 The IRGC as the Foundation of Raisi’s Islamic Government The Clergy and the Guard: An Inseparable Bond 16 No Coup in Sight Upholding Clerical Superiority and Preserving Religious Legitimacy The Importance of Understanding the Guard 21 Shortcomings of Existing Approaches to the IRGC A New Model for Understanding the IRGC’s Intra-elite Factionalism 25 The Economic Vertex The Political Vertex The Security-Intelligence Vertex Charting IRGC Commanders’ Positions on the New Model Shades of Islamism: The Ideological Spectrum in the IRGC Conclusion 32 About the Authors 33 Saeid Golkar Kasra Aarabi Endnotes 34 4 The IRGC in the Age of Ebrahim Raisi Executive Summary “The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps [IRGC] has excelled in every field it has entered both internationally and domestically, including security, defence, service provision and construction,” declared Ayatollah Ebrahim Raisi, then chief justice of Iran, in a speech to IRGC commanders on 17 March 2021.1 Four months on, Raisi, who assumes Iran’s presidency on 5 August after the country’s June 2021 election, has set his eyes on further empowering the IRGC with key ministerial and bureaucratic positions likely to be awarded to guardsmen under his new government. There is a clear reason for this ambition. Expanding the power of the IRGC serves the interests of both Raisi and his 82-year-old mentor, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the supreme leader of the Islamic Republic.
    [Show full text]
  • The Middle East After the Iraq War
    THE ARTS This PDF document was made available CHILD POLICY from www.rand.org as a public service of CIVIL JUSTICE the RAND Corporation. EDUCATION ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT Jump down to document6 HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit NATIONAL SECURITY research organization providing POPULATION AND AGING PUBLIC SAFETY objective analysis and effective SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY solutions that address the challenges SUBSTANCE ABUSE facing the public and private sectors TERRORISM AND HOMELAND SECURITY around the world. TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE Support RAND WORKFORCE AND WORKPLACE Purchase this document Browse Books & Publications Make a charitable contribution For More Information Visit RAND at www.rand.org Explore RAND Project AIR FORCE View document details Limited Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law as indicated in a notice appearing later in this work. This electronic representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for non-commercial use only. Unauthorized posting of RAND PDFs to a non-RAND Web site is prohibited. RAND PDFs are protected under copyright law. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of our research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please see RAND Permissions. This product is part of the RAND Corporation monograph series. RAND monographs present major research findings that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors. All RAND mono- graphs undergo rigorous peer review to ensure high standards for research quality and objectivity. THE IRAQ EFFECT The Middle East After the Iraq War Frederic Wehrey Dalia Dassa Kaye Jessica Watkins Jeffrey Martini Robert A.
    [Show full text]
  • The Myth and Reality of Iraq's Al-Hashd Al-Shaabi (Popular
    Policy Paper The Myth and Reality of Iraq’s al-Hashd al-Shaabi (Popular Mobilization Forces): A Way Forward Author: Hassan Abbas Publisher: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) Amman Office September 2017 Amman, Jordan Published in 2017 by Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Jordan & Iraq Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Jordan & Iraq P.O. Box 941876 Amman 11194 Jordan Tel. +962 6 5008335 Fax: +962 6 5696478 Email: [email protected] Website: www.fes-jordan.org Facebook: www.facebook.com/FESAmmanOffice Not for sale. © FES Jordan & Iraq All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted, reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means without prior written permission from the publishers. The views and opinions expressed in this publication are solely those of the author, and do not necessarily represent those of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung or the institution he is affiliated with. II Table of Contents Introduction .............................................................................................................. 1 Who constitutes the Hashd? What are their organizational structures, motivations and operational capabilities? Who sponsors and funds the Hashd? .............................. 4 How do Sunnis (and other groups) view the Hashd? Why are Iraq’s neighbours so concerned about the role of the Hashd? .................................................................. 9 Can the Hashd be fully integrated into Iraq’s official security forces? ................... 11 POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS: ...............................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Iran and the Taliban
    Iran and the Taliban by Erfan Fard BESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 2,147, September 6, 2021 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: The US invaded Afghanistan in 2001 to overthrow the Taliban regime and al-Qaeda after the 9/11 attacks. Iran opposed the US presence, as it strove (and continues to strive) for regional hegemony. Despite its distaste for the Sunni Taliban, Tehran constantly undermined US efforts to stabilize Afghanistan by collaborating with the extremist group. Shortly after the 9/11 attacks on the American homeland in 2001, the US invaded Afghanistan to overthrow the Taliban regime and al-Qaeda. US policy was to conduct a full-scale war to neutralize jihadism and Islamic terrorism, not just in Afghanistan but around the globe. This was a new paradigm in the security order of the Middle East. As the Taliban in Afghanistan rose in terms of power and visibility, it became a serious concern of the Iranian Quds Force (QF). It dealt with the challenge by using non-conventional military methods and directing revolutionary activities on Afghan soil from Tajikistan and areas controlled by the Northern Alliance. Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) strengthened its forces along the Afghan border, and the former commander of the IRGC-QF, Qassem Soleimani, spent most of his time on that border. Iran’s geopolitical situation played a crucial role in the war against al-Qaeda terrorism immediately following 2001 in two important respects: by helping to remove the Taliban and by blocking infiltration routes of al-Qaeda forces. By providing intelligence and security information to the Americans as well as supporting the Northern Alliance, Iran played a vital role in overthrowing the Taliban.
    [Show full text]
  • What General Soleimani's Death Means for the Middle East
    What General Soleimani’s Death Means for the Middle East ALINA V. GUERRA n January 3, 2020, General Qasem Soleimani – commander of the Quds Force, a powerful branch of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) – was assassinated in a OUS drone strike.1 Prior to his assassination, Soleimani’s significance as a military leader and prominent figure in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) was largely underappreciated in the West. In this article, I first review Soleimani’s background and achievements to draw ‘lessons learned’ from his career and then I assess the implications of his assassination for Iran, the future of the Middle East, and US strategic interests in the region. Who was Qasem Soleimani? Qasem Soleimani was one of Iran’s leading military officers and Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei’s top military advisor. Born and raised in a village in the Kerman Province near Afghanistan and Pakistan, Soleimani from a young age showed interest in the Arab world. Soleimani entered the IRGC after the 1979 revolution, becoming a new recruit trainer following graduation from basic training.2 During the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88), Soleimani’s unfaltering leadership earned him a fast track to the top of the IRGC. He became the commander of the Quds Force by 1997. Though Khamenei generally set term limits of ten years for top military and political positions, General Soleimani kept his military command for over twenty years until his death. As Khamenei’s right-hand military man, Soleimani was nearly indispensable in loyally propping up Iran’s theocratic regime and in attacking Iran’s enemies.3 In a 2018 speech, at a memorial service for Imad Mughniyeh – the former deputy leader of Lebanese Hezbollah who was assassinated by a CIA car bomb in 2008 – a fiery Soleimani warned that the “enemy knows that punishment for Imad’s blood is not firing a missile or a tit-for-tat assassination.
    [Show full text]
  • The Shiite Jihad in Syria and Its Regional Effects
    THE SHIITE JIHAD IN SYRIA AND ITS REGIONAL EFFECTS Phillip Smyth This piece is dedicated to the memory of a true scholar, friend, and mensch, Barry Rubin. I would never have been able to complete such an undertaking without his confidence in me. POLICY FOCUS 138 THE SHIITE JIHAD IN SYRIA AND ITS REGIONAL EFFECTS PHILLIP SMYTH THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY www.washingtoninstitute.org The opinions expressed in this Policy Focus are those of the author and not necessarily those of The Washington Institute, its Board of Trustees, or its Board of Advisors. All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. © 2015 by The Washington Institute for Near East Policy The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 1828 L Street NW, Suite 1050 Washington, DC 20036 www.washingtoninstitute.org Design: 1000colors Photo: Sayyeda Zainab mosque, Damascus (Ahmad al Husseini). CONTENTS Acronyms | iv 1 introduction | 1 2 the NArrAtive of JihAd | 3 3 cAll to JihAd: clericAl Views of the Shiite JihAd in SyriA | 13 4 Building An Army for ZAinab | 21 5 the WeB of Multiplying Shiite IslAmist MilitiAs in SyriA | 37 6 Joining of Fronts: Blowback in IrAq And Lebanon | 48 7 policy RecommendAtions | 55 8 notes And Sources | 58 ABout the Author | 80 APPENDICES (ONLINE ONLY) 1 phAses of Shiite MilitiA
    [Show full text]
  • Iran's Game Plan for Iraq's Militias | the Washington Institute
    MENU Policy Analysis / Articles & Op-Eds Iran’s Game Plan for Iraq’s Militias by Hamdi Malik Apr 19, 2021 Also available in Arabic / Farsi Also published in Middle East Institute ABOUT THE AUTHORS Hamdi Malik Dr. Hamdi Malik is an Associate Fellow with the Washington Institute, specializing in Shia militias. He is the co-founder of the Militia Spotlight platform, which offers in-depth analysis of developments related to the Iranian-backed militias in Iraq and Syria. He is the coauthor of the Institute's 2020 study "Honored, Not Contained: The Future of Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces." Articles & Testimony Tehran still regards the full withdrawal of U.S. forces as its ultimate goal, and its Iraqi proxies are more than happy to use escalation for that purpose whenever they can. sent a clear and frank message to Mr. Esmail Qaani [commander of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps- “I Quds Force]...the matter is related to us, regardless of other calculations...from now on...please no one talks to us and we won’t listen.” Qais al-Khazali, leader of Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH), had never talked about Qassem Soleimani, Qaani’s predecessor, in this way—not on national TV. But Soleimani is gone now and things have changed in Iraq, at least to an extent. In his Nov. 19, 2020 interview, Khazali was speaking about the Quds Force’s attempts to persuade some Iraqi militias to stop provoking then-President Donald Trump to avoid any reaction from the United States. At the time the Islamic Republic’s policy was to de-escalate tensions with the United States and wait for the new administration to start negotiating on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and sanctions.
    [Show full text]
  • Iran's Revolutionary Guards, the Al Quds Force, and Other Intelligence
    Center for Strategic and International Studies Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy 1800 K Street, N.W. • Suite 400 • Washington, DC 20006 Phone: 1 (202) 775-3270 • Fax: 1 (202) 457-8746 Web: http://www.csis.org/burke Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, the Al Quds Force, and Other Intelligence and Paramilitary Forces Rough Working Draft Anthony H. Cordesman Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy August 16, 2007 Cordesman: Iran’s Revolutionary Guards 6/28/06 Page ii Table of Contents I. THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD S CORPS (PASDARAN, O R VEZARAT -E SEPAH PASDARAN -E ENQELAB -E ISLAMIC) ................................ ................................ ................................ ................. 3 IRGC LAND FORCES ................................ ................................ ................................ ................................ ................. 4 THE IRGC AIR FORCE ................................ ................................ ................................ ................................ ............... 6 THE IRGC NAVAL FORCES ................................ ................................ ................................ ................................ ........ 6 PROXY AND COVERT CBRN OPERATIONS ................................ ................................ ................................ ................. 7 THE QUDS (Q ODS , OR JERUSALEM ) FORCES ................................ ................................ ................................ .............. 7 THE BASIJ (NIRUYEH MOGHAVEMAT BASIJ , BASEEJ -E
    [Show full text]
  • Iran's ISIS Policy
    Iran’s ISIS policy DINA ESFANDIARY AND ARIANE TABATABAI The rise of a new Sunni extremist group in the Middle East has become a signif- icant security threat in an already volatile region. Empowered by conflict and instability, the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), founded as Al-Qaeda’s regional affiliate in the Levant, became an independent entity, the split sealed when Al-Qaeda’s leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, disavowed the group in early 2014. A few months later, ISIS made headlines when it began to seize control of terri- tories beyond Syria, rapidly advancing in Iraq and even Lebanon, and brutally massacring civilians. Reports of mass executions and rapes of Shi’is, Christians, and other ethnic and religious minorities, including the Yazidis in Iraq, and videos of behead- ings, led to the formation of an international coalition, headed by the United States, to implement President Barack Obama’s four-point plan to ‘degrade and ultimately destroy’ ISIS.1 This plan includes air strikes against ISIS targets, increased support to local forces on the ground, continuation of counterterrorism efforts to prevent future attacks, and humanitarian assistance to non-combatants in the region. Despite reports of US–Iran cooperation in the fight against ISIS, the two countries have issued conflicting statements on the matter. On the one hand, US and Iranian officials have stated that their countries could cooperate to defeat ISIS; on the other, the US Secretary of State argued that Tehran should not be invited to the international conference on ISIS held in France in September 2014, and Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei claimed that his country rejected Washington’s request for cooperation.2 And yet, although to date Tehran has been excluded from the international coalition against ISIS, it is difficult to imagine a resolution of the crisis without some form of coordination between the United States and Iran, and also between Saudi Arabia and Iran.
    [Show full text]
  • Soleimani Is Dead: the Road Ahead for Iranian- Backed Militias in Iraq
    OBJECTIVE · RELEVANT · RIGOROUS | JANUARY 2020 · VOLUME 13, ISSUE 1 FEATURE ARTICLE FEATURE ARTICLE Soleimani Is Dead: The Lessons from the Islamic Road Ahead for Iranian- State's 'Milestone' Texts Backed Militias in Iraq and Speeches Haroro J. Ingram, Craig Whiteside, Michael Knights and Charlie Winter FEATURE ARTICLES Editor in Chief 1 Soleimani Is Dead: The Road Ahead for Iranian-Backed Militias in Iraq Michael Knights Paul Cruickshank 11 Lessons from the Islamic State's 'Milestone' Texts and Speeches Managing Editor Haroro J. Ingram, Craig Whiteside, and Charlie Winter Kristina Hummel INTERVIEW EDITORIAL BOARD Colonel Suzanne Nielsen, Ph.D. 22 A View from the CT Foxhole: Rob Saale, Former Director, U.S. Hostage Department Head Recovery Fusion Cell Seth Loertscher Dept. of Social Sciences (West Point) Brian Dodwell ANALYSIS Director, CTC 28 After Soleimani: What's Next for Iran's Quds Force? Don Rassler Ariane M. Tabatabai Director of Strategic Initiatives, CTC 34 Piety Is in the Eye of the Bureaucrat: The Islamic State's Strategy of Civilian Control CONTACT Gina Vale Combating Terrorism Center U.S. Military Academy The January 3, 2020, U.S. drone strike that killed Islamic Revolutionary 607 Cullum Road, Lincoln Hall Guard Corps-Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani and Kata’ib Hez- West Point, NY 10996 bollah leader Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis at Baghdad International Airport Phone: (845) 938-8495 will likely have consequences that reverberate across the region and beyond for years. In our first feature article, Michael Knights focuses
    [Show full text]
  • Backgrounder #26 Iran and Al-Qaeda in Iraq
    Backgrounder #26 Iran and Al-Qaeda in Iraq: What’s the Connection? Marisa Cochrane, Research Coordinator, Institute for the Study of War It is widely speculated in the media that the relationship between the Shi’a government of Iran and the Sunni insurgent group, al-Qaeda in Iraq, is a hostile one, primarily because of the sectarian differences between the two. However, there is clear evidence of Iranian support for another Sunni group, the Taliban in Afghanistan.i Therefore, it is worth investigating the potential links between al- Qaeda in Iraq and the Iranian regime, particularly the Iranian Revolutionary Guard-Quds Force (IRGC- QF). The dossier below contains articles, press releases, and Defense Department briefings from the last year that consider the nature of this relationship. While it may not present a definitive explanation of the connection between these groups, it does suggest possible links exist between the groups and the sectarian grounds for dismissing the relationship are likely too simplistic. The most relevant passages have been highlighted in yellow. DATE SOURCE TEXT 1/3/2007 Iran's Secret Plan For Mayhem WASHINGTON — Iran is supporting both Sunni and Shiite terrorists in the Iraqi civil war, according to secret Iranian Eli Lake- Staff Reporter of the documents captured by Americans in Iraq. Sun The news that American forces had captured Iranians in Iraq January 3, 2007 was widely reported last month, but less well known is that the Iranians were carrying documents that offered Americans http://www.nysun.com/article/460
    [Show full text]
  • A Short Overview of U.S.-Iran Relations
    The United States-Iran Crisis Name: _____________________________________________ Teaching with the News Online Resource 1 A Short Overview of U.S.-Iran Relations Instructions: Read the following text about the origins of hostilities between the United States and Iran. Un- derline at least three new facts you learn. Write a question mark near a sentence that raises a question for you. Be ready to share with a classmate. he U.S. relationship with Iran has been filled Iranian government also provides support to the Twith hostility and mistrust for decades. For militant group Hezbollah, which the United States many Iranians, mistrust dates back to the U.S.-led and the European Union consider to be a terrorist coup of 1953 that forced Iran’s elected prime min- organization. ister from office. Many in the United States mark On the other hand, the United States and the start of a hostile relationship with Iran in 1979, Iran have consulted closely on certain security when Iranian students seized the U.S. embassy in issues. For example, U.S. and Iranian diplomats Tehran and held fifty-two Americans prisoner for cooperated on the military response to the Taliban more than a year. government in Afghanistan after the terrorist at- Iran and the United States do not currently tacks on the United States of September 11, 2001. have diplomatic relations, making it more difficult More recently, U.S. and Iranian military forces both for their governments to work together, resolve fought against the terrorist group ISIS in Syria and their differences, and even communicate. Iraq.
    [Show full text]