A Short Overview of U.S.-Iran Relations

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

A Short Overview of U.S.-Iran Relations The United States-Iran Crisis Name: _____________________________________________ Teaching with the News Online Resource 1 A Short Overview of U.S.-Iran Relations Instructions: Read the following text about the origins of hostilities between the United States and Iran. Un- derline at least three new facts you learn. Write a question mark near a sentence that raises a question for you. Be ready to share with a classmate. he U.S. relationship with Iran has been filled Iranian government also provides support to the Twith hostility and mistrust for decades. For militant group Hezbollah, which the United States many Iranians, mistrust dates back to the U.S.-led and the European Union consider to be a terrorist coup of 1953 that forced Iran’s elected prime min- organization. ister from office. Many in the United States mark On the other hand, the United States and the start of a hostile relationship with Iran in 1979, Iran have consulted closely on certain security when Iranian students seized the U.S. embassy in issues. For example, U.S. and Iranian diplomats Tehran and held fifty-two Americans prisoner for cooperated on the military response to the Taliban more than a year. government in Afghanistan after the terrorist at- Iran and the United States do not currently tacks on the United States of September 11, 2001. have diplomatic relations, making it more difficult More recently, U.S. and Iranian military forces both for their governments to work together, resolve fought against the terrorist group ISIS in Syria and their differences, and even communicate. Iraq. Why does the U.S. government How did the United States respond to view Iran as an adversary? Iran’s nuclear enrichment program? Today, the United States views Iran as an For many years, the U.S. government worried adversary in conflicts in the Middle East. U.S. that Iran had a program to develop nuclear weap- policymakers see Iran as a threat to the security of ons. The Iranian government denied that it was Israel and Saudi Arabia, two important U.S. allies. developing weapons, but claimed that as a signato- Iran has backed Bashar al-Assad’s government in ry of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Syrian Civil War, as well as groups in Yemen it had the right to develop nuclear materials for and Iraq who are fighting U.S.-backed groups. The peaceful purposes. (All countries that have signed the NPT are allowed to acquire equipment, materials, and knowledge for peace- ful purposes. For example, NPT countries may develop nuclear materials for nuclear power plants or medical purposes.) The United States has been involved in various attempts to limit a potential nuclear enrichment program in Iran. (Highly enriched uranium is an essential component of a nuclear weapon.) When a secret Ira- nian nuclear enrichment Public Domain. Public plant was discovered in 2009, Iranians climbing the gate at the U.S. embassy in Tehran, November 1979. The the United States, the UN, hostage crisis was a key event in the history of U.S.-Iran relations. and the European Union THE CHOICES PROGRAM ■ BROWN UNIVERSITY DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY ■ WWW.CHOICES.EDU The United States-Iran Crisis Teaching with the News Online Resource 2 placed economic sanctions (penalties) on Iran in to grow scarce. After waiting a year, Iran restarted an attempt to pressure its leaders to cooperate. The its nuclear enrichment program in 2019. sanctions severely damaged Iran’s economy and caused hardships for Iranians. In 2010, the Stuxnet What are some Iranian computer virus attacked Iranian nuclear enrich- perspectives on U.S. policy? ment facilities. Many experts believe that Israel and Iranian perceptions of the United States and the United States developed the virus. U.S. policy are complex and vary across the popula- In 2015, after negotiations with the United tion. The Iranian government’s primary goal is to States and other members of the international com- protect itself from perceived security threats. The munity, Iran agreed to reduce its nuclear program Iranian government sees the United States and its and to allow inspections of its nuclear facilities. In allies as a major threat to Iran’s security. return, the international community agreed to end Iranians elected their current president, Has- economic sanctions on Iran. san Rouhani, in 2013 because he promised to During his presidential campaign and after reduce tensions with the United States and Eu- his election in 2016, U.S. President Donald Trump rope and to bring Iran back into the international (2017- ) stated that he thought the nuclear deal economic system. After he reached the nuclear deal with Iran, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan with the United States and the international com- of Action, was bad for the United States. In May munity in 2015, Iranians overwhelmingly reelected 2018, Trump announced that the United States him in 2017 in support of his policies. Rouhani’s would withdraw from the agreement. Trump re- conservative opponents warned that the United imposed economic sanctions on Iran and tensions States could not be trusted to stick to the nuclear between the two countries increased. The United deal. When President Trump withdrew the United States’ “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran States from the agreement and reimposed sanctions brought much of Iran’s economy to a halt. Unable on Iran, it made those conservative Iranians look to sell its oil overseas, inflation and unemployment right all along. skyrocketed in Iran and food and medicine began Tasnim News Agency (CC BY 4.0) BY News Agency (CC Tasnim Supporters of President Rouhani celebrate his 2017 election victory in Tehran. THE CHOICES PROGRAM ■ BROWN UNIVERSITY DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY ■ WWW.CHOICES.EDU The United States-Iran Crisis Teaching with the News Online Resource 3 For years after the Iranian Revolution of 1979, Iran’s government-controlled media produced anti- Key Terms U.S. propaganda. Today, some Iranians—including Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps some conservative religious leaders and members (IRGC)—The IRGC, whose name in Persian of older generations—continue to condemn the means “army of the guardians of the Islamic United States. Many express skepticism about the revolution,” is tasked with the protection and motivations behind U.S. foreign policy, claiming survival of the Iranian government. that the stated goals of U.S. policy in Iran do not Quds Force—an elite special operations always align with U.S. actions. group of the IRGC. While disapproval and skepticism toward the United States still exist, many younger Iranians have more favorable views of the United States. How did the U.S. killing of Iranian General These Iranians have concerns about U.S. policy Solomeini create a crisis in U.S.-Iran relations? toward Iran, but they also hope for improved rela- On January 3, 2020, a U.S. drone strike assas- tions with the United States. Many believe that sinated General Qasem Solomeini, the head of the stronger relations would help their country join the Quds Force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard international economy and prosper. Corps, while he was traveling in Iraq. While the United States government had said that he was a terrorist, he was seen as a hero by some in Iran. Stop saying, ‘Death to America,’ make President Trump claimed the drone strike was amends with the world and foreign “ necessary, arguing that Solomeini represented an investors and jobs will come.” imminent threat to U.S. soldiers in the region. The —Hamidreza Faraji, May 15, 2017 drone strike caused shock and anger in Iran. Ten- sions between the two countries, already extremely high, threatened to boil over and lead to war. When Mehr News Agency (CC BY 4.0) BY News Agency (CC Mehr The funeral of General Qasem Solomeini, Tehran, January 6, 2020. THE CHOICES PROGRAM ■ BROWN UNIVERSITY DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY ■ WWW.CHOICES.EDU The United States-Iran Crisis Teaching with the News Online Resource 4 ROMANIA RUSSIA against two U.S. air bases in KAZAKHSTAN Black Sea Iraq, but there were no U.S. BULGARIA GEORGIA Caspian Sea Istanbul UZBEKISTAN or Iraqi casualties. After the Ankara ARMENIA AZERBAIJAN GREECE missile attack, Iran’s foreign TURKEY TURKMENISTAN minister announced that Iran T igris CYPRUS had completed its response SYRIA Tehran LEBANON IRAQ Mediterranean Sea Beirut Damascus Euphrates ISRAEL AFGHANISTAN and did not want war. Presi- West Bank Baghdad Tel Aviv Amman IRAN Alexandria Jerusalem dent Trump responded the Gaza Strip JORDAN Cairo next day that the United States KUWAIT Kuwait City Persian PAKISTAN wanted peace. Nile Gulf LIBYA BAHRAIN Manama EGYPT QATAR Abu Medina Doha Dhabi Riyadh Gulf of Oman Muscat U.A.E. Iran took & concluded SAUDI ARABIA OMAN Mecca proportionate SUDAN “ Red Sea Nile measures in self-defense... targeting base from which Ara bian Blue Nile ERITREA YEMEN S e a cowardly armed attack Sanaa against our citizens & White Nile Gulf of Aden Countries with U.S. DJIBOUTI military forces senior officials were launched. We do not seek SOMALIA SOUTH SUDAN ETHIOPIA 500 miles 500 km escalation or war, but will defend ourselves against Today, the United States has military forces throughout much of the Middle East any aggression.” and other surrounding regions. For example, the United States has military —Iranian Foreign Minister forces in the following countries pictured on the map: Afghanistan, Bahrain, Javid Zarif, in a tweet, Djibouti, Greece, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Romania, January 7, 2020 Somalia, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Syria. Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei promised The fact that we have this great military a military response against the United States for and equipment, however, does not mean Solomeini’s killing, U.S.
Recommended publications
  • The IRGC in the Age of Ebrahim Raisi: Decision-Making and Factionalism in Iran’S Revolutionary Guard
    The IRGC in the Age of Ebrahim Raisi: Decision-Making and Factionalism in Iran’s Revolutionary Guard SAEID GOLKAR AUGUST 2021 KASRA AARABI Contents Executive Summary 4 The Raisi Administration, the IRGC and the Creation of a New Islamic Government 6 The IRGC as the Foundation of Raisi’s Islamic Government The Clergy and the Guard: An Inseparable Bond 16 No Coup in Sight Upholding Clerical Superiority and Preserving Religious Legitimacy The Importance of Understanding the Guard 21 Shortcomings of Existing Approaches to the IRGC A New Model for Understanding the IRGC’s Intra-elite Factionalism 25 The Economic Vertex The Political Vertex The Security-Intelligence Vertex Charting IRGC Commanders’ Positions on the New Model Shades of Islamism: The Ideological Spectrum in the IRGC Conclusion 32 About the Authors 33 Saeid Golkar Kasra Aarabi Endnotes 34 4 The IRGC in the Age of Ebrahim Raisi Executive Summary “The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps [IRGC] has excelled in every field it has entered both internationally and domestically, including security, defence, service provision and construction,” declared Ayatollah Ebrahim Raisi, then chief justice of Iran, in a speech to IRGC commanders on 17 March 2021.1 Four months on, Raisi, who assumes Iran’s presidency on 5 August after the country’s June 2021 election, has set his eyes on further empowering the IRGC with key ministerial and bureaucratic positions likely to be awarded to guardsmen under his new government. There is a clear reason for this ambition. Expanding the power of the IRGC serves the interests of both Raisi and his 82-year-old mentor, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the supreme leader of the Islamic Republic.
    [Show full text]
  • The Middle East After the Iraq War
    THE ARTS This PDF document was made available CHILD POLICY from www.rand.org as a public service of CIVIL JUSTICE the RAND Corporation. EDUCATION ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT Jump down to document6 HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit NATIONAL SECURITY research organization providing POPULATION AND AGING PUBLIC SAFETY objective analysis and effective SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY solutions that address the challenges SUBSTANCE ABUSE facing the public and private sectors TERRORISM AND HOMELAND SECURITY around the world. TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE Support RAND WORKFORCE AND WORKPLACE Purchase this document Browse Books & Publications Make a charitable contribution For More Information Visit RAND at www.rand.org Explore RAND Project AIR FORCE View document details Limited Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law as indicated in a notice appearing later in this work. This electronic representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for non-commercial use only. Unauthorized posting of RAND PDFs to a non-RAND Web site is prohibited. RAND PDFs are protected under copyright law. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of our research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please see RAND Permissions. This product is part of the RAND Corporation monograph series. RAND monographs present major research findings that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors. All RAND mono- graphs undergo rigorous peer review to ensure high standards for research quality and objectivity. THE IRAQ EFFECT The Middle East After the Iraq War Frederic Wehrey Dalia Dassa Kaye Jessica Watkins Jeffrey Martini Robert A.
    [Show full text]
  • CLASSROOM | 9-12 Lessons
    CLASSROOM | 9-12 Lessons : JIMMY CARTER AND THE IRANIAN HOSTAGE CRISIS President Carter announces sanctions against Iran in the White House Press Room. Jimmy Carter Library Jimmy Carter would say later, “No matter who was with me, we watched the big grandfather clock by the door.” Time was running out, for it was Tuesday, January 20, 1981. The scene was the Oval Office. In just hours this president would leave it for good, and a new leader, Ronald Reagan, would move in. As the clock ticked the time away, Carter tried to resolve a crisis that had almost destroyed his presidency. He was close, very close, and as he said, “At stake were the lives of 52 precious human beings who had been imprisoned in Iran for 444 days–and almost 12 billion dollars of Iranian assets.” 1 Prelude The beginnings of this crisis preceded Jimmy Carter’s term by almost thirty years. For that long, the United States had provided political support and, more recently, massive military assistance to the government of the shah of Iran. Iran was important because it provided oil to the industrial West and separated the Soviet Union from the Persian Gulf and the oil states. The United States had an enormous stake in keeping it stable and independent. By 1979, however, when Carter had been in office three years, the shah was in trouble, reaping the harvest of years of brutal and unpopular policies, including the use of secret police that controlled dissent with arbitrary arrests and torture.2 It was clear that the shah had lost the (next page) White House Historical Association | http://www.whha.org | Pg.
    [Show full text]
  • The Myth and Reality of Iraq's Al-Hashd Al-Shaabi (Popular
    Policy Paper The Myth and Reality of Iraq’s al-Hashd al-Shaabi (Popular Mobilization Forces): A Way Forward Author: Hassan Abbas Publisher: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) Amman Office September 2017 Amman, Jordan Published in 2017 by Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Jordan & Iraq Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Jordan & Iraq P.O. Box 941876 Amman 11194 Jordan Tel. +962 6 5008335 Fax: +962 6 5696478 Email: [email protected] Website: www.fes-jordan.org Facebook: www.facebook.com/FESAmmanOffice Not for sale. © FES Jordan & Iraq All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted, reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means without prior written permission from the publishers. The views and opinions expressed in this publication are solely those of the author, and do not necessarily represent those of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung or the institution he is affiliated with. II Table of Contents Introduction .............................................................................................................. 1 Who constitutes the Hashd? What are their organizational structures, motivations and operational capabilities? Who sponsors and funds the Hashd? .............................. 4 How do Sunnis (and other groups) view the Hashd? Why are Iraq’s neighbours so concerned about the role of the Hashd? .................................................................. 9 Can the Hashd be fully integrated into Iraq’s official security forces? ................... 11 POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS: ...............................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • The Future of Iranian Terror and Its Threat to the U.S. Homeland
    THE FUTURE OF IRANIAN TERROR AND ITS THREAT TO THE U.S. HOMELAND HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON COUNTERTERRORISM AND INTELLIGENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION FEBRUARY 11, 2016 Serial No. 114–53 Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 21–525 PDF WASHINGTON : 2016 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800 Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001 COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas, Chairman LAMAR SMITH, Texas BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi PETER T. KING, New York LORETTA SANCHEZ, California MIKE ROGERS, Alabama SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan, Vice Chair JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina BRIAN HIGGINS, New York TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania CEDRIC L. RICHMOND, Louisiana LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania DONALD M. PAYNE, JR., New Jersey CURT CLAWSON, Florida FILEMON VELA, Texas JOHN KATKO, New York BONNIE WATSON COLEMAN, New Jersey WILL HURD, Texas KATHLEEN M. RICE, New York EARL L. ‘‘BUDDY’’ CARTER, Georgia NORMA J. TORRES, California MARK WALKER, North Carolina BARRY LOUDERMILK, Georgia MARTHA MCSALLY, Arizona JOHN RATCLIFFE, Texas DANIEL M. DONOVAN, JR., New York BRENDAN P. SHIELDS, Staff Director JOAN V. O’HARA, General Counsel MICHAEL S. TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk I. LANIER AVANT, Minority Staff Director SUBCOMMITTEE ON COUNTERTERRORISM AND INTELLIGENCE PETER T.
    [Show full text]
  • The Iranian Constitution: an Exercise in Contradictions S
    The Fletcher School Online Journal for issues related to Southwest Asia and Islamic Civilization Spring 2004, Article 1 The Iranian Constitution: An Exercise in Contradictions S. Waqar Hasib A constitution is not merely a document, nor I. Introduction a set of laws. Rather, in many ways a constitution Since the overthrow of Shah Mohammed is an expression of the values, needs, and desires Reza Pahlevi in 1979, Iran can best be described as of a particular community. Thus it is important to a nation of contradictions. Iranians are often examine not only the actual content of a shown on U.S. television burning American flags constitution, but also the particular historical and chanting “death to America,” while behind context in which it was created. One could not the camera they listen to Madonna, wear Tommy properly study the U.S. constitution with out at Hilfiger jeans and watch the latest Los Angeles least a basic understanding of the history of the Lakers games on satellite dishes.1 Iran ranks at British Empire in North America, the American the top of the U.S. State Department’s list of Revolution, and the Articles of Confederation. nations that sponsor terrorism,2 yet Iranians lit Likewise, one cannot properly study the Iranian candles and held mass impromptu vigils in the constitution without first examining the chain of streets of Tehran for the victims of the September events that led to its creation. 11 attacks.3 Often a nation’s externally visible A. From the Qajars to Reza Khan – 1826 to 1941 characteristics are a result of its internal political The roots of the current Iranian constitution structures.
    [Show full text]
  • United States Policy and Military Strategy in the Middle East
    S. HRG. 114–350 UNITED STATES POLICY AND MILITARY STRATEGY IN THE MIDDLE EAST HEARINGS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES UNITED STATES SENATE ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION MARCH 24; SEPTEMBER 22; OCTOBER 27, 2015 ( Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services VerDate Nov 24 2008 10:53 Sep 08, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 6011 Sfmt 6011 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\21401.TXT WILDA UNITED STATES POLICY AND MILITARY STRATEGY IN THE MIDDLE EAST VerDate Nov 24 2008 10:53 Sep 08, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 6019 Sfmt 6019 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\21401.TXT WILDA S. HRG. 114–350 UNITED STATES POLICY AND MILITARY STRATEGY IN THE MIDDLE EAST HEARINGS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES UNITED STATES SENATE ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION MARCH 24; SEPTEMBER 22; OCTOBER 27, 2015 Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services ( Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/ U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 21–401 PDF WASHINGTON : 2016 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800 Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001 VerDate Nov 24 2008 10:53 Sep 08, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00003 Fmt 5011 Sfmt 5011 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\21401.TXT WILDA COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona, Chairman JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma JACK REED, Rhode Island JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama BILL NELSON, Florida ROGER F.
    [Show full text]
  • Iran's Ideological Expansion
    Iran’s Ideological Expansion “We shall export our revolution to the whole world. Until the cry ‘there is no god but God’ resounds over the whole world, there will be struggle.” – Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini June 2018 Table of Contents About the Author ......................................................................................................................................... 4 Introduction .................................................................................................................................................. 4 Profiles of Institutions Spreading Iran’s Revolution Abroad ...................................................................... 6 Universities .............................................................................................................................................. 6 Al-Mustafa International University ..................................................................................................... 6 Islamic Azad University ......................................................................................................................... 8 Charitable Organizations ..................................................................................................................... 10 Imam Khomeini Relief Committee ...................................................................................................... 11 Ahlul Bayt World Assembly ................................................................................................................. 13 Iran’s
    [Show full text]
  • ANTI-AMERICANISM Table of Contents Anti-American Statements
    ANTI-AMERICANISM Table of Contents Anti-American Statements........................................................................................................... 1 Death to America ..................................................................................................................... 1 America Is The Enemy and Its "Enmity Is Endless" ................................................................. 2 The Great Satan ......................................................................................................................4 Regime’s Goal is to Destroy the United States ........................................................................ 5 America Created ISIS and Al-Qaeda ....................................................................................... 6 U.S. Seeks to Dominate Iran, Islamic Lands, and the World .................................................... 8 Timeline of Anti-American Hostilities ........................................................................................... 8 Iran’s Anti-Western Conspiracies .............................................................................................. 15 The Iranian Regime’s Conspiracies ....................................................................................... 15 The Iranian Regime Prohibits ................................................................................................ 19 Anti-American Statements The Iranian regime has maintained its virulent anti-Americanism as a core pillar of its ideology since
    [Show full text]
  • The Long Road to Tehran the Iran Nuclear Deal in Perspective
    THE LONG ROAD TO TEHRAN THE IRAN NUCLEAR DEAL IN PERSPECTIVE BRYAN R. GIBSON STRATEGIC UPDATE 15.6 DECEMBER 2015 THE AUTHOR Bryan R. Gibson holds a PhD in International History from the London School of Economics, was a post- doctoral research fellow at the LSE’s Centre for Diplomacy and Strategy, and an instructor on Middle Eastern politics in the LSE’s Department of International History and the University of East Anglia’s Department of Political, Social and International Studies (PSI). He has taught undergraduate courses on U.S. and British politics toward the Gulf region, the Arab-Israeli conflict, and Arab nationalism, winning a departmental teaching excellence award in 2011. He also taught undergraduate and postgraduate courses on Middle Eastern politics at the University of East Anglia. He is the author of Sold Out? US Foreign Policy, Iraq, the Kurds, and the Cold War (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), Covert Relationship: U.S. Foreign Policy, Intelligence and the Iran-Iraq War (Praeger, 2010), and co-edited with Professor Nigel Ashton, The Iran- Iraq War: New International Perspectives (Routledge, 2012). He also contributes regularly to publications dealing with Middle Eastern issues, like Foreign Policy, Middle East Eye, CNN, and Huffington Post. His research focuses on foreign policy decision- making with respect to the Middle East and Gulf regions. Specifically, he analyses U.S. foreign policy toward Iraq, Iran, and the Gulf. Gibson 1 THE LONG ROAD TO TEHRAN THE IRAN NUCLEAR DEAL IN PERSPECTIVE The history of the Iranian nuclear issue is littered with missed opportunities. It is a history in which fixation on the perfect crowded out the good, and in whose rearview mirror we can see deals that look a lot better now than they seemed then.
    [Show full text]
  • Discussion Guide for “The Iranian Revolution” a Video Interview with Dr
    DISCUSSION GUIDE FOR “THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION” a video interview with Dr. Abbas Milani Organizing • What is a revolution? Questions • What were the successes and failures of the Iranian Revolution? • How did the Iranian Revolution impact or contribute to events in the Middle East, the United States, and the world? • How is the Iranian Revolution similar and different from other revolutions? • What are some of the challenges of writing about a historical event like the Iranian Revolution? Summary In this video, Professor Abbas Milani discusses Iran and the Iranian Revolution, noting the influence of Iran regionally and in the United States, the significance and impact of the Iranian Revolution, and the Iranian Revolution’s causes and effects. He also emphasizes the fight for democracy throughout Iran’s history of revolutions and today. Objectives During and after viewing this video, students will: • gain a general understanding of the course of the Iranian Revolution and the events leading up to it; • examine the definition of revolution and compare the Iranian Revolution with other revolutions; • analyze the significance and impact of the Iranian Revolution in history and today; and • understand the complexities and multiple perspectives of history. “IRANIAN REVOLUTION” DISCUSSION GUIDE 1 introduction Materials Handout 1, Background Guide—Iranian Revolution, pp. 5–9, 30 copies Handout 2, Video Notes, p. 10, 30 copies Handout 3, Connection—Iran Today, pp. 11–12, 5 copies Projection 1, Discussion—What is a revolution?, p. 13 Projection 2, Wrap-up Discussion, p. 14 Answer Key 1, Video Notes, pp. 15–16 Answer Key 2, Connection—Iran Today, pp.
    [Show full text]
  • U.S. and Iranian Strategic Competition
    1 U.S. AND IRANIAN STRATEGIC COMPETITION: Iran’s Perceptions of its Internal Developments and their Implications for Strategic Competition with the U.S. in the Gulf, Sept. 2010 – March 2011 By Alexander Wilner May 17, 2011 Anthony H. Cordesman Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy [email protected] 2 With the assistance of Adam Seitz of the Marine Corps University, the Burke Chair has compiled a series of chronological reports that focus on Iranian perceptions of national security and assess Iran‟s intentions concerning competition with the US. The latest version of these reports is entitled “U.S. and Iranian Strategic Competition: Iran's Perceptions of its Ballistic Missile Program and Competition with the US and the Gulf, Sept. 2010 – Feb. 2011,” and is available on the CSIS web site at http://csis.org/publication/us-and- iranian-strategic-competition-2. Previous versions include “U.S. and Iranian Strategic Competition: Iranian Views of How Iran‟s Asymmetric Warfare Developments Affect Competition with the US and the Gulf, Sept. 2010 – Feb. 2011” (http://csis.org/publication/us- and-iranian-strategic-competition-1). The Iranian government‟s statements and actions provide considerable insight into the country‟s strategic competition with the US. They help show how the regime perceives and responds to external pressure and its relationship with the international community. The regime‟s rhetoric regarding its “soft war” against external cultural influence and domestic liberalism as well as laws such as the proposed Supervision of Members of Parliament bill provide key insights into the changing nature of the regime and its outlook.
    [Show full text]