NO. 27 JULY 2018 Introduction Preventing a Spillover of the Iran-Israel Conflict in Syria E3+Russia Should Lead the Way Out Gil Murciano Israel’s containment policy vis-à-vis Iran in Syria has entered a new phase of direct confrontation aimed at achieving a decisive outcome on the ground. Israeli decision- makers now see a window of opportunity to remove Iran’s long-term military presence in Syria through a combination of military and diplomatic means. Israel’s approach is based on the assessment that this goal can be achieved while containing the fighting to the Syrian arena. Nevertheless, this new strategic attitude increases the likelihood of a spillover beyond the Syrian arena and into a regional conflict. Iran’s military actions in Syria have demonstrated that its goals exceed the logic of defensive deter- rence and are driven by an ambition to increase its offensive potential vis-à-vis Israel. Germany should take an active role in a coordinated effort by the E3 countries (Ger- many, France, and the United Kingdom) and Russia to pressure Iran to scale-down its military presence while providing it with a face-saving framework to protect its core political interests. Since summer 2017, Iran has made efforts Since February 2018, with the scenario to turn Syria into a platform for military of direct confrontation between Israel and activity against Israel, prompting a new Iran becoming a reality, Israel’s policy has Israeli policy of “active containment” – been led by a new strategic concept. Israel’s concentrated military and diplomatic ef- leadership now sees the removal of Iran’s forts to define red lines to Iran’s military military presence in Syria as a feasible buildup. In this process, Israel has increased objective. Israel’s formal demand since the the level of risk it is willing to take in order start of Iran’s involvement has been the to halt Iran’s efforts. Israel’s active contain- removal of Iran and its proxies from Syria. ment campaign was not intended solely to Nevertheless, Israeli decision-makers have deter Iran, but also to convince Russia – now identified a space for decisive action – the main arbiter in Syria – to factor Israeli a window of opportunity – to enter into security concerns into the new order it was a continuous campaign to eliminate Iran’s trying to create in Syria. military capabilities in Syria. This new approach and its strategic goals are being directed by Israel’s security establishment, A new mode of operations and they are strongly supported by the political leadership, as explained on May 10 Israel’s new approach is currently guided by Israel’s Minister of Intelligence, Yisrael by three operational principles. Katz: “Israel is decisive … We are confront- 1. Taking a toll from the Iranians directly – ing Iran with a dilemma – leave Syria or Israel’s new mindset is demonstrated by a get hurt and involved in a conflict … in the change in the mode of military operations. end it is about breaking the Iranian will to Current military efforts are aimed almost be in Syria.” exclusively at Iran’s and Hezbollah’s infra- The Israeli change of attitude is shaped structure and personnel in Syria. As ex- by two main factors: first, specific inter- plained on May 24 by a senior Israeli officer: national developments that Israel perceives “When we identify consolidation [of Iranian as placing Iran in a state of strategic weak- forces] or the introduction of weapons, we ness; and second, in response to Iran’s act.” Prior to the February drone incident, recent attempts (February 10, May 10) to Israel’s military actions against Iran-affili- directly attack Israel as well as the failure ated targets were designed to deter Iran of Israel’s previous “active containment” rather than harm its forces. Airstrikes such policy to deter Iran from building its forces as the one launched against an empty base in Syria. that was due to be populated by pro-Iranian The tipping point in Israel’s strategic ap- militias in December 2017 could be seen proach was Iran’s recently attempted drone as a warning shot across the bow. Israeli attack/infiltration into Israeli airspace in policy was to minimize Iranian casualties February. For Israel, this action was a cata- in order to avoid further escalation. In the lyst for an operational reevaluation for two aftermath of the drone incident, it seems reasons. First, it demonstrated in practical that the prospect of casualties among Ira- terms Iran’s willingness to use Syria as a nian personnel turned from a scenario to base for offensive operations against Israel. be avoided into a stated objective of Israeli In this context, Iran’s decision to use a plat- operations. Consequently, Iran’s Quds Force form carrying a distinct Iranian “signature” in Syria has suffered dozens of casualties – namely an Iranian-manufactured drone since February due to Israeli airstrikes. If instead of using proxies to act directly the policy of active containment was de- against Israel – supported Israel’s belief signed to signal Israeli resolve and set red that Iran meant to emphasize its involve- lines vis-à-vis Iran, the new Israeli approach ment. As a senior Israeli military officer is focused on enforcing these lines through stated: “This is the first time we saw Iran do military means. Israel’s new approach also something against Israel – not by proxy … appears in its willingness now to claim this opened a new period.” Second, it ex- responsibility for some of the airstrikes. The posed Russia’s inability – or perhaps its new logic of decisive maneuver reduces the unwillingness – to prevent its military ally value of preserving operational and politi- from executing direct infiltration attempts cal ambiguity. Instead, it supports a public into Israeli airspace and challenged the discourse that is meant to announce Israel’s Israeli perception of Russia serving as a con- resolve to both domestic and international taining factor for Iran’s actions against Israel. audiences. In this context, the relatively The fact that the mission was launched from broad support that this new mode of opera- the T4 airbase, where Russian advisers are tions in Syria is receiving from the Israeli regularly present, was likely to enhance public and across the domestic political these doubts. map provides further backing to this policy of open confrontation with Iran. 2. Distinguishing between Iran and the Bashar al-Assad regime – Israeli airstrikes are focused solely on targets affiliated with the IRGC SWP Comment 27 July 2018 2 Israel’s military operations in Syria since February 2018 (according to media sources) Feb. 10 Following the interception of May 8 Israel launched a preemptive strike an armed Iranian drone, which against missile storage facilities and attempted to infiltrate Israeli air- launchers shortly before their deploy- space, Israel targeted the com- ment for an attack against Israeli mand unit controlling the drone military installations in the Golan. at the T4 airbase. After Syrian anti- May 10 The peak of Israel’s operations aircraft fire intercepted an Israeli against Iran’s military presence F-16, the Israeli Air Force retaliated in Syria: Iran attempted to launch against Syrian air defense systems a rocket barrage against Israeli and Islamic Revolutionary Guard military posts in the Golan. In re- Corps (IRGC) targets. Casualties in- sponse, Israel launched a large-scale cluded IRGC personnel. attack against the Quds Force’s Apr. 9 An airstrike against the IRGC’s infrastructure in Syria (“Operation drone unit at the T4 airbase House of Cards”). Targets were resulted in the death of at least military bases, intelligence-gather- seven Iranian officers, including ing posts, logistics centers, and the commanding Colonel. Reports weapon storage facilities. It is indicate that a Tor air defense described as the largest military system (SA-15) that Iran was plan- operation in the Israel-Syria con- ning to deploy was an additional flict since the 1973 war. Israeli target of the attack. decision-makers describe the attack Apr. 30 Combined airstrikes against two as a major setback for the Quds underground missile depots of Force’s capabilities in Syria. the Quds Force in the Hama and May 24 Israel allegedly launched an air- Aleppo districts reportedly destroyed strike against the al-Dabaa airbase, hundreds of missiles. Reports in- which is close to the Syria-Lebanon dicate that one of the targets was border. Targets were weapon depots an Iranian-manufactured anti-air belonging to Hezbollah. defense system. Both attacks report- Jul. 8 Israel allegedly launched an air- edly resulted in Iranian casualties. strike against the T4 airbase. and have avoided, at this phase, hitting reduces the latter’s ability to influence or threatening targets related to the Assad Iran’s activity in Syria. Second, an Israeli regime. This differs from Israel’s pre–civil attack on Syria’s political leadership and its war strategy of flying sorties above the presi- symbols of sovereignty is likely to increase dential palace as a means of putting pres- the friction with its main patron – Russia, sure on Assad to contain Hezbollah. Syrian the core goal of which is to strengthen the army units are targeted only when they get regime’s capacity to rule. Third, this dis- directly involved in the Israel-Iran clash – tinction might be designed to drive a wedge as in the case of Syrian air defense units, between the direct target, Iran, and the in- which have suffered heavy losses in their directly injured party, Syria. attempts to resist Israeli operations – or 3. Synergic military and diplomatic efforts when Syrian army bases host Iranian troops. – In coordination with the military efforts, There are three possible explanations Israel’s decisive maneuver against Iran’s for this operational policy.