NO. 27 JULY 2018 Introduction

Preventing a Spillover of the -Israel Conflict in E3+ Should Lead the Way Out Gil Murciano

Israel’s containment policy vis-à-vis Iran in Syria has entered a new phase of direct confrontation aimed at achieving a decisive outcome on the ground. Israeli decision- makers now see a window of opportunity to remove Iran’s long-term military presence in Syria through a combination of military and diplomatic means. Israel’s approach is based on the assessment that this goal can be achieved while containing the fighting to the Syrian arena. Nevertheless, this new strategic attitude increases the likelihood of a spillover beyond the Syrian arena and into a regional conflict. Iran’s military actions in Syria have demonstrated that its goals exceed the logic of defensive deter- rence and are driven by an ambition to increase its offensive potential vis-à-vis Israel. Germany should take an active role in a coordinated effort by the E3 countries (Ger- many, France, and the United Kingdom) and Russia to pressure Iran to scale-down its military presence while providing it with a face-saving framework to protect its core political interests.

Since summer 2017, Iran has made efforts Since February 2018, with the scenario to turn Syria into a platform for military of direct confrontation between Israel and activity against Israel, prompting a new Iran becoming a reality, Israel’s policy has Israeli policy of “active containment” – been led by a new strategic concept. Israel’s concentrated military and diplomatic ef- leadership now sees the removal of Iran’s forts to define red lines to Iran’s military military presence in Syria as a feasible buildup. In this process, Israel has increased objective. Israel’s formal demand since the the level of risk it is willing to take in order start of Iran’s involvement has been the to halt Iran’s efforts. Israel’s active contain- removal of Iran and its proxies from Syria. ment campaign was not intended solely to Nevertheless, Israeli decision-makers have deter Iran, but also to convince Russia – now identified a space for decisive action – the main arbiter in Syria – to factor Israeli a window of opportunity – to enter into security concerns into the new order it was a continuous campaign to eliminate Iran’s trying to create in Syria. military capabilities in Syria. This new approach and its strategic goals are being

directed by Israel’s security establishment, A new mode of operations and they are strongly supported by the political leadership, as explained on May 10 Israel’s new approach is currently guided by Israel’s Minister of Intelligence, Yisrael by three operational principles. Katz: “Israel is decisive … We are confront- 1. Taking a toll from the Iranians directly – ing Iran with a dilemma – leave Syria or Israel’s new mindset is demonstrated by a get hurt and involved in a conflict … in the change in the mode of military operations. end it is about breaking the Iranian will to Current military efforts are aimed almost be in Syria.” exclusively at Iran’s and ’s infra- The Israeli change of attitude is shaped structure and personnel in Syria. As ex- by two main factors: first, specific inter- plained on May 24 by a senior Israeli officer: national developments that Israel perceives “When we identify consolidation [of Iranian as placing Iran in a state of strategic weak- forces] or the introduction of weapons, we ness; and second, in response to Iran’s act.” Prior to the February drone incident, recent attempts (February 10, May 10) to Israel’s military actions against Iran-affili- directly attack Israel as well as the failure ated targets were designed to deter Iran of Israel’s previous “active containment” rather than harm its forces. Airstrikes such policy to deter Iran from building its forces as the one launched against an empty base in Syria. that was due to be populated by pro-Iranian The tipping point in Israel’s strategic ap- militias in December 2017 could be seen proach was Iran’s recently attempted drone as a warning shot across the bow. Israeli attack/infiltration into Israeli airspace in policy was to minimize Iranian casualties February. For Israel, this action was a cata- in order to avoid further escalation. In the lyst for an operational reevaluation for two aftermath of the drone incident, it seems reasons. First, it demonstrated in practical that the prospect of casualties among Ira- terms Iran’s willingness to use Syria as a nian personnel turned from a scenario to base for offensive operations against Israel. be avoided into a stated objective of Israeli In this context, Iran’s decision to use a plat- operations. Consequently, Iran’s form carrying a distinct Iranian “signature” in Syria has suffered dozens of casualties – namely an Iranian-manufactured drone since February due to Israeli airstrikes. If instead of using proxies to act directly the policy of active containment was de- against Israel – supported Israel’s belief signed to signal Israeli resolve and set red that Iran meant to emphasize its involve- lines vis-à-vis Iran, the new Israeli approach ment. As a senior Israeli military officer is focused on enforcing these lines through stated: “This is the first time we saw Iran do military means. Israel’s new approach also something against Israel – not by proxy … appears in its willingness now to claim this opened a new period.” Second, it ex- responsibility for some of the airstrikes. The posed Russia’s inability – or perhaps its new logic of decisive maneuver reduces the unwillingness – to prevent its military ally value of preserving operational and politi- from executing direct infiltration attempts cal ambiguity. Instead, it supports a public into Israeli airspace and challenged the discourse that is meant to announce Israel’s Israeli perception of Russia serving as a con- resolve to both domestic and international taining factor for Iran’s actions against Israel. audiences. In this context, the relatively The fact that the mission was launched from broad support that this new mode of opera- the T4 airbase, where Russian advisers are tions in Syria is receiving from the Israeli regularly present, was likely to enhance public and across the domestic political these doubts. map provides further backing to this policy of open confrontation with Iran. 2. Distinguishing between Iran and the Bashar al-Assad regime – Israeli airstrikes are focused solely on targets affiliated with the IRGC

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Israel’s military operations in Syria since February 2018 (according to media sources)

Feb. 10 Following the interception of May 8 Israel launched a preemptive strike an armed Iranian drone, which against missile storage facilities and attempted to infiltrate Israeli air- launchers shortly before their deploy- space, Israel targeted the com- ment for an attack against Israeli mand unit controlling the drone military installations in the Golan. at the T4 airbase. After Syrian anti- May 10 The peak of Israel’s operations aircraft fire intercepted an Israeli against Iran’s military presence F-16, the retaliated in Syria: Iran attempted to launch against Syrian air defense systems a rocket barrage against Israeli and Islamic Revolutionary Guard military posts in the Golan. In re- Corps (IRGC) targets. Casualties in- sponse, Israel launched a large-scale cluded IRGC personnel. attack against the Quds Force’s Apr. 9 An airstrike against the IRGC’s infrastructure in Syria (“Operation drone unit at the T4 airbase House of Cards”). Targets were resulted in the death of at least military bases, intelligence-gather- seven Iranian officers, including ing posts, logistics centers, and the commanding Colonel. Reports weapon storage facilities. It is indicate that a Tor air defense described as the largest military system (SA-15) that Iran was plan- operation in the Israel-Syria con- ning to deploy was an additional flict since the 1973 war. Israeli target of the attack. decision-makers describe the attack Apr. 30 Combined airstrikes against two as a major setback for the Quds underground missile depots of Force’s capabilities in Syria. the Quds Force in the and May 24 Israel allegedly launched an air- Aleppo districts reportedly destroyed strike against the al-Dabaa airbase, hundreds of missiles. Reports in- which is close to the Syria-Lebanon dicate that one of the targets was border. Targets were weapon depots an Iranian-manufactured anti-air belonging to Hezbollah. defense system. Both attacks report- Jul. 8 Israel allegedly launched an air- edly resulted in Iranian casualties. strike against the T4 airbase.

and have avoided, at this phase, hitting reduces the latter’s ability to influence or threatening targets related to the Assad Iran’s activity in Syria. Second, an Israeli regime. This differs from Israel’s pre–civil attack on Syria’s political leadership and its war strategy of flying sorties above the presi- symbols of sovereignty is likely to increase dential palace as a means of putting pres- the friction with its main patron – Russia, sure on Assad to contain Hezbollah. Syrian the core goal of which is to strengthen the army units are targeted only when they get regime’s capacity to rule. Third, this dis- directly involved in the Israel-Iran clash – tinction might be designed to drive a wedge as in the case of Syrian air defense units, between the direct target, Iran, and the in- which have suffered heavy losses in their directly injured party, Syria. attempts to resist Israeli operations – or 3. Synergic military and diplomatic efforts when bases host Iranian troops. – In coordination with the military efforts, There are three possible explanations Israel’s decisive maneuver against Iran’s for this operational policy. First, the drastic presence is taking place also on the diplo- change in the balance of power between matic level. The main objective of these Iran and the Assad regime significantly efforts is to substantiate Israeli military

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operations through diplomatic steps (and hancing the effective sovereignty of the vice versa). This is apparent in the consist- Assad regime. Even if Israel’s actions against ent diplomatic efforts being directed at the Iran are currently not being directed against relevant extra-regional actors – Russia, the Assad regime, they are still causing the US, and the main European actors – to damage to its military capacities and carry convince them to take concrete positions a potential risk to its political resilience. So against Iran’s continuing efforts in Syria. far, these actions have cost the regime a sub- The effort to mobilize international support stantial portion of its air defense capacities. against Iran’s military presence in Syria was Taking a broader perspective, as the a key motive behind ’s fighting dies down and the Assad regime visit to Europe in early June and a central regains its independent capacity to rule topic of his meetings with the leaders of over most of Syria’s territory, Russia’s Germany, France, and the UK. Israel’s policy reliance on military support from Iran is is to present Iran’s presence in Syria and expected to decline. Moreover, as Syria its attempts to achieve military nuclear slowly shifts from chaos to partial order, capability as two interlinked matters con- Russia-Iran relations are gradually shifting stituting Iran’s destabilizing effect on the from alliance to competition. Russia finds region – a focus on “Iran and Iran,” as itself competing with Iran on the future Netanyahu described it. Yet, among these political order in Syria as well as over the two, the Syrian issue seems to have received economic benefits of the massive recon- priority, necessitating an immediate inter- struction of the country. Although Iran national response. Israel’s diplomatic ef- remains a key military ally in Syria, the forts vis-à-vis Russia corresponds directly evolving reality is gradually transforming with Israel’s military activity. it into a liability for Russia. The change in the Russia-Iran equilib- rium is mainly being felt on the level of Global factors contributing to political discourse. Since May 2018, a dis- Israel’s direct confrontation tinct change in the Russian leadership’s approach discourse regarding the legitimacy of Iran’s and Hezbollah’s long-term military pres- Israel’s perception of a window of oppor- ence in Syria can be observed, much to tunity to act decisively against Iran seems Iran’s dismay. Russian leaders, who once to be based on two main developments in described Iran’s future presence as legiti- the Syria policies of the US and Russia. From mate, are now asserting the need for the the perspective of the Israeli leadership, forces of Iran and Hezbollah to leave Syria these developments challenge Iran’s ability following the end of the civil war. For to maintain its long-term military presence Israel, this change in Russia’s willingness in Syria as well as enhance Israel’s freedom to discuss not only the presence of Iranian of military maneuverability in Syria. forces near the 1974 Israel-Syria armistice The first development is a readjustment line, but also Iran’s long-term military pres- in Russia’s approach to Iran’s and Israel’s ence in Syria is important. In accordance, in respective roles in Syria. Since May 2018, their recent meetings with Russian leader- there has been a perceptible change in Rus- ship in May, Israeli leaders reintroduced sia’s attitude toward Iran’s long-term mili- their demand that Iran must remove its tary presence in Syria and a greater toler- forces from Syria. ance for Israel’s containment policy. The Albeit general political statements, a evolving escalation between Israel and Iran basic difference in opinions still exists be- in Syria further exposes the gap between tween Israel and Russia regarding the scope Iran’s strategic interest to maintain Syria as of Russia’s current steps to limit Iran’s mili- a component in its deterrence strategy vis-à- tary presence. Whereas Russia is focusing vis Israel, and Russia’s core interest of en- on reaching an understanding that will

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keep Iranian forces away from the Israel- take steps to limit Israel’s freedom of opera- Syria armistice line, Israeli demands clearly tion in Syrian airspace. In this context, the assert that “Iran must leave Syria. All of relative silence with which Russia responded Syria.” In addition, intentions aside, Rus- to Israel’s large-scale operation against sia’s practical ability to limit Iran’s deploy- Iran’s infrastructure in Syria on May 10 ments remains in question. Russia has yet (“”) could be seen to display a commitment toward preventing as evidence of Russia’s increasing tolerance pro-Iranian militias from participating in of Israel’s actions. Some reports even claimed the Assad regime’s recent July offensive in that Russia gave Israel a green light to act the southwest of Syria. In any case, pre- against Iranian targets in Syria, just as long venting Iran from engaging in activities in as the regime is not targeted. In some as- other parts of Syria is not currently on Rus- pects, Russia could even be seen as a bene- sia’s agenda. On the practical level, Russia ficiary of Israel’s actions, since it shares is still trying to maintain its balancing role Israel’s ambition of curbing Iran’s influence between Israel and Iran while preserving but lacks the capability to do so. Russia’s effective working relations with its Iranian recent decision in May to refrain from sup- military ally on the ground. plying Syria with upgraded S-300 air de- Nevertheless, Russia’s current readjust- fense systems serves as an additional indi- ment seems to be influencing its operational cation that Russia does not intend to limit attitude toward Israel’s demands about – Israel’s freedom of operation in Syria. Israel and military activity against – Iran in therefore seems to at least be achieving its Syria. Since this past May, Russia has been basic goal vis-à-vis Russia – ensuring that making considerable diplomatic efforts to Russia will stay out of Israel’s way. reengage in discussions regarding Israel’s The second development is Israel’s per- demand to keep Iran’s and Hezbollah’s ception of Iran’s strategic weakness follow- forces away from the Israel-Syria armistice ing the US decision to impose secondary line. Some reports indicated Russia’s wil- sanctions on Iran – Israel’s direct confron- lingness to commit to a buffer zone stretch- tation approach vis-à-vis Iran in Syria corre- ing 60–70 km from the armistice line. lates with the confrontational Iran strategy Russia’s effort was designed to support the recently adopted by the administration of regime’s successful offensive in the south- . This relates to the admin- west of Syria by preventing Israel from istration’s decision to withdraw from the acting against the maneuvering forces. The nuclear deal with Iran (Joint Comprehen- Russian support of this buffer-zone demand sive Plan of Action – JCPOA), and even is hardly new – it served as the basis of the more so to its decision to introduce a new Russia-US brokered ceasefire deal in July set of comprehensive sanctions on Iran. 2017. Nevertheless, this move is meaningful Israel’s assessment is that these sanctions for Israel for two reasons. First, it indicates will have a direct effect on Iran’s strategic a renewed Russian willingness to take active position as well as on its domestic resili- steps to enforce a future buffer zone in the ence. In the Syrian context, Israeli leaders Golan area. Second, if accepted, the new seem to believe that the sanctions’ negative framework will substantially broaden the effects on Iran’s economy will increase buffer zone defined by the July agreement domestic criticism concerning the costly and restrict Iran’s ability to use the Golan intervention in Syria, and therefore impede region as a launching pad to attack Israel. Iran’s ability to preserve its military pres- In the context of Israel’s military cam- ence. In addition, the new emphasis by paign, Russia’s critical response to Israel’s the Trump administration on Iran’s actions February and April airstrikes against the T4 beyond its borders raises Israeli hopes for airbase raised initial concerns in Israel that an increase in US political and intelligence Russia might consider suspending the co- support for Israel’s containment campaign. ordination mechanism with Israel, or even Recent reports indicate that Trump will

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express support for Israel’s demand to attack on Iranian nuclear installations be- remove Iran’s military presence from Syria coming a valid possibility once more, the during his July 16 meeting with Putin. value of the Syrian outpost for Iran’s deter- rence policy vis-à-vis Israel is greater than ever. In addition, with Iran’s international The risk of a regional spillover position being challenged by the US, a with- drawal from Syria under fire is hardly a loss In their actions against Iranian personnel Iran can afford. Its continued presence in and facilities, Israel has demonstrated its Syria is therefore both a key strategic inter- willingness to accept the risk of further est and a matter of national prestige. At the escalation in order to roll back Iran’s pres- current stage, both Israel and Iran are dis- ence. Nevertheless, the events of the last playing a lack of motivation to expand the two months have enhanced the Israeli per- scope of warfare beyond the Syrian context. ception that Iran’s operational capabilities Nevertheless, both parties’ actions demon- could be neutralized without the situation strate their willingness to risk further esca- deteriorating into a regional war. Israel is lation of the conflict to protect their core therefore aiming to conduct a “deluxe war” interests in Syria. against Iran in Syria – utilizing its fire- The key catalyst that could transform the power superiority to dismantle Iran’s Israel-Iran conflict in Syria into a regional stronghold piece by piece without paying one is the danger of a spillover into Lebanon. the human, political, and economic price If Iran decides to involve Hezbollah and its of a full-out conflict. Specifically, the lack massive stockpiles of rockets against Israel’s of Iranian reaction to the “House of Cards” home front, Israel will likely use unprec- operation is seen in Israel as affirmation of edented levels of military force, resulting the “arena isolation” logic – the operation- in destructive outcomes for Lebanon. Con- al concept that Israel could engage in direct sidering Hezbollah’s current capabilities to military conflict with Iran in Syria while hit strategic targets in Israel; the growing preventing a spillover into other arenas. Israeli tendency to categorize Hezbollah, Israel’s current mindset relates to the the Lebanese Army, and the Lebanese politi- perceived success of Israel’s deterrence vis- cal system as one entity; and Israeli leaders’ à-vis Hezbollah in Lebanon. Keeping Hez- threats to turn Lebanon “into a wasteland” bollah – and its vast stockpiles of more in a future war, such a conflict is expected than 100,000 rockets targeted at Israel’s to be greater in magnitude than any of the home front – away from the fighting is preceding rounds of fighting between the considered a central goal by Israeli decision- parties. It could easily precipitate a further makers. expansion of the warfare into a regional Nevertheless, the continuation of the conflict. Echoing Israeli Defense, Minister direct Iran-Israel conflict in Syria increases Avigdor Liberman’s warning that “if Iran the chances for escalation, both within the attacks Tel Aviv – Israel will attack Tehran,” Syrian arena and beyond. Hoping to use its an attack on Israel’s home front by Iran or perceived window of opportunity, Israel is Hezbollah could instigate an Israeli response likely to continue – and even increase – that will be felt not only in Lebanon and the rate and magnitude of its attacks against Syria but also in Iran. Iranian and Hezbollah targets in Syria, for On the immediate level, four potential example by targeting high-ranking Iranian developments could instigate a further officers. Iran, out of principle and especial- escalation and a spillover of the Israel-Iran ly in its current international position, conflict beyond the Syrian scope: is highly unlikely to cave in to Israeli de- 1. A continuation of Iran’s current efforts to mands and reduce its military activity build its independent operational capabilities in under Israeli military pressure. With the Syria – for example through the placement JCPOA in serious jeopardy and an Israeli of new weapons systems, an assimilation of

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its forces into the Syrian army as independ- the second option and expanding the scope ent units, enhancement of Hezbollah’s stra- of conflict. Furthermore, an escalation tegic capability to inflict damage on Israel, by Iran could also occur as an outcome of building new air and naval bases in Syria, broader international developments, which and the deployment of Hezbollah and pro- the regime in Iran might interpret as a threat Iranian militias near the 1974 armistice to its stability: for example, the collapse of line. The incremental buildup of Iranian the JCPOA, an estimation that an imminent forces in Syria is likely to lead to an en- Israeli attack is about to be launched against hanced Israeli response and a dynamic of Iran’s nuclear facilities, or a direct regional reciprocal escalation. conflict with and the Gulf 2. A belated Iranian retaliation for “Opera- States. Any such development could create tion House of Cards” – aimed at seeking re- new incentives for Iranian decision-makers venge for Iranian losses and deterring addi- to challenge the status quo by utilizing its tional Israeli attacks. Such a retaliation could Syrian trump card, for what it is worth. be launched from Syrian territory in the form of yet another rocket barrage against Israeli military installations in the Golan, A Euro-Russian approach to a high-trajectory attack against strategic de-escalation targets in Israel, or a tactical attack by pro- Iranian militias on Israeli forces in the line Since early 2018, Iran has demonstrated an of skirmish. It could also duplicate previous ambition to use its direct intervention in IRGC tactics and be launched against Israeli Syria as an opportunity to turn the country targets abroad. An Iranian retaliation – into a strategic platform for offensive action and especially one that attempts to expand against Israel. In response, Israel has adopted the fighting to other arenas or damage the an “all or nothing” approach to Iran’s pres- Israeli home front – is likely to evoke a ence in Syria, culminating in a military strong Israeli response, which is unlikely effort to push back Iran. This approach sets to stay limited to Syria alone. a policy goal that can hardly be accom- 3. An Israeli ground engagement with Quds plished without sparking a regional war. Force/pro-Iranian militias following Assad’s cam- The main goal of the international com- paign to regain control over the armistice-line munity should be to stop the escalation by area – The inclusion of Hezbollah and pro- pressuring Iran to scale-down its military Iranian militias in the current campaign presence in Syria while convincing Israel to challenges Israel’s core policy of opposing abstain from using military force in Syria. the presence of pro-Iranian forces near the This goal necessitates two types of effort. armistice line. A Russian failure to prevent First, it requires a firm international com- the future deployment of pro-Iranian troops mitment against Iran’s continuing efforts to in the area could lead Israel to attack these enhance its operational capabilities in Syria. forces. These concerns gain relevance with Second, it necessitates that the international Iran’s public rejection of any limitations on community advance an understanding be- its current activity in the south of Syria. tween Israel and Iran about the limitations 4. Aside from scenarios of unintended of Iran’s future military presence in Syria. escalation, a spillover of the conflict could In this, it should follow a “dual-track” also result from a premeditated decision by approach that combines a diplomatic dia- Iran’s leadership. Such a decision to escalate logue with concrete measures to pressure could be taken if Israeli military efforts put Iran, as was done by the E3 countries in Iran’s back to the wall in Syria. While Isra- the early phases of the nuclear negotiations el’s policy is aimed at pushing Iran to a with Iran. decision-making juncture where it has to Considering the international actors’ choose between leaving Syria and escalating interests and capacities, the most effective the fighting, Israel might find Iran choosing framework with which to achieve a scale-

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down is a combined effort led by the E3 diplomatic reengagement by all parties in- countries in coordination with Russia. volved with the framework of the JCPOA. A spillover of the conflict into Lebanon The E3 countries are already involved in and beyond would have a destabilizing a strategic dialogue with Iran on its regional impact on Europe. With more than a mil- policy through the framework of the “struc- lion Syrian refugees in Lebanon alone, such tured dialogue,” which was initiated by a conflict would likely generate a new Germany during the 2018 Munich Security exodus of refugees toward Europe. The con- Conference. In this context, Iran’s military flict would also create a new inflammatory activity in Syria should become a core issue context, leading to the intensification of alongside the E3’s key effort to preserve the © Stiftung Wissenschaft terror activities and radicalization across JCPOA. und Politik, 2018 the continent. In addition, it would most Germany has the potential to fulfill an All rights reserved likely lead to the collapse of the JCPOA. important role in these efforts. In its special A crucial aspect in achieving a scale- position as both a strategic partner of Israel This Comment reflects down depends on providing Iran with a and a party to an ongoing dialogue with the author’s views. face-saving approach to make such a stra- Iran – with which it enjoys relative credibil- The online version of tegic compromise and to secure Israel’s ity and political access – Germany could this publication contains commitment to the compromise at the lead the strategic dialogue with the two par- functioning links to other same time. This could be achieved by incor- ties over a possible formula for de-escalation. SWP texts and other relevant porating Iran in the process of defining The inclusion of Russia in such a frame- sources. accepted limitations on its presence in Syria work is vital, not just in terms of leverage, SWP Comments are subject and by implementing the scale-down in a but also to provide an effective means for to internal peer review, fact- gradual manner to avoid the appearance of upholding the agreed-upon rules of engage- checking and copy-editing. a defeat. This effort should be designed to ment. Having boots on the ground and For further information on first deal with the urgent matters of reduc- dominance in the Syrian airspace, Russia our quality control pro- ing Iran’s offensive capabilities and pre- is the only international actor capable of cedures, please visit the SWP website: https://www.swp- venting the presence of pro-Iranian forces monitoring – and potentially even enforc- berlin.org/en/about-swp/ in the vicinity of the armistice line. Later, ing – the terms of such an understanding. quality-management-for- it could be expanded to deal with the stra- The gradual change in Russia’s attitude swp-publications/ tegic issues of Iran’s long-term presence in toward Iran’s long-term presence in Syria Syria and Iran’s advanced weapons supply has led to a convergence of perceptions SWP to Hezbollah. The challenge is to find a between Russia and the E3 regarding the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik formula that satisfies Israel’s security needs combustible potential of Iran’s current German Institute for while allowing Iran to preserve a certain activities in Syria. This creates common International and level of political and economic influence ground for a combined behind-the-scene Security Affairs in Syria as well as allowing its leaders to diplomatic effort (E3+Russia) to pressure save face. Iran to accept limitations on its military Ludwigkirchplatz 3–4 10719 Berlin Beyond the immediate objective of activity in Syria. Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 preventing a regional escalation, a gradual Fax +49 30 880 07-100 scale-down of Iranian forces in Syria could www.swp-berlin.org create a positive dynamic in supporting the [email protected] efforts to preserve the JCPOA. Iran’s mili-

ISSN 1861-1761 tary activities beyond its borders serves as a distinct justification for both the Trump administration and the Israeli government to oppose the JCPOA. Addressing the topic could thus serve as a starting point for

Dr. Gil Murciano is an Associate in the research project “Israel and its regional and global conflicts: Domestic developments, security issues and foreign affairs”. The project is located within SWP’s Middle East and Africa Division and is funded by the German Foreign Office.

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