Three Tweets to Midnight Nuclear Crisis Stability and the Information Ecosystem

NUCLEAR POLICY READOUT & RECOMMENDATIONS Three Tweets to Midnight Nuclear Crisis Stability and the Information Ecosystem

58th Strategy for Peace Conference October, 2017 | Airlie Center, Warrington, VA

This Readout and Recommendations presents key discussion points and observations from a multidisciplinary roundtable convened in October 2017 at the Stanley Foundation’s 58th annual Strategy for Peace Conference. The brief provides a framework for identifying such questions. It identifies several disruptive dynamics in the information ecosystem. It then looks at the psychology of decision making and asks when during the arc of a crisis the information ecosystem might have significant detrimental influence. It also recognizes that technology may be empowering new actors who have stabilizing effects on the information ecosystem and could promote accuracy and informed decisions. The brief concludes with a series of open questions deserving further examination.

How might a nuclear crisis play out in today’s media environment? the likelihood that a conflict could escalate, potentially to include What dynamics in this information ecosystem—with social media the threatened or actual use of nuclear weapons. increasing the volume and velocity of information, disrupting journalistic models, creating potent vectors for disinformation, “Trending” opening public channels for adversaries to influence national leaders, and changing how political leaders interact with constituencies—might threaten rational decision making during crises The Information Ecosystem and Its Malignancies between nuclear-armed states? The urgent focus today on social media and “fake news” often 1 neglects the scope and scale of the challenge. A large-scale tech- There are still many unknowns about the effects of social media nology transition is disrupting how we communicate, thereby on international conflict. Digital disinformation and influence changing how we interact with and interpret the world around us. campaigns have already been used by foreign adversaries to inter- The resulting dynamics are destabilizing the global information fere in democratic elections and have played roles in low-intensity ecosystem, and the effects are increasingly observable in inter- international conflicts. But leaders have not been tested in high- national conflicts. The ecosystem metaphor may seem intuitive, stakes security crises in this media environment. It is worth asking but we will turn first to an overview of how we communicate what new dynamics leaders would face and whether this affects using a systems view of communication, then explore how the

Readout & Recommendations 1 Internet and social media are disrupting that system, followed us have been weakened, and today they have diminished by a discussion of the malignancy of fake news. influence to counter false or misleading narratives.

Communication is commonly seen as the transmission of infor- • The business models of traditional journalism have been mation. A more holistic perspective sees communication also as upended. Social media platforms have overtaken publishers’ a complex social ritual through which communities can develop roles in distributing information, driving dramatic declines shared beliefs. This view of communication as a social ritual in advertising revenue and circulation. explains how community members interact with information to construct, maintain, and modify shared beliefs within that • There is a crisis of public trust in institutions, particularly in 2 community. print media. Trust in media recently reached historically low 8 levels, though it may be rising, according to one recent poll. This view of communication as a dynamic social process hints at a larger set of interrelationships at play in an information eco- • Audiences increasingly rely on social media networks to 3 system. This is akin to a community of living organisms and the access and interpret news, often leading them to alterna- relationships between them and with the surrounding environ- tive sources of information that are not subject to the same ment. There is not a common definition for what makes up an verification standards as traditional news sources. 4 information ecosystem. Internews, in its research on the concept, • Using advanced algorithms, social media platforms allow pre- defined it as: cise audience segmentation for advertisers while drawing “a loose dynamic configuration of different sources, flows, user attention toward messages that more closely conform 9 producers, consumers, and sharers of information interacting to their existing personal, ideological, and political beliefs. 5 within a defined community or space.” • Politicians and constituencies interact in dynamic new ways The Internet and social media technology are disrupting this in this information ecosystem. It is easier to distribute mes- information ecosystem, compelling dramatic changes in the sages, segment and narrowly target messages to different 6 actors and the complex interrelationships within it. These shifts groups, shape political narratives, and interpret or whip up are still under way, but some stand out: public support.

• It is cheaper and easier than ever to create and distribute These changes in the information ecosystem also enable the misuse content. of false information for political effect. There is a resurgence of 10 misinformation, disinformation, and propaganda campaigns. This • Individuals, organizations, networks, and states can directly has been keenly felt with recent foreign interference in democratic communicate with global audiences like never before. elections. States and malicious actors can—at low cost and with high impact—sow confusion and discord in adversaries’ domestic • The volume and velocity of information has greatly acceler- politics through digital information campaigns. ated news cycles. Defending against and responding to these campaigns has proven 11 • Verified information is necessarily more expensive and slower difficult. It takes more time and resources to refute or displace a to produce than unverified information, because the latter— falsehood than to propagate it. A lie can circulate within trusted by definition—need not undergo a verification process that networks long enough to be socialized as credible before fact has a cost and time associated with it. checkers can debunk it. Such campaigns have been highly cost effective, distributed, adaptive, and deniable. Automated accounts These shifts accompany other changes in the information ecosys- 12 on social media—or “bots ”—can scale up the effects. These prob- tem that warrant attention for discussions of international conflict: lems are not necessarily new, but the new information ecosystem • The volume and velocity of information are increasing faster has made such campaigns cost effective on a scale that was dif- 13 than norms, policies, and institutions have evolved to manage ficult to achieve previously. the consequences of the information. “Engagements” • The increasing volume and velocity of information could produce versions of a “CNN effect,” wherein disruptive communications technology accelerates news cycles and Information and International Conflict intensifies interplay between foreign policy makers, pub- Rapid evolution in the information ecosystem has affected domes- 7 lics, and the media. tic and international political dynamics and widened the arena for conflict. Early cases where digital disinformation and social • Professional journalists’ once primary roles as gatekeepers media had effects in international crises have been few and low for information and privileged narrators of the world around on the spectrum of conflict intensity. They do, however, at least

2 Stanley Center for Peace and Security raise questions about whether countries are sufficiently resilient escalatory dynamics and the risk of deterrence failure between 14 to such dynamics. nuclear powers.

For example, disinformation driven on social media sparked a dip- “Impressions” lomatic crisis in the Persian Gulf in May 2017. Hackers reportedly planted highly inflammatory statements attributed to the Qatari emir on the Qatar News Agency. This caused a wave of outcry, Information, Stress, and the Phases of a Crisis likely amplified on social media by bots, from neighboring Kuwait, The most likely path through which the structure of today’s Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. Qatari officials denied information ecosystem—and specifically social-media-enabled the statements. Even so, Qatar’s neighbors responded in protest disinformation campaigns—can exert significant influence on by severing diplomatic ties with the country and cutting off air 15 those making nuclear decisions is during the earlier phases of a and land travel with Qatar. crisis whose evolution and dynamics help to shape the psychology Disinformation driven on social media has sown confusion into the of the ultimate decision. It is of course possible that a nuclear politics around chemical weapons attacks in Syria. In the hours decision maker could wake up one morning and decide to use following the Syrian regime’s use of chemical weapons on April a nuclear weapon. That scenario, however, seems far less likely 4, 2017, a pro-Assad Web site published an article claiming the than the cumulative effects of the information ecosystem influ- attack was a “false flag” operation. The piece was promoted by encing the mind-set and predisposition of the leader responsible pro-Kremlin sites, caught traction in alt-right media, and went for making nuclear use decisions. viral under the hashtag #SyriaHoax. The campaign ended up Viewing crises as a phased process, and understanding the roles drawing in a part of President Donald Trump’s political base on of information and perception throughout them, helps to iden- social and digital media to echo pro-Assad messages opposing the 16 tify where these cumulative effects might be most significant. administration’s response with missile strikes in Syria. According to Michael Brecher, a crisis occurs following the receipt Social media have played a prominent role in the Trump adminis- of information about a change in the environment that creates the 17 perception of a threat to basic values, the probability of military tration’s management of the escalating crisis with North Korea. 22 This has caused experts and observers to publicly worry about involvement, and a finite time in which to respond to the threat. whether the president’s Twitter usage has undercut diplomatic These perceptions induce feelings of stress and uncertainty, the 18 options and raised the risk of war. As Brian McKeon, former resolution of which is the drama of a crisis. acting undersecretary of defense for policy, testified at a recent Leaders will not necessarily behave rationally during a crisis. Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on presidential Stress is known to degrade leaders’ cognitive performance by nuclear authorities, “The statements the president makes through restricting attention, limiting receptivity to information that chal- his Twitter account no doubt cause concern and confusion on the lenges existing beliefs, and narrowing the range of alternatives other side of the Pacific…. I’ll be very worried about a miscalcula- 23 considered. Moreover, leaders are not any less susceptible than tion based on continuing use of his Twitter account with regard 19 other people to relying on heuristic and intuitive thinking pro- to North Korea.” Such concerns are undoubtedly accentuated by 24 cesses when under stress. These processes are subconscious the consistently expressed administration view that Trump tweets 20 mechanisms that operate in short time frames and allow indi- reflect official statements by the president of the United States. viduals to make decisions without the kind of deliberation that Crises involving the potential use of nuclear weapons are an characterizes rational thought. Such mechanisms enable individ- extreme on the conflict-intensity spectrum. Given tensions in uals to minimize their cognitive load and to arrive at (or avoid) nuclear deterrent relationships today—including the NATO-Russia, a vital decision, but such shortcuts subject leaders to cognitive US-North Korea, and India-Pakistan relationships—low-level biases and make them more prone to wishful thinking. For example, feeling acute domestic political or strategic vulnerabilities, conflicts could escalate quickly. Two roundtable participants 25 argued that, during a conflict in this information ecosystem, it leaders might fear loss and act irrationally out of desperation. might be easier to inflame calls for war, complicate signaling, Prospect theory also suggests that leaders who perceive that and compress decision windows. For example, in December 2016, they are in a domain of losses, as might be the case in a crisis, Pakistani Defense Minister Khawaja Muhammad Asifa—appar- are more likely to be irrationally risk acceptant. Stress may also worsen decision makers’ abilities to frame and interpret adver- ently in response to a false news story that Israel had threatened 26 Pakistan with nuclear weapons—tweeted, “Israeli def min threat- saries’ signals. ens nuclear retaliation presuming pak role in Syria against Daesh. 21 No human decision is more fraught than one involving the use of Israel forgets Pakistan is a Nuclear state too.” nuclear weapons—a decision on which rides the lives of millions A nuclear use decision—generally made by a country’s sole of people and potentially the fate of civilization. Such a decision would be made under unfathomable stress, with imperfect infor- political leader and possibly in very tight time frames—could be 27 particularly sensitive to such new pressures. It is worth exploring mation, in four minutes or less in some scenarios. Heuristics and how features of this information ecosystem might contribute to emotional thinking may well reign over rational deliberation in

Readout & Recommendations 3 this environment. Because of this, a nuclear-use decision during journalists, the growth of citizen journalism, and new means for a crisis may largely be determined by the decision maker’s per- public diplomacy could improve the accuracy of reporting and ceptions of reality developed, in part, prior to the onset of a crisis. contribute to more-informed, deliberative, and cautious policy debates and decisions. Could the information ecosystem—over days, weeks, or years before a crisis—distort a decision maker’s perception of reality? For example, the exponential growth of digital sensors in the Could it change the social process through which a leader and world has improved the timeliness of information, given actors his or her circle of closest advisers develop shared assessments more objective sources, and increased the resolution that analysts and beliefs? Could malicious actors hijack such processes? It is and journalists can achieve with reports. Consider the sensors unclear under which conditions, (if any) such influence is possible, inside a mobile phone: cameras, microphones, accelerometers, significant, or significantly different in the current information and GPS receivers. With billions of smartphones globally, these 28 ecosystem. If such influence is significant, it is worth asking how devices represent a vast sensor network that provides a dimen- the effects of the information ecosystem on decision makers could sion of data that records changes in the world. Other networked contribute to conflict escalation and deterrence failure. devices for personal, industrial, or public uses similarly hold data from niche applications. At global and local levels, earth-imaging Researching deterrence psychology and the information eco- satellites, meteorological sensors, and seismographic networks system, or gaming scenarios involving social media use during a provide real-time data about events. Following an event, data from crisis between nuclear-armed states, could illuminate questions these sensors can quickly propagate through social media and for future consideration. Such questions could include: get picked up by analysts and journalists. This allows actors in the information ecosystem near-instantaneous alerts on devel- • To what degree does the information ecosystem make it oping events. Looking through social media and data leading to easier for a leader to use bad information, disinformation, an event provides a time machine with which to see how events or questionable alternative information sources to shape transpired. Analyzing data sets also allows actors to identify and or buttress his or her preferred decision? How might these understand trends. dynamics affect a leader’s ability to identify and dismiss bad information? This data-rich environment, and the interconnectivity between actors in it, has given analysts and journalists powerful new tools • How might online belittling and humiliation (directed either with which to strengthen reporting and combat falsehoods. There at a nation or personally at an individual decision maker) is a new emphasis on how stories can use data to investigate, be affect the emotional state of that decision maker in a crisis? 31 enriched by data, or explain the data itself. Crowdsourcing has • How do leaders factor messages on social media into percep- transformed how stories can be found, developed, and shared with 32 tions of adversary signals? What messages on social media, participating audiences. The relationship between the audience and in which contexts, might be effective at signaling? How and journalism is also now more dynamic, as citizen journalists 33 does the proliferation of message channels affect signal have grown increasingly skilled with journalistic practice. In consistency? this increasingly transparent and open source world, it is easier to identify and refute misinformation and disinformation. • How might the information ecosystem change the likelihood that a leader gets caught in a commitment trap or is able to Open source experts and networks of citizen journalists have 29 escape one? increasingly innovative ways to locate, track, and analyze conflicts and events. Such activities have increased the information • How and to what extent, if any, could an online public opin- and analysis available to states. This has provided citizens and ion firestorm calling for war from a leader’s political base publics with independent sources of information on world events. predispose him or her to escalate a crisis or use nuclear The cases below illustrate this. 30 weapons first? • Notification of crisis-provoking events—like nuclear tests • How might a leader instigate such an online firestorm? How or missile launches—near-instantaneously appear in social could an adversary, or third party, spark such a firestorm media. One roundtable participant described how, after through disinformation? North Korea test launched a long-range missile, he was able through live social media reports on its flight characteris- “What’s Happening?” tics to approximate the range of the missile before its flight ended.

Stabilizing Effects in the Information Ecosystem • Citizen journalist networks like Bellingcat have proven adept at open source investigations that combat falsehoods around The features of the information ecosystem that let falsehoods Russia’s involvement in the shooting down of Malaysian Air proliferate also enable new dynamics that could have stabiliz- Flight 17 and the Assad regime’s use of chemical weapons in ing influences on international crises. New tools for professional 34 Syria.

4 Stanley Center for Peace and Security • Even intelligence hard targets like North Korea are To facilitate that examination, these are some additional open now observable by citizens. Analysts at the Center for questions that are possible avenues for future research: Nonproliferation Studies apply geospatial imagery, open source data, and 3-D modeling to analyze North Korea’s • What features of a state—or of deterrent relationships—might 35 nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs. make crises between nuclear-armed states more susceptible to the negative effects of today’s information ecosystem? Such open source capabilities are not so important to national How does the strength of communication and diplomatic intelligence services, whose technical means and analyti- ties between states affect such vulnerabilities? cal resources can achieve higher resolution with and greater confidence in their intelligence products. Rather, open source • What do cases tell us about feedback loops on issues of state capabilities pull back the veil of secrecy that traditionally envel- instability and war? ops intelligence collection and analysis, making it harder for • Does the information ecosystem complicate the politics of national leaders to keep secrets from the interested public. In extended deterrence arrangements? If it is easier for adver- some instances, the inability to maintain secrecy (e.g., about saries to manipulate domestic constituencies, is decoupling impending military operations) may induce caution on the part allies similarly becoming easier? What effect might this have of national leaders. on states’ decisions to acquire nuclear weapons? The information ecosystem has also opened new channels for • What is the relationship between nuclear posture and doc- diplomacy. One hypothesis is that digital communications (includ- trine and decision makers’ timelines? ing social media) have made it easier for current and former officials to maintain relationships with peers abroad, thereby • What steps could be taken to increase leaders’ decision time creating more networks for backchannel diplomacy. It might also and encourage leaders during crises to “think slowly” and be be easier to conduct public diplomacy in this ecosystem. One more deliberative? roundtable participant argued that parties to the P5+1 negoti- ations for the 2015 Iran nuclear agreement tacitly coordinated • Should governments attempt to manage the social media communications to develop a common narrative that allowed environment during a crisis? political space to reach agreement. • How does the information ecosystem influence public atti- 36 Such potential stabilizing effects of the information ecosystem tudes about the use of nuclear weapons? on decision making deserve more attention. Potential questions for future research include: • How might the information ecosystem change over the next five to ten years? What lessons can be inferred today about • Under what circumstances, if any, do crowdsourcing and the future roles of the information ecosystem in international open source intelligence analysis improve the pace and accu- conflict? racy of public reporting? This Readout and Recommendations concludes with a sense • How do the ubiquity of sensors and disintermediation of of concern about the disruptive potential of social media and intelligence affect the management of public opinion during digital disinformation campaigns on public policy and interna- crises? tional conflict. It also concludes with renewed appreciations for psychological perspectives and the dynamics of crisis decision • How, if at all, might the immediacy and directness of social making. It is clear that more perspectives and more original media allow leaders to improve signaling or reassure publics research are needed to arrive at better understandings of how during times of crisis? conflicts, potentially escalating to involve the use of nuclear weapons, could transpire in this information ecosystem. • How and to what extent, if any, does increased connectivity of sitting or former officials create richer and more frequent Until then, we are likely to experience those effects—280 char- opportunities for diplomatic outreach? acters at a time.

“Follow and RT” This Readout and Recommendations summarizes the primary findings of the conference as interpreted by the cochairs, Benjamin Loehrke, Herbert Lin, and Harold Trinkunas, and rapporteur Danielle Additional Open Questions Jablanski. Participants neither reviewed nor approved this publication. This Readout and Recommendations, and the roundtable dis- Therefore, it should not be assumed that every participant subscribes cussion it draws on, raises more questions than it answers. This to all of its recommendations, observations, and conclusions.} reflects a shared observation that security researchers have not fully engaged with how the information ecosystem affects foreign Additional information about the 58th annual Strategy for Peace policy and crisis decision making. Conference is available at www.stanleycenter.org.

Readout & Recommendations 5 Endnotes com/poll/212840/americans-confidence-institutions-edges. aspx. 1 1 There is a vibrant community working to define and 9 9 Anamitra Deb, Stacy Donohue, and Tom Glaisyer, “Is understand the information ecosystem and the disruptive Social Media a Threat to Democracy?” The Omidyar dynamics within it. See David Lazer et al., “Combating Fake Group, October 1, 2017, https://www.omidyargroup.com/ News: An Agenda for Research and Action,” Shorenstein wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Social-Media-and-Democracy- Center on Media, Politics, and Public Policy, May 2017, October-5-2017.pdf. https://shorensteincenter.org/combating-fake-news-agen- 10 da-for-research/; Giovanni Luca Ciampaglia et al., “Report 10 While the terms “misinformation,” “disinformation,” and on ICWSM 2017 Workshop on Digital Misinformation,” “propaganda” are widely used, there is not a common set of International Conference on Web and Social Media, May definitions for them. For a discussion of practical defini- 15–18, 2017, https://docs.google.com/document/d/1wX- tions, see Claire Wardle, “Fake News. It’s Complicated,” A8nr4j_CVhTVYLa-PJ3j2DwPBH4efbBV4eeQjDWfc/ First Draft, Feb. 16, 2017, https://firstdraftnews.com/ edit. fake-news-complicated/; Caroline Jack, “Lexicon of Liew:

2 Terms for Problematic Information,” Data & Society, August 2 James W. Carey, “A Cultural Approach to Communication,” 9, 2017, https://datasociety.net/pubs/oh/DataAndSociety_ in Communication as Culture: Essays on Media and Society, LexiconofLies.pdf. (London: Routledge, 1989), pp. 3–8.

11 11 3 See David Lazer et al., “Combating Fake News: An 3 See Marie Gillespie and Ben O’Loughlin, “The Media- Agenda for Research and Action,” Shorenstein Center Security Nexus: Researching Ritualised Cycles of on Media, Politics, and Public Policy, May 2017, h t t p s : // Insecurity,” in The Routledge Handbook of Media, Conflict shorensteincenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/ and Security, ed. Romy Frohlich, Piers Robinson, and Philip Combating-Fake-News-Agenda-for-Research-1. Seib (London: Routledge, 2016), pp. 51–67. pdf?x78124; Giovanni Luca Ciampaglia et al., “Report 4 4 This description draws on the writing of Timothy Norris on ICWSM 2017 Workshop on Digital Misinformation,” and Todd Suomela, who argue that the ecosystem metaphor International Conference on Web and Social Media, May has its faults. See Timothy B. Norris and Todd Suomela, 15, 2017, http://cnets.indiana.edu/blog/2016/12/29/ “Information in the Ecosystem: Against the ‘Information icwsm-2017-misinformation-workshop/.

Ecosystem,’” First Monday, Vol. 22, No. 9, 2017, http://first- 12 12 Samuel Woolley, “Automating Power: Social Bot monday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/6847/6530#11. Interference in Global Politics,” First Monday, Vol. 21, No. 5 5 Internews Center for Innovation and Learning, “Why 4, 2016, http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/ Information Matters: A Foundation for Resilience,” May view/6161/5300.

2015, p. 11, https://www.internews.org/sites/default/files/ 13 13 David Uberti, “The Real History of Fake News,” Columbia resources/150513-Internews_WhyInformationMatters.pdf. Journalism Review, December 16, 2016, https://www.cjr. 6 6 See also Claire Wardle and Hossein Derakhshan, org/special_report/fake_news_history.php.

“Information Disorder: Toward an Interdisciplinary 14 14 For a more in-depth discussion of digital disinformation Framework for Research and Policymaking,” Council of in international conflict and the vulnerabilities of liberal Europe Report, September 27, 2017, pp. 10–14, h t t p s : // democratic societies to it, see Herb Lin and Jackie Kerr, shorensteincenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/ “On Cyber-Enabled Information/Influence Warfare and PREMS-162317-GBR-2018-Report-de%CC%81sinformation. Manipulation,” in Oxford Handbook of Cybersecurity, 2018 pdf?x78124. (forthcoming), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. 7 7 The “CNN effect” is disputed and argued in a variety of cfm?abstract_id=3015680.

ways. The term is used here because it is recognizable in 15 15 Akin Ünver, “Can Fake News Lead to War? What the literature as a prominent discussion on communications the Gulf Crisis Tells Us,” War on the Rocks, June, technology change and foreign policy making. For a review 13, 2017, https://warontherocks.com/2017/06/ of various studies on the CNN effect, see Eytan Gilboa, “The can-fake-news-lead-to-war-what-the-gulf-crisis-tells-us/. CNN Effect: The Search for a Communication Theory of 16 International Relations,” Political Communication, Vol. 22, 16 Ben Nimmo and Donara Barojan, “How the Alt-Right No. 1, 2005, pp. 27–44. Brought #SyriaHoax to America,” Digital Forensic Research

8 Lab, April 7, 2017, https://medium.com/dfrlab/how-the-alt- 8 Frank Newport, “Americans’ Confidence in Institutions right-brought-syriahoax-to-america-47745118d1c9. Edges Up,” Gallup News, June 26, 2017, http://news.gallup.

6 Stanley Center for Peace and Security 17 17 26 “Everything President Trump Has Tweeted (and 26 Richard Ned Lebow, “Deterrence: A Political and What It Was About),” Los Angeles Times, accessed Psychological Critique,” in Perspectives on Deterrence, ed. December 10, 2017, http://www.latimes.com/ Robert Axelrod, Robert Jervis, Roy Radner, and Paul Sterns politics/la-pol-updates-everything-president-trump- (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp.25–51. has-tweeted-and-what-it-was-about-2017-htmlstory. 27 html#lb-tag=north-korea. 27 Jeffrey Lewis, “Our Nuclear Procedures Are Crazier Than Trump,” Foreign Policy, August 18 18 See Abigail Tracy, “Diplomats Fear Trump Is Tweeting 5, 2016, http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/08/05/ the United States Into War,” Vanity Fair, October 9, 2017, our-nuclear-procedures-are-crazier-than-trump/. https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2017/10/diplomats-don- 28 ald-trump-twitter-north-korea; Laura Rosenberger, “How 28 Ben O’Loughlin summarized this point well, with President Trump Could Tweet His Way Into Nuclear healthy skepticism, in a piece on his reflections from the War With North Korea,” Washington Post, July 5, 2017, roundtable. Ben O’Loughlin, “Nuclear Policy Remains https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/posteverything/ a Strategic Decision, Despite Tactical Tail-Twisting wp/2017/07/05/how-president-trump-could-tweet-his- on Twitter,” Global Policy Journal, November 14, 2017, way-into-nuclear-war-with-north-korea/?. http://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/14/11/2017/ nuclear-policy-remains-strategic-decision-despite-tacti- 19 19 Authority to Order the Use of Nuclear Weapons, Senate cal-tail-twisting-twitter. Foreign Relations Committee, 115th Cong. 1, November 14, 29 2017 (testimony of Brian McKeon). 29 Scott D. Sagan, “The Commitment Trap: Why the United States Should Not Use Nuclear Threats to Deter Biological 20 20 On June 6, 2017, when asked about the president’s tweets, and Chemical Weapons Attacks,” International Security, Vol. press secretary Sean Spicer said, “The President is the 24, No. 4, 2000, pp. 85–115. President of the United States, so they’re considered official 30 statements by the President of the United States.” h t t p : // 30 Katja Rost, Lea Stahel, and Bruno S. Frey, “Digital Social www.cnn.com/2017/06/06/politics/trump-tweets-offi- Norm Enforcement: Online Firestorms in Social Media,” cial-statements/index.html. This position was repeated in PLOS One, Vol. 11, No. 6, June 17, 2016.

response to a lawsuit filed against the Department of Justice, 31 31 in which the department said on November 13, 2017, that Simon Rogers, Jonathan Schwabish, and Danielle Bowers, “The government is treating the statements upon which “Data Journalism in 2017: The Current State and Challenges plaintiffs rely as official statements of the President of the Facing the Field Today,” Google News Lab, September, 2017, United States.” See https://assets.documentcloud.org/docu- p. 6, https://newslab.withgoogle.com/assets/docs/data-jour- ments/4200037/Trump-Twitter-20171113.pdf. nalism-in-2017.pdf.

32 21 32 21 Russell Goldman, “Reading Fake News, Pakistani Minister Mimi Onuhoa, Jeanne Pinder, and Jan Schaffer, “Guide to Directs Nuclear Threat at Israel,” New York Times, December Crowdsourcing,” Tow Center for Digital Journalism, 2015, 24, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/24/world/ pp.9-12, https://academiccommons.columbia.edu/catalog/ asia/pakistan-israel-khawaja-asif-fake-news-nuclear.html. ac:95x69p8d09.

33 22 33 22 Michael Brecher, “State Behavior in International Crisis: A The terms “citizen journalism” or “participatory journal- Model,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 23, No. 3, 1979, ism” have varied and wide interpretations. See Luke Goode, pp. 446–480. “Social News, Citizen Journalism and Democracy,” New Media & Society, Vol. 11, No. 8, pp. 1288–1292. 23 23 Alexander George, “The Impact of Crisis-Induced Stress on 34 34 Decision Making,” in The Medical Implications of Nuclear Ben Sullivan, “Bellingcat Wants Your Help to Debunk War, ed. Fred Solomon and Robert Q. Marston (Washington, Fake News,” Motherboard, March 7, 2017, h t t p s : // DC: National Academies Press, 1986), pp. 539–542. motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/78qbqy/ bellingcat-wants-your-help-to-debunk-fake-news. 24 24 Discussion of heuristics and biases depend on the pioneer- 35 35 ing work of Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman. See Daniel See Anna Fifield, “With Technology, These Researchers Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (New York: Farrar, Are Figuring Out North Korea’s Nuclear Secrets,” Straus and Giroux, 2011). Washington Post, November 21, 2017, h t t p s : // www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/ 25 25 For a discussion of framing effects and the effects on with-technology-these-researchers-are-figuring-out-north- deterrence, see Jeffrey Berejikian, “A Cognitive Theory of koreas-nuclear-secrets/2017/11/20/274d9786-c9e2-11e7- Deterrence,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 39, No. 2, 2002, b244-2d22ac912500_story.html?utm_term=.39b6a3884ce5; pp. 165–183. Jeffrey Lewis, “Applying New Tools to Nonproliferation: A

Readout & Recommendations 7 Nuclear Detective Story,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, May Tom Glaisyer, Director of the Public Square Program, Democracy 2, 2016, http://www.nti.org/analysis/reports/apply- Fund ing-new-tools-nonproliferation-nuclear-detective-story/. Robert Gorwa, Doctoral Student, Political Science and 36 International Relations, Oxford University 36 Scott Sagan and Ben Valentino, “Revisiting Hiroshima in Iran,” International Security, Vol. 42, No. 1, 2017, pp. 41–79. Kelly Greenhill, Professor, Political Science and International Relations, Tufts University, and Research Fellow, Harvard University Participant List Jaclyn Kerr, Postdoctoral Research Fellow, Center for Global Security Research, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

Ben O’Loughlin, Professor, Politics and International Relations, CoChairs Royal Holloway, University of London Herbert Lin, Senior Research Scholar for Cyber Policy and Anna Péczeli, Research Fellow, Centre for Strategic and Defense Security, Center for International Security and Cooperation, Studies, National University of Public Service Stanford University Keith Porter, President, The Stanley Foundation Benjamin Loehrke, Program Officer, Nuclear Policy, The Stanley Foundation John Scott-Railton, Senior Researcher, Citizen Lab University of Toronto, Munk School of Global Affairs, University of Toronto Harold Trinkunas, Deputy Director and Senior Research Scholar, Center for International and Security Cooperation, Stanford Paul Slovic, Professor, Psychology, University of Oregon University Lior Tabansky, Scholar of Cyber Power, Tel Aviv University

Rapporteur Philip Taubman, Adjunct Professor, Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University Danielle Jablanski, Program Associate, Nuclear Policy, The Devon Terrill, Program Officer, Media, The Stanley Foundation Stanley Foundation Benjamin Valentino, Associate Professor, Government, Dartmouth Participants College

James Acton, Co-Director and Senior Fellow, Nuclear Policy Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Affiliations are listed for identification purposes only. Participants Jeffrey Berejikian, Professor, International Affairs, University attended as individuals rather than as representatives of their gov- of Georgia ernments or organizations. Malfrid Braut-Hegghammer, Associate Professor, Political Science, University of Oslo

Jennifer Erickson, Professor, Political Science and International Studies, Boston College

Henry Farrell, Professor, Political Science and International Affairs, George Washington University

Anya Loukianova Fink, Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow, RAND Corporation

About Us The Stanley Center for Peace and Security partners with people, organizations, and the greater global community to drive policy progress in three issue areas—mitigating climate change, avoiding the use of nuclear weapons, and preventing mass violence and atrocities. The center was created in 1956 and maintains its independence while devel- oping forums for diverse perspectives and ideas. To learn more about our recent publications and upcoming events, please visit stanleycenter.org.

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