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Bladecenter, Linux, and Open Source Blueprint for E-Business on Demand

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Bladecenter, Linux, and Open Source Blueprint for E-Business on Demand Front cover IBM Eserver BladeCenter, Linux, and Open Source Blueprint for e-business on demand Discover open source projects to reduce cost and improve reliability Install and configure Linux and critical open source network services Learn best practices to implement reliable services George Dolbier Peter Bogdanovic Dominique Cimafranca Yessong Johng Rufus Credle Jr. ibm.com/redbooks International Technical Support Organization IBM ^ BladeCenter, Linux, and Open Source: Blueprint for e-business on demand July 2003 SG24-7034-00 Note: Before using this information and the product it supports, read the information in “Notices” on page vii. First Edition (July 2003) This edition applies to Red Hat Advanced Server 2.1. © Copyright International Business Machines Corporation 2003. All rights reserved. Note to U.S. Government Users Restricted Rights -- Use, duplication or disclosure restricted by GSA ADP Schedule Contract with IBM Corp. Contents Notices . vii Trademarks . viii Preface . ix The team that wrote this redbook. ix Become a published author . xi Comments welcome. xi Chapter 1. About the book: Blueprint for building an e-business application for BladeCenter. 1 1.1 Building an e-business infrastructure . 2 1.1.1 Materials . 2 1.1.2 Objectives . 3 1.2 IBM eServer™ BladeCenter . 3 1.3 FAStT SAN storage. 3 1.4 BladeCenter business value . 4 1.5 Linux business value. 4 1.6 Open source business value. 4 1.7 Other references . 5 Chapter 2. Architecture: Solution overview . 7 2.1 Open source e-business infrastructure a modular approach . 8 2.2 All construction projects start with a pattern . 8 2.2.1 Industry standard e-business pattern: A three-tier infrastructure . 8 2.3 Blade servers . 8 2.3.1 The next evolutionary step in computing: Blade-based computing. 9 2.3.2 IBM eServer BladeCenter . 9 2.3.3 BladeCenter value . 9 2.3.4 When BladeCenter is not the right platform . 10 2.4 SAN storage . 10 2.5 Software stack. 10 2.5.1 High-level architecture . 10 2.5.2 Open source e-business software components . 11 2.5.3 Functional aspects . 12 2.5.4 Non-functional requirements. 13 2.5.5 Non-functional aspects . 13 2.5.6 Detailed software stack. 13 Chapter 3. Foundation . 17 3.1 Hardware. 18 3.1.1 Single CD-ROM, floppy drive, keyboard, video, and mouse. 18 3.2 Installing operating system instances . 18 3.2.1 PXE. 19 3.2.2 Red Hat Kickstart . 20 3.2.3 Sample Kickstart configuration for BladeCenter . 22 Chapter 4. Plumbing: Network infrastructure. 25 4.1 DHCP . 26 4.1.1 Background. 26 © Copyright IBM Corp. 2003. All rights reserved. iii 4.1.2 Building in fault tolerance . 26 4.1.3 Security concerns . 28 4.1.4 Conclusion . 29 4.2 DNS. 29 4.2.1 History . 30 4.2.2 Building a highly available DNS . 32 4.2.3 Conclusion . 34 4.3 LDAP. 34 4.3.1 LDAP servers . 35 4.3.2 LDAP concepts . 35 4.3.3 Working with OpenLDAP . 39 4.3.4 gq: A graphical LDAP browser . 45 4.3.5 Server authentication with LDAP . 52 4.3.6 Apache authentication with LDAP. 58 Chapter 5. Wiring: File services with Samba and NFS . 61 5.1 Working with Samba . 62 5.1.1 Required Samba packages. 62 5.1.2 Configuring Samba as a basic file server . 62 5.1.3 Adding Samba users. 63 5.1.4 Samba passwords . 63 5.1.5 Connecting to the Samba server using smbclient. 64 5.1.6 Connecting to the Samba server using smbmount . 64 5.1.7 Connecting to the Samba server from a Windows machine . 64 5.1.8 Automatically mounting a Samba directory at boot time. 64 5.1.9 Sharing additional directories . 64 5.1.10 For more information on Samba . 65 5.2 Working with NFS . ..
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