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Cops Or Robbers? How Georgia's Defense of Habitation Statute Applies to No-Knock Raids by Police Dimitri Epstein
Georgia State University Law Review Volume 26 Article 5 Issue 2 Winter 2009 March 2012 Cops or Robbers? How Georgia's Defense of Habitation Statute Applies to No-Knock Raids by Police Dimitri Epstein Follow this and additional works at: https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Dimitri Epstein, Cops or Robbers? How Georgia's Defense of Habitation Statute Applies to No-Knock Raids by Police, 26 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. (2012). Available at: https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol26/iss2/5 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Publications at Reading Room. It has been accepted for inclusion in Georgia State University Law Review by an authorized editor of Reading Room. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Epstein: Cops or Robbers? How Georgia's Defense of Habitation Statute App COPS OR ROBBERS? HOW GEORGIA'S DEFENSE OF HABITATION STATUTE APPLIES TO NONO- KNOCK RAIDS BY POLICE Dimitri Epstein*Epstein * INTRODUCTION Late in the fall of 2006, the city of Atlanta exploded in outrage when Kathryn Johnston, a ninety-two-year old woman, died in a shoot-out with a police narcotics team.team.' 1 The police used a "no"no- knock" search warrant to break into Johnston's home unannounced.22 Unfortunately for everyone involved, Ms. Johnston kept an old revolver for self defense-not a bad strategy in a neighborhood with a thriving drug trade and where another elderly woman was recently raped.33 Probably thinking she was being robbed, Johnston managed to fire once before the police overwhelmed her with a "volley of thirty-nine" shots, five or six of which proved fatal.fata1.44 The raid and its aftermath appalled the nation, especially when a federal investigation exposed the lies and corruption leading to the incident. -
Legal Methods for the Suppression of Organized Crime (A Symposium) Arthur Buller
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology Volume 48 | Issue 4 Article 8 1958 Legal Methods for the Suppression of Organized Crime (A Symposium) Arthur Buller Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminology Commons, and the Criminology and Criminal Justice Commons Recommended Citation Arthur Buller, Legal Methods for the Suppression of Organized Crime (A Symposium), 48 J. Crim. L. Criminology & Police Sci. 414 (1957-1958) This Criminal Law is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. CRIMINAt LAW CASE NOTES AND COMMENTS Prepared by students of Northwestern University School of Law, under the direction of the student members of the Law School's Journal Editorial Board. Arthur Buller, Editor-in-Chief Arthur Rollin, Associate Editor Marvin Aspen Jay Oliff Malcolm Gaynor Louis Sunderland Ronald Mora Howard Sweig LEGAL METHODS FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF ORGANIZED CRIME (A SYMPOSIUM) Organized crime is a vital problem in the "The Use of Equitable Devices to Suppress field of law enforcement. Because of the nature Organized Crime", will consider the mechanics of its various forms of activity, the suppression and availability of the use of the injunction and of organized crime presents difficulties not other equitable remedies where the usual legal ordinarily encountered in other areas of criminal remedies have proved inadequate. The fifth and conduct. In this and subsequent issues of the concluding paper, "Indirect Control of Organized Journal, a series of articles will examine these Crime Through Liquor License Revocation", will problems and the legal remedies available for examine this tactic as a substitute for direct their solution. -
Level of Certainty Needed to Prove the Standard
% certainty Curved Line represents Level of certainty needed to prove the standard needed toprove of certainty Level difficulty to prove or articulate 90+ % CONVICTION – Proof Beyond Criminal Case a Reasonable Doubt 75% Insanity defense / Clear & alibi / prove consent Convincing given voluntarily Evidence Needed to prevail in Preponderance 51% civil case – LIABLE of evidence Asset Forfeiture 35% Arrest / Search / Probable Indictment / Cause Pretrial hearing 20% Stop & Frisk Reasonable – must be Suspicion articulated Hunch – not able to Mere 0% articulate / Suspicion no stop Mere Suspicion – This term is used by the courts to refer to a hunch or intuition. We all experience this in everyday life but it is NOT enough “legally” to act on. It does not mean than an officer cannot observe the activity or person further without making contact. Mere suspicion cannot be articulated using any reasonably accepted facts or experiences. An officer may always make a consensual contact with a citizen without any justification. The officer will however have not justification to stop or hold a person under this situation. One might say something like, “There is just something about him that I don’t trust”. “I can’t quit put my finger on what it is about her.” “He looks out of place.” Reasonable Suspicion – Stop, Frisk for Weapons, *(New) Search of vehicle incident to arrest under Arizona V. Gant. The landmark case for reasonable suspicion is Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) This level of proof is the justification police officers use to stop a person under suspicious circumstances (e.g. a person peaking in a car window at 2:00am). -
1 in the UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT for the DISTRICT of MARYLAND MICHAEL DENNIS : : : V. : Criminal No. CCB-10-715 : (Civil
Case 1:10-cr-00715-CCB Document 99 Filed 05/05/17 Page 1 of 19 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND MICHAEL DENNIS : : : v. : Criminal No. CCB-10-715 : (Civil No. CCB-13-301) : UNITED STATES OF AMERICA : : MEMORANDUM Michael Dennis is serving a 264-month sentence in the custody of the United States Bureau of Prisons after pleading guilty to conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute cocaine base and heroin, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. He now attacks that sentence via a motion brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, (ECF No. 70), arguing that his lawyer was constitutionally ineffective. In a separate motion, Dennis asks the court to equitably toll the statute of limitations. (ECF No. 73.) Dennis also asserts, via a motion for leave to supplement and request for appointment of counsel filed in 2013, (ECF No. 84), that his sentence is unlawful in light of Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013), and Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013). Finally, in briefing authorized by the court in 2015, Dennis argues that the court may grant relief despite the Fourth Circuit’s decisions in Whiteside v. United States, 775 F.3d 180 (4th Cir. 2014) (en banc), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2890 (2015), and United States v. Foote, 784 F.3d 931 (4th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2850 (2015). (ECF No. 95.) No hearing is necessary to the resolution of Dennis’s motions. -
BAIL JUMPING in the THIRD DEGREE (Any Criminal Action Or Proceeding) Penal Law § 215.55 (Committed on Or After Sept
BAIL JUMPING IN THE THIRD DEGREE (Any Criminal Action or Proceeding) Penal Law § 215.55 (Committed on or after Sept. 8, 1983) The (specify) count is Bail Jumping in the Third Degree. Under our law, a person is guilty of Bail Jumping in the Third Degree when by court order he or she has been released from custody or allowed to remain at liberty, either upon bail or upon his or her own recognizance, upon condition that he or she will subsequently appear personally in connection with a criminal action or proceeding1, and when he or she does not appear personally on the required date or voluntarily within thirty days thereafter. In order for you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, the People are required to prove, from all of the evidence in the case, beyond a reasonable doubt, both of the following two elements: 1. That the defendant, (defendant’s name) was, by court order, released from custody or allowed to remain at liberty upon bail [or upon his/her own recognizance] upon condition that he/she would subsequently appear personally on (date) in (county) in connection with a criminal action or proceeding; and 2. That the defendant did not appear personally on the required date or voluntarily within thirty days thereafter. Note: If the affirmative defense does not apply, conclude as follows: If you find the People have proven beyond a reasonable doubt both of those elements, you must find the defendant guilty 1 If in issue, define criminal action or criminal proceeding in accordance with CPL 1.20(16) and (18). -
Conflict of the Criminal Statute of Limitations with Lesser Offenses at Trial
William & Mary Law Review Volume 37 (1995-1996) Issue 1 Article 10 October 1995 Conflict of the Criminal Statute of Limitations with Lesser Offenses at Trial Alan L. Adlestein Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr Part of the Criminal Law Commons Repository Citation Alan L. Adlestein, Conflict of the Criminal Statute of Limitations with Lesser Offenses at Trial, 37 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 199 (1995), https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol37/iss1/10 Copyright c 1995 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository. https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr CONFLICT OF THE CRIMINAL STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS WITH LESSER OFFENSES AT TRIAL ALAN L. ADLESTEIN I. INTRODUCTION ............................... 200 II. THE CRIMINAL STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AND LESSER OFFENSES-DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONFLICT ........ 206 A. Prelude: The Problem of JurisdictionalLabels ..... 206 B. The JurisdictionalLabel and the CriminalStatute of Limitations ................ 207 C. The JurisdictionalLabel and the Lesser Offense .... 209 D. Challenges to the Jurisdictional Label-In re Winship, Keeble v. United States, and United States v. Wild ..................... 211 E. Lesser Offenses and the Supreme Court's Capital Cases- Beck v. Alabama, Spaziano v. Florida, and Schad v. Arizona ........................... 217 1. Beck v. Alabama-LegislativePreclusion of Lesser Offenses ................................ 217 2. Spaziano v. Florida-Does the Due Process Clause Require Waivability? ....................... 222 3. Schad v. Arizona-The Single Non-Capital Option ....................... 228 F. The Conflict Illustrated in the Federal Circuits and the States ....................... 230 1. The Conflict in the Federal Circuits ........... 232 2. The Conflict in the States .................. 234 III. -
Reasonable Cause Exists When the Public Servant Has
ESCAPE IN THE SECOND DEGREE Penal Law § 205.10(2) (Escape from Custody by Defendant Arrested for, Charged with, or Convicted of Felony) (Committed on or after September 8, 1983) The (specify) count is Escape in the Second Degree. Under our law, a person is guilty of escape in the second degree when, having been arrested for [or charged with] [or convicted of] a class C [or class D] [or class E] felony, he or she escapes from custody. The following terms used in that definition have a special meaning: CUSTODY means restraint by a public servant pursuant to an authorized arrest or an order of a court.1 "Public Servant" means any public officer or employee of the state or of any political subdivision thereof or of any governmental instrumentality within the state, [or any person exercising the functions of any such public officer or employee].2 [Add where appropriate: An arrest is authorized when the public servant making the arrest has reasonable cause to believe that the person being arrested has committed a crime. 3 Reasonable cause does not require proof that the crime was in fact committed. Reasonable cause exists when the public servant has 1 Penal Law §205.00(2). 2 Penal Law §10.00(15). 3 This portion of the charge assumes an arrest for a crime only as authorized by the provisions of CPL 140.10(1)(b). If the arrest was authorized pursuant to some other subdivision of CPL 140.10 or other law, substitute the applicable provision of law. knowledge of facts and circumstances sufficient to support a reasonable belief that a crime has been or is being committed.4 ] ESCAPE means to get away, break away, get free or get clear, with the conscious purpose to evade custody.5 (Specify the felony for which the defendant was arrested, charged or convicted) is a class C [or class D] [or class E] felony. -
Jun a 1 Ioqy Marcia J
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO STATE OF OHIO, Case No. 2007-0923 Plaintiff-Appellee, On Appeal from the Licking County Court of Appeals, V. Fifth Appellate District HAROLD T. BIESER, Court of Appeals Case No. 06 CA 00045 Defendant-Appellant. MEMORANDUM OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT HAROLD T. BIESER IN SUPPORT OF JURISDICTION Tricia M. Klockner (0077414) John J. Kulewicz (0008376) Assistant Law Director (Counsel of Record) City of Newark Alexandra T. Schimmer (0075732) 40 West Main Street Vorys, Sater, Seymour and Pease LLP Newark, Ohio 43055 52 East Gay Street (740) 349-6663 P.O. Box 1008 Columbus, Ohio 43216-1008 Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee (614) 464-5634 State of Ohio (614) 719-4812 (Facsimile) [email protected] [email protected] Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant Harold T. Bieser JUN A 1 IOQY MARCIA J. MENGEL; CLERK SUPREME COURT OF OHIO TABLE OF CONTENTS Page I. THIS CASE INVOLVES A SUBSTANTIAL CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION AND RAISES QUESTIONS OF PUBLIC OR GREAT GENERAL INTEREST .............1 II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS . ...................................................................4 III. ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF PROPOSITIONS OF LAW ...........................................7 PROPOSITION OF LAW NO. 1: The rule announced in State v. Broughton (1991), 62 Ohio St.3d 253, 581 N.E. 2d 541 -- that speedy-trial time ordinarily stops running in the interim between a nolle prosequi dismissal and refiling of the same charges -- does not apply where the defendant was not notified of the dismissal and the bond was retained after dismissal ...........................................................7 PROPOSITION OF LAW NO. 2: The State violates the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, as well as Section 10, Article I, of the Ohio Constitution and the Ohio Speedy Trial Act (R.C. -
SELECTED DECISIONS of the HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE Under the OPTIONAL PROTOCOL
OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS SELECTED DECISIONS OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE under THE OPTIONAL PROTOCOL Volume 7 Sixty-sixth to seventy-fourth sessions (July 1999 – March 2002) UNITED NATIONS New York and Geneva, 2006 NOTE Material contained in this publication may be freely quoted or reprinted, provided credit is given and a copy of the publication containing the reprinted material is sent to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Palais des Nations, 8-14 avenue de la Paix, CH-1211 Geneva 10, Switzerland. CCPR/C/OP/7 UNITED NATIONS PUBLICATION Sales No. E.06.XIV.1 ISBN 92-1-130294-3 ii CONTENTS (Selected decisions — Sixty-sixth to seventy-fourth sessions) Page Introduction........................................................................................................................... 1 FINAL DECISIONS A. Decision declaring a communication admissible (the number of the Committee session is indicated in brackets) No. 845/1999 [67] Rawle Kennedy v. Trinidad and Tobago............................. 5 B. Decisions declaring a communication inadmissible (the number of the Committee session is indicated in brackets) No. 717/1996 [66] Acuña Inostroza et al v. Chile.............................................. 13 No. 880/1999 [74] Terry Irving v. Australia...................................................... 18 No. 925/2000 [73] Wan Kuok Koi v. Portugal .................................................. 22 C. Views under article 5 (4) of the Optional Protocol No. 580/1994 [74] Glen Ashby v. Trinidad and Tobago ................................... 29 No. 688/1996 [69] María Sybila Arredondo v. Peru.......................................... 36 No. 701/1996 [69] Cesario Gómez Vázquez v. Spain........................................ 43 No. 727/1996 [71] Dobroslav Paraga v. Croatia ................................................ 48 No. 736/1997 [70] Malcolm Ross v. -
Burden of Proof and 4Th Amendment
Burden of Proof and 4 th Amendment Burden of Proof Standards • Reasonable suspicion • Probable cause • Reasonable doubt Burden of proof • In the United States we enjoy a ‘presumption of innocence’. What does this mean? • This means, essentially, that you are innocent until proven guilty. But how do we prove guilt? • Law enforcement officers must have some basis for stopping or detaining an individual. • In order for an officer to stop and detain someone they must meet a standard of proof Reasonable Suspicion • Lowest standard • A belief or suspicion that • Officers cannot deprive a citizen of liberty unless the officer can point to specific facts and circumstances and inferences therefrom that would amount to a reasonable suspicion Probable Cause • More likely than not or probably true. • Probable cause- a reasonable amount of suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficiently strong to justify a prudent and cautious person’s belief that certain facts are probably true. • In other terms this could be understood as more likely than not of 51% likely. • This is the standard required to arrest someone and obtain a warrant. Reasonable Doubt • Beyond a reasonable doubt- This means that the notion being presented by the prosecution must be proven to the extent that there could be no "reasonable doubt" in the mind of a “reasonable person” that the defendant is guilty. There can still be a doubt, but only to the extent that it would not affect a reasonable person's belief regarding whether or not the defendant is guilty. 4th Amendment • Search -
PETITION for EXPUNGEMENT FILED in a CIRCUIT COURT – ACQUITTAL/DISMISSAL (Page 4 of These Instructions), for Additional Information
Form CC-1473 PETITION FOR EXPUNGEMENT FILED IN A Form CC-1473 CIRCUIT COURT – ACQUITTAL/DISMISSAL Using This Revisable PDF Form 1. Copies a. Original – to court. b. Copy – arrange to have served on Commonwealth’s Attorney in the county or city in which the petition is filed. 2. Attachments a. Copy of order or acquittal or dismissal. b. Copy of warrant(s) or indictment(s) for the charge(s) you seek to have expunged. c. Completed circuit court form CC-1416, COVER SHEET FOR FILING CIVIL ACTIONS, if required by the clerk. 3. Preparation details a. Data Element Nos. 1-20 prepared by the petitioner or the attorney for the petitioner. b. Data Element Nos. 21-24 prepared by the clerk of court or deputy clerk, who will also provide or complete the case number if unknown to the petitioner (Data Element No. 1). c. Data Element No. 25 is provided for the use of the petitioner. See circuit court form CC-1473 (INST), INSTRUCTIONS FOR PETITION FOR EXPUNGEMENT FILED IN A CIRCUIT COURT – ACQUITTAL/DISMISSAL (page 4 of these instructions), for additional information. OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA Form CC-1473 Revised 11/15 PETITION FOR EXPUNGEMENT Case No. ................................1................................ ............. FILED IN A CIRCUIT COURT – ACQUITTAL/DISMISSAL Commonwealth of Virginia VA. CODE § 19.2-392.2 A ................................................................................................2 ....................................................................................... Circuit Court -
Rule 48 TITLE 18, APPENDIX—RULES of CRIMINAL PROCEDURE Page 180
Rule 48 TITLE 18, APPENDIX—RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE Page 180 (c) TIMING OF A MOTION. A party must serve a that the public prosecutor may enter a nolle prosequi in written motion—other than one that the court his discretion, without any action by the court, pre- may hear ex parte—and any hearing notice at vails in the Federal courts, Confiscation Cases, 7 Wall. least 7 days before the hearing date, unless a 454, 457; United States v. Woody, 2 F.2d 262 (D.Mont.). rule or court order sets a different period. For This provision will permit the filing of a nolle prosequi only by leave of court. This is similar to the rule now good cause, the court may set a different period prevailing in many States. A.L.I. Code of Criminal Pro- upon ex parte application. cedure, Commentaries, pp. 895–897. (d) AFFIDAVIT SUPPORTING A MOTION. The mov- 2. The rule confers the power to file a dismissal by ing party must serve any supporting affidavit leave of court on the Attorney General, as well as on with the motion. A responding party must serve the United States attorney, since under existing law any opposing affidavit at least one day before the Attorney General exercises ‘‘general superintend- the hearing, unless the court permits later serv- ence and direction’’ over the United States attorneys ice. ‘‘as to the manner of discharging their respective du- ties,’’ 5 U.S.C. 317 [now 28 U.S.C. 509, 547]. Moreover it (As amended Apr. 29, 2002, eff.