The United Mine Workers of America, afl-cio/clc

REPORT ON THE Sago Mine Disaster

of January 2, 2006

Table of Contents

Letter from Cecil E. Roberts and Daniel J. Kane ……………………………………………………………………… III

Dedication ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………… V Executive Summary, Findings and Recommendations ………………………………………………………………… 1 MSHA’s responsibilities under the law MSHA’s responsibilities as a watchdog for safety The mine operator’s responsibilities Summary of events of January 2, 2006 Seals Methane accumulation Second mining Forces Escape attempt of the 2nd Left crew Destruction of infrastructure Donning and use of self-contained self-rescuers Barricading and tracking devices Notification of regulatory agencies and mine rescue The failure to secure evidence and control the mine site National mine rescue preparedness The Mine Safety and Health Administration Events of January 2, 2006 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 19 Prior to the preshift examination Preshift examination Start of production shift to time of explosion The explosion and its effects Evacuation of mine 1st Left section and initial rescue attempt Evacuation attempt 2nd Left Parallel section Regulatory action and rescue/recovery Mine Seal Requirements ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 27 Mine Seals 2nd Left Mains ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 33 Roof Control …………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 37 Ventilation ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 41 Consideration of Lightning as a Potential Cause ……………………………………………………………………… 43 Conclusion ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 49 Photographs, Post Explosion …………………………………………………………………………………………… 50 General Information …………………………………………………………………………………………………… 57 International Coal Group Wolf Run Coal Company Sago Mine Acknowledgments: Participating Mine Rescue Teams ………………………………………………………………… 63 Mine Safety and Health Administration West Virginia Office of Miners’ Health, Safety and Training United Mine Workers of America Appendices Index ……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 67

Report on the Sago Mine Disaster i

At approximately 6:30 am on January 2, 2006, an explosion occurred at the Sago mine in Upshur County, West Virginia. Fifty-two hours later, the bodies of 12 miners had been recovered from the mine and one unconscious survivor had been transported to the hospital. Those 12 men did not have to die. But they did, as a result of a series of decisions that were made by the mine’s owner, and allowed by the state and federal agencies that are charged with mine safety. Some of those decisions were made in the weeks and months immediately prior to the explosion and in the hours immediately after it. Sadly, some of those decisions were made many years prior to the explosion. But whenever they were made, all of those misguided decisions contributed to this preventable tragedy. And without immediate action by mine operators and regulatory agencies across America to reverse the effects of these decisions, more tragedies are inevitable. The mine’s owner, the International Coal Group (ICG), has advanced the theory that the explosion was caused by a natural event it could do nothing to prevent—a lightning strike. ICG touts this theory even though the lightning struck over two miles away and there was no conduit for an electrical charge from that lightning to get into the sealed area of the mine where the explosion occurred. Though it cannot adequately explain why, the West Virginia Office of Miners’ Health, Safety and Training agrees with that theory. The UMWA does not agree with that unprecedented theory, and this report lays out the reasons why. We find it is much more likely that the explosion was triggered by frictional activity in the roof, roof support or support material, which created an electrical arc underground that ignited an explosive methane-air mixture in the sealed area. Although it is important to know how the methane ignited, it is not really material to the subsequent deaths of the 12 miners. The conditions in the mine at the time of the ignition caused these 12 tragic deaths. The fact is that the tragedy that morning was preventable and should never have occurred. What adds insult to injury is that at least 11 of those 12 miners survived the explosion, and when miners survive an explosion underground, those miners should come out of the mine alive. The reasons why these 12 men are dead—when they should not be—must be the focus of efforts to improve mine safety from this point forward. And we must start with this: The will and intent of Congress when it first passed the Coal Act in 1969 and then the Mine Act in 1977 has been diluted, modified and subverted by the federal Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) and mine operators to the point where some practices and policies in place today offer miners little more protection than they had before those laws were passed. The various state safety and health agencies are also culpable for failing to protect miners.

Report on the Sago Mine Disaster iii 1. When MSHA decided to ignore Congress’ mandate to build “bulkhead seals” and began allowing substandard seals, including seals from foam material called Omega Block, we began down the path to the Sago tragedy. Had the seals in the Sago mine been constructed in such a manner as Congress intended, it is very likely all the miners killed at Sago would have survived. 2. When the coal companies and the regulatory agencies decided not to pursue enhanced two-way communications underground, even though the UMWA and others raised this as a problem even before 1968, it ensured that no one would be able to talk to the trapped Sago miners in 2006 to let them know their way out of the mine was not blocked. 3. When MSHA decided to mitigate the law as passed by Congress and not require that there be a sufficient number of mine rescue teams available at all times when miners are underground at every mine in America, it meant that ICG was free to contract out its mine rescue functions to an inexperienced mine rescue team that was not on site and had to be gathered from the far corners of Upshur County before it could begin any type of rescue operation. There was no team available to immediately respond at Sago, perhaps rescuing all the miners who survived the explosion instead of just one. 4. When Sago mine management submitted and MSHA approved a ventilation plan that would course fresh air past the sealed area, and this contaminated air was separated from the working section’s intake air supply by only one brattice wall which was destroyed in the explosion, it meant that the trapped miners were doomed to a continuous flow of carbon monoxide and other deadly gases that eventually killed all but one of them. 5. The lack of additional oxygen supplies and the poor performance of the self-contained self-rescue (SCSR) units, along with the failure by MSHA over the past 30 years to require the development of a new generation of SCSRs, meant that these trapped miners were left gasping for their final breaths. 6. When MSHA decided not to follow up on Congress’ mandate in 1969 to require safety chambers in mines, that meant the miners at Sago were left with hanging a ventilation curtain as their only option in a futile attempt to keep the deadly gases away. 7. When MSHA did not require the use of tracking devices to locate trapped miners underground, even though such technology has been available for over 30 years and is used widely in other countries, the mine rescue teams that finally did enter the Sago mine did not have any idea where to look for the trapped miners, further delaying the rescue efforts. All of these issues are examined in depth in this report. The UMWA also makes recommendations in this report that, if enacted and enforced, will make a real difference, not just in the ability of miners to survive explosions and other incidents underground, but to keep these events from happening in the first place. The truth is that ICG failed the miners at Sago, and so did our government. And when our government failed those miners it failed all miners. The company and the government agencies forgot the words of Congress, stated in the preamble of the Mine Act: “Congress declares that the first priority of all in the coal or other mining industry must be the health and safety of its most precious resource—the miner.” The UMWA has not forgotten those words. We believe they must be in the forefront of our nation’s focus as we move forward to improve safety in America’s coal mines. The 12 who died needlessly at Sago and the 35 others who perished at coal mines throughout the United States in 2006 deserve no less.

Cecil E. Roberts Daniel J. Kane International President International Secretary-Treasurer

iv United Mine Workers of America Dedication

he United Mine Workers of America dedicates this report to the entire mining community: the men and women who work in the industry, their families and friends and the miners who courageously Tarrive at the mine to offer assistance when tragedy strikes. History will judge 2006 to be a tragic and difficult year for the nation’s mining community. By the end of the calendar year, the coal industry claimed the lives of 47 miners. The fatal accident numbers of the previous years have been surpassed, making it the worst year since 1995, when there were also 47 fatal accidents. But numbers do not tell the entire story: indeed they dehumanize the message and make it easier to accept. These miners must not be remembered merely as numbers. Theirs was a life of hard work, sacrifice and dedication. These miners were: Miner Date Age Mine Mine Controlling Company Terry Helms 1-2-06 50 Sago International Coal Group Marty Bennett 1-2-06 51 Sago International Coal Group Thomas Anderson 1-2-06 39 Sago International Coal Group James Bennett 1-2-06 61 Sago International Coal Group Jerry Groves 1-2-06 56 Sago International Coal Group Jesse Jones 1-2-06 44 Sago International Coal Group Junior Hamner 1-2-06 54 Sago International Coal Group Martin Toler 1-2-06 51 Sago International Coal Group David Lewis 1-2-06 28 Sago International Coal Group Jack Weaver 1-2-06 51 Sago International Coal Group Fred Ware 1-2-06 59 Sago International Coal Group Marshall Winans 1-2-06 50 Sago International Coal Group Cornelius Yates 1-10-06 44 Mine #1 Maverick Mining Company Don Bragg 1-19-06 35 Aracoma Alma Mine #1 Massey Energy Company Ellery Hatfield 1-19-06 47 Aracoma Alma Mine #1 Massey Energy Company Shane Jacobson 1-29-06 37 Aberdeen Andalex Resources, Inc James Thornburry 1-23-06 72 No. 4 Sassy Coal Company Edmund Vance 2-1-06 46 #18 Tunnel Mine Long Branch Energy Corp. Paul Moss 2-1-06 58 Black Castle Massey Energy Company Timothy Caudill 2-16-06 33 HZ4-1 TECO Energy Willard Miller 2-17-06 35 Mettiki Mine Alliance Coal, LLC Jackie Toler 4-7-06 53 Candice 2 Rainbow Trout Coal, LLC Robert Runyon 4-7-06 48 No. 1 Mine Southern WV Resources Garry Jones 3-29-06 57 No. 4 Mine Jim Walter Resources, Inc. David Bolen 4-20-06 28 No. 1 Tri Star Coal LLC Rick McKnight 4-21-06 45 Huff Creek No. 1 Arch Coal, Inc.

Report on the Sago Mine Disaster v Miner Date Age Mine Mine Controlling Company Jimmy Lee 5-20-06 33 Darby Mine No. 1 Kentucky Darby LLC Amon Brock 5-20-06 51 Darby Mine No. 1 Kentucky Darby LLC Roy Middleton 5-20-06 35 Darby Mine No. 1 Kentucky Darby LLC Bill Petra 5-20-06 49 Darby Mine No. 1 Kentucky Darby LLC Paris Thomas, Jr. 5-20-06 35 Darby Mine No. 1 Kentucky Darby LLC Steven Bryant 5-23-06 23 Risner Branch #1 Miller Bros. Coal Inc. Todd Upton 5-24-06 34 Sycamore Mine #2 International Coal Group Edward R. Fitzgerald 7-7-06 35 East Volunteer Alliance Coal, LLC Jason Mosley 7-18-06 28 Smith Branch #1 Hendrickson Equipment Inc. John May 7-20-06 39 Slate Branch CAM Mining LLC Jeremy Heckler 7-30-06 30 Star Bridge Prep Plant Circle M Enterprises Inc. Richard Cox 5-4-06 40 Buchanan Mine #1 Consolidation Coal Co. Joseph Seay 10-6-06 56 Mine No. 2 D & R Coal Co., Inc. Jerry McKinney 10-11-06 56 No. 7 Mine Jim Walter Resources, Inc. Thomas Channell 10-20-06 49 Whitetail Kittanning Alpha Natural Resources, LLC Dale Reighter 10-23-06 43 R & D Coal Co R & D Coal Co. Brett Gibson 10-30-06 31 Double Bonus Coal Co. Bluestone Industries, Inc. Tony Swiney 11-4-06 44 Mine #23 James River Coal Co. Howard Harvey 11-5-06 52 Kayenta Mine Peabody Western Coal Co. Mario Corriveau 11-28-06 50 Spring Creek Coal Co. Rio Tinto Energy America John Elliot 12-17-06 26 Prime No. 1 Dana Mining Co., Inc.

On behalf of the United Mine Workers of America, we wish to express our deepest sorrow and heartfelt sym- pathy to the families of these brave men over the untimely death of their loved ones. The passing of each is not only a shocking loss to their families, but to all miners and the members of the UMWA. Their deaths are a reminder of how tragically short life can be and how dangerous coal mining can be, especially if safety laws are not followed by coal operators and enforced by government regulators. Words alone cannot atone for the tremendous loss their families have sustained, but we trust that in their hour of bereavement they and all members of their families will obtain some solace in knowing that others share their sorrow and weep with them in their misfortune. The Union offers a special thanks to the wives, the sons, the daughters and all the family members who, after their tragic loss, found the strength of will to fight for those who still work in the nation’s mines. When you put your grief aside and testified in Congress and state legislatures, spoke out in the media, participated in public hearings and spoke truth to power, you brought a powerful and eloquent message on behalf of all miners to those who might otherwise ignore it. Though you do not know most of them, you saw the struggle miners were facing and made it your own. You gave them a voice, and today they are safer because of your efforts. Thank you on behalf of the nation’s miners for all you do for them. We must also recognize those who willingly enter burning, smoky and unstable mines to try to rescue those who cannot escape on their own. We owe each of you a deep debt of gratitude. When conditions are at their worst and most would judge the situation to be too dangerous, members of the nation’s mine rescue teams are ready to offer assistance to their brothers and sisters in harm’s way. Each of you plays a significant role in pro- tecting and saving the lives of countless miners every day. You share in the joy when your efforts are successful, vi United Mine Workers of America but suffer a unique and painful sense of loss when your efforts are met with tragedy. The difficult task you take upon yourselves does not get easier with time or better with experience; it remains a challenge that is ever- changing and dangerous. The facts are simple: You are the first to enter and the last to leave a disaster site. You witness the happiness of families and friends as their loved ones emerge from the mine because of your efforts. You witness the hor- ror of the industry and feel the loss as few others can understand. And you return each time you are called, because it is who you are. Thank you on behalf of this nation’s miners, their families, their friends and the United Mine Workers of America. Finally, we must also recognize all the men and women who have lost their lives to build and energize the nation. When tragedy strikes, whether it is one miner or many in a single moment, we feel the loss and pain as only miners can. We dedicate this report to each of you, and to your families. More importantly, we pledge to continue the fight for even greater protections. Because like every American worker, coal miners must be secure in the knowledge that they will return safely to their loved ones at the end of every shift.

Report on the Sago Mine Disaster vii

Executive Summary and Recommendations

ased on information gathered during profit and if the Mine Safety and Health Adminis- the investigation of the January 2, 2006, tration (MSHA) had followed the mandates estab- Bexplosion and subsequent fatalities at the lished by Congress in the 1969 Coal Act and the Sago mine, the United Mine Workers of America Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, all 12 (UMWA) issues the following report. of the trapped miners would have survived and given the circumstances it is likely all 13 would be Though the miners at the Sago mine were not mem- alive today. bers of the UMWA or any other union, the UMWA was designated under federal regulations as a miners’ The Agency’s decisions over the past several decades representative after this incident. to promulgate regulations, grant petitions for modi- fication and create policies that contradict the intent The explosion may have claimed one life imme- of Congress by reducing or eliminating the legislated diately. Over the course of the next several hours protections played a major role in the tragic events eleven of the men died as a result of these condi- of January 2, 2006. tions. The lone survivor, Randall McCloy, Jr. was res- cued approximately 40 hours after the explosion. Likewise, decisions Sago mine management made in operating the mine, including ventilation plans, The Union believes that there is absolutely no clear roof control plans and its extremely rare practice evidence to support the theory that lightning was the of second mining created conditions in the mine cause of the explosion. Further, there is no evidence that were inherently risky. The Union believes that lightning striking the ground near a mining that the company’s flawed plans and mining operation has ever traveled into the underground practices contributed to the devastating events of area of a mine, without the presence of a conduit January 2, 2006. from the surface into the mine, and then caused an ignition or explosion of gas or dust. Knowing the cause of the explosion is important so that steps can be taken to prevent a similar situ- The Union has determined that the most likely cause ation from happening again. However, regardless of the explosion was conditions contained solely of the cause of the explosion in this instance, had within the sealed area of the mine where the explo- MSHA followed the mandates of Congress, and had sion occurred. The lightning strike theory is based ICG operated the mine with an eye firmly focused entirely on circumstantial evidence and is so remote on miners’ safety, there is every reason to believe as to be practically impossible. that every person underground that day would The UMWA concludes that the most likely cause of have survived. the explosion was frictional activity from the roof, roof support or support material which ignited the MSHA’s responsibilities under the law methane-air mixture. The 1969 Coal Act and the 1977 Mine Act followed The union firmly believes that 12 men are dead years of neglect and indifference to coal mine safety. today who should not be. The UMWA believes In 1969, following the 1968 Farmington explosion that if the mine’s operating company, the Interna- that claimed the lives of 78 miners, 19 of whom are tional Coal Group (ICG) had put safety ahead of still entombed in the mine, Congress for the first

Report on the Sago Mine Disaster 1 time demanded that miners be afforded safer work- pany to meet these requirements. Smaller operators ing conditions. In 1977, Congress expanded upon were permitted to contract with these teams to cover those protections and created MSHA to enforce their operation. these directives. The Union has historically criticized the contract However, in the nearly three decades since 1977, the team concept because there were no regulations to Agency has routinely ignored the wishes of Congress ensure these teams would be able to reach the opera- and in many instances created regulations, granted tion in a reasonable time or be familiar with the petitions and established policies directly opposite to operation once they arrived. its mandate. These actions by MSHA contributed to the events of January 2, 2006. These failures by the Since 1980, MSHA has used policy directives to Agency include: erode the effectiveness of the mine rescue team rules. These policies permit mine operators to rely on Requirements for seals. Had MSHA required geographically distant contract teams. MSHA also Sago mine management to build the seals to the allowed “composite” teams, with miners from several requirements of the Mine Act, the seals would have different operations. Often, these composite team contained the explosion and the noxious gases it members have not trained together as a unit, and generated sufficiently to permit the safe escape of all may not have ever trained at all the mines they were the miners. responsible for. Congress mandated in the 1977 Mine Act that The adverse consequences of this flawed mine rescue “explosion-proof seals or bulkheads” be used to system played a significant role in the response to isolate abandoned or worked out areas of the mine the Sago mine. The first team, a composite contract from active workings. team, did not arrive on the property until approxi- In subsequent years MSHA has promulgated regula- mately 4-1/2 hours after the explosion. Other teams tions regarding seals that are much less protective arrived later that morning and afternoon. This delay than what Congress mandated. The current law sim- contributed to the ultimate outcome of the disaster. ply requires that seals withstand static pressure of 20 Had mine rescue teams been immediately available pounds per square inch (psi) in order to be approved and on-site more quickly, the tragic outcome may for installation in the mine. have been averted. At Sago, ICG requested and MSHA approved the use Emergency Shelters. Had MSHA required the instal- of Omega Block—blocks made of foam—to seal an lation of properly equipped emergency shelters, as it area instead of the explosion-proof seals or bulk- was given the authority to do in the 1977 Mine Act, heads required in the Mine Act. Use of Omega the miners at Sago could have survived for hours, if Blocks directly contributed to the effects of the not days, underground. explosion and the deaths of all the miners. In the decades since Congress passed the Mine Act Mine Rescue Teams. The need for well trained, well very little has been done to develop and deploy these equipped and readily available mine rescue teams chambers despite repeated instances where miners has been understood for many years. In 1977, Con- were trapped underground. The Sago miners repre- gress ordered MSHA to propose regulations requir- sent but one example where miners were forced to ing teams be available at every mine in the event of retreat to an area of the mine to build a barricade an emergency. and hope for rescue. Technology exists today to cor- In July 1980, MSHA promulgated a rule for the cre- rect this situation, yet operators in this country— ation and deployment of mine rescue teams. The including ICG—have refused to utilize it and MSHA regulation required that two mine rescue teams must fails to require it. be available at all times when miners are under- Communications. Not until 1969 did Congress ground. Generally larger mine operators established mandate two-way communications from the sur- several teams within a mine or throughout a com-

2 United Mine Workers of America face of the mine to all active working sections. In mine alive, even after an extraordinary event such 1969 communications were facilitated by the use of as a fire, inundation or explosion. a “twisted pair” of wires connected to battery-pow- Tracking devices. Since before the Farmington ered phones. Thirty-eight years later this primitive disaster, one of the greatest impediments to mine communication system is still the primary source of rescue has been locating the trapped miners. Hav- communications in the industry. ing the ability to immediately send mine rescue Yet Congress specifically directed MSHA to promul- personnel to the location of trapped miners after a gate regulations that will spur the development of disaster is key to their survival. The U.S. Bureau of new technology. The Agency has failed to do that in Mines tested a system capable of locating trapped many ways, including failing to require state-of-the- miners in 1970 and published its successful results. art communications systems. Despite the require- It was not until after the Sago tragedy that any real ments of the Mine Act to, “conduct such studies, movement has been made in this country to create research, experiments and demonstrations as may be an effective tracking device for implementation appropriate...to develop new and improved methods into the mining environment. of communication from the surface to the under- The facts here are simple: Had miners at Sago been ground area of a coal or other mine,” the Agency did outfitted with tracking devices that would show their little to fulfill this mandate. location both pre-and-post accident they could have Had MSHA pursued new technologies as Congress been saved. The Agency, by not promulgating tech- directed, there is every reason to believe that a system nology-driving regulations as Congress intended, could have been in place that would have permitted failed these miners. the trapped miners to communicate from the 2nd Left Oxygen. There was not a sufficient supply of oxygen Parallel Section and facilitate their rescue. to sustain each miner trapped at Sago until mine MSHA’s responsibilities as a rescue teams could reach them in the hours after the explosion. watchdog for safety The Union has consistently argued that, in the event MSHA has ignored the mandates of Congress by of a disaster, sufficient oxygen must be available to promulgating inadequate regulations and set- every miner that will allow that miner to travel from ting disastrous policies on several occasions. These the deepest penetration of the mine to the surface. actions have negatively impacted miners’ safety and health for years. Moreover, MSHA has not learned In the early 1980’s MSHA finally required mine from tragic events that occurred in the past. operators to supply miners with 1 hour of oxygen in the form of a Self-Contained Self-Rescuer (SCSR) to The mine explosion at Farmington in 1968 and the begin an escape. fire at Wilberg in 1984 took the lives of 105 miners. The lives of each of these miners and many others While not enough, this was an important step for- lost to their families are a tragedy that cannot be for- ward. However, since the mid-1990’s SCSR technol- gotten. These events should have pushed everyone to ogy has stagnated. The Agency has not pushed for address the shortcomings and needs of the industry SCSR advances and those who perished at Sago were and make it safer for all miners. carrying rescue devices that rely on technology over a decade old. These two disasters alone demonstrated that min- ers trapped in the aftermath of a fire or explosion Moreover, MSHA did not require additional units to need an adequate supply of oxygen to sustain them be available for miners who could not reach the sur- until rescue, and that locating trapped miners face of the mine from their workplace in the limited quickly is crucial to their survival. They also dem- time the oxygen in a single SCSR provides. onstrated that if sufficiently protective regulations At the time of the Sago tragedy, ICG satisfied only are promulgated and enforced, a miner who sur- the minimal requirement of one SCSR per miner. vives the initial disaster should come out of the

Report on the Sago Mine Disaster 3 Some operators, however, provided additional oxy- also over the many decades that MSHA has ignored gen to underground miners. the mandates of Congress and needs of miners. At Sago, some SCSRs did not even function as Summary of the events of intended. Units failed outright and others did not January 2, 2006 produce sufficient on-demand oxygen to allow the The explosion occurred inby an area of the mine miners the best possible chance for escape. that had been recently sealed as a result of very poor The mine operator’s responsibilities mining conditions. The seals, which were completed on December 12, 2005, were constructed using Decisions of mine management at Sago played a Omega Blocks. This was the first time such seal large role in the tragedy that unfolded at the mine on material had been used at this operation. Previously, January 2, 2006. seals constructed at this operation were solid con- The company submitted and MSHA approved a crete block or packsetter-type construction. ventilation plan just weeks before the explosion There were roof falls above the bolt anchorage that would course fresh air past the sealed area. This point in the 2nd Left Mains Section before and since contaminated air was separated from the working December 2005, when the area was sealed. The section’s intake air supply by only one brattice wall, investigation revealed that roof conditions contin- which was designed to withstand minimal pressure. ued to deteriorate after the area was sealed. This brattice wall was destroyed in the explosion with disastrous consequences. Studies completed by MSHA and the West Vir- ginia Office of Miner’s Health, Safety and Training The extremely rare practice of “second mining” that (WVOMHST) determined the approximate area of was employed at Sago created entry heights in excess and the methane liberation within the sealed area. of 18 feet in some areas, which is inherently danger- Based on this data an explosive methane-air mixture ous because it increases hazards associated with roof would have been created approximately 14 days after falls and rib rolls. completion of the seals, on December 26, 2005. Had In addition, the height of the entry permits methane there been no interruption, the methane-air mixture to accumulate in the area at volumes much greater within the sealed area would have remained in the than would normally be the case. When the methane explosive range until about January 22, 2006, when in these areas is ignited, as was the case at Sago, the the atmosphere would have passed through the forces from the explosion are compressed as they explosive range, and become inert. radiate outward into the entries that were not part Permitting these conditions to continue without of second mining. being actively monitored created an extremely This compression, commonly referred to as “piling”, hazardous situation. increases the magnitude of the forces, creating The explosive forces of the blast traveled from its much greater than normal pressure from the epicenter in the sealed area outward in all directions. original explosion. These forces generated significant heat and pres- Mine management is responsible for its contribu- sure waves within the sealed area. They struck the tions to this tragedy. It is not sufficient for the inby sides of the Omega Block seals, pushing them company to merely rely on MSHA approvals outward toward the working area of the mine, com- of flawed plans the company submitted. Mine pletely obliterating nine seals. The remaining seal, management is responsible for the operation located in the #1 entry, failed catastrophically and of a mine. Management at the Sago mine failed was blown against the adjacent rib-line. the miners. When the explosion occurred, there were 29 min- The events that led to the explosion were rooted in ers underground in various locations. Terry Helms, flawed decisions. These decisions were made not mine examiner/beltman, had completed his pre- only in the months leading up to the explosion, but shift examination and was located near the 2nd Left

4 United Mine Workers of America switch. Before the explosion, Fred Jamison, mine examiner/beltman had completed his preshift The 2nd Left Parallel crew: examination, entered his fi ndings in the examination book on the surface and walked back underground Martin Toler victim to his work location along the beltline. Section Foreman The 2nd Left Parallel Crew Marshall Winans victim Scoop Operator The 2nd Left crew had entered the mine at approxi- mately 5:55 am and proceeded to the Section. They Jerry Groves victim were moving towards their work stations in the Roof Bolter Operator Section when the blast occurred at 6:26 am. The James Bennett victim forces from the explosion traveled from the seals Shuttle Car Operator and entered the active workings of the mine. The forces continued to travel several thousand feet, Marty Bennett victim destroying communication devices, ventilation Continuous Miner Operator controls and other equipment. The force of the Fred Ware victim blast struck Terry Helms. Continuous Miner Operator nd The forces from the explosion entered the 2 Left Jesse Jones victim Parallel Section, damaging communication devices Roof Bolter Operator and ventilation controls and immediately fi lled the area with smoke, dust and noxious gases. The 12- Thomas Anderson victim man crew proceeded to the mantrip and attempted Shuttle Car operator to evacuate the Section. Smoke and dust in the mine Jack Weaver victim atmosphere severely limited their visibility and wors- Electrician ened as they moved toward the mouth of the Sec- tion. They proceeded outby until they were stopped David Lewis victim by debris on the track and zero visibility, interfering Roof Bolter Operator with their further escape. Junior Hamner victim The crew exited the mantrip and walked into the Shuttle Car Operator intake escapeway. There are confl icting reports about Randall McCloy, Jr. survivor when the crew members donned their self-contained Roof Bolter Operator self-rescuers (SCSRs), but from the location of the discarded cases it seems they performed this task once they entered the intake entry. would pound several times on the roof bolt and wait An attempt was made to walk out the intake escape- for a response in the form of a shot set off on the way, but smoke and gases from the explosion were surface. However, no one on the surface was listen- blowing directly onto the crew. They then proceeded ing because seismic equipment was never deployed, to the face of the #3 entry and built a barricade to so the trapped miners never received a response. isolate themselves from the smoke and noxious Over the course of the next several hours, 11 of the gases. Two members of the crew made a second 12 miners from 2nd Left Parallel crew died from the attempt to fi nd a safe escape route, but were turned poisonous mine atmosphere. back by heavy smoke and gases. st Over the course of the next several hours, members The 1 Left Crew of the 2nd Left Parallel crew followed the established The 1st Left crew had entered the mine at approx- procedures for barricaded miners by pounding on a imately 6:10 am. They dropped off John Boni, roof bolt at their location. During this process, they pumper, at the 1st Right pumper shanty and Pat Boni,

Report on the Sago Mine Disaster 5 beltman, at the No. 4 belt drive. The 13-member crew then proceeded inby to the Section. At the mouth of The 1st Left crew: 1st Left Section, Roger Perry, miner operator, threw the track switch to enter the Section, returned and sat Owen Jones Section Foreman down on the mantrip when the explosion occurred. Gary Rowen Roof Bolter Operator Immediately after the explosion, these miners felt a Randy Helmick Roof Bolter Operator strong gush of air and visibility was virtually zero in the track heading. Miners from the 1st Left crew and Alton Wamsley Roof Bolter Operator outby areas immediately began to evacuate the mine Joe Ryan Roof Bolter Operator through the track heading and intake escapeway. By 7:30 am, fi fteen of the miners outby the 1st Left Sec- Roger Perry Miner Operator tion, including John and Pat Boni and Fred Jamison, Denver Anderson Utility Man had reached the surface and only Owen Jones, 1st Left Section foreman, remained underground. Chris Tinney Utility Man Ron Grall Mine Examiner Mine Management Eric Hess Scoop Operator Jones was met in the track heading by Jeff Toler, Superintendent; Al Schoonover, Safety Director; Paul Avington Equipment Operator Denver Wilfong, Maintenance Superintendent, and Hoy Keith Mechanic Ernest Hofer, Maintenance Foreman, who entered the mine immediately after the explosion, at about Gary Carpenter Continuous Miner 6:45 am. The fi ve men traveled up the track and Operator intake entries, repairing damaged ventilation con- trols as they proceeded. They reached 58 block of No. 4 belt, located at the mouth of 2nd Left Parallel Parallel crew. Those remaining on the surface after Section. They encountered heavy smoke and carbon the explosion failed to take charge of the situation. monoxide, which stopped them from advancing The chaos that followed continued during the entire any further. They shouted towards the Section, but rescue and recovery operation. received no response. They decided to exit the mine and call for mine rescue teams. They reached the Offi cials from ICG, MSHA and WVOMHST arrived surface at approximately 10:30 am. at the mine by 10:30 am. Control orders were placed on the mine by the regulatory agencies to prepare for Twelve members of the 2nd Left Parallel crew and mine rescue teams to arrive and begin their activi- Terry Helms were underground and unaccounted ties. The fi rst rescue teams arrived at approximately for. There had been no contact with any of these 11:00 am on January 2, 2006, and other teams that miners since they entered the mine at about 5:55 am. were contacted arrived throughout the rest of the morning and into the afternoon. Initial Response There was little control over who entered mine There was no attempt by mine management to property. Deliberations and plan decisions on rescue immediately implement the mine’s emergency evacu- efforts were done in unsecured areas. Information ation plan or contact the appropriate regulatory that was not verifi ed for accuracy was communi- agencies. Despite a call to the surface by Jones at cated from the mine site to the families, media and approximately 6:35 am for help (“We had…an explo- general public. Further chaos was created by ICG’s sion…get the people in here.”), attempts to contact failure to provide adequate accommodations for MSHA and the WVOMHST were not initiated until mine rescue teams as they arrived. 7:20 am, nearly one hour after the explosion. The decision to notify the agencies was made by Jeff Toler The fi rst rescue plan from ICG was not submitted while underground attempting to rescue the 2nd Left for approval until 1:00 pm and simply requested

6 United Mine Workers of America continued monitoring of the gases exiting the mine. tions had become too dangerous to justify continu- Because of indecisiveness and inexperience on the ing advance development of the area. In sworn part of ICG, rescue teams did not enter the mine testimony given to MSHA and WVOMHST, several until after 5:00 pm to begin their rescue efforts. Nei- miners and management employees cited poor roof ther of the regulatory agencies ever moved to take conditions and water accumulation as the reasons control of the rescue operation. for abandoning the area.

Terry Helms was located by Ron Hixson, a member The Company then initiated a second mining of of the MSHA mine rescue team, at 58 block in the the Section and began making preparations to per- track heading of No. 4 belt at 5:15 pm on January 3, manently seal the area. In September, management 2006. His body remained in the mine until the early sought approval from MSHA to use Omega Blocks morning hours of January 4, 2006, when the recov- to seal the area. ery effort was completed. Approval was received from MSHA for the use of Mine rescue teams moved into the 2nd Left Parallel non-hitched Omega Block seals on October 24, Section and, after several hours, a decision was made 2005. Construction of the seals began on the same to break protocol and move immediately to the face day and was completed on December 12, 2005. The area of the Section. Jimmy Klug, Captain of the Company submitted an amendment to use Omega McElroy Mine Rescue Team, heard someone moan- Blocks with a pilaster in the center of the seals ing from the area where the miners had barricaded. for areas in the mine over eight feet in height, as Team members called for assistance and immediately required by MSHA policy. MSHA approved their use began to assess the miners’ condition. on December 8, 2005. An overstretched communication system, resulting The testimony of miners who built the seals raises from the decision to move to the face, contributed serious questions regarding the actual construc- to a problem with unverified information from the tion of the seals. To begin with, it is apparent that face area being communicated through the mine miners were not properly trained in how to con- and to the surface. Normal procedures for checking struct seals with Omega Block. Miners indicated and double-checking information were disregarded. that the seals were not always anchored to the roof Inaccurate and unverified information that 12 min- as required because there was not sufficient room ers were found alive was immediately spread to fam- to install the wedges. Wedges were used on some ily members and the nation. of the seals to tighten them from rib to rib, poten- At approximately 12:15 am of January 4, 30 minutes tially causing weakness in the perimeter of the seal. after the initial report to the families and the nation Whether the bonding agent was applied properly that 12 miners were found alive, mine rescue teams cannot be determined. Miners testified that the underground informed the command center that bonding cement was poured onto the horizontal the initial information was incorrect. They reported layers of the Omega Blocks and applied with both that eleven of the miners were deceased. However, trowels and gloved hands. no one in the command center took action to notify the families or anyone else of the error of the earlier The integrity of the seals cannot be verified, because report about 12 survivors. at no time in the installation process or at the completion of their construction were they properly For almost three hours, the families and the nation inspected by mine management or officials of the were not informed that 11 of the miners were actually regulatory agencies. In fact, no one from either mine deceased. After being trapped for more than 40 hours, management or the regulatory agencies observed the a single miner, Randall McCloy, Jr., was rescued. construction long enough to ensure compliance with the approved plan. Note: Since the tragedy, MSHA has UMWA Findings on the Seals placed a moratorium on the use of Omega Blocks, and In late 2005, Sago mine management determined a new minimum 50 psi requirement has been insti- that mining conditions in the 2nd Left Mains Sec- tuted for seals.

Report on the Sago Mine Disaster 7 UMWA RECOMMENDATIONS 50 psi, if monitoring can assure that the maxi- mum length of explosive mix behind a seal 1. Training of all miners who work on seal construc- does not exceed 15 feet and that the volume of tion must be given by a certified person with the explosive mix does not exceed 40 percent knowledge of why each construction requirement of the total sealed volume. is necessary to the process. All information in the approved plan must be passed on during the 7. The method of seal construction submitted by the training session. operator in the ventilation plan and approved by the agencies must include: 2. “Tailgate” or descriptive training cannot be per- mitted for these types of tasks. Training must a. Seals must be hitched into the ribs and bottom be comprehensive and clear. The trainer and a minimum of 6 inches. trainee(s) must also be required to sign documen- tation that proper training was completed. b. A method to continually monitor the atmo- sphere inby the seals from a remote location 3. Inspections of the construction of seals must be on the surface. conducted by a certified engineer. The inspec- tion must include monitoring the construction c. Sealed areas must be treated as an integral for a sufficient time, as well as evaluating the part of the mine’s overall ventilation system, completed seal, to insure each seal is properly and be specifically designed and approved installed. The certified engineer should record the for each installation at each mine. The seal findings in an appropriate book. requirements must be based on several fac- tors, including area to be sealed, special 4. The regulatory agencies should routinely inspect conditions within the area to be sealed and the seal during the construction and at the methane liberation. completion of each seal. Sufficient time for this inspection must be permitted to determine that d. Seals must be constructed of solid, incom- all seals are properly constructed. bustible material as prescribed in the 1977 Mine Act. 5. The use of Omega Blocks should not be permit- ted as a ventilation control in any underground 8. The agencies should no longer permit areas of the mining operation. mine that are sealed to self-inert without continu- ous monitoring as recommended by NIOSH. 6. The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) recently released a draft 9. Areas of the mine that are to be sealed must be report entitled, “Explosive Pressure Design Crite- free of all debris that is not permanently installed ria for New Seals in U.S. Coal Mines.” The UMWA during the mining process. Materials and supplies fully endorses the report and its recommenda- such as unused roof support material, posts, oil tions, as follows: and hydraulic containers, cables, equipment, belt structure, message or other cables and electri- a. For unmonitored seals where there is a pos- cal components or cables must be retrieved and sibility of methane-air detonation behind placed in a safe area outside the seals. the seal, seals should be designed and built to withstand a pressure of 640 psi. UMWA Findings on Methane b. For unmonitored seals with little likelihood of Accumulation detonation, seals should be designed and built Information from surveys conducted by MSHA and to withstand a pressure of 120 psi. WVOMHST indicates the sealed area of 2nd Left c. For monitored seals where the amount of Mains encompassed approximately 4 million cubic potentially explosive methane-air is strictly feet. Further testing by the agencies showed that the limited and controlled, seals should be area liberated about 14,400 cubic feet of methane designed and built to withstand a pressure of every 24 hours.

8 United Mine Workers of America Methane in sealed areas should follow a trend and at NIOSH’s Lake Lynn experimental mine. Any produce accumulations similar to what is described leaks or damage to the seal must be repaired below. Based on this data from the agencies, and immediately. understanding barometric and fan pressures, the 3. Adequate rock dusting of the area prior to seal- relative tightness of the seals to resist leakage and ing must be required. Operators must be required other factors that can affect methane accumulation to bulk dust each entry and crosscut prior to the in the sealed area, the following general assumptions start of the sealing process. The final seals should can be made: not be installed until the area is inspected and the December 26, 2005, 14 days after the completion of agencies are satisfied the area has been sufficiently the seals; the atmosphere in the sealed area would rock dusted. have entered the explosive range with a reading of 4. The agencies should consider future sealing approximately 5 percent methane. methods that require approval of smaller, more January 2, 2006, 21 days after the completion of the manageable areas of the mine. These smaller seals; the atmosphere in the sealed area would have sequentially sealed areas will eliminate large areas reached approximately 7 - 8 percent methane. This is where enormous volumes of explosive gases can when the explosion occurred. This concentration is accumulate, allowing better control within the extremely significant based on studies performed by area. Successively sealing these areas will afford the U. S. Bureau of Mines in 1960. Report of Inves- additional protections to miners. tigation 5548 (RI 5548) determined that frictional 5. The agencies should not approve ventilation sparking, created by roof strata and roof support plans that utilize blowing ventilation where active material, would cause methane concentrations to working areas are inby. ignite. The report also concluded that methane con- centrations at about 7 percent would more readily UMWA Finding on Second Mining ignite than higher or lower concentrations (RI 5548 The mine operator submitted and MSHA approved at page 9). a plan at the Sago mine to conduct second mining. Given this basic information, had there been no Second mining is so unusual that many people in explosion on January 2, 2006, the methane in the the industry are unaware of its practice. The Sago sealed area would have continued to trend upward mine is located in an area where the upper and lower and oxygen would have decreased until it passed benches of the Kittanning Coal seam are located in through the explosive range. Using the regula- close proximity to each other. The lower bench lies tory agencies’ data, that level would not have been directly underneath the upper bench and is sepa- achieved until January 22, 2006, a total of 42 days rated by a binder that ranges from 1-1/2 to 10 feet from the completion of the seals. This would have thick. The upper bench, which varies in thickness permitted an explosive methane-air mixture to exist from six to nine feet, is mined while the sections are in the sealed area for about 28 days (trending graph advancing. When advance mining ceases, the binder attached as Appendix 15). between the coal benches is removed and the lower coal bench is mined. UMWA RECOMMENDATIONS This process creates areas in the mine where the dis- 1. Seals in worked-out or abandoned areas of the tance from the mine roof to the floor can be several mine should be visually inspected and tested each times higher than when advance mining occurred. shift with an approved methane detector to insure This second mining at Sago created entry heights their structural integrity and to check for meth- in excess of 18 feet in many areas. This practice ane leakage. increased the hazards associated with roof falls and rib rolls. 2. Seals that do not pass this inspection must be immediately leak-tested utilizing the same The practice also created a unique problem in the methodology currently used for this purpose sealed area of the mine. The height of the entries

Report on the Sago Mine Disaster 9 permitted methane to accumulate in the area at b. What are the appropriate design criteria for volumes much greater than would normally be the seals that will withstand these pressures? case. When the methane in this area was ignited, the The UMWA recommends that MSHA pro- forces from the explosion compressed as they radi- mulgate a regulation that would require the ated outward into the entries that were not part of construction of seals that meet the mandates the second mining. This compression, commonly of Congress outlined in the 1977 Mine Act and referred to as “piling,” increased the magnitude of the recent recommendations of NIOSH’s draft the forces, creating much greater-than-normal pres- report on mine seals. sure from the original explosion. The pressures that struck the seals from the blast at UMWA Findings on the Escape the Sago mine, though yet undetermined, were in Attempt of 2nd Left Parallel excess of what investigators had witnessed at other Section Crew similar events. There is no doubt that this “piling” contributed to the extensive damage underground. The ventilation plan submitted by the operator and approved by the agencies after the completion of the UMWA RECOMMENDATION: 2nd Left Mains seals was inadequate. The intake air coursed up the #9 entry and then split to ventilate 1. The practice of second mining should not the seals as well as the 2nd Left Parallel Section, plac- be approved. ing miners at great risk. The only safety protection offered to miners from contaminated air entering UMWA Findings on Forces the Section once the seals failed following the explo- The explosion in the sealed area produced heat and sion were a few ventilation controls. These controls extreme forces. These factors pulverized nine of the were not designed to withstand even the limited ten Omega Block seals. The remaining seal, located pressures MSHA requires for seals. in the #1 entry, failed catastrophically. The ventilation controls were immediately com- UMWA RECOMMENDATIONS promised by the explosion, and the blowing-type ventilation system pushed the contaminated air 1. The Union calls for the immediate and perma- directly into the Section. This ventilation scheme nent ban on the use of all Omega or similar-type compromised the miners’ escape route. MSHA head- blocks and material in any underground area of quarters must stop its current practice of approving all coal mines. plans based on industry-wide standards. The unique 2. MSHA should rescind its regulation that permits conditions of each mine must be assessed by the alternative materials and methods for construct- appropriate MSHA District Office and a determina- ing seals, and immediately require that all seals be tion to approve or deny a plan should be made at the explosion-proof seals or bulkheads, as is required District level. by Section 303(y)(2) and (3) of the Federal Mine Based on our investigation, the Union determined Safety and Health Act of 1977. that the miners in 2nd Left Parallel Section, with 3. The Union believes the current protocol used their 245 collective years of experience, performed for testing and approving seals is flawed. The as a cohesive group, with a good understanding National Institute of Occupational Safety and of appropriate emergency response. Immediately Health (NIOSH) recently issued a draft report after the explosion, the crew gathered themselves entitled “Explosion Pressure Design Criteria together and went to the mantrip. They attempted for New Seals in U.S. Coal Mines.” The report their first escape, but were stopped by debris on addresses two critical issues: the track and zero visibility. They exited the man- trip and immediately entered the intake escapeway, a. What explosion pressures can develop during where they donned their SCSRs. Evidence in the an explosion within a sealed area, and mine indicates they then attempted to exit the mine

10 United Mine Workers of America in the intake escapeway, but because of the design two-way communication in underground mines. of the ventilation system, the gases and smoke from As new technology becomes available, mine the explosion continued to be forced directly into operators must be required to install it in all their faces. The crew then moved inby to the face their operations. area and, as they were instructed in their training, 5. MSHA and NIOSH must be mandated to fund barricaded themselves in an isolated location and and direct continued studies and research to prepared for rescue. develop a new generation of wireless communi- cations technology. UMWA RECOMMENDATIONS 6. Flame-resistant reflective directional lifelines 1. Mine ventilation systems must be designed to must be required from the face areas in both offer miners the greatest possible protection to the primary and secondary escapeways. These enhance their ability to escape. Air used to ven- lifelines should direct miners from their work- tilate seals must be coursed away from working place to the nearest surface escape, shaft, slope sections, and immediately to the return. This is or capsule. necessary to insure that the integrity of the intake escapeways are not compromised. 7. Tethers for linking miners together when neces- sary during escape should be available in every 2. All mandoors must be clearly marked on section at the inby end of the lifeline. They should both sides. be of sufficient length to eliminate the possibility that miners will become entangled while they are UMWA Findings on Destruction walking or crawling to safety. Additional tethers of Infrastructure should be located at strategic locations through- The forces of the explosion in the 2nd Left Mains out the mine. Section traveled into both active working sections. These forces destroyed the communication system UMWA Findings on Donning and ventilation controls. and Use of SCSRs With all their escape routes cut off and left with no UMWA RECOMMENDATIONS other alternatives, as a last resort the crew returned to the face area to barricade. Randall McCloy, Jr., 1. Current communication systems must be hard- reported that soon after donning their self-rescu- ened (reinforced to withstand the forces of an ers, four of the miners could not get their units to explosion) to increase their survivability. function properly. He testified that they tried several 2. A second (redundant) communication system, times over the next few hours to activate the devices, independent of the mine’s current primary sys- by both turning the brass valve to start the “candle” tem, must be installed in a separate isolated entry. and manually breathing into them, but neither This second communication system must run method proved effective. from the surface to additional phones completely separate from the phones currently underground UMWA RECOMMENDATIONS and must be hardened to increase survivability. 1. Additional oxygen devices must be readily avail- 3. Current communication technology, including able where miners are working to ensure there one-way text messaging and two-way wireless sys- is an adequate supply to begin an escape in an tems, must be immediately installed in all mines. emergency situation. Oxygen must be avail- Any system that can increase the ability for miners able for all miners to effectively escape from the to escape a mine emergency, even if it is limited in deepest penetration of the mine to the surface. scope, must be utilized. 2. Additional oxygen devices in protective cases 4. MSHA must be required to pursue new technolo- must be stored at strategic locations in both the gies that will increase the effectiveness of wireless primary and secondary escapeways for miners

Report on the Sago Mine Disaster 11 to access as they travel out of the mine. These 11. New SCSRs should be positive-pressure units caches must be placed at a distance not to exceed with full face masks. 30 minutes normal walking distance. 12. Training for SCSR donning and escape must be 3. Flame-resistant directional reflective lifelines wholly separate from all other types of training must intersect every oxygen storage location in miners currently receive. This training must be the escapeway. repeated every 90 days. 4. SCSR storage caches should include a commu- 13. SCSR and escape training must be done in nication system to the surface, first aid supplies actual conditions underground and, to the and tethers as well as oxygen. extent possible, reflect real-life emergency situa- tions. Miners must don the SCSR training model 5. SCSRs currently deployed in the nation’s coal and walk at least a portion of the escapeway. mines must be immediately subjected to random The training model must duplicate the charac- testing to ensure they are working effectively. teristics of the working units, including restric- MSHA, with the assistance of NIOSH, should tive breathing and heating. The Union opposes immediately begin a random testing of all units the practice of co-mingling or mixing different currently deployed in the field. SCSRs at a single operation. 6. MSHA, with the assistance of NIOSH, should conduct a mandatory random sampling of UMWA Findings on Barricading all SCSRs deployed in the field annually. The and Tracking Devices annual sample size should be no less than three nd percent of all units deployed in the industry. The 2 Left Parallel Crew completed a barricade in the face of #3 entry. They then followed correct 7. The cost of SCSR replacement units selected for barricade protocol to signal rescuers, but no rescue testing must be borne by the mine operator as a was facilitated. normal cost of business. Barricade procedures are taught to all miners in their 8. The test protocol for approval of SCSRs must initial and annual retraining. While barricading has be reevaluated and changed to ensure the proven to be effective in a few instances, had track- adequacy and duration of the units. Testing of ing devices been available they may have facilitated devices must take into consideration the tem- the rescue of the miners. Unfortunately, requiring perature, age or other condition that may affect this technology has never been a priority for the the unit’s performance agencies, nor of interest to the industry. 9. Shelf life of stored and carried SCSRs must UMWA RECOMMENDATIONS be reevaluated and if necessary shortened, so that each unit can be relied upon to perform in 1. Tracking devices that can identify the location an emergency. of miners at all times underground must be required at all operations. Such technology is cur- 10. Current SCSR technology is almost 20 years rently available and MSHA must require mine old. The federal and state governments, through operators to provide these devises to all min- MSHA and NIOSH, should actively pursue ers working underground. Any system that can new SCSR technology. All stakeholders must increase the ability for miners to escape a mine be closely involved in the design, development emergency, even if it is limited in scope, must and testing of these devices. The new generation be utilized. of SCSRs must be longer-lasting, more reliable units that require single donning with dockable 2. MSHA and NIOSH must be mandated to fund oxygen canisters. This will eliminate the chance and continue to pursue technology to greatly of breathing contaminated irrespirable air when increase the capabilities of wireless tracking changing units. devices. The goal of the agencies must be to cre-

12 United Mine Workers of America ate a unit that will allow pre- and post-accident e. sanitary facilities to accommodate trapped tracking of all miners underground. miners for the duration of the event; 3. MSHA and NIOSH must update and test new, f. a separate communications line located in a easily deployable, reliable and accurate seismic- separate isolated entry, or through a borehole type devices to locate trapped miners. At least one from the surface to the chamber; of these devices should be maintained in each g. devices to monitor the mine atmosphere out- MSHA District office. side the chamber at all times; In the event the agencies do not move forward h. an alarming device that indicates to the with this recommendation, the Union demands mine rescue team that miners have entered miners be informed that, when barricading, the chamber; their signaling will not likely be detected on the surface. i. activities that will allow miners to avoid, to the extent possible, stress and panic; and 4. “Safety chambers” and “safe havens” should be required in all mining operations. The Union j. other life-saving or life-sustaining technology notes that these are two distinct systems and they that becomes available in the future. cannot be used interchangeably. Training on when to access the chamber and how Each operator must be required to submit a plan to utilize its life-saving equipment will be essen- that dramatically increases the possibility of sur- tial to enhancing miners’ health and safety. This vival of miners who are unable to escape an emer- training must be separate from the current annual gency situation. The plan must include the use of retraining under Part 48. It must be comprehen- both safety chambers and safe havens. sive and frequent to be successful. The Union rec- ommends that it be done at least every six months Safety chambers must be explosion-and fire- and should coincide with the emergency response resistant, mobile either by means of track wheels plan review by the Secretary. or skids and be located no further than 600 feet from the nearest working face of the section in MSHA must drive the industry to improve tech- the intake entry. The location of all safety cham- nology and to require the use of these devices in bers in the mine must be noted on the mine map the nation’s mines. Any Program Policy Letter on the surface. Additional chambers must be (PPL) or any future rules must be prescriptive located at strategic locations throughout the mine in nature, demanding mine operators be pro- to accommodate outby workers or miners who active to enhance miners’ health and safety become trapped during an evacuation attempt. on a continuous basis, including the use of Lifelines from working areas of the mine must safety chambers. intersect each additional chamber in the escape Safe Havens are relatively permanent structures route. The chamber must contain sufficient sup- of the mine. The location of all safe havens in plies to sustain the lives of all miners who may the mine must be noted on the mine map on the have to access it for a period of not less than five surface. They must be designed to offer protection full days. The chamber must contain: and temporary sanctuary to miners as they exit a. adequate oxygen to sustain trapped miners; the mine during an emergency. These areas would contain many of the same items required in the b. first aid supplies to deal with injuries that safety chambers, but are not designed for the could be sustained in an emergency; same purpose. c. potable drinking water sufficient to allow one Rather, they would be a temporary stop to estab- gallon per person per day; lish communication with the surface, refresh the d. food sufficient to sustain miners in a healthy miners’ oxygen supply and offer help to those in condition for five days; need of first aid before continuing to the surface.

Report on the Sago Mine Disaster 13 The safe haven itself must be constructed of explo- other necessary assets to the mine site after being sion-proof bulkhead seals with submarine type notified that an emergency situation exists. doors for access from either side. The area inside 4. Every effort should be made to coordinate the the seals must be ventilated with positive pressure emergency response of the federal, state and from a surface borehole and with a separate com- local agencies. munication line to the surface. Directional lifelines from the working areas of the mine or other inby 5. Mine rescue teams required to be first responders safe havens or safety chambers must intersect each must be notified immediately, but at least within additional safe haven in the escape route. 15 minutes of the onset of an emergency. This notice should be made by mine management per- UMWA Findings on Notification sonnel immediately after notifying the regulatory of Regulatory Agencies and Mine agency. Rescue 6. Mine management must ensure that appropriate The first call from the Sago mine notifying the regu- arrangements have been made to guarantee their latory agencies or rescue personnel occurred at about designated mine rescue teams are available 24 7:20 am. The calls made approximately 50 minutes hours a day, seven days a week, to cover any situa- after the explosion to MSHA, WVOMHST and tion that may require their services. Barbour County Mine Rescue initially went unan- 7. Two (2) mine rescue teams designated as first swered. The necessary information was finally passed responders must be employees of the mining between the parties when phone messages were company who routinely train together at the returned or additional calls were made. affected mine, but under no circumstance less than four times per year. These teams must UMWA RECOMMENDATIONS be readily available at all times when miners 1. Mine management must be required to contact are underground. the proper regulatory authorities and the mine As additional mine rescue teams are needed, rescue teams for their operation immediately, they should be from the operations nearest but at least within 15 minutes of the onset of the the affected mine. Under no circumstances emergency. The operator should have enough should a contract or composite mine rescue responsible people physically on the mine site or team be permitted. immediately available by phone to handle these duties without delay. UMWA Findings on the Failure to It is the Union’s position that the 15-minute noti- Secure Evidence and Control the fication should not be interpreted to permit an Mine Site operator an excessive amount of time to assess an The scene on the surface at the Sago mine, even after emergency. This would only serve to delay rescue the arrival of MSHA, the WVOMHST and ICG cor- and recovery operations. porate officials, was chaotic. There appeared to be 2. MSHA must create a Mine Emergency Response no one in charge, causing in some cases inaccurate Office (MERO) within the Agency. The MERO information to be inappropriately disseminated must be staffed 24 hours a day, seven days a week, beyond the confines of the command center and res- by experienced full-time MSHA employees with cue teams. This confusion wasted valuable time and extensive mining knowledge. Emergency contact complicated rescue efforts. to MSHA by mine management personnel should ICG’s first plan was not submitted to the agencies for be available using a toll-free phone number. approval until 1:00 pm, nearly 6-1/2 hours after the 3. The federal and state agencies should be respon- explosion. That plan only requested that gases at the sible for immediately notifying and deploying all pit mouth be monitored, a practice that had already government rescue personnel, equipment and been ongoing for several hours.

14 United Mine Workers of America It was not until several hours later that ICG submit- 3. The mine operator must be on-site to provide ted a plan requesting the Tri-State A Mine Rescue logistical and general mine information necessary Team—a contract team—be permitted to enter to facilitate rescue and recovery operations. the mine and begin rescue activities. The plan was 4. The federal and state regulatory agencies must later modified to have the more experienced Consol secure the surface area of the mine and limit Energy Robinson Run Rescue Team enter the mine access by individuals who have no right to enter first; however, that did not occur until about 5:10 the property or are not involved in the rescue pm, over 10-1/2 hours after the explosion, already efforts. This will ensure rescue teams, fire crews, too late for some of the miners. police, miners’ representatives and other neces- Also, the regulatory agencies have many responsi- sary personnel understand their roles in the disas- bilities with regard to mine emergencies, including ter response and are not delayed in beginning the requiring that the operator secure the mine site and rescue effort. manage the accident scene. They failed to adequately 5. Communications with family members, the press fulfill these responsibilities. and general public should be handled by an inde- Further, it is the responsibility of MSHA to secure pendent arm of the federal government, much evidence obtained during the investigation of any like the National Transportation Safety Board serious non-fatal accident, fatal accident or disaster. (NTSB) and Surface Transportation Board (STB) This evidence must be immediately recorded and a do with air, rail or highway incidents. They should chain of custody established to ensure it is not tam- also make necessary arrangements for family pered with by any individual(s). members as they arrive at the site. These require- ments should be specifically laid out in the mine During the Sago investigation a pump and pump emergency response plan. cable were discovered in the sealed area and retrieved by the WVOMHST. They were removed from the 6. Information from the command center to any mine and placed on the surface. The equipment was sources not immediately involved in the rescue allowed to remain on Sago mine property unattended efforts should be carefully monitored and verified for several days before government personnel trans- to ensure accuracy. In the event miscommunica- ported it to a federal facility for testing. This break tions occur, they must be immediately corrected. in the chain of custody renders the pump and pump 7. All mobile equipment entering the mine during cable unreliable as evidence. Test performed on the rescue and recovery efforts must be equipped unsecured equipment is not credible and will not with two- way communications. withstand reasonable scrutiny in the court of public opinion, let alone a court of law. 8. All evidence or materials that may become part of the official investigation must be secured immedi- UMWA RECOMMENDATIONS ately by MSHA. 1. MSHA must take immediate control of all 9. MSHA must establish a rigid chain of custody for aspects of the rescue and recovery. It must cre- all evidence and see that it is followed to ensure ate plans and implement them to facilitate the accurate and credible results are obtained during immediate use of all mine rescue assets as soon testing procedures. as possible. MSHA should exercise the author- ity mandated by Congress and not delay before UMWA Findings on National Mine implementing a plan to safely enter the mine and Rescue Preparedness facilitate rescue activity. Given the demands on the current mine rescue pre- 2. Representatives of the miners must be afforded paredness system, it is questionable how much lon- full rights to participate in all aspects of the rescue ger it can be expected to function at its current level. and recovery operations and the subsequent acci- The industry and agencies have known for years that dent investigation. the number of experienced mine rescue teams was

Report on the Sago Mine Disaster 15 continually decreasing, placing ever-greater pressure 3. Training for mine rescue teams should be on those remaining. Many of these teams are made required frequently, but at least every quarter up of highly skilled and motivated individuals who (three months). Training should be done at each offer their expertise and experience to help miners mine the rescue team is charged with covering. who are in dire need of assistance. With fewer teams This will require surface as well as underground covering an expanding industry, the need for teams exercises to ensure the team members are familiar to work longer hours in difficult conditions places with the facility. them at unnecessary risk. 4. Mine rescue teams should be certified by MSHA MSHA policy has further eroded the number of to ensure competence. Certification should be mine rescue teams. Permitting mine operators to directly tied to the team’s demonstrating pro- create unrealistic schemes to cover their mines in ficiency and skill in all aspects of mine rescue. the event of an emergency has served to undermine Teams that do not pass the certification may con- the program. Well-established mine rescue teams tinue to practice, but shall not be permitted to train together and participate in mine rescue con- perform any actual mine rescue. tests which are supervised and evaluated by the reg- 5. All mine rescue teams should be required to ulatory agencies. This establishes a continuity that participate in at least two mine rescue contests leads to a more effective and successful rescue and every year. Failure to participate must result in the recovery operation. Most composite and contract team’s certification being revoked. teams do not do any of the above, which makes them, at times, ineffective. MSHA must require 6. Composite and contract mine rescue teams should realistic training that simulates mine emergencies not be permitted under any circumstances. for all mine rescue teams. 7. A member of the mine rescue team actively Many mine operators consider mine rescue teams a working in a mine or acting as backup should be drain on their financial resources rather than a safety immediately available when requested in the com- enhancement. They refuse to maintain their own mand center. teams because they see this practice as an excessive 8. The agencies must immediately take enforcement cost rather than a safety protection. They associate action against any operator that does not comply rescue team training, and the purchase and mainte- with the mine rescue team requirements. This nance of equipment, simply as a loss of man-hours action should include issuance of a closure order and profits. This gives companies who refuse to par- that stops production at all affected operations. ticipate in this important process an unfair competi- Facilities so affected should not be permitted to tive advantage over other operators. resume operations until all aspects of the mine MSHA’s current policy regarding mine rescue rescue team requirements are met. teams should be rescinded immediately. UMWA Findings about MSHA UMWA RECOMMENDATIONS The UMWA has become increasingly concerned 1. Steps must be taken immediately to significantly in recent years with the direction of MSHA as a increase the number of qualified mine rescue regulatory agency. In 1969 and again in 1977, the teams nationwide. U.S. Congress assessed the conditions in the coal industry and determined that mine operators were 2. MSHA should immediately require all mine oper- unable to self-regulate. It decided that having statu- ators to have two rescue teams readily available tory language and strictly enforced regulations were at all times when miners are underground. These the only way to ensure the lives of miners would teams should be made up of miners working at be protected. the operation who are familiar with the mine layout and conditions and those team members There has been a marked shift in MSHA’s priori- must perform all required training together. ties from enforcing health and safety regulations

16 United Mine Workers of America to “compliance assistance.” MSHA has become • Move to increase the number and skill level of unduly concerned with the expense that regulations mine rescue teams; may have on the operators’ bottom line. In some • Lower the maximum exposure limit for respi- instances, it actively pursues and promulgates regu- rable coal mine dust and silica; lations operators want that increase production even when they decrease health and safety. The regulation • Update and expand training and retraining of allowing the use of belt air is but one example. miners; MSHA has greatly expanded its compliance assis- • Develop a public hearing- style investigation tance program to get along with the operators, process; while enforcement activity has taken a back seat. • Update the penalty and assessment scheme; The number of coal mine inspectors has reached an historically low level, although that issue is being • Modify the conferencing process; addressed thanks to the efforts of Senator Byrd, • Improve the certification and approval who led the charge to appropriate $25.6 million in process; supplemental funding to train 170 additional coal mine inspectors. • Assist NIOSH in developing the next genera- tion SCSRs; The Mine Act and MSHA were created as a result of numerous tragedies in the coalfields. For years, the • Update permissible exposure limits for con- Agency has come under the influence of operator taminants in the mine environment; interests, run by men and women from the highest • Improve atmospheric monitoring systems; levels of industry. This is not what Congress intended. • Develop a nationwide emergency communica- UMWA RECOMMENDATIONS tions system; 1. MSHA must re-establish itself as the govern- • Develop air quality, chemical substances and ment’s advocate for miners. respiratory protection standards; and 2. MSHA must immediately hire and train a suffi- • Address issues related to working in confined cient number of inspectors to fill vacant positions spaces. and better prepare for the retirement of its aging The UMWA made many of these same recommen- workforce. dations after the September 23, 2001, Jim Walter 3. Former coal industry executives should not be #5 disaster. Had they been implemented, the events permitted to hold the highest offices within at Sago, Alma and Darby may have been avoided. MSHA. MSHA has a responsibility to move forward with these recommendations immediately. The United 4. Future regulations must focus first on the health Mine Workers of America and the nation do not and safety benefits they afford miners. Consider- intend to see more miners die as a result of regula- ations regarding cost benefits should not tory inaction at any level of the government. in any way negatively impact the protections miners enjoy. 5. In addition to the recommendations already made in this report and the MINER Act, MSHA must immediately take the following actions: • Repeal the belt-air regulation; • Require flame resistant conveyor belts in all mines;

Report on the Sago Mine Disaster 17

Events of January 2, 2006

Prior to preshift examination Considering the layout of the mine, the duties each fireboss was assigned to perform and the distance On Tuesday, January 2, 2006, three individuals they would be required to travel, these discrepancies arrived at the Sago mine to perform their required can be crucial in determining the events leading up duties prior to the start of production by the to the explosion. At the time this report was written, dayshift crews. Fred Jamison, beltman and outby the timing discrepancy could not be resolved. fireboss, and Terry Helms (victim), beltmen and fireboss, arrived to perform the preshift examina- Preshift examination tion of the underground areas of the mine. William Chisolm, dispatcher, was the responsible person on [Note: for clarity, this section of the report relies on the surface. times noted by Fred Jamison, but does not concede their accuracy.] The testimony of Jamison (January 17, 2006) and Chisolm (February 15, 2006) to the Mine Safety and Fred Jamison arrived at the mine and reported to Health Administration (MSHA) and the West Vir- the bathhouse at approximately 2:15 am and began ginia Office of Miners’ Health Safety and Training changing into his work clothes for the start of his (WVOMHST) conflict in several areas. The most shift. Terry Helms arrived shortly after Jamison, notable difference between the testimony is in regard and the two discussed what areas of the mine each to the time at which certain events took place on the would examine. Helms told Jamison they would be morning of January 2, 2006. doing their regular fireboss runs. Jamison’s normal examinations included numbers 1, 2 and 3 track and Jamison testified when asked what time he arrived at belt. The two then proceeded to the foreman’s room the mine that, “It was probably a quarter after 2:00 to review and countersign the preshift examination am.” (Jamison page 22 at line 23) Further, he testified books. Helms went out to talk with William Chi- in response to a question about what time he entered solm, Dispatcher, then he and Jamison went down the mine that, “It was close to three o’clock…” (page the hill into the pit to get a mantrip. 48 at line 19) Helms and Jamison rode into the mine to the first Chisolm testified that, “I arrived at the mine site derail switch. Jamison threw the derail, crossed probably 3:30 because Fred Jamison and Terry over the track and walked inby in the belt entry. Helms had to go under and fireboss, so I had to be He reached 11 block and heard Helms approaching there in time to start by 4:00.” (Chisolm page 29 at in the mantrip. He entered the track entry, opened line 2) Further, he testified that, “My usual shift is the airlock door, threw the second derail switch 6:00 in the morning till 6:00 in the afternoon. I was and got into the mantrip with Helms and the two to come in at 4:00 in the morning so the firebosses proceeded to the No. 3 belt drive. Jamison exited could go under, and then continue working my the mantrip at No. 3 belt drive and began walking shift.” (Chisolm page 41 at line 2) the belt entry inby towards No. 4 belt drive. Dur- However, both Jamison and Chisolm reported they ing the examination he noticed that a pump at 22 had spoken to one another before the fireboss run block of No. 3 belt was not operating. The breaker began. Chisolm also testified that he had a conversa- would not reset, so he continued up the belt entry. tion with Helms prior to his entering the mine to Helms continued to travel inby to examine 1 Left begin his preshift examination. Section. Prior to leaving, he asked Jamison to

Report on the Sago Mine Disaster 19 examine 2nd Left Parallel Section for him. (Jamison record book and the examiners would sign the does not normally fireboss face areas of the mine. reports at the end of their shift. He reported this was only the second time he On January 2, 2006, Jamison went to the surface firebossed a working section at this operation.) prior to the start of the production shift and Jamison arrived at No. 4 belt drive, exited onto signed for his examination. It must be assumed the track and took the mantrip Helms left at 1st that Helms would sign at the end of the shift as he Left switch to the 2nd Left Parallel Section. Jamison had in the past. arrived at 2nd Left Parallel at approximately 4:00 There is no way to corroborate the times stated by am, parked the mantrip at the switch and walked Jamison. The dispatcher’s report kept on the surface the belt entry into the Section. He entered the contained insufficient information. Section and crossed into #1 entry, finding no meth- ane and 11, 241 cubic feet per minute of air. He Indications are that Helms completed the preshift ran all the faces 1 through 8 and found nothing examination of 1st Left Section at approximately to report. Jamison exited the Section in the track 4:50 am. He walked to the mouth of the Section, entry and examined the Section power center and picked up his bucket and walked to 2nd Left Parallel charging station. belt drive to complete his preshift examination. At the mouth of 2nd Left Parallel, Jamison took the Sometime after 5:00 am, Helms called outside to mantrip to 1st left. He called outside to Chisolm and Owen Jones, 1st Left Section foreman, to report told him he was leaving Helm’s bucket and coat at his findings. The evidence shows that: Helms the 2nd Left Parallel Switch. He proceeded to 22 block reported that 1st Left Section and charger were safe of the No. 3 belt and attempted to reset the pump at the time of the examination, between 4:20 and again. He was unable to do so and continued to the 4:50 am; he also informed Jones that #2 and #3 outside. Jamison told investigators that he recorded entries were not bolted, and 5, 6 and 7 entries this problem on his note pad and informed John needed to be cleaned. Boni, the pumper, when he was on the surface. The note book he refers to has not been found. Jamison The report does not indicate what time the call was arrived on the surface sometime between 5:30 am received on the surface; however, Jones stated he and 5:40 am and placed the mantrip on charge. did not arrive at the mine until after 5:00 am. There is no way to determine the time Helms made his Jamison filled out the 2nd Left Parallel preshift book report. Jones did not record the time on the preshift on the surface, indicating that nothing unusual was report and it is not clarified in his testimony. Helms found. He also reported talking with the oncoming also relayed the belt/track preshift examination 2nd Left Parallel Section foreman Martin Toler, telling report to John Boni at about the same time. him that, “The section looked good and...your miner is in number one.” (Jamison page 96 at line 4) Toler Start of production shift to time of countersigned the preshift report. explosion Jamison then signed the belt/track preshift book. It Shortly before 6:00 am, Owen Jones and his brother specifically noted that Nos. 1-3 track and 1-3 belt Jesse Jones, roof bolter operator (victim), proceeded were clear. It also noted that Nos. 4, 5 and 6 track to the pit and began preparing mantrips for entry were clear. The report stated that areas of Nos. 4, 5, into the mine. and 6 belts needed rock dust and that No. 7 belt had The 2nd Left Parallel crew loaded up in the first man- a water accumulation that needed to be pumped at trip and entered the mine at about 5:55 am. It was the 20 block. The preshift examination report for Nos. 1, practice at the mine to have the 2nd Left Parallel crew 2 and 3 track as well as Nos. 4, 5 and 6 belt were enter first because they were the inby Section. reported by Terry Helms to John Boni, as was the practice at the mine. Boni would record all the track The crew traveled to the 2nd Left Parallel Section, and belt preshift examinations in the appropriate exited the mantrip, and began their normal routine.

20 United Mine Workers of America Fred Jamison completed his paperwork on the sur- Evacuation of mine and face and re-entered the mine after the 2nd Left Paral- initial rescue attempt lel mantrip departed, at approximately 6:00 am. ST The 1st Left crew was delayed entering the mine FROM 1 LEFT SECTION OUTBY because the mantrip was not large enough to carry The forces of the explosion struck the mantrip car- everyone. The trip was switched out and the crew rying the 1st Left crew, immediately engulfing them entered the mine on a larger mantrip at approxi- in smoke and dust. Debris swept up in the blast also nd mately 6:05 am, about 10 minutes behind the 2 Left struck the mantrip. Owen Jones, section foreman, Parallel crew. attempted to operate the mantrip but was blown out The mantrip proceeded to 1st Right pumper shanty of the seat by the forces of the explosion. The forces and John Boni exited the trip. The crew continued were so strong he noted that, “...I’m standing there inby to No. 4 belt drive, where Pat Boni exited the and it’s pushing me forward. It’s making me walk. trip and entered the No. 4 belt drive. And I’m thinking it’s absolutely going to pick me up and throw me, I mean, and then it quits.” (Jones page st The production crew continued inby to the 1 Left 23 at line 1) switch. Roger Perry, miner operator, got off the man- trip and threw the track switch towards the Section. The 13-member crew immediately exited the man- Perry returned to the mantrip and, immediately trip, gathered on the outby end and started down the upon his sitting down, the explosion occurred. At track toward the entrance of the mine. The dust was this time, 29 miners were underground in the mine so thick, Jones recalls, that, “...You can’t even see the in various locations. ground. You can’t even see your feet. We’re follow- ing the track the best we can down through there...” The explosion and its effects (Jones page 23 at line 17) They continued to follow The explosion was initiated behind the newly-con- the track entry to 37 block of No. 4 belt, where a structed Omega Block seals and blew outward in mine phone was located. Jones called outside to the all directions from its epicenter. No one can con- dispatcher and reported that, “...We’ve had something clusively determine the exact point of origin of the happen in the mine, an explosion or something, I explosion. However, based on the damage, it is clear said, get the people in here...” (Jones page 26 at line 2) that the sealed area contained sufficient gases to Jones remained at the phone. The rest of the crew propagate the forces of the explosion a great distance left the track though a mandoor, traveled across #7 and with extreme force. entry through a second mandoor, and entered the The pressure forces (both static and dynamic) and #8 intake escapeway entry. As the twelve miners con- the heat from the blast struck the inby sides of the tinued to travel outby in the intake escapeway, Ron Omega Block seals, pushing them outward into the Grall and Paul Avington moved ahead of the group. active area of the mine. These forces were so great The remaining ten miners continued to follow the that nine of the seals were completely obliterated. escapeway entering #9 entry at 31 block. They pro- The remaining seal, located in the #1 entry, suffered ceeded to travel outby to 27 block when they heard catastrophic failure and was blown against an adja- a mantrip approach. They exited the escapeway cent rib-line. through mandoors at that location and entered The forces traveled into the 2 North Mains area of the track heading. A mantrip carrying Jeff Toler, the mine outby in the sealed area, destroying com- Superintendent; Al Schoonover, Safety Director; munications and ventilation controls up to at least Ernest Hofer, Maintenance Foreman; Denver Wil- 42 block. The forces also traveled into the 2nd Left fong, Maintenance Superintendent; and John Boni Parallel Section, destroying communication and stopped when they encountered the crew. Wilfong, ventilation controls. Dust and noxious gases were Boni and Hofer were instructed to take the crew out immediately present in virtually every area of the of the mine. Toler and Schoonover remained under- mine from 37 block of No. 4 belt inby. ground to assess the situation.

Report on the Sago Mine Disaster 21 The mantrip proceeded in an outby direction until crosscut. They moved to 58 block and noticed it reached 9 block of No. 4 belt, where they encoun- the smoke was extremely dense. Toler noted, “... tered Grall and Avington. The two miners got onto It seemed that the smoke was just kind of swirling, the mantrip and it continued to exit the mine, arriv- that it wasn’t wanting to dissipate.” (Toler page 36 at ing on the surface at approximately 7:30 am. line 2) The three discussed the possibility that they may be pushing fresh air into an ignition source and The two other miners who entered the mine at cause another explosion. They remained in the area the beginning of the shift also exited the mine for some time trying to contact the 2nd Left Parallel safely. Jamison exited in the track entry and Pat crew, but got no response. Boni walked out the escapeway. At that time Toler, Schoonover and Jones were the only men under- They finally decided they had gone as far as possible ground outby the 2nd Left area of the mine. under the circumstances and they should retreat from the area. Toler stated that they “...Probably After gathering supplies on the surface, Wilfong needed to back out and let the professionals come in, and Hofer boarded the mantrip and headed back the people that were trained in this.” (Toler page 37 at underground. They met Toler, Schoonover and line 8) They walked outby to crosscut 49 where Toler Jones at 32 block in the track heading. The stop- had moved the phone previously, called the surface ping at this location was damaged, and they and notified the dispatcher of their decision to exit repaired it using brattice cloth. the mine. They walked down the intake escapeway The trip proceeded inby with all five miners repair- and caught up with Jones and Hofer around 2 Right; ing stoppings as they went until they reached 42 they all proceeded out of the mine, reaching the sur- block and stopped when their handheld gas detec- face at approximately 10:35 am. tors alarmed, indicating the presence of carbon The 12 members of the 2nd Left Parallel crew and monoxide. mine examiner/beltman Terry Helms were the only miners left underground. There had been no contact The mine atmosphere was unstable, so they decided with them since approximately 5:55 am when they to disconnect the batteries in the mantrip because entered the mine. they presented an ignition source. They then pro- ceeded inby on foot. They repaired damaged ven- Evacuation attempt/rescue tilation controls between the #6 and #7 entries and recovery at crosscuts 42, 43, 45, 46 and 47. Toler traveled through the damaged brattice wall at crosscut 49 2ND LEFT PARALLEL SECTION across the track entry and retrieved a phone from the 1st Left belt head; he noticed a reading of 700 There is limited information on the activity that nd ppm CO on the track. occurred on the 2 Left Parallel Section in the hours immediately after the explosion. However, data col- Toler extended the phone line and brought some lected during the investigation, and the testimony first aid supplies into the crosscut between #6 and #7 of Randall McCloy, Jr., indicate the following events entry; they then continued inby after repairing the occurred. wall at 49 block. The crew moved inby and repaired The crew felt the blast from the explosion as a strong damaged ventilation controls at crosscuts 51, 54 and gust of wind and the Section was immediately filled 55. They noticed that the smoke and CO did not with dust and smoke. The severity of the blast had dissipate as quickly as it had been and they became destroyed the Section communication system and concerned that they had missed some damaged ven- severely damaged ventilation controls. While it is tilation controls along the way. Toler asked Jones and unclear how far miners in the Section had separated Hofer to take a roll of brattice cloth and check the from one another at this point in time, soon after outby stoppings. the explosion they all came together and boarded the The other three (Toler, Schoonover and Wilfong) mantrip in an attempt to exit the Section. As they advanced to 57 block and hung a curtain in the moved down the track heading, they encountered

22 United Mine Workers of America thicker smoke and dusty conditions. The mantrip system to Jeff Toler. Toler explained the situation and was stopped by debris on the track at 10 block. told Stemple that, “Dick Wilfong recommended that we contact a mine rescue team…” (Stemple page 30 The crew exited the mantrip and walked in the at line 6) Nearly 40 minutes had passed since Jones direction of the intake escapeway. There are con- first recommended teams be contacted. flicting reports about when the crew donned their Self-Contained Self-Rescuers (SCSRs), but it would The first attempt by mine management to contact appear from the discarded SCSR cases that they anyone outside of the mine was made at approxi- performed this task at around 11 block in #7 entry. mately 7:20 am when Stemple placed calls to the McCloy reports that four of the units did not work state and federal regulatory agencies. His initial despite repeated efforts to activate them. calls were either not answered or went to answer- ing machines. At 7:50 am John Collins, an inspector Dust and smoke continued to enter the Section, from the West Virginia Office of Miners’ Health, and after attempting to exit the mine in the intake Safety and Training (WVOMHST), returned the call escapeway, the crew returned to the Section and from Stemple. After getting some information about entered the face of #3 entry. At this location, they the incident, Collins contacted Brian Mills, inspec- built a barricade to isolate themselves from the dust tor-at-large for WVOMHST, and informed him of and noxious gases. Two members of the crew made a the situation. Collins then proceeded to the mine. second attempt to find a safe escape route, but were turned back by heavy smoke, gases and debris. Stemple also tried to contact the Barbour County Mine Rescue Team, which was under contract with Over the course of the next several hours, mem- ICG to provide mine rescue services for the Sago bers of the crew followed the standard procedures mine. The call went unanswered: the rescue team’s for barricaded miners, taking turns pounding on a “24 hour” answering machine was turned off. roof bolt at their location. (A standard procedure in which miners are trained: pound several times Inspector Collins arrived at the mine at about 8:15 on a roof bolt or waterline and wait for a response am and discussed the situation with miners from from the surface. Rescuers on the surface, hearing the 1st Left crew. He asked that air readings be taken the miners, are to set off a shot to notify the trapped in the return entry and, based on the levels of CO, miners they have been heard.) No response was issued a control order. Meanwhile, Stemple con- received by the barricaded miners because the seis- tacted a member of the Barbour County Rescue mic equipment had not been properly maintained Team at home and informed him of the situation. by MSHA and therefore could not be deployed. Eleven of the trapped miners later succumbed to the At 8:30 am, Stemple reached Jim Satterfield, an poisonous mine atmosphere. inspector with MSHA. Satterfield issued a 103(k) order over the phone and informed Stemple that no Regulatory action and rescue/recovery one was to enter or do any work at the mine. There was no further contact with representatives of MSHA Shortly after 6:35 am on January 2, 2006, supervisory until approximately 10:30 am when Satterfield, Pat personnel on the surface at the mine became aware Vanover and Ron Postalwait arrived on mine property. that something catastrophic had occurred under- ground. They had received word from Owen Jones The Barbour County Rescue Teams arrived at the that, “We had...an explosion...get mine rescue team mine at 11:00 am and began preparations to enter here.” (Jones page 55 at line 14) Efforts to contact the the mine, but were placed on stand-by. MSHA con- regulatory agencies and mobilize the necessary mine tacted Consol Energy and requested it to mobilize its rescue teams, emergency personnel and equipment rescue teams and proceed immediately to the mine. should immediately have been put in motion, but ICG chartered a plane to bring its team from the were not. Viper mine in Illinois. At about 7:15 am, Johnny Stemple, Assistant Safety At 1:00 pm, some 6-1/2 hours after the explosion, Director, was patched into the mine communication ICG submitted a plan to MSHA and WVOMHST to

Report on the Sago Mine Disaster 23 continue to monitor gases at the pit mouth, though listen for signs of life in the area. After about 10 min- this was already being done. utes, the drill steel was struck in an attempt to signal the trapped miners, but there was no response. The Union is unaware of any previous plans sub- mitted by the company to this point. MSHA and Rescue teams reentered the mine at 6:30 am on WVOMHST approved the plan, and monitoring January 3, 2006. At the same time, a camera was continued for several hours. lowered through the borehole into the belt entry of the 2nd Left Parallel Section, about where the feeder Finally, at 4:45 pm, a plan was submitted to send the was located. There was no sign of damage from the Tri-State Team A underground to explore the first explosion at that location, indicating the blast was 1,000 feet inby the pit mouth. The team was required initiated outby the Section. There was also no indi- to separate the belt structure and rails one crosscut cation that the trapped miners had barricaded. inby the pit mouth. They were also instructed to tie in three entries every 500 feet and take air readings. From 7:00 to 8:00 am the rescue teams advanced The plan was approved by the regulatory agencies. to 31 block No. 4 belt when MSHA decided to use its V2 mine robot. The robot was offloaded at this However, before it could be implemented, a modi- location and advanced to 32 block, where it became fication was requested to permit the more-expe- disabled. rienced Consol Energy Robinson Run Team to enter instead of Tri-State. The plan modification The teams continued to move inby and advanced was approved at 5:10 pm. The Robinson Run Team into the 1st Left Section, a distance of six breaks at entered the mine’s intake entry through the fan block 48. They then proceeded up the mains and housing on the surface. The team continued to move established a fresh air base at 57 block, #4 belt. While methodically through the mine, taking air readings some rescue team members secured the fresh air and assessing conditions. At 6:57 pm, water was base, others explored the entries between 57 and 58 reported to be accumulating in the return entry at 21 blocks. Ron Hixson, MSHA inspector, discovered a block. Progress was halted until a plan was submit- body lying across the track, subsequently identified ted and approved to start the pump. as Terry Helms. Indications are that he was caught in the direct path of the blast. The agencies approved a plan to permit the use of battery mantrips to transport mine rescue teams The fresh air base was completed at 5:45 pm, and in and out of the mine to block 17 of #3 belt. The rescue teams began to move inby to take gas readings teams advanced to 32 block by 8:50 pm. The track at the sealed area. The teams continued to advance was separated in this area to prevent the possibility it forward, but did not realize until they called outside would carry a charge into the mine, creating an igni- with their location and the results of their air read- tion source. The Robinson Run Team advanced to ings that they had actually traveled inby the seal 34 block and reported seeing a red light in the entry, locations, at 62 block of the 2nd Left Mains. They which they were given permission to investigate. retreated out of the area and examined all the head- The light was identified as a CO monitor operating ings across 2 North Mains, confirming that all the on a backup power supply. Because of the potential seals had been completely destroyed. The Omega ignition source the CO monitor presented, all teams Block seals had been struck with sufficient force were instructed to exit the mine until it could be de- to pulverize them. The damage was so extensive energized. At approximately the same time the light that team members did not realize that they had was detected, 2:45 am, a drill rig on the surface began advanced into the 2nd North Mains Section. drilling a borehole into the 2nd Left Parallel Section. The teams then advanced into the 2nd Left Parallel At 5:30 am, the borehole punched through into the Section and discovered the ventilation controls from 2nd Left Parallel Section approximately 300 feet from the mouth of the Section to 12 block in the primary the face. Air samples indicated levels of CO at 1,300 intake escapeway were all damaged. They found the ppm, or three times the maximum safe level for a Section mantrip at 10 block, and determined the one-hour exposure. The drill rig was shut down to crew must have attempted escape, but were stopped

24 United Mine Workers of America by debris on the track. At 8:00 pm, the rescuers and Clark arrived at #3 face and the rescue team found the discarded cases of twelve SCSRs in the examined all the trapped miners. It became obvious intake escapeway at 11 block of #7 entry. that there were no other survivors. Despite this real- ity, while Klug and others worked on the surviving The process of exploration from the mouth of 2nd miner, the remaining rescuers checked each of the Left Parallel Section to just inby the location where other miners and confirmed they were deceased. the SCSR cases were discovered, about halfway to Rescue workers relayed the new information back the faces, had taken rescuers nearly three hours. through the communications chain, but it is unclear The determination was made that continuing at how far the correct information was transmitted. this slow pace was unacceptable, and a decision was made to break rescue team protocol and push The rescuers arrived at the fresh air base at the immediately to the faces. The teams were instructed mouth of 2nd Left Parallel Section with McCloy at about 11:00 pm to disregard normal procedure around 12:15 am. They immediately placed the and advance inby immediately. mask of a Draeger BG-4 positive pressure breath- ing apparatus on him and fitted it to his face. When This decision stretched the already taxed commu- Klug reached the fresh air base with McCloy, he nication system beyond its capacity and resulted realized the original miscommunication, regarding in communication problems; nevertheless rescuers the condition of the trapped miners, had never been agreed with the decision to advance more quickly. By corrected. He immediately went to the mine phone 11:40 pm, the McElroy Team had reached the faces and contacted the command center and reported, and split in separate directions to explore each face. “We got 11 items” (Klug page 32 at line 2) (“item” Jimmy Klug, McElroy team captain, and Bill Tucker, was a code for body that the teams were instructed of WVOMHST, explored the left entries, while to use at the request of ICG). The command center Hixson (MSHA) and McElroy team members Mike personnel did not comprehend the message and Clark and Jim Smith explored the right side entries. finally, after several attempts to make them under- As they advanced forward in the #3 entry, Klug and stand the situation, Klug stated, “There’s 11 deceased Tucker heard someone gasping for air. They imme- people.” (Klug page 32 at line 4) The command cen- diately noticed a curtain hanging across the entry ter ordered everyone out of the mine. and pushed it to the side. The 12 miners were all at McCloy was carried to the mouth of 1st Left Sec- this location. Klug moved toward the gasping miner tion and placed on a mantrip for transport to (Randall McCloy), pulling him away from another the surface. The mantrip was delayed when they miner who had fallen on top of him. He immedi- encountered a motor pulling a supply car into the ately activated a CSE SR-100 SCSR and placed it into mine. The miners on the motor acting on the origi- McCloy’s mouth. However, because of the victim’s nal incorrect information had entered the mine shallow breathing the device could not be properly to assist in what they believed was a rescue effort. activated. Tucker stepped back into the entry and Mine rescue team members informed them of the called to the other rescue team members that they situation in the Section and proceeded to the sur- had found the miners and needed help. In the excite- face with McCloy, arriving at about 1:00 am. The ment Tucker yelled out, “They’re over here. They’re officials at the command center had received news over here and they’re alive.” (Tucker page 27 at line 6) about the fatalities at approximately 12:30 am on The message, largely incorrect and yet unverified, January 4, 2006, but no one communicated it from was relayed from location to location along the there at that time. The families of the miners con- overstretched communications system. The message tinued to celebrate at the church until about 2:45 went outside to the command center and was almost am when they were informed by mining company immediately communicated across the mine prop- officials of the tragic news. erty and to the families at the Sago Baptist Church. The Viper Mine Rescue Team went back under- In the 2nd Left Parallel Section, the initial excite- ground at 1:55 am with stethoscopes and body bags ment quickly turned to sadness, as Hixson, Smith to reassess the condition of the miners and remove

Report on the Sago Mine Disaster 25 them from the mine. The members of the team con- the surface with the bodies of the twelve miners at firmed the information relayed earlier by Klug and approximately 10:00 am, January 4, 2006. began the task of identifying each miner and prepar- The rescue and recovery efforts were completed ing them for transport. The rescue teams reached nearly 52 hours after the explosion.

26 United Mine Workers of America Mine Seal Requirements

Federal Coal Mine Safety and Health ment of the Interior, Bureau of Mines at the Lake Act of 1969 (Coal Act), and Lynn Experimental Mine in Pennsylvania. The study, Report of Investigation 7581 (RI 7581) determined Federal Mine Safety and Health Act that seals placed in mines to isolate worked-out or of 1977 (Mine Act) abandoned areas from working sections need only pass a static pressure test of 20 psi. Previously, the Concerning ventilation, 30 USC § 863(z) requires Department of Interior had established a 50 psi that: static pressure requirement for seals. The lower stan- (2) When sealing [a mined out or abandoned area of dard was, however, contingent upon other factors the mine] is required, such sealing shall be made in an being accounted for and monitored. approved manner so as to isolate with explosion-proof There is a marked difference between static pressure bulkheads such areas from the active workings of the cited here as the pounds-per-square-inch a seal must mine. withstand and the forces of an explosion. Static pres- (3) In case of mines opened on or after the operative sure refers to the pressure waves that strike the seal date of this title, or in case of working sections opened from an explosion as they pass by it or parallel to the on or after such date in mines opened prior to such seal as it travels down the entry adjacent to the cross- date, the mining system shall be designed in accor- cut. This type of testing does not subject the seal dance with a plan and revisions thereof approved by to the direct forces of an explosion, or the dynamic the Secretary and adopted by such operator so that, as pressure. It is not clear why the tests were performed each working section of the mine is abandoned, it can in this manner, given that the forces from an explo- be isolated from the active workings of the mine with sion within a sealed area will push outward in all explosion-proof seals or bulkheads. directions, including directly toward the seals. 30 USC §877(k) requires that any inactive areas of Mitchell stated in his opening that, “The Federal the mine “shall be sealed by the operator in a man- Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 requires ner prescribed by the Secretary...” that such areas [worked-out or abandoned] be ven- tilated or sealed with explosion-proof bulkheads, but However, by subsequent regulation, 30 CFR §75.335, the present study indicates that bulkheads alone can- the Secretary has allowed mine operators to submit not isolate areas in the coal mine in which methane ventilation plans which included alternate methods or or other dangerous gases have accumulated. Gas-air materials for sealing worked-out or abandoned areas exchanges between sealed and open areas must be of the mine. This regulation affected all seals installed controlled.” (Mitchell RI 7581, page 1) after November 15, 1992, and allowed the use of other materials, including timber and Omega Blocks, for The determination that a seal must only withstand seals provided they met a 20 psi static pressure test. a static pressure of 20 psi to be approved by MSHA (The testing of this material by the Mine Safety and for use in a coal mine relied on several other factors Health Administration was completed in 1990, so being controlled by the mine operator. Mitchell con- approval for in-mine use was permitted.) cluded that an explosion occurring within a sealed area will never exert more than 20 psi static pressure The initial underpinnings for the regulation rely for a distance greater than 200 feet from where it on a 1971 study by Donald Mitchell, U.S. Depart- originates, provided coal dust is not involved. Fur-

Report on the Sago Mine Disaster 27 ther, seal leakage must be controlled to ensure the of 200 feet calculation in determining the pressures area does not flow in and out of the explosive range that may be applied to the seals. of methane. These factors are crucial in determining The UMWA also contends that simply looking at the effectiveness of the seals. static pressure is improper and incomplete. The Mitchell noted that, “A leakage rate as small as explosive forces created when a methane-air mixture 100 cubic feet per minute (CFM) will cause an is ignited also generates extreme dynamic forces that exchange as great as 1 million cubic feet of atmo- travel in all directions from the epicenter of the blast. sphere between open and sealed areas within a This dynamic pressure must be considered when week.” (Mitchell RI 7581 at page 3) In real terms, a determining minimum standards for seals. sealed area containing 4 million cubic feet of atmo- The Union does agree with Mitchell that sealed sphere, with an inert methane mixture at 20 per- areas of the mine must be continuously monitored cent of the total volume, could present a real hazard to insure a pro-active plan for controlling gob gases should it leak into the active area of the mine at a remains in place and is followed as necessary. rate of 100 CFM. The final basis for 30 CFR §75.335 and the inclu- In the course of a week, the atmospheric change sion of other seal construction materials, includ- could reduce the methane accumulation to 15 per- ing Omega Block, was completed in 1990 by Clete cent, creating a potentially explosive methane-air Stephan, MSHA’s Principal Mining Engineer of the mixture. This leakage is affected by several factors, Bruceton Safety Technology Center. including increase or decrease in fan and barometric pressure. Decreases in the pressure against the seals Stephan agreed with many of the determinations will allow the seals to out gas into the active mine, of Mitchell, including the 20 psi standard, leakage changing the methane-air mixture of the sealed area. flows from sealed to active workings, the effects of changes in fan and barometric pressure and the need Mitchell concluded, “To isolate sealed areas from to actively control gob gas exchanges into the open active workings, pressure within the sealed area must area of the mine. be relieved; gas-air exchanges between sealed and open portions of the mine must be controlled; and However, unlike Mitchell, he determined that gas leakage from sealed areas must be directed into “§75.329-2, which states that seals...may be con- return air courses, preferably through the bleeder structed of...incombustible material” (Stephan, entry. Further, sealed areas should not adjoin Omega 384 Block as a seal construction material at intake air courses. If they must, then atmosphere page 4) is a very stringent test for seal construction in the intake air should be continuously monitored material. He defines the incombustible aspect of by a system that gives warning should harmful gases a seal as, “one that is intended to keep the mate- be detected, or other suitable means that protect the rial used to build a seal from creating a fire hazard health and safety of the men in the mine.” (Mitchell or contributing fuel to a fire or explosion.” He RI 7581, page 8) therefore suggested that, “A less restrictive term... noncombustible,” (Stephan, Omega 384 Block as The Union disagrees with Mitchell’s determination a seal construction material at page 4) should be that a seal need only withstand 20 psi static pressure applied to seal testing. In his final determination on in order to be sufficiently protective of miners. Even the subject he stated that, “Another way to define in isolation, this minimal requirement does not take incombustible for seals is that the total structure into account the ever-changing and dynamic atmo- is capable of providing a certain fire resistance. sphere that exists in the sealed area. The mixtures of The fire resistance rating is essentially the time the gases within the sealed area are, by nature, subject to wall can be expected to resist the passage of heat, erratic changes and are free-moving bodies of vari- flame or hot gases, any of which could ignite com- ous gases. It is impossible to determine how close in bustible material on the opposite side of the wall proximity an explosive mixture is to the seals. There- when the wall is subjected to heat from a carefully fore, it is not practical to use the 20 psi at a distance controlled source, such as a furnace.” (Stephan,

28 United Mine Workers of America Omega 384 Block as a seal construction material at He then determined that Omega Blocks meet this page 4) Stephan determined that, “A one hour fire incombustible requirement and proceeded with resistance as per ASTM E-119(4) (American Soci- explosion-testing of the material, despite the intent ety for Testing and Materials) or equivalent, would of Congress and specific Mine Act language. be reasonable.” (Stephan, Omega 384 Block as a seal construction material at page 5) The seal testing performed on October 10, 1990, included four Omega Block seals constructed in Based on his decision that incombustible is a fire- various configurations. It is important to note resistance definition, Stephan then determined that all were hitched six inches into the bottom that, “...There are combustible materials, such as and ribs. Two were constructed with two pilasters wood, which are capable of providing one-hour and two were built with a single pilaster. The seals fire resistance according to ASTM E-119(4). Basi- were subjected to a single explosive force of 20 psi cally it requires that such a seal be thick enough to static pressure. prevent passage of flame or hot gases for one hour.” (Stephan, Omega 384 Block as a seal construction The seal descriptions and test results are as follows: material at page 6)

Seal # 2 Crosscut Description Seal Thickness 32 inches Number of Pilasters 2 Pilaster Thickness 48 inches Pilaster Width 48 inches Keying Floor (6 inches) and Ribs (6 inches) Joints Staggered Bonding Agent All joints, inby face and outby face with Burrell Bond Bond Thickness 1/4 inch minimum Wedging Approximately 6 inches to 1 foot on top Test Result Survived Blast Passed Air Leakage APPROVED

Seal # 3 Crosscut Description Seal Thickness 24 inches Number of Pilasters 2 Pilaster Thickness 48 inches Pilaster Width 48 inches Keying Floor (6 inches) and Ribs (6 inches) Joints Staggered Bonding Agent All joints, inby face and outby face with Burrell Bond Bond Thickness 1/4 inch minimum Wedging Approximately 6 inches to 1 foot on top Test Result Survived Blast Failed Air Leakage NOT APPROVED

Report on the Sago Mine Disaster 29

Seal # 4 Crosscut Description Seal Thickness 24 inches Number of Pilasters 1 Pilaster Thickness 56 inches Pilaster Width 42 inches Keying Floor (6 inches) and Ribs (6 inches) Joints Staggered Bonding Agent All joints, inby face and outby face with Burrell Bond Bond Thickness 1/4 inch minimum Wedging Approximately 6 inches to 1 foot on top Test Result Survived Blast Passed Air Leakage APPROVED

Seal # 5 Crosscut Description Seal Thickness 24 inches Number of Pilasters 1 Pilaster Thickness 48 inches Pilaster Width 48 inches Keying Floor (6 inches) and Ribs (6 inches) Joints Staggered Bonding Agent All joints, inby face and outby face with Burrell Bond Bond Thickness 1/4 inch minimum Wedging Approximately 6 inches to 1 foot on top Test Result Survived Blast Passed Air Leakage APPROVED

The Union has never agreed with several of the Likewise, Stephan’s determination that the mandate determinations by Stephan. We believe that his of Congress when it required “noncombustible” was redefinition of “noncombustible” coupled with the not what it intended, but was something less, is not 20 psi standard put forth by Mitchell is a significant appropriate. This redefinition flies in the face of the reduction in miners’ health and safety. Consider- “no less protection” standard MSHA is required to ing the potential forces from a gob gas explosion, meet when promulgating regulations. permitting the use of lighter and therefore less sub- Finally, it is important to note that the require- stantial materials for seal construction reduces their ments for seal construction today are significantly effectiveness. The Union contends that the forces reduced beyond even what was outlined by Mitch- needed to cause the catastrophic failure of an Omega ell and Stephan. In practice, Omega Block seals Block is substantially less than previously approved are not required to be built with any pilasters seal material, and that it cannot be classified as a reli- unless they reach a height of over 8 feet. Neither able sealing material. does the agency require hitching of the seals into

30 United Mine Workers of America the bottom or ribs. There can be no doubt that This practice does not enhance miners’ health and these types of applications will not even provide safety, and MSHA should revert back to the Con- the minimal protection to miners outlined in the gressional mandate outlined in the 1969 Coal Act 1990 tests cited above. and reiterated in the 1977 Mine Act by requiring the use of explosion-proof seals or bulkheads in areas With regard to implementing the minimal monitor- of the mine that are permanently abandoned and/or ing of seals, both inby and outby, as advocated by worked out. both Mitchell and Stephan, the Agency has failed the nation’s miners. The approval process has become The seals must be examined each shift to ensure a rubber stamp for the 20 psi requirement and no their integrity. Further, mine operators must be other protections. More often than not, MSHA and required to continuously monitor the atmosphere mine operators treat the areas beyond the seals as if inby the seals from locations on the surface. they are not a part of the mine. Because mine opera- The Union believes the current protocol used for tors are not even required to do routing leakage tests testing and approving seals is flawed. The National to determine the effectiveness of the seals, there is Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) no process by which they can determine the relative recently issued a draft report entitled “Explosion safety of the sealed area. Pressure Design Criteria for New Seals in U.S. Coal Since the disaster, MSHA initially placed a mora- Mines.” The report addresses two critical issues: torium on the use of Omega Blocks for seal con- a. What explosion pressures can develop during struction. The Agency has reassessed its position an explosion within a sealed area, and; and determined that seals must withstand at least 50 psi of static pressure. The Agency did not limit b. What are the appropriate design criteria for any type of material currently used in the industry, seals that will withstand these pressures? including Omega Blocks. MSHA has made this The UMWA recommends that MSHA promulgate determination despite ongoing testing to determine a regulation that would require the construction of the potential pressure seals must withstand in the seals that meet the mandates of Congress outlined in event of an explosion. the 1977 Mine Act and the recent recommendations of NIOSH’s draft report on mine seals.

Report on the Sago Mine Disaster 31

Mine Seals (2nd Left Mains)

s noted previously in this report, based on (Snyder page 29 at line 22) Snyder was then given a conditions encountered in the 2nd Left Mains copy of the seal plan. Section of the mine, a decision was made to A nd abandon and seal the area from the active workings Construction of the 2 Left Mains seals began on of the mine. According to Jeff Toler, Superintendent, October 24, 2005, the same day the approval was mining ceased, “...around the 1st of October...” (Toler received from MSHA. Snyder was assigned to super- page 145 line 17). vise the construction with a crew that generally con- sisted of three miners, including Jeremy Toler, Casey nd Shortly after mining ceased in 2 Left Mains, Short and George Brooks. Prior to constructing the a decision was made to submit a plan to utilize seals, the crew removed the roof mesh as required. Omega Blocks to seal the area. In response to ques- During construction, four other miners, Marty tions by MSHA regarding the decision to request Conrad, Mike Trippett, John Jackson and Harmon plan approval for Omega Blocks rather than using Jordan, would occasionally help. None of the crew, packsetter seals (as had been previously done), including Snyder, had ever installed Omega Block Toler stated, “I have some history. I’ve built a few seals previously. Snyder stated in his testimony that seals in my career, and if I’m building the seal, I he reviewed the sealing plan with the members of would prefer an Omega seal.” (Toler page 122 at line his crew. He does not remember if he instructed the 10) other miners who helped. In his testimony he noted, The request for approval for Omega Block seals in “I went over it with everybody that was helping me excess of eight feet was reportedly done for seals to in charge. I don’t think I covered it with every indi- be built in 1st Left Section, at a later date. These seals vidual, the seal plan. I tried to, but I may have missed required additional support in the form of pilas- one or two, maybe three, I don’t know.” (Snyder page ters—a single pilaster for seals over eight feet, but 77 at line 7) less than ten feet and two pilasters for seals over ten The first seal to be built was located in the #8 entry. feet but less than 12 feet. The #1 seal located in #1 The crew completed it to a height of about four or five entry of the 2nd Left Mains Section exceeded eight feet when Toler discovered it did not meet the require- feet in height for a distance of seven feet on the left ments of the plan and had to be moved. Snyder stated, side looking inby, but was not constructed with a “...I didn’t have it in the right spot and the superin- pilaster as required. tendent came up and we had it over halfway built and Jeffrey Snyder, Outby Foreman, was assigned the task he made us tear it down and put it in the right spot.” of building the seals by Jeff Toler, Superintendent. (Snyder page 46 at line 4) The seal was moved approx- Snyder stated that Toler indicated on the mine map imately four feet further inby the edge of the rib and where the seals were to be placed, and then they the crew started rebuilding the seal to a distance ten reviewed the seal plan. Though the effectiveness of feet inby the rib as required by the approved plan. training miners on new tasks is extremely important, This seal was constructed using at least some of the there is some question as to the training received Omega Blocks that had been used previously, accord- in this instance based on the testimony of Snyder. ing to Snyder. He also testified that during construc- He states, “It (the training) was kind of a before the tion, the crew was not always able to seal all the joints shift started kind of thing, where the office is kind with b-bond or place the required number of wedges of chaotic and you’re trying to get ready for the day.” on the middle board on the top of the wall.

Report on the Sago Mine Disaster 33 SUBMISSION AND APPROVAL OF OMEGA BLOCK SEALS

1. October 12, 2005 Anker West Virginia Mining Company Sago Mine Ventilation Plan Changes

To: Mr. Kevin Stricklin, District Manager, MSHA District 3 Request to add Omega Concrete Block Seal Method, non-hitched style to the Ventilation Plan. Joe Myers for Al Schoonover, Safety Director

2) October 19, 2005 Guidelines for installation of Omega Block Concrete Seals Stamp of receipt from MSHA District 3 (noted as revision in approval letter) Unsigned

3) October 24, 2005 U.S Department of Labor Mine Safety and Health Administration, District 3

To: Jeffrey Toler, Superintendent, Anker West Virginia Mining Company Requests of October 12, 2005, and revision of October 19, 2005, to add alternative method of seal construction is approved. Kevin Striklin, District Manager, MSHA District 3 (stamped)

4) October 28, 2005 Anker West Virginia Mining Company Sago Mine’s Seal Proposed Plan Amendment

To: Mr. Kevin Stricklin, District Manager, MSHA District 3 Request to amend the proposed mine seal plan submitted September 29, 2005, to permit the use of Omega Block mine seals, with pilasters, in areas that exceed 8 feet in height. (The UMWA is not in receipt of this document) John Stemple, Assistant Director of Safety and Employee Development

5) October 31, 2005 U.S Department of Labor Mine Safety and Health Administration, District 3

To: Jeffrey Toler, Superintendent, Anker West Virginia Mining Company Requests of October 31, 2005, to add alternative method of seal construction is approved. Kevin Striklin, District Manager, MSHA District 3 (stamped)

All correspondence relating to the above matters are included at the end of this report as Appendices 9-12.

34 United Mine Workers of America With the exception of the day Toler made them Blocks and the ribs to keep the wall tight from side move the initial seal, Snyder does not remember any to side, and that pieces of wood and paper were used specific time he or the Mine Foreman, Crumrine, to fill gaps between the rib and blocks. were in the area. He notes they occasionally came to The seals were completed, according to Scott, on the area, but did not offer any specific comments or December 12, 2005. He then finished making the instructions. required air changes. The 2nd North Mains sealed Snyder ceased working on the seals on November area was left to self-inert. 9, 2005, when he was reassigned to another job in The questionable construction of the seals seems the mine. He was replaced by James Scott, a certi- obvious when looked at in their entirety. Missing fied foreman working at the Sago mine as a contract fly boards, the inability to wedge the center of the miner with Garrett Mining Service (GMS). He had structures, unapproved material being used to secure been at the operation in that capacity for about two the seals rib-to-rib and serious questions about the years at the time of the explosion. application of the bonding material all raise con- There are discrepancies between the testimony of cerns about their integrity and effectiveness in sepa- Scott and Snyder, and while that is not uncommon, rating the active area of the mine from the sealed it is also important to highlight the more notable area. However, even if the seals had been constructed ones. Snyder stated of the ten seals constructed, he according to the approval, they would have failed helped build the first seven before Scott took over. catastrophically against the explosive forces on Janu- However, Scott states, “The last five (seals) I built.” ary 2, 2006. (Scott page 25 at line 2) There were ten seals in all. Nevertheless, there are questions with regard to these Scott also stated that both he and Snyder received particular seals that must be viewed as systemic the seal plan training from Toler at the same time. As problems at the mine, including lack of experience, noted previously, Snyder said he received the train- poor training and inadequate oversight. The failure ing from Toler at the start of the shift, and when to correct these was inexcusable. asked if anyone else was present, stated, “I don’t recollect anyone else standing in.” (Snyder page 29 at The discrepancy between Scott’s and Snyder’s tes- line 21) timony is problematic, but not the real issue. The real problem is not whether their training session Scott supervised the construction of the final seals, occurred together or separately, but the implications including the #1 seal that contained the water trap are extremely important because it indicates that and #10 where the sampling tube was located. training for new tasks was not given a high priority. George Brooks and Casey Short, who were assigned The real concern must be the extent of the training, to Scott, were new contract miners from GMS; their especially given the fact that no one working this first day underground was October 31, 2005. Like assignment had any experience with these types of the previous crew assigned to build the seals, none seals. In fact some of the laborers had very limited had any experience with Omega Blocks. mining experience at all. Scott’s crew constructed the seals in generally the Where experience is lacking, as was the case here, same manner as the previous ones. They testified training and supervision of the task must be done in that they were not able to get b-bond into all the such a way as to ensure miners thoroughly under- joints, and that it was often too difficult to place all stand the construction process and the importance the required wedges on the middle board at the top of their work in the overall operation of the mine’s of the seal. In fact, when asked if all the seals were ventilation system. Scott’s recollection that train- built with three boards on top as required, Casey ing on the seals occurred with Snyder present and stated, “No. Like I was telling you earlier, the best Snyder’s statements that the training happened you could do, they said, you know, you need to use between shifts when it was chaotic indicate the three if you can.” (Short page 106 at line 9) They also information was not passed on in a methodical or reported that they used wedges between the Omega instructive manner. Further, the foremen assigned to

Report on the Sago Mine Disaster 35 the task cannot say with any certainty that everyone It must also be pointed out that the approval of this who assisted them in the seal construction was ever seal design is not realistic from a construction stand- trained in the job task. In fact, one foreman noted point. Miner after miner noted that because of the during questioning that, “They’re seals. If you can thickness of the Omega Block wall and the limited build one, you can build them all.” (Conrad page 35 distance between the seal top and the roof, placing at line 4) The training that was given to some of the wedges on the middle “fly board” was almost impos- crew was done underground immediately before sible. The Union submits that construction require- they began work on the seals. ments of the approved plan for these types of seals were practically impossible to adhere to, and should This type of casual instruction is unacceptable. In not have been approved. many instances, miners’ lives depend on training. This is not limited only to evacuation and SCSRs, The facts noted above are important to evaluate but includes equipment operation and systems’ con- the overall effectiveness of training and oversight struction. The operator failed to properly execute at the mine, however, they do not address the real training in this case. problems with these seals. Omega Blocks are not designed to withstand the forces that can be gener- By all accounts, oversight of the seal construction ated in the underground areas of a coal mine. This is process was almost non-existent. From the testimony, obvious by the pulverization of nine of the ten seals there does not appear to have been anyone from at the Sago mine. Unfortunately, it is not the only middle or upper management or the regulatory agen- time they have proven to be inadequate for use in cies who spent any substantial time in the area during the mining industry. Recent events at Drummond the construction of the seals. This should never be the Coal’s Shoal Creek mine in Alabama and Kentucky practice during a project that plays such a key role in Darby’s Darby Mine No.1 are other examples of the the mine’s ventilation system. However, considering Omega Block failures. that the location of these seals was immediately outby the mouth of an active working section in a blowing The UMWA urges MSHA to return to the mandates ventilation system, it was even more crucial to have set out in the 1969 Coal Act and the 1977 Mine Act proper oversight of the construction. and require the use of explosion-proof seals or bulk- heads and implement the recent recommendations Based on these findings, the Union does not believe of NIOSH’s draft report on mine seals to separate that adequate steps were taken to ensure proper con- mined-out or abandoned areas from the active struction. Therefore, setting aside the fact that Omega workings of the mine. Blocks seals should not have been approved, what went wrong during seal construction was the result of inadequate training and insufficient oversight.

36 United Mine Workers of America Roof Control

oal mine operators are required to submit the plan. There were also additional requirements a roof control plan that outlines the mini- for when unexpected adverse mining conditions Cmal requirements for supporting the mine would be encountered. roof to the federal and state regulatory agencies In addition to the general information, the plan for approval prior to initiating any mining activity. requires that supplemental roof support be used for The agencies are responsible for reviewing these the development of mains and sub-mains at the Sago plans at least every six months thereafter. Roof mine. This required that screen wire, with openings control plans usually remain unchanged unless no greater than 4 inches by 4 inches, be bolted to mining conditions warrant modifications. These the roof in the track and belt entries. The primary modifications can be requested by the operator or escapeway and one return aircourse were required to required by the agencies depending on the circum- have one of the following supplemental support sys- stances. The modifications are submitted to agen- tems installed: roof sealant, roof bolt plate at least 17 cies and generally amend certain specific sections inches square, wire screen with openings no greater of the approved plan. Submission of a new plan than 4 inches square or two rows of posts no greater can be initiated by either the mine operator or than six feet apart. The plan was approved by MSHA requested by either agency and usually occurs District 3 on October 4, 2004. when modifications are so numerous that the plan becomes confusing. The 2nd Left Mains Section was one of the areas of The last complete copy of the Roof and Ground the mine that required supplemental roof support to Control Plan for the Sago Mine was submitted on be installed. The use of these supplemental materials September 16, 2004, by Al Schoonover from the demonstrates the Section was encountering adverse Safety Department of Anker West Virginia Mining roof conditions. The application of the minimum Company, Inc. supplemental support indicates that the operator expected to encounter difficulty supporting the The plan indicates that the immediate roof in the immediate roof. mine consists of 20 feet of gray shale, and above that, the main mine roof is sandstone. Entry and crosscut The mine encountered several roof control problems widths are not to exceed 20 feet, and crosscuts may over the next ten months that required modifications be turned off the entry between 48 and 110 foot be made to the roof control plan, including the use of centers. The distance between crosscuts is generally truss bolts and tunnel arches. The use of these sup- dictated by the roof conditions encountered in a ports indicates that problems were being encountered particular area of the mine. beyond the anchorage point of the bolts. This would affect the main mine roof, generally causing roof falls The roof was to be primarily supported by the use above the anchor points of the bolting pattern. of either 5-foot fully grouted (glued) tension bolts or by a combination of 4- and 6-foot fully grouted The first modification of the roof control plan specif- bolts installed in a staggered pattern. This would be ically identifying the 2nd Left Mains Section was sub- considered the normal bolting pattern for the mine. mitted by the operator on or around August 16, 2005. The use of 10-foot non-tensioned cable bolts were to The new plan required screen wire, with openings no be installed as supplemental and only as needed. The greater than 4 inches by 4 inches, to be installed in specific installation requirements were contained in the primary escapeway in addition to the track and

Report on the Sago Mine Disaster 37 belt entries. This type of requirement indicated that mining of the lower bench of the Kittanning seam of the local roof conditions were bad enough to require coal, which is located immediately beneath the origi- a specific type of supplemental support at all times. nally mined seam at a depth of between 1-1/2 and 10 feet. Mining this coal seam would eliminate any The roof conditions continued to deteriorate, and the further advancement of the 2nd Left Mains Section operator made a second request to modify the roof and require the eventual abandonment of the area. control plan sometime between August 22–26, 2005. MSHA approved the plan on September 21, 2005. Based on the conflicting dates on the documents, it appears information was being passed between the On September 21, 2005 an MSHA official stated in operator and MSHA to address the situation (this is a a letter to Sago mine Superintendent, Jeffery Toler, standard and accepted practice in the industry). The “As you are aware, increasing the opening height of first modification submitted by the operator (Roof entries and crosscuts to the extent in your request Control Plan Amendment: page 2a) for controlling the decreases the stability of the coal and rock ribs and roof required the operator to install screen wire on increases the hazards related to falls in areas where the immediate mine roof so as to “reduce exposure persons are required to work and/or travel.” of falling material to personnel” (indicating all head- The dangers associated with second mining have ings were to be screened), reduce the width of the been discussed previously in this report. However, entries from 20 to 18 feet, and increase the size of the it is important to note that MSHA was well aware roof bolt bearing plates. There is no MSHA approval of the dangers that this practice would create at the attached to this modification. Sago mine. The operator then submitted a second request to The operator requested modifications to permit sec- the August 22–26, 2005, modification (Roof Control ond mining of additional areas of 2nd Left Mains Sec- Plan Amendment: page 2a1) that included minimum tion be approved between October 3-7, 2005. MSHA requirements beyond those originally submitted. approved the request on October 7, 2005. After com- In addition to those cited above, the modification pletion of second mining, the area inby 62 block of required: the installation of 8-10 foot cable bolts in the 2nd North Mains was abandoned, and the plans four-way intersections, 6-10 foot cable bolts in all were approved by MSHA to seal the area. three-way intersections, and two 10-foot cable bolts A month after MSHA’s approval of the second min- on 8-foot centers as mining advanced. Further, the ing, on November 7, 2005, miner Charles Donegia plan modification noted, “The above stated stipula- was struck by rock and coal in an area that had been tion will be in effect while the current roof condi- second mined. Donegia suffered permanently dis- tions exist.” MSHA approved the plan modifications abling injuries including two broken vertebrate, bro- on August 29, 2005. ken ribs, a collapsed lung and a ruptured spleen. The UMWA is convinced that these modifications An investigation into the accident found that the and the dialogue between the two parties show a operator exceeded the parameters of the mine’s roof sense of concern on both their parts about the roof control plan, and that additional roof support that conditions. The changes to the plan approved on was required was not installed. Despite these find- August 29, 2005, cannot be understated; they rep- ings the company did not correct the conditions resent an understanding by the parties that the roof when MSHA returned to the mine. The Agency also conditions were progressively getting worse, and that cited the company for not recording the conditions the conditions could not be corrected without exten- in the pre-shift report as required. sively enhancing the roof control requirements. The modifications to the Roof Control Plan reveal On September 19, 2005, the operator submitted ever-deteriorating roof conditions in the 2nd Left a modification to MSHA requesting that second Mains Section. Management assessed the situation mining be permitted in limited “test” areas of two and determined that it was no longer feasible to con- sections of the mine including areas in the 2nd Left tinue mining in the area. Mains Section. This amendment would permit the

38 United Mine Workers of America It is clear that by constantly modifying the roof con- Darrel Lucas, Roof Bolter trol plan, conditions were changing in the affected nd area and that the operator and the regulatory agen- In his description of 2 Left Mains Section, he cies were aware of the deterioration. Still, the modi- said, “Most of it was pretty bad top.” (Lucas page fications required at the Sago mine do not give the 23 at line 7) complete story of the severity of the situation. During When asked to describe what he meant, he stated, the investigation into the explosion, many of the min- “It was falling in everywhere. We set up rail ers testified about the adverse conditions in 2nd Left plates, screen, we cable-bolted the section in a lot Mains Section. Their testimony is very important to of places, because the 6-foot bolts didn’t anchor understanding the magnitude of the problem. in for the sand rock, we just did cable bolts.” (Lucas page 23 at line 17) Lonnie Short, Weekend Shift Foreman When asked what the immediate roof strata was When asked about abnormal conditions in 2nd and what fell in, he said, “I guess sometimes it Left Mains Section, he stated, “We just had a lot was sand rock. But most of it was slate.” He fur- of bad top.” (Short page 30 at line 13) ther stated, “But some of it, I seen sand rock fall When asked what the roof conditions were in the in, too.” (Lucas page 24 at line 5) area he stated, “I mean we had a lot of bad top up there. We set brow bolts—I mean, brow extend- Jeff Toler, Superintendent ers, or whatever they call them.” (Short page 33 at line 10) “Well, we were advance mining, and toward the end of the panel, we were having some roof con- Further, he noted, “Cable bolt intersections and ditions.” (Toler page 145, line 21) at last, I think we screened every entry, but I’m not sure.” (Short page 33 at line 15) When asked about roof falls in 2nd Left Mains Section, he stated, “Two falls, one in #1 entry, it When asked why they pulled out of the area, he was pretty good—it was a pretty long fall. I’m said, “It’s all water and bad top. We was cable thinking it went a crosscut, maybe two cross- bolting every intersection, 12 and 14s, 10s. Tens, cuts right down the entry, which would put it in 12s, 14s cable bolts.” (Short page 33 at line 20) excess of 100-foot long, probably six feet high, at Jeff Snyder, Outby Foreman least. And we had another one—we had one in the track entry that was about a crosscut long. It When asked if he knew why mining was stopped fell pretty high. ...eight, ten-foot, maybe higher.” nd in 2 Left Mains Section, he said. “Yes sir, I do, (Toler page 149 at line 3) it was adverse conditions. The mining process became intolerable.” (Snyder page 89 at line 25) Al Schoonover, Safety Director When asked what those adverse conditions were, When asked if he was familiar with the 2nd Left he stated, “We was running into bad roof and Mains Section, he stated, “I would—yeah I would excess water.” (Snyder page 90 at line 5) investigate roof falls up there.” (Schoonover page Seth Osborne, Laborer 81 at line 16)

nd When asked what work he did in the 2 Left John Boni, Pumper Mains Section, he said, “...We screened (the roof) all the way up, pretty much all the way in there.” When asked if he knew why mining was stopped (Osborne page 49 at line 16) in 2nd Left Mains Section, he stated, “Adverse con- ditions.” (Boni page 131 at line 5) He further stated, “It was always pretty—you always had to keep your eyes on top, which you He further stated, “They were getting a lot of always do, but it was—it was more flaky in spots.” water. Some of the top wasn’t real good...” (Boni (Osborne page 49 at line 24) page 131 at line 8)

Report on the Sago Mine Disaster 39 John Collins, Inspector, West Virginia ing oil and hydraulic cans, cables, equipment and Office of Miners’ Health, Safety and other supplies left behind. Pressure exerted on point Training anchor and combination roof bolts can cause them to fail and become dislodged from the roof strata. When asked if he ever noticed anything unusual This is also true for cable bolts: the weight of the in 2nd Left Mains Section, he stated, “Number rock compromises their ability to support the roof, two—old two Left had real adverse roof condi- and they are sheared off. This “popping” of the bolts tions. We had a permanent disabling injury up releases energy and will in many instances cause arc- there with a piece of roof. That’s why they were ing at the point of separation. The danger is com- required to go full screen in the brow tenders.” pounded when the metal bolts strike other materials, (Collins page 47 at line 18) including additional roof supports or rock in the As noted previously, mine operators or the regulatory area. These situations can create sparking which can agencies can request modifications to the roof control ignite methane if an area has not been inerted. plan. These changes are a common occurrence in the Finally, the testimony of miners at Sago and the industry and do not necessarily represent anything statement by mine inspector Collins indicated that, out of the ordinary. A modification will, however, as mining progressed in 2nd Left Mains Section, wire give clear indications of the conditions that are being screen was required in every entry. While the instal- encountered in specific areas of the mine. The series lation of wire screen to support the local roof was of requests, with increasingly stringent measures at the necessary to protect miners working in the Section, Sago mine, demonstrated that conditions were con- it proved to be a potential ignition source within tinuing to deteriorate and additional measures were what became the sealed area. necessary in an attempt to address the problems. As the roof deteriorates and settles, it can exert pres- This is clearly the case in the 2nd Left Mains Section of sure on the wire. Sudden shifting of the rock or wire the Sago mine preceding management’s decision to can cause arcing. In addition, the pressure from abandon the area. The fact that the final decision was the roof can cause sections of wire to shift and rub made to stop advance mining and seal the area shows against one another. The action of metal rubbing that even the supplemental roof controls were not against metal can create additional ignition sources. sufficient. There is every indication that the mine roof was too unstable to permit mining. Based on the underground investigation of the Sago mine and the information obtained during the inter- It is likely that the conditions in 2nd Left Mains Sec- view process, the Union is convinced that the roof in tion continued to worsen during the retreat mining the 2nd Left Mains Section continued to deteriorate after and while the seals were being constructed. This mining in the area ceased. These conditions, together became obvious during the accident investigation with the additional roof support required, created an when mapping of the area revealed adverse roof con- undeterminable number of possible ignition sources. ditions and roof falls that were not present before the area was abandoned. Based on the facts of the investigation, the United Mine Workers of America finds that the most likely These roof conditions would have continued to pres- cause of the explosion was frictional activity from ent an even greater hazard once the area was sealed. the roof, roof support or support material igniting Shifting of the roof strata and roof falls often create the methane-air mixture. friction and sparking as the materials rub together or become dislodged and strike other materials as they The suggested ignition source offered by ICG and fall. Roof falls create cavities where methane can accu- WVOMHST represents a self-serving and predeter- mulate. Previous reports have shown that frictional mined theory that the ignition source was beyond arcing can cause methane ignitions in sealed areas. their control. The facts of the investigation, as well as the long history of coal mining, indicate that frictional This problem is further compounded by the metal activity from the roof, roof support or supporting roof bolts, plates, straps and other materials—includ- material was a more likely source of the ignition.

40 United Mine Workers of America Ventilation

ased on the information received from scheme pushed the return air from the seals outby the federal and state regulatory agencies and away from the active 2nd Left Parallel Section. Band observations made during the under- According to testimony, on December 12, 2005, ground investigation, the Union has made the mine management completed a major ventilation following assessment of the ventilation system at change that affected the airflow from 2nd Right the Sago mine. Section inby. From that point, the #9 entry was The mine was ventilated by a Joy 400 horsepower fan changed from a return to an intake entry. Intake installed in a blowing type system. The fan produced ventilation was coursed into the working sections approximately 125,000 cubic feet of air per minute in #7, #8 and #9 entries by means of overcasts and (CFM) and was located at the mine mouth in the #5 other ventilation controls much as it was prior to entry. the air change. However, a portion of the intake was split and pushed up the #9 entry to ventilate nd Prior to the completion of the 2 Left Mains seals the seals. The seals were then ventilated from right and the installation of other ventilation controls, the to left, pushing this air towards the mouth of 2nd nd #9 entry from the 2 Right Section inby was used as Left Parallel Section. a return. In this ventilation scheme, intake (fresh) air was coursed up #7 and #8 entries, inby the 2nd Right This air split would pass by the seals from entry #9 Section. It then crossed over the other entries from to entry #1 before being coursed into the #2 return. right to left through a series of overcasts and regula- At this point the return entry was separated by only nd tors to ventilate the 1st Left and 2nd Left Parallel Sec- one brattice wall from the 2 Left Parallel Section tions and the abandoned 2nd Left Mains Section. main intake. This ventilation design was not sufficiently protective The active working sections (1st Left and 2nd Left of the miners. The fact that a single brattice wall was Parallel) were both ventilated in the same man- all that separated the intake of the 2nd Left Parallel Sec- ner. Intake air would enter the section in #7 and #8 tion from air that had ventilated the seals is a cause of entries, sweep across the faces, and return in #1 and concern and should not be permitted. Mitchell even #2 entries to the mouth of the sections. The 1st Left made special note of this in his report when he stated, Section ventilated the “butt” sections off of #1 entry “Further, sealed areas should not adjoin intake air as they advanced. courses.” (RI 7581 at page 8) The abandoned area of 2nd Left Mains Section was It is clear that the explosion destroyed the seals and ventilated by the same split of intake air used to damaged ventilation controls in the 2nd Left Parallel ventilate 2nd Left Parallel Section. The ventilation Section and further outby. When this occurred, the entered the area in the #1 entry of 2nd Left Mains single wall separating the return from the intake was Section, swept the faces and returned in the #9 also destroyed. Because of the mine’s blowing sys- entry of 2 North Mains, inby the 2nd Right Section. tem and ventilation design, the contaminants from The return air crossed over entries 5, 6, 7 and 8 and the explosion were forced into the 2nd Left Parallel dumped into the main return at 2nd Right Section. Section’s primary and secondary escapeways. Immediately after the completion of the seals, the mine ventilation remained the same. This meant the The UMWA contends the ventilation system in place ventilation swept the inby side of the seals from left at the mine at the time of the explosion did not to right (from #1 entry to #9 entry). This ventilation adequately protect the miners.

Report on the Sago Mine Disaster 41

Consideration of Lightning as a Potential Cause

he Union has completed an exhaustive majority of these reports were of ignitions of review of data obtained from the Mine methane gas accumulations, generally caused by TSafety and Health Administration, the West frictional activity between mining equipment and Virginia Office of Miners Health, Safety and Train- the coal/rock faces being mined. There were also ing, the United States Bureau of Mines reports and numerous reports of ignitions occurring when the National Institute for Occupational Safety and miners were cutting and welding. Health, in an effort to determine the potential for a The Union has also reviewed the information on lightning strike that occurred over two miles away to coal mine ignitions and explosions compiled in cause the explosion at the Sago mine. 1998 by MSHA through the National Mine Safety The Union received information from MSHA’s and Health Academy. That historical reference, the Warehousing Group in Denver, Colorado, identify- Historical Summary of Mine Disasters in the United ing 1,151 incidences of ignitions and 35 reports States, Volume II - Coal Mines - 1959 - 1998, docu- of underground mine fires since 1995. The vast mented the information on the following pages.

Report on the Sago Mine Disaster 43 From January 29, 1959, to January 24, 1994: • Total ignitions and explosions reported 2,289

CAUSES (RELEVANT TO THIS REPORT) • Frictional roof fall 14 • Unknown origin 19 • Lightning (without conduit) 0

FRICTIONAL ROOF FALLS: Date Company Mine State 1) 12-14-62 Not listed Lancashire #15 PA 2) 6-23-66 Not listed Robena PA 3) 4-3-67 Not listed Moss #2 VA 4) 8-10-67 Not listed Moss #2 VA 5) 8-17-67 Not listed Forge Slope PA 6) 6-5-71 Not listed Humphrey #7 WV 7) 12-5-72 Not listed Virginia Pocahontas #3 VA 8) 12-26-72 Not listed Moss #3 VA 9) 3-15-75 Not listed Virginia Pocahontas #3 VA 10) 12-19-75 Not listed Olga WV 11) 3-6-76 Not listed Lancashire #20 PA 12) 10-7-86 Sidney Coal Co. Roadfork Mine No. 1 KY 13) 7-27-87 Sidney Coal Co. No. 1 Mine KY 14) 12-19-92 Consolidation Coal Co. Amanota No. 31 Mine WV

UNDETERMINED ORIGIN: Date Company Mine State 1) 5-24-62 Not listed Shannopin PA 2) 3-3-63 Not listed Itman No. 3 WV 3) 1-20-68 Not listed Jamison WV 4) 1-9-74 Not listed Maitland WV 5) 3-9-76 Not listed Scotia KY 6) 3-9-76 Not listed Scotia KY 7) 4-10-77 Not listed Vesta #5 PA 8) 12-19-81 Not listed Mars #2 WV 9) 9-5-86 Jim Walter Mine #3 AL 10) 12-12-86 Consolidation Coal Co. Buchanan #1 VA 11) 4-27-87 Golden Oak Mining Co. Black Oak No. 2 KY 12) 6-23-88 Green River Coal Co. Green River Coal No. 9 KY 13) 7-19-88 Clinchfield Coal Co. McClure No. 1 Mine VA 14) 12-14-88 Pyro Mining Co. No. 9 Slope William Station KY 15) 12-18-89 Birchfield Mining Inc. Mine No. 1 WV 16) 7-10-90 Clinchfield Coal Co. Splashdam Mine VA 17) 1-15-91 Island Creek Coal Co. VA Pocahontas No. 3 Mine VA 18) 5-4-93 Jim Walter Mine #3 AL 19) 8-22-93 Drummond Coal Co. Mary Lee No. 1 Mine AL

44 United Mine Workers of America Neither MSHA nor any other regulatory agency were somehow relevant to the Sago mine disaster. has ever specified the cause of the 19 ignitions and They are not. explosions listed above. They have been unable to The examples in The Sago Mine Disaster, a Prelimi- determine the exact cause of the events because of nary Report to Governor Joseph Manchin III noted the existence of several potential possibilities that above did not specify the additional information were found at each event or the conditions caused as contained in the UMWA’s report. The Report did not the result of the event precluded investigators from include the potential paths that would have enabled making any absolute determination. None of these lightning to travel from the surface to the affected events was ever attributed to a source outside the sealed areas of an underground coal mine, despite underground area of the mine. this information being noted in the investigative In July 2006, Davitt McAteer, former Assistant Sec- reports. Each of these examples contained a conduit retary of Labor for Mine Safety and Health, was path, should lightning have been the source, for appointed by West Virginia Governor Joseph Man- energy to be transferred from the surface into these chin, to determine the cause of the Sago disaster and sealed areas. The Union is certain that these eight offer regulatory measures to ensure such an event cases do not reflect the circumstances present at the did not occur again. Sago mine on January 2, 2006. It is disingenuous for the Report to even suggest that the other explosions The Sago Mine Disaster, a Preliminary Report to Gov- have significant characteristics in common with the ernor Joseph Manchin III (Report), makes several Sago mine disaster. They do not. statements the Union disputes. These statements are not supported by the facts uncovered during the On December 11, 2006, WVOMHST issued its joint investigation. Report of Investigation into the Sago Mine Explo- sion, under the direction of Ronald Wooten, Agency First, the statement that, “Based on the available Director. The report states on its initial page that, evidence thus far, we do not believe that the Sago “This represents the final report regarding this mat- mine disaster can be attributed to any specific ter.” However, there are few conclusive findings actions on the part of International Coal Group within the report itself. The repeated omissions, (ICG), the federal Mine Safety and Health Admin- general speculation and lack of solid facts contained istration (MSHA) or the West Virginia Office of in the state’s report renders it unreliable. In fact, the Miners’ Health, Safety and Training (WVOMHST), report raises far more questions than it answers. (Report at page 12) is not accurate. The Union has The Union believes that the report by WVOMHST was determined, based on the available evidence, that drastically flawed from the beginning, based on the some of the plans proposed by Sago mine man- statement made by one of its primary authors before agement and approved by the regulatory agencies the underground investigation was even initiated. created the conditions that lead to the events of January 2, 2006. The Union has reviewed a January 12, 2006, memo- randum (attached as Appendix 16) from Monte The Report also states that, “Lightning probably Heib, Chief Engineer to then Agency Director Doug caused the explosion.” (Report at page 38) There Conaway. Mr. Heib noted calibrations made to the is no evidence to support such a finding based on mine’s CO monitoring system clock and the approx- the investigation and additional data the Union has imate times of lightning strikes within several miles analyzed. Circumstantial evidence, such as timing of of the Sago mine. He then stated, “Unless evidence lightning strikes and the approximate onset of the is uncovered in the future which casts doubts on the explosion, offer no conclusive indication, let alone facts as stated above, there is convincing circumstan- solid evidence, that the two events are related. tial evidence that the explosion at the Sago Mine on Finally, the Report cites eight specific incidences, January 2, 2006, was directly related to one or both excluding the Sago mine disaster, where sealed areas of the lightning strikes recorded at 06:26:35 am, of underground mines were involved in explosions. both of which occurred at the opposite side of the The Report would suggest that these eight events Buchannon River from the Sago Mine.”

Report on the Sago Mine Disaster 45 The memorandum by Mr. Heib was written over two The Union’s investigation does not find any plausible weeks before the official underground investigation means for lightning to have entered the Sago mine into the cause of the disaster was initiated. Based on on January 2, 2006. The facts remain that all the con- these facts, it is extremely difficult to believe, as a ditions necessary to cause the disaster were present lead member of the investigation team, that he could within the confines of the mine. conduct an impartial and thorough investigation Neither ICG nor the WVOMHST have cited one into this matter. Further, being a major author of the example where lightning entered a sealed area of the report, it is apparent its writing parallels his initial mine without a direct conduit from the surface to thinking despite the lack of conclusive evidence to the sealed area. In addition, the Union is unaware support the report’s limited conclusion. of any investigative report by MSHA that offers any such evidence.

46 United Mine Workers of America The Union has reviewed each of the explosions that were initiated in sealed areas along with MSHA’s analysis: 1) 8-22-93 Drummond Coal Company Mary Lee Mine Alabama An explosion occurred in a sealed area of the mine. Investigators determined that an electrical storm passed through the area around the time of the explosion. They also determined that a vent pipe located atop the 70 North Fan Shaft could have been electrified by a lightning strike and was the prob- able cause. (Conduit present) 2) 4-5-94 U.S. Steel Mining Oak Grove Mine Alabama An explosion occurred in a sealed area of the mine. Investigators determined that an electrical storm passed through the area around the time of the explosion. A cased borehole was located in the imme- diate area of the lightning strike. The casing would have acted as a conduit from the surface to the sealed area of the mine. (Conduit present) 3) 6-9/16-95 U.S. Steel Mining Gary No. 50 Mine West Virginia An explosion occurred in a sealed area of the mine between June 9 and 16, 1995. Investigators were unable to determine the source of the ignition. However, they have speculated that the source was either a lightning strike or a frictional roof fall. There are several paths at the location from the surface that would have permitted energy gen- erated by a lightning strike to enter the sealed area of the mine. A frictional roof fall is also a likely ignition source. (Conduit present) 4) 1-29-96 U.S. Steel Mining Oak Grove Mine Alabama An explosion occurred in a sealed area of the mine. Investigators determined that an electrical storm passed through the area around the time of the explosion. There were several cased test wells located in the immediate area of the lightning strikes. The well casings would have acted as a conduit from the sur- face to the sealed area of the mine. A frictional roof fall is also a likely ignition source. (Conduit present) 5 & 6) 5-15 and 6-22-95 Oasis Contracting Mine #1 West Virginia Two explosions occurred in a sealed area of the mine. Investigators were unable to determine an igni- tion source for either explosion. However, they have speculated that a lightning strike or frictional roof fall were probable causes. Cased borehole/wells were located in the immediate area of the light- ning strikes. The casing would have acted as a conduit from the surface to the sealed area of the mine. A frictional roof fall is also a likely ignition source. (Conduit present) 7) 7-9-97 U.S. Steel Mining Oak Grove Mine Alabama An explosion occurred in a sealed area of the mine. Investigators were unable to determine the ori- gin of the ignition source, however, lighting was reported above the sealed area about the time of the explosion. Lightning had occurred in the same general location twice previously, May 4, 1994, and January 29, 1996 (noted above). The immediate area of the strikes had numerous cased wells. The cas- ings would have acted as a conduit from the surface to the sealed area of the mine. (Conduit present) 8) 5-8-01 U.S. Steel Mining Gary No. 50 Mine West Virginia An explosion occurred in a sealed area of the mine. Investigators have not determined an ignition source. However, they have speculated that the source was a lightning strike. The area is penetrated by several sealed shafts from the surface to the coal seam. There are also numerous cased wells in the area that would act as a conduit from the surface to the sealed area of the mine. (Conduit present)

Report on the Sago Mine Disaster 47

Conclusion

here were numerous factors that came The choices the International Coal Group (ICG) together on the morning of January 2, 2006, made, as approved by the agencies, to address the Tcausing the violent explosion and the tragic overall conditions at the mine and how each plan and unnecessary loss of life. Based on the Union’s affects the other is even more tragic when we real- investigation, and contrary to other assertions, it is ize the initial explosion may have taken but one life. not factual to say that events beyond the control of The fact that 11 other miners died because they were the mine operator or the regulatory agencies simply unable to escape compounds the consequences. happened. Nor is it accurate to state the explosion These consequences could have and should have was “an act of God,” and thus unavoidable. been prevented if reasonable care had been taken to assess the conditions being created. The UMWA believes that the decisions made months and years prior to the explosion put a series The actions by mine management, approved by the of events in motion that lead to the disaster. The regulatory agencies, created the greater potential failure to assess the overall impact of these decisions for an accident than would normally be found in a must be called into question. single area of a coal mine. However, to permit these conditions to be created in an area of the mine so Submission and approval of inadequate mining and susceptible to frictional activities that can cause arc- training plans, improper installation of ventilation ing, the most probable ignition source for the explo- controls all have consequences after they are put sion, was inexcusable. in place. Each aspect of the mine’s overall operat- ing system impacts every other; no specific plan or It becomes apparent based on our findings that there method of operating is isolated from the others. is no conclusive evidence the lightning caused the If thoughtful analysis is not done of each plan or explosion, as has been suggested in other reports or method—not only how they meet the immediate in others’ comments. Based on the facts of the inves- needs they are designed to address, but how they tigation, the United Mine Workers of America finds will impact other aspects of the mine’s overall sys- that the most likely cause of the explosion was fric- tem—the possibility of bad things happening can tional activity from the roof, roof support or support dramatically increase. material igniting the methane-air mixture. The events at the Sago mine on January 2, 2006, could and should have been prevented.

Report on the Sago Mine Disaster 49 Wire screen, such as that in the picture to the left, was common in many areas of the Sago Mine. The West Virginia Office of Miners Health, Safety and Training required mine management to screen almost the entire roof area in the 2nd North Mains Section just prior to abandoning the Section.

In areas that did not require wire mesh, management was required to install large roof bolt plates (pie pans) to support the local roof. Supplemental supports, such as cable bolts, were also required in many areas of the mine to address adverse conditions, including the 2nd North Mains Sections.

Continuously deteriorating roof conditions after an area has been supported by roof bolts and screening causes pressure on the supports as demonstrated in the picture. These stresses can cause the screening, bolts and roof to rub together or break under the pressure, potentially causing frictional arcing.

50 United Mine Workers of America Roof falls are a hazard in the mining industry. The picture to the left was taken in the 2nd North Mains Section after the explosion. The investigation revealed numerous falls in the area that had occurred after it was sealed. Roof fall have been documented to cause frictional arcing.

The remains of a concrete block wall after being struck by the forces of the explosion. It is still possible to see some of the blocks strewn around the area.

Damage to the roof supports (pie pans, roof bolts and plates) from the forces of the explosion. There is a roof fall in the foreground.

Report on the Sago Mine Disaster 51 During the investigation the marks in the roof pictured at the left drew much attention. The “anomaly,” as it became known, was later determined to be a fossil.

Damaged charging station located in the mains outby the sealed area.

Area inby the Omega Block seals after the explosion. Debris is scattered over the entire area and a thick layer of soot covers everything.

52 United Mine Workers of America Damaged 2nd Left belt drive. The drive was located at 58 block, approximately the location where the miners were forced to abandon their first rescue attempt.

Ventilation overcast destroyed by the forces of the explosion.

Discarded pieces of the 2nd Left crews SCSR’s were found in the #7 entry at about the eleven block. The picture indicates all the miners donned their rescuers at the same time at this location.

Report on the Sago Mine Disaster 53 The forces of the explosion completely destroyed the Omega Block seal. Fine powder and dust was all that remained of most of the seal material.

Discarded SCSR found in the 2nd Left Section.

Outby view of the barricade constructed by the 2nd Left crew in an attempt to isolate themselves from the contaminated mine atmosphere.

54 United Mine Workers of America View of the barricade from the inby side.

Sledge hammer used by the 2nd Left crew to signal their location to the surface.

Roof bolt the 2nd Left crew hit to signal the surface of their location.

Report on the Sago Mine Disaster 55

General Information International Coal Group

n January 2, 2006, the International Coal Samuel Kitts Group (ICG) headquarters was located Senior Vice President, West Virginia and Maryland Oat 2000 Ashland Drive, Ashland, Ken- Operations. Previously served in various manage- tucky 41101. The company was formed in May of ment positions at Massey Energy Company. 2004 when Wilbur Ross led a group of investors William Perkins who bought many of the assets of Horizon Natural Senior Vice President, Kentucky and Illinois Resources in a bankruptcy auction. Subsequently the Operations. Previously Vice President and Gen- company purchased the assets of Anker Energy and eral Manager of Horizon’s Kentucky Division. completed a merger agreement with Coal Quest. Michael Hardesty The executive staff of ICG was: Senior Vice President, Sales and Marketing. Pre- Bennett K. Hatfield viously served in various positions at Arch Coal. President, Chief Executive Officer and Director. Oren Kitts Previously Executive Vice President and Chief Senior Vice President, Mining Services. Previ- Operating Officer at Massey Energy Company. ously President of Massey Coal Services. Charles Snavely ICG held approximately 315 million tons of metal- Vice President, Planning and Acquisitions. Previ- lurgical coal reserves and approximately 572 million ously served in various management positions at tons of steam coal reserves. It also reported owning Massey Energy Company. or controlling 707 million additional tons of coal William Campbell reserves that did not yet qualify as commercially Vice President, Accounting and Treasury. Previ- viable coal reserves under SEC rules. ously Vice President and Controller at Horizon The company’s overview highlighted 11 operations Natural Resources. located in West Virginia, Kentucky and Maryland, Roger Nicholson nine of which were part of the Wolf Run Mining Senior Vice-President and General Counsel. Company subsidiary. However, a run of the Mine Previously Vice-President, Secretary and General Safety and Health Administration’s data retrieval Counsel at Massey Energy Company. system indicated ICG owned and operated 31 addi- tional operations under seven other subsidiaries.

Report on the Sago Mine Disaster 57

General Information Wolf Run Mining Company

s of January 2, 2006, the Wolf Run Mining located in Upshur County, West Virginia, as a sub- Company was a wholly owned subsidiary of sidiary of Wolf Run Mining Company. MSHA’s data- A ICG. MSHA listed nine operations as sub- base listed the operation as an abandoned subsidiary sidiaries of Wolf Run Mining Company. Some of the of Anker Energy. The Spruce Fork Mine produced nine operations listed appear to have been indepen- 249,855 tons of coal with 91 employees in 2005. It is dent operations at one point in time, but were part unclear whether the mine was ever active after ICG of Anker Energy at the time of purchase. Coaldat purchased Anker. shows an additional operation, Spruce Fork Mine #1,

MSHA’s database includes the following information: Mine Name State Fed ID Type Status Empl Tons Steyer MD 1800724 Und. Temp. Idle N/A N/A Sentinel WV 4604168 Und. Non-Prod. 70 147,035 Baybeck Prep. WV 4608364 Prep Active 9 N/A Stoney River WV 4608631 Und. Non-Prod. 21 45,464 Sentinel Prep WV 4608777 Prep. Active 10 N/A Sago WV 4608791 Und Active 141 507,775 Eccles Refuse WV 4609023 Surf. New N/A N/A Sycamore #2 WV 4609060 Und. Active 38 68,758 Imperial WV 4609115 Und. Active N/A N/A

Report on the Sago Mine Disaster 59

General Information Sago Mine

he mine was opened on August 1, 1999 by The Sago mine is located approximately six miles the BJM Coal Company as Spruce #2 Mine. outside of Buckhannon, Upshur County, West TIt was purchased by Anker Energy on Janu- Virginia. The mine is ventilated using a 400 horse- ary 10, 2002. It is unclear from the Mine Safety and power blowing fan manufactured by Joy. The mine Health Administration (MSHA) data when the name accesses the Middle Kittanning Coal Seam in a box was changed, however, the federal identification cut development through five entries driven level number, 4608791, has remained the same since the with the seam. mine was first operational. The mine was operated There were a total of 20 seals separating the old mine by the Wolf Run Mining Company as of January 11, from the active operation. These seals were reportedly 2002. It was subsequently purchased by the Interna- constructed of solid concrete blocks or packsetters. tional Coal Group.

Report on the Sago Mine Disaster 61

Acknowledgments Participating Mine Rescue Teams

LOVERIDGE MINE ROBINSON RUN MINE BAILEY Robert Hovatter Sherman Goodwin Larry Cuddy Gary Hayhurst Jeff Bienkoski Dennis Vicinell James Clendenen Craig Carpenter George Joseph Richard Shockley Alfred Bell Mike Spears Wayne Conaway Mark Koon Kevin Williamson Leslie Rich Cosner Larry Tenney Dave Cass Nick A Tippi Bob Calhoun Donald A. Jack SHOEMAKER MINE Gene Menozzi Charles P. Layman Silas Stavischeck Glenn McWhorter MSHA McELROY MINE Clff Ward Danny E. Beyser Charles E. Fisher STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA Dennis Crow Okey Rine Kelvin Jolly Ted Hunt BARBOUR COUNTY James Klug Robert Haines Names not provided Robert Rohde Shan Michener Michael Clark Jim Jack TRI-STATE COAL James A. Smith Names not provided Randy Clark BLACKSVILLE 2 Jack Price Jim Ponceroff VIPER MINE William Blackwell David Rush Names not provided Richard Tolka EIGHTY-FOUR MINING Robert Wade COMPANY Lonny Myers Don Krek Tony Casini Dale Tiberie Richard Gindlesperger ENLOW FORK Kenneth Clark Dennis Cole Robert Volpe Ron Henry Michey Miskiewicz Bob Gross Adrian Gordon Shawn Dewitt John Stowinsky Dave Leverknight Dan Puckey Terry Winland Brad DeBusk Bill Whipkey

Report on the Sago Mine Disaster 63 Mine Safety and Health Administration

Ray McKinney Ron Wyatt Mike Stark Kevin Stricklin Greg Fetty Jan Lyall Allen McGilton Thomas Hlavsa Charles Pouge Ron Postalwait Willie Spens Ronald Hixon Jim Satterfield Jerry Johnson Cheryl McGill Ken Tenney Ed Parrish Richard Gates Argel Vanover Frank Thomas Denny Swentoski Carlos Mosley Ron Tulanowski Bill Ponceroff Richard Herndon

West Virginia Office of Miners Health, Safety and Training

Doug Conaway Clarence Dishman John Collins Eugene White Barry Fletcher Bill Tucker Jeff Bennett Mike Rutledge John Scott Randy Smith John Hall Jim Hodges

64 United Mine Workers of America United Mine Workers of America

Cecil E. Roberts International President Daniel J. Kane International Secretary-Treasurer Dennis O’Dell Administrator, Department of Occupational Health and Safety Timothy Baker Deputy Administrator, Department of Occupational Health and Safety Judy Rivlin Associate General Counsel Ron Bowersox International Representative Gary Trout International Representative Max Kennedy International Representative Butch Oldham International Representative Mark Cochran International Representative Dennis “Turk” Bailey International Representative Silas “Sam” Stavischeck International Representative Marty Hudson Executive Assistant to the President Robert Scaramozzino Administrator, President’s Office James Lamont Executive Assistant to the Secretary-Treasurer Philip Smith Director, Communications Department David Kameras Communications Coordinator Mike Caputo International Representative Jack Rinehart International Representative Jim Shifflett International Representative

Report on the Sago Mine Disaster 65

Appendices

1. Mine Map, showing: Portion of North Mains 1st Left Section 2nd Left Parallel Section 2nd North Mains Section — sealed area 2. Pre-shift report Jan. 2, 2006 1st Left Section 3. Pre-shift report Jan. 2, 2006 Numbers 1-3 track and belt 4. Pre-shift Report Jan. 2, 2006 2nd Left Parallel Section 5. Dispatcher’s Report Jan. 2, 2006 6. Mine Maps A. Ventilation of the active areas of the mine prior to Dec. 11, 2005 air change. B. Ventilation of seals prior to Dec. 11, 2005 air change. 7. Ventilation report Dec. 11, 2005 Completed seals (North Mains) and made air change. 8. Mine Maps A. Ventilation of the active areas of the mine after the Dec. 11, 2005 air change. B. Sketch on a mine map of seal locations, overcasts, brattice walls and direction of ventilation after the completion of the seals. 9. Oct. 12, 2005 Correspondence from Anker West Virginia Mining Co. to MSHA requesting approval for the use of non-hitched Omega Block seals. 10. Oct. 24, 2005 Correspondence from MSHA to Anker West Virginia Mining Co. approving the request to use Omega Block seals. 11. Oct. 12, 2005 Correspondence from Anker West Virginia Mining Co. to MSHA requesting approval to install Omega Block seals in the North Mains. The proposal also out- lines the ventilation changes that will be made at the time the seals are completed. 12. Oct. 24, 2005 Correspondence from MSHA to Anker West Virginia Mining Co. approving the request to seal using Omega Blocks and notifying Sago mine management the changes will be added to the mine ventilation plan. 13. Guidelines for the installation of Omega Block seals (five pages) 14. Mine Map Location of the completed seals 15. Methane trending chart—based on methane liberation and the volume of the sealed area. Data collected during the course of the investigation.

Report on the Sago Mine Disaster 67 16. Jan. 12, 2006 Memorandum from Monte Hieb, Chief Engineer, West Virginia Office of Miners’ Health, Safety and Training (WVOMHST) to Doug Conaway, WVOMHST Direc- tor, stating his determination regarding the cause of the explosion. (two pages) 17. Topographical map showing lightning strikes and their proximity to the sealed area. 18. Accident overview 1999-2006 Fatal overview 1999-2006 19. Violation overview 1999-2006 20. Violation history 2005-2006 (totaled by quarter and by year) • Citations/Orders Jan. 1, 2005 - Dec. 31, 2006 • Citations/Orders by type Jan. 1, 2005 - Dec. 31, 2006 • Citations/Orders by 30 CFR designation Jan. 1, 2005 - Dec. 31, 2006 • Citations/Orders by proposed penalty Jan. 1, 2005 - Dec. 31, 2006

68 United Mine Workers of America Appendices Appendix 1 United Mine Workers of America Report on the Sago Mine Disaster Appendix 1 Appendix 2 United Mine Workers of America Report on the Sago Mine Disaster Appendix 3 Appendix 4 United Mine Workers of America Report on the Sago Mine Disaster Appendix 5 Appendix 6A United Mine Workers of America Report on the Sago Mine Disaster Appendix 6A Appendix 6B United Mine Workers of America Report on the Sago Mine Disaster Appendix 7 Appendix 8A United Mine Workers of America Report on the Sago Mine Disaster Appendix 8A Appendix 8B United Mine Workers of America Report on the Sago Mine Disaster Appendix 9 Appendix 10 United Mine Workers of America Report on the Sago Mine Disaster Appendix 11 Appendix 12-1 United Mine Workers of America Report on the Sago Mine Disaster Appendix 12-2 Appendix 13-1 United Mine Workers of America Report on the Sago Mine Disaster Appendix 13-2 Appendix 13-3 United Mine Workers of America Report on the Sago Mine Disaster Appendix 13-4 Appendix 13-5 United Mine Workers of America Report on the Sago Mine Disaster Appendix 14 Appendix 15 United Mine Workers of America Report on the Sago Mine Disaster Appendix 16-1 Appendix 16-2 United Mine Workers of America Report on the Sago Mine Disaster Appendix 17-1 Appendix 17-2 United Mine Workers of America Report on the Sago Mine Disaster Appendix 18 Appendix 19 United Mine Workers of America Report on the Sago Mine Disaster Appendix 20A-1 Appendix 20A-2 United Mine Workers of America Report on the Sago Mine Disaster Appendix 20B-1 Appendix 20B-2 United Mine Workers of America Report on the Sago Mine Disaster Appendix 20C-1 Appendix 20C-2 United Mine Workers of America Report on the Sago Mine Disaster Appendix 20C-3 Appendix 20C-4 United Mine Workers of America Report on the Sago Mine Disaster Appendix 20C-5 Appendix 20D-1 United Mine Workers of America Report on the Sago Mine Disaster Appendix 20D-2 Appendix 20D-3 United Mine Workers of America Report on the Sago Mine Disaster Appendix 20D-4