The United Mine Workers of America, afl-cio/clc REPORT ON THE Sago Mine Disaster of January 2, 2006 Table of Contents Letter from Cecil E. Roberts and Daniel J. Kane ……………………………………………………………………… III Dedication ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………… V Executive Summary, Findings and Recommendations ………………………………………………………………… 1 MSHA’s responsibilities under the law MSHA’s responsibilities as a watchdog for safety The mine operator’s responsibilities Summary of events of January 2, 2006 Seals Methane accumulation Second mining Forces Escape attempt of the 2nd Left crew Destruction of infrastructure Donning and use of self-contained self-rescuers Barricading and tracking devices Notification of regulatory agencies and mine rescue The failure to secure evidence and control the mine site National mine rescue preparedness The Mine Safety and Health Administration Events of January 2, 2006 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 19 Prior to the preshift examination Preshift examination Start of production shift to time of explosion The explosion and its effects Evacuation of mine 1st Left section and initial rescue attempt Evacuation attempt 2nd Left Parallel section Regulatory action and rescue/recovery Mine Seal Requirements ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 27 Mine Seals 2nd Left Mains ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 33 Roof Control …………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 37 Ventilation ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 41 Consideration of Lightning as a Potential Cause ……………………………………………………………………… 43 Conclusion ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 49 Photographs, Post Explosion …………………………………………………………………………………………… 50 General Information …………………………………………………………………………………………………… 57 International Coal Group Wolf Run Coal Company Sago Mine Acknowledgments: Participating Mine Rescue Teams ………………………………………………………………… 63 Mine Safety and Health Administration West Virginia Office of Miners’ Health, Safety and Training United Mine Workers of America Appendices Index ……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 67 Report on the Sago Mine Disaster i At approximately 6:30 am on January 2, 2006, an explosion occurred at the Sago mine in Upshur County, West Virginia. Fifty-two hours later, the bodies of 12 miners had been recovered from the mine and one unconscious survivor had been transported to the hospital. Those 12 men did not have to die. But they did, as a result of a series of decisions that were made by the mine’s owner, and allowed by the state and federal agencies that are charged with mine safety. Some of those decisions were made in the weeks and months immediately prior to the explosion and in the hours immediately after it. Sadly, some of those decisions were made many years prior to the explosion. But whenever they were made, all of those misguided decisions contributed to this preventable tragedy. And without immediate action by mine operators and regulatory agencies across America to reverse the effects of these decisions, more tragedies are inevitable. The mine’s owner, the International Coal Group (ICG), has advanced the theory that the explosion was caused by a natural event it could do nothing to prevent—a lightning strike. ICG touts this theory even though the lightning struck over two miles away and there was no conduit for an electrical charge from that lightning to get into the sealed area of the mine where the explosion occurred. Though it cannot adequately explain why, the West Virginia Office of Miners’ Health, Safety and Training agrees with that theory. The UMWA does not agree with that unprecedented theory, and this report lays out the reasons why. We find it is much more likely that the explosion was triggered by frictional activity in the roof, roof support or support material, which created an electrical arc underground that ignited an explosive methane-air mixture in the sealed area. Although it is important to know how the methane ignited, it is not really material to the subsequent deaths of the 12 miners. The conditions in the mine at the time of the ignition caused these 12 tragic deaths. The fact is that the tragedy that morning was preventable and should never have occurred. What adds insult to injury is that at least 11 of those 12 miners survived the explosion, and when miners survive an explosion underground, those miners should come out of the mine alive. The reasons why these 12 men are dead—when they should not be—must be the focus of efforts to improve mine safety from this point forward. And we must start with this: The will and intent of Congress when it first passed the Coal Act in 1969 and then the Mine Act in 1977 has been diluted, modified and subverted by the federal Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) and mine operators to the point where some practices and policies in place today offer miners little more protection than they had before those laws were passed. The various state safety and health agencies are also culpable for failing to protect miners. Report on the Sago Mine Disaster iii 1. When MSHA decided to ignore Congress’ mandate to build “bulkhead seals” and began allowing substandard seals, including seals from foam material called Omega Block, we began down the path to the Sago tragedy. Had the seals in the Sago mine been constructed in such a manner as Congress intended, it is very likely all the miners killed at Sago would have survived. 2. When the coal companies and the regulatory agencies decided not to pursue enhanced two-way communications underground, even though the UMWA and others raised this as a problem even before 1968, it ensured that no one would be able to talk to the trapped Sago miners in 2006 to let them know their way out of the mine was not blocked. 3. When MSHA decided to mitigate the law as passed by Congress and not require that there be a sufficient number of mine rescue teams available at all times when miners are underground at every mine in America, it meant that ICG was free to contract out its mine rescue functions to an inexperienced mine rescue team that was not on site and had to be gathered from the far corners of Upshur County before it could begin any type of rescue operation. There was no team available to immediately respond at Sago, perhaps rescuing all the miners who survived the explosion instead of just one. 4. When Sago mine management submitted and MSHA approved a ventilation plan that would course fresh air past the sealed area, and this contaminated air was separated from the working section’s intake air supply by only one brattice wall which was destroyed in the explosion, it meant that the trapped miners were doomed to a continuous flow of carbon monoxide and other deadly gases that eventually killed all but one of them. 5. The lack of additional oxygen supplies and the poor performance of the self-contained self-rescue (SCSR) units, along with the failure by MSHA over the past 30 years to require the development of a new generation of SCSRs, meant that these trapped miners were left gasping for their final breaths. 6. When MSHA decided not to follow up on Congress’ mandate in 1969 to require safety chambers in mines, that meant the miners at Sago were left with hanging a ventilation curtain as their only option in a futile attempt to keep the deadly gases away. 7. When MSHA did not require the use of tracking devices to locate trapped miners underground, even though such technology has been available for over 30 years and is used widely in other countries, the mine rescue teams that finally did enter the Sago mine did not have any idea where to look for the trapped miners, further delaying the rescue efforts. All of these issues are examined in depth in this report. The UMWA also makes recommendations in this report that, if enacted and enforced, will make a real difference, not just in the ability of miners to survive explosions and other incidents underground, but to keep these events from happening in the first place. The truth is that ICG failed the miners at Sago, and so did our government. And when our government failed those miners it failed all miners. The company and the government agencies forgot the words of Congress, stated in the preamble of the Mine Act: “Congress declares that the first priority of all in the coal or other mining industry must be the health and safety of its most precious resource—the miner.” The UMWA has not forgotten those words. We believe they must be in the forefront of our nation’s focus as we move forward to improve safety in America’s coal mines. The 12 who died needlessly at Sago and the 35 others who perished at coal mines throughout the United States in 2006 deserve no less. Cecil E. Roberts Daniel J. Kane International President International Secretary-Treasurer iv United Mine Workers of America Dedication he United Mine Workers of America dedicates this report to the entire mining community: the men and women who work in the industry, their families and friends and the miners who courageously Tarrive at the mine to offer assistance when tragedy strikes. History will judge 2006 to be a tragic and difficult year for the nation’s mining community. By the end of the calendar year, the coal industry claimed the lives of 47 miners. The fatal accident numbers of the previous years have been surpassed, making it the worst year since 1995, when there were also 47 fatal accidents. But numbers do not tell the entire story: indeed they dehumanize the message and make it easier to accept. These miners must not be remembered merely as numbers. Theirs was a life of hard work, sacrifice