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Acbar News Summary on Afghanistan 1995

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Acbar News Summary on Afghanistan 1995 ACBAR NEWS SUMMARY ON AFGHANISTAN 1995 . t....... .....,.... AGENCY COORDINATING BODY FOR AFGHAN RELIEF 2 REHMAN BABA ROAD UNIVERSITY TOWN PESHAWAR TEL : (0521) 44392 I 40839 FEBRUARY 1996 rr========--==-==-=-=--=-··=-·--'==-=-==-=-=-=-=--=--=--=-===============-·--=··-=·-=--==il-· l am pleased to make available a summmy of the significant news - extracted from The News, Frontier Post, Muslim, and The Nation - related to Afghanistan for 1995. For easy access, the document has been listed under five headings (by months): Aid and Economic Developments Military Developments Political Developments Security matters; and Other News It is hoped that this ACBAR report will prove useful and be of significant value for NGOs, donors and other interested persons. Charles A. MacFadden Executive Director Janua1y 1996 !!:=:==========================-·--·--- SELECTED EVENTS OF 1995 .JANUARY MARCH The Taliban (Islamic Religious students) after Mehmood Mestiri arrived back in Islamabad capturing four southwestern provinces of to resume his peace mission in Afghanistan. Afghanistan (Kandahar, Helmand, Uruzgan and Zabul) in November & December 1994, President Rabbani arrived in Pakistan to attend took control of Ghazni Province. the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) summit in Islamabad. Talking to newsmen. he Mehmood Mestiri, Special UN envoy, arrived said that his Defence Minister, Ahmad Shah in Kabul on the first day of the new year with Masood had decided to crush all opposition a formula for the transfer of power. forces posing danger to Kabul's security. He also held talks with Pakistan's Prime Minister. Fifteen civilians were killed and 30 injured when Russian jets bombed Maimo village of The Taliban captured the strategic town of Badakhshan Province in Afghanistan near the Dilaram in Farah Province and took control of border with Tajikistan. Nimroz Province. Amnesty International, while reporting on the Abdul Ali Mazari, leader of the Shi'ite Hezb-i­ human rights catastrophe in Afghanistan, Wahdat and his nine companions, who had including mass murders, arbitrary detention­ been captured by the Taliban, were killed tortures, rape of women & children, carried while being flown by helicopter from out by armed political persons, condemned the Charasyab to Kandahar. international community for ignoring the conflict in Afghanistan~ Forces loyal to President Rahbani, pushed the Taliban back and took control of Charasyab, FEBRUARY 25 km south of Kabul. The Taliban took control of Paktia, Paktika, and Wardak Provinces: captured the capital APRIL of Logar Province; overran the headquarters UNOCHA opened a new dcmining training of Hezb-i-Islami in Charasyab: and captured camp in Jalalabad, following the closure of its militarybasesofHezb-i-Islami (Hckmatyar) in demining caltlp in Risalpur, Pakistan which Khost. was established in 1989. The Taliban overran bases of Hezb-i-Islami Afghan Ministry of Public Health (MOPH) (Hekmatyar) in Khost without encountering with the collaboration of WHO and UNICEF, any resistance. Hezb commanders and fighters started a mass campaign against polio fled when confronted by the Taliban. throughout Afghanistan. Mehmood Mestiri, said that the transfer of The Taliban took complete control of Badghis power by President I\ahbnni to a United Province. However, it was later reported that Nations sponsored Council, was postponed to commander Ismail Khan's forces pushed the 21 March. On the other hand, an Afghan Taliban back some 60 km. official said that the new March 21 deadline, for President Rabbani to cede power, would Mohammad Karim Khalili was elected as the have to he extended if the political and social new leader of Hezb~i-Wahdat, replacing the conditions in the country warranted it. deceased leader, Abdul Ali Mazari. MAY .JULY A senior Iranian official said that Iran would The European Commission announced new begin to repatriate•-400,000 Afghan refugees humanitarian aid of 6.66 million ECU who had fled the violence in Afghanistan. (equivalent to about Rs.275 million) for the relief of the suffering people in Kabul. United Nations received· contributions of Similarly, Britain provided Rs.l3.75 million to US$6.2 million from a number of countries for the demining programme of the British mine relief projects in Afghanistan. clearance NGO, Halo Trust. It had also contributed Rs.50 million to UNOCHA 's Pakistan's Federal Government sanctioned demining programme. funds of Rs.91 million to the Afghan Commissionerate, NWFP, for the year 1995-96 UN asked about 300,000 displaced people in to continue its work. UNHCR and other Jalalabad to leave for Kabul, as the assistance donor agencies are to completely stop aid was to be stopped by the end of September. assistance to the Afghan refugees in Pakistan by September this year. Mehmood Mestiri, arrived in Islamabad, to resume his peace mission in Afghanistan. He President Rabbani's forces recaptured Farah met OIC Ambassador, and various Afghan and Nimroz Provinces from the Taliban and leaders in Pakistan as well as in Afghanistan. penetrated into Ghar Province. In its annual report, Amnesty International Pakistan's Foreign Office sources said that reported serious human rights deficiencies in Pakistan reopened its mission in Kabul and its Afghanistan including mass murder, torture, ·'Ambassador reached Kabul along with 30 rape of women and children, arbitrary arrests diplomatic staff. and detention of political opponents and unarmed civilians by various armed groups. JUNE A Donors Conference entitled "Briefing of Cholera struck some parts of Afghanistan Donors on Afghanistan, Longer-Term killing 97 persons in Badakhshan Province and Rehabilitation Assistance and its Relationship an unspecified number in Ghazni and Paktika. with Humanitarian Programmes" was held in Stockholm, Sweden 1-2 June. It was AUGUST organized by the UNDP and hosted by the Using their air power for the first time, the Government of Sweden. Taliban forced two cargo planes of Tatar and Ariana airlines to land at Kandahar. Forces of President Rabbani and Akbari's Hezb-i-Wahdat recaptured Bamyan Province A diplomat from the Russian Embassy in defeating Khalili's Hczb-i-Wahdat. Islamabad went to Kandahar, to seck the release of 7 crew members of the Albanian US ambassador to Pakistan, John Monjo, plane. The Taliban, demanded that Moscow accompanied by a few American diplomats should provide information about those flew to Jalalabad and Kabul. They met intellectuals, mujahideen, and Ulcma still Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and President Rabbani missing from the Afghan war, before they and discussed a number of issues concerning release the crew of the cargo plane. Afghanistan and the UN peace process. President Rabbani's forces recaptured Dilaram For the first time, a representative of the district in Farah Province. former Afghan king Zahir Shah arrived in Pakistan to meet various Afghan leaders, Turkey reopened its Embassy in Kabul after a community elders and Afghan refugees. lapse of two and half years. SEPTEMBER NOVEMBER The World Food Programme (WFP) said that UNICEF announced that it was suspending it would terminate its General Feeding aid for education programmes in the Talihan­ Programme for more than 1.2 million Afghan controlled areas of Afghanistan, where schools refugees in Pakistan on 30 September. for girls were being closed. However, WFP would implement a safety-net programme for vulnerable groups of refugees. The US Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian affairs, Ms. Robin Raphel. after holding The Taliban recaptured Farah, Helmand, and talks with Pakistani Officials in Islamabad, Nimroz Provinces from President Rabbani's flew to Afghanistan for talks with Afghan forces. They also captured Shindand military factions, groups, and individuals to find a base. Simultaneously, the Taliban captured negotiated settlement of the Afghan crisis. Herat and Ghar Provinces. The Taliban captured the strategically More than 1,000 demonstrators attacked the important Pul-e-Charkhi, east of Kabul. and Pakistan Embassy in Kabul, killing at least two effectively took control of the only eastern people. Pakistan evacuated the entire supply route for the city. However, a week personnel of its Embassy closing down its later, Afghan Government troops"recaptured mission in Kabul. In another development, 20 km of lost ground (Butkhak, Pul-e-Charkhi, Pakistan declared 13 Afghan diplomats, Band-e-Ghazi, and Khurd Kabul) from the including the Charge d'Affaires of the Afghan Taliban. Embassy in Islamabad, as persona non grata and asked them to leave the country. DECEMBER ,'·1 The Pakistan Government told 11 French OCTOBER members of MADERA, a French organization A high level United Nations official, Peter working to resettle refugees in rutal areas. to Hansen, arrived in Islamabad to study leave Pakistan by 11 December 1995. Pakistan's request to restart humanitarian However, it was later reported that Pakistan's assistance for Afghan refugees, which was Government on advice from the foreign office terminated on 30 September. He went to revised its earlier orders and allowed the 11 Kabul as part of an Afghan tour, prior to the members of MADERA to remain in Pakistan launching of the 1995-96 aid appeal. until 27 December 1995. The European Commission committed ECU Charles A. MacFadden, the Executive 9 million (approx. Rs.361 million) to UNHCR Director of Agency Coordinating Body for to assist Afghan refugees returning to Afghan Relief (ACBAR) called on the NWFP Afghanistan. Governor, Khurshid Ali Khan, in Peshawar.
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