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UNCLASSIFIED DepartmentofDefense Officefor theAdministrativeReviewofthe of Combatant at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba 19 November 2007 To: MOHMAD , HAJAWALI Subject: SUMMARY OF EVIDENCEFORADMINISTRATTVE REVIEWBOARDINTHE CASE MOHMAD, HAJAWALI 1. An AdministrativeReviewBoard be convenedto review your case to determine if your continueddetention is necessary. 2. The AdministrativeReview Boardwill conduct a comprehensivereview ofall reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Boardwill make a recommendationto : ( ) release you to your home state; (2 ) transfer you to your home state , with conditions agreed upon by United States and your home state ; or (3) continue your detention under United States control. 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention : a . Commitment 1. The detaineewas a moneymanfor Usamabin Ladenfrom 1996to 1997. The conducted most ofhis money transactions at three money exchangers with offices inDubai, UnitedArab Emirates. InMarch2000, thedetaincefacilitated transfersfrom Usamabin Laden's accountsto purchase shoulder- launchedSurface-to - Air Missiles for al Qaida. The detainee and the detaince's businesspartnerworked with an associate of Usama bin Ladenwho oftenpurchased wcapons for Usama binLaden's organization. 3. As of April 2000, the detainee, who was Usama bin Laden's financier, had an office inPeshawar, Pakistanand was facilitating the movementoffunds associated with the purchase of weapons by the binLaden organization. 4. The detaineereceivedone millionUnitedStatesDollarsto manageinApril 2000, from Taliban Supreme Leader Mullah Mohammad Omar 5. The detaineehad a personaland professionalrelationshipwith a high- ranking officialofthe Taliban, andthe detaineewas instrumentalin raisingrevenuefor the Taliban ISN 560 DMO Exhibit 1 Page 1 of 4 UNCLASSIFIED 581 UNCLASSIFIED Subject: UNCLASSIFIEDSUMMARYOFEVIDENCEFORADMINISTRATIVE REVIEWBOARD INTHE CASE OFMOHMAD, HAJAWALI 6. The detainee was arrested by the Pakistan authorities at the detainee's residence on January 26, 2002. b Connections/Associations According to a source, the detainee paid for a high -rankingTaliban official's travel to Dubai, United Arab Emirates for cancer treatment and to Saudi Arabia for a religious festival. The detainee was a frequent visitor at the official's office and the detainee purchased numerous vehicles from Dubai for the Taliban . 2. The detainee was identified as a wealthy Afghan Sara ", meaning moneychanger, who was affiliated with the e - Islami Gulbuddin . The detainee was closely affiliated with Taliban and was considered to be very close to leaders Mullah Mohammad Rabbani and Mullah Mohammad Omar . 3. The Hezb - e - IslamiGulbuddin(HIG) was foundedby GulbuddinHikmatyarand was one ofthe majorMujahedingroups inthe war againstthe Soviets. In the 1990's, GulbuddinHikmatyarranseveral terrorist trainingcamps in Afghanistanandwas a pioneerin sendingmercenaryfightersto other Islamic conflicts. Hikmatyar also offered to shelter UsamabinLaden after the latterfled Sudan in 1996. The HIG has longestablishedties with UsamabinLaden. 4. The preachersof al- Tabilighorganizationhavebeen supportingIslamic groups in south and Southeast Asia under the cover ofconducting religious activities. The group is closely alignedwith other Pakistani organizationsand the al network 5. The detainee maintained friendship and remained in contact with a head of the Afghan National Bank. Intent 1. The detainee stated that if released he would liketo to his trade as a moneylender d OtherRelevantData 1. The detainee insists he has not conducted business with the Taliban since 1996, which was about the time the Taliban started fighting with the Northern Alliance 2. In 1996, the detainee obtained 1.5 million United States dollars from the Director oftheBank ofAfghanistan to purchase gold in Dubai, United Arab Emirates. ISN 560 DMOExhibit Page2 of4 UNCLASSIFIED 582 UNCLASSIFIED Subject: UNCLASSIFIEDSUMMARYOF EVIDENCEFORADMINISTRATIVE REVIEWBOARD INTHECASE OFMOHMAD, HAJAWALI The detainee stated he lost 500,000 United States Dollars as a result of the exchange rate. 3. The detainee stated that he would sell the gold and the Taliban would receive 75 % of the profits and would take 25% . The detainee admittedhe was inbusiness with Taliban and with the Taliban because of the money. The detainee stated that his business relationship with Taliban lasted approximately three months. 5. Accordingto a source, the detainecwas the mostimportantpersonofthe detainec's business partnership, and he believedthat the detainee will still share in the partnership's profits whenreleased from Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. 6. A source stated that he fought with the detainee and other Afghan Taliban members against the Northern Alliance . 4. The followingprimaryfactors favor releaseor transfer: a. The detaineeadamantlystressed that his relationshipwiththeTalibanwas simply business and he never agreed with the manner in which they treated people. b The detainee stated he didn't have close connections with other Taliban officials and did not attempt other business deals with individuals or entities associated with Taliban The detainee claims that he had no knowledge ofal Qaida prior to his arrest and never heard of Taliban converting cash to gold or other commodities to eam . d. The detaineeclaims to haveneverconductedany currencyexchangesor other financialtransactionsfor Hekmatyaror any knownassociatesof . e. The detaineedenied any associationwith al Qaida andstated thathewas a simple businessman f. The detainee stated that he never heard of al Qaida or the Taliban shipping gold out of Pakistan. The detainee stated he never heard ofAriana Airlines being used in gold smuggling operations. ISN560 DMOExhibit1 Page 3 of4 UNCLASSIFIED 583 UNCLASSIFIED Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FORADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MOHMAD, HAJAWALI g. The detaineestated he is unawareof anyonethat usedJamat-al- Tabiligh as a cover for illicitpurposesor travel. 5. You willbe affordeda meaningfulopportunityto beheardandto presentinformationto the Board; this includesan opportunityto be physicallypresentat the proceeding. The Assisting MilitaryOfficer(AMO) will assistyouinreviewingall relevantandreasonablyavailable unclassifiedinfomationregardingyour case. The AMO isnotan advocatefor or against continueddetention normaythe AMO form a confidentialrelationshipwith you or represent you inany other matter. ISN DMO Exhibit 1 Page4 of4 UNCLASSIFIED 584.
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