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Agriculture, Cap Reform – Background Information and Timetable

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Agriculture, Cap Reform – Background Information and Timetable CONFERENCE DES REGIONS PERIPHERIQUES MARITIMES D’EUROPE CONFERENCE OF PERIPHERAL MARITIME REGIONS OF EUROPE 6, rue Saint-Martin 35700 RENNES - F Tel. : + 33 (0)2 99 35 40 50 - Fax : + 33 (0)2 99 35 09 19 e.mail : [email protected] – web : www.crpm.org CRPMNTP090001 A0 JANUARY 2009 TECHNICAL PAPER FROM THE CPMR GENERAL SECRETARIAT AGRICULTURE, CAP REFORM – BACKGROUND INFORMATION AND TIMETABLE - Since 2007, the CPMR has been working hard to ensure that the regions’ opinion is heard in EU work on medium-term changes to the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), bearing in mind that it is a major policy from a budgetary point of view and in terms of its territorial impact. This paper outlines recent developments in this field, both at EU level and within the CPMR, and proposes some areas for further work in 2009. These proposals have arisen from discussions with the regions of Andalucia and Pays de la Loire, which were entrusted with the responsibility to lead the CPMR’s work in this field at the Bayonne General Assembly in September 2008. This new stage of CPMR activity comes after France’s Presidency of the EU during the second half of 2008, which was marked by: - the adoption of the CAP Health Check by the Council of Ministers meeting of 20 November 2008; - the lack of agreement on a common text by ministers at the extraordinary European Council meeting of 28 November on the future of the CAP after 2013. A high point: the Nantes seminar on 23 October 2008 – “The future of EU agricultural and food policy: the regions propose” The high number of people attending this seminar (over 200) demonstrates, as if this were necessary, the topic’s relevance. The regions are clearly entities of which much is expected when it comes to developing the CAP and bringing it closer to territories, citizens and consumers. The attendance, in person, of European Commissioner Mariann Fischer Boel and the then Council of Ministers Chairman Michel Barnier bears witness to the CPMR’s credibility on this topic as far as Brussels is concerned. Following the adoption of policy positions on the Health Check at the Rhodes Political Bureau meeting and then at the General Assembly in Bayonne, this seminar established the main strands of activity on post-2013 issues (the presentations are available at http://www.crpm.org/en/index.php?act=6,1,2,93 ). The CPMR regions represented in Nantes unanimously voted in favour of a declaration (see attached). This was set out as a manifesto entitled: “Health Check, mindful of the global challenges, Europe’s regions propose a territorial-based treatment”. This declaration provides the basis for the CPMR’s activities on agriculture in 2009, focusing on the following themes: regionalisation of the First and Second Pillar of the CAP, food security and quality, contribution to territorial cohesion, partnership with other interregional networks active in this area, “institutionalisation” of relations between the regions and EU institutions on the preparation of the post- 2013 CAP. Technical Paper from the CPMR General Secretariat – Agriculture, CAP Reform “Background information and timetable” - Reference CRPMNTP090001 A0 – January 2009 - p. 1 Launch of an intercommission working group The first meeting of the CPMR’s intercommission working group on the CAP will be held in Brussels at the end of February or beginning of March 2009. In accordance with the decisions of the Bayonne 2008 General Assembly, it will be jointly chaired by the regions of Andalucia and Pays de la Loire. As with all CPMR intercommission groups, the CPMR General Secretariat will help run it and act as the secretariat. The draft terms of reference are currently being drawn up and will be presented to the members of the Political Bureau at the meeting. A letter is being sent to the presidents of the geographical commissions to ask them to appoint their representatives to this group. Its main task is simple: to prepare the forthcoming reform of the CAP. It will meet three times a year in Brussels, will prepare the CPMR’s decisions and policy positions and will make proposals on the partnerships to be developed with other networks if necessary. At its first meeting it will examine the new legislative context further to the adoption of the Health Check by the national agriculture ministers on 20 November 2008: new opportunities for the regions, consideration of the CPMR’s priorities such as they were set by the Rhodes Political Bureau meeting and confirmed the Bayonne General Assembly. It should also have an opportunity to hear the views of experts on the CAP/territories field. The CAP and governance Neither the Health Check nor the initiatives of the French EU presidency have permitted any legal progress on the participation of the regions in EU decision-making on the CAP: - The Health Check does introduce some elements of flexibility in the Council Regulation on direct payments (articles 47, 48, 64 and 68). It notably gives member states the possibility to change their single payment systems so they can adopt the regional model advocated by the CPMR. However, as subsidiarity dictates, the decision is up to the member states, further to consultation with their regional authorities if they wish. The first meeting of the intercommission working group will examine, country by country, how far these consultations really take place. As far as France is concerned, which is one of the most centralised and agricultural countries in Europe, it should be noted that the Nantes seminar, along with the efforts made by the Association of French Regions, has opened up prospects for improved consultation of the regions; - The Health Check has not changed the governance of the Second Pillar of the CAP. The European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) still fails to oblige the member states to regionalise rural development. If this situation does not change by 2014, country by country negotiations should be held, as needed, between the regions and central governments in order to bring about rural development programmes that are run at regional level and led by regional authorities. Referring again to the case of France, the Ministry of Agriculture indicated its openness on this point at the Nantes seminar; - Despite a request made by its President, the CPMR was not invited to the informal Council meeting in Annecy in September 2008, even as an observer, and despite the fact that European agricultural organisations were represented. Neither does the Czech Presidency intend to involve the regions in the informal Council meeting on the future of the CAP which it will hold in the first half of 2009. This incomplete overview shows how much the regions still need to do in order to become major equal stakeholders in the CAP. A platform of the regions on the CAP Bearing in mind the above, the Nantes Declaration proposed: “Furthermore, the regions invite the European Commission to develop an ongoing partnership with them (over and beyond the sporadic meetings such as this seminar in Nantes or their arbitrary participation in the different committees that advise the Directorate-General for agriculture). The regions, under the umbrella of the CPMR, are ready and willing to study the forms that this permanent partnership and called take and will shortly be taking initiatives to put this aim and into practice.” Technical Paper from the CPMR General Secretariat – Agriculture, CAP Reform “Background information and timetable” - Reference CRPMNTP090001 A0 – January 2009 - p. 2 Michel Barnier felt that this proposal was appropriate, rightly considering that this annual meeting should involve not just the Commission, but also the Parliament and the Council. Subsequent contacts between the Commissioner’s services, the CPMR and the regions of Andalucia and Pays de la Loire further developed these ideas. The CPMR could be asked to bring together all the interregional organisations concerned by and interested in a “platform” (similarly to the role it had in the discussion on the Governance White Paper published by the Prodi Commission). The specific arrangements are yet to be settled: organisation of the first meeting in the first half of 2009, a second meeting in the first half of 2010 under the Spanish Presidency, etc.? Partnerships with other interregional organisations Various interregional organisations are active in, and/or concerned by, changes in the CAP. Some have a general interest, seeking to improve governance of the CAP, and are likely to join the above-mentioned political platform. Others are more specialised, and are associations of regions that: - Produce given agricultural/food products, - Promote certain modes of production and/or marketing, - Are representative of specific areas in terms of production and/or marketing. In early 2009, the CPMR will take the initiative to organise a meeting of the secretary generals to examine the most appropriate arrangements for common or coordinated activities. Improving the relationship between the CAP and territories The CPMR “specialises” in the analysis of the relationship between sectoral policies and territorial cohesion, for example its response to the European Commission's Green Paper and a range of proposals on European policies for the 2014-2020 period to be discussed at the 2009 General Assembly in Gothenburg. For their part, the member states are starting to think about how to change the system for direct payments under the First Pillar in order to ensure a fairer distribution of funds after 2014, with this being a vital pre- requisite for the acceptability of pursuit of the CAP. There is no reason that the CAP absolutely has to be organised into two pillars, with the first not being co- financed or linked to territories, and the second being partly co-financed and partly linked to territories.
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