Militancy Among Minority Groups: the Protection-Group Policing Dynamic

Militancy Among Minority Groups: The Protection-Group Policing Dynamic

Word Count: 12,000

Saurabh Pant∗ University of Essex

October 7, 2020 Abstract When does militancy emerge among minorities? This paper presents an understudied but important dynamic and develops a formal model illustrating how the state can influence minority militant mobilization. In many contexts, minorities face the threat of indiscriminate retaliation from non-state sources if violent transgressions are committed by someone from their community. Insufficient protection from this threat incentivizes minority members to police their group in order to prevent militancy from emerging within their community. The actions and characteristics of the state shape these perceptions of protection. Therefore, the strategic tensions in this protection-group policing dynamic occur within the minority group and between the minority group and the state. I thus develop a formal model to study how the interaction between state capacity and state willingness - two important aspects of the state - can influence the onset of minority militancy through this dynamic. The model can account for the variation in the extent and types of militancy that would emerge. Through the protection-group policing dynamic, the model counterintuitively demonstrates how low-capacity states can provide less conducive environments for minority militancy than high-capacity states, and it provides a new explanation for why small-scale militancy is more likely in higher capacity states.

∗I would like to thank Daniela Barba Sanchez, Michael Becher, Mark Beissinger, Kara Ross Camarena, Thomas Chadefaux, Casey Crisman-Cox, Matias Iaryczower, Amaney Jamal, Danielle Jung, Amanda Kennard, Nikitas Konstantinidis, Jennifer Larson, Andrew Little, Philip Oldenburg, Robert Powell, Kristopher Ramsay, Peter Schram, Jacob Shapiro, Sondre Solstad, Karine Van Der Straeten, Keren Yarhi- Milo, and Deborah Yashar for helpful comments. Between 2017 and 2020, earlier versions of this paper were presented in various research seminars at Princeton University and the Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse; the annual conferences of ISA, MPSA, EPSA, and APSA; and the Formal Models of International Relations conference. All remaining errors are mine. Militant mobilization across marginalized minority populations has not been uniform. There are cases where long-lasting, substantial militancy arose such as in the Catholic population in Northern Ireland from the mid to late twentieth century, and there are also cases where little militancy emerged such as with the African American population in the early post-Civil War South. Muslims are a minority in India and the United Kingdom (UK) and we also see diﬀerences in their rates of militant mobilization. In 2017, the UK’s MI5 Chief stated the UK was “facing the most severe terror threat ever” from Islamist terrorism (Dodd, 2017). Yet, in the same year, Zakir Musa, a then high-level al-Qaeda operative in Kashmir, publicly scolded Indian Muslims for not “joining jihad” (Singh, 2017). In fact, India has the second largest Muslim population in the world but only relatively negligible amounts of domestic and transnational Islamist militancy has emerged among this population.1 When does militancy emerge among members of marginalized minorities? This paper addresses this question by presenting an understudied but relevant dynamic and developing a formal model to illustrate the political conditions inﬂuencing the onset of minority militancy.

In many contexts, minorities face the threat of indiscriminate retaliation from non-state sources if violent transgressions are associated with someone from their community (e.g., Muslims in India, Jews in 19th century and early 20th century Europe, and African Americans in the early post-civil war South). The extent that a minority group is protected from the threat of indiscriminate retaliation would inﬂuence the actions of minority group members toward militancy. If there is little protection, then minority group members would want to avoid the indiscriminate retaliation and would thus be more incentivized to police their group in order to prevent militancy from emerging within their community. In fact, even alleged violent transgressions as opposed to conﬁrmed actual

1See Supplementary Information (SI hereafter).

1 transgressions can be enough to provoke a response. The 2002 Gujarat riots, for instance, was triggered by rumors of alleged Muslim involvement in the Godhra train burning. If alleged transgressions are suﬃcient to trigger a response, then a credible threat exists and the minority group would be increasingly incentivized to police their group in order to prevent or at least minimize the frequency of such indiscriminate retaliation events.2 Therefore, there is a link between the perceptions of protection of the minority group and the amount of in-group policing that occurs within the minority group, and, additionally, the actions and characteristics of the state can shape these perceptions of protection. I call this link the “protection-group policing dynamic.”

In this dynamic, there are strategic tensions occurring within the minority group and between the minority group and the state. I thus develop a formal model that incorporates these strategic tensions and examines how state capacity and state willingness interact in influencing the extent and type of militancy emerging among minorities. The model I propose differs from the in-group policing model of Fearon and Laitin (1996) as I explicitly model the state as a key actor (rather than just in the background) in the protection-group policing dynamic that determines the amount of in-group policing and, consequently, the amount of inter-group violence that emerges.3 The level of state capacity constrains the amount of resources available to the government and, given a level of capacity, we need to consider how willing the government is to invest in making the minority feel secure (Wilkinson, 2004). Therefore, both state capacity and state willingness are characteristics of the state that influence minority militant mobilization. After the state has made its choices to create the political environment, the minority group

2If rumors were suﬃcient to give rise to indiscriminate retaliation, then minority members would be increasingly circumspect about their everyday behavior and their group members’ behavior. 3“Further development of our informational approach would require fuller consideration of the state’s role in both cauterizing and fostering interethnic violence.” (Fearon and Laitin, 1996, p.731)

2 members would strategically interact with each other in deciding which actions to take with regards to militancy. Through accounting for the protection-group policing dynamic, we can explain the variation in the amount of militancy and the type of militancy emerging across different types of states. The model reveals counterintuitively how a low-capacity state can actually provide a less conducive environment for militancy to emerge among minorities than a high-capacity state if the threat of indiscriminate retaliation to the minority group is enhanced which encourages in-group policing. Additionally, the model suggests that small-scale militant operations are more likely to emerge in high-capacity states which is consistent with findings in the related literature (Bueno de Mesquita, 2013; Carter, 2015; Wright, 2017). However, I provide a different explanation for this phenomenon stemming from the protection-group policing dynamic where the fear of indiscriminate retaliation in low-capacity states discourages people from being silent witnesses to militant acts.

Furthermore, the model also accounts for factors associated with other existing frameworks to explain political violence, and shows how the protection-group policing dynamic is related to these other factors. First, psychological mechanisms (e.g., grievances from relative deprivation; see Gurr, 1970) are incorporated in the model through influencing the benefits of militancy to the minority members. However, high grievances are shown to be insufficient for political violence to emerge if little protection is provided against the threat of indiscriminate retaliation. Second, social networks (e.g., Atran, 2010; Staniland, 2014; Porta, 2015; Scacco, 2017; Larson and Lewis, 2018) matter in this model in that who is linked to who in a community can have implications for militant outcomes. This suggests that under the threat of indiscriminate retaliation, if one’s actions are more likely to be observed by different types of people then this can increase the deterrence effect of in-group policing. Finally, changes in the opportunity cost of militancy against the

3 state can make political violence more or less appealing (Grossman, 1991; Enders and Sandler, 2002; Collier and Hoeffler, 2002, 2004; Miguel, Satyanath and Sergenti, 2004; Humphreys, 2005; Rosendorff and Sandler, 2010; Dube and Vargas, 2013; Bazzi and Blattman, 2014). Moreover, the ability of the government to respond forcefully also influences the strategies of groups (Crenshaw, 1981; McAdam, 1982; Li, 2005; Carter, 2016). The opportunity cost of violence is seen as greater in higher capacity states which means, intuitively, that political violence should be lower in higher capacity states. Yet, the model in this paper shows counterintuitively how, through enhancing the threat of indiscriminate retaliation which encourages in-group policing, low-capacity states can actually create conditions that are less conducive to militancy than high-capacity states.

This paper provides theoretical reasons to collect in-group policing data and data on perceptions of protection from indiscriminate retaliation in order to explain minority militancy. Understandably, such data on in-group policing will not be readily available or easy to collect especially if it is of an informal nature (e.g., an informal community leader policing their group). Additionally, one would need to ﬁnd exogenous changes in the perceptions of protection from indiscriminate retaliation emanating from non-state sources. Although more rigorous empirical testing is required, I provide some supportive empirical evidence for the insights from the model by looking at Islamist militancy in regions where Muslims are a minority group, and by contrasting the scale of minority militancy that has emerged in India with that of the UK.

To be clear, there are two important scope conditions for this paper. First, the focus of the model and the paper is to explain the onset of militancy among minorities speciﬁcally and not militancy in general. Thus, for example, the insights from the model would not apply in explaining the emergence and growth of Sunni Islamist militancy in Pakistan but

4 they could be used to explain the lack of Shia Islamist militancy in Pakistan.4 Second, as the indiscriminate violence is coming from non-state sources while the state is responsible for either protecting or failing to protect the minority, the other scope condition is that the state has at least some interest in the security of the minority group. In other words, the state would not directly inﬂict the indiscriminate violence themselves which could be due to internal reasons (e.g., legal restraints, norms, etc.) and/or external reasons (e.g., international sanctioning, international condemnation, etc.). This scope condition does not mean that the state is a completely innocent actor during an indiscriminate retaliation episode. The state can often be complicit during these episodes by deliberately not taking actions to prevent the retaliation against the minority group (e.g., local authorities during the Tulsa race riot in 1921). This scope condition only reﬂects how the state would have incentives to not directly participate in the indiscriminate retaliation themselves and at least put up a front of plausible deniability if this retaliation occurred. These are not restrictive scope conditions as there are many cases across time and space for which the insights of the model could be applied to explain militancy or the lack thereof.5

The paper is structured as follows. I ﬁrst describe the protection-group policing dynamic and the related literature. Next, I present and solve the formal model culminating in an analysis of the relationship between the onset of militancy and the interaction between state capacity and state willingness. I then provide some suggestive empirical support for the model’s insights before concluding. 4In Pakistan, Sunni Muslims are the majority and the Shia Muslims are the minority. This minority group has faced widespread discrimination and has also been the target of sectarian violence from mobs and militant groups (e.g., Sipah-e-Sahaba). 5Examples include Muslims in India (Jammu and Kashmir is discussed separately in the SI), the Catholic population in Northern Ireland (mid to late 20th century), the African American population in the early post-Civil War South, other minority groups within India, Shia Muslims in Pakistan, and Muslims in Western Europe.

5 1 Protection-group policing and the related literature

In this section, I introduce an understudied but important mechanism influencing the emergence of militancy among a minority: the protection-group policing dynamic. Given the historical record of majority-minority relations, it is necessary to account for such a dynamic. Minority militant violence can provoke indiscriminate counter-violence where a community associated with the militants are made targets. Indiscriminate retaliation can come from the state but, in many contexts, it often comes from non-state sources (e.g., Hindu mobs in India against Muslims, the mobs of white southerners against African Americans in the early post-Civil War South, etc.). A minority group often needs to rely on the state for protection from such non-state indiscriminate retaliation. Thus, if there is little confidence in the state for protection, then group members will be particularly concerned about indiscriminate retaliatory violence that could occur in response to militancy associated with their community. Consequently, they are then more likely to take preventative in-group policing actions to halt militancy emerging within their group. On the contrary, if there is high confidence in the state for protection, then group members will be less concerned about indiscriminate retaliation. There would thus be a lower inclination for in-group policing. Figure 1 illustrates how the protection-group policing dynamic can influence the emergence of militancy. If minority members participated in in-group policing (resulting in costly sanctions) then potential militants would be deterred. Therefore, the minority group’s perception of protection from these non-state sources of indiscriminate retaliation affects in-group policing which, in turns, affects the onset of militancy.

6 Figure 1: The protection-group policing dynamic

YES History of mob attacks? NO Communal political rhetoric? Low conﬁdence in High conﬁdence in state for protection state for protection

Fear of indiscriminate No fear of indiscriminate retaliation from any retaliation from any minority militant attacks minority militant attacks

More likely to participate Less likely to participate in in-group policing in in-group policing

In this dynamic, the minority group members and the state are important actors. The minority group members are strategically interacting with each other in choosing whether to engage in militancy and whether to participate in in-group policing. Through creating the political environment, the state inﬂuences these choices of the minority group members. The formal model developed in this paper incorporates these strategic tensions to examine how state capacity and state willingness can impact militant outcomes among a minority group.

By studying the impact of this dynamic on the onset of minority militancy, this paper contributes to a range of literature that has looked at the causes and eﬀects of political violence. Some have used bargaining models to study how conﬂict can emerge in divided societies,6 others have pointed the importance of mobilizational capacity on ethnic group rebellion,7 and the state’s use of selective and indiscriminate violence or repression has been

6Fearon (1995); Cetinyan (2002); Bueno de Mesquita (2005); Grigoryan (2010); Pant (2018) 7Cederman, Wimmer and Min (2010); Lindemann and Wimmer (2018)

7 studied both theoretically8 and empirically.9 This paper differs from this previous literature in three key ways. First, I am looking at the context of minority militancy where collective punishment has historically often come from non-state sources and where the state, rather than directly dispensing out the punishment, plays a role in either protecting or failing to protect the minority. As mentioned above in the scope conditions, there are many cases where a government is not able to directly use such extreme indiscriminate violence against a minority group because of both internal pressures (e.g., legal restraints, norms, etc.) and external pressures (e.g., potential international condemnation and sanctioning). Second, I am studying how two aspects of the state - state capacity and state willingness - affect the onset of minority militancy through the protection-group policing dynamic. Specifically, I investigate how the interaction between state capacity and state willingness influences minority individuals’ decisions to engage or not and to inform or stay silent, and I examine how these decisions in turn affect the amount and type of minority militancy that emerges. Third, rather than studying the case with an established militant group, this paper focuses on the prior question of how militancy can emerge in the first place. An established armed opposition group is assumed to have enough resources to stage an attack, to make credible threats in bad bargaining deals, and even protect supporters. Moreover, to prevent the local population from informing and taking other in-group policing measures, the well- resourced militant group can credibly threaten to take punitive actions. Thus, once the group

8Kalyvas (2004, 2006); Kalyvas and Kocher (2007); Dragu and Polborn (2014); Zhukov (2015); Dragu (2017); Zhou (2019); Rozenas (2020) 9Kalyvas and Kocher (2007); Lyall (2009); Kocher, Pepinsky and Kalyvas (2011); Balcells (2012); Condra and Shapiro (2012); Lyall, Blair and Imai (2013); Benmelech, Berrebi and Klor (2014); Finkel (2015); Zhukov (2015); Balcells and Steele (2016); Byman (2016); Schutte (2017); Lupu and Peisakhin (2017); Rozenas, Schutte and Zhukov (2017); Dell and Querubin (2018); Lindemann and Wimmer (2018); Rozenas and Zhukov (2019)

8 is established, it is not entirely dependent on the willful cooperation of the local population to conduct operations.10 However, when a militant group is still ﬂedgling or latent and has not really emerged yet, then the only way it can grow and remain viable is with the willful “cooperation” of the local population (see also Wood, 2003). Thus, this paper looks at the prior question of how militancy can emerge in the ﬁrst place from within a minority group when cooperation from others is essential. Through accounting for the protection-group policing dynamic when a militancy is still in its infancy, this paper illustrates a mechanism where the indiscriminate retaliatory violence can be more “productive” than selective violence in preventing the onset of militancy as the threat of being attacked - regardless of whether one is a militant or not - encourages minority individuals to prevent militancy from emerging in their community.

2 Model

Having introduced the protection-group policing dynamic, this section now develops a model that incorporates the strategic tensions involved to study how state capacity and state willingness can aﬀect the onset of minority militancy. The story behind this model is as follows. In the ﬁrst period, the government divides their budget between the counterterrorism/counterinsurgency (countermilitancy hereafter) infrastructure and the defensive/protection (defensive hereafter) infrastructure for the minority group. The second period then involves two minority members interacting and making decisions over using militant violence. If a minority member sees that their partner intends to commit militant violence, then the former can inform on the latter to prevent the violence or stay silent. If militancy emerges, then, regardless of their chosen actions, the two minority members will be exposed to the threat of indiscriminate retaliation. The government’s

10For example, in the context of the threat of U.S. airstrikes in the Vietnam War, the unarmed locals would highly unlikely be able to remove or weaken armed insurgents (Dell and Querubin, 2018).

9 decisions in the ﬁrst period aﬀects the decision-making of the minority group members and, in turn, whether and how militancy emerges in the second period.

2.1 Players and actions

There are three actors - the government and the two minority group members. In the first period, instead of just investing in countermilitancy (as in Bueno de Mesquita (2005)), the government can choose how to distribute their budget (B) between the countermilitancy infrastructure (C) and also the defensive infrastructure for the minority group (D).11 After the government makes its choices, the second period commences with two minority group members. Each member is indexed by a level of grievances (α) which are drawn independently from a commonly known differentiable CDF, F (·), with support (−∞, ∞). The shape of the distribution of grievances reflects the overall well-being of the minority group. For example, if minority members face substantial discrimination and low economic prospects, then there would be a left-skewed distribution implying that the minority members are more likely to be highly aggrieved. Although the shape of the distribution will influence the chances that militancy will arise, the main comparative statics and insights always hold and are not dependent on a specific functional form. For the main model, I assume that there is a close social network between the two members in that each minority member will know their grievance level and their partner’s grievance level and then interact in the following game:12

11In the SI, I study a “hearts-and-minds” extension of the model where the government could also choose whether to implement a policy that reduces the grievances of the minority or provide a good/service that beneﬁts the minority. 12In the SI, I show how the main insights would still hold even if we instead assume that each minority member is uncertain about their partner’s grievances.

10 Figure 2: Game tree 1

E ¬E 2 2

E ¬E E ¬E 2 1

S I S I

This game involves two stages and depicts how militancy involves coordination between the minority members. Militant acts (even most lone-wolf attacks) are rarely conducted entirely solo and require the active or at least passive participation of others. In this game, the two minority group members (1 and 2) ﬁrst choose simultaneously whether to engage in militancy (E) or to not engage in militancy (¬E). Next, if one person has chosen to engage and another has chosen to not engage, then they enter into a subgame where the person who chose to not engage can choose whether to stay silent (S) or to inform (I) on their partner. If both choose to engage or not engage then there is no option for someone to choose to stay silent or to inform. In this model, I take informing to characterize in-group policing. I am agnostic about to whom the informant reports (the police, an informal community leader, etc.). It is true that informing to the police and informing to an informal community leader would each have a diﬀerent process but the exact intricacies of the informing process is not the focus of this paper. The main point is that, through informing, the minority member is able to prevent militancy from emerging and thus participates in in-group policing.

2.2 Payoﬀs

Payoﬀs for each minority member is a function of actions chosen within their pair. Let

Ei ∈ {0, 1} where Ei = 1 if minority member i chooses to engage and Ei = 0 if they choose

11 to not engage. In the subgame where the other member chooses to engage and member i chooses to not engage, let Si ∈ {0, 1} where Si = 1 indicates that minority member i chooses to stay silent while Si = 0 indicates that they chose to inform on their partner. Before describing the payoffs from the game, let us go over the specific parameters. p(C) is a differentiable function and represents the probability that a militant operation will successfully occur. It is convex and decreasing in C which is the level of government investment in the countermilitancy infrastructure. For example, increasing C could constitute enhancing the technology of a country’s national counterterrorism agency. The higher the investment in this infrastructure, the less likely that militancy will be successful. I assume p(0) = 1, and p(C) → 0 as C → ∞. The probability that the indiscriminate retaliation successfully occurs against minority group members is defined by the differentiable function Π(D). This function is convex and decreasing in D which represents the level of government investment in the defensive infrastructure for the minority group. This paper does not directly model the formation of the non-state group responsible for committing the indiscriminate retaliation. However, it is assumed that Π(D) accounts for the factors that influence this formation in addition to the factors that directly protect the minority. For example, increasing D could constitute both putting resources towards strengthening the legal code with regards to punishing those involved in indiscriminate retaliation (which would affect formation) and putting resources towards increasing the effectiveness of anti-riot police (which directly affects the protection level of the minority). The larger the investment in this infrastructure, the lower the threat of the indiscriminate retaliation. I assume Π(0) = 1 and Π(D) → 0 as D → ∞. The benefit of successfully engaging in a militant act is increasing in the level of grievances of the minority member (α). Grievances can be negative which allows one to obtain disutility from militancy. One keeps their income (z) if they do not engage in militancy and sacrifices their income if they choose to engage. In other words, the opportunity cost calculation of

12 deciding whether to engage in militancy involves a minority member weighing the relative benefit of engaging (which depends on the strength of the countermilitancy infrastructure of the state reflected in p(C)) against keeping their income. If militant violence materializes, then the minority group members risk facing indiscriminate retaliation which inflicts damage R. I assume that the magnitude of damage from the indiscriminate retaliation is larger than one’s income (R > z). Given the historical record, this assumption seems reasonable as many episodes of indiscriminate retaliation have resulted in damages that go beyond just displacing income.13 A militant act should be larger if more people are involved in the operation. Thus, I assume the utility gained from militancy occurring is magnified by a factor K when both minority members engage where K > 1. K − 1 thus reflects the marginal product of labor (MPL hereafter) of engaging jointly with a partner in militancy. Now that we have described each of the components, we can move on to describing the payoffs from the minority members’ game. Table 1 below shows the different, possible payoffs for minority member 1 depending on the actions chosen by each minority member (the analogous payoffs exists for minority member 2):

Table 1: Payoﬀs for Minority Member 1

Minority Member 1’s action Minority Member 2’s action Payoﬀ for Minority Member 1

Engage (E1 = 1) Engage (E2 = 1) p(C) · [K · α1 − Π(D) · R]

Engage (E1 = 1) Don’t Engage, Stay Silent (E2 = 0,S2 = 1) p(C) · [α1 − Π(D) · R]

Engage (E1 = 1) Don’t Engage, Inform (E2 = 0,S2 = 0) 0

Don’t Engage (E1 = 0) Don’t Engage (E2 = 0) z

Don’t Engage, Inform (E1 = 0,S1 = 0) Engage (E2 = 1) z

Don’t Engage, Stay Silent (E1 = 0,S1 = 1) Engage (E2 = 1) z + p(C) · [α1 − Π(D) · R]

13In the SI, I show how the main insights will still hold even if we assume the reverse (i.e., R ≤ z).

13 Recall that for any minority member who chooses to engage, or for any minority member who choose to not engage and their partner does the same, then the second stage of the game is never reached. In such a situation, any of-the-equilibrium path action could be taken here

(S1 ∈ {0, 1} and S2 ∈ {0, 1}). The ﬁrst line in the table applies when both members engage. Each member obtains their

expected payoff from their militant act (p(C)·K ·α1) and the expected cost of indiscriminate retaliation if the act is successful (−p(C) · Π(D) · R). I thus assume that even those who engage are exposed to the risk of indiscriminate retaliation.14 The second line applies when the minority group member engages and their partner does not engage and stays silent. As discussed above, the only difference between the first line and this one is that, in the former, the utility from militant violence occurring is of a larger magnitude (K · α1 versus α1). For the main analysis, I keep the probability of success the same regardless of whether one minority group member or both minority group members choose to engage as it is not clear which direction this probability should move. p(C) could increase with a larger team as both members pool their resources together. On the contrary, p(C) could decrease as having larger teams increases the risk of being caught (Fearon, 2008). I thus assume that p(C) is independent of the number of people engaging but, in the SI, I explain how assuming otherwise (in either direction) does not change the substantive insights of the model. The third line applies when the minority group member engages but their partner does not engage and informs (i.e., in-group policing). The former member is thus prevented from committing a militant act and incurs the failure disutility which is normalized to be 0.I thus assume in the main model that a member’s failure at militancy is certain as long as their partner chooses to inform.15

14In the SI, I show that the main insights still hold if I assume that the threat of indiscriminate retaliation is a cost of nonparticipation (Kalyvas and Kocher, 2007) where those engaging in militancy escape this threat. 15This is not a critical assumption. In the SI, I show all the main insights still hold even if informing

14 The fourth line applies in all situations in which both members in a pair choose to not engage. Here, both minority group members keep their income (z). Similarly, the ﬁfth line is where the member chooses to not engage and inform on their partner who is engaging. By informing, they are able to stop the minority militancy, prevent the indiscriminate retaliation, and keep their income (z). The sixth line applies where the member does not engage and stays silent while their partner engages in militant violence. The member keeps their income (z) and obtains the expected utility of their partner’s militancy occurring (p(C)·α1) and the subsequent expected disutility from the indiscriminate retaliation if militancy materializes (−p(C) · Π(D) · R). As the payoﬀs indicate, the minority members are only playing the above game in Figure 2 once. In the SI, I describe how the incentives of minority members could change if the game was repeated but that the main insights from playing the game once would still highly likely hold under the repeated game scenario. If militancy is successfully attempted by one member or both members then we will say that militancy has emerged. There are two types of militant operations that can emerge:

Deﬁnition I - Types of militancy

1. Large operations: Both minority members choose to engage in militancy.

2. Small operations: One minority member chooses to engage in militancy and the other chooses to not engage but stay silent.

The government inﬂuences the choices of the minority members through investments in the defensive infrastructure (D) and the countermilitancy infrastructure (C). Investment in the former reduces the fear of indiscriminate retaliation (i.e., Π(D) goes down). Investment in the latter makes militant attacks less likely to succeed (i.e., p(C) goes down). The government divides their budget across these two dimensions in maximizing their utility function V : depended on the government investment in C and thus did not prevent militancy with certainty.

15 maximize V (C,D; H) = (1 − H) · [UM (M; C,D)|αi, αj] + H · [UIR(Π; D)] C,D E

subject to D + C = B

The government does not observe the minority group members’ grievances and only knows that the grievances are drawn independently from the CDF F (·) when making the

16 budget allocations. UM can be a concave (risk averse) or linear (risk neutral) function and M ∈ {0, 1, 2} is the amount of minority members engaging in militancy successfully where UM (0) > UM (1) > UM (2). The function E[UM (M; C,D)|αi, αj] represents how the government wants to reduce the likelihood that militancy occurs. It is an expectation because the government does not know the exact grievance levels of minority members (αi,

αj). The grievances will influence the decisions of the minority members which in turn affects the value of M. However, given a level of minority grievances, the government’s investments in C and D also affect the decisions of the minority members. Π is the probability that indiscriminate retaliation occurs which varies, as explained above, by the level of D. The function UIR(Π; D), represents how the government is also interested in making the minority group feel secure. UIR is differentiable, concave, decreasing in Π and reaches its maximum when Π = 0. Therefore, the government cares about the security environment of the minority members beyond whether the indiscriminate retaliation actually happens.17 To ensure an interior solution of how the budget is divided, I assume that lim p0(C) = −∞ and lim Π0(D) = −∞. C→0 D→0

16It does not matter for the results. 17If the government almost entirely cared about whether indiscriminate retaliation occurred, then with a large enough budget, the government would invest their budget almost entirely in the countermilitancy infrastructure to ensure militancy almost always fails as indiscriminate retaliation only occurs if militancy happens. By almost ensuring militancy never happens, they maximize both parts of their utility function. Thus, I assume that the government also cares about how secure the minority group feels which is reﬂected in Π(D).

16 B and H are two important parameters for the government. The budget constraint, B, limits the amount that can be spent, and H ∈ (0, 1) indicates how much the government cares about the security of the minority group compared to reducing the likelihood that militancy occurs. For example, we could imagine H increasing if the minority group became an important electoral constituency. As explained in the introduction, one of the scope conditions is that the state has at least some interest in the security of the minority group. In other words, H is positive but that does not imply that a state is “innocent” if indiscriminate retaliation occurs. It just reflects that, due to various constraints, the state would not directly inflict the indiscriminate response against the minority. A state, however, could still be complicit during a retaliation episode from a non-state source. For instance, a small H could imply that as the state does not care that much about the security of the minority, it puts very little into the defensive infrastructure which raises the probability that indiscriminate retaliation would occur. The state thus gets some plausible deniability but still effectively makes the retaliation likely to occur. For example, in the 1921 Tulsa race riot or the 2002 Gujarat Hindu-Muslim riot, the relevant local authorities might not have been the main participants involved in directly harming the minority groups but they were blamed for taking little action to prevent it.18 Therefore, the amount of investment in the two infrastructures depends on both state capacity (represented by the budget, B) and the state’s willingness to care about the security of the minority (represented by the parameter, H). Although there are different conceptions of state capacity (e.g. fiscal, legal, etc.), resources are important for and would be positively correlated with all these different conceptions. Resources are thus a proxy for state capabilities (Fearon and Laitin, 2003) and for the sake of parsimony in the model I

18Minority groups sometimes have non-governmental sources of protection (e.g., rough terrain) and do not have to rely on the state. However, in the SI, I show how the main insights still hold under these alternative protection sources.

17 take the minimalist conception and let budget size, B, represent state capacity. A higher B means more can be spent on the two types of infrastructure. A higher H means the government cares more about the security of the minority.

2.3 Sequence

In sum, the game takes place over two periods and has the following sequence:

First Period

1. The government divides their budget between the countermilitancy infrastructure and the defensive infrastructure for the minority.

Second Period

2. Each minority member draws their grievances independently from a commonly known CDF F (·), and knows their own and their partner’s grievance level.

3. Within the pair of minority members, the following game occurs:

(a) Members choose simultaneously whether to engage or not engage in militancy. (b) If one member chooses to engage and the other chooses to not engage, then the latter can choose whether to inform or stay silent.

4. If militancy arises, then both minority members might face indiscriminate retaliation.

5. Payoﬀs are realized.

2.4 Solution concept

The solution concept will be a sub-game perfect equilibrium (SPE). In the second period, after the government has created the political environment, we will be solving for a symmetric SPE which maps the minority member’s grievances and their partner’s grievances onto a strategy denoted by σ. The mapping for a member i paired with a member j is as follows:

(αi, αj | C,D) 7→ σi(Ei ∈ {0, 1},Si ∈ {0, 1})

18 In the ﬁrst period, the government will be choosing levels of investments in their countermilitancy (C) and defensive (D) infrastructure that maximize their utility given their preferences (represented by H) and their capacity constraint (represented by B).

3 Analysis for minority members

Now that we have covered the framework of the model, by backwards induction we can proceed to the equilibrium analysis for the minority members in the second period. Substantively, the analysis here describes how the optimal actions for each minority member depends on (1) the grievance levels for both themselves and their partner and (2) the government investments from the ﬁrst period. In the main analysis, I solve the model for when the MPL takes high values (K − 1 > 1) due to space constraints and because the insights are clearest under this scenario, but I also present the analysis for other values of the MPL in the SI.19 All proofs are in the SI.

3.1 Cut points

The ﬁrst proposition characterizes the structure of the symmetric equilibrium.

Proposition I - Equilibrium in cut point strategies Any symmetric SPE will involve cut points in the grievance space.

The intuition here is that if one fixes their partner’s strategy, then one’s optimal choice depends on one’s level of grievances. Thus, if an SPE exists, it must be based on cut points. Using the payoff function described above and for a given pair of members i and j, if we fix j’s strategy then the four important cut points for i are as follows: 19With a moderate MPL, a free rider problem can exist amongst the minority members but the main insights will still hold. For low values of the MPL, the insights again still hold unless the MPL is so low such that its effect dominates any other effects.

19 1. If j chooses to not engage and stay silent, then it is better to engage than not iﬀ: z α ≥ α˜1 = + Π(D) · R i p(C)

2. If j chooses to engage, then it is better to engage than stay silent iﬀ:

z α ≥ α˜2 = i [K − 1] · p(C)

3. If j chooses to engage, then it is better to engage than inform iﬀ:

z Π(D) · R α ≥ α˜3 = + i K · p(C) K

4. If j chooses to engage, then it is better to stay silent than inform iﬀ:

4 αi ≥ α˜ = Π(D) · R

The structure of the cut points are intuitive. A larger opportunity cost - lower chances of success in militancy (p(C)), larger outside income (z), or a smaller MPL from militancy

(K) - makes engaging in militancy (Ei = 1) less attractive so the ﬁrst three cut-points increase. As the threat and size of indiscriminate retaliation (Π(D) · R) increase, then

engaging (Ei = 1) and staying silent (Ei = 0,Si = 1) become less appealing than not

engaging (Ei = 0) and informing (Ei = 0,Si = 0) and, consequently, the ﬁrst, third, and fourth cut points increase. Recall that we are assuming that failure at militancy is certain if one’s partner chooses to inform (i.e., participates in in-group policing).20 Thus, one would not engage in militancy if they knew their partner was informing.

As with many sequential games, multiple equilibria can exist and the next lemma states a property about the cardinality of the set of equilibria.

Lemma I - Amount of equilibria For every pair of grievance levels, either one or two symmetric SPE can exist.

20As mentioned before, this is not a crucial assumption.

20 Given the possible presence of two equilibria and with one’s actions affecting the payoffs for oneself and one’s partner, I assume the minority members choose the pareto optimal (pareto efficient) equilibrium which is stated in the following assumption.

Assumption I - Equilibrium selection Minority members choose the strategies speciﬁed in the pareto optimal SPE.

3.2 Militancy outcomes

There are only two possible worlds, deﬁned by the ordering of the cut points, that can arise in this model. I will explain the conditions for each one to arise before substantively describing what these worlds then represent. The two worlds are: Non-Silent World: α˜2 < α˜3 < α˜4 < α˜1 Silent World: α˜4 ≤ α˜3 ≤ α˜2 < α˜1 The reasoning behind the names of these worlds will become clearer later. The equilibrium actions and outcomes are going to depend on the world which arises. The next lemma explains how the investments by the government determine which world materializes.

Lemma II - The worlds For every level of investment in the countermilitancy infrastructure (C), there exists a ˆ threshold in the investment in defensive infrastructure D1(C) such that:

1. A Silent World materializes over a Non-Silent World when investment in the defensive ˆ infrastructure (D) is greater than the threshold (D1(C)).

ˆ 2. The threshold (D1(C)) is decreasing as investment in countermilitancy (C) increases.

The lemma states how a Silent World reﬂects conditions where, given the investment level in the countermilitancy infrastructure, the government investment in the defensive

21 infrastructure is suﬃciently large. Given these worlds, Lemma A.I in the SI describes the symmetric pareto optimal equilibrium strategies for the minority members. Although these equilibrium strategies are important, it is more relevant for us to understand how and when these strategies will lead to militancy arising as described below in Proposition II.

Proposition II - Militancy as an equilibrium outcome

1. In the Non-Silent World: Both members have grievances greater than α˜3, and both choose to engage.

2. In the Silent World:

(a) Both members have grievances greater than α˜2, and both choose to engage.

(b) A member has grievances greater than α˜1, and the other has grievances between α˜4 and α˜2 with the former engaging and the latter staying silent.

The names given to these worlds now become clearer. As defined before, militancy can emerge with a large operation (both minority members choose to engage) or a small operation (one minority member chooses to engage while the other stays silent). Grievances need to be relatively large in order for minority individuals to engage and, additionally, there has to be a sufficient amount of protection from indiscriminate retaliation in order for there to be small militant operations as an equilibrium outcome where one minority member stays silent. This is why small operations only emerge in the Silent World where there is a relatively sufficient amount being invested in the defensive infrastructure for the minority (refer to Lemma II). Based on this proposition, Figure 3 illustrates the constellation of grievances between a pair of minority members that are necessary for militancy to arise. In the Non-Silent World, the dark gray area represents the grievance coordinate space where large operations are attempted with both minority members choosing to engage in militancy. In the Silent World, this dark gray area exists along with a light gray area which represents the grievance

22 coordinate space where small operations are attempted with one member engaging and the other choosing to not engage but stay silent. Consider the subgame where a minority member is deciding whether to stay silent or inform on a partner who chooses to engage in militancy. If there was a minority group like Muslims in India today or African Americans in the South during the early post-Civil War period who felt suﬃciently insecure about protection then they would be in the Non-Silent World where it would be increasingly likely that minority members would choose to inform over staying silent (the fourth cut point, α˜4 is relatively high). As a result, staying silent in a small operation could not be an equilibrium outcome, because the heightened threat of indiscriminate retaliation means that those who would choose to stay silent have to be aggrieved to such a level that they would actually instead prefer to join their partner in engaging (i.e., a large operation). If the minority group felt a lower threat of indiscriminate retaliation (e.g., Muslims in Western Europe today or Catholics in Northern-Ireland from mid to late twentieth century), then we would be in a Silent World where choosing to stay silent over informing becomes more likely (the fourth cut point, α˜4, is now the lowest one). Small operations can now be an equilibrium outcome as there are some individuals who would not engage jointly but would stay silent if their partner was engaging. In the next section, we will explore how the characteristics of the state inﬂuence which world arises and, in turn, the equilibrium outcomes for the onset of minority militancy.

23 Figure 3: Constellation of grievances

Non-Silent World Silent World j’s grievances j’s grievances

α˜1 α˜1

α˜4 α˜2

α˜3 α˜3

α˜2 α˜4

α˜2 α˜3 α˜4 α˜1 α˜4 α˜3 α˜2 α˜1 i’s grievances i’s grievances

- Both engage

- One engages

- No one engages

4 Analysis for the government

As we have established the equilibrium actions and outcomes for the minority members, we will now analyze the ﬁrst period where the government chooses how to allocate their resources. Substantively, the main takeaway from the analysis here is that the interaction of two characteristics of the state - state capacity and state willingness - have equilibrium implications for the extent and type of minority militancy that arises. Building and expanding on Fearon and Laitin (1996), we will see how the state inﬂuences in-group policing. While discussing the main corollary below, I illustrate the applicability of the

24 model’s insights to various cases of minority militancy. All proofs are in the SI. The government is solving the following maximization problem in the ﬁrst period:

maximize V (C,D; H) = (1 − H) · [UM (M; C,D)|αi, αj] + H · [UIR(Π; D)] C,D E

subject to D + C = B

The expected amount of militancy successfully occurring depends on whether we are in the Non-Silent World or the Silent World and the actual location of the cut points, which is a function of the investments in countermilitancy infrastructure (C) and defensive infrastructure (D). Π(D) is just a function of D. From the budget constraint, we know that C = B − D and thus the constrained maximization problem of two variables can be rewritten as an unconstrained maximization problem of one variable where, for some H, the government will choose D∗(H) such that:

D∗(H) ∈ arg max V (D; H) 0≤D≤B

4.1 Budget allocation

The division of the budget will inﬂuence the equilibrium choices of minority members with regards to militancy. In the SI, Lemma A.II describes how the expected utility of minority militancy for the government changes with its investment choices. With this in mind, the next proposition addresses how the government’s optimal budget allocation (D∗(H)) will change according to its preferences (H).

Proposition III - Budget allocation This optimal investment in the defensive infrastructure, D∗(H), exists and if the government cares more (less) about the security of the minority (H), then it will increase (decrease) this optimal investment in the defensive infrastructure and militancy will be more (less) likely to occur.

25 The intuition behind this comparative static is straightforward. If the government cares more about the security of the minority (i.e., H increases), then the amount invested in their protection would increase. With the budget constraint, any increase in this investment would also result in less money for the countermilitancy infrastructure. This changed budget allocation makes staying silent and even engaging more appealing which, in turn, results in militancy being more likely to occur.

4.2 Capacity, willingness, and militancy

Now that we have characterized both the minority group members’ and the government’s equilibrium actions, we would want to know the relationship between militancy and the interaction between state capacity and state willingness. From Lemma II, the type of world that materializes depends on the relative amount of investment in the defensive infrastructure ˆ (D). If D is less than a certain threshold (D1(C)), then theNon-Silent World materializes. ˆ Another way to specify this condition is that we are in the Non-Silent World if D < D1(C) = z Π−1 where Π−1 is the inverse function of Π. p(C) · R · [K − 1] As we assume that Π is a decreasing, diﬀerentiable, and convex function, we know that

−1 ˆ Π and thus the threshold D1(C) are also decreasing, diﬀerentiable, and convex functions. This is important in graphically illustrating how the C x D parameter space is split between the diﬀerent worlds as depicted in Figure 4.

26 Figure 4: Split in worlds

Silent World

ˆ Non-Silent D1(C) World C

ˆ The dashed line represents the threshold D1(C). The Silent World materializes for any government investment portfolio where D is above this dashed line, and the Non-Silent World materializes when D is below this dashed line. Note that the dashed line will eventually intersect with the horizontal axis which is where the threshold equals 0. As the probability of indiscriminate retaliation occurring (Π) is bounded above by 1, once the inverse function Π−1 is evaluated at a number greater than 1 then it is not deﬁned. We next want to understand how capacity, represented by the government’s budget B, and willingness to care about the security of the minority, represented by the H parameter, inﬂuences minority militancy. The next corollary describes this relationship with the intuition illustrated in Figure 5.

Corollary I - Capacity and willingness

1. In low-capacity and high-capacity states, militancy will be less (more) likely to occur when willingness to protect is lower (higher).

27 2. If militancy does materialize, then the type varies according to state capacity:

• Low-capacity states: Only large operations occur • High-capacity states: Large and small operations occur

Figure 5: Capacity and willingness D

High H

Low H Low H C BL BH

The straight, solid lines are the budget constraints of a low-capacity government (BL) and a high-capacity government (BH ). By Proposition III, the optimal division of the budget depends on how much the government cares to make the minority group feel secure (H). If H is higher, the government will invest more in the defensive infrastructure, D, as reﬂected in Figure 5.

Let us focus ﬁrst on the low-capacity government. With any feasible budget allocation, low-capacity governments will always be in the Non-Silent World. When willingness to protect is low (Low H in Figure 5), then there is little invested in the defensive infrastructure (D) relative to the amount invested in the countermilitancy infrastructure (C), which reduces the likelihood that militancy occurs (Proposition III) and ensures no

28 small operations can occur due to two processes. First, this investment profile means that the threat of indiscriminate retaliation is sufficiently high which increases the incentive to participate in in-group policing. As a result, mainly due to this heightened threat of indiscriminate retaliation, staying silent if one’s partner is engaging cannot be an equilibrium outcome. Second, the cut points are higher which means engaging is less likely to occur as it is a less appealing option for more grievance levels. This particular configuration, for example, could be applied to explain the lack of militancy among Muslims in India (a relatively low-capacity country) today. Due to a history of indiscriminate retaliation (e.g., Hindu-Muslim riots) and even sometimes the political rhetoric, Muslims in India would perceive a less secure environment where there is a heightened threat of indiscriminate retaliation from non-state sources. Consequently, there would be a higher incentive to inform (i.e., participate in in-group policing) and a lower incentive to engage, and thus militancy would be less likely to occur. On the other hand, when willingness to protect is high (High H in Figure 5), then now more is invested in D which increases the likelihood that militancy will occur (Proposition III), and any attempted militancy will still take the form of large operations where both minority members would want to engage. Why do small operations still not occur? This is due to the low-capacity of the state where, for every value of D, there is very little that can be invested in C. Within this constrained budget, it cannot be an equilibrium that a minority member will stay silent when their partner is engaging as they can do better by engaging jointly because the low amount invested in C makes the chances of militant success higher. As a result, only large operations will materialize if militancy is attempted in equilibrium. This particular configuration could be applied to explain the militancy that has emerged in North-East India. In contrast to Muslims in India, these minority groups are in an environment where there is lower threat of indiscriminate retaliation from

29 non-state sources.21 This lower threat means that militancy would be more likely to occur. Additionally, the corollary suggests that the militancy that emerges within this minority population should be of a relatively larger scale (i.e., “large” instead of “small” operations) than the minority militancy that emerges in high-capacity states, and I present some data below in Figure 7 and in the SI to support this insight.

Let us now focus on the high-capacity state. Similar to the low-capacity state, when willingness to protect is low (high), then the amount invested in the defensive infrastructure is lower (higher) which decreases (increases) the likelihood that militancy will occur (Proposition III). However, the Silent World materializes for all budget allocations so militancy that emerges in high-capacity states can involve small operations. There can now be an equilibrium where a minority member stays silent for two reasons. The first reason stems from the opportunity cost logic and has been covered in the extant literature. Holding investment in D fixed at the same level as when there was low willingness in the low-capacity state (Low H in Figure 5), there will be an increase in the amount invested in C for the high-capacity state which considerably reduces the chances of militant success. Some minority members who would have engaged jointly with their partner in the low-capacity state now see militant success as much less likely and thus instead choose to stay silent if their partner is engaging in the high-capacity state. The second reason, however, stems from the protection-group policing dynamic introduced in this paper. If we hold investment in C fixed at the same level as when there was high willingness in the low-capacity state (High H in Figure 5), there will be an increase in the amount invested in D for the high-capacity state which will considerably reduce the threat of indiscriminate retaliation. Some minority members who would have informed on an engaging partner in the low-capacity state now feel much safer from indiscriminate

21See SI.

30 retaliation than before and choose to stay silent if their partner is engaging in the high-capacity state. Therefore, one reason small operations can emerge in high-capacity states stems from the protection group policing dynamic. This particular conﬁguration could be applied to explain the Catholic Republican militancy in Northern Ireland from the mid to late twentieth century or Islamist militancy in Western Europe today. These are both cases of militancy emerging among minority groups in relatively higher state capacity environments where there is a considerably lower threat of facing indiscriminate retaliation on the scale of what Muslims in India could potentially face. The model illustrates how this lower threat would increase the likelihood that militancy emerges by reducing the incentive for in-group policing and making engaging more appealing. Furthermore, if militancy does arise, the model suggests that smaller-scale operations are more likely to emerge within these minority groups than within the minority militancy that emerges in low-capacity states, and I present some data below in Figure 7 and in the SI to support this insight.

The model incorporates factors from grievance-, social network-, and opportunity cost- based explanations but the protection-group policing dynamic plays an important role for how these other factors can affect minority militant mobilization. For minority members, a higher level of grievances increases the appeal of militancy but this is not sufficient for militant acts to emerge if there is little protection from the indiscriminate retaliation. The model shows that networks matter (the types of minority members linked together matters) but an implication from the model is that tight social networks and low group fragmentation might not be conducive to the viability of militancy as they might be in other contexts (see Larson and Lewis, 2018). Under the threat of indiscriminate retaliation, if it is more likely that different types of people will see one’s actions (especially with tight social networks) with regards to militancy then this will increase the deterrence effect of in-group policing.

31 Furthermore, if we were not to account for the protection-group policing dynamic (influenced by D), then we would simply only focus on the opportunity cost calculation influenced by the investment in the countermilitancy infrastructure - C (Grossman, 1991; Enders and Sandler, 2002; Collier and Hoeffler, 2002, 2004; Miguel, Satyanath and Sergenti, 2004; Humphreys, 2005; Rosendorff and Sandler, 2010; Dube and Vargas, 2013; Bazzi and Blattman, 2014). We would thus only see how the countermilitancy infrastructure is inversely related to militancy and it would imply that a higher capacity state can invest more in this infrastructure thereby increasing the opportunity cost of militancy and reducing the likelihood of militancy occurring. However, by also accounting for the protection-group policing dynamic, we can explain how, counterintutively, low-capacity states can provide an environment that is less conducive to minority-linked militancy than high-capacity states. A low-capacity state that provides little protection to the minority is able to effectively reduce militancy by enhancing the threat of indiscriminate retaliation even if there is no substantial investment in the countermilitancy infrastructure. This threat increases the incentive for minority members to not engage and to inform (i.e., participate in in-group policing) on any potential militants which in turn deters other minority members from engaging in militancy. If the optimal resource allocation in high capacity states however allows for considerable minority protection then even with sizable spending on countermilitancy, the reduced indiscriminate retaliation threat could increase the likelihood of militancy occurring as more people choose to stay silent than inform. Finally, if we take small operations to represent activities such as small-cell terrorist attacks and large operations to represent relatively larger resourced attacks (e.g., large-cell terrorist attacks, insurgency, etc.), then the model can also help explain why minority militancy will more likely take the form of large operations in developing countries while smaller operations will more likely emerge in industrialized countries. This finding is consistent with other literature showing how the lower relative capacity of an opposition

32 militant group vis-á-vis the state leads to the adoption of irregular over conventional tactics (Bueno de Mesquita, 2013; Carter, 2015; Wright, 2017). However, in contrast to this literature, I am pointing out how another mechanism - the protection-group policing dynamic - can explain why irregular tactics are more likely to be employed in high-capacity states as the threat of indiscriminate retaliation in low-capacity states discourages people from being silent witnesses to militancy.

5 Suggestive empirical evidence

The data presented here illustrate variation in the amount and type of minority militancy that is consistent with the insights from the model. Additionally, in the SI, I apply these insights in narratives to contrast Islamist militancy in India with that in the UK and to explain the minority militancy that emerged in various parts of India - Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), the North-East, and Punjab. The focus of this paper was theoretical and not empirical: I developed a formal model to capture the protection-group policing dynamic in order to study the role of the state in inﬂuencing the onset of minority militancy. To be sure, these data below are descriptive as opposed to causal and future empirical research should more rigorously address the insights.

5.1 Amount of minority militancy

One of the model’s insights is that the enhanced threat of indiscriminate retaliation will reduce the likelihood of militancy emerging within a minority group. Figure 6 below uses individual-level militant data from the John Jay & Artis (JJA) database to illustrate the connection between the onset of Islamist militancy and the threat of indiscriminate retaliation from places where Muslims are a minority group. Given that it is the best systematic individual-level data for militant groups to this author’s knowledge, the JJA data are presented in this paper. In the SI, I discuss the

33 limitations of the data but argue that these limitations should not lead to a downward bias for Muslims in India. In Figure 6, I present the data for individuals by their place of birth but in the SI I also examine the data in other ways and show that the results remain consistent.

Figure 6: Islamist militancy

- Actual Amount - Expected Amount Note: Estimates with Agresti-Coull conﬁdence intervals (Brown, Cai and Dasgupta, 2001). Data on individuals taken from the John Jay and Artis Database. Data on Muslim population taken from 2011 country censuses and Pew Research: Religion and Public Life. Estimates calculated assuming a binomial distribution of people who join these groups.

Even though Muslims are a minority in India, India has the second largest Muslim population in the world. India is also a country where there is a heightened threat of indiscriminate retaliation for Muslims given the history of Hindu-Muslim riots and relatively frequent communal political rhetoric.22 It is true that the state governments, not the federal government, are responsible for security and preventing indiscriminate

22This applies even in the current political climate. For example, Yogi Adityanah, the BJP Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh, is renowned for making anti-Muslim statements.

34 retaliation. However, as I explain in the SI, it would still highly likely be the case that Indian Muslims, regardless of the state that they live in (excluding J&K but, as explained in the SI, this would not matter for the insight), would perceive a sufficiently high threat of indiscriminate retaliation from non-state sources if violent transgressions were committed by someone from their community. Assuming a binomial distribution for individuals who join militant groups, Figure 6 shows how Indian Muslims are underrepresented in Islamist militant groups: the expected amount of Indian Muslims in these groups exceeds the actual number. However, in the other places (the UK, US, Canada, and other EU countries) where Muslims are a minority and the threat of violent indiscriminate retaliation is greatly reduced, Muslims are overrepresented in Islamist militant groups. To be clear, given that we are only looking at the population of militants, we cannot estimate the probability of militancy conditional on being from the different countries/regions.23 However, Figure 6 shows the differences in the representation across these countries/regions which is still consistent with the insight that the enhanced threat of indiscriminate retaliation can reduce the likelihood of militancy emerging.

5.2 Type of minority militancy

The other insight of the model is that, if minority militancy does emerge, smaller-scale militant operations are more likely in higher capacity states. Using data on the number of perpetrators per attack from the Global Terrorism Database, I look at minority militancy within the UK and India in Figure 7. Within India, I look at the militant groups in J&K and the North-East. For the former state, I exclude infamous militant groups based in Pakistan and whose members are mainly Pakistani (e.g., Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohamed). Within the UK, I look at Irish Republican militant groups (that emerged among the Catholic minority in Northern Ireland) and Islamist militant groups.

23The data mean that we are sampling on the dependent variable.

35 Figure 7: Scale of minority militant operations

Note: Data taken from the Global Terrorism Database. For India, J&K and the North-East insurgent groups are included. For the UK, Irish Republican and Islamist militant groups are included.

If we take the number of perpetrators per attack to reﬂect the size of an operation, then Figure 7 illustrates how the minority militancy that has emerged in a high-capacity state, like the UK, is of a smaller-scale than that which has emerged in a low-capacity state like India. This result is consistent with the insight of how the average scale of militancy emerging among minority groups would be inversely related to state capacity. In the SI, I show the results still hold if we look at the North-East and J&K militant groups from India separately.

6 Conclusion

To explain the onset of minority militancy, this paper has argued that we need to account for an understudied but important mechanism, the protection-group policing dynamic, where

36 the threat of indiscriminate retaliation from non-state sources incentivizes minority members to police their group in order to prevent militancy from emerging within their community, and the magnitude of the threat is determined by the actions and characteristics of the state. Strategic interaction is thus occurring on two levels - within the minority group itself and between the minority group and the state. I developed a formal model that incorporated these strategic tensions in order to study the relationship between minority militancy and the interaction between state capacity and state willingness to protect. The insights help us understand the variation in the types of minority militancy emerging and some counterintuitive differences in militant outcomes between low-capacity and high-capacity states. This dynamic moderates and interacts with the effects stemming from factors suggested by existing frameworks - namely grievances, social networks, and opportunity costs. Therefore, ignoring the protection-group policing dynamic adversely affects our ability to explain the onset of militancy among minorities. Future empirical work can more rigorously address the insights of the model and this paper provides theoretical reasons to collect data on in-group policing and perceptions of protection from indiscriminate retaliation in order to explain the onset of minority militancy. Data on in-group policing would be difficult to collect especially if informing is of an informal nature, and one would need to find exogenous changes in the perceptions of protection from indiscriminate retaliation emanating from non-state sources. I still do provide some supportive empirical evidence for the insights of the model and, in the SI, I also apply these insights using narratives to help explain militancy (or the lack thereof) among Indian Muslims, UK Muslims, and other minorities in India.

There are two scope conditions for the argument in this paper. First, I am addressing how militancy emerges within a minority group speciﬁcally, and not just militancy in general. Second, the state is assumed to at least have some interest in the security of the

37 minority (i.e., the H parameter in the model is positive), which could stem from internal pressures due to legal considerations and norms, and/or from external pressures due to potential international sanctioning. As mentioned in the introduction, these scope conditions are not restrictive and apply in many cases across time and space.

Finally, given the sensitivity of this topic, it is important to be clear on two points. First, I do not assume that all marginalized minority group members are inclined toward militancy. For example, within Indian Islam, there are many historic and modern voices advocating non-violent approaches to addressing genuine grievances (Hasan, 2008; Sajjad, 2014). Within each minority group, the vast majority would not view militancy as legitimate, and only a small proportion would engage in or accept violence. This paper speaks to the puzzle of this violent sub-minority within an otherwise peaceful minority: this violent subgroup has emerged within some marginalized minority groups but not others. Second, this paper is not advocating for non-state indiscriminate retaliation threats as a countermilitancy strategy to control political violence. In fact, an extension of the model (in the SI) shows how this problematic trade-oﬀ can be eased where more protection can be given if policies can simultaneously be implemented to reduce minority grievances. The aim of this paper is to simply elucidate an important dynamic in the emergence of minority militancy.

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44 Supplementary Information: Militancy Among Minority Groups: The Protection-Group Policing Dynamic

October 7, 2020

1 Contents

1 Proof of Proposition I 4

2 Proof of Lemma I 5

3 Proof of Lemma II 6

4 Lemma A.I and proof 7

5 Proof of Proposition II 9

6 Lemma A.II and proof 10

7 Proof of Proposition III 12

8 Proof of Corollary I 16

9 Analysis for moderate and low levels of MPL in militancy 16 9.1 Moderate MPL ...... 16 9.2 Low MPL ...... 21

10 Grievances as a function of protection 22

11 Repeated game and dilemmas for retaliation and militancy 23

12 Uncertainty about grievances 24

13 Non-governmental sources for protection 31

14 Minority-favorable policy 33

15 Providing a good or service to the minority 35

16 Probability of success 37

17 Imperfect Informing 44

18 Costs of non-participation 46

19 Magnitude of indiscriminate retaliation 47

2 20 Suggestive empirical evidence 48 20.1 Amount of minority militancy ...... 48 20.1.1 JJA Data ...... 48 20.1.2 Charts ...... 49 20.1.3 Tables ...... 51 20.2 Type of minority militancy ...... 52

21 Indian Muslims and UK Muslims 53

22 Variation across minorities in India 61 22.1 Punjab, Jammu & Kashmir, and the North East ...... 61 22.2 Lack of militancy among Scheduled Castes and Other Backward Classes ...... 64

23 References for online appendix 67

3 1 Proof of Proposition I

Without loss of generality, let us take minority member 2’s strategy as ﬁxed, and let us look at minority member 1’s optimal strategy. We will look at the case of minority member 2 choosing a pure strategy, but the explanation can also extend to the case when minority

member 2 adopts a mixed strategy. We will use Uα1 in the proof.

• Member 2 chooses to not engage and stay silent (E2 = 0,S2 = 1)

It is best for member 1 to engage (E1 = 1) iﬀ

z α > + Π(D) · R 1 p(C)

• Member 2 chooses to engage (E2 = 1,S2 = 1 or E2 = 1,S2 = 0)

It is best for member 1 to engage (E1 = 1) iﬀ both the following hold:

z α > 1 [K − 1]p(C)

z Π(D) · R α > + 1 K · p(C) K

It is best for member 1 to not engage and stay silent (E1 = 0,S1 = 1) iﬀ both the following hold:

α1 > Π(D) · R

z α < 1 [K − 1]p(C)

It is best for member 1 to not engage and inform (E1 = 0,S1 = 0) iﬀ both the following hold

α1 < Π(D) · R

z Π(D) · R α < + 1 K · p(C) K

4 • Member 2 chooses to not engage and inform (E2 = 0,S2 = 0)

Then for all levels of α1, it is best for member 1 to not engage. With the exception of when one’s partner is choosing to not engage and inform (as failure in militancy is then certain), if we hold one’s partner’s strategies ﬁxed, then the optimal action is determined by cut-points in the grievance space. Therefore, this implies that if a pareto optimal symmetric SPE exists, then it will be determined by cut-points in the grievance space as well.

2 Proof of Lemma I

In the subgame where minority members have to choose whether to stay silent or inform on their partner, we know that if a minority member has a grievance level at least as high (less than) as α˜4 then they choose to stay silent (inform). Therefore, we will prove this lemma by looking at all combinations of grievance levels of minority group members with regards to this fourth cut-point - α˜4.

If both minority members have grievance levels less than α˜4, then they would each inform on their partner in the subgame. As one would not engage if they knew their partner was going to inform on them, if in equilibrium one person chooses to not engage and inform (E = 0,S = 0), then their partner could only choose to not engage and inform as well (E = 0,S = 0). The only other possible equilibrium that could exist here would be for both minority members to choose to engage (but in the oﬀ-the-equilibrium path subgame they would choose to inform) (E = 1,S = 0). Therefore, there are at most two SPEs here.

If one minority member has a grievance level at least as high α˜4, while the other has a grievance level less than this cutpoint then the former member would choose to stay silent and the latter member would choose to inform in the subgame. In an equilibrium, if the latter member chooses to not engage and inform (E = 0,S = 0) then their partner would

5 not engage (as they would fail with certainty if they tried) and thus can only choose to not engage (E = 0,S = 1). If this is an equilibrium, then there cannot be an equilibrium where the member, who has a grievance level less than α˜4, chooses to engage while their partner does not engage but stay silent (from Proposition I). The only other equilibrium that could be possible would be for both minority members to engage. If on the other hand, there is an equilibrium where the minority member, who has a grievance level less than α˜4, choose to engage (E = 1,S = 0) while their partner chooses to not engage and stay silent (E = 0,S = 1), then there cannot be an equilibrium where the latter member chooses to jointly engage with the former (from Proposition I). Therefore, again there could only be at most two SPEs here. The ﬁnal situation is where both minority members have grievance levels at least as high as α˜4. Thus, both minority members would stay silent in the subgame. If one member chooses to engage (E = 1,S = 1) in an equilibrium, then the other member would either choose to not engage and stay silent (E = 0,S = 1) or would choose to engage (E = 1,S = 1) jointly depending on their grievance level. If they both choose to engage then that’s the sole equilibrium (from Proposition I). If, on the other hand, there is an equilibrium where one stays silent (E = 0,S = 1) while the other engages (E = 1,S = 1), then there could possibly be another equilibrium where the roles are reversed (the one who stays silent now engages, and the one who engages now stays silent). Thus, again, there are most two SPES here.

3 Proof of Lemma II

When the MPL from militancy is large (K ≥ 2), then it can be easily shown that

1. z < p(C) · Π(D) · R · [K − 1] if and only if the Non-Silent World materializes

2. z ≥ p(C) · Π(D) · R · [K − 1] if and only if the Silent World materializes

6 R > z by assumption; p(C) = 1 when C = 0, and Π(D) = 1 when D = 0; and p(C) → 0 when C → ∞ and Π(D) → 0 when D → ∞. Moreover, the right hand side of the above inequalities are continuous as p(C) and Π(D) are continuous. Therefore, by the ˆ intermediate value theorem, for every C, there exists a D1(C) such that ˆ z = p(C) · Π(D1(C)) · R · [K − 1]. As Π(D) is decreasing in D, that means that when ˆ ˆ D > D1(C), then z > p(C) · Π(D) · R · [K − 1] and when when D < D1(C) then z < p(C) · Π(D) · R · [K − 1]. Also, note that p(C) is decreasing in C. Therefore, the ˆ threshold D1(C) would also be decreasing in C. This establishes the ﬁrst and second part of the Lemma.

4 Lemma A.I and proof

Lemma A.I - Symmetric pareto optimal equilibrium strategies The symmetric pareto optimal equilibrium strategies for member 1 when paired with member 2 is the following:

• In the Non-Silent World:

3 1. If α1 < α˜ then choose (E1 = 0,S1 = 0).

3 4 3 2. If α˜ ≤ α1 < α˜ and α2 < α˜ then choose (E1 = 0,S1 = 0).

4 3 3. If α1 ≥ α˜ and α2 < α˜ then choose (E1 = 0,S1 = 1).

3 4 3 4. If α˜ ≤ α1 < α˜ and α2 ≥ α˜ then choose (E1 = 1,S1 = 0).

4 3 5. If α1 ≥ α˜ and α2 ≥ α˜ then choose (E1 = 1,S1 = 1).

• In the Silent World:

4 1. If α1 < α˜ then choose (E1 = 0,S1 = 0).

4 2 2. If α˜ ≤ α1 < α˜ then choose (E1 = 0,S1 = 1).

2 1 2 3. If α˜ ≤ α1 < α˜ and α2 < α˜ then choose (E1 = 0,S1 = 1).

7 2 2 4. If α1 ≥ α˜ and α2 ≥ α˜ then choose (E1 = 1,S1 = 1).

1 4 5. If α1 ≥ α˜ and α2 ≥ α˜ then choose (E1 = 1,S1 = 1).

Note that if a minority member was choosing to not engage and inform, then the other minority member would not choose to engage because they would fail with certainty. We will ﬁrst prove the Lemma with regards to the Non-Silent World. Without loss of

3 4 generality let us look at the perspective of minority member 1. If α1 < α˜ , then α1 < α˜ as α˜3 < α˜4. This implies that if member 2 was engaging, member 1 would prefer to inform

3 than stay silent, and would prefer to inform than engage. Furthermore, as α1 < α˜ also

1 implies that α1 < α˜ , this also means that member 1 would not engage if they knew that

3 member 2 was staying silent. Therefore, when α1 < α˜ , not engaging and informing is the preferred strategy of member 1 independent of member 2’s strategy.

3 Due to the above reasoning, if α2 < α˜ , then member 1 would never want to engage. The only way member 1’s grievances would impact actions is in what happens oﬀ the

4 equilibrium path. If α1 < α˜ , then member 1 would choose to not engage but would inform

4 if their partner engaged. If α1 ≥ α˜ , then member 1 would choose to not engage but would stay silent if their partner engaged.

3 2 If α1 > α˜ , then we know that α1 > α˜ . This means that if member 2 was choosing to engage, member 1 would also prefer to engage than any of the other options. This is the pareto optimal equilibrium as both minority members are better oﬀ in this equilibrium than one where both choose to not engage and inform. This establishes the Lemma with regards to the Non-Silent World.

4 4 3 Let us now focus on the Silent World. Let us assume α1 < α˜ . As α˜ < α˜ , this means

3 that α1 < α˜ too. Thus, member 1 prefers to inform than to engage or stay silent if member 2 was choosing to engage. Furthermore as α˜4 < α˜1, this also means that member 1 would not want to engage if their partner chose to stay silent. In other words, not engaging

8 and informing is the preferred strategy.

4 2 If α˜ ≤ α1 < α˜ , then, independent of member 2’s grievances, member 1 would prefer to stay silent than to inform or engage if their partner chose to engage. Additionally, they

2 1 would not want to engage if their partner was staying silent (α1 < α˜ < α˜ ).

2 1 3 2 3 If α˜ ≤ α1 < α˜ , then α1 > α˜ as α˜ > α˜ . Thus, member 1 prefers to engage over any other choice if member 2 is also choosing to engage. However, member 1 would not want to

1 engage alone if member 2 chose to not engage and stay silent as α1 < α˜ . Therefore, if

2 α2 < α˜ (which would indicate that member 2 prefers to stay silent than engage if their

partner was engaging), then member 1 would choose to not engage. However, if both α1

2 and α2 are at least as big as α˜ , then both members would engage and neither would want to deviate from their respective actions. Both minority members choosing to not engage and stay silent is not a pareto optimal equilibrium in this case because both minority members can improve their utility by choosing to engage jointly.

1 If α1 ≥ α˜ , then now member 1 would be willing to engage as long as member 2 would

4 4 choose to stay silent (i.e. if α2 ≥ α˜ ). Therefore, under these circumstances, if α2 < α˜ then member 1 would not engage as they know that member 2 would inform (as described

4 above), but if α2 ≥ α˜ then member 1 would always choose to engage as member 2 would at least stay silent. This establishes the Lemma with regards to the Silent World.

5 Proof of Proposition II

We will prove this proposition for each World. By Lemma A.I, in the Non-Silent World, if both members have grievances greater than α˜3, then they both would choose to engage. In order for a small operation to emerge, one person would need to want to stay silent - their

9 grievances would have to be at least α˜4 and smaller than α˜2 - and the other person would want to engage if they knew their partner was staying silent - their grievances would have to be at least α˜1. However, for the former person, if their grievances were at least α˜4, then their grievances would also be larger than α˜2 and α˜3 (as α˜2 < α˜3 < α˜4 due to the relatively increased threat of indiscriminate retaliation). As speciﬁed in Lemma A.I., this person would not want to stay silent but would want to deviate to engaging. Thus, there can only be large operations in the Non-Silent World. This establishes the Proposition with regards to the Non-Silent World.

In the Silent World, by Lemma A.I., if both members have grievances greater than α˜2, then they would both want to engage. As stated above, for there to be a small operation, one person needs to choose to stay silent and the other person needs to choose to engage if they knew their partner was staying silent. By Lemma A.I., this is satisﬁed if if one person has their grievances between α˜4 and α˜2, and the other person has grievances of at least α˜1. This establishes the Proposition with regards to Silent World.

6 Lemma A.II and proof

Lemma A.II - Expected utility of militancy for the government In the interior of the Non-Silent World and the Silent World, as D increases (decreases) the

expected utility of militancy occurring for the government (E[UM ]) will decrease (increase)

At the boundaries of where the World’s transition, the probabilities of two people, one person, or no one attempting to engage are not diﬀerentiable (even though the probabilities are always continuous). Thus, this Lemma is with regards to the interior space within each

10 world. With the budget constraint, as more is spent on D then less is spent on C. Furthermore, it can be easily checked then that:

dα˜1 dα˜2 dα˜3 dα˜4 < 0, < 0, < 0, < 0 dD dD dD dD

This is not surprising as, intuitively, if more is spent on protecting the minority from indiscriminate retaliation than on the countermilitancy infrastructure, that would make engaging more preferable than the other options, and would make staying silent more preferable than informing. Thus, all these cut-points would fall. We will use this in proving

Lemma A.II. Additionally, we know that UM (2) < UM (1) < UM (0). Without loss of

generality and for simplicity let us assume that the UM (0) = 0. In the Non-Silent World, the expected utility of militancy occurring for the government is the following:

3 2 E[UM ] = [1 − F (˜α )] · UM (2) · p(B − D) Diﬀerentiating this function with respect to D yields:

d [U ] dα˜3 E M = − 2 · [1 − F (˜α3)] · f(˜α3) · · U (2) · p(B − D) dD dD M

0 3 2 − p (B − D) · [1 − F (˜α )] · UM (2) < 0

This establishes Lemma A.II with respect to the Non-Silent World.

In the Silent World, the expected utility of militancy for the government is the following:

2 2 E[UM ] = [1 − F (˜α )] · UM (2) · p(B − D)

1 2 4 + 2 · [1 − F (˜α )] · [F (˜α ) − F (˜α )] · UM (1) · p(B − D) Diﬀerentiating this function with respect to D yields:

11 d [U ] dα˜2 E M = f(˜α2) · [−2 · [1 − F (˜α2)] · U (2) + [1 − F (˜α1)] · U (1)] · p(B − D) dD dD M M dα˜1 − [F (˜α2) − F (˜α4)] · f(˜α1) · · U (1) · p(B − D) dD M dα˜4 − [1 − F (˜α1)] · f(˜α4) · · U (1) · p(B − D) dD M

0 2 2 − p (B − D) · [1 − F (˜α )] · UM (2)

0 1 2 4 − p (B − D) · 2 · [1 − F (˜α )] · [F (˜α ) − F (˜α )] · UM (1) < 0

This establishes Lemma A.II with respect to the Silent World.

7 Proof of Proposition III

Note that:

V (D; H) = (1 − H) · E[UM (M; D)|αi, αj] + H · [UIR(Π; D)]

It is clear that [0,B] is a compact set. Thus, to prove that D∗(H) exists (i.e. a maximum exists), we will only need to show that V (D; H) is continuous. UIR is continuous, by assumption, in Π(D). By assumption, Π(D) is also continuous in D, and therefore UIR is continuous in D as well. E[UM ] is continuous as the probabilities of M = 2, M = 1, and M = 0 are continuous even though they are not diﬀerentiable at the points where the World’s transition. E[UM ] is continuous in each World but is also diﬀerent in each World. However, at the boundary point where the Non-Silent World becomes the

4 3 2 1 Silent World (α˜ =α ˜ =α ˜ < α˜ ), E[UM ] is the same in the Non-Silent World and the

Silent World. Therefore E[UM ] is also continuous even as the World’s change, and thus

E[UM ] is continuous in D. As E[UM ] and UIR are continuous in D, then V (D; H) is continuous and therefore D∗(H) exists. For the next part of the proof, we cannot just simply use ﬁrst order conditions a (1) s

12 E[UM ] is not diﬀerentiable at the points when the Non-Silent World transitions into the Silent World, and (2) V is not necessarily concave everywhere in D as it will depend on the functional form of the distribution of grievances. Instead, we will prove this Proposition through revealed preferences.

Let D∗(H˙ ) be the arg max set when H = H˙ . Let H¨ > H˙ , and let D∗(H¨ ) be in the ∗ ˙ ∗ ¨ corresponding arg max set. Let D1 ∈ D (H) and D2 ∈ D (H). By deﬁnition of the arg max:

˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ (1 − H) · E[UM (M; D1)] + H · [UIR(Π; D1)] ≥ (1 − H) · E[UM (M; D2)] + H · [UIR(Π; D2)]

¨ ¨ ¨ ¨ (1 − H) · E[UM (M; D2)] + H · [UIR(Π; D2)] ≥ (1 − H) · E[UM (M; D1)] + H · [UIR(Π; D1)]

Combining the inequalities yields:

¨ ˙ ¨ ˙ (H − H) · (E[UM (M; D1)] − UIR(Π; D1)) ≥ (H − H) · (E[UM (M; D2)] − UIR(Π; D2))

UIR(Π; D2) − UIR(Π; D1) ≥ E[UM (M; D2)] − E[UM (M; D1)]

Now, we will consider the ways that this inequality can be satisﬁed.

• If D1 ≤ D2:

UIR(Π; D) is increasing in D as Π is decreasing in D by deﬁnition which implies that

UIR(Π; D2) ≥ UIR(Π; D1). Therefore, the left hand side of the inequality is at least

zero. Now, if E[UM (M; D1)] ≥ E[UM (M; D2)], then the whole inequality is satisﬁed.

However, if E[UM (M; D1)] < E[UM (M; D2)], then this would imply that D1 is not in the arg max set when H = H˙ as then:

˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ (1 − H) · E[UM (M; D1)] + H · UIR(Π; D1) < (1 − H) · E[UM (M; D2)] + H · UIR(Π; D2)

This is a contradiction.

13 • If D1 > D2:

UIR(Π; D) is increasing in D as Π is decreasing in D by deﬁnition, which implies

that UIR(Π; D1) > UIR(Π; D2). Therefore, the left hand side of the inequality is

negative. Now, if E[UM (M; D1)] ≤ E[UM (M; D2)], then the inequality cannot be

satisﬁed. Moreover, if E[UM (M; D1)] > E[UM (M; D2)] then this would imply that D2 is not in the arg max set when H = H¨ as then:

¨ ¨ ¨ ¨ (1 − H) · E[UM (M; D2)] + H · UIR(Π; D2) < (1 − H) · E[UM (M; D1)] + H · UIR(Π; D1)

This is a contradiction.

Therefore, the inequality can only be satisﬁed when D1 ≤ D2 and

E[UM (M; D1)] ≥ E[UM (M; D2)]. The latter condition implies that the likelihood that

militancy will occur when D = D2 is at least as high as when D = D1.

To see why these inequalities are strict, we will ﬁrst look at when we are within each World and when we are at the boundary points where the World’s transition. Although

E[UM ] is not differentiable at every point, it is differentiable within each World (excluding the boundary points). To see why D∗(H) will increase, differentiating the government’s utility function results in: d [U ] dU (1 − H) · E M + H · IR dD dD

If D∗(H) is chosen within a World for an H, then this derivative would equal 0 with d [U ] dU E M < 0 and IR > 0. If H increases, then the derivative would be positive which dD dD means that D would also have to increase.

Now we will look at the boundary points where the Worlds transition. We will need the following lemma:

14 Lemma A.III - Boundary points At the boundary point where the World’s transition, increasing (decreasing) D will increase (decrease) the likelihood of militancy occurring.

This is clear by looking at Figure 3. Increasing D reduces the amount spent on C, and thus, at a boundary point, if one increases D then this will mean that militancy will be attempted in a larger portion of the grievance coordinate space than before.

By Lemma A.III, if D∗(H) is the boundary point then it means increasing D by a marginal amount should have a zero eﬀect on the government’s utility. If H increases then this means that it would be optimal for D to increase as well.

Therefore, D1 < D2 and E[UM (M; D1)] > E[UM (M; D2)]. This establishes Proposition III.

It can similarly be shown that if the government puts less weight on making the minority feel secure (i.e. H¨ < H˙ ), then the analogous inequality will only be satisﬁed when

D1 > D2 and E[UM (M; D1)] < E[UM (M; D2)].

However, D∗(H) is not necessarily unique given that increasing D has opposite eﬀects on UIR and E[UM ]. Therefore, this proposition shows how the all the values in the set of D∗(H¨ ) are larger than all the values in the set of D∗(H˙ ) when H¨ > H˙ .

15 8 Proof of Corollary I

By Proposition III, we know that if willingness to make the minority feel secure is low (high), then less (more) is invested in the defensive infrastructure and the likelihood of militancy occurring will be decreasing (increasing) in the equilibrium. This establishes the ﬁrst part of the Corollary.

Recall that from Proposition II, large operations only occur in the Non-Silent World, while large and small operations occur in the Silent World. By Lemma II, we know that the ˆ threshold for D1(C) is decreasing in C. Thus, in order for the government to be only in the ˆ Non-Silent World then clearly its budget constraint has to be less than D1(0). Additionally, ˆ ˆ the budget line cannot intersect the D1(C) line. We have further shown that D1(C) = z Π−1 . By assumption, Π(D) is a decreasing, convex function, so we p(C) · R · [K − 1] know that the inverse Π−1(D) is also a decreasing, convex function. The slope of the budget line is -1 and thus the budget line also has to be small enough such that it falls below the ˆ D1(C) line.

9 Analysis for moderate and low levels of MPL in

militancy

In this section, we will analyze the model when K < 2. Note that there is then some level of the K = K˙ where z = R · [K˙ − 1].

9.1 Moderate MPL

Let us ﬁrst look at the analysis when the MPL is moderate in size (K < 2, but not too small). I show here that if the MPL is small but not too small such that K is at least larger

16 than K˙ then all the substantive insights from the paper still hold but a new world emerges: Silent with Mixing World: α˜4 < α˜3 < α˜1 ≤ α˜2

K − 1 1. z < p(C) · Π(D) · R · [K − 1] < p(C) · Π(D) · R · if and only if the Non-Silent 2 − K World materializes

K − 1 2. p(C) · Π(D) · R · [K − 1] ≤ z < p(C) · Π(D) · R · if and only if the Silent World 2 − K materializes

K − 1 3. p(C) · Π(D) · R · [K − 1] < p(C) · Π(D) · R · ≤ z if and only if the Silent with 2 − K Mixing World materializes

The analysis for the Non-Silent World and the Silent World all holds, but there is now an additional world - Silent with Mixing World. Similar to the Silent World, Silent with Mixing World reflects conditions where, given the investment level in the countermilitancy infrastructure, the government investment in the defensive infrastructure is sufficiently large. However, the difference lies in the fact that there is now an area of the grievance space where mixed strategies will be used. The equilibrium strategies for the minority members in the Silent with Mixing World are:

4 1. If α1 < α˜ then choose (E1 = 0,S1 = 0).

4 1 2. If α˜ ≤ α1 < α˜ then choose (E1 = 0,S1 = 1).

1 4 3. If α1 ≥ α˜ and α2 < α˜ then choose (E1 = 0,S1 = 1).

1 4 1 4. If α1 ≥ α˜ and α˜ ≤ α2 ≤ α˜ then choose (E1 = 1,S1 = 1).

1 2 2 5. If α˜ ≤ α1 < α˜ and α2 ≥ α˜ then choose (E1 = 0,S1 = 1).

2 1 6. If α1 ≥ α˜ and α2 ≥ α˜ then choose (E1 = 1,S1 = 1).

17 1 2 1 2 7. If α˜ < α1 < α˜ and α˜ < α2 < α˜ then choose (E1 = 1,S1 = 1) with probability q1

and choose (E1 = 0,S1 = 1) with probability 1 − q1 where: p(C) · [α2 − Π(D) · R] − z q1 = p(C) · [2 · α2 − Π(D) · R] − p(C) · K · α2

Based on these equilibrium strategies, militancy could arise in equilibrium in the following ways:

1. Both members have grievances greater than α˜2 and both choose to engage.

2. A member has grievances greater than α˜1 and the other has grievances between α˜4 and α˜1 with the former engaging and the latter staying silent.

3. A member has grievances greater than α˜2 and the other has grievances between α˜1 and α˜2 with the former engaging and the latter staying silent.

4. Both members have grievances between α˜1 and α˜2, then the probability that at least

one member engages in militant violence is 1 − (1 − q1)(1 − q2) with probabilities q1

and q2 deﬁned above.

The corresponding plot of the constellation of grievances for militancy to arise in this world would thus look like this:

18 Silent with Mixing World j’s grievances

- Both engage α˜2

- One engages α˜1

- No one engages α˜3

- Both use a mixed strategy α˜4

α˜4 α˜3 α˜1 α˜2 i’s grievances

In the Silent with Mixing World there is an area of the grievance coordinate space where both minority members choose mixed strategies in equilibrium. This arises because the MPL from militancy is not too high (i.e., K is moderate in size) in the Silent with Mixing World which makes engaging jointly with one’s partner a less attractive option. Consequently, there is an area where the free-rider problem exists: No one wants to engage jointly but each would like there to be a small operation. Yet, each minority member would rather the other person engage than them if only one person was going to engage, but each would want to engage if the other chose to only stay silent.

Now, to the analysis of the government, note that Lemma A.II does not necessarily hold in the Silent with Mixing World as it does in the other two worlds. In the former, E[UM (M; D)] could be increasing or decreasing in D due to the free-rider problem. However, Proposition III will still hold, and the main corollary (Corollary I) depicting the relationship between militancy and the interaction between state capacity and state willingness would still hold

19 as shown in the following ﬁgure.

High H

Low H Low H C BL BH

When the MPL is moderate in size, then there are now two thresholds - one that depicts the split between the Non-Silent World and the Silent World, and one that depicts the split between the Silent World and the Silent with Mixing World. As mentioned above, the free rider problem can exist for some budget allocations in this new world. Within a certain area of the grievance space, no one wants to engage jointly but each person would want a small operation. Yet, each minority member would prefer if their partner chose to engage while they stayed silent rather than engaging while their partner was staying silent. This free rider issue arises because of two reasons. First, the MPL is only moderate in size which means engaging jointly is less appealing. Second, the spending on C and D is such that, at some grievance levels, one would want to engage if the other person was staying silent. Yet, as the Silent with Mixing World only materializes in relatively high-capacity states, it is still the case then that the small operations will only be an equilibrium outcome in high-capacity states. As Proposition III also holds (as mentioned above), this means that

20 all the substantive insights from Corollary I also still hold.

9.2 Low MPL

When K ≤ K˙ (i.e., MPL becomes so low that it falls below a certain level), then it will be that z ≥ p(C) · Π(D) · R · [K − 1] for all values of C and D. In such circumstances, the Non-Silent World will never materialize. The only two worlds that can then materialize are the Silent World and the Silent with Mixing World. K¨ − 1 Eventually, there is some K = K¨ where K¨ < K˙ and z = R · . When K ≤ K¨ (i.e., 2 − K¨ K − 1 MPL falls even below this lower level), then it will be that z ≥ p(C) · Π(D) · R · for 2 − K all values of C and D. In such circumstances, the Non-Silent World and the Silent World will never materialize (as described above). The only world that can then materialize is the Silent with Mixing World.

Therefore, when the MPL becomes too small, then its associated eﬀect dominates any other eﬀects. The considerably small MPL considerably discourages minority members from wanting to engage jointly with their partner. This means there will always be minority members who would have engaged jointly before but who now instead choose to stay silent. Thus, the Non-Silent World can no longer materialize (even when D is low and for a low- capacity state) after the MPL falls below a certain level because there are now some minority member types who would choose to stay silent in equilibrium. When the MPL falls even further below another level, then now the Silent with Mixing World is the only World that can materialize. This is because the further reduced MPL (even when D is low and for a low-capacity state) means that there is now an area of the grievance space where the free rider problem exists: No one wants to engage jointly, each minority member wants their partner to engage (while they stay silent), but each minority member would engage if their

21 partner stayed silent. Therefore, when the MPL becomes considerably small, the eﬀects stemming from the low MPL dominate any other eﬀect.

10 Grievances as a function of protection

Some might argue that grievances should be a function of protection levels. Specifically, the government can win the hearts and minds of the minority population by providing more protection as this would shift the distribution of grievances down. We would want to explore how the results change if grievances were decreasing in government protection - α0(D) < 0. The key cut points (α˜1, α˜2, α˜3, and α˜4) in the grievance space are not functions of the distribution of grievances and so all the analysis for the minority members will still hold. The insight regarding state capacity and the scale of minority militancy will also still hold (Corollary I, part 2). However, the insight regarding state willingness to protect, investment choices, and the likelihood of militancy occurring could change (Proposition III and Corollary I, part 1). Increasing investment in the defensive infrastructure now has two opposing effects on the emergence of militancy. On the one hand, enhancing the defensive infrastructure makes the minority feel more secure from indiscriminate retaliation which reduces the incentive for in-group policing. Yet, on the other hand, enhancing the defensive infrastructure shifts the grievance distribution downwards which means people are less aggrieved and thus are less incentivized to engage or to even stay silent. The analysis regarding willingness to protect, investment choices, and the likelihood of militancy will hold as long as the magnitude of α0(D) is not too big. The insight will thus hold as long as grievances are not entirely about a lack of protection. Intuitively, this means that the grievances of the minority group cannot just be entirely about protection - there has to be other issues that play a significant role beyond protection (e.g., discrimination, socio-economic conditions, etc.). If grievances were

22 only about protection, then even if the state did not care about protecting the minority, a suﬃciently high-capacity state would just allocate their budget almost entirely to investing in the defensive infrastructure as they are able to achieve both objectives of reducing the likelihood of militancy and protecting the minority.

11 Repeated game and dilemmas for retaliation and

militancy

For the main analysis, the game is played once. The government makes a decision, the minority members make a decision, and then payoﬀs are realized and the game is over. However, if the game was repeated, we would be able to capture dilemmas for the various actors (Bueno de Mesquita and Dickson, 2007). For the model in this paper, for instance, there could be a “retaliation dilemma” and a “militancy dilemma.” For the former, the indiscriminate retaliatory violence would lead to a new distribution of minority grievances that stochastically dominates the prior distribution. For the latter, militant attacks would cause the majority to enhance their indiscriminate retaliation in future periods (R would increase). If the game was repeated and included these dilemmas, would some minority members commit militant acts in a current period to create indiscriminate retaliation such that minority grievances become exacerbated which makes militancy more likely in the future? Let us assume that the grievance distribution has shifted rightwards and militant violence had occurred in a previous period. As a result, the indiscriminate retaliation damage (R) has increased (militancy dilemma). Increased grievances make the probability of militant violence more likely (retaliation dilemma). However, a higher R would enhance the relative threat of indiscriminate retaliation to the minority members. For every combination of C and D, the ﬁrst, third, and fourth cut-points for the minority would thus be larger than they were before. This would lower the probability of militancy occurring in

23 all Worlds and could offset and even dominate any increase in the likelihood of militancy stemming from the exacerbated grievances. Thus, long-sighted militants might not benefit from the retaliation dilemma as the militancy dilemma can cancel out the retaliation dilemma effects or even worsen their prospects in future rounds. Incorporating these dilemmas could be a worthwhile next step but is outside the scope of this current paper.

12 Uncertainty about grievances

What if minority members do not perfectly observe each other’s grievances? In this section, I show how the main insights will still hold in such a scenario. Note that the analysis for how the government allocates their budget (Proposition III) does not change in this extension. Let us assume that the minority members have the same information as the government and only know that their partner’s grievance level is independently drawn from the distribution F (·) with support (−∞, ∞). I will show that an equilibrium in cut-points will still exist but will be differently constructed. It will still be the case that if one person chooses to not engage and their partner engages, then the former person will then enter into the subgame of choosing whether to inform or stay silent. From the main analysis, those who have a grievance level less than the cut-point α˜4(= Π(D) · R) will choose to inform, and those who have a grievance level at least as high as this cut-point will choose to stay silent. Therefore, if a cut-point equilibrium exists, the cut-point will be different for those who are below and above α˜4 as the outside option from not engaging is different for those below and above α˜4 (informing versus staying silent). Thus, let us try to find the following cut-

4 point equilibrium, αI and αS, where αI ≤ α˜ ≤ αS. For those who have grievances less than

4 α˜ : Inform if grievance level is less than αI , and engage if grievance level is between αI and α˜4. For those who have grievances at least as high as α˜4: Stay silent if grievance level is at

24 4 least as high as α˜ but is less than αS, and engage if grievance level is at least as high as αS. These strategies are illustrated below in Figure A.1.

Figure A.1: Cutpoints under uncertainty αI α˜4 αS

Inform Engage Silent Engage

Increasing grievances

Based on this reasoning, the next proposition establishes the cut-point equilibrium under uncertainty.

Proposition A.I - Cut-point equilibrium under uncertainty

4 1. In the high capacity state, αI = α4 and αS ∈ (˜α , ∞)

3 4 2. In a low capacity state with a suﬃciently aggrieved minority population, αI ∈ (˜α , α˜ )

4 and αS =α ˜

3. In a low capacity state without a suﬃciently aggrieved minority population, αI = α4

4 and αS ∈ (˜α , ∞)

The proof is as follows. Recall that from the main analysis a low-capacity (high-capacity) state is deﬁned as follows: z < (≥) p(C) · Π(D) · R · [K − 1]. If αI and αS exist, then the person with a grievance level equal to each of these cut-points will respectively be indiﬀerent between informing and engaging, and staying silent and engaging.

For αI (whose partner will have some grievance level α), this means:

4 z = P r(α < α˜ ∩ α > αI ) · [p(C) · K · αI − p(C) · Π(D) · R]

4 + P r(α ≥ α˜ ∩ α < αS) · [p(C) · αI − p(C) · Π(D) · R]

4 + P r(α ≥ α˜ ∩ α ≥ αS) · [p(C) · K · αI − p(C) · Π(D) · R]

25 And, for αS (whose partner will have some grievance level α), this means:

4 z = P r(α < α˜ ∩ α > αI ) · [p(C) · αS · [K − 1]]

4 + P r(α ≥ α˜ ∩ α < αS) · [p(C) · αS − p(C) · Π(D) · R]

4 + P r(α ≥ α˜ ∩ α ≥ αS) · [p(C) · αS · [K − 1]]

4 By deﬁnition, as αI < α˜ = Π(D) · R, this means that, as a result, it will be the case

that p(C) · αI − p(C) · Π(D) · R < 0 < z. Therefore, a necessary (but not suﬃcient) condition for such a cut-point to exist is that: z Π(D) · R p(C) · K · α − p · Π(D) · R > z =⇒ α > α˜3 = + I I K · p(C) K 3 4 Thus, α˜ < αI < α˜ . However, this is only possible in a low-capacity state (i.e., where the Non-Silent World materializes). As soon as the conditions for a high-capacity state are met, then the Silent World will materialize where α˜3 ≥ α˜4. Thus, in a high-capacity state, it will always be the case that informing is preferred over engaging for those who have

4 4 grievance levels less than α˜ . Therefore, in a high-capacity state, αI =α ˜ .

4 4 I will now show that αS ∈ (˜α , ∞) in the high-capacity state. Given that αI =α ˜ , we can rewrite the condition for the cut-point αS as the following:

4 z = P r(α ≥ α˜ ∩ α < αS) · [p(C) · αS − p(C) · Π(D) · R]

4 + P r(α ≥ α˜ ∩ α ≥ αS) · [p(C) · αS · [K − 1]] (1)

4 To see that there is a αS ∈ (˜α , ∞), we will use the intermediate value theorem. If

4 αS =α ˜ = Π(D) · R, then from the above equation, we know that in a high-capacity-state (where z > p(C) · Π(D) · R · [K − 1]):

26 z > P r(α ≥ α˜4) · [p(C) · Π(D) · R · [K − 1]]

In other words, staying silent is preferred to engaging. If αS → ∞, then the right-hand side of (1) would obviously be larger than the left-hand side. Thus, by the intermediate value

4 theorem, there must exist some αS ∈ (˜α , ∞), where the left-hand side of (1) equals the right-hand side. However, the cut-point is not necessarily unique because the right-hand

side of (1) is not necessarily non-decreasing in αS. This proves part 1. of Proposition A.I which is illustrated in Figure A.2.

Figure A.2: High-capacity state 4 α˜ = αI αS

Inform Silent Engage

Increasing grievances

3 4 Recall that a necessary but not suﬃcient condition for cut-point αI ∈ (˜α , α˜ ), is that we

4 are in a low-capacity state. First, I will show that if such an αI exists, then αS =α ˜ . Let us

4 4 assume instead that αS ∈ (˜α , ∞). Someone with a grievance level in the range of (αI , α˜ ) would prefer to engage than inform. In other words:

4 z < P r(α < α˜ ∩ α > αI ) · [p(C) · K · α − p(C) · Π(D) · R]

4 + P r(α ≥ α˜ ∩ α < αS) · [p(C) · α − p(C) · Π(D) · R]

4 + P r(α ≥ α˜ ∩ α ≥ αS) · [p(C) · K · α − p(C) · Π(D) · R]

For all such α, it will also be the case that p(C) · α˜4 · [K − 1] = p(C) · Π(D) · R · [K − 1] > p(C) · K · α − p(C) · Π(D) · R. Therefore, someone with a grievance level α˜4 would prefer to engage than stay silent:

4 4 z < P r(α < α˜ ∩ α > αI ) · [p(C) · α˜ · [K − 1]]

27 4 4 + P r(α ≥ α˜ ∩ α < αS) · [p(C) · α˜ − p(C) · Π(D) · R]

4 4 + P r(α ≥ α˜ ∩ α ≥ αS) · [p(C) · α˜ · [K − 1]]

Clearly, if someone with a grievance level α˜4 would choose engaging over staying silent (i.e., right-hand side is larger than left-hand side), then anyone with a grievance level α > α˜4 would also choose to engage over staying silent (i.e., right-hand side will still be larger than left-hand side). Therefore, there can be no one with a grievance level in the range [˜α4, ∞) who

4 would prefer to stay silent over engaging which is a contradiction as we assumed αS ∈ (˜α , ∞).

3 4 4 Thus, if αI ∈ (˜α , α˜ ), then αS =α ˜ . This means that for for someone with the grievance level αI , this person (whose partner will have some grievance level α) would be indiﬀerent between informing and engaging:

z = P r(α ≥ αI ) · [p(C) · K · αI − p(C) · Π(D) · R] (2)

4 And, thus as α˜ > αI , this would mean:

z < P r(α ≥ αI )·[p(C)·K ·α˜4 −p(C)·Π(D)·R] = P r(α ≥ αI )·[p(C)·Π(D)·R·[K −1]] (3)

As it is a low-capacity state, we know that z < p(C) · Π(D) · R · [K − 1]. And in addition to the necessary condition of the state being a low-capacity one, (2) and (3) make

3 4 up the necessary and suﬃcient conditions to ensure the existence of a αI ∈ (˜α , α˜ ) which

4 means αS =α ˜ . Thus, if the minority population is not that aggrieved then P r(α ≥ α˜3) · [p(C) · Π(D) · R · [K − 1] < z, and this means that there is no way that condition (3)

4 can be satisﬁed. In such a case, αI =α ˜ and, by the same reasoning above then, there will

4 be some αS ∈ (˜α , ∞). Thus, in a low-capacity state, if there is a suﬃciently aggrieved minority population then

3 4 4 αI ∈ (˜α , α˜ ) and αS =α ˜ , and if there is not a suﬃciently aggrieved minority population

4 4 then αI =α ˜ and αS ∈ (˜α , ∞). This establishes part 2 and part 3 of Proposition A.I which

28 is illustrate below in respectively Figures A.3 and A.4. Figure A.3: Low-capacity state with suﬃciently aggrieved minority 4 αI α˜ = αS

Inform Engage Engage

Increasing grievances

Figure A.4: Low-capacity state without suﬃciently aggrieved minority 4 α˜ = αI αS

Inform Silent Engage

Increasing grievances

Now that we have specified minority member’s strategies in high-capacity and low-capacity states, we can now move on to see how changes in government investments affect these strategies. This is specified in the next lemma.

Lemma A.IV - Eﬀect of government investments under uncertainty

4 1. As the government invests more (less) in protection infrastructure (D), α˜ , αI and αS decrease (increase) in both the low-capacity states and high-capacity states

2. As the government invests more (less) in the counter militancy infrastructure (C):

(a) In a low-capacity state with a suﬃciently aggrieved minority population, αI

increases (decreases) but αS does not change (b) In a high-capacity state or a low-capacity state without a suﬃciently aggrieved

minority population, αS increases (decreases) but αI does not change

4 These dynamics can clearly be seen by looking at how α˜ , αI and αS are deﬁned in the low-capacity and high-capacity states in Proposition A.I. Intuitively, if indiscriminate retaliation becomes less likely, staying silent and even engaging becomes more appealing, and if the chances of militant success decreases then engaging becomes less appealing. Given the budget constraint of the government (D + C = B), this means that investment in one infrastructure comes at the cost of less investment in the other infrastructure. Thus,

29 with the budget constraint, the effects listed above are occurring at the same time and complementing each other. Thus, if more is invested in the protection infrastructure (D), then less is invested in the countermilitancy infrastructure (C) which makes engaging and staying silent more appealing. Combining Proposition A.I. and Lemma A.IV above, we would obtain the same Corollary I in the main paper of how state willingness and state capacity interact in influencing the onset and type of minority militancy that will emerge. Willingness to protect the minority is positively related to the likelihood of militancy occurring, and small operations are more likely to emerge in higher-capacity states. The latter result is again due to the two dynamics explained in the paper: (1) The opportunity cost of engaging becomes much higher if there is a considerable increase in the amount invested in the countermilitancy infrastructure (which makes some people who were originally engaging now choose to stay silent), and (2) the threat of indiscriminate retaliation becomes much smaller if there is a considerable increase in the amount invested in the protection infrastructure which reduces the incentive to participate in in-group policing (which makes some people who were originally informing now choose to stay silent). The only difference is now that a low-capacity state that does not have a sufficiently aggrieved minority population will have similar dynamics to that of a high-capacity state. Intuitively, this is because in such a low-capacity state, it is sufficiently likely that a minority member will be matched with someone who will inform on them if they choose to engage. This effect is sufficiently strong such that there are now some parts of the population who will choose to not engage and choose their other option (either not engaging and staying silent or not engaging and informing). Therefore, under these particular conditions, uncertainty does have an effect beyond what is covered in the main model such that now small operations can emerge in lower-capacity states. However, even if we compared a low-capacity state which does not have a sufficiently aggrieved minority population to the high-capacity state version, it will still be the case that small operations will be more likely to occur in a high-capacity

30 state which is still consistent with the main insights of the model.

13 Non-governmental sources for protection

Minority groups often have non-governmental sources for protection. In other words, they do not need to rely on the state for protection and can instead rely on other factors (e.g., terrain of the land they inhabit). If minority groups rely on these alternative sources of protection, how would Corollary I (Capacity and willingness) change? This is illustrated in Figure 5 below.

Figure A.5: Non-State sources of Protection D

iv. High Protection iii.

ii. Low Protection i.

Note that the equilibrium strategies for the minority group do not change so we can use the same dashed line to separate the Worlds. The ﬁrst part of the Corollary is no longer

31 applicable as written because the state is not providing protection. However, a similar logic prevails when there are non-state sources for protection. Holding the level of C constant, If there is higher protection (similar to the state being more willing to protect the minority) that stems from these non-state sources, then the likelihood of militancy occurring will increase.

The state will still choose the amount to invest in the countermilitancy infrastructure. As there is no reason to not invest the full amount, we know that C = B. When there is low protection, if there is little to invest in C (which is point i. in Figure 5), then this coincides with the point available to the low-capacity state. Given the countermilitancy level, there is not enough protection provided for members to stay silent in equilibrium. Additionally, the limited capacity of the state means that minority members who chose to stay silent could improve their payoﬀ by engaging jointly with their partner in militancy. Therefore, there are no equilibrium outcomes where someone chooses to stay silent while their partner engages and thus the Non-Silent World materializes at this point. For point ii., even though there is low protection, there is a lot to invest in C. This increased spending on the countermilitancy infrastructure leads to the Silent World materializing. At this level of protection, the Non-Silent World can materialize for lower values of C. The reason why the Silent World materializes at point ii. is because, with the high-capacity state, the amount spent on C is large enough such that minority members are dissuaded from engaging in militancy. There are thus people who would have engaged jointly with their partners at lower values of C but who are now choosing to stay silent instead. For points iii. and iv., there is a high level of protection. For both of these points, protection is suﬃcient enough such that minority members could be silent in equilibrium. Even though point iii. and point i. have the same C level chosen, the reason why the Silent

32 World materializes at the former point is because there are people who would have informed at point i. who are now choosing to stay silent instead if their partner is engaging because they feel more secure at point iii. Thus, the same logic as to why small operations can emerge when the government provides protection also applies when the minority relies on non-governmental sources of protection. In sum, the same logic that held in part i. and part ii. of Corollary I in the paper holds when we look at non-state sources of protection. Points ii., iii., and iv. reﬂect choices available to high capacity states, while point i. reﬂects the choices available to low capacity states. Therefore, at points ii., iii., and iv., both large and small operations can materialize, while at point i., only large operations can materialize.

14 Minority-favorable policy

As Proposition III indicates, there is a normatively problematic trade-oﬀ where increasing (decreasing) investment in the defensive infrastructure leads to an increase (a decrease) in the likelihood that militancy will occur. I explore if enacting a minority-favorable policy (e.g., anti-discrimination legislation) would help to ease the problematic trade-oﬀ.

Let y be a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if the government chooses to adopt the policy that is favorable to the minority group. Let F (α; y) be the distribution of grievances that depends on if the policy is implemented. We will also make the following key assumption:

Assumption A.I - First order stochastic dominance F (α; 0) has ﬁrst order stochastic dominance over F (α; 1)

This assumption intuitively implies that if the government adopts the

33 minority-favorable policy, then for each grievance level, the probability that we observe a minority individual with at least that grievance level will be lower than that probability if the minority-favorable policy was not implemented. In other words, the chances of ﬁnding a highly aggrieved person will be lower when the minority-favorable policy is implemented.

If the policy that is favorable to the minority is implemented by the government (i.e., y = 1), then there are two effects to the government’s utility function. First, from Assumption A.I above, it will change the likelihood that militancy will occur. Second, the government incurs a cost from implementing the policy that I denote as ∆. This cost can encompass different factors. For instance, this could be a direct cost of implementation, or it could reflect the fact that by aiding the minority population the government loses some support from the majority population.

Let D1 be the optimal investment in the defensive infrastructure when y = 1, and let

D0 be the optimal investment when y = 0. Let us rewrite the ﬁrst component of the

government’s utility function as E[UM (M; D, y)]. Implementing the minority-favorable policy will only be done when:

(1 − H) · E[UM (M; D1, 1)] + H · UIR(Π; D1) − ∆ ≥ (1 − H) · E[UM (M; D0, 0)] + H · UIR(Π; D0) Or, by rewriting:

∆ ≤ (1 − H) · [E[UM (M; D1, 1)] − E[UM (M; D0, 0)]] + H · [UIR(Π; D1) − UIR(Π; D0)]

Therefore, clearly, the cost of implementing the policy (∆) has to be suﬃciently small which establishes the ﬁrst condition.

The question then is how does D1 compare to D0? By the deﬁnition of the arg max, we also know that:

(1 − H) · E[UM (M; D1, 1)] + H · UIR(Π; D1) − ∆ ≥ (1 − H) · E[UM (M; D0, 1)] + H · UIR(Π; D0) − ∆

(1 − H) · E[UM (M; D0, 0)] + H · UIR(Π; D0) ≥ (1 − H) · E[UM (M; D1, 0)] + H · UIR(Π; D1)

34 These two inequalities imply that

E[UM (M; D1, 1)] − E[UM (M; D0, 1)] ≥ E[UM (M; D1, 0)] − E[UM (M; D0, 0)]

∂ E is negative from Lemma A.II. If we additionally assume that the magnitude of this ∂D derivative decreases if the minority favorable policy is implemented (i.e., As D increases, the expectation of a militant act occurring increases by a smaller amount if the minority

1 favorable policy is implemented), then the only way the inequality will hold is if D1 ≥ D0 so the government invests more in minority protection when the minority favorable policy is implemented. If we could not make any such assumptions about the derivative then the only things impacting this decision is how to maximize the right handside of the following inequality:

∆ ≤ (1 − H) · [E[UM (M; D1, 1)] − E[UM (M; D0, 0)]] + H · [UIR(Π; D1) − UIR(Π; D0)]

Under such a scenario, this implies that there will be a higher likelihood of the government

investing more in D when the minority favorable policy is implemented (i.e., D1 > D0) if the government cares enough about the security of the minority (H should be high), and if there is a suﬃciently large relative return to investing in protecting the minority (i.e.,

UIR(Π; D1) − UIR(Π; D0)).

15 Providing a good or service to the minority

Let the good or service be represented by the parameter G. Thus, the budget constraint now is: B = D + C + G. We will assume that the grievances of the minority group will be decreasing as more is spent on G. The analysis for the minority members still holds as the cut-points will not depend on G. Furthermore, the insight regarding the positive relationship

1Analogous to the cross partial being positive if the minority favorable policy was a continuous variable with higher values meaning a more favorable policy is implemented.

35 between state willingness to protect and the likelihood of militancy occurring will still hold. However, the insight regarding the scale of operations and state capacity might no longer hold. Increasing spending on G, reduces the amount that is available to be spent on the countermilitancy infrastructure (C) and the protection infrastructure (D). Therefore, as can be seen in Figure A.6, some high-capacity states can thus be reduced to a low-capacity state with regards to spending on C and D once investment in the good or service is taken into account.

Figure A.6: Budget with and without G

Budget without G

Possible Budget with G

The transition from the “Budget without G” to the “Possible Budget with G” will most likely occur under three conditions: (1) the budget of the high-capacity state is not too large, (2) grievances are suﬃciently responsive to G, and (3) there is a higher weight on reducing the likelihood of militancy (i.e., a smaller H). Given (2) and (3), by providing G,

36 the government is then able to reduce the chances of militancy being attempted as people become less and less aggrieved. Given (1), the amount left over for spending on C and D then resembles a low-capacity state in terms of the incentives of the minority members and the type of militancy that can be attempted. However, if a state had a very large budget (i.e., it is a very high-capacity state), then that state would be able to put a substantial investment in G and still remain above the threshold line in Figure A.6. Thus, it could still be the case that for suﬃciently high-capacity states, even the main insight on the relationship between the scale of operations and state capacity would still hold.

16 Probability of success

The Silent with Mixing World (in addition to the other two known worlds) described in the analysis for the moderate MPL is used in this section. Please refer to that part in this Supplementary Information to see more of an explanation of the Silent with Mixing World.

Let p2(C) (denoted p2 hereafter) be the probability of success in militancy when both

minority members engage. For simplicity in notation, I will refer to p1(C) (success in

1 militancy when one member engages) as p1, q(C) as q, and Π(D) as Π. The value of α˜ , α˜2, and α˜3 change respectively to:

z + p · Π · R α˜1 = 1 p1

z + (p − p ) · Π · R α˜2 = 2 1 p2 · K − p1 z + p · Π · R α˜3 = 2 p2 · K

37 α˜4 does not change from how it was before.

• p2 · K ≥ 2 · p1

Now, we will ﬁrst assume that p2 · K ≥ 2 · p1. It can be shown then that when

z < Π · R · p2 · [K − 1], then the Non-Silent World materializes, and when z ≥ Π · R · p2 · [K − 1], then the Silent World materializes. Therefore, the thresholds (speciﬁed in Lemma II) change but the basic dynamics surrounding equilibrium minority strategies and militant outcomes - described in Lemma A.I and Proposition II for the Non-Silent World and the Silent World - stay the same. Furthermore, the analysis concerning the state and its characteristics (capacity and willingness) still holds.

• p1 < p2 · K < 2 · p1

If p1 < p2 · K < 2 · p1, then the two thresholds (speciﬁed in Lemma II) change. Now if Π · R · p2 · p1 · [K − 1] z < Π · R · p2 · [K − 1] < , then the Non-Silent World materializes. If 2 · p1 − p2 · K Π · R · p2 · p1 · [K − 1] Π · R · p2 · [K − 1] ≤ z < , then the Silent World materializes. And if 2 · p1 − p2 · K Π · R · p2 · p1 · [K − 1] Π · R · p2 · [K − 1] < ≤ z, then the Silent with Mixing World 2 · p1 − p2 · K materializes. Again, the thresholds change but the basic dynamics described in Lemma A.I and Proposition I for the Non-Silent World, the Silent World, and the Silent with Mixing World stay the same. Furthermore, the analysis concerning the state and its characteristics (capacity and willingness) still holds.

Therefore, when p2 · K > p1 (which holds when p2 > p1 or if p2 is smaller than p1 but this diﬀerence is not suﬃciently large), then there are no real changes in the main insights of this paper.

38 • p2 · K < p1

Next, if p2·K < p1, then the results change more substantially. As engaging together leads to a substantially lower expected beneﬁt than one person engaging alone, the key thresholds (from Lemma II) that determine which world transpires and the worlds themselves change. Π · R · p · p · [K − 1] First, if z < 2 1 , then the following equilibrium outcomes occur: 2 · p1 − p2 · K

Figure A.7: Constellation of grievances when p2 · K < p1: First World

j’s grievances - Both engage

α˜2 - One engages - Both use a mixed strategy

α˜1 - No one engages

α˜4

α˜3

α˜3 α˜4 α˜1 α˜2 i’s grievances

As engaging together becomes less attractive to engaging alone and not engaging at all, unsurprisingly mixed strategy equilibria become more prevalent across the grievance space where members mix between engaging and not engaging. Furthermore, there is also an area of the grievance space where small operations can occur.

Π · R · p2 · p1 · [K − 1] Next, if D increases then eventually ≤ z < Π · R · p2 · [K − 1], and 2 · p1 − p2 · K the equilibrium outcomes are:

39 Figure A.8: Constellation of grievances when p2 · K < p1: Second World

j’s grievances - Both engage

α˜1 - One engages - Both use a mixed strategy

α˜2 - No one engages

α˜4

α˜3

α˜3 α˜4 α˜2 α˜1 i’s grievances

Π · R · p2 · p1 · [K − 1] As D increases further then eventually < Π · R · p2 · [K − 1] ≤ z < 2 · p1 − p2 · K Π · R · p · p · [K − 1] 2 1 , and the equilibrium outcomes are: p1 − p2 · K

Figure A.9: Constellation of grievances when p2 · K < p1: Third World

j’s grievances - Both engage

α˜1 - One engages - Both use a mixed strategy

α˜3 - No one engages

α˜4

α˜2

α˜2 α˜4 α˜3 α˜1 i’s grievances 40 Π · R · p · p · [K − 1] Finally, as D increases even further then eventually 2 1 ≤ z, then the p1 − p2 · K equilibrium outcomes are:

Figure A.10: Constellation of grievances when p2 · K < p1: Fourth World

j’s grievances - Both engage

α˜3 - One engages - Both use a mixed strategy

α˜1 - No one engages

α˜4

α˜2

α˜2 α˜4 α˜1 α˜3 i’s grievances

Even though the equilibrium outcomes diﬀer substantially from the equilibrium

outcomes from the main model (and the results when p2 · K ≥ p1 above), as can be seen in the progression of the World’s above, the main dynamics hold from Lemma II and Proposition II where as more is invested in the defensive infrastructure, then when militancy does emerge, the ratio of the grievance space where small operations emerge to that where large operations emerge (such that both members want to jointly engage) is increasing. The insights from the government’s equilibrium choices also hold. Proposition III will still hold as it is written for the main model. Furthermore, and consistent with Corollary I, as state capacity increases the budget allocation decision will, if militancy does emerge, more likely involve small operations than large operations (such that both members want to jointly engage). Small operations can now emerge in every World as engaging together is much less attractive due to the considerably lower chances of success

41 in engaging jointly. Therefore, even in the First World above where there is not much defensive infrastructure, there are minority members who instead of engaging jointly now prefer to choose to stay silent instead due to the reduced chances of success in joint operations. However, as more protection to the minority is provided, then minority members who would have informed now feel safer staying silent and which provides more chances for small operations to materialize.

• p1 = p2 · K

2 Finally, if p1 = p2 · K, then the results change slightly. α˜ no longer exists. Now if

z < Π · R · p2 · [K − 1] or if z ≥ Π · R · p2 · [K − 1], then the following equilibrium outcomes respectively materialize when minority members are paired with each other:

42 Figure A.11: Constellation of grievances when p2 · K = p1

j’s grievances j’s grievances

α˜1 α˜1

α˜4 α˜3

α˜3 α˜4

α˜3 α˜4 α˜1 α˜4 α˜3 α˜1 i’s grievances i’s grievances

- Both engage

- One engages

- Both use a mixed strategy

- No one engages

Similar to before, although these Worlds differ from Worlds X, Y, and Z in the paper, the main dynamics still hold from Lemma II and Proposition II where if a sufficient amount is invested in protecting the minority, then small operations can emerge where there can be an equilibrium outcome where a minority member stays silent if their partner is engaging. Additionally, the insights from the analysis of the government also still hold. The government would choose more protection if they cared more about the security of the minority group (Proposition III) and small operations would only materialize in high-capacity states (Corollary I). Small operations can only materialize in higher capacity states because of the reasons explained in the paper: Minority members find engaging less appealing and/or minority members feel safer staying silent (group policing is less needed).

43 17 Imperfect Informing

In the main model, failure at militancy was certain if one’s partner informed. In this extension, let us assume that informing is not perfect and that the person who is informed on would still be able to engage but the chance of militant success is much lower: pˆ(C) < p(C). It is important to note that the analysis regarding the government’s choice over investments (Proposition III) and how state willingness is positively related to militancy will still hold (Corollary I, part 1). With imperfect informing, there would now be a ﬁfth cut-point which determines whether people would engage if their partner was informing on them. This is the case when grievances are larger than this ﬁfth cut-point:

z α˜5 = + Π(D) · R pˆ(C)

Furthermore, we would need to rewrite the third cut-point (α˜3) to be the following:

z Π(D) · R · (p(C) − pˆ(C)) α˜3 = + p(C) · K − pˆ(C) p(C) · K − pˆ(C)

Note that α˜5 will always be the largest cut-point as it is larger than α˜1. Furthermore, α˜1 > α˜3. Let us modify the Non-Silent World and the Silent World slightly to be the following: the Non-Silent World: α˜2 < α˜3 < α˜4 < α˜1 < α˜5 the Silent World: α˜4 < α˜3 < α˜2 < α˜1 < α˜5

The equilibrium outcomes in these Worlds are as follows in Figure A.12:

44 Figure A.12: Constellation of grievances

Non-Silent World Silent World j’s grievances j’s grievances

α˜5 α˜5 α˜1 α˜1

α˜4 α˜2

α˜3 α˜3

α˜2 α˜4

α˜2 α˜3 α˜4 α˜1 α˜5 α˜4 α˜3 α˜2 α˜1 α˜5 i’s grievances i’s grievances

- Both engage

- One engages (Original)

- No one engages

- One engages (New)

Similar to when informing works perfectly, the Non-Silent World materializes over the Silent World when z < p(C) · Π(D) · R · [K − 1] and the Silent World materializes over the Non-Silent World when z ≥ p(C) · Π(D) · R · [K − 1]. The main diﬀerence between this analysis and that of where informing results in militant failure with certainty is that a new type of small operation can exist in this scenario where, even in a low-capacity state, one minority member engages and the other informs but fails to prevent it. However, the main insight about how the protection-group policing dynamic can

45 help explain why the original type of small operation - where one person stays silent and the other engages - is more likely to emerge in higher capacity states still holds: If people feel more secure staying silent, then small operations can emerge.Thus, the main broad insight from the paper still holds when the MPL is high.

18 Costs of non-participation

As those who engage are no longer exposed to the threat of indiscriminate retaliation, the utility functions that will change are the following (from minority member 1’s perspective but it is analogous for member 2):

• U1(E; E) = p(C) · K · α1

• U1(E; ¬E,S) = p(C) · α1

With these two new utility functions, the α˜1, α˜2, and α˜3 cut points change to respectively the following: z α˜1 = p(C) z Π(D) · R α˜2 = − p(C) · [K − 1] K − 1 z α˜3 = p(C) · K

Furthermore, there is now a new world which we will call the Non-Silent World II : α˜2 < α˜3 < α˜1 ≤ α˜4. It is easy then to check the following:

1. z < p(C) · Π(D) · R < p(C) · Π(D) · R · K if and only if the Non-Silent World II materializes

2. p(C)·Π(D)·R ≤ z < p(C)·Π(D)·R·K if and only if the Non-Silent World materializes

46 3. p(C) · Π(D) · R < p(C) · Π(D) · R · K ≤ z if and only if the Silent World materializes

Therefore, with the same logic from the proof of Lemma II above, for every C, D has to ˆ be larger than a certain threshold (D0) in order for the Non-Silent World to materialize ˆ over the Non-Silent World II, and D has to be larger than another threshold (D1) in order for the Silent World to materialize over the Non-Silent World. In line with Lemma II, these ˆ ˆ two thresholds are decreasing in C and the thresholds are increasing in size (D1 > D0). Therefore, even though there is an additional threshold, the same dynamics described in Lemma II still hold.

The equilibrium strategies in the Non-Silent World II are the same equilibrium strategies speciﬁed in the Non-Silent World in Lemma A.I. Similarly then, as speciﬁed in Proposition II, the only way for militancy to emerge in the Non-Silent World II in equilibrium is for there to be large operations where both minority members choose to engage.

Therefore, characterizing indiscriminate retaliation as a cost of non-participation does not aﬀect any of the equilibrium government strategies or the insights regarding the relationship between minority militancy and the interaction between state capacity and state willingness.

19 Magnitude of indiscriminate retaliation

Let us assume that the magnitude of indiscriminate retaliation is less than or equal to the income of the minority members (R ≤ z). From the proof of Lemma II above, it is clear that the Non-Silent World will not z materialize if R < . Therefore the Non-Silent World can still materialize as long as [K − 1] R is not suﬃciently small. If R is suﬃciently small, then the Non-Silent World will no

47 longer materialize. This is because the threat of indiscriminate retaliation is so small (as R is small) that minority members, who would have informed if the threat was larger, now choose to stay silent in equilibrium. Therefore, under these circumstances, staying silent while one’s partner is engaging can always be an equilibrium outcome. The results are still in line with the main insight regarding small operations. Small operations can always emerge in a political environment where there is a suﬃciently reduced threat of indiscriminate retaliation, and thus a reduced need for in-group policing.

20 Suggestive empirical evidence

20.1 Amount of minority militancy

20.1.1 JJA Data

On the JJA website, it states that “the sampling mechanism prevents these data from being representative of the radical Islamist population as a whole”2 as they often have to rely on newspaper reports, court documents, and arrest documents to compile the data. This warning is warranted as two homegrown Indian militant Islamist groups (these groups are discussed in the “Indian Muslims and UK Muslims” section of the Supplementary Information and the underrepresentation of Indian Muslims in Islamist militant groups still holds even after accounting for these two groups) are missing from the dataset. However, there is no reason to think that missingness across countries would lead to a unique downward bias for Indian Muslims. The country has a relatively free and vibrant press implying that reports on potential militants would be more easily available. It is harder for journalists to report in J&K, but even properly accounting for this conﬂict would not aﬀect the statistical illustration

2See http://doitapps.jjay.cuny.edu/jjatt/attributes.php

48 of the underrepresentation.3 Furthermore, court and arrest documents of suspected and arrested militants are freely available on the website of India’s national counterterrorism agency (the National Investigation Agency).

20.1.2 Charts

This next charts show the underrepresentation of Indian Muslims in militant groups by looking at the John Jay & Artis database (JJA). In the paper, I showed this chart by looking at individual’s country of birth. In the top panel of Figure A.13, I look at individuals by the country that they joined the militant group. Consistent with the chart in the paper, Muslims in India, a country where the threat of indiscriminate retaliation is relatively more enhanced, are underrepresented in these militant groups compared to Muslims in other places where they are a minority but do not face such a threat.

3The ongoing militancy in J&K is a conflict that tends to involve Muslim insurgents but, as Fair (2014) has shown, the militants in this region tend to be predominantly from Pakistan (particularly the Punjab province) or Kashmir (both Indian-administered and Pakistan-administered). It is thus empirically incorrect that substantial numbers of aggrieved Muslims from the rest of India are joining up with groups fighting in Kashmir. Furthermore, it would be short-sighted to focus solely on J&K as this one state is not representative of the broader Indian Muslim experience. As the sole Muslim-majority Indian state, it holds a unique place in the Indian polity in terms of governance (the former Article 370), history (in its contentious accession to India as a former princely state), and culture (e.g. Kashmiriyat). The state also has 8.5 million Muslims which is only a fraction of the 172 million Muslims living throughout India. To focus solely on J&K is ignoring the Muslims in Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Kerala, Gujarat, and so forth and, as the findings of the 2006 Sachar Committee Report suggests, the situation in J&K is unlikely to be the main source of grievances for the broader Indian Muslim community.

49 Figure A.13: Islamist militancy

- Actual Amount - Expected Amount Note: Estimates with Agresti-Coull conﬁdence intervals (Brown, Cai and Dasgupta, 2001). Data on individuals taken from the John Jay and Artis Database. Data on Muslim population taken from 2011 country censuses and Pew Research: Religion and Public Life Project. Estimates calculated assuming a binomial distribution of people who join these groups.

The model is more relevant to domestic militancy, but in the JJA data, we cannot readily distinguish between those who traveled abroad to join transnational groups and those who joined groups in their own country. As a second best option to examine domestic militancy, I also look at only those individuals who join groups in the countries in which they were born in Figure A.13. The sample size is much smaller but, as before, a similar pattern holds where Indian Muslims are underrepresented in Islamist militant groups.

50 20.1.3 Tables

Table A.1: Under/over represenation by individual’s place of birth

Region Muslim Muslim % No. of People in Expected Pop (M)1 of Total2 Islamist Terrorist groups3 Amount4 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) India 172.2 88.4 0 80.4 UK 2.7 1.4 16 1.3 EU Countries 16.3 8.4 66 7.6 USA and Canada 3.5 1.8 9 1.6 Total 194.7 100 91 1Data taken from 2011 country censuses and Pew Research: Religion and Public Life Project, 2value obtained by dividing the value in Column 2 by the Total in Column 2, 3John Jay and Artis Database, 4value obtained by multiplying the value in Column 3 by the Total in Column 4.

Table A.2: Underrepresentation of Indian Muslims by individual’s country of joining

Region Muslim Muslim % No. of People in Expected Pop (M)1 of Total2 Islamist Terrorist groups3 Amount4 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) India 172.2 88.4 0 107.0 UK 2.7 1.4 9 1.7 EU Countries 16.3 8.4 94 10.1 USA and Canada 3.5 1.8 18 2.2 Total 194.7 100 121

1Data taken from 2011 country censuses and Pew Research: Religion and Public Life Project, 2value obtained by dividing the value in Column 2 by the Total in Column 2, 3John Jay and Artis Database, 4value obtained by multiplying the value in Column 3 by the Total in Column 4.

Table A.3: Underrepresentation of Indian Muslims: Domestic militancy

Region Muslim Muslim % No. of People in Expected Pop (M)1 of Total2 Islamist Terrorist groups3 Amount4 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) India 172.2 88.4 0 38.9 UK 2.7 1.4 3 0.6 EU Countries 16.3 8.4 41 3.7 USA and Canada 3.5 1.8 0 0.8 Total 194.7 100 44

1 Data taken from 2011 country censuses and Pew Research: Religion and Public Life Project, 2value obtained by dividing the value in Column 2 by the Total in Column 2, 3John Jay and Artis Database, 4value obtained by multiplying the value in Column 3 by the Total in Column 4.

51 20.2 Type of minority militancy

In Figure 7 in the main paper, I use data from the Global Terrorism Database to compare the scale of minority militant operations between a low-capacity state (India) and a high- capacity state (UK). For India, I look at the militancy in the North-East and in Kashmir (excluding the groups based in Pakistan such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohamed). Below, I split up the Indian sample to look at ﬁrst militant groups from the North-East only (Figure A.14), and then militant groups from Kashmir only (Figure A.15). Both charts remain consistent with Figure 7 and the main insight: militant operations in low-capacity states will likely be of a larger scale than that in high-capacity states. At ﬁrst, Figure A.15 might look less supportive of the insights as they only seem to apply in the early 1990s. However, this paper studies the emergence of militancy amongst minority groups and the militancy in J&K only emerges in the 1990s which is exactly where we would expect to see the pattern. Staniland (2013) discusses the lessening militancy in the early 2000’s and the subsequent tensions. Figure A.14: Scale of minority militant operations

Note: Data taken from the Global Terrorism Database. For India, the North-East insurgent groups are included. For the UK, Irish Republican militant groups and Islamist militant groups are included.

52 Figure A.15: Scale of minority militant operations

Note: Data taken from the Global Terrorism Database. For India, the Kashmiri insurgent groups are included (not including those groups who are based in Pakistan - e.g., Lashkar-e-Taiba). For the UK, Irish Republican militant groups and Islamist militant groups are included.

21 Indian Muslims and UK Muslims

Muslims in India and the UK experience substantial amounts of discrimination. Reports and academic research have shown the discrimination, marginalization, and underrepresentaion that Muslims face in economic and political life in India (Sachar Committee Report, 2006, Thorat and Attewell, 2007; Jaffrelot, 2010b; Gayer and Jaffrelot, 2012; Thorat et al., 2015). Similarly there have been reports and academic studies illustrating the discrimination and socioeconomic marginalization facing Muslims in the UK (Khattab and Johnston, 2015; Social Mobility Commission, 2017; Jolliffe and Haque, 2017). Moreover, Muslims in India have historically been on the receiving end of violent Hindu mobs (e.g., the 2002 Gujarat riots), and various anti-Muslim groups in the UK (e.g., the English Defense League) have conducted large, notable demonstrations and protests. Minority discrimination has been empirically linked to militancy (Piazza, 2011), but it is not a sufficient factor to explain the variation in Islamist militancy between these two countries. As mentioned in the introduction of the paper, In 2017, the UK’s MI5 chief stated that the UK was “facing the most severe terror threat ever” from Islamist terrorism

53 (Dodd, 2017). On the other hand, in the same year, an al-Qaeda operative publicly scolded Indian Muslims for not “joining jihad” (Singh, 2017a). From Figure A.13 above and Figure 6 in the paper, we can see the underrepresentation of Indian Muslims in Islamist militant groups compared to Muslims in the UK and other regions where Muslims are the minority. In fact, the JJA data (that is used to construct these charts) have no observations from India which is surprising given that India has the second largest Muslim population in the world. Even though the model in this paper is much more about domestic militancy, it is interesting to note that the contrast is also reflected among ISIS foreign fighters. Table 4 shows the Muslim population-based rankings of ISIS foreign fighters from some selected countries. India ranks last out of 65 countries which is far below the UK and a lot of other European countries. Table A.4: ISIS Foreign Fighters

Rank Country Fighters/Million Muslims

(1) (2) (3)

1 Finland 1590.9

11 France 342.4

16 UK 256.2

22 Germany 187.9

65 India 0.1

Data from Benmelech and Klor (2016)

Even if we directly consider speciﬁc “homegrown” groups, there is still relatively little domestic militancy among Indian Muslims. The ongoing militancy in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K hereafter) is a conﬂict that tends to involve Muslim insurgents but, as Fair (2014) has shown, the militants in this region tend to be predominantly from Pakistan (particularly the Punjab province) or Kashmir (both Indian-administered and Pakistan-administered). It is thus empirically incorrect that substantial numbers of aggrieved Muslims from the rest of

54 India are joining up with groups fighting in Kashmir. Furthermore, it would be short-sighted to focus solely on J&K as this one state is not representative of the broader Indian Muslim experience. As the sole Muslim-majority Indian state, it holds a unique place in the Indian polity in terms of governance (the former Article 370), history (in its contentious accession to India as a former princely state), and culture (e.g. Kashmiriyat). The state also has 8.5 million Muslims which is only a fraction of the 172 million Muslims living throughout India. To focus solely on J&K is ignoring the Muslims in Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Kerala, Gujarat, and so forth and, as the findings of the 2006 Sachar Committee Report suggests, the situation in J&K is unlikely to be the main source of grievances for the broader Indian Muslim community. Domestic militancy among Indian Muslims in the rest of India has also been relatively limited. The South Asian branch of al-Qaeda has yet to make a significant mark in India but, even though the JJA database does not have information on them, there have been two other notable home-grown Islamist militant groups - the Student’s Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) and the Indian Mujahideen (IM). SIMI is a banned student organization that most analysts consider to be linked to the more militant IM (Fair, 2010, p.105). In 1977, SIMI was established as the student wing of Jamaat-e-Islami Hind (JIH). Although the position of JIH moderated over time, SIMI became more radical and were eventually banned in 2001. However, rather than pushing the group further into extremism, the ban led to an internal split with one side choosing to pursue a radical path and the other side choosing a more moderate one. Those members on this latter path have tried to restore the credibility of their organization by adopting anti-jihad positions (Fair, 2010, p 114), while the more militant faction has not really lasted after the removal of the initial leaders. IM has committed deadly attacks but the number and intensity of these attacks have been falling and, presently, IM attacks do not appear to be a serious threat.4 After some

4In fact, given the level of external support, it is often diﬃcult to determine from an attack whether IM

55 notable bombings in 2008, police crackdowns led to arrests and leaders ﬂeeing India, and the IM have only publicly claimed responsibility for ﬁve bombings since 2008 - three in 2010, one (questionable) in 2011, and one in 2013 (Subrahmanian et al., 2013). The last blast resulted in no deaths, and there have been no publicly claimed attacks since 2013 even after the Hindutva-linked party, the BJP, came to power in 2014. In fact, in 2009, then Prime minister Manmohan Singh said the Naxalites, not any Islamist militant groups, were the most serious internal threat to India’s national security and this statement was made after the four IM-related bombings in India in 2008. Thus, both SIMI and IM have struggled to maintain a presence and this seems to be due to a lack of membership. The interrogation of IM leaders reveal that one of their chief constraints was a shortage of manpower (Nanjappa, 2010, 2015), and these two groups heavily relied on help from Bangladeshi and Pakistani sources such as respectively Harkat ul-Jihad-e-Islami and Lashkar- e-Taiba (Swami, 2008; Gupta, 2011). Furthermore, even prior to the emergence of IM or the ban on SIMI, Islamist terrorist attacks within India were mostly committed by Pakistani and Bangladeshi militants (Swami, 2013; First Post, 2013).5 Given the overall low level of domestic militancy, it is not surprising that even after acknowledging the potential threat of SIMI and IM in her report, Fair (2010, p.119) still concludes by asking “[given] the pervasive problems confronting India’s vast and variegated Muslim communities, why is terrorism not more pervasive among them?”

India would be considered to have relatively lower capacity than the UK which means or another militant group based outside of India (for example, in Pakistan) was the chief perpetrator. 5Two notable exceptions are the 1993 Bombay bombings and 1998 Coimbatore bombings. The 1993 Bombay bombings occurred in the wake of the Babri Masjid demolition and the resulting riots. Yet, these attacks were orchestrated by the underground criminal organization D-Company - a group that already had the infrastructure and established criminal network who, with help from Pakistani sources, turned its focus to committing the bombings. This was thus not the act of a militant group that emerged from within the Muslim community. On the other hand, the 1998 Coimbatore bombings were conducted by a homegrown militant group, al-Umma. After these attacks, arrests were made and there was some mob violence directed against Muslims. Since 1998, however, Al-Umma has not conducted any such attacks.

56 that the budget constraint of the former is smaller than that of the latter. For simplicity in presentation, I look at the case of when the MPL is large (K ≥ 2) but the result is analogous when the MPL is moderate in size (K < 2, but not too small). Figure A.16 illustrates India’s low-capacity budget constraint and UK’s high-capacity budget constraint. Figure A.16: India and the UK D D India UK BH

D∗ BL

D∗ C C BL BH Let us take the case of India first. Given the ghettoization of Indian Muslims across many cities (Gayer and Jaffrelot, 2012), it would be difficult to avoid being seen such that militancy would be difficult to generate unless there is cooperation from others who either engage jointly or at least stay silent. Additionally, the threat of indiscriminate retaliation against Muslims in India is real. For example, a Hindutva-linked organization committed the 2008 Malegon blast in response to IM terrorism (Jaffrelot, 2010a), and the infamous 2002 Gujarat riots were triggered by rumors surrounding the Godhra train burning where some members of the Muslim community were accused of allegedly setting fire to train carriages carrying Hindu pilgrims back from Ayodhya. There is a rich and still expanding literature that has looked into understanding the causes and political effects of Hindu-Muslim riots.6 The model in this paper uses the threat of indiscriminate retaliation, such as a Hindu mob, as an explanatory variable but my outcome variable is different in that I look at explaining

6Engineer (1984); Brass (2003); Varshney (2003); Wilkinson (2004); Copland (2010); Berenschot (2011); Dhattiwala and Biggs (2012); Wilkinson (2012); Jha (2013, 2014); Mitra and Ray (2014); Klašnja and Novta (2016); Iyer and Shrivastava (2015); Nellis, Weaver and Rosenzweig (2016)

57 minority-led militancy (or the lack thereof). In India, as Wilkinson (2004) explains, it is the state governments, not the federal government, that is in charge of security and preventing indiscriminate retaliation against the minority. Given the minority status of Muslims across Indian states, such high levels of H for a government are unlikely to be found. Even though willingness to protect might vary across states, almost all Indian state governments would be more interested in preventing militancy from occurring than protecting the minority Muslim community. Therefore (and in line with Proposition III), more would be spent on C than D, which would lead to the government’s optimal choice being towards the bottom right of the budget constraint in Figure A.16. As a result, the relative threat of indiscriminate retaliation would be considerably higher which would encourage people to inform (i.e., implement in-group policing) rather than stay silent. Consequently, we would expect little militancy among Indian Muslims.

If, as described above, many Indian Muslims have very low trust in the police then why would Indian Muslims ever inform to a body in which they have little conﬁdence? First, in the model, I am agnostic about to whom the minority group members inform. Thus, they might be participating in in-group policing through informing to an informal community leader who is able to use their resources to prevent the militancy. Second, as in many developing countries (e.g., see Adida (2014)), certain groups (such as Muslims in the case of India) have to often rely on a community leader to interact with the police. Therefore, they do not directly interact with the police. Third, a considerable part of this distrust is due to the fact that the police have failed to protect Indian Muslims from the mob during some notable riots and are often accused of participating in the mob violence themselves (Brass, 2003)[pp.329-330]. As the police have this reputation for failing to protect, the minority would be even more incentivized to report any known militant plots.

58 Willingness to protect Muslims does vary across Indian states which impacts the amount of retaliatory anti-Muslim violence (Wilkinson, 2004). This raises the question of why do we not see similar variation in the amount of Islamist militant incidents in India? This discrepancy exists because perceptions matter. It seems highly likely that the memory and occurrence of riots (even if they are in other parts of India) have large effects on the beliefs of Indian Muslims. In other words, all riots affect perceived willingness (and even perceived ability) of the state to protect and there is evidence to suggest this is the case. A 2014 Director General of Police (DGP) report depicted a Muslim “trust deficit” with police due to perceived communalism, bias, and corruption (Nair, 2014), and one of the authors was the DGP of Tamil Nadu - a state that Wilkinson (2004, pp.189-196) cited as an example of where the state government has an incentive to protect this minority. Further 2013 survey data indicate that overall and even within states where willingness should exist, Indian Muslims have limited trust in the police.7 Overall, 53% of the Indian Muslim respondents stated they had not much to no trust in the police, and in Andhra Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, and Kerala, respectively 50%, 47.2%, 50%, and 60% of Muslim respondents stated they had not much to no trust in police.8 These findings suggest that Indian Muslims would still question whether the state could and would protect them. Recent events suggest that there would now be more improved perceptions of the countermilitancy infrastructure but not defensive infrastructure. In 2008, the Indian Government established a new counterterrorism agency, the National Investigation Agency, which likely enhanced their counterterrorism abilities. In contrast, the increased presence of cow-vigilantes and the 2017 Uttar Pradesh election which resulted in a new controversial Chief Minister would likely make Indian Muslims less trusting of the defensive

7These ﬁgures are highly likely to be a lower bound due to social desirability biases. 8Obtained from the State of Democracy in South Asia data set, Centre for the Study of Developing Societies, New Delhi, India.

59 infrastructure.9 It might be important to note, however, though that in West Bengal in 2016 and 2017, some accused this state government of having an overly “protective” posture toward Muslims, which was encouraging communal violence where Muslim groups were allegedly the ones attacking rather than the ones on the receiving end (PTI, 2017; Singh, 2017b).

In the UK case, the accountability procedures and the rule of law that prevail in this country result in the government oﬀering considerable protection to minorities. It is not surprising then that, even though anti-Muslim violence does exist in the UK, it has never reached the scale of retaliatory anti-Muslim violence that prevails in India. As a result (and in line with Proposition III), the optimal budget allocation for the UK would be higher up the budget line in Figure A.16. This would result in UK Muslims feeling relatively more secure that they are safer from indiscriminate retaliation which means, for those who are relatively aggrieved, there would be less incentive for in-group policing. Some recent suggestive survey evidence from Britain supports this as a plausible explanation. There appears to be positive impressions of the police and the court system with around 70% of Muslim respondents expecting to be treated the same or better by these two institutions compared to people from other religions (ICM, 2015). At the same time, two separate surveys reveal that a half to two-thirds of British Muslim respondents would not inform the police if they thought someone close to them was getting involved with people who support terrorism in Syria (ICM, 2015, 2016). This does not mean that they would not take any action at all. Instead, many reported that they would opt for other means to deal with the issue (talking to them directly, involving family members, etc.). However, all this survey evidence still suggests that the threat of indiscriminate

9The current UP Chief Minister, Yogi Adityanath, was renowned for making anti-Muslim statements in the past.

60 retaliation is relatively low in the UK such that there is a lower incentive to inform to the police.

22 Variation across minorities in India

22.1 Punjab, Jammu & Kashmir, and the North East

In each of these cases below, I brieﬂy illustrate how the insights from the model can explain these episodes of militancy among marginalized minority populations within India.

We can apply the insights of the model to the militancy that has materialized in Punjab, J&K, and the North East. In all three cases, we can see that various community grievances formed the mobilizing foundations, with militant groups emerging to offer a vehicle for the violent expression of those feelings. In the Kashmir valley, the combination of limited economic prospects, a politically knowledgeable youth, and the inability to express dissent through legitimate political channels led Kashmiris to turn to violence (Ganguly, 1997). Militant groups like the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front and Hizb-ul-Mujahideen were then able to provide outlets for these feelings. The timing of the conflict in J&K is an interesting feature given that it only really started in the early 1990s. According to Ganguly (1997), the delay is due to the limited political awareness of Kashmiris immediately after 1947, which inhibited any potentially aggressive responses to prior events that stoked grievances. However, even in light of this explanation that explains when the conflict started, the insights presented in the model still help to explain why it was able to emerge in the first place. In Punjab, the grievances appeared to be manifold spanning issues such as unpopular agricultural policies to the 1984 Operation Bluestar and its aftermath (Pettigrew, 1995). The Babbar Khalsa, which had already shown its predilection to militancy prior to 1984, as well as other groups capitalized on these grievances to create and sustain an insurgency which

61 lasted until the early 1990s. Finally, in the North-East, grievances vary from state to state but include identity concerns, Bengali migration, and government neglect (Misra, 2014). These grievances, combined with the lack of rule of law, created a conducive environment for militant groups to emerge in almost all of the seven sister states (Lacina, 2007). How did these insurgencies materialize when not even a sustainable terrorist outfit has been able to emerge within the broader Indian Muslim community? One explanation, thats stems from the model introduced in the paper, is the considerably reduced threat of indiscriminate retaliation. In all these prior insurgencies, the aggrieved group were majorities within their own locality even if they were minorities within India. In Punjab and J&K, respectively Sikhs and Muslims make up the majority of the state population. In the North East, the insurgencies initially represented “local” majorities.10 For example, Nagaland was the site of the first insurgency and the Naga people were a majority within their specific region at that time in Assam. Thus, being majorities within their respective geographies exposed all these groups’ sympathizers to a considerably lower risk of being victims of indiscriminate retaliation from the national Hindu majority. The incidence of anti-Sikh riots in the wake of Indira Gandhi’s assassinations were concentrated in Delhi (where Sikhs form a minority), not in Punjab. In Kashmir, anti-Muslim riots have not taken place as they have in other parts of the country at various points in time. Instead, there has actually been mob violence directed against the Kashmir Hindu pandits with no subsequent retaliation by the Hindu mob (as the Hindus are the minority group in the Kashmir Valley), resulting in the exodus of this community out of the Valley. Similarly, in the North East, the population represented by the insurgent groups have not incurred the costs of retaliatory mob violence but other minority “foreign” migrants have endured such assaults (e.g. 1983 Nellie Massacre).

10I emphasize initially as currently the insurgent groups have fractured into smaller factions and resemble criminal groups as opposed to political insurgencies (Lacina, 2007, 2009).

62 Figure A.17 illustrates how the model can explain the amount and type of militancy that has emerged among these other minority groups. First, and as a comparison, because Muslims are a minority in every state (except J&K), any state government’s chosen budget

allocation with respect to this minority group would be around HIM where relatively more is spent on counter militancy (C) than protection/defense for this minority (D) as shown below. Figure A.17: Minorities within India D

HOM

HIM C BL However, as is the case in J&K, Punjab, and the North-East, the associated minority groups are majorities in these states even though they are minorities with respect to the whole country. Therefore, the willingness to protect these minorities would be greater for these state governments which implies that more could actually be spent on D than C (the

HOM point), and this in turn increases the likelihood of militancy occurring (Proposition III). Furthermore, with low-capacity states, this model also explains why the militancy involving these conﬂicts would take the form of relatively larger operations. The reduced fear of indiscriminate retaliation combined with the fact that there is relatively little left over that a low-capacity state can spend on the countermilitancy infrastructure mean that staying silent while one’s partner engages (which is necessary for small operations) cannot be an equilibrium action as one could improve their payoﬀ by joining their partner in militancy.

63 Figure 7 in the paper, and Figures A.14 and A.15 above, provide some suggestive evidence to support this insight. The charts show how the scale of minority militant operations - speciﬁcally those from the North-East and Kashmir - are larger than the minority militant operations that have emerged in the UK.

22.2 Lack of militancy among Scheduled Castes and Other

Backward Classes

Some might question why a substantial militancy has not emerged among scheduled castes (SC) and other backward classes (OBC) - neither of which, alone, make up a majority in India11 - and whether these reasons could also apply to Indian Muslims. These two groups have been historically disadvantaged and thus fare badly on the socioeconomic spectrum in comparison to the Hindu upper castes.12 There are five possible factors which could explain why members of these two groups have not resorted to violence, and the first four factors would not really apply to the Indian Muslim community. First, the constitution enjoins the government to improve the situation of SCs and OBCs through various affirmative action policies in education and government employment. These positive discrimination measures were instituted for SCs during British Rule and were continued and expanded post-independence.13 For OBCs, some states incorporated reservations at different points in time after 1947, but the implementation of the Mandal Commission recommendations by the central government in 1990 was particularly important in improving the opportunities available to the OBCs. Even though some Muslim groups are included under the OBC category, Muslims as a whole do not

11Although the population of these two groups combined do constitute a majority. 12It is important to acknowledge here that there has historically been wide sub-national variation between North and South India in the political power of lower castes due to demographic features. See Jaffrelot (2003) for more discussion on this topic. 13Although the quotas were initially not fulfilled, the representation of SCs and even OBCs in government jobs has improved (Jaffrelot, 2003).

64 enjoy these same constitutional “privileges.” In fact, a SC is no longer considered a SC (and thus is no longer technically allowed access to the reservations) if they convert to Islam. Second, SCs and OBCs have been increasingly incorporated into the political landscape, which can be important in reducing the appeal to militancy (Chandra and García-Ponce, 2019). Pre-independence, SCs had seats reserved within the Hindu electorate.14 Post-independence, SC leaders were first co-opted into the Congress Party, but eventually political movements emerged to mobilize the SCs and OBCs as political communities (Weiner, 2001; Jaffrelot, 2003).15 There are successful parties such as the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) and the Samajwadi Party (SP) that have respectively targeted SCs and OBCs. The two main national parties (the BJP and Congress Party) have also used increasing amounts of lower caste party officials and candidates in elections (Jaffrelot, 2003; Chandra, 2004, 2016). Even during the 2014 general election, Narendra Modi emphasized his OBC status (Jaffrelot, 2015b). Yet, Muslims have been underrepresented at both the national and state level (Ansari, 2006; Jaffrelot, 2010b).16 Overall, out of all subaltern groups, “Muslims in particular remain consistently underrepresented in positions of power” (Chandra, 2016, p.152).17 Third, the caste cleavage might have become less pronounced over time. In a bid to create a united Hindu front,18 the BJP has at different points in time chosen a strategy of ethno-religious mobilization to transcend caste barriers, which is likely to have had some significant effect on reducing the salience of the caste identity (Hassan 1998, pp.104-106,

14The Poona Pact of 1932 allowed for scheduled castes to have seats reserved within the Hindu electorate. 15In recent history, the relative representation of these two groups across parties appears to have had a significant effect on the way these different ethnic groups vote (Chandra, 2004). 16However, there is wide variation across states: Gujarat has the worst average deprivation rate (79%) and Delhi has the best average deprivation rate (11.76%) for the years 1952 to 2004 (Ansari, 2006)[p.370] 17The All India Majlis-e-Ittehad-ul Muslimeen is a potential vehicle for increasing Muslim political representation but they have not made a significant impact on the political landspace. On the other hand, the BSP in Uttar Pradesh have made appeals to Indian Muslims, as described in Chandra (2004, pp.216-217), but the main target group of this party are still SCs. 18The infamous 1981 Meenakshipuram conversion and the Mandal Commission recommendations had threatened to create disunity within the Hindu community.

65 Parikh 1998, p.45; Jaffrelot 1998, pp.75-77; Jaffrelot 1996, p.431).19 One’s caste might be declining as an electoral identity for other secular reasons as well. In the 1998 elections, caste appeared to be a less reliable predictor than class in determining voting intentions (Oldenburg, 1999). This trend seems to have somewhat carried on to the present. In 2014, the BJP obtained the largest share of the SC and OBC vote in the national election which perhaps reflected economic concerns or dissatisfaction with the then incumbent Congress Party (Verma, 2014; Jaffrelot, 2015a). Furthermore, the 2017 Uttar Pradesh assembly elections suggest that a considerable proportion of SC voters switched over to the BJP (Varmal, 2017), and in the 2019 general election it seems a considerable plurality of the SC and OBC vote went with the BJP (Bansal, 2019). Thus, the SC and OBC vote has been willing to shift to other parties (including to parties that have not historically had cordial relations with these communities), but the Muslim vote has not witnessed the same shifts. In comparison, in the preceding elections, the Muslim vote in the 2014 national election, and even in the 2017 Uttar Pradesh election, has remained consistently with the same parties and not shifted towards the BJP (Jaffrelot, 2015a; Varmal, 2017).20 Furthermore, in contrast to SC and OBC, the vast majority of the Muslim vote did not go to the BJP in the 2019 general election (Bansal, 2019). Fourth, the SC and OBC groups are composed of a multitude of smaller subgroups which implies a possible collective action problem could exist. The fragmentation could make it difficult for either broad category to be a cohesive coalition. The treatment of the sub groups within the SCs and OBCs by the political parties has also not been uniform. The BSP is primarily associated with the Jatavs, while the SP and the Rahstriya Janata Dal have focused their attention on the Yadav caste (Chandra 2004, p.189-190 Jaffrelot

19Yet, this ethno-religious mobilization strategy is unlikely to have been a successful long-term strategy given the moderation and diversiﬁcation of the BJP agenda in the mid 1990’s onwards. See Jaﬀrelot (1996) for a full description of the Hindu Nationalists’ changing strategy. 20This does not necessarily imply that there is a block Muslim vote-bank.

66 2003, Ch. 10 and 11). This division is somewhat reflected in the differences in voting behavior between the Jatavs and the broad Dalit category in the 2014 Lok Sabha elections (Jaffrelot, 2015a). On the other hand, Jaffrelot (2015a, pp.32-33) provides some evidence that the same voting divisions do not appear to exist for Muslims in the 2014 elections as “neither class nor caste make a big difference in the case of this community.” Fifth, there has been indiscriminate retaliation directed at the lower castes (e.g., the 1996 Bathani Tola massacre) in India. Extensions of reservations to lower castes, at both the state level and national level, has led to riots and indiscriminate violence featuring mobs. This paper has argued that the considerable perceived threat of indiscriminate retaliation can explain the relative lack of militancy among Muslims in India. If the fear of this threat also exists among SCs and OBCs, then the model developed in this paper could also be used to explain why militancy is restrained among these communities as well.

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