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Vegetarianism Reasons V Vegetarianism reasons. This entry explores both the non-anthropocentric and anthropocentric moral Mylan Engel Jr. reasons for vegetarianism. The principal Northern Illinois University, DeKalb, IL, USA non-anthropocentric reason for ethical vegetari- anism is direct moral concern for the welfare and well-being of the animals being eaten. The prin- Abstract cipal anthropocentric reasons for vegetarianism are (i) concern for the environment, (ii) concern Ethical vegetarians maintain that vegetarianism over global food scarcity and the just distribution is morally required. The principal reasons offered of resources, and (iii) concern for future genera- in support of ethical vegetarianism are (i) concern tions. The entry begins with a brief historical look for the welfare and well-being of the animals at ethical vegetarianism and the moral status of being eaten, (ii) concern for the environment, animals. (iii) concern over global food scarcity and the just distribution of resources, and (iv) concern for future generations. Each of these reasons is Ethical Vegetarianism: A Historical explored in turn, starting with a historical look at Overview ethical vegetarianism and the moral status of animals. Ethical vegetarianism has a rich history dating back more than 2,500 years. Pythagoras (ca. 570–490 BCE) is one of the earliest known Keywords and most prominent proponents of vegetarianism. From what we know of his teachings as spelled Vegetarianism; Animal ethics; Moral status; out by Ovid, Pythagoras offered at least four Environmentalism; Hunger; Food security; moral reasons for refraining from eating meat. Global justice; Future generations First, he maintained that eating meat requires the unnecessary killing of animals, since nature provides bountiful plant-based alternatives that “require no bloodshed and no slaughter” Introduction (Walters and Portmess 1999, p. 16). Second, he insisted that killing animals dehumanizes Vegetarians refrain from eating animals. Ethical humans: “Oh, what a wicked thing it is for flesh vegetarians refrain from eating animals for moral to be the tomb of flesh, ... Must you destroy # Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015 H. Ten Have (ed.), Encyclopedia of Global Bioethics, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-05544-2_434-1 2 Vegetarianism another to satiate your greedy-gutted cravings?” have only instrumental value, i.e., they have (Walters and Portmess 1999, p. 17). Third, he value only to the extent that they are of use for thought it wrong to kill animals for food, because rational creatures. Kant (1724–1804), too, they have done nothing to deserve it (Walters and followed Aristotle in embracing the rationality Portmess 1999, pp. 17–18). Finally, because he criterion of moral considerability. For Kant, ani- believed that human souls transmigrate into mals are not rational members of the kingdom of nonhuman animals, Pythagoras condemned eating ends, and so, the categorical imperative does not meat on the grounds that doing so might involve apply to them. Like Aquinas, Kant concluded that the murder of kindred souls: “So I warn you, lest animals only have instrumental value; they are appetite murder brotherhood, I warn you by all the not ends in themselves but rather, mere means to priesthood in me, do not exile what may be kindred an end – that end being man. souls by evil slaughter. Blood should not nourish Descartes (1596–1650) took linguistic ability blood” (Walters and Portmess 1999, p. 19). to be the mark of mentality. Because he held that Plutarch of Chaeronea (ca. 56–120 CE) argued all nonhuman animals are incapable of using that humans are not naturally carnivorous language, Descartes concluded that all nonhuman (Walters and Portmess 1999, p. 29). He also animals are mindless machines – mere automata argued that animals are intrinsically valuable devoid of thought and reason. When coupled with and deserve moral consideration in their own the rationality criterion of moral considerability, right because they are sentient, intelligent crea- the Cartesian view of animals implies that ani- tures and, thus, should not be killed and eaten mals are bereft of morally significant interests. (Walters and Portmess 1999, p. 32). Porphyry Historically, Aristotelianism and Cartesianism (ca. 232–304 CE) held that justice requires that helped shape Western attitudes regarding the we do no harm to any being capable of being treatment of animals, including killing them for harmed, and since animals can be harmed, the food, for if animals are devoid of morally signif- do no harm principle must be extended to every icant interests, then killing them and eating them animated being (Walters and Portmess 1999, does not violate their interests. pp. 44–45). But not all modern philosophers were per- Aristotle (384–322 BCE) had quite a different suaded by the Aristotelian/Cartesian view of ani- view of our moral relationship with animals. He mals. Voltaire (1694–1778) appealed to maintained that every being that exists has a telos, neurophysiological evidence to challenge i.e., an ultimate purpose for existing. Aristotle Descartes’s claim that linguistic ability provides held that the purpose of the superior is to rule the only compelling evidence of mentality: “has over the inferior and the purpose of the inferior nature arranged all the means of feeling in this is to serve the superior. He also held that the animal, so that it may not feel? Has it nerves in rational is superior to the irrational. Because he order to be impassible? Do not suppose this regarded animals as inferior irrational beings, impertinent contradiction in nature” (Regan and Aristotle concluded that the purpose of animals Singer 1989, p. 21). Voltaire also argued that is to serve the needs of rational man: tame animals animal behavior – such as nervous pacing or serve as food and as beasts of burden, and wild jumping for joy – often provides us with excellent animals serve as food and provide clothing and evidence of an animal’s current mental states. instruments (Regan and Singer 1989, pp. 6–7). David Hume (1711–1776) also rejected Carte- Aquinas (1225–1274) echoed Aristotle in sianism with respect to animals. He insisted that insisting that rationality is what makes a being no truth is more evident than that animals are worthy of moral consideration and respect. He endowed with thought and reason. Hume also maintained that only rational creatures are free thought it obvious that animals are not only capa- and autonomous, and only free and autonomous ble of experiencing pain and pleasure but also creatures have intrinsic value, i.e., value in and of capable of experiencing fear, anger, courage, themselves. Animals, being irrational creatures, and other emotions. Vegetarianism 3 Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) argued that ani- • We observe significant anatomical and neuro- mals deserve direct moral consideration. He physiological similarity between humans and rejected the rationality criterion of moral many animals (including all mammals and considerability, insisting that when it comes to most vertebrates). the moral status of animals, the relevant question • Efferent and afferent nerves run throughout “is not, Can they reason? nor Can they talk? but, their bodies, including myelinated A-delta Can they suffer?” (Regan and Singer 1989, p. 26). fibers (the kind of fibers responsible for acute Like Bentham, Henry Salt (1851–1939) also “protective pain” in humans) and unmyelin- thought that the capacity to suffer is what makes ated C fibers (the kind of fibers responsible for a being worthy of moral consideration. Because “restorative pain” in humans). animals are capable of suffering, Salt thought it • Endogenous serotonergic and opioid pain- morally unjustifiable to cause them unnecessary control mechanisms are present in mammals, pain. He also thought it wrong to kill animals birds, and fish. [Why would organisms inca- unnecessarily. Since we can meet all of our nutri- pable of feeling pain have endogenous pain- tional needs with a vegetarian diet, Salt argued control systems?] that it is wrong “to breed and kill animals for • Analgesics and anesthetics cause animals to merely culinary purposes” (1886, p. 10). stop exhibiting pain behavior, presumably Many of these historical themes repeat them- because these substances prevent the pain selves in the contemporary debate over ethical itself in much the way they prevent pain in vegetarianism: What property or feature makes humans. a being worthy of moral consideration? Which • There is compelling experimental evidence beings deserve moral consideration, and how that the capacity to feel pain enhances survival much consideration are they owed? Are we justi- value in animals, based on the self-destructive fied in killing animals for food, when equally tendencies displayed by animals that have nutritious plant-based foods are readily avail- been surgically deafferented. able? Contemporary answers to these questions are addressed in what follows. In short, there is overwhelming evidence that mammals, birds, and fish can feel morally significant pain. Setting the Stage for the Contemporary Second, despite the scientific, philosophical, Debate and commonsense awareness that animals are conscious, sentient beings in their own right, Three factors play a critical role in the contem- farmed animals are regarded as commodities porary case for ethical vegetarianism. The first and are treated as if they were mere “production concerns sentience, i.e., the capacity to suffer units” devoid of morally significant interests. The and/or
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