Suggestion and Its Role in Social Life

ALDINETRANSACTION A Division of Transaction Publishers New Brunswick (U.S.A.) and London (U.K.)

Transaction Publishers New Brunswick (U.S.A.) and London (U.K.) A Center for Urban Policy Research Book

V. M. Bekhterev Edited by Lloyd H. Strickland and ALDINETRANSACTION A Division of Transaction Publishers translated by Tzvetanka Dobreva-Martinova New Brunswick (U.S.A.) and London (U.K.)

Transaction Publishers New Brunswick (U.S.A.) and London (U.K.) A Center for Urban Policy Research Book First published 1998 by Transaction Publishers

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Bekhterev, Vladimir Mikhailovich, 1857–1927. [Vnushenie i evo rol’ v obshchestvennoĭ zhiani. English] Suggestion and its role in social life / Vladimir M. Bekhterev; Lloyd H. Strickland, editor; Tzvetanka Dobreva-Martinova, translator. p. cm. This work first appeared as a lecture delivered by the author at the Military-Medical Academy, Dec. 1897. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1-56000-340-5 (alk. paper) 1. Mental suggestion. 2. Mental suggestion—Social aspects. I. Strickland, Lloyd H. II. Title. BF1156.S8B3513 1998 153.8’5—dc21 97-51701 ISBN 13: 978-1-4128-5706-2 (pbk) CIP ISBN 13: 978-1-56000-340-3 (hbk) Contents Preface and Acknowledgments ix

Introduction xiii Lloyd H. Strickland

Foreword to the Second Edition xxvii V. Bekhterev

Foreword to the Third Edition xxix V. Bekhterev

1 Different iewsV on the Nature of Suggestion 1

2 The Definition of Suggestion 11

3 Suggestion and Persuasion 17

4 Suggestion in the Hypnotic State 21

5 Suggestion in the Waking State 25

6 The Importance of Faith 31

7 Unintentional Suggestion and Mutual Suggestion 39

8 Concerning the Suggestion of Thoughts 41

9 Paths of Influencing One Another through Suggestion 47

10 Collective or Mass Illusions and Hallucinations 51 11 Inalterable Hallucinatory Sensations and the Importance of Auto-Suggestion 59

12 Suggestion as a Factor in Mass Self-Destructive Acts of the Russian Sectarians, and Suicide Epidemics 61

13 Murder and Robbery Epidemics 67

14 Epidemics of Convulsions in History 73

15 Witchcraft and Devil-Possession Epidemics 79

16 Hysterical and Nervous Debility Epidemics 89

17 Other Psychopathological Epidemics of a Religious Variety 99

18 The Paranoiac Malevannii as a Culprit in a Distinctive Psychopathological Epidemic 107

19 The Malevannism pidemicE 123

20 The Jehovah sychopathologicalP Epidemic 129

21 The Tatar sychopathologicalP Epidemic in Kazan Province 135

22 The Supanevo sychopathologicalP Epidemic in Orel Province 141

23 The Novogrud pidemicE and the “Pavlovka Slaughter” 145

24 Sectarian Collectivities and Epidemics 147

25 A Chinese Epidemic of the I-Ho-Ch’uan Sect 151

26 A Canadian Psychopathological Epidemic among Russian Dukhobors 153

27 The Epidemic Dissemination of Mystical Doctrines 155 28 A Free Love Epidemic 159

29 Panic among People and Animals 163

30 Psychic Epidemics during Historic People’s Movements 169

31 Financial Speculation Epidemics 173

32 The Importance of People’s Collectivities for the Spread of Psychic Epidemics 175

33 The Importance of Suggestion for Social Groups 183

Index 195

Preface and Acknowledgments Suggestion and its Role in Social Life first appeared as a lecture delivered by Bekhterev at the December 1897 assembly of the Military-Medical Academy. It underwent two subsequent elaborations, still in lecture format. Translation of the third edition of this work is what we have provided; it was originally published as a monograph in St. Petersburg in 1908.1 We suspect that much of Bekhterev’s text remained in its original form as transcribed lectures, and this has affected both its structure and style. Faced with many ambiguities of interpretation, we finally elected to offer as faithful translation as we could to the original Russian. Our models have been the efforts of Murphy & Murphy (Bekhterev, 1933) and of Eugenia Lockwood (see Strickland. 1994, p. vii). Both these translations explicitly addressed the challenge that Bekhterev’s writings offer, particularly those in which he exchanged subject matter, sometimes substituting discussions of mind and society for the more familiar language of physiology, anatomy, and reflexes. We have retained Bekhterev’s paragraphs, although they sometimes appear awkward or unnecessary. We have tried to preserve the richness and complexity of his Russian thought; simplification has led to distor- tion in translations of other Russian psychologists, a point to which even the multilingual Bekhterev was himself sensitive, and so we did not make excessive changes in the sentence length and structure of the original in order to better fit current English language style. Thus, we have retained in the manuscript some long and cumbersome sen- tences; these may sometimes be a challenge for the reader, but coping with them should be worth the effort (see Rumbaugh, 1996; Valsiner, 1994). Responsibility for any absolutely unfathomable passages lies with the editor, who has been working with such material a lot longer than the translator. Bekhterev sometimes seems almost casual in his referencing when judged against modern, particularly American Psychological Association,

ix Suggestion and its role in social life standards. A few Western references provided by Bekhterev in Russian have been impossible to identify; these were simply transliterated from Russian into English. Some of the French, German, and English references used by Bekhterev appear incomplete or contain abbreviations, but we have kept them as cited by the author. Russian historians may in the future be able to untangle them, but as they are they faithfully convey the working of a far-ranging, complex, brilliant, and argumen- tative mind. Transliteration from Russian has also been used for a few non-Russian proper names and names of obscure geographic locations, and editorial discrepancies in the original (e.g., different abbreviations of the same name or reference in the text and reference sections) have been reproduced. Bekhterev frequently employed lengthy quotations; we view these as attempts to maintain a cautious and high level of authenticity with regard to the ideas referred to and historical events. However, on occasion it is difficult to follow these lengthy quotations and a few times even to understand where they start and where they end. We suspect that his stenographers were equally confused in these few instances. Another distracting technique employed by Bekhterev and his publisher in the original was expanded letter-spacing as a means of indicating varieties of importance or emphasis. In consultation with the publisher, we have elected to eliminate Bekhterev’s letter spacing, and have resorted to italics when appropriate. We have perserved Bekhterev’s gender use for the third person singular; it is ordinarily masculine and on just a few occasions feminine. There are many footnotes in this translation, since Bekhterev provided his references in footnotes. Translator’s footnotes have been added where a clarification or explanation could be of help for the reader. We hope that these preceding paragraphs have not sounded omi- nous, but what amounts in publishing circles to a “found document” should not be treated otherwise in its first translation. Anyone who has ever tried to locate a copy of Suggestion and its Role in Social Life in the original Russian will not cavil at our assignment of this label. We are grateful to a number of people and offices who have been helpful in the preparation of this book. First, Tzvetanka Dobreva- Martinova expresses gratitude to Carleton University and to the Fonds pour la Formation et l’Aide a la Recherche (FCAR) for the funds which sustained her over the year in which her first run (of several!) x Preface and Acknowledgments at Bekhterev was accomplished. She is also thankful to her Bulgarian friend Pavlina Petkova who has been insightful and helpful throughout the whole endeavor. Strickland is, as usual, indebted to the Chair of the Psychology Department, Bill Jones, for his helping the project along in countless small ways. Michael Cole has been a sustaining supporter for years now; it was his enthusiasm for this particular undertaking that kept our own motivation at the level required. Larry Black of Carleton’s Department of History has provided much support and encouragement. We are grateful to Jaan Valsiner, who reviewed the translation and provided many useful suggestions for clarification, corrections, etc. We have been particularly fortunate to have had Laurence Mintz of Transaction Publishers as our editor. His invaluable editorial interjec- tions have been supplemented by scholarly and important suggestions that have strengthened the book in many ways not obvious to the reader. We regret that we cannot with Suggestion and Its Role in Social Life engage the critical mind and authority of our late colleague, Nick Spanos, whose stature in the field of hypnosis and suggestion would surely have made him another target for our indebtedness. His potential contribution to this was in our mind when we undertook the project, and we are aware of his absence as we end it. Finally, we are deeply grateful to our respective spouses, Pat and Petromil, both for their support for this long project and for their forgiveness for our respective, frequent absences from our normal family routines.

Lloyd H. Strickland Tzvetanka Dobreva-Martinova Note 1. There is a translation of the first edition into German (Bechterew, 1899), which Bekhterev himself cites in the last chapter of the present version, as well as “translation and adaptation” in French (Bechterew, 1910), probably of the second edition. References Bechterew, W. (1899). Suggestion und ibre sociale Bedeutung. Leipzig. Bechterew, W. M. (1910). La Suggestion et sone rôle dans la vie sociale. P. Keraval (trans). Paris: Alex. Coccoz. Bekhterev, V. M. (1933). General principles of human reflexology: An introduction to the objective sutdy of personality, 4th (1928) edition. (E. & W. Murphy, trans.). London: Jarrolds.

xi Suggestion and its role in social life

Rumbaugh. D. M. (1996). In search of Red October’s psychology. Contemporary Psychology, 41, 639–641. Strickland, L. H. (1994). V. M. Bekhterev’s “Collective reflexology”: Part I. (E. Lock- wood, trans.) Commack, N.Y.: NOVA Science Publishers. Valsiner, J. (1994). From energy to collectivity: a commentary on the development of Bekhterev’s theoretical views. In L. H. Strickland (ed.), V. M. Bekhterev’s “Collective reflexology” (E. Lockwood, trans.) Commack, N.Y.: NOVA Science Publishers.

xii Introduction “Is there any point to which you would wish to draw my attention?” “The curious incident of the dog in the night-time.” “The dog did nothing in the night-time.” “That was the curious incident,” remarked Sherlock Holmes. —from Sir Arthur Conan Doyle’s “Silver Blaze”

This book is a translation of what might well have been, in a world of different politics, one of the major contributions to the history of social psychology, clinical psychology, and political psychology. That the title, Suggestion and Its Role in Social Life, is totally unfamiliar to practically all English-speaking readers, and that the name of the author, Vladimir M. Bekhterev, is only slightly less so, is something I shall try to explain. To start, I will draw from previous introductions I and colleagues have prepared (Dobreva-Martinova & Strickland, 1995; Strickland & Lockwood, 1989; Strickland & Dobreva- Martinova, 1996), on contemporary historical accounts (Joravsky, 1989; Kozulin, 1984; McLeish, 1975; Rahmani, 1973; Valsiner, 1994), on brief biographies by two of Bekhterev’s junior associates, V. Gerver (1933) and A. L. Schniermann (1930), and from what was until recently the main source of Bekhterev’s thought in English, General Principles of Human Reflexology (Bekhterev, 1933). All these sources contribute to the picture of an outstanding man of science, one who published over 600 works on anatomy, physiology, nervous and mental diseases, biology, pedology, philosophy, and reflexology. He founded several important journals. He established many laboratories and research units, most of them small and oriented toward specific problems (vocational counselling or child learning, for instance) but ranging upward in size to the gigantic Psychoneurological Institute in St. Petersburg, through which, Gerver (1933) points out, over 10,000 students passed in the space of a decade.

xiii Suggestion and its role in social life

Born in 1857, and receiving his medical degree at the age of twenty- one, he studied mental illness and its relation to anatomy and physiology. He spent time at some of the major laboratories and hospitals of his time, among them those of Wundt and Charcot. While still in Western Europe in 1895, he was appointed to a new chair of mental diseases at the University of Kazan. He was active there both as a teacher and clinician, and since he was a skilled hypnotist, hypnotherapy and group suggestion were among the techniques he used frequently. While at Kazan, he first developed and later published several lectures which, after two elaborations became the third edition of Suggestion and its Role in Social Life (Bekhterev, 1908, the work translated here). Because of the Russian view of the personality as a social, interpersonal construct, his inevitable interest in group psychology led to publication of The Subject Matter and Goals of Social Psychology in 1911. He came to believe that both individual and group phenomena could be effectively studied only in a totally objective manner, that is without relying on assumptions about a level of “validity” of private conscious experience. Nevertheless, as we shall see in what follows, he was quite at home in discussions about mental phenomena. He definitely presented himself as a reflexologist, but his own concept of the reflex was much broader than that of his scientific progenitor, Sechenov (1965a, 1965b), and of his main contemporary and rival, Ivan Pavlov (1927). Ultimately, the concept “reflex” was to be applied to behavioral (and psychic) reflec- tions, manifestations of energy, an output from an organism following the transformation of an energy input; it was not restricted to use with questionable physiology. The concept “reflex” was applicable to every variety of life—from one-celled organisms reacting to bright light to complex human groups under conditions of panic—clearly a far cry from gastric secretions and the spinal cord. Indeed, the “basic” motor reflexes characteristic of all animal life, and from which other behav- iors develop, were identified as “aggression” and “defense”; these are clearly social psychological concepts. Yet little or nothing has been published about his social psychology, either by historians or social psychologists, since his death. An exception, a recent description of Bekhterev’s thought and research with special reference to social psychology, is by Jaan Valsiner (1994) in his introductory comment to our translation of Bekhterev’s Collective Reflexology (Strickland, 1994). In fact, his is the single comment of consequence on Suggestion and its Role in Social Life, excepting xiv Introductionntroduction

only the extensive review by Rumbaugh (1996), and some of it deserves quotation here:

Psychology of the 20th century has had very few empirical phenomena of persisting theoretical relevance at its foundation. One of those few is the phenomenon of hypnosis, and especially that of post-hypnotic suggestion. It is well known that these phenomena gave rise to the psychoanalytic belief system and its methodology. The issue of the effects of hypnosis (and its use in therapy) was a major topic that puzzled psychiatrists and psychologists in the last decades of the 19th century. Bekhterev, as a psychiatrist and a practitioner with practical hypnotic skills, was right on target in trying to understand the phenomena of social suggestion that are involved in hypnosis as well as in social life in general. Social suggestion in that context was used by Bekhterev, using an analogy with infectious diseases (contagium vivum), as a special kind of ‘psychological infection’ (contagium psychicum). Analogously to infection-carrying biological microorganisms, that psychological infection is carried by words, gestures, and other phenomena in social interaction—hence, human beings are constantly available to social suggestions (Bekhterev, 1903, p. 5). Bekhterev’s emphasis on the organism-environment interaction as the framework in which a ‘hidden reserve of energy’ is being accumulated fits with the notion of psychological infection: through social suggestion, each personality accumulates the particular suggested material (‘energy’) in a way that later starts to look (from the perspective of others) as if it were the person’s own willful act. However, Bekhterev’s view on the mechanisms of social suggestion (in both everyday life and under hypnosis) transcended the traditional opposition of the ‘self versus other’s-suggestion’ dilemma. Bekhterev’s notion of the active person led him to emphasize that, in any case of social suggestion, the socially suggested material interacts with the person’s already existing ‘core’ personality. The latter, of course, was seen as the result of previous encounters with the world by the given person. Bekhterev viewed the implicit (we could call it ‘clandestine’) process of everyday social suggestion as the normative context for the development of personality. (Valsiner, 1994, pp. xix–xx)

Pertaining to the wide range of topics Bekhterev addressed in Sug- gestion and its Role in Social Life, Valsiner states:

The social world of Russia, Europe and North America provided Bekhterev with a multitude of real-life phenomena that could be explained by social suggestions that have become fixated into persons’ strong beliefs. Cases of religious sects of extreme kinds, recovery from hysterically-based somatic symptoms under personal religious

xv Suggestion and its role in social life

‘revelations’, and so on, were all present in Russian society at Bekhterev’s time, as in any other society at any time. The strong beliefs that social groups develop among their members—by way of escalation of the belief through mutual social suggestion— constitute the basis of (episodes of) social hysteria that have been described widely in world history. For Bekhterev, the energy-based world view that recognized the development of intra-personal psychological phenomena on the basis of social (self and other) suggestions constituted the foundations on which the ideas expressed in Collective Reflexology were built two decades later. (Valsiner, 1994, p. xxi)

It is grudging testimony to the success of the legendary repressive measures of the Soviets to admit that, despite the publication of Collec- tive Reflexology, Valsiner’s commentary, and Rumbaugh’s essay, we still cannot discuss Bekhterev and his place in psychological science with anything like the relative certainty with which we might Ivan Pavlov (see, for example, American Psychologist, September, 1997). It is particularly frustrating to be unable to give more context to Bekhterev’s social psychological work, because it was our pursuit of the source of Soviet Academy of Science “social psychophysics” research in the 1970s, in the laboratories of Boris Lomov and Eugene Zabrodin (see Lomov, 1979; Nosulenko, 1979; Lomov & Kol’tsova, 1984; Belyaeva & Nosulenko, 1985, 1991), that led in the first instance to a decade’s work on Bekhterev’s (1921) Collective Reflexology (Strickland, 1994; 1996) and published translations of related papers (Berkhin, 1988; Strickland and Lockwood, 1988; Vasil’eva, 1988). Some solace may be gained by recalling that contemporary historians of Russian/Soviet psychology, on whom we greatly depended for guidance when we started, had little to say about Bekhterev’s social psychological thought and research, as we shall see below. Some of these historians are former “insiders,” that is, psychologists raised and trained in the former USSR or Eastern Europe; they are writers who, in a normal world, may well have been expected to have known better than “outsiders” about the context and development of Russian/Soviet psychological science, if it were truly there to be known. Their near silence about Bekhterev’s social psychology, which until now we could do little more than echo, may make understandable my reluctant acknowledgment of the success of Soviet suppression, or, at least, half-suppression (his physiological and general experimental work remained more accessible) of the works of a great scientist. xvi Introduction

I do not offer the following examples of “silent watchdogs” as negative assessments of the work of admired colleagues; rather, they confirm what it has been my experience to find—or perhaps I should say “not find”—in my own searches. For instance, the senior Western historian of Soviet psychology, Joseph Brozek (1973, p. 4), in a foreword to the work of a fellow historian (Rahmani, 1973), proclaimed that the latter had provided an “effective ‘introduction’ to Soviet psychology.” It assuredly was that in the area of general experimental psychology as well as personality and social psychology; but Bekhterev’s Collective Reflexology (Bekhterev, 1921; Strickland, 1994) was mentioned only as a title, and not again referred to, even in the section on Soviet social psychology (Rahmani, 1973, pp. 364–69). Further, Rahmani’s reference was to a 1918 French “adaptation and extension” of Bekhterev’s magnificent effort, which bears the original Russian publication year of 1921 (!). More to the point of present concern, however, is the fact that Suggestion and its Role in Social Life was not mentioned at all. And in Brozek’s own historiography of Soviet psychology (Brozek, 1976), there are no references to social psychology, Bekhterev’s or anyone else’s, although his “developmental reflexology” and its disappearance on ideological grounds is acknowledged. Prior to the appearance of Rahmani’s volume, the best source on Russian psychology was probably the handbook edited by Cole and Maltzman (1969). In this, Bekhterev received numerous citations, and was mentioned as a pioneer in almost every topic area (developmental psychology, clinical psychology, comparative psychology, engineering psychology). Nevertheless, his social psychology went unacknowledged, even in the Part II section devoted to abnormal and social psychology; neither Collective Reflexology nor Suggestion and its Role in Social Life were mentioned at all. Krauss (1976), in a discussion of the relationship between politics and social psychology in the USSR, did mention Bekhterev and Collec- tive Reflexology, the latter almost derisively (through implication of the similarity of Bekhterev’s energic argument to a quoted application by Vasil’ev, 1927). Suggestion and its Role in Social Life was not referred to. McLeish (1975) announced that he had provided “the first book in any language, including Russian, to provide a detailed analysis of the relationship between Russian philosophy and psychology, as it developed from 1750, and contemporary Soviet psychology” (p. xi). This carefully documented and insightful history devoted much space

xvii Suggestion and its role in social life to the rise and fall of both Bekhterev himself and his reflexological approach, and it also offered a discussion of social psychology and its history in the USSR and before in Russia. The existence of Collective Reflexology is mentioned, but it was not discussed, not even in the section on Soviet social psychology. Suggestion and its Role in Social Life receives no mention. One of Bekhterev’s most important social psychological papers, (with M. Lange 1925/1976), was indeed published in English translation, with a brief introduction by Michael Cole, who speculated that the work must have seemed provocative in the USSR in the mid 1920s and later. Its implications seem not to have been taken up by other Western investigators, although Bekhterev compares his Collec- tive Reflexology with the work of Tarde, LeBon, McDougall, Wundt, Mikhailovsky, Kopel’ man, de la Grasseri, Rossi, and others. He also gave the names of many associates and students in his laboratory, but what became of them nobody knows. At any rate, Bekhterev himself did not cite Suggestion and its Role in Social Life in this article, although it was doubtless here that the roots of his work on collectives vs. the individual lay. Almost a decade later, Alex Kozulin’s (1984) contribution to the clarification of Bekhterev’s role in Russian/Soviet social psychology took the form of an enlightening contrast of the latter’s career with that of Pavlov. The brief introduction to his chapter, entitled “Personalities and reflexes: The legacies of Ivan Pavlov and Vladimir Bekhterev” deserves restatement here, because it foretold how little we and others would find about Bekhterev:

The careers of Vladimir Bekhterev (1857–1927) and Ivan Pavlov (1849–1936) form a good starting place for an attempt to make sense of the history of Soviet psychology. On the surface, they had much in common. Both had achieved fame and honor before the Revolution. Both chose to stay in their homeland in hopes of proceeding with their studies. Both succeeded in this and were later praised as leaders of Soviet science. And both were devoted to the epistemology of the natural sciences and sought so-called objective methods for the study of behaviour. At this point the similarities between the two cease. Bekhterev left hundreds of disciples who, on the eve of the Revolution, filled most of the departments of psychiatry and neurology in Russia (except for those in Moscow). Within a decade of his death, however, there were only a handful left who dared to call themselves Bekhterev’s students and to develop his theories. Pavlov, in contrast, was always reluctant to xviii Introduction

call anybody a disciple, yet today his self-proclaimed protégés occupy most of the top positions in Soviet psychology. In contemporary texts Pavlov is lavishly praised as the founder of modern neurophysiol- ogy and the most profound theorist of the behavioural sciences; Bekhterev is simply mentioned in historical surveys as a prominent neurologist. Pavlov’s writings can be found in any library or bookstore; Bekhterev’s books, especially the ones published in the 1920’s, have been rarities for many years. It is perhaps not surprising to find that the two scientists were extremely hostile toward each other, forever searching for weak points in the other’s studies, forever embroiled in arguments concerning priority. (Kozulin, 1984, p. 40) While mentioning Bekhterev’s legendary skills as a hypnotist, Kozulin (1984, p. 50) refers to Suggestion and its Role in Social Life as a lecture given in 1897, and the footnote to this is the 1903 St. Petersburg second edition. He fleetingly mentions the critical reception ofCollective Reflexology (p. 12), and also notes that “the department of collective reflexology, though they used objectivistic terminology, in fact carried out the first sociological studies concerning the interaction of the individual with different types of groups” (Kozulin, 1984, pp. 57–58). Arguably the most beautifully written and carefully documented discussions of Bekhterev’s personal characteristics, professional life and career, along with the place of psychological science in both pre- and postrevolutionary Russia, is that provided by David Joravsky (1989). This is, as far as we know, the definitive source of information about this great man and his place in both science and politics; however, once again, Bekhterev’s writing about social phenomena gets abbreviated treatment. Of Collective Reflexology, Joravsky observes (p. 273) “That was where he incidentally explained the Russian Revolu- tion,” although this mocking observation is among the best half-dozen pages on the man. Of Suggestion and its Role in Social Life, there is no mention. How are we to interpret the scanty reference to such works by dis- tinguished historians and these major commentators? In the first place, most writers who could have been named as social psychologists in Bekhterev’s time either became quickly identified with the field that replaced it, that is, pedology, or they simply disappeared (see Kozulin’s assessment above). Since a social psychology recognizable as such was effectively reborn only in the mid 1960s (Kuz’min and Trusov, 1986), can we realistically expect to find much of Bekhterev’s early or late social psychology in any Russian books to which the preceding authors might have been exposed? We shall examine a few important texts from the

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Soviet period to demonstrate how unlikely it would have been for the historians to have known much about Bekhterev’s social psychology. Porshnev (1970, p. 101) mentioned Bekhterev only as one “of many outstanding scientists . . . who endeavored to create the science of social psychology,” footnoting his Subject Matter and Tasks of Social Psychology as an Objective Science (1911) and Collective Reflexology (1921). Later in this same book (Porshnev, 1970, p. 132), the author does footnote Suggestion and its Role in Social Life, but only in support of an assertion that, with respect to the different contexts of suggestion (in hypnotic sleep, natural sleep, and the waking state), “Social psychology has no relation to the first two types of suggestion; its entire attention is devoted to suggestion in a waking state” (p. 132). Here one has but a dozen words devoted to some of Bekhterev’s fundamental contributions to social, clinical, and political psychology. A decade later, in a work devoted almost totally to social psychology, particularly group psychology, Parygin (1981) makes no mention at all of Bekhterev. More recently, Artur Petrovsky (1985), probably the leading official Soviet authority on the collective, mentions Bekhterev only among others as a representative of the natural scientist variety in turn-of-the-century psychology. Interestingly enough, it appears that it was in a book prepared for Western readers that Elena Budilova (1984), probably the premier historian of psychology in the USSR Academy of Sciences at that time, finally acknowledged Bekhterev’s importance to social psychology. In this enlightening chapter, she cast Bekhterev as one of the last of a long line of brilliant Russian contributors to social psychological theory and research. It is interesting to note that this chapter contained much of the information about Bekhterev as did a preceding one in Russian (Budilova, 1981), but with the negative (ideologically) assessments of Bekhterev’s ideas omitted. It appears that Bekhterev’s “rehabilitation” was, during the Soviet period, to have been accomplished through assigning him a place in Soviet work on obshchenie (very broadly, “communication”). In Direc- tions in Soviet Social Psychology (Strickland, 1984), Budilova says “Experiments conducted under his guidance were meant to determine the influence of communication on cognitive processes. It turned out that group work produced better results. However, those individuals classified by Bekhterev as particularly good performed complex tasks better on their own” (Budilova, 1984, p. 27). One might suspect that the suppression of Bekhterev’s social psychology, which may be dated xx Introduction from his untimely and suspicious death (Strickland & Lockwood, 1989; Moroz, 1989) was partly due to these findings and their implications, i.e., that it was group members who had the most to contribute to a group’s activity that would be most hurt by its collectivization. Another Russian publication (Lomov, Bel’yaeva & Nosulenko, 1985) presenting psychological studies of obshchenie contains a chapter by Kol’tsova (1985) on the psychological problems of communication in the works of Bekhterev. In this chapter, Kol’tsova refers to Bekhterev as “an outstanding Russian scientist and a brilliant representative of experimental psychology,” who was “one of the first in our country and in the world to explore the problems of communication” (p. 6). Kol’tsova mentions both Collective Reflexology and Suggestion and its Role in Social Life as sound social psychological works by Bekhterev, and acknowledges him as one of the founders of Russian social psychology. She states that “Bekhterev was the first in Russian psychology to define the subject, goals and methods of social psychology, and to develop its theoretical principles” (p. 8). Referring to Suggestion and its Role in Social Life, Kol’tsova points out the importance of suggestion as an effective means for managing mass movements and for the unification of people around common tasks. She states: “It is the specificity of suggestion as a way of direct induction of psychic states, i.e., ideas, feelings and sensations, without reliance on the logical forms of persuasion and argument, which defines its universal ability to influence different population groups, including those lacking the ability to perceive and understand logically” (Kol’tsova, 1985, p. 13). Kol’tsova refers to the conditions, revealed by Bekhterev, under which suggestion is effective: among them are the unity of moods, feelings and experiences of people, the homogeneity of the group, its monoideism and its focus toward a common goal. Kol’tsova extensively acknowledges Bekhterev’s influence on the development of Soviet social psychology in particular: “Bekhterev’s conclusions regarding group influence on a personality have undergone extensive development in Soviet psychology. Bekhterev’s theoretical and empirical approaches provided the foundation for the development of Soviet social psychology involved in the study of group dynamics and group influence on personality” (p. 23). However, Kol’tsova does not, and, alas, probably could not, provide any reference to specific Russian social psychologists influenced by Bekhterev, or to people recognizable as Bekhterev’s followers. That Bekhterev had to be “smuggled” back into a respectable place in the history of psychology as a communications

xxi Suggestion and its role in social life theorist (Strickland and Lockwood, 1988), along with people bearing names far more familiar to Western contemporaries than his own, for example, Konstantin Stanislavsky (Berkhin, 1988) and Mikhail Bakhtin (Vasil’eva, 1988), testifies to his importance as a social psychological theorist and researcher—his contributions simply could no longer remain unacknowledged by the Russians. Bekhterev was clearly a political psychologist throughout his career, as made particularly clear by Kozulin (1984) and Joravsky (1989); the long-standing rumors about his death (Moroz, 1989) suggest that he certainly was so in his final hours. Recently, Alexander Yuriev (1992) has confirmed what a threat Bekhterev’s person and ideas must have been to the Soviet regime. In his Introduction to Political Psychology (1992), Yuriev states,

The political experience of Russia has been unique and tragic. It consists not only of the traditional, ‘civilized’ political events, but also of theoretically unbelievable, fantastic aspects of politics, which sometimes take the form of heroic public deeds, and sometimes of unprecedented cruelty and meanness. The description and analysis of psychological events in Russia from a psychological point of view was first conducted in St Petersburg by Bekhterev, the author of the fundamental work, Collective Reflexology. Bekhterev died tragically in 1927 under mysterious circumstances, which were directly related to his psychological analyses of both politics and politicians. (p. 6)

Yuriev acknowledges that it was the work of Bekhterev that prompted establishment of the first department of political psychology in Russia, at St. Petersburg University. He also refers to Suggestion and its Role in Social Life as one of the first publications in political psychology, and he argues that Bekhterev in fact deserves recognition as one of the founders of political psychology, along with Harold Lasswell and Graham Wallas. (Wallas published his study, Human Nature in Poli- tics, in 1908, and Lasswell published Psychopathology and Politics in 1930). “At the end of the last and the beginning of the present century, Bekhterev studied mass psychological epidemics whose analysis was presented in Suggestion and its Role in Social Life. He wrote that, in most cases, the crowd needs leaders who, instinctively feeling the importance and the power of the crowd, lead it as skillful demagogues, much more through the power of suggestion than through the power of persuasion. Later, during the Russian Revolutions of 1905 and 1917 and the Civil War, Bekhterev discussed their similarity in the political life of society to previously discussed mass epidemics. In fact, he did xxii Introduction not term the Revolutions ‘psychological states’. Then it was a different time, and there was different terminology” (Yuriev, 1992, p. 207–208). If Bekhterev’s social psychological offerings had indeed been so political, the reader can well understand why I have had to dwell in this introduction on his absence from rather than his presence in the history of social psychology, both in the USSR/Russia, and, hence, throughout Western literature. In closing this section of our introduction I admit some dissatisfaction at being unable to precede the translation of V. M. Bekhterev’s Suggestion and its Role in Social Life with a richer history of the man and his context than I can mine from reviews of our own writing plus the publications of the several historians mentioned above. In Collective Reflexology, Bekhterev compared some of the theoretical analyses he had offered in Suggestion and its Role in Social Life with others who, as he subsequently discovered, had almost simultane- ously shared his preoccupation with the process(es) of suggestion—for example, Charcot, LeBon, Sidis, Sighele, Tarde, etc. (see Allport, 1954 for a review and comparison of these approaches). For the most part, these others were not at all part of Bekhterev’s context in his early years when he worked on the lectures that became Suggestion and its Role in Social Life and he seems not to have been part of theirs. Kol’tsova (1985) does discuss the difference between Bekhterev’s approach to social psychology and the approaches of these contemporaries. She states that it was absolutely essential for Bekhterev to differentiate strictly the concepts of “collective” and “crowd” and to account for the nature of different social groups in terms of the form of the interaction among their constituent subjects. This distinction, “which was formal- ized by Bekhterev in the organization of his experimental studies, is crucially important and it counteracts attempts to extend the regularities of people’s behavior in a crowd to the regularities of influencing an organized collective” (Kol’tsova, 1985, p. 11). However much Bekhterev’s reputation is being redeemed in the USRR/Russia, Westerners have long remained ignorant about his work. Remedying this situation has been my preoccupation for a couple of decades, and, in recent years, I have been in good company: Alexander Etkind (1990) has written:

The first victory of perestroika is a deeper understanding of our history. In psychology, this process has not yet begun. For example, we still do not know what kind of science pedology was, and why they were judging it in the West as they were, at the same time, judging Soviet genetics. We know neither the names, the achievements, nor

xxiii Suggestion and its role in social life

the real mistakes of our predecessors. This applies not only to pedology, but, also, for example, to the social psychology of the 1920s, to such varied figures as Bakhtin, Bekhterev, and Berdyaev, (pp. 16–17)

We now know that this ignorance is on the way to being remedied. At the time of this writing, we have learned of the forthcoming publication of the “Collected Social Psychological Works of V. M. Bekhterev” in Russia. We know nothing about its publisher, contents, etc.

Lloyd H. Strickland References Allport, G. W. (1954). The historical background of modern social psychology. In G. Lindzey (ed.) The Handbook of social psychology, pp.3‒56. Cambridge, Mass.: Addison-Wesley. Bekhterev, V. M. (1903). Vnushenie i evo rol’ v obshchestvennoi zhizni. [Suggestion and its role in social life], second edition. St. Petersburg: Rikker. Bekhterev. V. M. (1908). Vnushenie i evo rol’ v obshchestvennoi zhizni [Suggestion and its role in social life], third edition. St. Petersburg: Rikker. Bekhterev. V. M. (1911). Predmet i zadachi obshchestvennoi psikhologii kak ob’ektivnoi nauki. [The subject matter and tasks of social psychology as an objective science]. St. Petersburg: Vestnik znania [Herald of knowledge]. Bekhterev, V. M. (1921). Kollektivnaia reflexologiia. [Collective reflexology]. St. Petersburg: Kolos. Bekhterev, V. M. (1924/1992). Results of experiments in collective reflexology. (D. V. Moran, trans.). Journal of Russian and East European Psychology, 30, no. 2, 59‒95. Bekhterev, V. M. (1933). General principles of human reflexology: An introduction to the objective study of personality, 4th (1928) edition. (E. & W. Murphy, trans.). London: Jarrolds. Bekhterev. V. M. & Lange, M. (1925/1976). Some empirical data in the area of collective reflexology. Soviet Psychology, 14, 4, 3‒41. Bekhterev, V. M. & Lange. M. V. (1928/1992). The collective’s influence on the personality (E. Lookwood, trans.). Journal of Russian and East European Psy- chology, 30, No. 6, 60‒74. Bel’yaeva, A. V. & Nosulenko, V. A. (1985/ 1991). The influence of the communication situation on the perception and description of complex sound. Soviet Psychology, 29, 2, 39‒65. Berkhin, N. V. (1988). The problem of communication in K. S. Stanislavski’s work. Soviet Psychology, 26, 17‒31. Brozek, J. (1973). Foreword. In Rahmani, L. Soviet psychology: Philosophical, theoretical and experimental issues. New York: International Universities Press, pp. 1‒4. Brozek. J. (1976). History of Soviet psychology: Recent sources of information in English (1965‒1975). In S. A. Corson & E.O. Corson (eds.) Psychiatry and psychology in the USSR. New York: Plenum. Budilova, E. A. (1981). Problemy sotsial’noi psikhologii v trudakh V.M. Bekhtereva (K 60-letiyu “Kolektivnoi Refleksologii”) [Problems of social psychology in xxiv Introduction

the works of V.M. Bekhterev Concerning the 60th anniversary of “Collective Reflexology”]. Psikhologicheskii Zhurnal, 2, 6, 135‒141. Budilova, E. A. (1984). On the history of social psychology in Russia. In L. H. Strickland (ed.). Directions in Soviet social psychology, pp. 11‒28. New York: Springer-Verlag. Cole, M. & Maltzman. I. (1969). (eds.) A Handbook of Contemporary Soviet Psy- chology. New York Basic Books. Dobreva-Martinova, T. & Strickland, L. H. (1995). Bekhterev’s political psychology and current political events in Eastern Europe. Paper presented at the Eigh- teenth Annual Meeting of the International Society of Political Psychology. Washington, D.C. Etkind. A. M. (1990). The ability of psychology to support social change. Soviet Psychology, 28, 1, 13‒17. Gerver, V. (1933). Vladimir Mikhailovich Bekhterev. In V. M Bekhterev, General principles of human reflexology: An introduction to the study of personality (4th ed.). (Emma and William Murphy, trans.). London: Jarrolds. Joravsky, D. (1989). Russian psychology: A critical history. Oxford: Blackwell. Kol’tzova, V. A. (1985). Razrabotka psikhologicheskikh problem obshcheniia v trudakh V. M. Bekhtereva. [Psychological problems of communication in V. M. Bekhterev’s works]. In B. F. Lomov, A. V. Belyaeva, & V. N. Nosulenko (eds.). Psikhologicheskiie issledovaniia obshcheniia. [Psychological studies of communication]. Moscow: Nauka. Kozulin A. (1984). Psychology in utopia: Toward a social history of Soviet psychology. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Krauss, R. M. (1976). Social psychology in the Soviet Union. In S. A. Corson & E. C. Corson (eds.) Psychiatry and psychology in the USRR. New York: Plenum. Kuz’min, E. S. & Trusov, V. P. (1986). Social psychology at Leningrad University. In L. H. Strickland. V. P. Trusov, & E. Lockwood (eds.) Research in Soviet social psychology, pp. 1‒7. Berlin: Springer-Verlag. Lasswell, H. D. (1930). Psychopathology and Politics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Lomov, B. F. (1979). Mental processes in communication. In L. H. Strickland (ed.) Soviet and western perspectives in social psychology, pp. 211‒225. Oxford: Pergamon. Lomov, B. F., & Kol’tzova, V. A. (1984). Mental processes and communication. In L. H. Strickland (ed.). Directions in Soviet social psychology, pp. 47‒64. New York: Springer-Verlag. Lomov, B. F., Belyaeva, A. V., & Nosulenko, V. A. (eds.) (1985). Psikhologicheskiie issledovaliia obshcheniia [Psychological studies of communication]. Moscow: Nauka. McLeish, J. (1975). Soviet psychology: History, theory, content. London: Methuen. Moroz, A. (1989). The last diagnosis: A plausible account that needs further veri- fication. Soviet Psychology, 27, 39‒65 (E. Lockwood, trans.) Nosulenko, V. (1979). The estimation of sound intensity when subjects com- municate. In L. H. Strickland (ed.) Soviet and Western perspectives on social psychology, pp. 227‒233. Oxford: Pergamon. Parygin, B. D. (1981). Sotzial’no psykhologicheskii klimat kollektiva [The social psychological climate of the collective]. Leningrad: Nauka. Pavlov, I. V. (1927). Conditioned reflexes. London: Oxford University Press.

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Petrovsky, A. V. (1985). Studies in psychology: The collective and the individual. Moscow: Progress.Porshnev, B. (1970). Social psychology and history. Moscow: Progress. Rahmani, L. (1973). Soviet psychology: Philosophical, theoretical, and experimental issues. New York: International Universities Press. Rumbaugh, D. M. (1996). In search of Red October’s psychology. Contemporary Psychology, 41, 639‒641. Schniermann, A. L. (1930). Bekhterev’s reflexological school. In C. Murchinson (ed.), Psychologies of the 1930s, pp. 221‒242. Worcestor, Mass.: Clark Univer- sity Press. Sechenov, I. M. (1965a). Reflexes of the brain. Cambridge. Mass.: MIT Press. Sechenov, I. M. (1965b). Autobiographical notes. Washington, DC.: American Institute of Biological Sciences. Strickland, L. H. (1984). (ed.) Directions in Soviet social psychology. New York: Springer-Verlag. Strickland, L. H. (1991). Russian and Soviet social psychology. Canadian Psychology. 32, 580‒595. Strickland, L. H. (1994). V. M. Bekhterev’s “Collective reflexology”: Part I. (E. Lockwood, trans.) Commack, N.Y.: NOVA Science Publishers. Strickland, L. H. (1997). Who? V. M. Bekhterev? A field theorist? SAFT Newsletter, 13, 1,2‒3. Strickland, L. H. & Lockwood, E. (1988). Communication in Soviet social psychology. Soviet Psychology, 26, 5‒6. Strickland, L. H. & Lockwood, E. (eds.) (1989). Commentary: The life and times of V. M. Bekhterev. Soviet Psychology, 27, 68‒70. Strickland, L. & Dobreva-Martinova, T. (1996). Theory and context: Bekhterev’s Collective Reflexology. In Tolman, C., Cherry F., van Hezewijk, R., & Lubek I. (eds.) Problems of theoretical psychology, 254‒261. New York: Captus Press. Valsiner, J. (1994). From energy to collectivity: a commentary on the development of Bekhterev’s theoretical views. In L. H. Strickland (ed.), V. M. Bekhterev’s “Collective reflexology” (E. Lookwood, trans.) Commack, NY: NOVA Science Publishers. Vasil’ev, S. (1927). Kharakteristika mekhanicheskogo materializma. Dialektika prirody [Description of the mechanistic materialism. Dialectics of the nature], second edition. Vologda Vosil’eva, I. I. (1988). On the importance of M. M. Bakhtin’s idea of dialogue and dialogic relations for the psychology of communication. Soviet Psychology, 26, 7‒16. Wallas, G. (1908). Human Nature in Politics. London: A. Constable. Yuriev, A. (1992). Vvedenie v politicheskuyu psikhologiyu [Introduction to Political Psychology]. St Petersburg: St. Petersburg University Publishing.

xxvi Foreword to the Second Edition

The term “suggestion” is adopted from everyday life. It was initially employed in medical circles as hypnotic or posthypnotic suggestion. Nowadays, concurrently with the more careful study of suggestion, this concept has received a broader meaning. The point is that suggestion is not necessarily associated with the particular state of mental activity known as hypnosis, because it is demonstrable by cases of suggestion carried on in the waking state. Furthermore, suggestion, as understood in the broader meaning of the word, is one of the ways of exerting influence of one person over another even under conditions of ordinary life. From this view, suggestion is an important factor in our social life and must be the subject of study, not only for physicians but for all people who study the conditions and laws of social life. However, here an important page is opened in social psychology, in itself a broad and insufficiently developed research area. The present work was a lecture in its first edition, delivered at the December 1897 Assembly of the Military-Medical Academy, and that is why it was restricted to its size limit. But the interest in and the importance of the topic addressed prompted the author to broaden his framework considerably, and consequently this second edition appears substantially enriched, when compared with the first one, and is not in lecture format. Without claiming the desired completeness of exposition of the subject in the present edition either, the author anticipates that its accurate comprehension could be of help for those interested in the role of suggestion in social life.

V. Bekhterev

xxvii

Foreword to the Third Edition

The second edition of the present work, like the first one, was sold out comparatively quickly, demonstrating the audience’s interest in folk psychology. That interest is now obviously increasing along with the important social events taking place in Russian society. The new edition of the book Suggestion and Its Role in Social Life is longer, introducing a description of several psychic epidemics that were not included in the second edition, along with some facts from the recent Russian Revolution that are related to the main subject. There are additional parts of the work that are enriched, based on the most recent data in the literature. As a consequence, this new edition, while maintaining the author’s previous line of thought, undoubtedly ben- efits from its completeness when compared with the previous edition.

V. Bekhterev

xxix

1 Different Views on the Nature of Suggestion

Nowadays people talk so much about physical infection through “living contact” (contagium vivum) or so called microbes that I feel it is useful to consider “psychic contact” as well (contagium psychicum), which causes a psychic infection, whose microbes, although invisible with a microscope, nevertheless function here, there and everywhere, similarly to physical microbes, and are transferred through words, gestures, and movements of surrounding people, through books, newspapers, etc.; in a word, wherever we are in the surrounding society, we are exposed to the action of psychic microbes and therefore we are in danger of being psychically infected. That is why it seems to me not only timely but also of interest to focus on suggestion as a factor that plays an eminent role in our social life, a factor that holds a deep meaning in the daily life of private individuals as well as in the social life of nations. Although the issue is not yet sufficiently illuminated by science, which is why I cannot hide my fears that in a short exposition I will hardly succeed in giving a complete presentation of the issue raised, this is the nature of human thought: while a problem is not sufficiently studied, it holds vivid interest for everyone, but soon after this problem is thoroughly reviewed in science and becomes generally known by a broad circle of people, it loses much of its interest. Guided by this, I hope that I will not deserve serious reproach from my readers if I focus their attention on the problem of so-called suggestion and psychic infection. Above all, we must clarify what suggestion is in and of itself. The problem of the nature of suggestion is one of the most important problems in psychology; it has recently received enormous practical attention, thanks particularly to the study of hypnosis, although it can be definitely claimed now that suggestion appears to be a much

1 Suggestion and Its Role in Social Life more widespread act than hypnotic suggestion itself, because suggestion appears in the waking state as well. Additionally, it can be observed here, there, and everywhere in life, i.e., under very different circumstances. However, despite its enormous practical importance, the psychological nature of suggestion remains extremely inadequately studied. Until quite recently, this term did not have a particular scientific meaning and was mainly used in everyday speech to designate insti- gations that were produced by some persons on others with one or another purpose. A misuse of the term began by applying it to phenomena to which it was completely unrelated. It was also frequently used to conceal facts that are still not sufficiently clarified. Undoubtedly, this misuse of a scientific term leads to much confusion in the clarification of psychological phenomena related to suggestion, and that is why at the start we think about the definition and the boundaries of that term. It is necessary to point out that many authors have given one or another meaning to this term. If we turn to the literature on that topic, we shall see very different definitions of suggestion. Liebeault defines suggestion as ideas in the hypnotized person being provoked by words or gestures that cause one or another physical or psychical phenomenon. According to Bernheim, suggestion is that influence through which an idea is entered into the brain, and through which that notion is accepted. Lowenfeld construes as suggestion a psychical or psycho-physical concept that by its manifestation displays unusual action through the restriction or cessation of associative activity.1 That author cites in his book a number of definitions of suggestion given by other authors. Forel construes suggestion as provoking a dynamic change in the nervous system when an idea about the past, present, or future hap- pening of that change appears. Moll gives a similar definition; according to him, suggestion is that instance when a response is conditioned to its stimuli. According to Wundt, suggestion is an association with a narrow- ing of awareness of ideas that, when arising, does not allow contrary associations to be revealed. According to Schrenk-Notzing, suggestion expresses itself in the restriction of associations related to certain contents of consciousness.

2 Different Views on the Nature of Suggestion

According to Binet, suggestion is a moral pressure that one person exerts on another by means of intellect, emotions, and will. Vincent says that by suggestion we ought to understand a piece of advice or an order: “In the state of hypnosis, suggestion is an impres- sion produced on the psyche that provokes an immediate adaptation of the brain and everything dependent on it.” According to the point of view of Dr. Lefevre,2 the phenomena of suggestion and auto-suggestion in general are the assimilation without any motive of thoughts, of any kind of ideas that are admitted by these phenomena and, occasionally, their rapid transformation into action, into sensations or into acts of inhibition. According to Hirschlaff,3 by suggestion we ought to understand an unmotivated and false assertion on the part of the hypnotist and the implementation of that assertion on the part of the hypnotized subject. If the above definitions are more or less one-sided, contradictory, and inaccurate, then the last definition is extremely narrow, and Lowenfeld correctly rejects it, as according to that definition it would be necessary to exclude from the area of suggestion not only therapeutic suggestions (that according to Hirschlaff ought to be viewed not as suggestions, but as advice) but, as well, wishes, etc. As well, all phenomena known as counter-suggestion should be excluded from the area of suggestion, as they correspond to reality. But how indefinite is the concept “not-corresponding with reality”! For example: a suggestion is given to a sleeping person that when he wakes up he take a cigarette from the table and light it, and he unquestion- ingly carries out that suggestion. We may here ask, how much of this does not correspond to reality? At any rate, it is doubtless that we deal here with suggestion, as in many other cases as well. It is unnecessary and not useful to include other definitions, as the above ones are completely sufficient to show how much confusion, unclarity, and uncertainty is centered in the concept of suggestion. Regarding this, B. Sidis4 begins his book very distinctively:

Psychologists use the term suggestion in such a disorderly way that the reader often does not understand its real meaning. Sometimes it is used to identify cases when one idea carries another in its wake, and thus suggestion is identified with association. Some authors broaden the area of suggestion so much that they include in it any influence of one person on others. Others narrow suggestion and suggestibility to the simple symptoms of hysterical neurosis. So do the supporters

3 Suggestion and Its Role in Social Life

of the Salpetriere school. The Nancy school calls suggestion the factor that provokes a peculiar state of mind in which suggestibility completely emerges.

It stands to reason, according to B. Sidis, that this unclear situation concerning suggestion leads to great confusion in psychological research related to suggestion, an idea that we have already discussed above. B. Sidis himself, clarifying suggestion with some examples, decides in favor of the definition of Baldwin,5 according to whom “suggestion is understood as a large range of events whose typical represen- tation is the sudden intrusion into consciousness, from outside, ideas or images that become part of the thought process, striving to provoke muscular and willful efforts as their usual consequences.” However, B. Sidis considers that insufficient; he additionally finds in suggestion other important characteristics that consist of the accep- tance of suggestion by the subject without any critical evaluation and of its almost automatic fulfillment. Irrespective of this, according to Sidis there is another element in suggestion, without which the definition is incomplete. “That element or factor overcomes or bypasses the resistance of the subject. A suggested idea enters the stream of consciousness by force. It is something alien, an unwanted visitor, a parasite from which the consciousness of the subject strives to rescue itself. The stream of consciousness of the individual fights with the suggested ideas just as an organism fights with bacteria aiming to destroy its stability. Dr. I. Grossmann has in mind this counteraction element, when defining suggestion as ‘a process in which a certain idea tries to impose itself on the brain.’”6 Finally, B. Sidis accepts a definition of suggestion such as the following: “By suggestion we ought to understand an intrusion of any idea, met with more or less opposition by the personality, into the brain; finally, this idea is accepted without any critical evaluation and is executed without any discussion, almost automatically.”7 This definition is rather close to the definition of suggestion I gave earlier, in the first edition of the present book,8 but at any rate, owing to some introductory qualifications, it cannot be recognized as entirely complete. First of all, suggestion does not always meet one or another kind of opposition from the personality of the suggested person. Opposition can be seen more often in hypnotic suggestions that touch on the moral realm of the target person, or that counteract the attitudes of that person toward the phenomena that are the subject of

4 Different Views on the Nature of Suggestion

suggestion. In the majority of other cases, suggestion enters the psychic realm without any opposition from the suggested person. Moreover, it often penetrates into the psychic realm completely imperceptibly to the person, even in the waking state. An example from the book of Okhorovich “Concerning Mental Sug- gestion”, is cited by B. Sidis himself in support of the above statement.

My friend P., a person who is as absent-minded as he is smart, was playing chess next door while we were talking at the door. I noticed that, when my friend was completely absorbed by the game, he was whistling an aria from Madame Angot. I was about to accompany him by beating time on the table, but at this moment he started whistling a march from Le Prophete. “Listen,” I said to my friends, “let’s play a joke with P.: We will order him (mentally) to move from Le Prophete to La fille de Madame Angot. First, I started beating the time of the march, then, taking advan- tage of several notes common for both pieces, I immediately passed on to the more rapid time of my friend’s favorite aria. P., on the other hand, suddenly changed the tune and started whistling Madame Angot. Everyone laughed. My friend was too busy with the chess to notice anything. “Let’s start again,” I said, “and go back to Le Prophete. Again we heard immediately Meyerbeer’s splendid fugue. All that my friend knew was that he was whistling something.

It is not necessary to explain that it was not a mental suggestion here, but an auditory one that was entering the psychic realm completely unnoticed by the suggested person and without any opposition on his part. The same happens in many other cases. Let us take some more examples from B. Sidis: “I have a newspaper in my hands and I start rolling it up; soon I notice that my friend, sitting facing me, rolled his newspaper up in the same manner; we say this is a case of suggestion.”9 We can bring forward many other analogous examples in which suggestion penetrates into the psychic realm unnoticed by the person himself and without any resistance or opposition on his part. Generally speaking, at least in the waking state, suggestion more often penetrates into the psychic realm unnoticed and, in most cases, without particular resistance or opposition by the suggested person. That shows the social power of suggestion. Let us take more examples from B. Sidis. “Outside, in a square, a trader stops and starts pouring flattery on the public and praising his own goods. The curiosity of the passers-by is aroused; they stop. Soon our hero becomes the center of a crowd

5 Suggestion and Its Role in Social Life that is stupidly staring at the ‘wonderful’ goods offered to it. In a while the crowd starts buying the goods, of which the trader suggests that they are ‘wonderful, inexpensive’.”

A street speaker climbs up on a billet or on a carriage and starts talking on and on in front of a crowd. Roughly speaking, he is glori- fying the nation’s great mind and honesty, the citizens’ civil courage, skillfully stating to his audience that, with such gifts, they have to see clearly how the flourishing of the state depends on the politics that he approves, on the party whose valorous advocate he is. His arguments are ridiculous, his motives are contemptible and although he usually captivates the masses, another speaker needs only to turn up and he will carry away their attention in another direction. The speech of Antony in Julius Caesar is an excellent example of suggestion.

It is obvious in both these cases that the act of suggestion would not have happened if it had been noticed by all that the trader praised his goods too much, that the street speaker exaggerated the importance of his party by foolishly praising its merits. All who know foolishness and deceit feel confident in such cases, and they immediately leave such speakers, around whom remains only the trusting crowd of lis- teners who little understand things, and who can notice neither the crude flattery, nor the false declarations. That is why they are easily susceptible to suggestion. So, in the action of the latter, at least in the cases brought here, there is nothing “forced,” there is nothing that ought to be “overcome,” finally there is nothing from which “the person’s consciousness strives for rescue.” Everything follows the most usual, natural sequence, although this is a real suggestion that invades the psychic realm and leaves decisively important consequences in it. It is certainly not necessary to prove that in some cases suggestion really meets an opposite reaction by the target of suggestion, and that it nevertheless penetrates the psyche as a parasite, after some struggle, in an almost violent way. One of the wonderful examples of suggestion penetrating into the psyche after some struggle, is the suggestion by Iago to Othello, who initially meets that suggestion with a certain resistance, but when “the jealous rage” begins its destructive work in Othello’s mind, he gradually opens himself to that suggestion. In the same way, some of the suggestions produced in a hypnotic state sometimes meet with opposition 6 Different Views on the Nature of Suggestion from the target of suggestion. This happens particularly often to persons who are suggested to proceed with actions that contradict their most cherished moral beliefs. As we know, some French authors were able to determine the morals of a person by inducing a suggestion contradicting commonly accepted moral concepts. It is obvious that even in a hypnotic state, the personality is not completely eliminated. The personality is only suppressed to a certain point, and when it meets with suggestion contradicting its belief, it counteracts that suggestion to one or another extent. Nevertheless, we do not consider the reaction of the target of suggestion as necessary and even as characteristic of suggestion, because many suggestions enter the psychic realm without the least opposition by the target of suggestion. I told a person who was in the waking state that his hand was becoming tightened in his sleeve, that his whole arm was seized in a convulsion and dragged up to his shoulder. And that suggestion is immediately carried out. I told another person that he could not grasp with his hand any of the surrounding objects because his hand was paralyzed, and it turned out that from this time on he actually stopped using his hand, and this continued until I told this person that he had again, as before, control over his hand. Neither in this case nor in many others is there any shadow of opposition. That is why we cannot agree with B. Sidis when he says that the resistance is a basic part of suggestion, or that the stream of individual consciousness is fighting with suggested ideas, as an organism fights with bacteria striving to destroy its stability. Suggestion need not involve this struggle, nor resistance to the suggestion, and consequently, the opposition of the personality cannot and must not enter the definition of suggestion. We cannot suppose that suggestion does not allow for critical evaluation. Opposition to suggestion, where there is opposition, is based on resistance, on the awareness of an inner contradiction between the suggested subject and his beliefs, on the disagreement of his “ego” with the suggestion, when this “ego” is not completely eliminated. Otherwise there would not have been any opposition. From this it is obvious that in certain cases suggestion does not exclude even critical evaluation, and remains as suggestion at the same time. This usually can be noticed in weak levels of hypnosis, when the personality, without being totally eliminated, still relates with resistance to everything surrounding it, including suggestion.

7 Suggestion and Its Role in Social Life

I suggested to a person under hypnosis that when he wakes up, he was to pick up the photograph that he will see on the table. Waking up, he almost immediately started examining the surface of the table and fixed his eyes on a certain place. “Do you see anything?” I asked. “I see a photograph.” Intending to leave, I said good-bye to him but his eyes were still fixed on the table. “Don’t you need to do something?” I asked. “I would like to take this photograph, but I do not need it!” he answered and left, without carrying out the suggestion and obviously fighting with it. We also find a very good example in B. Sidis. To a person who is in a weak state of hypnosis, the suggestion is made that when he hears a knock, he will take a cigarette and light it. “Waking up, he remem- bered everything. I quickly knocked several times. He got up, but he immediately sat down again, and sighed laughing: “No, I will not do that!” “Do what?” I asked. “Light a cigarette. That is nonsense!!!”—“And you wanted a lot to do that?” I asked, imagining the desire of the person, although it was obvious that he presently was fighting with that suggestion. He did not answer. I asked again: “Did you want a great deal to do that?” “Not very much,” he answered briefly and evasively. Thus, “suggested ideas and actions that were accepted uncritically” also do not embody unconditional necessity for the target of suggestion, though it is unquestionable that the majority of suggestions enters the psychic realm without any counteraction, as we discussed earlier. In addition, we do not find total automatism in the performance of suggestion. It is known, as we often see even in persons under hypnosis, that suggestion is not carried out without conflict. We observe the same in cases of posthypnotic suggestion as well. Sometimes the conflict ends with the fact that suggestion, while being close to fulfillment, in the end remains incompletely fulfilled, as was the case in the example just introduced. It is true that a counteraction can differ, depending upon the strength of the suggestion, in its character or various external conditions; nevertheless, this counteraction is possible and in many cases it actually exists. Consequently, automatic motor implementation is far from being considered an integral part of suggestion. Thus, suggestion often enters the psychic realm unnoticed, without any conflict; it sometimes provokes a struggle in the personality of the target of suggestion, even elicits critical evaluation on his part, and the suggestion is carried out, even if forcibly, but far from always automatically.

8 Different Views on the Nature of Suggestion

It is necessary to note that, in other cases, suggestion somehow really enters the psychic sphere forcibly, and being accepted without any critical evaluation and inner struggle, it is carried out completely automatically. An example of such suggestion can be the suggestive method of the Abbot Faria, employing a single imperative word. To this kind of suggestion can be related the familiar idea of the command, one that is always based not so much on the strength of the fear of disobedience and awareness of the rationality of submission as it is on the real existence of a suggestion that, in this case, bursts violently and suddenly into the psychic domain, and, without allowing time for thinking and critical evaluation, leads to automatic fulfillment of the suggestion. Notes 1. See Lowenfeld. Gipnotism [Hypnotism]. Translated by Dr. Lyass. Saratov, 1903. 2. Dr. L. Lefevre. Les phenomenes de suggestion et d’auto-suggestion. Paris, 1903, pp. 101 and 102. 3. See Lowenfeld, loco cit., p. 31. 4. B. Sidis. Psikhologiya Vnusheniya [Psychology of Suggestion]. Russian translation. 1902. 5. Baldwin. Psychology. Vol. II. 6. S. Grossmann. Zeitschrift f. Hypnotismus. April, 1893 (Discrepancies in initial in original—trans.). 7. B. Sidis. Psikhologiya Vnusheniya [Psychology of Suggestion]. Translated by Dr. M. Kolokolov. Coll. Publ. 1902, p. 2. 8. See V. Bekhterev. Rol’ Vnusheniya v Obshchestvennoi Zhizni. [The Role of Suggestion in Social Life]. Coll. Publ. 1898, p. 2. 9. B. Sidis. Psikhologiya Vnusheniya [Psychology of Suggestion]. Russian translation, p. 10.