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Ukrainian-Russian Interstate Relations During the Presidency of Viktor Yanukovych – “Honeymoon Period” Or “Coercion to Marriage”

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Ukrainian-Russian Interstate Relations During the Presidency of Viktor Yanukovych – “Honeymoon Period” Or “Coercion to Marriage” DOI: 10�17951/m�2016�1�103 ANNALES UNIVERSITATIS MARIAE CURIE-SKŁODOWSKA LUBLIN – POLONIA VOL. I SECTIO M 2016 Ihor Hurak Vasyl Stefanyk Precarpathian National University Ukrainian-Russian Interstate Relations During the Presidency of Viktor Yanukovych – “Honeymoon Period” or “Coercion to Marriage” 1. Introduction The Orange Revolution was a powerful blow to theambitious foreign policy strategy of the leadership of the Russian Federation and, undoubtedly, viewed by the Russian political elite as a threat to its national interests� On the one hand, the defeat of Viktor Yanukovych who was openly supported by the Russian government during the presidential race, was clearly a negative signal to Moscow� It seemed “the lesser evil”, though� From the perspective of the Kremlin, it was the possible impact of the Orange Revolution on the situa- tion in Belarus, Moldova, Caucasus and Central Asia that appeared much more dangerous� At the same time, political analysts expressed fears that changes in Ukraine might threaten the Russian political system by triggering another “colour” rev- olution in the Russian Federation itself� Consequently, from 2005 on, taking various actions against the new Ukrainian government1 was a logical reaction of Russia� 1 A� Szeptycki, Ukraina wobec Rosji. Studium zależności, Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, Warszawa 2013, pp� 168–170� 104 Ihor Hurak Despite the fact that it was Moscow president Viktor Yushchenko paid his first official visit to2, he remained imprinted in the minds of the Russian political elite as an anti-Russian leader3� It was only natural that in such a situation, the Kremlin anxiously awaited the Yushchenko’s presidency to come to an end and hoped that his successor would be able to establish a more favourable dialogue� A few months before the next presidential elections in Ukraine, Dmitry Medvedev openly expressed his opinion on the issue� On August 11, 2009, in his “Message to Viktor Yushchenko, the President of Ukraine”, he noted: “In Russia, we hope that the new political leadership of Ukraine will be ready to build the relations between our countries, which actually will meet the real aspirations of our peoples and the interests of strengthening of the European security”4� 2. “Honeymoon period” of Ukrainian–Russian relations Both foreign and domestic political analysts regarded Viktor Yanukovych as a pro-Russian politician� During the election campaign in 2009–2010, he clearly declared his desire to restore “friendly and mutually beneficial relations with the Russian Federation and the CIS countries”5, by which confirmed his reputation� Strengthening of the Ukrainian-Russian relations at all levels, implementa- tion of the pre-election statements, was definitely observable at the very begin- ning of Yanukovych’s presidency� The nature of a political and diplomatic dia- logue as well as information support changed dramatically in bilateral relations� The full-scale work of Ukrainian-Russian Interstate Commission was unblocked� At the highest level meetings, a number of interstate, intergovernmental and interdepartmental agreements in various spheres6 were signed� Ukrainian-Russian interstate relations were especially active throughout the year 2010� On 21 April, 2010, in Kharkiv Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych and Russian President Dymitry Medvedev signed “The Agreement between Ukraine and Russia on the Black Sea Fleet in Ukraine” whereby the Russian lease 2 Сайт радіостанції “Голос Столиці”, http://newsradio�com�ua, “Перший візит Порошенка: куди і навіщо”, p� X, access: 13 VI 2014� 3 Сайт Телевізійної служби новин телеканалу “1+1”, http://tsn�ua, “Хто помирить Україну і Росію?”, p� X, access: 4 XII 2008� 4 Офіційний сайт Президента Російської Федерації, http://kremlin�ru, “Послание Президенту Украины Виктору Ющенко”, p� X, access: 11 VIII 2009� 5 Сайт журнала “Фокус”, https://focus�ua, “Программа Януковича «Украина – для людей!»”, p� X, access: 17 XII 2009� 6 Відносини ЄС – Україна – Росія: проблеми і перспективи (Аналітична доповідь Центру Размкова), “Національна безпека і оборона”, 2012, no� 4–5, pp� 6–7� Ukrainian-Russian Interstate Relations During the Presidency of Viktor Yanukovych… 105 on the Black Sea Fleet at the naval base in Sevastopol was extended beyond 2017 by 25 years “with an additional five-year renewal option (to 2042–47) unless one of the party notifies in a written form the other party about their termination, no later than one year before the expiry of agreement”7� On 27 April, 2010, at a briefing in Strasbourg, Viktor Yanukovych publicly questioned the expediency to continue Ukraine’s membership in the Organiza- tion for Democracy and Economic Development GUAM which Moscow viewed as a kind of alternative to the Russian regional project in the post-Soviet space� On the other hand, some members of the new president’s team publicly stated about the possible participation of Ukraine in the integrational associations initiated by Russia� Thus, on May 20, the Prime Minister of Ukraine Mykola Azarov said that Ukraine was ready to consider the integration to the Common Economic Space of CIS8� On July 1, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted the Law of Ukraine “On the Principles of Domestic and Foreign Policies” according to which one of the basic principles of our country in foreign policy was “Ukraine’s compliance with the policy of non-alignment”, which meant Ukraine’s non-participation in military-political alliances9� The document also called for amending the Law of Ukraine “On National Security of Ukraine”� In particular, some provisions referring the Euro-Atlantic integration10 were removed from Articles 6 and 8 of the abovementioned law� 3. Challenges for Kyiv within the framework of the renewed Ukrainian-Russian partnership These and a number of other steps in various areas during the first year of Viktor Yanukovych’s presidency demonstrated a significant revision of the Ukrainian priorities in the direction of their unification with the national in- terests of the Russian Federation� Under those circumstances, there was an impression of radical and long-term improvement in Ukrainian-Russian rela- tions� However, a detailed analysis of those facts and processes confirmed the 7 Інтернет-видання “Резонанс� Волинь”, http://rezonans�volyn�net, “Харківська угода: повний текст”, p� X, access: 28 IV 2010� 8 А� Бульвінський, Новий політичний курс Віктора Януковича та російські страте- гічні інтереси, “Віче”, 2010, no� 20, p� 11� 9 Офіційний портал Верховної Ради України, http://zakon2�rada�gov�ua, “Закон України «Про засади внутрішньої і зовнішньої політики»”, p� X, access: 1 VII 2010� 10 Сайт Військового інституту Київського національного університету імені Тараса Шевченка, www�mil�univ�kiev�ua, “Закон України «Про основи національної безпеки України»”� 106 Ihor Hurak correctness of the thesis expressed in 2012 in one of the analytical reports of the Razumkov Centre� It is in particular about the fact that the “optimization” of relations was achieved mainly at the price of unilateral concessions on the part of Ukraine including the surrender of Ukrainian interests in joining NATO; extension of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation basing in Crimea; the rejection of the Ukraine’s interpretation of a number of historical events; removal of the issue ensuring national-cultural needs of Ukrainians in the Russian Federation from the agenda of bilateral relations; the presence and growing influence of Russia in key sectors of the national economy; Ukraine’s support of some of the Kremlin’s political initiatives11; suspension of negotiations on the distribution of property of the former USSR abroad12, etc� However, these concessions did not change the attitude of Russian political elite to Ukraine which considered the neighboring country mostly as a facility of its own geopolitical interests, mainly as an important part of their integration structures� On the contrary, concessions of Kyiv only intensified the Ukrainian vector in Russian activity13� Accordingly, the year 2011 witnessed the decline of the Ukrainian-Russian “honey year” or “honeymoon”14 as seen in both Ukrain- ian and Russian political discourses� In this way, the Deputy General Director of Razumkov Center while mentioning “the improvement in the atmosphere of the dialogue” remarked, that the compromise expected by Russia on the part of Ukraine had come to a red line� He emphasized the fact that for the Ukrainian government and its closest circle there was nothing left to hand over as the next step was the direct threat to their own interests� Expert of the Finnish Insti- tute of International Relations Andrey Moshes expressed the same opinion� He noted the improvement of climate between Moscow and Kyiv after the so-called “Kharkiv agreements” but at the same time, he stated that Ukrainian-Russian in- terstate relations “had failed to come to the constructive path of improvement”15� Thus, the willingness of the parties to the mutual rapprochement did not mean the complete elimination of differences� There remained a number of unsettled issues in the bilateral relations, mainly: the territorial delimitation in 11 Відносини ЄС – Україна – Росія: проблеми і перспективи (Аналітична доповідь Центру Размкова), “Національна безпека і оборона”, 2012, no� 4–5, p� 7� 12 О� Крамар, Батогом по прянику, http://www�ukrrudprom�com, p� X, access: 27 IV 2011� 13 Відносини ЄС – Україна – Росія: проблеми і перспективи (Аналітична доповідь Центру Размкова), “Національна безпека і оборона”, 2012, no� 4–5,
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