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ECLAC WORKSHOP NEW TOOLS and METHODS for POLICY-MAKING 19 May 2014, Paris
OECD - ECLAC WORKSHOP NEW TOOLS AND METHODS FOR POLICY-MAKING 19 May 2014, Paris 21 March 2014 Dear Madam/Sir, We are pleased to invite you to the Workshop on New Tools and Methods for Policy-making, co- organised by the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The workshop will take place at the OECD headquarters in Paris on Monday 19 May 2014. The workshop represents a unique opportunity for policy-makers, academics, researchers in economics and representatives of international organisations to meet. Discussions will focus especially on how recent advances in methods and tools in economics could contribute to devise more effective policies to foster growth, employment and improved income distribution. Leading economists will present their views on these advances in the four following fields: • complexity and network theory; • agent-based modelling; • behavioural and experimental economics; and • big data. These approaches hold promise to redefine the toolkit which experts, academics and policy-makers could use for their analyses in the coming years. The preliminary programme of the workshop is attached. We kindly invite you to register on our dedicated website at http://www.oecd.org/naec/workshop.htm by 25 April 2014. Should you require additional information, please do not hesitate to contact Mr. Romain Zivy at ECLAC and Ms. Elena Miteva at the OECD via the meeting website. We look forward to welcoming you at this workshop. Yours sincerely, Alicia Barcena Angel Gurría Executive Secretary Secretary General ECLAC, United Nations OECD ECLAC, Av. -
Neuroeconomics: the Neurobiology of Decision-Making
Neuroeconomics: The Neurobiology of Decision-Making Ifat Levy Section of Comparative Medicine Department of Neurobiology Interdepartmental Neuroscience Program Yale School of Medicine Harnessing eHealth and Behavioral Economics for HIV Prevention and Treatment April 2012 Overview • Introduction to neuroeconomics • Decision under uncertainty – Brain and behavior – Adolescent behavior – Medical decisions Overview • Introduction to neuroeconomics • Decision under uncertainty – Brain and behavior – Adolescent behavior – Medical decisions Neuroeconomics NeuroscienceNeuronal MentalPsychology states “asEconomics if” models architecture Abstraction Neuroeconomics Behavioral Economics Neuroscience Psychology Economics Abstraction Neuroscience functional MRI VISUAL STIMULUS functional MRI: Blood Oxygenation Level Dependent signals Neural Changes in oxygen Change in activity consumption, blood flow concentration of and blood volume deoxyhemoglobin Change in Signal from each measured point in space at signal each point in time t = 1 t = 2 t = 3 t = 4 t = 5 t = 6 dorsal anterior posterior lateral ventral dorsal anterior medial posterior ventral Anterior The cortex Cingulate Cortex (ACC) Medial Prefrontal Cortex (MPFC) Posterior Cingulate Cortex (PCC) Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex (vMPFC) Orbitofrontal Cortex (OFC) Sub-cortical structures fMRI signal • Spatial resolution: ~3x3x3mm3 Low • Temporal resolution: ~1-2s Low • Number of voxels: ~150,000 High • Typical signal change: 0.2%-2% Low • Typical noise: more than the signal… High But… • Intact human -
Volatility As Link Between Risk and Memory in Economics, Econometrics and Neuroeconomics: an Application for the Bolivian Inflation Rate 1938 - 2012
Volatility as link between risk and memory in Economics, Econometrics and Neuroeconomics: an application for the Bolivian Inflation Rate 1938 - 2012 María Edith Chacón B. [email protected] Teacher and researcher CIDES – UMSA. La Paz, Bolivia. Ernesto Sheriff B. [email protected] Teacher and researcher CIDES – UMSA and UPB. La Paz, Bolivia. Experimental and Behavioral Economics: Other Neuroeconomics Econometrics: Time Series ABSTRACT This paper provides an indicator that measures memory as a stock. Memory affects economic decisions thus the memory indicator is useful to help in applied work, it was built according to the state of the art in Psychology and Neuroeconomics and it is presented as a time series; it is a recursive one and it is represented by an accumulated measure of the volatility. Many theories of risk have used volatility indicators to represent risk in the applied work. Risk valuation is associated to volatility and it is very sensitive to periods in which it is measured; it is very sensitive too to the type of data associated to volatility. In this paper we found that the memory affects risk valuations and the link between them is a special kind of volatility i.e. accumulated volatility with an endogenous initialization period and compatible with many Psychological hypotheses. The developed indicator is compatible with the econometrics of stationary series, integrated series and fractional integrated series. These contributions help to improve the study of hysteresis in applied economics, to develop more consistent links between memory and risk in Neuroeconomics and, to obtain more confident time series models in econometrics using the new indicator. -
Nudging Cooperation in Public Goods Provision
A Service of Leibniz-Informationszentrum econstor Wirtschaft Leibniz Information Centre Make Your Publications Visible. zbw for Economics Barron, Kai; Nurminen, Tuomas Article — Accepted Manuscript (Postprint) Nudging cooperation in public goods provision Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics Provided in Cooperation with: WZB Berlin Social Science Center Suggested Citation: Barron, Kai; Nurminen, Tuomas (2020) : Nudging cooperation in public goods provision, Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, ISSN 2214-8043, Elsevier, Amsterdam, Vol. 88, Iss. (Article No.:) 101542, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2020.101542 This Version is available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/216878 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. personal and scholarly purposes. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle You are not to copy documents for public or commercial Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, If the documents have been made available under an Open gelten abweichend von -
Competition and Cooperation on Predation: Bifurcation Theory of Mutualism Author: Srijana Ghimire Xiang-Sheng Wang University of Louisiana at Lafayette
Competition and Cooperation on Predation: Bifurcation Theory Of Mutualism Author: Srijana Ghimire Xiang-Sheng Wang University of Louisiana at Lafayette Introduction Existence and Stability of E1,E+ and E− Existence and property of Hopf bifurcation 3. R > 1 and R > 3R − 2R2. In this case, Q = Q , 1 2 1 1 c 1 points We investigate two predator-prey models which take into con- xc = 1/R1, E1 always exists, E1 is locally asymptotically H E + H E E sideration the cooperation between two different predators and stable if and only if Q < Q1, E− does not exist, and E+ exits + + R H within one predator species, respectively. Local and global dy- if and only if Q > Q1. 2.0 E E E - namics are studied for the model systems. By a detailed bi- - - Q Q Q Q Q Q furcation analysis, we investigate the dependence of predation + + h + h1 h2 1.5 no Hopf bifurcation Existence conditions of positive equilibria. (a) case 1(a) (b) case 1(b) (c) case 1(c) dynamics on mutualism (cooperative predation). H H E R + 2 E E two supercritical + + 1.0 R2 > 1 Q H E+ E - E Q1 - E y y - First Predator-Prey Model with Competition 1 E 1 E 1 1 y 1 E 1 0.5 one supercritical NA Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q and Co-operation 1 + 1 + 1 h + h1 1 h2 R2 < one Q R1 NA if Q < Q1 (d) case 2(a) (e) case 2(b) (f) case 2(c) E± subcritical E+ if Q ≥ Q1 E+ d 0 H 0 2 4 6 8 E x = 1 − x − p xy − p xz − 2qxyz, (1) + 1 2 Q+ E Q1 + 0 Figure: Existence and property of Hopf bifurcation points in the (d, R) y = p xy + qxyz − d y, (2) 2 1 1 R2 = 3R1 − 2R NA 1 H parameter space. -
Field Experiments in Development Economics1 Esther Duflo Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Field Experiments in Development Economics1 Esther Duflo Massachusetts Institute of Technology (Department of Economics and Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab) BREAD, CEPR, NBER January 2006 Prepared for the World Congress of the Econometric Society Abstract There is a long tradition in development economics of collecting original data to test specific hypotheses. Over the last 10 years, this tradition has merged with an expertise in setting up randomized field experiments, resulting in an increasingly large number of studies where an original experiment has been set up to test economic theories and hypotheses. This paper extracts some substantive and methodological lessons from such studies in three domains: incentives, social learning, and time-inconsistent preferences. The paper argues that we need both to continue testing existing theories and to start thinking of how the theories may be adapted to make sense of the field experiment results, many of which are starting to challenge them. This new framework could then guide a new round of experiments. 1 I would like to thank Richard Blundell, Joshua Angrist, Orazio Attanasio, Abhijit Banerjee, Tim Besley, Michael Kremer, Sendhil Mullainathan and Rohini Pande for comments on this paper and/or having been instrumental in shaping my views on these issues. I thank Neel Mukherjee and Kudzai Takavarasha for carefully reading and editing a previous draft. 1 There is a long tradition in development economics of collecting original data in order to test a specific economic hypothesis or to study a particular setting or institution. This is perhaps due to a conjunction of the lack of readily available high-quality, large-scale data sets commonly available in industrialized countries and the low cost of data collection in developing countries, though development economists also like to think that it has something to do with the mindset of many of them. -
Game-Theoretic Analysis of Cooperation Incentive Strategies in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks
1 Game-Theoretic Analysis of Cooperation Incentive Strategies in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks Ze Li and Haiying Shen Dept. of Electrical and Computer Engineering Clemson University, Clemson, SC 29631 fzel,[email protected] F Abstract—In mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs), tasks are conducted nodes will decrease the throughput of cooperative nodes and lead based on the cooperation of nodes in the networks. However, since the to complete network disconnection [6]. Therefore, encouraging nodes are usually constrained by limited computation resources, selfish nodes to be cooperative and detecting selfish nodes in packet nodes may refuse to be cooperative. Reputation systems and price-based transmission is critical to ensuring the proper functionalities of systems are two main solutions to the node non-cooperation problem. A reputation system evaluates node behaviors by reputation values and uses MANETs. a reputation threshold to distinguish trustworthy nodes and untrustworthy Recently, numerous approaches have been proposed to deal nodes. A price-based system uses virtual cash to control the transactions with the node non-cooperation problem in wireless networks. of a packet forwarding service. Although these two kinds of systems have They generally can be classified into two main categories: reputa- been widely used, very little research has been devoted to investigating the tion systems and price-based systems. The basic goal of reputation effectiveness of the node cooperation incentives provided by the systems. systems [7–18] is to evaluate each node’s trustworthiness based In this paper, we use game theory to analyze the cooperation incentives provided by these two systems and by a system with no cooperation on its behaviors and detect misbehaving nodes according to rep- incentive strategy. -
Economists As Worldly Philosophers
Economists as Worldly Philosophers Robert J. Shiller and Virginia M. Shiller Yale University Hitotsubashi University, March 11, 2014 Virginia M. Shiller • Married, 1976 • Ph.D. Clinical Psychology, University of Delaware 1984 • Intern, Cambridge Hospital, Harvard Medical School, 1980-1 • Clinical Instructor, Yale Child Study Center, since 2000 • Private practice with children, adults, and families Robert Heilbroner 1919-2005 • His book The Worldly Philosophers: Lives, Times and Ideas of the Great Economic Thinkers, 1953, sold four million copies • Adam Smith, Henry George, Karl Marx, John Stewart Mill, John Maynard Keynes, Thomas Malthus Example: Adam Smith • Theory of Moral Sentiments, 1759 • The Wealth of Nations, 1776 • Did not shrink from moral judgments, e. g., frugality Example: John Maynard Keynes • Economic Consequences of the Peace • The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, 1936 Economics as a Moral Science • The kinds of questions economists are asked to opine on are inherently moral • Moral calculus requires insights into the complexities of human behavior • A plea for behavioral economics and a broader focus for economic research Kenneth Boulding 1910-1993 • “We cannot escape the proposition that as science moves from pure knowledge toward control, that is, toward creating what it knows, what it creates becomes a problem of ethical choice, and will depend upon the common values of the societies in which the scientific culture is embedded, as well as of the scientific subculture.” Boulding on the Theory that People Maximize Utility of their Own Consumption • That there is neither malevolence nor benevolence anywhere in the system is demonstrably false. • “Anything less descriptive of the human condition could hardly be imagined.” (from American Economics Association Presidential Address, 1968). -
2 Cognitive Load Increases Risk Aversion 5 2.1 Introduction
Essays in Experimental and Neuroeconomics DISSERTATION zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades Dr. rer. pol. im Fach Volkswirtschaftslehre eingereicht an der Wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Fakultät der Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin von Diplom-Volkswirt Holger Gerhardt geboren am 17. Januar 1978 in Arnsberg Präsident der Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin: Prof. Dr. Jan-Hendrik Olbertz Dekan der Wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Fakultät: Prof. Oliver Günther, Ph. D. Gutachter: 1. Prof. Lutz Weinke, Ph. D. 2. Prof. Dr. Hauke R. Heekeren eingereicht am: 9. Mai 2011 Tag des Kolloquiums: 20. Juni 2011 Contents 1 Introduction 1 Bibliography . 3 2 Cognitive load increases risk aversion 5 2.1 Introduction . 5 2.2 Related literature . 7 2.2.1 Introductory remarks . 7 2.2.2 Overview of dual-system and “dual-self” approaches . 7 2.2.3 Subjective expected-utility theory as a unitary-process model of decision making under risk . 10 2.2.4 Dual-process approaches to decision making under risk . 11 2.2.5 Empirical evidence on dual processes in decision making under risk . 12 2.3 Experimental design . 17 2.3.1 Introduction: Advantages of our design over alternative designs . 17 2.3.2 Trial setup . 18 2.3.3 Additional measures of individual differences . 24 2.4 Results . 24 2.4.1 Introductory remarks . 24 2.4.2 Were the tasks adequate? . 25 2.4.3 How did subjects allocate attention to the two simultane- ous tasks? . 25 2.4.4 Preference reversal?—How often did subjects choose the riskier lottery? . 26 2.4.5 Structural regressions: the influence of additional cognitive load on subjects’ degree of relative risk aversion . -
The Role of Time Preference on Wealth
THE ROLE OF TIME PREFERENCE ON WEALTH _______________________________________ A Thesis presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School at the University of Missouri-Columbia _______________________________________________________ In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Master of Science _____________________________________________________ by ANDREW MARK ZUMWALT Dr. Deanna L. Sharpe, Thesis Co-Supervisor Dr. Sandra J. Huston, Thesis Co-Supervisor December 2008 The undersigned, appointed by the dean of the Graduate School, have examined the thesis entitled THE ROLE OF TIME PREFERENCE ON WEALTH presented by Andrew Mark Zumwalt, a candidate for the degree of master of science, and hereby certify that, in their opinion, it is worthy of acceptance. Professor Deanna L. Sharpe Professor Sandra J. Huston Professor Thomas Johnson ad maiorem dei gloriam ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS All throughout my life, I have been supported by strong individuals. These people have been the pillars of my success, and without their influence and guidance, I would be nowhere near where I am now. I can only hope that I have, in turn, enriched their lives. I aspire to fulfill a similar role for the young men and women I meet. While I believe that my success has been caused by the cumulative efforts of many individuals, I would like to take this limited space to thank those that have helped with this part of my life. First, I would like to thank the members of my committee. Dr Thomas Johnson’s experience from agricultural economics provided insight into overlooked ideas in my research when viewed in a broader context. He has also been extremely understanding with regard to interesting timetables, and I’ve thoroughly enjoyed learning from him in both inside and outside the classroom. -
A Value-Based Framework for Understanding Cooperation
CDPXXX10.1177/0963721420906200Pärnamets et al.Value-Based Framework for Cooperation 906200research-article2020 ASSOCIATION FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE Current Directions in Psychological Science A Value-Based Framework for 2020, Vol. 29(3) 227 –234 © The Author(s) 2020 Article reuse guidelines: Understanding Cooperation sagepub.com/journals-permissions DOI:https://doi.org/10.1177/0963721420906200 10.1177/0963721420906200 www.psychologicalscience.org/CDPS Philip Pärnamets1,2, Anastasia Shuster3, Diego A. Reinero2 , and Jay J. Van Bavel2 1Division of Psychology, Department of Clinical Neuroscience, Karolinska Institutet; 2Department of Psychology, New York University; and 3Department of Psychiatry, Icahn School of Medicine at Mt. Sinai Abstract Understanding the roots of human cooperation, a social phenomenon embedded in pressing issues including climate change and social conflict, requires an interdisciplinary perspective. We propose a unifying value-based framework for understanding cooperation that integrates neuroeconomic models of decision-making with psychological variables involved in cooperation. We propose that the ventromedial prefrontal cortex serves as a neural integration hub for value computation during cooperative decisions, receiving inputs from various neurocognitive processes such as attention, memory, and learning. Next, we describe findings from social and personality psychology highlighting factors that shape the value of cooperation, including research on contexts and norms, personal and social identity, and intergroup relations. Our approach advances theoretical debates about cooperation by highlighting how previous findings are accommodated within a general value-based framework and offers novel predictions. Keywords cooperation, preferences, norms, social neuroscience, neuroeconomics Cooperation is a central feature of group living and map for psychologists and help promote cumulative involves any action that benefits other people while science. -
Behavioral & Experimental Macroeconomics and Policy Analysis
Working Paper Series Cars Hommes Behavioral & experimental macroeconomics and policy analysis: a complex systems approach No 2201 / November 2018 Disclaimer: This paper should not be reported as representing the views of the European Central Bank (ECB). The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the ECB. Abstract This survey discusses behavioral and experimental macroeconomics emphasiz- ing a complex systems perspective. The economy consists of boundedly rational heterogeneous agents who do not fully understand their complex environment and use simple decision heuristics. Central to our survey is the question under which conditions a complex macro-system of interacting agents may or may not coordinate on the rational equilibrium outcome. A general finding is that under positive expectations feedback (strategic complementarity) {where optimistic (pessimistic) expectations can cause a boom (bust){ coordination failures are quite common. The economy is then rather unstable and persistent aggre- gate fluctuations arise strongly amplified by coordination on trend-following behavior leading to (almost-)self-fulfilling equilibria. Heterogeneous expecta- tions and heuristics switching models match this observed micro and macro behaviour surprisingly well. We also discuss policy implications of this coordi- nation failure on the perfectly rational aggregate outcome and how policy can help to manage the self-organization process of a complex economic system. JEL Classification: D84, D83, E32, C92 Keywords: Expectations feedback, learning, coordination failure, almost self- fulfilling equilibria, simple heuristics, experimental & behavioral macro-economics. ECB Working Paper Series No 2201 / November 2018 1 Non-technical summary Most policy analysis is still based on rational expectations models, often with a per- fectly rational representative agent.