State and Social Formation in Religion, Kuntowijoyo Faculty of Arts, Gadjah Mada University, Indonesia

In the course of the past two decades many changes have influenced Indonesian political life. The military emerged from the 1965 national tragedy to become the dominant social force in reshaping the political structure and playing the dwi fungsi (dual role), military and civil at the same time, quite effectively. The civil administra- tion, the houses of representatives, business enterprises, and even sport clubs show the importance of uniformed men behind the many activities at all levels. It does not mean, however, that Indonesia today is a military state, since the power is ac- quired more through sophisticated political maneuvering than through pure military action. In fact, certain national consensus does support the political role of the military. The military is able to establish for the first time in Indonesian history an undisputed stability. It is precisely the imminent social and economic consequences of such stability and national consensus that this paper will seek to assess - among other things - in the light of historical experiences. , In the first years following 1965 there was a spirit of high optimism among the political parties banned under the administration, especially those of the Islamic party Masjumi (Madjelis Sjura Muslimin Indonesia or Consultative Council of the Indonesian Muslims) and the democratic-socialist party, the PSI (Partai Sosialis Indonesia). The latter was not revived, but many of its leaders, even those involved in the 1958 PRRI-Permesta regional rebellion, were incorporated in the administra- tion. Apparently the administration is determined to employ their talents and expertise to support its political and economic objectives. Many of the alleged former PSI intellectuals are now working in the government's most important posi- tions, while many others are actively involved in the government-sponsored , the or the Functional Group. This is in the midst of Soksi (All Indonesia Trade Union Organization), the PSI's trade union movement, becoming an influential member of the Golkar. What is still in doubt is the possible ideological I adoption of the democratic-socialist ideals.' As for the Masjumi, the party was neither rehabilitated nor its functionaries incorporated. The government even vetoed the return of the moderate Masjumi leaders into politics for fear of their ability to mobilize the Ummat in favor of the liberal politics of the pre-Guided Democracy which the Masjumi leaders were thought to have in mind. Political pressure was exercised upon the Ummat until the government could find acceptable political figures to serve the newly formed (Indonesian Muslim Party) before the scheduled 1971 general election. In the beginning it seems that the Parmusi inherited the spirit of the late Masjumi, yet none of the key former Islamic party leaders served in the central and regional organizations. The govern-

I 2 ment also succeeded in preventing the Masjumi leaders and prominent members from 2 being candidates of the Parmusi in the election. The government-sponsored Golkar won the 1971 election, though the elec- tion was much criticised by the other contestants for its manipulation of vote, abuse of power, use of coercion and threat, and other disregards of constitutional rights of the citizens.' The government was becoming more self-confident; never before had such a large majority been given to a single party in Indonesian politics. The years between the 1971 and 1977 general elections brought about further political restructuring, mainly in order to simplify political grouping. The government initiated realignment of political parties into three organizations, the Golkar, the PDI (In- donesian Democratic Party) and the PPP (). The first is the existing functional group; the second, merger of PNI (Indonesian National Party), the Indonesian Catholic Party, and the Parkindo (Indonesian Christian Party); and the third for the existing Islamic parties, the Parmusi, the NU (Nahdatul Ulama), the PSII (Partai Syarekat Islam Indonesia), and the Perti (Persatuan Tarbiyah Islamiyah).4 Again, the government played successfully in orchestrating the respective political leadership of the PDI and PPP. Presumably ideological problems arose within the PDI. The largest member, the PNI, confessed Marhaenism - a populist ideology formulated by the late Sukarno in 1927.' To the objection of the PNI, the ideological stand was abandoned causing confusion within the PDI. Rivalries and conflicts between the leaders and the com- ponents were finally solved, partly because of the government's pressure. Despite the abandonment of the Marhaenism ideology, however, the PDI still employed much , ., of the PNI's jargon in rallying support. As for the Muslim PPP, the question of ideology was nearly absent; after all it is a Muslim party. The problem that arose dealt with the proportional share of power and privileges for each component. The NU which by then had never undergone serious internal friction claimed the biggest share, since it was also the largest com- ponent of the PPP. However, the Parmusi component seems to be politically closer to the government, as its leaders were practically handpicked by the government. Despite the internal difficulties the PPP was united in the election year of 1977. Later, there were disputes concerning the membership in the house of representatives, mainly because the government pressed the PPP to dissociate itself from the Muslim "hardliners". The process of taming the Islamic party has continued even through the recent general election of 1982. Significant political developments occurred in the 1983 session of the newly elected MPR (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat or People Consultative Assembly). For one, the pragmatic politics of the government went so far as to deemphasize the ideological character of the political parties; a step with a long range political consequences in the future. Through a majority vote of the Golkar the government demanded that the political parties adopt a single principle (azas tunggap, the , to be the only legitimate ideology. The Pancasila had already in fact received national consensus, but this time it was made the exclusive and complete principle for Indonesia. There is not yet much further elaboration of what precisely the monolithic ideology means, except in very vague terms. All of the political parties, including the Muslim PPP, hurriedly accepted the term in order not to bear negative impression. The monolithic

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