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The Ultimatum Game in Southwestern Tanzania: Ethnic Variation And Volume 44, Number 3, June 2003 F 427 Kenya are broader in scope because they require coop- The Ultimatum Game in eration both within and between villages (Henrich et al. Southwestern Tanzania: Ethnic 2001). 1 We played the ultimatum game with individuals from Variation and Institutional Scope two sympatric Tanzanian ethnic groups (Sukuma and Pimbwe) experiencing similar physical environmental conditions and state political forces. Sukuma live on the brian paciotti and craig hadley outskirts of densely settled Pimbwe villages, and mem- Department of Sociology, University of California, bers of the two ethnic groups interact on a daily basis. Davis, Calif. 95616, U.S.A. ([email protected])/ The two groups differ markedly in the scope of their Department of Anthropology, University of California, social institutions, however, and we used this difference Davis, Calif. 95616, U.S.A. 8xi02 to make predictions regarding ultimatum-game play. Building on the work of Henrich et al. (2001), we for- mulated the following three hypotheses: Experimental economic games offer anthropologists an 1. The institutional-scope hypothesis. Because Suk- additional tool for measuring norms of fairness and con- uma institutions are broad in scope, with in-groups cross- cerns over inequality within and between groups (Ca- cutting even distant villages, Sukuma will make similar merer and Fehr 2002). The game that has attracted the offers and rejections to players living both within and most attention, the ultimatum game, involves two anon- outside of their village. In contrast, Pimbwe, whose in- ymous players. The first player, the proposer, offers the stitutions encourage sharing within villages rather than responder a portion, e, of a set amount of money, x. The between, will offer lower amounts and punish less when responder is then given the chance to accept or to reject playing with individuals outside of their village. the offer. A rejection of the offer leaves both players with 2. The magnitude hypothesis. Because of their gen- nothing, whereas acceptance of the offer leaves the pro- erosity and tendency to enforce sharing rules (Abrahams Ϫ poser with the offer, x e, and the responder with e. Ra- 1967), Sukuma will make higher offers and reject low tional-choice theory under standard assumptions pre- offers more frequently than Pimbwe, who lack such rules dicts that proposers will offer the smallest possible and rarely enforce cooperation rules outside of the allocation of x while responders will accept any of- family. fer—something is better than nothing. In stark contrast 3. The macro/micro hypothesis. Individuals’ ethnic af- to these predictions, modal offers from students in in- filiation, used as a proxy for institutional rules, will have dustrialized countries are generally 50%ofx and offers a greater effect on offers and rejections than individual less than 20%ofx are frequently rejected (Kagel and Roth economic and demographic characteristics. 1995). Henrich et al. (2001) asked whether the seemingly ubiquitous pattern among subjects from industrialized ethnographic description countries was the result of universal patterns of behavior Pimbwe and, recently, Sukuma live interspersed in sev- or of individuals’ economic and social environments. eral villages in the northern section of southwestern Tan- They played the ultimatum game with individuals from zania’s Rukwa region. The Pimbwe (the original inhab- 15 geographically and economically diverse societies and itants of the area), who once hunted game, have depended found game play to be considerably more heterogeneous mainly on maize horticulture since the establishment of than in studies conducted in industrialized countries. To a national game reserve in the region. Their political account for this variation, they hypothesized that game structure involved loosely linked clans controlled by a 2 play reflects the societal institutions within which the chief in a centrally located village (Willis and Interna- players’ lives are imbedded. All populations have insti- tional African Institute 1966). Political integration be- tutional rules promoting sharing or “fair” transactions, tween clans existed, but overall there was little need for but these vary in the degree to which they are stressed large-scale cooperation between settlements. After the and the boundaries within which they apply (Barth 1969). state settlement scheme of the 1970s (Ujamaa), some of For example, Machiguenga horticulturalists of the Am- the Pimbwe were forced to leave their isolated house- azon have few institutions beyond the family level, and holds in the forest and settle in villages that now contain sharing or cooperation occurs mainly within the family. a few thousand people. In contrast, the institutions of Orma pastoralists of Originally from the northern part of Tanzania, Sukuma agro-pastoralists have since the 1960 and ’70s migrated ᭧ 2003 by The Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Re- in large numbers to every region in Tanzania (Galaty search. All rights reserved 0011-3204/2003/4403-0008$1.00 1988). Today there are nearly as many Sukuma as 1. We thank William Baum, Joseph Henrich, Monique Borgerhoff Pimbwe living in the study area. Traditionally, the Suk- Mulder, Peter Richerson, Eric Smith, Richard McElreath, and three uma lived in a multiple chiefdom system in which local anonymous reviewers for helpful comments. [Supplementary ma- chiefs controlled large areas but also cooperated with terial appears in the electronic edition of this issue on the journal’s web page (http://www.journals.uchicago/edu/CA/home.html).] distant chiefs. The Sukuma also had powerful organi- 2. We define “institutions” as sets of cultural rules that, through zations and clubs at the village level (Abrahams 1967, sanctions, maintain patterns of behavior. Abrahams and International African Institute 1967) that 428 F current anthropology have preadapted them to sophisticated cooperation lage and between-village treatments. Participants in the among agricultural cooperatives (Lang 1978) and sun- within-village treatment were told that they would play gusungu justice institutions (Bukurura 1994). Village the ultimatum game with a member of their ethnic group sungusungu organizations cooperate effectively across from their own village. Those in the between-village the country to capture and prosecute thieves (Paciotti treatment were told that they would play the game with 2002). members of the village of Kahama. Because we were able Ethnohistorical data point to differences in the scope to obtain only a small sample of Sukuma from Mahenge of institutions between these ethnic groups. The Pimbwe and none from Kahama, we chose to have Sukuma and have smaller-scale institutions that encourage coopera- Pimbwe from Mahenge play the roles of both proposer tion within smaller units such as clans or villages, and responder, with participants first proposing an offer whereas the Sukuma cooperate at the ethnic-group level and then responding to a preexisting offer. The researcher with even distant villages. Ethnographic data in the and an assistant individually visited participants at their study region confirm that these institutional patterns homes. In each treatment, participants were matched have persisted. Pimbwe have few large-scale gatherings without their knowledge to the participants whom the or events involving individuals from outside the ex- researchers had just visited. Thus, it was necessary to tended family or friendship networks; they interact give the first participant in each treatment a sham offer mostly with their families and friends from their village. As a result, Pimbwe residential mobility is low, and most for the rejection role in the game. In addition, offers given individuals live in the village in which they were born. to responders for between-village treatments were taken Finally, the Pimbwe have weak third-party institutions not from another village but from the participant pre- of social control and rely mainly on the state, gossip, and viously visited in Mahenge. Each player was told that personal violence to mediate disputes. In contrast, Su- the researcher would return the following day to report kuma organize yearly dance competitions in which al- the responder’s decision and, if the offer had been ac- most all the Sukuma in the study area participate. There cepted, give them the money. Players who received false is a continual influx of new Sukuma migrants, and in- information during the games were carefully debriefed dividuals are immediately integrated into their new com- after game play.5 In Kahama, the 16 proposers and 21 munities. While the Pimbwe are regarded as stingy, the responders were visited on a single day with a local as- Sukuma are renowned by Tanzanians for their excep- sistant and were given the same instructions as for the tional generosity. Anthropologists have written about within-village treatment in Mahenge. Proposers were how Sukuma mothers socialize generosity in their young visited first and then responders were randomly matched children by forcing them to share food with others (Var- to proposers’ offers.6 kevisser 1973). In contrast to Pimbwe, Sukuma have Other than manipulation of within-village and be- strong symbolic in-group markers such as jewelry, col- tween-village conditions, identical protocols were used orful capes, and hats. All of this helps create the trust in each treatment. The game was explained in Swahili that is important for maintaining efficient rule enforce- using a pretested script, examples were given, and in- ment within the sungusungu organizations (Paciotti dividuals played only after we were assured that they 2002). understood the game. Each player was told that the money used was not our personal money and had been given to us specifically for research.7 Data on age, gender, methods and analysis amount of maize harvested last year (in 70-kg bags), and In the village of Mahenge,3 20 Sukuma and 20 Pimbwe years of education for each participant were collected were chosen from a larger sample of households visited (table 1). After completing the game, players were ques- previously during research on the sungusungu.
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