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Inter-Ethnic Interaction, Strategic Bargaining Power, and The 1 1 Inter-ethnic Interaction, Strategic Bargaining Power, and the Dynamics of 2 Cultural Norms: A Field Study in an Amazonian Population 3 4 John Andrew Bunce1,2,3 and Richard McElreath1,2 5 6 1Department of Human Behavior, Ecology, and Culture, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary 7 Anthropology, Leipzig, Germany 8 2Department of Anthropology, University of California, Davis, CA USA 9 3Department of Anthropology, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN USA 10 11 Corresponding author: John Andrew Bunce (tel: +49 341 3550 347, email: 12 [email protected]) 13 14 ORCID 15 John Andrew Bunce: 0000-0003-4092-485X 16 Richard McElreath: 0000-0002-0387-5377 17 18 In press in Human Nature 2 19 ABSTRACT 20 Ethnic groups are universal and unique to human societies. Such groups sometimes have 21 norms of behavior that are adaptively linked to their social and ecological circumstances, and 22 ethnic boundaries may function to protect that variation from erosion by inter-ethnic interaction. 23 However, such interaction is often frequent and voluntary, suggesting that individuals may be 24 able to strategically reduce its costs, allowing adaptive cultural variation to persist in spite of 25 interaction with out-groups with different norms. We examine five mechanisms influencing the 26 dynamics of ethnically-distinct cultural norms, each focused on strategic individual-level choices 27 in inter-ethnic interaction: bargaining, interaction frequency-biased norm adoption, assortment 28 on norms, success-biased inter-ethnic social learning, and childhood socialization. We use 29 Bayesian item response models to analyze patterns of norm variation and inter-ethnic interaction 30 in an ethnically-structured Amazonian population. We show that, among indigenous Matsigenka, 31 inter-ethnic education with colonial Mestizos is more strongly associated with Mestizo-typical 32 norms than is even extensive inter-ethnic experience in commerce and wage labor. Using 33 ethnographic observations, we show that all five of the proposed mechanisms of norm adoption 34 may contribute to this effect. However, of these mechanisms, we argue that changes in relative 35 bargaining power are particularly important for ethnic minorities wishing to preserve distinctive 36 norms while engaging in inter-ethnic interaction in domains such as education. If this mechanism 37 proves applicable in a range of other ethnographic contexts, it would constitute one cogent 38 explanation for when and why ethnically-structured cultural variation can either persist or erode 39 given frequent, and often mutually beneficial, inter-ethnic interaction. 40 41 Keywords: Ethnic boundaries, Cultural evolution, Education, Norms, Indigenous peoples, 42 Amazonia 43 44 1. INTRODUCTION 45 The extent of human cultural variation is unprecedented in nature, and its evolutionary 46 origins remain mysterious. Much human cultural variation is structured in symbolically marked 47 groups, i.e., ethnic groups, which are often associated with different suites of beliefs about what 48 constitutes appropriate behavior in a given context, i.e., cultural norms (Barth 1998[1969]; see 49 also Bicchieri 2006). Life in such groups may have characterized our species for 80,000 years or 50 more (d'Errico et al. 2009; Foley and Lahr 2011). The fact that ethnic groups are nearly universal 51 in human populations at all but the smallest geographic scales, are absent in all other primates, 52 and are highly dynamic presents important puzzles to evolutionary social scientists: What are the 53 psychological and cultural processes that make and remake ethnic groups? What role did such 54 processes play in the adaptive history of humankind? 55 56 1.1. Evolutionary Models of the Norms and Behaviors of Symbolically Marked Groups 57 One idea to explain the maintenance of ethnic groups is that assortment on symbolic 58 markers helps to preserve locally-adaptive norms, knowledge, and beliefs from erosion by 59 admixture (Richerson and Boyd 2005; Henrich and McElreath 2003). For example, McElreath et 60 al. (2003) demonstrate that symbolically marked groups with differences in norms can arise 61 spontaneously under a minimal set of assumptions: benefits to inter-individual interaction 62 depend on norm coordination, interaction partners are chosen on the basis of markers, and norms 63 and markers tend to be acquired from locally successful individuals. Once such marked groups 64 evolve, intra-group coordination interactions yield greater benefits than interaction between 3 65 groups. A similar model by Boyd and Richerson (1987) focuses instead on ecological 66 adaptations rather than norms, but also produces symbolically marked groups that protect 67 adaptive, culturally transmitted behavioral variation from erosion by mixing between residential 68 groups. Once evolved, ethnic groups in these models have salient, and relatively fixed, 69 boundaries (see also Pagel and Mace 2004), and isolating mechanisms attenuate costly inter- 70 group interaction (analogous to reproductive isolating mechanisms in biological species, e.g., 71 Price 2008). 72 A shortcoming of these models is that interaction between groups is exogenously 73 imposed, rather than a result of the strategic decisions of individuals. In these models, there are 74 no benefits to inter-group over intra-group interaction. In contrast, in nearly all ethnographic and 75 historically-described contexts, people voluntarily engage in at least some inter-ethnic interaction 76 (e.g., Wolf 1982). Such interaction sometimes entails the adoption of out-group cultural norms 77 (Nagel 1996; Kopenawa and Albert 2013; Behrens 1992) and is not necessarily viewed by 78 participants as detrimental (Rosengren 2004; Baer 2004). There may be adaptive reasons to 79 interact with other ethnic groups, and even to adopt culturally transmitted behavior from them. 80 Thus, models that exclude such benefits miss a potentially important factor affecting cultural 81 dynamics. 82 One potential resolution to this conflict between models and empirical observation is that 83 individuals strategically adjust how, and with whom, they interact, in order to either reduce costs 84 of norm mis-coordination, or, rather, to preferentially adopt adaptive behavior from members of 85 other groups. The strategic nature of between-group interaction could help explain how, in some 86 contexts, ethnic-typical norms can be maintained for generations despite frequent inter-ethnic 87 interaction (e.g., Fur and Baggara: Haaland 1998 (1969)), while, in other cases, the norms of one 88 ethnic group are rapidly replaced by those of another (e.g., assimilation of some immigrants in 89 the United States: Gans 1979). The lack of mechanistic models of these dynamics represents an 90 important challenge for our understanding of the evolution of cultural norms in ethnically- 91 structured populations. Ultimately we seek a body of theory that can explain the uniqueness of 92 human ethnic variation among primates, contribute to an understanding of the dynamics of 93 historical and contemporary ethnic groups, and enhance the ability of ethnic minority members 94 to reverse or slow the loss of valued cultural norms, should they wish to. 95 96 1.2. Mechanisms of Norm Adoption at Ethnic Boundaries 97 Previous research on ethnic variation has emphasized links between the adoption of out- 98 group cultural norms (e.g., assimilation and marginalization), participation in inter-ethnic 99 interaction (e.g., through social networks), individual personality traits (e.g., attitude toward the 100 out group, bicultural efficacy), and the strategic maintenance or change of ethnic identity 101 (Wimmer 2013; Berry 1997; LaFromboise et al. 1993). However, the mechanistic links between 102 inter-ethnic interaction and norm adoption are often not specified in sufficient detail to facilitate 103 empirical testing. For instance, the pioneering study of Graves (1967) among minority Spanish- 104 speaking Americans and Native Americans in a majority Anglo-American town in the 105 Southwestern U.S., found a strong relationship between inter-ethnic interaction (e.g., in domains 106 such as education, military service, out-group friendships, employment, etc.) and the probability 107 that minority individuals hold majority-typical norms. From this, it is argued that exposure to 108 outgroup norms, identification with the outgroup, and access to resources controlled by the 109 outgroup all play roles in the adoption of outgroup norms. However, the mechanisms underlying 110 such relationships are not well understood, making it difficult to distinguish among them with 4 111 the available data. As an initial step forward, we focus on five theoretically-grounded and 112 previously-published mechanisms whose predictions can be compared using quantitative and 113 ethnographic data at hand. An individual’s adoption of outgroup norms may depend on: 1) 114 differential bargaining power during inter-ethnic interactions, 2) the relative importance (e.g., 115 relative frequency) of inter-ethnic coordination interactions; 3) inter-ethnic assortment on 116 coordination norms, coupled with success-biased social learning among co-ethnics; 4) success- 117 biased inter-ethnic social learning; and 5) favorable exposure to outgroup norms during 118 childhood socialization. These five mechanisms are neither exhaustive nor mutually exclusive. 119 However, they make distinct predictions that we can evaluate using empirical data in order to 120 better understand their roles in the
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