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Downloaded with Software That Would Allow Them to Look for Drug SARS and Illness Narratives: An Examination of an Epidemic by ©Jon D. Lee A thesis submitted to the School of Graduate Studies in prutial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Department of Folklore Memorial University of Newfoundland August 2008 St. John's Newfoundland Abstract One of the largest recent disease outbreaks began in November of 2002, when the first cases of a disease that would soon be known as SARS began spreading in China. Since then, the SARS coronavirus has achieved infamy seldom seen among diseases, sweeping through media and Internet sources to create a panic that left thousands of people halfway around the world wearing surgical masks in attempts to protect themselves from perceived harm. The goal of this dissertation is to examine and understand the narratives that people told about the SARS outbreak-the rumors, gossip, legends, jokes, and other forms of oral communication. Examining these narratives will provide insights into why people believe the things they do about diseases, and why narratives both shape and are shaped by disease. A key concept included in this examination involves the reasons behind the exaggerated, and in many cases disproportionate reactions exhibited by the public. Tied up in these reactions were issues of race and ethnicity, personal and familial protection, and fear, all of which were directly influenced by oral narratives, as well as by information gathered from media sources. Ultimately, sources such as newspapers and news broadcasts can be blamed for the larger part of the hysteria that surrounded the outbreak. But oral narratives were also culpable, and so a second thrust of this work will be to examine what steps can be taken to counteract, or possibly preempt these sources of information. 11 Ultimately, it is the goal of this work to demonstrate that the types of nan-atives that circulated during the SARS outbreak closely resembled nan-atives associated with other diseases, thereby establishing a template or typology of disease nan-atives. The existence of such a typology would mean that medical and health personnel, responding to future disease outbreaks, would be able to better predict the forms of nan-ative that would arise, and would thus be better able to respond to the panic and xenophobia that so often accompany epidemics. lll Acknowledgements Writing any list such as this is stressful, to say the least. I began researching this project almost exactly five years before completing my first draft, and in that time I no doubt discussed my various and ever-changing ideas with hundreds of people. Dozens more helped me in subtler ways. It takes a village to raise a child, as the saying goes, and it took the support and encouragement of everyone around me to help me create this work. The impulse to therefore include in this section anyone and everyone I've talked to since March of 2003 is strong. More stressful still, after narrowing down this list of contributors, is the task of placing them into some sort of order. Whose name should be first? Will I offend anyone by placing their name last? By leaving them out altogether, even if by accident? To this last question I can only say, I tried my best to include everyone, and if a name is not on this list it is only due to my idiocy, and not because I did not appreciate what that person did for me. As for ranking names by importance, I have concluded that any such feat would be self-defeating. I cannot say, for the most part, that one person helped me more than another. Like the butterfly in Ray Bradbury's "A Sound of Thunder," the removal of any one person from the history of this project could result in catastrophe. The lists of people that make up the rest of this section will therefore be random, written down as they occurred to me, with no differentiations made as to importance or usefulness. IV Save one. I met my wife, Lynnette, only a few months before beginning this project. She has, in faith and love beyond my comprehension, remained beside me throughout my struggle to bring this work to light, offering condolences where necessary and, as was more often the case, Drill-Sergeant-like encouragement during my periods of sloth and torpor. For putting up with me (and putting me up, given my graduate student's salary), I will never adequately be able to express my gratitude. Thank you, my love. In random order, then, I also wish to thank the following people. None of this could have been possible-quite literally-without the time and space volunteered me by my interviewees: Jennifer Lim, Angel and Rosita Lim, Luis Tan, Mike Larsen, Jonathan Gould, Annie Ferraro, Mayee Ramrattan, Justin Aitcheson, Ann Moran, Seny Zamora, Benjamin Sandler, and Heather Read. For answering my questions, providing me with data and new avenues of research, and for making me realize important aspects of my research that even I wasn't aware of, I am forever indebted. My former roommate Robert "Robbie D" Dennis was instrumental in not only helping me procure a place to stay while I conducted my research in Toronto, Canada, but for introducing me to one of my informants, and for providing me with bibliographic resources. Robert's sister, Hollie, and her husband, Michael Peter Carter, were kind enough to offer me a bed and an Internet connection in Toronto, and more importantly, free use of their coffee maker. My friends and fellow graduate students in the Folklore Department at Memorial University of Newfoundland also deserve to be mentioned, and none more so than Lynne v McNeill and Andrea Kitta. Together, the three of us suffered the long road East, and logged hundreds of hours of encouragement, diversion, ideational dissection, and support. Without Lynne, I could not have written sections of chapter six; without Andrea, I would not have survived chapter two. Many of the professors in the Folklore Department buttressed me at one time or another, and none so much as Diane Goldstein, dissertation advisor extraordinaire, who challenged me at every turn and forced me to greatly hone my mental skewers. Committee members Paul Smith and Cory Thorne provided additional assistance, slipping important mailings and printouts into my mailbox and otherwise providing new ideas and sources of material. Martin Lovelace, who served as Department Head for most of the years I was physically present at MUN, offered constant encouragement, and more importantly, believed in me enough as an educator to consistently offer me courses to teach. In addition, Dr. Lovelace was generous enough to step in last-minute as a committee member when circumstances left Dr. Smith unable to continue. Philip Hiscock performed brilliantly in his role as teaching mentor, and offered better bibliographic advice than even my Chicago Style Manual. Peter Narvaez's CD Some Good Blues played constantly in the background, as did his theory lectures from Folk 6030. Diane Tye's clarifications of proper dissertation format and length kept me buoyant during mental storms. And the patience and grace of departmental secretaries Sharon Cochrane and Cindy Turpin cannot be underestimated for keeping me out of trouble, for helping me organize my academic life, and for providing me with the resources I needed to make it from one class to the next. VI MUN was not the only university to provide me with useful folkloristic mentor . Jeannie Thomas, Steve Siporin, and Barre Toelken of Utah State University are singularly responsible for not only getting me interested in this discipline in the first place, but for writing me the letters that got me accepted into MUN, and for continuing to show their loyalty by writing me the dozens of letters of recommendation that I have thrown their way in my search for gainful employment. Mikel Koven and Elliott Oring have given me helpful feedback on conference papers, sometimes providing jaw­ dropping alternate views of key elements that have forced me to reconsider large parts of theories. And I can only send out a broad "thanks" to the dozens of folklorists-both professionals and students-who have come up to me at conferences and offered positive, tmsolicited reviews of my papers. Outside of the academic world, no two people have been more influential and supportive than my parents, David and Jan. Together with my grandmothers-Ruth and Willa-they have provided shoulders strong enough on which to support the world. For assistance both financial and emotional, I offer the following prayer: May your beer be forever cold and never flat. Gracias. I also wish to extend my appreciation to everyone who has ever encouraged me to write, regardless of genre. Special mention must be given here to Sam Green, Michael Donovan, Bill Holm, Bill Kloefkom, Robert Hodgson Van Wagoner, Primus St. John, J.V. Brummels and Eddie Elfers at Logan House Press, Charles Cuthbertson, Robin Parent, Micah Schicker, Chris Okelberry, Ian Brodie, and Jodi McDavid. VII Finally, a note for the fallen. Ellen Meloy, Leslie Norris, and Ken Brewer-all wonderful people, all brilliant writers, all fast friends-did not make it to see the completion of this work. I know they would have been proud to see me succeed. From whatever vantage point they're watching me, I hope they're smiling. Vlll Table of Contents Abstract 11 Acknowledgments iv Chapter 1. The Yellow Brick Road 1 2. Folklore, Media, and Medicine 25 Folklore and Folkloristic Materials 29 Contemporary Legends 32 Health Panics 39 Race and Racialization 44 Risk and Risk Assessment 4 7 Media Theory 53 SARS and Official Medicine 61 3.
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