The Case of Morocco

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The Case of Morocco Democracy Promotion in the European Neighbourhood Policy the case of Morocco Author: Helena Bergé Supervised by: Hubert Smekal, Ph.D. Masaryk University 2012-2013 ABSTRACT Contrary to European Union (EU) rhetoric on the importance of democracy promotion, security considerations have always been prioritised over democratisation in its relations with the Southern Mediterranean. In a review of the European Neighbourhood Policy after the Lisbon Treaty and the Arab Spring in 2011, the EU pleaded again to give full attention to democracy considerations. This research paper investigates whether democracy promotion in the ENP towards Morocco has undergone any change since the review of the policy, both in substance and importance. A comparative analysis of European democracy support before and after 2011 in Morocco based on policy reports, financial allocations and conditionality mechanisms reveals that socio- economic conditions are the main focus of EU democracy promotion in Morocco, while most changes can be found in an increased support of civil society. However, the EU seems to repeat its previous behaviour by again prioritising security over democratisation. II LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AP: Action plan CAT: Convention against Torture CEDAW: Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women CFSP: Common Foreign and Security Policy CSF: Civil Society Facility CSO: Civil Society Organisation DCFTA: Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement EEAS: European External Action Service EED: European Endowment for Democracy EIDHR : European Instrument for Human Rights and Democracy EMP: Euro-Mediterranean Partnership ENP : European Neighbourhood Policy ENI: European Neighbourhood Instrument ENPI : European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument EU : European Union GCC : Gulf Cooperation Council GF: Governance Facility GONGO: Government Organised Non-Governmental Organisation ICAPED: International Convention for the protection of All Persons against Enforced Disappearance ICCPR: International Convention on Civil and Political Rights MEDA: Mesures d’Accompagnement PJD: Party of Justice and Development PR: Progress Report TEU : Treaty of the European Union TFEU: Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union SPRING: Support for Partnership, Reforms and Inclusive Growth UN: United Nations UNCAC : United Nations Convention against Corruption III LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1: The concept of liberal democracy Figure 2: Promotion of electoral regime components in the ENP towards Morocco, 2004-2010. Figure 3: Promotion of political rights in the ENP towards Morocco, 2004-2010. Figure 4: Promotion of civil rights in the ENP towards Morocco, 2004-2010. Figure 5: Promotion of horizontal accountability in the ENP towards Morocco, 2004-2010. Figure 6: Promotion of the effective power to govern in the ENP towards Morocco, 2004-2010. Figure 7: Promotion of stateness in the ENP towards Morocco, 2004-2010. Figure 8: Promotion of political civil society in the ENP towards Morocco, 2004-2010. Figure 9: ENPI, 2007-2010. Figure 10: ENPI funds to Morocco, subdivided in democracy regimes, 2007-2010. Figure 11: EIDHR subdivided in democracy regimes, 2005-2010. Figure 12: Comparison ENPI-EIDHR towards Morocco, 2007-2010. Figure 13: Promotion of electoral regime components in the ENP towards Morocco, 2004-2010. Figure 14: Promotion of political rights in the ENP towards Morocco, 2011-2013. Figure 15: Promotion of civil rights (1) in the ENP towards Morocco, 2011-2013. Figure 16: Promotion of civil rights (2) in the ENP towards Morocco, 2011-2013. Figure 17: Promotion of horizontal accountability in the ENP towards Morocco, 2011-2013. Figure 18: Promotion of the effective power to govern in the ENP towards Morocco,2011-2013. Figure 19: Promotion of stateness (1) in the ENP towards Morocco, 2011-2013. Figure 20: Promotion of stateness (2) in the ENP towards Morocco, 2011-2013. Figure 21: Promotion of political civil society in the ENP towards Morocco, 2011-2013. Figure 22: ENPI, 2011-2013. Figure 23: ENPI funds to Morocco, subdivided in democracy regimes, 2011-2013. IV TABLE OF CONTENTS Abstract ........................................................................................................................................................ II List of Abbreviations ................................................................................................................................... III List of Figures ............................................................................................................................................. IV Table of Contents ......................................................................................................................................... V 1. Introduction .............................................................................................................................................. 1 2. Democracy in the ENP before 2011 ......................................................................................................... 9 Substance of democracy promotion 2004-2010 ..................................................................................... 17 Financial resource allocation 2004-2010 ............................................................................................... 29 Conditionality 2004-2010 ...................................................................................................................... 34 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................. 39 3. The Lisbon Treaty, Arab Spring and the European Neighbourhood Policy ........................................... 42 Lisbon Treaty ......................................................................................................................................... 42 Arab Spring ............................................................................................................................................ 47 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................. 58 4. Democracy in the ENP since 2011 ......................................................................................................... 60 Substance of democracy promotion 2011-2013 ..................................................................................... 61 Financial resource allocation 2011-2013 ............................................................................................... 78 Conditionality 2011-2013 ...................................................................................................................... 80 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................. 87 5. Conclusion .............................................................................................................................................. 91 Bibliography ............................................................................................................................................... 95 V 1. INTRODUCTION The self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi in December 2010 triggered historic changes in the Southern Mediterranean. Long-established dictatorships were confronted with widespread anti-government uprisings. The sudden call for more inclusion in economic and political life, better governance and strengthened civil liberties challenged and in some cases overthrew Arab authoritarian regimes in a wave of popular protests. Although the uprisings occurred in the European Union’s (EU) backyard, the EU’s reaction has been heavily criticised for being too cautious, too slow and too weak. Preoccupied at the highest level with the Eurozone crisis, in the middle of establishing a new diplomatic service, influenced by the idea of Arab exceptionalism and with divergent positions among its member states, the Union’s initial response was indeed everything but proactive, coherent and effective. While the protests in Tunisia started on 17 December 2010, the first official reaction did not appear until 10 January 2011: High Representative Catherine Ashton and European Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Stefan Füle expressed their concern over the violence, called for restraint in the use of force and the release of detained activists while adding that cooperation with the Tunisian government would continue.1 A couple of days later, Ben Ali was ousted. Only after his departure, the EU expressed its ‘support and recognition to the Tunisian people and their democratic aspirations’.2 The European reaction to the events in Egypt and the uprisings elsewhere came faster, but could not hide the fact that long-standing alliances with Arab dictators were only switched after it became clear that the regimes would collapse.3 The very cautious EU reaction is surprising. External democracy promotion is a long- established component of the EU’s external action, anchored in the EU-treaties since the Treaty of Maastricht (1992). This has also influenced the agenda towards the so-called 1 European Commission, MEMO/11/12. Some EU member states even went further than that. France for example proposed to dispatch security forces to the Tunisian regime to ‘resolve the situation’ there. (Marshall, 2013). 2 European Union, A 016/11. 3 Biscop, 2011. 1 ‘Southern Mediterranean’. Relations
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