INDONESIA AND THE DUTCH

LESLIE H. PALMIER

Issued under the auspices of the Institute of Race Relations, London

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

LONDON NEW YORK KUALA LUMPUR

I962 122 INDONESIA AND THE DUTCH THE WESTERN NEW GUINEA DISPUTE 123 is not of an economy which offers possibilities of develop­ colonists or estates. But Europeans have failed to take ment. root in the territory, no doubt because of the poor It is true that in 1949 some people in the Netherlands prospects, both economic and political. Indeed, in 1957 entertained hopes of Western New Guinea producing and 1958 substantially more private persons had left than minerals: petroleum, nickel, cobalt, and bauxite were entered the area.1 The situation is perhaps best summar­ specifically mentioned. But 'although deposits of a large ized in the government budgets for the territory. They have number of minerals have been found, commercial exploita­ shown a deficit every year, amounting to as much as the tion seems possible only in a small number of cases. This, equivalent of over £8 million, or $22 million, which the however, does not apply to oil'.1 Certainly that commodity Netherlands has had to meet. In brief, economic reasons do has made up about four-fifths of the value of exports from not seem to explain the initial or continued retention of the territory. But by comparison with other sources, the Western New Guinea. quantity has been negligible, and in any case is now Pressure from certain political interests probably con­ declining. It amounted to only 2,600 barrels; Indonesia tributed more than did economic calculation to the produced 94,000, whilst Kuwait accounts for 400,000. The decision not to transfer the territory. On the one hand, the Netherlands New Guinea Oil Company from 1936 to 1955 political parties in the Netherlands based on specific invested about £4.0 million ($100 million), and recouped religions hoped that the continuance of Dutch government only about £10 million ($27 million). Petroleum produc­ would give their missionary activities greater scope. On the tion reached its peak in 1954 with 550,000 tons; it had fallen other, some politicians wanted to keep something of the to less than half, or 267,000 tons, by 1958. The Netherlands Dutch empire in the East, if only to give the Netherlands a New Guinea Oil Company announced in i960 that it right to a voice in the determination of world policy— would have to discharge up to 50 per cent of its employees much the same motive that has led the British and French 2 because of the diminishing profitability of its operations. Governments to develop nuclear weapons. The future promises no more than the past delivered. The political reasons that had led to the decision to No brighter is the outlook for the other products of the retain Western New Guinea kept the Netherlands there territory. The chief native export commodity has been when it became clear that the Eurasians did not want a copra; its potential production is estimated at 10,000 tons. home in the territory. New motives were produced, of But there are formidable obstacles in the way of achieving 'tutelage' for a backward people and the need to ensure this, in the shape of inaccessibility and shortage of man­ their right to 'self-determination'. These reasons were power. By 1957 exports of copra had reached only 5,000 absent when the original decision was taken, and they did tons; they had already attained 4,000 tons before the not prevent the Netherlands from including the primitive Second World War.3 Agricultural development generally people in Borneo in the Transfer of Sovereignty. depends on the introduction of the Papuan to Western Now, however, it is clear that the political calculations methods by the use of European intermediaries, either have gone awry. The Christian Missions have found that ' Handbook on Netherlands New Guinea 1958, p. 63. whatever advantages they gain by having Western New 2 Ibid., p. 67; J. M. van der Kroef, 'Dutch Opinion on the West Guinea under Dutch rule are outweighed by the embar­ New Guinea Problem', Australian Outlook, vol. 14, no. 3, Dec. i960, rassments the dispute causes them in Indonesia. And pp. 282, 288. 1 3 Ibid., p. 58. Van der Kroef, op. cit., p. 284, n. 41.