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IHS Jane's Terrorism Country Briefing IHS Jane’s Terrorism Country Briefing INDIA December 2012 ihs.com/janes A product of IHS Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Centre (JTIC) IHS Jane’s Terrorism Country Briefing – India December 2012 Executive Summary 3 Operational Tempo 3 Distribution of Attacks 3 Counter-terrorism Rating 4 1. Introduction 5 Country Summary 5 Physical Terrain 6 Human Terrain 8 Sub-State Threats 9 2. Quantitative Analysis 13 Operational Tempo 13 Operational Tactics 17 Operational Targeting 18 3. Qualitative Analysis 19 JTIC Brief: Indian Maoists kidnap Italian nationals 26 Hundreds of militants surrender weapons in northeast India 29 4. Principal Groups 32 Communist Party of India – Maoist (CPI-M) 32 Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT) 40 United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) 45 5. Counter-Terrorism Environment 51 Counter-Terrorism Campaign 51 Counter-Terrorism Environment Rating 52 Summary 52 6. Appendix: JTIC Country Briefing Methodology 56 Will Hartley [JTIC Editor] [email protected] Charles Lister [JTIC Analyst] [email protected] © 2012 IHS 2 ihs.com/janes IHS Jane’s Terrorism Country Briefing – India December 2012 Executive Summary Operational Tempo Non-militant casualty trend (1 December 2011 - 30 November 2012) 120 Attacks Fatalities 100 80 60 40 20 0 Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sept Oct Nov Over the 12 months between 1 December 2011 and 30 November 2012, Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Centre (JTIC) recorded a total of 967 damaging attacks in India, with damaging attacks classed as operations by sub-state armed actors which directly resulted in loss of life, damage, or disruption. These attacks represented a discernible 6.9% increase from the preceding 12 month period and equated to an average operational tempo of 80.6 attacks per month. December 2011 and January 2012 saw the highest level of militant violence recorded across the reporting period, which reflected a particularly intense level of operational activity by the Communist Party of India – Maoist (CPI-M) as well as by militants in the northeast state of Manipur. The majority of violence was characterised by small-unit guerrilla operations, typi- cally utilising small-arms and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). While February saw a substantial decrease in the number of recorded attacks, the summer and monsoon months – April to August – experienced a relatively constant tempo of sub- state violence, although there were no high-profile militant attacks. The reporting period also saw a significant 51% decrease in non-militant fatalities, compared to the previous 12 months period, which was perhaps somewhat a consequence of expanded anti-Maoist operations in key CPI-M operational areas, notably the so-called “Red Belt” states – Bihar, Chhat- tisgarh, Jharkhand, Odisha, and West Bengal. While violence remained steady in September and October, November saw the nationwide level of violence rise towards the level previously recorded in December 2011 and January 2012. Distribution of Attacks The majority of sub-state violence in the reporting period was recorded in the northeastern states of Manipur (202 attacks) and Assam (126 attacks), which together accounted for 33.9% of all attacks nationwide. While the states have traditionally seen high levels of tribal and separatist violence, the reporting period saw 59.2% more attacks than in the previous 12-month reporting period. In areas experiencing high levels of CPI-M violence, Jharkhand (96 attacks) and Odisha (91 attacks) were the most active. However, West Bengal – a long-time CPI-M heartland – saw only 10 attacks, a major 80.7% decrease. Substantial levels of violence were also recored in Jammu and Kashmir state (88 attacks), with much of this attributable to Islamist or separist militants. © 2012 IHS 3 ihs.com/janes IHS Jane’s Terrorism Country Briefing – India December 2012 Distribution of attacks by province (1 December - 30 November) 0 1-19 20-89 90+ Counter-terrorism Rating Security Environment 3.0 Police, Customs and Intelligence 2.5 Military and Paramilitary Forces 3.0 Judicial and Penal System 3.5 Political Environment 2.0 Government Legitimacy 2.0 Socioeconomic Conditions 2.0 International Co-operation 1.5 Physical Environment 2.0 Geography and Terrain 2.0 Natural Resource Control 3.0 Weapons Proliferation 2.0 The counter-terrorism environment in India is rated Lax (2.5) based on a weighted composite of the country’s ratings for Security Environment (military and law enforcement), Political Environment (government and society) and Physical Environ- ment (terrain and resources). A Lax environment is defined as one in which the environment slightly favours the sub-state actor. Terrorism campaigns may be sustainable indefinitely, and have a realistic prospect of achieving limited concessions. Insurgencies may be sustainable in the medium to long term, but are unlikely to be able to maintain anything other than temporary control over any territory, and pose only a moderate threat to the state. © 2012 IHS 4 ihs.com/janes IHS Jane’s Terrorism Country Briefing – India December 2012 1. Introduction Country Summary India, South Asia’s most powerful state, is the largest democracy in the world, with a rapidly expanding economy and a population expected to exceed China’s by 2050. The greatest danger facing the country in the long term is therefore resource scarcity. India already suffers from regular water shortages, and is heavily dependent on fossil fuels to drive its economic growth. This has placed it in direct competition with its neighbours and regional rivals, especially China. However, the coun- try’s most immediate external security threat is Pakistan, particularly with regard to the long-standing dispute over Kashmir. Internally, the divide between the rich and poor, and the impact of rapid modernisation, are key issues. Three quarters of India’s huge population are involved in agriculture, while the growing urban middle classes are estimated to number around 200 to 300 million. Disparities are also seen between states, with some embracing economic reform and taking full advan- tage of new markets, while others remain mired in bureaucratic inefficiency and corruption. Communal tensions are also a long-term issue and have repeatedly flared between the Hindu and Muslim communities. Maintaining the country’s unity amid these centrifugal problems will continue to be a challenge for the government for decades. Ethnic diversity, communalism (sectarianism), poverty, and income disparities have all created friction and conflict within the union. In addition to the ongoing troubles in Kashmir, the Communist Party of India – Maoist (CPI-M) insurgency remains prominent across eastern India, while a variety of secessionist or tribal groups have waged long-running insurgencies in the country’s comparatively deprived and isolated northeastern states. Tensions have also been exacerbated by the growing ability of Pakistani-based militant groups to operate not just in their traditional area of operations in Indian-administered Kashmir (IAK), but also in India’s heartland – most notably the November 2008 attack on Mumbai by Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT). Such operations have been accompanied by the training of indigenous militant Islamist groups, which have been involved in several operations in Indian cities in recent years, making domestic mili- tant Islamism an increasing priority for state security structures. While the threat posed by such groups remains substantial, no significant attack was carried out by such groups in India between December 2011 and November 2012. Flag of the Communist Party of India – Maoist (CPI-M). © 2012 IHS 5 ihs.com/janes IHS Jane’s Terrorism Country Briefing – India December 2012 Physical Terrain India is comprised of 3,287,590 sq km of territory, making it slightly more than one-third the size of the US and over thirteen times the size of the UK. Of this territory, 2,973,190 sq km is land, and 314,400 sq km is water. The country has 7,000 km of coastline and 14,103 km of land borders – the fourth longest land frontier in the world – with Myanmar (1,463 km), Bangladesh (4,053 km), Pakistan (2,912 km), China (3,380 km), Nepal (1,690 km), and Bhutan (605 km). The capital of India is New Delhi, located in the National Capital Territory in the northern centre of the country, with a popula- tion of 21.7 million. However, the commercial capital and largest single city is Mumbai, with a population of between 13 and 14 million. Population density averages 366.6 per sq km, and India’s predominantly agrarian society is reflected in the fact that only around 28% of the population live in urban areas, with this figure projected to rise to 33.5% by 2015. © 2012 IHS 6 ihs.com/janes IHS Jane’s Terrorism Country Briefing – India December 2012 The Ganges is the longest river in India and forms the Indo-Gangetic plain across most of northern, and eastern India, as well as parts of Pakistan and Bangladesh. The floodplains, flat and largely treeless, are densely populated and heavily farmed. Towards the south, the Deccan Plateau extends over eight Indian states, while the west of India is dominated by the Thar Desert – 800 km long and 400 km wide – characterised by sandy dunes and low, barren hills. Across India as a whole, forest covers around 677,010 sq km or 22.77% of total land area. Topographical map of India Due to the wide variety in terrain, India experiences a mixture of climatic conditions, including a monsoon season from June to October which impacts on the heavily agricultural nature of much of the economy. India has approximately 3,320,410 km of roadway – compared to 394,428 km in the UK – of which 48.3%, or 1,603,705 km, is paved. The country’s transport infrastructure relies heavily on an approximately 63,974 km long rail network, compared to 16,454 km in the UK.
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