IHS Jane's Terrorism Country Briefing

IHS Jane’s Terrorism Country Briefing INDIA

December 2012 ihs.com/janes

A product of IHS Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Centre (JTIC) IHS Jane’s Terrorism Country Briefing – India December 2012

Executive Summary 3 Operational Tempo 3 Distribution of Attacks 3 Counter-terrorism Rating 4

1. Introduction 5 Country Summary 5 Physical Terrain 6 Human Terrain 8 Sub-State Threats 9

2. Quantitative Analysis 13 Operational Tempo 13 Operational Tactics 17 Operational Targeting 18

3. Qualitative Analysis 19 JTIC Brief: Indian Maoists kidnap Italian nationals 26 Hundreds of militants surrender weapons in northeast India 29

4. Principal Groups 32 Communist Party of India – Maoist (CPI-M) 32 Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT) 40 United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) 45

5. Counter-Terrorism Environment 51 Counter-Terrorism Campaign 51 Counter-Terrorism Environment Rating 52 Summary 52

6. Appendix: JTIC Country Briefing Methodology 56

Will Hartley [JTIC Editor] [email protected]

Charles Lister [JTIC Analyst] [email protected]

Executive Summary Operational Tempo

Non-militant casualty trend (1 December 2011 - 30 November 2012)

120 Attacks Fatalities 100

0 Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sept Oct Nov

Over the 12 months between 1 December 2011 and 30 November 2012, Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Centre (JTIC) recorded a total of 967 damaging attacks in India, with damaging attacks classed as operations by sub-state armed actors which directly resulted in loss of life, damage, or disruption. These attacks represented a discernible 6.9% increase from the preceding 12 month period and equated to an average operational tempo of 80.6 attacks per month.

December 2011 and January 2012 saw the highest level of militant violence recorded across the reporting period, which reflected a particularly intense level of operational activity by the Communist Party of India – Maoist (CPI-M) as well as by militants in the northeast state of Manipur. The majority of violence was characterised by small-unit guerrilla operations, typically utilising small-arms and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). While February saw a substantial decrease in the number of recorded attacks, the summer and monsoon months – April to August – experienced a relatively constant tempo of sub- state violence, although there were no high-profile militant attacks. The reporting period also saw a significant 51% decrease in non-militant fatalities, compared to the previous 12 months period, which was perhaps somewhat a consequence of expanded anti-Maoist operations in key CPI-M operational areas, notably the so-called “Red Belt” states – Bihar, Chhat- tisgarh, Jharkhand, Odisha, and West Bengal. While violence remained steady in September and October, November saw the nationwide level of violence rise towards the level previously recorded in December 2011 and January 2012.

Distribution of Attacks

The majority of sub-state violence in the reporting period was recorded in the northeastern states of Manipur (202 attacks) and Assam (126 attacks), which together accounted for 33.9% of all attacks nationwide. While the states have traditionally seen high levels of tribal and separatist violence, the reporting period saw 59.2% more attacks than in the previous 12-month reporting period.

In areas experiencing high levels of CPI-M violence, Jharkhand (96 attacks) and Odisha (91 attacks) were the most active. However, West Bengal – a long-time CPI-M heartland – saw only 10 attacks, a major 80.7% decrease.

Substantial levels of violence were also recored in Jammu and Kashmir state (88 attacks), with much of this attributable to Islamist or separist militants.

Distribution of attacks by province (1 December - 30 November)

0 1-19 20-89 90+

Counter-terrorism Rating

Security Environment 3.0 Police, Customs and Intelligence 2.5 Military and Paramilitary Forces 3.0 Judicial and Penal System 3.5 Political Environment 2.0 Government Legitimacy 2.0 Socioeconomic Conditions 2.0 International Co-operation 1.5 Physical Environment 2.0 Geography and Terrain 2.0 Natural Resource Control 3.0 Weapons Proliferation 2.0

The counter-terrorism environment in India is rated Lax (2.5) based on a weighted composite of the country’s ratings for Security Environment (military and law enforcement), Political Environment (government and society) and Physical Environ- ment (terrain and resources).

A Lax environment is defined as one in which the environment slightly favours the sub-state actor. Terrorism campaigns may be sustainable indefinitely, and have a realistic prospect of achieving limited concessions. Insurgencies may be sustainable in the medium to long term, but are unlikely to be able to maintain anything other than temporary control over any territory, and pose only a moderate threat to the state.

1. Introduction Country Summary

India, South Asia’s most powerful state, is the largest democracy in the world, with a rapidly expanding economy and a population expected to exceed China’s by 2050. The greatest danger facing the country in the long term is therefore resource scarcity. India already suffers from regular water shortages, and is heavily dependent on fossil fuels to drive its economic growth. This has placed it in direct competition with its neighbours and regional rivals, especially China. However, the country’s most immediate external security threat is Pakistan, particularly with regard to the long-standing dispute over Kashmir.

Internally, the divide between the rich and poor, and the impact of rapid modernisation, are key issues. Three quarters of India’s huge population are involved in agriculture, while the growing urban middle classes are estimated to number around 200 to 300 million. Disparities are also seen between states, with some embracing economic reform and taking full advantage of new markets, while others remain mired in bureaucratic inefficiency and corruption. Communal tensions are also a long-term issue and have repeatedly flared between the Hindu and Muslim communities. Maintaining the country’s unity amid these centrifugal problems will continue to be a challenge for the government for decades.

Ethnic diversity, communalism (sectarianism), poverty, and income disparities have all created friction and conflict within the union. In addition to the ongoing troubles in Kashmir, the Communist Party of India – Maoist (CPI-M) insurgency remains prominent across eastern India, while a variety of secessionist or tribal groups have waged long-running insurgencies in the country’s comparatively deprived and isolated northeastern states.

Tensions have also been exacerbated by the growing ability of Pakistani-based militant groups to operate not just in their traditional area of operations in Indian-administered Kashmir (IAK), but also in India’s heartland – most notably the November 2008 attack on Mumbai by Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT). Such operations have been accompanied by the training of indigenous militant Islamist groups, which have been involved in several operations in Indian cities in recent years, making domestic militant Islamism an increasing priority for state security structures. While the threat posed by such groups remains substantial, no significant attack was carried out by such groups in India between December 2011 and November 2012.

Flag of the Communist Party of India – Maoist (CPI-M).

Physical Terrain

India is comprised of 3,287,590 sq km of territory, making it slightly more than one-third the size of the US and over thirteen times the size of the UK. Of this territory, 2,973,190 sq km is land, and 314,400 sq km is water. The country has 7,000 km of coastline and 14,103 km of land borders – the fourth longest land frontier in the world – with Myanmar (1,463 km), Bangladesh (4,053 km), Pakistan (2,912 km), China (3,380 km), Nepal (1,690 km), and Bhutan (605 km).

The capital of India is New Delhi, located in the National Capital Territory in the northern centre of the country, with a population of 21.7 million. However, the commercial capital and largest single city is Mumbai, with a population of between 13 and 14 million. Population density averages 366.6 per sq km, and India’s predominantly agrarian society is reflected in the fact that only around 28% of the population live in urban areas, with this figure projected to rise to 33.5% by 2015.

The Ganges is the longest river in India and forms the Indo-Gangetic plain across most of northern, and eastern India, as well as parts of Pakistan and Bangladesh. The floodplains, flat and largely treeless, are densely populated and heavily farmed.

Towards the south, the Deccan Plateau extends over eight Indian states, while the west of India is dominated by the Thar Desert – 800 km long and 400 km wide – characterised by sandy dunes and low, barren hills. Across India as a whole, forest covers around 677,010 sq km or 22.77% of total land area.

Topographical map of India

Due to the wide variety in terrain, India experiences a mixture of climatic conditions, including a monsoon season from June to October which impacts on the heavily agricultural nature of much of the economy.

India has approximately 3,320,410 km of roadway – compared to 394,428 km in the UK – of which 48.3%, or 1,603,705 km, is paved. The country’s transport infrastructure relies heavily on an approximately 63,974 km long rail network, compared to 16,454 km in the UK. In addition, India has a total of 352 airports – compared to 505 in the UK – of which 251 possess paved runways.

Human Terrain

India is the second most populated country in the world and it is estimated by the UN that India will become the world’s most populous country by 2050. In 2012 the population was estimated to be 1,205,073,612 with the growth rate estimated at 1.31%. Rapid population growth has resulted in a disproportionately large number of young people – 29.3% of the population are under 14 years old, and the median age is only 26.5 years. Infant mortality averages 46.07 deaths per 1,000 live births, while life expectancy at birth averages 67.1 years.

Approximately 72% of India’s population are of Indo-Aryan origin, 25% are of Dravidian origin, and the remaining 3% are divided between smaller ethnic groups. These different identities manifest themselves mainly through language: Indo-Aryan- rooted languages (in particular Hindi) are prevalent in the north of India, while languages that are members of the Dravidian family, such as Tamil (Tamil Nadu), Telugu (Andhra Pradesh), Kannada (Karnataka), and Malayalam (Kerala) are found in the south.

Approximately 80% of the population is Hindu, and each Hindu belongs to a caste or sub-caste which determines their level of society, the type of people they can marry, and often the type of work they undertake. This cannot be changed through the generations, although caste-restrictions are beginning to blur in day-to-day life in urban centres.

India’s almost 140 million Muslims represent the largest Muslim community outside of Indonesia and its size rivals that of Pakistan. According to the 2001 census, the largest Muslim populations were found in Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal, and Bihar, although by percentage of population the most Muslim states were Jammu and Kashmir and Assam. Approximately 80% of Muslims in India are Sunnis.

In total 1,652 languages/dialects are spoken in India. Hindi is the official language of government, although English is still used widely. There are 15 other official languages, the most widely spoken of which are Bengali, Telugu, Marathi, Tamil, Urdu, Gujarati, and Punjabi.

The Indian labour force comprised approximately 487,600,000 workers in 2011. Approximately 52% of workers are engaged in agriculture, 14% in industry, and 34% in services. Around 29.8% of the population subsist below the poverty line, and vertical inequality (between rich and poor) is severe, with the richest 10% accounting for 31.1% of the country’s wealth. A significant amount of economic activity occurs in the informal sector, with the World Bank estimating that the shadow economy accounts for 23.1% of the whole Indian economy.

Sub-State Threats

Maoist Insurgency

Since the formation of the Communist Party of India – Maoist (CPI-M) in 2004, the Maoist insurgents have steadily expanded their areas of operation and their military capability to the extent that in 2007, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh described the Maoists as the “single biggest internal security challenge facing India”. Since then the threat posed by the Maoists has only increased, with numerous high profile attacks, leaving an increasing number of security force personnel and government officials dead.

The CPI-M is the largest group of a wider Maoist insurgency known as the Naxalite movement. The Indian government claimed in December 2009 that the CPI-M has a presence in approximately 223 districts across 20 of India’s 28 states, exerting varying degrees of influence in these areas. The state of West Bengal has traditionally been the worst affected, particularly the district of West Midnapore, although the group’s senior commander in this area, Koteshwar Rao alias Kishenji, was killed in late November 2011.

Communist Party of India – Maoist (CPI-M) militants shout pro-communism slogans in Chhattisgarh in April 2007. (PA Photos 4668370) Faced with increasingly well-equipped Maoists carrying out larger-scale and better co-ordinated attacks, the central and state governments have so far failed to effectively co-ordinate their respective counter-insurgency strategies, despite the recognition of the substantial threat posed by the CPI-M. As such, there has been no cohesive national response to the violence, and moreover, the affected states have adopted their own, largely military-oriented, responses to the violence with very mixed results – in some cases being accused of exacerbating the problem. While this changed somewhat with the launching of a series of co-ordinated counter-insurgency offensives throughout eastern India in late 2009, significant challenges remain.

While CPI-M violence has reduced somewhat through 2012, following sizeable peaks in the group’s operational tempo in 2010 and 2011, it remains unclear whether this decrease is a consequence of security force operations against the group or if it is an indication that its rural, forested, areas of operational control are being less contested by the state.

Kashmiri Militancy

Indian-administered Kashmir (IAK), in the state of Jammu and Kashmir, has suffered from a militant Islamist insurgency since 1989. Militant activity started in the Kashmir Valley and spread to Jammu during the 1990s, with a variety of Pakistani-based groups playing an increasing role. However, violence in the contested territory has declined since 2003, when India and Pakistan entered into an ongoing peace process and agreed to a ceasefire along the Line of Control (LoC). There has been a reduction in cross-border infiltration and militant activity, but there are still sporadic upswings in unrest, and violence remains a near-daily occurrence. Despite this decline, there seems little prospect of a permanent ceasefire given the proliferation of small-arms and light weapons in the region, and ongoing low-level insurgencies by a variety of groups, including the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT) and the Kashmiri Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM).

Furthermore, Kashmiri militant groups have successfully expanded their campaign beyond the immediate region. In Decem- ber 2001, a largely unsuccessful attack on the New Delhi parliament, carried out by Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) and the LeT, was an audacious demonstration of the militants’ demands for secession. Subsequently, the LeT allegedly detonated two bombs in Mumbai in August 2003 killing 55 people, while an attack on the disputed former site of the Babri Masjid – and current site of the makeshift Ram Janmabhoomi (‘birthplace of Rama’) temple – in Ayodhya, Uttar Pradesh in July 2005 was also blamed on the LeT.

Later, three near-simultaneous bombings in New Delhi in October 2005 killed 62 people, with LeT militants again believed by the authorities to be responsible. The group was also blamed for the December 2005 attack on the Indian Institute of Sci- ence in Bangalore, killing one person and injuring three others. This attack suggested a shift towards targets associated with India’s burgeoning hi-tech economic sectors. In September 2006, Indian police announced that they had proof of the LeT’s involvement in the bomb attacks on Mumbai’s commuter trains in July 2006, which killed at least 183 people. However, the most notable attack attributed to the LeT came in November 2008, when a team of 10 militants assaulted multiple targets in Mumbai, killing at least 172 people.

LeT militant during Mumbai assault, November 2008. (PA 1336279)

Domestic Militant Islamists

Alongside militant Islamism in Kashmir, a number of bomb attacks in India’s mainland urban centres have been attributed to domestic Indian militant Islamist groups, most notably the Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) which has been implicated in a number of attacks carried out with the LeT.

A series of high-profile bomb attacks carried out across India’s urban centres – including Jaipur, Ahmedabad, and New Delhi – in 2008 left over 150 people dead. The attacks were claimed by a group identifying itself as the Indian Mujahideen, and appeared to highlight a growing nexus between domestic Indian militant Islamist organisations and better established, externally-based militant Islamist groups operating in the country, particularly the LeT and Harakat-ul-Jihad-ul-Islami (HUJI). The Indian government has alleged that the Indian Mujahideen is an amalgam of SIMI, LeT, and HUJI militants, with the Pakistani-based groups providing operational experience and expertise for the attacks and indigenous SIMI militants providing personnel and logistics. While it remains unclear whether the LeT received similar operational assistance from indigenous associates in its planning and execution of the Mumbai assault in November 2008, the incident highlighted the blurred line between domestic and foreign militant Islamism in India.

A soldier outside the burning Taj Mahal hotel during the November 2008 Mumbai assault. (PA 6603750) The full extent of the role played by SIMI in these operations is uncertain and, as such, it remains unknown to what extent the group – and the wider domestic militant Islamist movement in India – can be considered a distinct phenomenon from the threat represented by the Pakistani LeT and HUJI, or simply a different manifestation of it.

In the aftermath of the attacks on Mumbai, however, the Indian government launched a concerted series of counter-terrorism operations across the country and a large number of suspected SIMI militants – including the alleged leader – were detained. Throughout 2009 there were no further such high-profile urban bombing operations, leading security officials to claim that SIMI had effectively been degraded and no longer posed a threat. However, in February 2010 a bomb attack in Pune, Ma- harashtra, killed 13 civilians. While authorities linked the attack to the Indian Mujahideen, Al-Qaeda claimed the attack had been carried out by members of the subsidiary group Al-Qaeda in Kashmir (AQK), although the credibility of the claim was questionable and could not be independently verified.

The attack was followed in July 2011 by a triple bomb attack in Mumbai which left at least 26 people dead. Local authorities and media speculated that Indian Mujahideen and SIMI elements were responsible for the attack. While these claims could not be independently verified, the attack highlighted the ongoing, if sporadic, threat posed by militant Islamists in mainland India. There was however, a notable absence of such attacks across 2012.

Northeastern Separatism

There is a complex pattern of terrorist and insurgent violence in the seven states that constitute India’s northeast. The region itself is a product of partition in 1947, and before this time there was little concept of a separate northeast, with almost all of the provinces and regions looking to the adjoining parts of Myanmar and eastern Bengal (now Bangladesh) for trade links, economic ties, and cultural bonds. Moreover, the areas that now constitute the northeast had enjoyed a large degree of independence under British rule. Many of the ethnic groups of the area expected to be granted independence once the British left.

At the end of 2004, a large-scale development package was unveiled for Assam and Manipur, with the authorities evidently seeking not only to improve the development of the region, but undermine the insurgencies using greater economic opportunities. This policy has been maintained, and in March 2005 a USD7.5 billion highways construction package was approved for the northeast. However, traditionally insurgents have targeted infrastructure and, as such, these projects only serve to encourage attacks as militants seek to undo the authorities’ initiatives.

Most of the insurgencies have in some part been sustained because of their participants’ ability to seek refuge in the neighbouring countries of Bangladesh, Myanmar, and Bhutan, and because of the militant groups’ logistical and training links with other regional militant groups. Although Indian pressure has led to countries such as Bangladesh, Myanmar, and Bhutan clamping down on these groups, external staging areas remain a key element in the insurgencies.

Among an increasing number of northeastern separatist groups, the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) is the most well-known. ULFA seeks independence for the state of Assam and the significance of the threat posed by the group was underlined in a series of high-profile bomb attacks in the state throughout 2008-09. While much of its senior leadership has been arrested, one of two founding members, Rajiv Rajkonwar alias Arabinda Rajkhowa, was released on bail in January 2011 and has expressed interest in peace talks with the central government. Meanwhile, senior commander Paresh Baruah leads the so-called anti-talks faction of ULFA, which has continued to carry out sporadic and low-level attacks throughout 2012. While attacks by the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) reduced in 2012 when compared to previous years, the National Socialist Council of Nagaland – Isak Muivah (NSCN-IM) maintained a steady tempo of low-level attacks through late 2011 and 2012.

A wounded man is removed from a blast site in Guwahati, the capital of Assam state, following a series of at least 10 explosions which killed 81 people and wounded more than 300 others on 30 October 2008. (PA Photos 6500613)

2. Quantitative Analysis Operational Tempo

Over the 12 months between 1 December 2011 and 30 November 2012, IHS Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Centre (JTIC) recorded a total of 967 damaging attacks in India, with damaging attacks classed as operations by sub-state armed actors which directly resulted in loss of life, damage, or disruption. These attacks represented a slight 6.9% increase from the preceding 12 month period and equated to an average operational tempo of 80.6 attacks per month.

Damaging attack trend (1 December 2011 - 30 November 2012)

120 Attacks 100

0 Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sept Oct Nov

The highest level of sub-state violence in the reporting period was recorded in the opening months of December 2011 and January 2012, with 107 and 114 attacks respectively. In addition, there was noticeably more violence in this two-month period than in the same months in the preceding 12 month period, which saw only 139 attacks in total. The high level of violence in these months was largely attributable to the Communist Party of India – Maoist (CPI-M), which carried out at least 99 recorded attacks, largely across the so-called “Red Belt” states – Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Odisha, and West Bengal.

The two most notable attacks in December and January were both carried out by the CPI-M. Firstly, an improvised explosive device (IED) and small-arms ambush was launched targeting the convoy of parliamentarian Inder Singh Namdhari in the Latehar district of Jharkhand on 3 December. While Namdhari was unhurt in the attack, eight police officers and two civilians were killed. Seven weeks later, on 21 January, the group killed 13 police officers in a remote-controlled improvised explosive device (RCIED) attack in Jharkhand. As part of the attack, the militants kidnapped four people, including a district council chief and a member of the Communist Party of India – Marxist-Leninist (CPI-ML). Although all four hostages had been released by 3 February, the kidnapping was an attempt by the CPI-M to force provincial security forces to cease anti-militant operations.

In addition, December and January saw substantial sub-state violence in the northeast state of Manipur, although the 77 attacks recorded were largely low-level and caused few casualties.

In comparison to the opening months of the reporting period, February saw a dramatic decrease in violence, with only 57 attacks recorded by JTIC. While the CPI-M accounted for almost half of these attacks, the Garo National Liberation Army (GNLA) notably carried out seven attacks in Meghalaya state.

A more significant attack occurred on 13 February though, when the wife of Israel’s defence attaché to India was wounded, along with her driver, in the detonation of an IED attached to her vehicle in New Delhi. The attack came on the same day as the defusing of an IED attached to the vehicle of an employee of the Israeli embassy in the Georgian capital Tblisi. Israel blamed the two incidents on Iran and Hizbullah, although this could not be independently verified.

The aftermath of an improvised explosive device (IED) attack targeting the vehicle of the wife of the Israeli defence attaché in the Indian capital New Delhi on 13 February 2012. The official’s wife and her driver were both wounded. (PA 1450401)

Violence rose once more into March, with a total of 90 attacks recorded. The most notable incident was an IED attack by CPI-M militants in the Gadchiroli district of Maharashtra state on 27 March, which killed 16 police officers.

Over the following summer and monsoon months – encompassing April, May, June, July, and August – the level of recorded violence remained largely steady, with the total of 382 attacks recorded equating to a monthly average of 76.4 attacks. This was largely equivalent to the same months in the preceding 12 month period, when 391 attacks were recorded.

While the level of violence in the northeastern states of Manipur and Assam remained substantial, with 63 and 51 attacks respectively across the five month period, the level of Maoist violence in the Red Belt states – incorporating both the CPI-M and splinter groups such as the People’s Liberation Front of India (PLFI) – fell by almost a third in comparison to the same months in the previous 12 month period. This was potentially somewhat attributable to a reported escalation in counter-terrorism operations targeting Maoist insurgents in the key states of Bihar, Jharkhand, and Chhattisgarh in the five-month period. One particular operation in the Bastar district of Chhattisgarh on 29 June left at least 18 suspected CPI-M militants dead.

What was most noteworthy across this five-month period, though, was the significant decrease in non-militant fatalities, with the 176 recorded deaths less than half the 362 recorded in the same five months of the preceding 12 month period. There were several potential reasons for this notable decrease. Firstly, while violence remained high in the northeast, such attacks largely caused only moderate casualties at best, whereas CPI-M operations – which typically cause the most casualties nationwide – decreased noticeably. In addition, there was a notable absence of mass-casualty operations by Islamist militants in India’s urban centres.

The level of recorded violence decreased slightly across September and October, with no significant instances of sub-state violence, although November saw violence rise once more towards the level recorded at the beginning of the reporting period. Once more there was a substantial level of violence in the northeast, particularly in Manipur (12 attacks) and Assam (17 attacks), as well as an escalation in CPI-M operations.

Non-militant casualty trend (1 December 2011 - 30 November 2012)

120 Attacks Fatalities 100

0 Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sept Oct Nov

During the reporting period, JTIC recorded a total of 447 non-militant fatalities – equating to a monthly average of 37.3 fatalities – and 778 non-militant wounded. This represented a 27.7% decrease from the number of non-militant fatalities recorded in the preceding 12 months. Non-militant fatalities include all security forces and civilians killed or wounded, whether by militants or as collateral damage in counter-terrorism actions or inter-factional fighting.

The deadliest single month in the reporting period was January 2012, with 56 non-militant fatalities and 64 non-militant wounded. January also saw the highest number of recorded attacks in the reporting period and there were several instances of low-level militant violence resulting in the killing or wounding of security force personnel. In addition, 13 police officers were killed when CPI-M militants detonated a remote-controlled improvised explosive device (RCIED) targeting their vehicle in Jharkhand state on 21 January.

Distribution of attacks by province (1 December - 30 November) 0 1-19 20-89 90+ Number Province Attacks

5 1 Manipur 202 2 Assam 126 3 Jharkhand 96

15 4 Odisha 91 18 5 Jammu and Kashmir 88 2 11 6 Meghalaya 81 8 6 1 7 Chhattisgarh 76

3 13 17 8 Bihar 70 14 12 7 9 Maharashtra 58 4 10 Andhra Pradesh 34 9 11 Nagaland 16 12 West Bengal 10 10 13 Tripura 5

16 14 Madhya Pradesh 3 15 Haryana 3

20 16 Karnataka 2 19 17 Mizoram 2 18 Arunachal Pradesh 1 19 Kerala 1 20 Tamil Nadu 1

The majority of sub-state violence in the reporting period was recorded in the northeast states of Manipur (202 attacks) and Assam (126 attacks), which between them accounted for 33.9% of all attacks nationwide. While both states experienced notable increases in violence from the preceding 12 month period, there was also a notable proportional increase, indicating that the increase was likely a consequence of local factors, rather than a reduction in the overall level of violence nationwide. Both states have traditionally been home to ethnic and separatist militant groups whose attacks remain relatively minor – in terms of scale or casualties – when compared to other insurgent theatres in India, but which can retain high levels of violent activity.

While the overall level of violence increased slightly nationwide, the third most violent state – Jharkhand (96 attacks) – actually declined by 19.3% when compared to the previous 12 month period. The state is part of the so-called “Red Belt” states – comprising Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Odisha, and West Bengal – where Maoist insurgent violence, especially by the Communist Party of India - Maoist (CPI-M), is predominant.

The state of Jammu and Kashmir (88 attacks) saw a notable 30.2% decrease in attacks from the preceding 12 month period, a key indicator of the diminishing tempo of operations by separatist and militant Islamist groups in the disputed region.

Meanwhile, the state of Meghalaya (81 attacks) saw a major 211.5% increase in the level of violence, which was largely attributable to a significant expansion of operations by the Garo National Liberation Army (GNLA), as well as ongoing CPI-M violence.

Operational Tactics

Principal Tactics 2011-12 Ambush

The most commonly utilised tactic by insurgents in India between 1 December 2011 and 30 November 2012 was ambush, with the tactic used on 421 separate occasions, accounting for 39.2% of all tactics employed. This represented a notable 26.3% decrease from the 571 instances of the tactic’s use in the preceding 12 months, as well as a proportional decrease from 46.2% of all tactics employed, likely indicating that the falling incidence was both a consequence of the overall decrease in sub-state violence and a shift in tactical preference, towards the increased use of explosive devices.

The predominant use of ambush tactics was largely indicative of the fact that guerrilla operations – typically characterised by small-arms attacks – remained the key operational method across the various insurgencies in India, including the Communist Party of India – Maoist (CPI-M), Kashmiri insurgents, and ethnic and Ambush 421 39% separatist groups in the northeast. Explosive Device 251 24% Hostage 142 13% While such operations largely caused only moderate casualties, there were sev- Assassination 89 8% Fire Attack 87 8% eral notable attacks using ambush tactics: Assault 65 6% Stand-Off Weapons 18 2% • At least five ethnic Bodo civilians were killed in an attack by unidentified militants outside a relief camp in the Chirang district of Assam state on 25 August.

• Six soldiers and a civilian were killed when suspected CPI-M militants ambushed their vehicle in the Dantewada district of Chhattisgarh state on 13 May.

• Five people were shot dead when a suspected National Socialist Council of Nagaland – Isak Muivah (NSCN-IM) militant attacked a local polling station in the Chandel district of Manipur state on 28 January.

Explosive Device

The second most commonly employed tactic by insurgents was explosive device, with the tactic used on 251 separate occasions, accounting for 23.4% of all tactics employed. This represented a substantial 39.4% increase from the 180 instances of the tactic’s use in the preceding 12 months, and a notable proportional increase from 14.6% of all tactics employed.

The use of explosive devices by militants in India varied between the different insurgent theatres in the country. Maoist insurgents often utlised improvised explosive devices (IEDs) both in stand-alone operations and in conjunction with small-arms ambushes, and exploited the rural and forested nature of their key areas of operation to emplace IEDs on strategic roads in order to target military and police convoys. Conversely, in Jammu and Kashmir the use of explosive devices was largely in the form of grenade attacks on fixed positions and on security force patrols.

• Sixteen police officers were killed in an IED attack by CPI-M militants in the Gadchiroli district of Maharashtra state on 27 March.

• Thirteen police officers were killed in a remote-controlled improvised explosive device (RCIED) attack by CPI-M militants in Jharkhand state on 21 January.

• Eight police officers and two civilians were killed when CPI-M militants carried out an IED and small-arms ambush on the convoy of a parliamentarian in the Latehar district of Jharkhand state on 3 December.

Operational Targeting

Between 1 December 2011 and 30 November 2012, insurgents attacked a variety of target sectors in India.

Principal Targets 2011-12 Other and Residential

The most common target of insurgent violence during the reporting period was “other and residential”, a classification used by JTIC to denote seemingly indis- criminate attacks where the nature of the target was either not apparent – typically involving attacks on random civilian targets – or attacks in which the civilian population was deliberately targeted. Two hundred and ninety-nine such attacks on this sector were recorded across the reporting period, accounting for 29.1% of all sectors targeted. This represented a notable 11.8% decrease from the 339 attacks on the sector recorded in the preceding 12 months, as well as a proportional decrease from 34.7% of all sectors targeted.

A sizeable number of attacks targeting this sector were accounted for by militants deliberately targeting the civilian population. In particular, the Communist Party of Other and Residential 299 29% Law Enforcement 159 15% India - Maoist (CPI-M) routinely targeted civilians in its areas of operation, often on Government and Diplomatic 143 14% suspicion that their allegiance lay with the government or local law enforcement Industrial and Energy 129 13% personnel. Military 114 11% Infrastructure and Transport 76 7% Retail and Commercial 63 6% There were also incidences of civilians inadvertently becoming the target of at- NGO and Education 26 3% tacks, typically with civilian vehicles striking explosive devices emplaced by the Other 13 1% CPI-M, likely with the intention of targeting security force vehicles. Religious 5 1% In India’s northeast, attacks on the sector were largely as a result of militant extortion. Nonetheless, there were several instances of civilians being targeted deliberately for reprisal or punishment. A notable example was the killing of five civilians at a local electoral station in Manipur state on 28 January by a suspected National Socialist Council of Nagaland – Isak Muivah (NSCN-IM) militant.

Law Enforcement

The second most common target of insurgent operations during the reporting period was law enforcement personnel and facilities, with the 159 attacks on the sector accounting for 15.5% of all sectors targeted. This represented a 7.4% increase from the 148 attacks on the sector recorded in the preceding 12 months, and a slight proportional increase from 15.2% of all sectors targeted.

The high number of attacks on the sector across India illustrated the fact that law enforcement personnel remain the primary arm of counter-insurgency operations in the country, particularly in operations against the CPI-M. As such, law enforcement personnel represent a more accessible target. While military units were involved in operations against Kashmiri militants and against ethnic or separatist militants in the northeast, the comparatively poorer armed and trained police remained a more attractive target for militants.

3. Qualitative Analysis

The following is a selection of recent IHS Jane’s analysis covering sub-state violence in India:

Fighting for the forest

10 April 2012

Key Points:

• Although several Communist Party of India - Maoist (CPI-M) leaders have recently been killed or captured and CPI-M attacks fell in 2011, the Maoists continue to enjoy significant support from impoverished tribal populations in India’s undeveloped forest heartland.

• Attempts by security forces to achieve area domination of the forests in which the Maoists operate have failed, and there are increasing moves towards development-based initiatives.

• However, there are concerns that such development programmes may ultimately be intended to open up the mineral-rich forests for mining operations, risking further alienating local tribes.

India is re-assessing its military strategy for dealing with the Maoist insurgency that operates in the mineral-rich forests of India’s heartland. Eric Randolph investigates.

The kidnapping of two Italian tourists and a local state assembly member by the Communist Party of India - Maoist (CPI-M) in two separate attacks in March brought renewed attention to the group’s campaign. However, the incidents are not reflective of broader trends in India’s Maoist insurgency, which has seen a notable decline in violence over the past year.

Nevertheless, while Indian security forces have successfully targeted the group’s leadership several times in recent months, forcing the CPI-M into a tactical retreat, there is no indication that the government will be able to translate these operational successes into sustained security gains.

Although there is increasing recognition of the need to complement military operations with programmes addressing the underlying socioeconomic grievances that the Maoists exploit, an ill-considered government-run development strategy offers little prospect of achieving this, and may even exacerbate the situation.

Maoist setbacks

The reduction in CPI-M operations recorded by Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Centre (JTIC) in 2011 reflected the group’s need to consolidate its position after a series of successful security operations targeting its senior leaders. Nine of the 16 members of the Polit Buro (PB), the CPI-M’s highest decision-making body, appointed in 2007 have since been killed or captured, while only 20 of the 39-member Central Committee (which includes the PB) from 2007 remain active.

Over the past year, security forces have had particular success in the state of West Bengal. On 24 November 2011, Mallojula Koteshwar Rao (alias Kishenji), the CPI-M’s third-in-command, was shot dead in the forests around the town of Burishol, approximately 150 km west of the state capital of Kolkata. As one of the group’s leading military strategists, with more than 30 years experience in the movement, Kishenji had been key to the Maoist resurgence in West Bengal over the past decade.

The corpse of senior Communist Party of India - Maoist (CPI-M) commander Mallojula Koteswara Rao (alias Kishenji), who was killed by Indian police during a counter-terrorism operation in the West Midnapore district of West Bengal state on 24 November 2011. (PA 1339479)

Meanwhile, Indian security sources have told IHS Jane’s that the killing in March 2011 of Sasadhar Mahato, a local commander in the Jangalmahal region of West Bengal, was conceivably an even greater setback for the CPI-M. Sasadhar was accused of spearheading a campaign of assassinations, including a failed attempt on the life of then chief minister Buddhadeb Bhattacharjee in November 2008. Bhattacharjee’s Left Front administration claimed that more than 250 of its staff and supporters had been killed by the Maoists between 2008 and 2011, before its loss of control over the state to the Trinamool Congress party.

Most recently, in March 2012 police arrested four individuals in Kolkata, including Sadanala Ramakrishna, an alleged CPI-M Central Committee member whom police claim was head of the group’s Technical Research and Arms Manufacturing Divi- sion. Five more people were arrested in a simultaneous raid in Mumbai - including Dipak Kumar, who was allegedly being trained to succeed Ramakrishna - and a total of INR9.6 million (USD188,735) in cash was seized. Former home secretary GK Pillai, who remains closely involved in the central government’s anti-Maoist campaign, told IHS Jane’s the arrests “would set the movement back five years. There is no one who can fulfil the technical role these individuals played”.

War among the people

Over the past 30 years, the CPI-M has entrenched itself in tribal areas of the country, in forests that stretch across the eastern and central states of Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Bihar, Odisha, West Bengal and parts of Maharashtra. It exploits the fact that the tribal populations inhabiting this region - which number around 70 million - represent by far the most neglected and undeveloped stratum of Indian society. The most recent census data available, from 2001, recorded a literacy rate of only 34.8%, and almost half those in rural areas live below the official poverty line.

CPI-M attacks and principal areas of operation in India (PA 1355887) Recent counter-insurgency successes have not been the product of any changes in this underlying situation, but rather the result of an increased focus on intelligence-led operations targeting specific individuals within the CPI-M. A confidential report from the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), shown to IHS Jane’s, reveals Kishenji’s killing was the culmination of a two-year effort by police and paramilitaries in West Bengal.

Nevertheless, the CRPF report acknowledged that the difficulty of “befriending the public” within an atmosphere of “complete alienation, distrust and animosity” was hampering its counter-insurgency operations. In an attempt to improve relations with the local populations, the CRPF has introduced initiatives such as setting up football training camps, distributing food for children and building schools sited in CRPF camps. The report also revealed that the CRPF, currently the primary force engaged in anti-Maoist operations, had become acutely conscious of allegations of human rights abuses. Although the report

dismissed most such allegations as “unfair and biased”, there is growing recognition that operations need to be perceived as ‘clean’ by the public.

This follows a disastrous counter-insurgency campaign implemented between 2005 and 2011 in Chhattisgarh state, the primary stronghold of the CPI-M. Local power-brokers in Maoist areas - a mix of politicians, police, business leaders and organised crime - created and armed a vigilante anti-Maoist force known as the Salwa Judum (variously translated from the local Gond language as either ‘peace march’ or ‘purification hunt’). With the alleged support of the state police, it carried out a brutal programme of forced evictions, amid widespread allegations of extra-judicial killings and rapes of suspected Maoist sympathisers. According to Chhattisgarh state government, an estimated 50,000 people were relocated to ‘relief camps’, while an estimated 30,000 fled across the border into the state of Andhra Pradesh, where many remain in squalid refugee camps.

Salwa Judum militiamen in the Dantewada district of Chhattisgarh state in November 2009. (PA 1458512) However, amid mounting public anger, in July 2011, the Supreme Court in New Delhi ruled against the state of Chhattisgarh, which had consistently denied its role in supporting the Salwa Judum, and banned the use of vigilante forces and ‘special police officers’ - a quasi-official title given to Salwa Judum members placed on the police payroll.

Development strategy

Concerns over human rights violations coincided with a realisation that the government’s existing strategy of large-scale, area-domination exercises was proving wholly ineffective. From late 2009, around 50,000 additional paramilitary forces had been deployed into Maoist-affected districts, but with extremely limited ground-level intelligence, minimal counter-insurgency training and resources, and no clearly defined strategy, they experienced a series of devastating losses. Most notably, on 6 April 2010, 76 CRPF officers were killed in a CPI-M ambush in the heavily forested Dantewada district of Chhattisgarh.

Although some area-domination exercises continue, they are more tightly controlled. Most recently, in early March 2012 3,000 to 4,000 paramilitary forces were sent into the dense forests of Abujhmad in Chhattisgarh. CRPF sources told IHS Jane’s that the operation was designed as a show of force, while avoiding any aggression that might further alienate the public. However, it appears to have achieved little beyond a handful of arrests and the distribution of some medical supplies and clothing to villagers.

Meanwhile, the government has increasingly couched its counter-insurgency strategy in the language of development. Under a new Integrated Action Plan, the central government sanctioned INR19.5 billion (USD384 million) in 2010-11 and INR23.4 billion (USD460 million) in 2011-12 for the 78 most Maoist-affected districts, to be spent on initiatives such as road-building, irrigation, schools, and electrification.

However, similar rhetoric and initiatives have been put forward many times in the past, with few tangible results. As Ajai Sahni, of the non-governmental organisation Institute for Conflict Resolution in New Delhi, wrote in April 2010: “The state’s absolute capacities to deliver an acceptable level of development to populations in the principal ‘problem areas’ are themselves limited by demographics, the available natural, financial and human resource base, and structural infirmities.”

Saranda forest

The latest showcase for the government’s attempt to combine security and development is the Saranda forest on the Jharkhand-Odisha border, a hilly region covering 85,500 hectares of dense forest from which the Maoists run their Eastern Regional Bureau. In July 2011, security forces launched Operation Monsoon, a month-long offensive involving more than 60 companies of CRPF forces and Jharkhand police. It led to the arrest of just 33 CPI-M militants, suggesting that insurgents were able to retreat deeper into the forest, across the porous borders into neighbouring states, or to conceal themselves among the local population.

This was followed by attempts to improve governance in the region under the Saranda Action Plan - later renamed the Sa- randa Development Plan - for which INR2.5 billion (USD49 million) has been allocated by the central government. However, a visit by IHS Jane’s to the Saranda forest in March 2012 demonstrated the enormity of the task supposedly being undertaken.

Most of the villages visited had never been surveyed, meaning residents had neither voting rights nor ration cards. Almost every child exhibited signs of severe malnutrition; schools and health centres were several hours away, along narrow forest footpaths; and families survived on subsistence agriculture with few prospects of formal employment. There were some signs of improvement, such as the recent distribution of job cards - part of the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme, which promises a minimum of 100 days work to every resident - although villagers were unclear how to claim these benefits.

Local villagers in Uttar Pradesh state employed under the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS) in June 2009. (PA 1458511)

While anecdotal, such evidence suggests that even if an unprecedented level of development took place in this region it would probably be years, even decades before the environment no longer heavily favoured the Maoists. Meanwhile, the government has shown little sign that it is willing to match the influx of funds with the ‘civilian surge’ of competent administra- tors that would be required to properly implement such a major development programme. One government official, speaking on condition of anonymity, told IHS Jane’s that he was the only official in his area who was willing to travel in the forests and work with local populations. Without improved ground-level administration, critics warn that most development funds will disappear through corruption and inefficiency, as they have in the past.

Hearts and mines

The CRPF intends to entrench its position in Saranda, and by 21 March had cleared 17 areas out of a proposed 24 in order to establish permanent camps in strategic locations, seven of which are due to become integrated centres, offering community services such as schools and pharmacies. However, despite the increasing emphasis on a development-focused strategy, in practice such initiatives appear geared more towards improving human intelligence, while the distribution of benefits has been accompanied by more coercive measures.

Many villagers in Saranda recounted stories to IHS Jane’s of being forced to act as guides for paramilitary forces, which they said placed them in danger of CPI-M retaliation. “They come to our fields when we are working and force us to go with them,” said one resident from a village near the town of Meghapubura in Jharkhand’s Chaibasa district. He added: “We are scared

of what the Maoists will do if they see us with them.”

Given that the areas visited were relatively close to towns and easily navigable, these tactics appear designed to force unaf- filiated villagers onto the government’s side. Meanwhile, many - including government officials who spoke to IHS Jane’s off the record - believe the primary motive for engaging the Maoists in Saranda is to open the region for mining companies. Ac- cording to the state’s Mineral Development Corporation, Jharkhand has an estimated 40% of the country’s mineral reserves, and the Saranda forest roughly a quarter of the country’s known iron ore deposits.

Twelve companies with a total of 50 mines are already operating in the region, but much of the area remains untapped due to fears over militancy. The Maoists have an ambivalent relationship with mining companies that cause displacement and environmental degradation for tribal communities but also provide millions of rupees in extortion payments - police sources have put the figures as high as INR20 billion (USD393 million) per year, although such figures are impossible to verify - as well as a ready source of explosives for use in improvised explosive devices (IEDs).

If current operations prove a precursor to increased mining in the area, this is likely to undermine the broader counter- insurgency drive. A study of the conflict between 2004 and 2010, entitled Hearts and Mines: A District-Level Empirical Analysis of the Maoist Conflict in India, conducted by researchers from Norway and Germany, found that “districts with mining operations were almost 23% more likely to experience an average of five Maoist related deaths each year than those districts without mines”.

Some of this correlation is simply a consequence of the fact that mineral resources are typically located in densely forested areas populated by impoverished tribal communities where the Maoists have traditionally found sanctuary and recruits, but the study found that mining also “provides opportunities and incentives for actors on all sides to loot resources to finance their operations”. The study concluded that it was not a lack of development, but rather the lack of effective government oversight over the impact of industrialisation that fuels armed conflict in India’s forest regions.

As such, while the kind of development-based programme showcased in Saranda forest represents a necessary step forward in the anti-Maoist campaign, there remains considerable doubt that the government has either the capability or the intent to follow-through with the programme, while it could even prove counter-productive if its stated development objectives become subordinated to the interests of outside mining companies.

JTIC Brief: Indian Maoists kidnap Italian nationals

23 March 2012

Key Points:

• The Communist Party of India - Maoist (CPI-M) kidnapped two Italian nationals in Odisha state on 14 March, the group’s first recorded attack on Western civilians.

• Although the hostages were kidnapped for local reasons, the group is attempting to use the situation to achieve wider goals.

• Nevertheless, there is currently no indication such attacks will become a regular feature of the CPI-M insurgency.

The Communist Party of India - Maoist launched its first attack on Western civilians in March. Matthew Henman investigates the attack and the implications for the group’s insurgency.

India’s foremost insurgent group, the Communist Party of India - Maoist (CPI-M), kidnapped two Italian nationals - a locally based tour guide and his tourist client - on 14 March. Two Indian nationals were also taken hostage in the incident, which occurred in a rural area of Kandhamal district in Odisha state (formerly Orissa).

While the CPI-M has regularly adopted kidnap tactics in the past, the seizure of the Italians was the first recorded instance of the group deliberately targeting Western civilians. This brief will examine the context in which the kidnapping occurred, and consider whether the attack indicates that the CPI-M intends to target Western civilians in future.

Red Corridor

The CPI-M insurgency can be traced back to an uprising by a splinter faction of the mainstream Communist Party of India in the village of Naxalbari in West Bengal state in May 1967. As the uprising spread throughout eastern and central India, the nascent insurgency splintered into numerous factions. By the early 2000s, the two main factions were the Maoist Communist Centre of India (MCCI) and the Communist Party of India - Marxist Leninist (People’s War), better known as the People’s War Group (PWG).

The MCCI and the PWG controlled significant amounts of territory in the rural and tribal-dominated areas of states such as Bihar and Andhra Pradesh, in northeast and southeast India respectively. As the groups expanded, their areas of operation began to overlap, and growing co-operation between the groups culminated in their merging to form the CPI-M in Septem- ber 2004.

Nevertheless, the operational tempo of the Maoist insurgency remained low, and it was overshadowed by the more high- profile Pakistan-backed separatist insurgency in Indian-Administered Kashmir (IAK). However, in the years following the formation of the CPI-M, the group launched a rising number of attacks across an ever-expanding area of operations. Between 2005 and 2007, the number of CPI-M attacks recorded annually by Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Centre (JTIC) increased fivefold, from 15 to 75, prompting Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to state in 2006 that the group had evolved into India’s “biggest internal security threat”.

In 2008, the number of recorded CPI-M attacks tripled to 236, before more than tripling again to 720 in 2009. This surge was accompanied by an expansion of the group’s territorial holdings, with the contiguous states of Bihar, West Bengal, Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh and Odisha forming the so-called Red Corridor.

In September 2009, senior CPI-M commander Mallojula Koteswara Rao (alias Kishenji) claimed that the group had established a strong operational presence in over 60% of Chhattisgarh?s districts, over 50% of Odisha’s districts, and over 25% of Bihar’s districts. In addition, the group maintained a substantial operational presence in Andhra Pradesh and the western state of Maharashtra, and in December 2009 the government conceded that the CPI-M was active in more than 223 districts in 20 states, out of a total of 640 districts in 28 states.

Green Hunt

In response to the increasing threat posed by the CPI-M insurgency, Indian federal and state authorities launched a major co-ordinated offensive against the group in the five Red Corridor states in November 2009. The offensive - referred to as Operation Green Hunt by the Indian media - continued throughout 2010 as the authorities sought to re-establish control over the swathes of CPI-M territory.

Nevertheless, the level of CPI-M violence remained constant through 2010, although the absence of another significant escalation in operations that year could be considered a success for the security forces. However, while there was no significant escalation in operational activity, the group demonstrated continually evolving capabilities.

On 15 February 2010, an assault on a paramilitary camp in West Bengal left at least 24 security forces personnel dead, while seven weeks later, a CPI-M unit tracked a police detachment searching for militants in Chhattisgarh’s Dantewada district for several days before leading them into an ambush. The detachment was surrounded by around 300 militants and engaged with heavy small-arms fire for several hours, leaving 76 police officers dead and the rest wounded. The sophistication of the operation was underlined by the ambushing of two separate police patrols that sought to reinforce the stricken detachment.

Low-level ambush and explosive device attacks, punctuated by more high-profile operations, continued during the remainder of 2010 and throughout 2011. Nevertheless, the number of recorded CPI-M attacks decreased by almost one-third in 2011, for which there are several potential explanations.

First, it is possible that the group’s operational tempo fell due to the cumulative effects of Operation Green Hunt. However, given that the CPI-M had increased its operations in response to the offensive in 2010, this seems unlikely. Furthermore, the decrease in CPI-M operational activity in 2011 was matched by a similar decrease in the number of recorded counter- terrorism operations. This may suggest that the security forces reduced their attempts to contest control of CPI-M territory, and consequently presented fewer targets of opportunity for CPI-M guerrillas.

The reduction in violence may also be explained by the apparent willingness of at least some elements within the CPI-M to consider a negotiated political solution to the conflict. This was demonstrated on 4 October 2011 when a senior CPI-M commander in West Bengal signed a month-long ceasefire deal with mediators from the newly appointed state government, and agreed to hold peace talks if security forces ended all operations in the state. However, despite the CPI-M adhering to the ceasefire in West Bengal, counter-terrorism operations continued in the state, and the CPI-M ended its ceasefire in early November 2011. The collapse of these tentative early negotiations was subsequently underlined by the killing of Kishenji in West Bengal on 24 November 2011.

Kidnapping

The early months of 2012 have seen the CPI-M maintain a steady tempo of low-level guerrilla operations throughout its extensive area of operations. As before, low-level operations have been interspersed with more significant attacks, such as the killing of 13 police officers in a remote-controlled improvised explosive device (RCIED) attack in Jharkhand on 21 January.

It was in this operational context that the CPI-M launched its first recorded attack on Western civilians. While kidnappings have become a common feature of the insurgency, the targets are typically security forces personnel, local government officials, or civilians accused of collusion with the authorities. In this instance, the targets were Italian nationals Paulo Bosusco, 54, and Claudio Colangelo, 61. The BBC reported that Bosusco had lived in the city of Puri in Odisha for 12 years and operated an adventure tourism company that took tourists to visit rural, tribal-dominated areas of the state. Bosusco was taking Colangelo on such a trip when they were abducted on 14 March. Local police subsequently stated that they had warned Bosusco on 12 March against visiting the Kandhamal area as it was a known CPI-M zone.

While the targeting of Western civilians represented a tactical departure for the CPI-M, it subsequently became clear that the incident represented an extension of the group’s local objectives, rather than any intent to internationalise its campaign. Following the abduction, local CPI-M official Sabyasachi Panda accused the two Italians of photographing bathing tribal women, and claimed that Bosusco had been monitored by the CPI-M for some time because it considered that his tours of tribal areas reduced the local indigenous people to being “exhibited like monkeys and chimpanzees”.

A forest guard stands at a checkpoint in the Kandhamal district of India’s Odisha state on 14 March 2012 following the kidnapping of two Italian tourists in the area by Communist Party of India – Maoist (CPI-M). (PA 1339464)

This was echoed in a list of 13 hostage demands released by the CPI-M late on 17 March, which stated: “Tribals are not commodities for tourists and tribal areas [are] not meant for tourism.” This emphasis on preventing the exploitation of tribal peoples, and the expropriation of their land, forms a key narrative element in the group’s insurgency against the Indian state.

However, while the CPI-M explained the Italians’ abduction in terms of distinct local factors, the rest of the statement articulated demands that, while consistent with established CPI-M objectives, indicated the group intended to exploit their abduction, and the international attention that was likely to follow, to publicise and further its wider goals. These demands included the ending of security forces operations, the release of several key jailed commanders, and the provision of enhanced political rights and increased socio-economic development opportunities for tribal communities.

Outlook

The CPI-M set 18 March as the deadline for meeting its ransom demands, although this was subsequently extended to 20 March. The situation remained unresolved on this date, but officials in Odisha claimed that day that the hostages were unharmed.

While there is no indication that the kidnapping of the Italians was anything other than a local event explained by the particular circumstances - namely, the perceived exploitation of the local tribal community - the future targeting of Western civilians cannot be discounted entirely, particularly if the current kidnap operation is resolved to the CPI-M’s advantage. However, while it is possible that other Westerners perceived to be exploiting tribal communities may be at risk in future, it is almost certain that the CPI-M has no intention of incorporating the targeting of Westerners into its regular strategy.

Hundreds of militants surrender weapons in northeast India

27 January 2012

• The surrender was termed as “historic” by Indian Minister of Home Affairs P Chidambaram.

• The surrender of hundreds of cadres on 24 January, and similar surrenders over the past few years, underscores a significant weakening of insurgent movements in the area.

• Nevertheless, the risk of violence emanating from the remaining outfits, including a United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) faction under Paresh Baruah, which has announced a 12-hour strike for Republic Day, should not be underestimated and could result in sporadic violence.

The surrender of hundreds of militants from nine insurgent outfits in northeast India took place on 24 January in a ceremony held at the Sarusajai Sports Complex in Assam’s state capital of Guwahati; it was presided over by Indian Minister of Home Affairs Palaniappan Chidambaram and Assam’s Chief Minister Tarun Gogoi. A total of 202 weapons were handed over, according to The Telegraph, a local newspaper based in West Bengal’s capital, Kolkata.

Viewing the development as a major step towards the pacification of the restive northeast, Chidambaram was quoted on 25 January in The Times of India daily as saying that “not often do we see so many groups, which have taken the path of militancy, returning to the path of peace, reconciliation and brotherhood”, adding: “We believe that in our republic and democracy every voice deserves to be heard and all differences can be settled through talks and consultations.” He also assured the former fighters taking part in the surrender that “we shall make sure each one of you is able to enjoy equal rights now that you have shunned violence”.

Meanwhile, Gogoi appealed to the remaining active groups to undertake a similar move, saying that “our doors are open for those who are willing to join the peace process but we will firmly deal with hardliners”.

There were major discrepancies in the reports of different news agencies over the precise number of militants taking part in the ceremony. The figures ranged from more than 600 fighters (Associated Press, Reuters, AFP and BBC news agencies) to more than 1,600 (The Times of India ) and more than 1,800 (The Economic Times).

Furthermore, local news media also reported that not all of the nine groups had handed over their weapons. This last claim is probably correct, given that two of the nine groups have not formally surrendered, according to The Telegraph. A 16-page pamphlet, Farewell to arms, welcome to the mainstream, which was distributed during the ceremony, said these two groups together accounted for 1,010 troops, while the remaining seven groups accounted for a total of 685.

Militants from separatist groups in Assam take photographs of arms displayed during a ceremony of surrender in Guwahati, India, on 24 January. (PA 1452314) However, three ‘adivasi’ (tribal) groups did hand over some weapons during the ceremony: the Santhal Tiger Force (STF; 134 troops); the All Adivasi National Liberation Army (AANLA; 90 troops); and the Adivasi People’s Army (APA; 70 troops). The Adivasi Cobra Military of Assam (ACMA; 453 troops) and the Birsa Commando Force (BCF; 557 troops) refused to hand over weapons and instead only submitted a list of demands, focusing mainly on the demand for scheduled tribe status for adivasis. The ACMA and BCF signed suspension of operations agreements in 2001 and 2004, respectively. Of the four other groups that surrendered, three were Kuki - the Kuki Revolutionary Army (KRA; 138 troops); the United Kukigram Defence Army (UKDA, 120 troops); and the Kuki Liberation Army (KLA) - and one, the Hmar People’s Convention (HPC-D; 50 troops), was ethnic Hmar.

Including all of these, a total of 15 insurgent groups are now in peace talks with the government, with Chidambaram claiming that talks for a permanent peace settlement were in advanced stages with some of them. In addition to the above-mentioned groups, Chidambaram said talks were underway with a pro-talks faction of the strongest group in the area, the United Libera- tion Front of Assam (ULFA), with which a ceasefire was signed in September 2011. In addition, a memorandum of settlement was signed in 2011 with the United People’s Democratic Solidarity (UPDS), leading to the surrender of 568 militants in De- cember 2011, and talks are in the final stages with the Dima Halam Daogah (J and N factions); the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB), both Progressive and Ranjan Daimary factions; and the Karbi Longri National Liberation Front (KLNLF).

History of violence

There has been a complex pattern of terrorist and guerrilla violence in the seven states that constitute India’s northeast. The region itself is a product of partition in 1947, before which there was little concept of a separate northeast, with almost all of the provinces and regions looking to the adjoining parts of Burma (now Myanmar) and eastern Bengal (now Bangladesh) for trade links, economic ties and cultural bonds. Moreover, the areas that now constitute the northeast enjoyed a large degree of independence under British rule. Many of the ethnic groups of the area expected to be granted independence once the British left.

For New Delhi, the northeast is growing in strategic importance. Not only does it offer the country’s only direct land corridor into the lucrative trading arena of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), but a proposed Myanmar-India gas pipeline would pass through this territory. These issues explain the authorities’ concentration of military action, ceasefires and development work in the region. However, the Indian government has in the past offered little acknowledgement of the various groups’ grievances and negotiations have regularly faltered, meaning disputes with the northeastern insurgents are likely to remain unresolved for the foreseeable future. The complex mix of ethnic groups, the contradictory positions of which have been hardened by decades of conflict and conscious efforts by the government to create divisions between them, have

left little room for compromise.

Since 2004, the government has sought to introduce large-scale development packages for Assam and Manipur states, which it claimed would lead to major economic improvements in the region and undermine the insurgencies. These included a USD7.5 billion highways construction package announced in March 2005. In July 2008, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh unveiled the North Eastern region vision 2020 document, which laid out plans to commit INR310 billion (USD7 billion) to the area’s infrastructure, agriculture, education services, electricity access and transport links. However, then minister for development of the northeastern region, Mani Shankar Aiyar, said the region required INR14 trillion (USD280 billion) in investment. Moreover, entrenched corruption on the part of government agencies and the criminalisation of many insurgent groups have mitigated the benefits from these initiatives. Widespread extortion has crippled the economy, exacerbated by the exodus of many able students to other parts of India.

Most of the insurgencies have in some part been sustained because of their participants’ ability to seek refuge in the neighbouring states of Bangladesh, Myanmar and Bhutan, and because of rebel groups’ logistical and training links with other regional movements. India has stepped up pressure on its neighbours, which has yielded some results, notably a military campaign on the part of the Bhutanese to destroy rebel camps in December 2003, followed in January 2004 by similar action on the part of Myanmar’s forces.

Subsequent offensives have been pursued sporadically, particularly by Myanmar in late 2007, when the then ruling junta launched military operations against the National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Khaplang (NSCN-K) in Sagaing division, bordering India. However, New Delhi has become increasingly frustrated that its improved defence and economic relations with Myanmar have not translated into greater co-operation on border security. Bangladesh has been much more responsive to Indian requests for co-operation since the accession of the Awami League government in early 2009. In the following year, it handed over several key members of the ULFA, including the movement’s chairman, Arabinda Rajkhowa.

Forecast

The surrender of hundreds of fighters on 24 January, and similar surrenders over the past few years, underscores a significant weakening of insurgent movements in northeast India. In an interview with The Telegraph on 24 January, Additional Director General of Police (Special Branch) officer Khagen Sarma even asserted that there were no militant groups left in Assam, claiming that “what is left are splinter groups, deserters and breakaway groups in ceasefire”, adding that “they have nothing but nuisance value”. The latest nine ceasefires also come as a relief to the government, which has traditionally faced a spate of violence in the area in the run-up to and during Republic Day celebrations, which are due to be held on 26 Janu- ary. Nevertheless, the risk of violence emanating from the remaining outfits, including an ULFA faction under Paresh Baruah that has announced a 12-hour strike for Republic Day, should not be underestimated and could result in sporadic violence. It is also noteworthy that among those 15 groups that have signed ceasefires over the past few years, none has reached a permanent settlement with central government, and as such the possibility remains of some of these groups resorting to violence if their demands go unheeded. Indeed, talks have in the past frequently stalled over perceptions that the centre was not responsive to the needs of certain groups. During the ceremony, Chidambaram made no mention of more specific points of discussion during the negotiations, although possible concessions on the part of the government could relate to the devolution of more power to the local level, including on issues such as finance and civil administration. Finally, it should be noted that the seven groups that surrendered to the government were small in size. The two largest groups taking part in the 24 January ceremony, the ACMA and the BCF, which together account for more than 1,000 troops, have refused to disarm.

4. Principal Groups Communist Party of India – Maoist (CPI-M)

Name: Communist Party of India - Maoist (CPI-M).

Type: Domestic Marxist/Maoist Revolutionary.

Status: Active since being founded in September 2004.

Leader: Muppala Lakshman Rao alias Ganapathi.

Summary: The Communist Party of India - Maoist (CPI-M) is a left-wing militant group operating primarily in the states of Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Orissa, West Bengal, and Bihar. The group aims to overthrow state governments in its areas of operation and establish communist administrations in their place. The CPI-M seeks to achieve this through an asymmetric insurgency following the Maoist doctrine of people’s war. The CPI-M was founded in 2004 following the merger of two long- established Maoist groups: the People’s War Group (PWG) and the Maoist Communist Centre of India (MCCI). Since the merger, the CPI-M has grown in influence, expanding its areas of operation and undertaking large-scale attacks, at times involving hundreds of armed militants. CPI-M operational activity has increased significantly since 2009, with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh re-iterating that year that the CPI-M was the single greatest threat to India’s internal security. This was underlined in a series of significant attacks by the group throughout early 2010. While the group would struggle to actually depose a state government, it poses a severe threat to local administrations and security forces in its areas of operation.

Group Formation: A small faction of hardline revolutionaries established the Daksin Desh group in 1969, which renamed itself the Maoist Communist Centre (MCC) in the mid-1970s, and later became the Maoist Communist Centre of India (MCCI) in January 2003. The People’s War Group (PWG), officially known as the Communist Party of India - Marxist Leninist (People’s War), or CPI-ML (PW), was founded on 22 April 1980. On 21 September 2004, the MCCI and the PWG united to form the Communist Party of India - Maoist (CPI-M), with an official announcement made the following month. Within India, CPI-M cadres are commonly referred to as Naxalites, or Naxals - a name derived from the town of Naxalbari in West Bengal where the Maoist uprising first began.

The formal leadership structure of the CPI-M is unclear, although the letter announcing the formation of the group stated that the former general secretary of the PWG, Muppala Lakshman Rao, had been elected as general secretary (the highest position) of the CPI-M. The official spokesperson for the CPI-M’s Central Committee was Cherukuri Rajkumar alias Azad, until he was killed by police in Andhra Pradesh in July 2010. The group subsequently identified his replacement as “Comrade Abhay.”

Both the PWG and the MCCI are outlawed within India. The CPI-M was officially banned by the Indian government on 22 June 2009, having only previously been outlawed by a small number of states. The CPI-M has also been designated as an ‘Other Group of Concern’ by the US Department of State since 2005.

In early December 2011, the Indian Ministry of Home Affairs, in response to a parliamentary inquiry, alleged that a number of organisations - including the Committee for the Release of Political Prisoners (CRPP); the Revolutionary Democratic Front (RDF); People’s Democratic Front of India (PDFI); and the Democratic Students Union (DSU) - were front organisations of the CPI-M that were active in the capital New Delhi, although state officials failed to provide specific evidence in support of these allegations.

Aims and Objectives: The CPI-M’s objective is to overthrow perceived repressive state governments and replace them with communist administrations. The group aims to achieve this objective through peasant-based guerrilla warfare following the Maoist model of ‘people’s war’. In its Party Constitution, the group says the “immediate aim or programme of the Com- munist Party is to carry on and complete the new democratic revolution in India as a part of the world proletarian revolution by overthrowing the semi-colonial, semi-feudal system under neo-colonial form of indirect rule, exploitation and control and the three targets of our revolution - imperialism, feudalism and comprador bureaucratic big bourgeoisie. The ultimate aim or maximum programme of the party is the establishment of communist society.” The statement adds: “This New Democratic

Revolution will be carried out and completed through armed agrarian revolutionary war i.e. the Protracted People’s War with area wise [sic] seizure of power remaining as its central task. The Protracted People’s War will be carried out by encircling the cities from the countryside and thereby finally capturing them.”

The group fully underlined its commitment to this strategy in November 2009 when a senior member stated: “All our plans, strategy, and tactics will be based entirely on the active involvement of the masses of people in this war of self-defence. The enemy class cannot decimate us without decimating the entire population in regions we control.” Citing the military defeat of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka as an example, he stressed that the CPI-M would not allow itself to be drawn into a conventional positional confrontation with the Indian military. Instead the group cautioned: “Until the time we reach a decisive stage in our war, we will not fight a positional war in a small area against a superior force that is likely to resort to aerial bombardment if needed. We can fight the mightiest enemy by properly adhering to the principles of guerilla war. We will hit the enemy when and where is convenient to us and not when and where he provokes us.”

Area of Operation: The amalgamation of the PWG and MCCI to form the CPI-M greatly increased the movement’s operational reach. Previously, the PWG had been the larger of the two Naxalite groups, operating mainly in the states of Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Orissa, Madhya Pradesh and Bihar. The MCCI was concentrated in Bihar but maintained a presence in western Jharkhand, northern West Bengal and northern Orissa. Since its formation, the CPI-M has extended its area of influence to many other Indian states, including Karnataka, Kerala and Tamil Nadu in the south; Uttar Pradesh, Ut- taranchal, and Haryana in the north; Gujarat, Punjab and Rajasthan in the west; and Assam in the north-east region of India.

It was estimated by India’s Institute for Conflict Management that in November 2003, the PWG operated in 55 districts in nine out of 28 states. Reliable independent assessments indicate that as of early 2008 at least 187 districts in 14 states, out of a total of 605 districts in the country, are affected by various levels of Maoist mobilisation and violence. Senior Polit Bureau member Koteswara Rao alias Kishan claimed in September 2009 that the CPI-M had established itself strongly in at least 50% of the districts in Orissa, 60% of those in Chhattisgarh, 25% of those in Bihar, 10% of those in Maharashtra, and 25% of those in Andhra Pradesh. The government later stated in December that the group had a presence in more than 223 districts across 20 states.

In effect, the merger between the PWG and the MCCI has rendered the CPI-M a ‘pan-Indian’ revolutionary group. The group is aiming to establish a ‘contiguous presence’ extending from the Nepalese border through Bihar to Andhra Pradesh and beyond in the south. Large parts of this territory are already under effective Maoist control, and were they to succeed in ‘liberating’ the remaining areas, a Maoist corridor would be driven through vital areas of the country. Indian police officials claimed in November 2009 that the CPI-M was attempting to establish a new corridor from Andhra Pradesh to Chhattisgarh via the districts of Koraput and Malkangiri in Orissa.

Media reports in 2009 claimed that the CPI-M have also been trying to build “organisational bases” in the border regions of Bhutan and Nepal. Further media reports in October 2011 suggested that Indian security forces had seized a number of important documents, including a laptop, when they arrested two suspected People’s Liberation Army (PLA) militants in the capital New Delhi, that allegedly revealed plans by the two groups to establish a number of joint training bases in Myanmar. Further examination of the digital data reportedly pointed towards Kachin state as the most likely location for the bases.

Map showing the distribution of CPI-M attacks by state in 2009. (IHS Jane’s 1396331) Alliances and Rivalries: Prior to the formation of the CPI-M, the PWG was the more active and high profile group, and hence had well-established political alliances with other national and international revolutionary organisations, particularly through its student members. These linkages are likely to have been carried over into the CPI-M as the same individuals maintain these contacts.

The PWG expressed solidarity with the Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan (PKK) in Turkey, and the New People’s Army (NPA) in the Philippines, however there are no known operational links. The group has also pledged its support for the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka, and following the military defeat of the LTTE by the Sri Lankan military in May 2009 a senior CPI-M official stated in October that the group would send weapons to Sri Lanka to “revive the armed struggle”. The official also admitted receiving training from what he described as “renegade” LTTE cadres in India in the early 1980s.

From July 2001, both the MCCI and the PWG have participated in a regional umbrella organisation known as the Co-ordination Committee of Maoist Parties and Organisations of South Asia (CCOMPOSA). Other members include the Revolutionary Communist Centre of India; the Bangladeshi factions of the Purba Bangla Sarbahara Party; the Bangladesh Samaywadi Party; the Communist Party of Nepal - Maoist (CPN-M); the Sri Lankan Communist Party of Ceylon (Maoist); and the Com- munist Party of Bhutan. However, none of these groups appear to have contributed more than rhetoric to the organisation.

The CPI-M’s formation was seen as an attempt to forge greater linkages with the CPN-M in Nepal. New Delhi has long been concerned over the possibility of a Maoist corridor running from Nepal through eastern India to Andhra Pradesh. The October 2004 letter detailing the formation of the group stated that the CPI-M would “more actively stand by the side of the Nepali people led by the CPN-M”. Yet little evidence of co-ordination between the Indian and Nepalese Maoists has been produced,

and relations between the two movements have deteriorated since the CPN-M gave up its armed struggle in 2007 in favour of participation in the political process.

Since the merger of the main Maoist groups under the CPI-M banner, rivalry with other militant groups has largely been eliminated, although a sometimes violent rivalry exists with the Communist Party of India - Marxist Leninist (CPI-ML) which operates as a mainstream political party within the electoral system.

However, the Maoists have long had to contend with various militia groups created to provide a local response to their insurgency. The police in Andhra Pradesh formed armed local militia groups known as the Green Tigers to counter the activities of the PWG, while the MCCI faced an intense and violent confrontation with upper-caste and landowner private armies, of which the largest and most organised was the Ranvir Sena. Tit-for-tat massacres and killings of mainly upper-caste civilians were a defining feature of this rivalry in Bihar. The CPI-M has also engaged in violence against civilians in Bihar in retaliation for opposition to the group’s activities. This was exemplified by an attack on a village in Bihar’s Jamui district in February 2010, in retaliation for the killing of CPI-M members by local residents, which left 11 villagers dead. In Chhattisgarh, the CPI-M faces local anti-Naxalite militia groups, known as Salwa Judum, whose emergence is thought to have had an impact on the significant increase in the level of violence against civilians in the state, as villagers are now brought directly into the line of fire.

The CPI-M also has several splinter factions, such as the Tritiya Prastuti Committee (TPC), which broke away in 2002, and the Chhattisgarh-Jharkhand Simant Committee (CJSC), which formed in 2009. The CPI-M has regularly clashed with TPC. However, in a statement on 24 June 2012 the CPI-M announced a three-month unilateral ceasefire with its splinter groups - including the TPC, the People’s Liberation Front of India (PLFI), the Jharkhand Janmukti Parishad (JMP), and the Shashtra People’s Morcha (SPM) - in order to form a united front against the Indian government. The group stated: “If these groups are working for the common people, they must come on one platform and accept the offer for ceasefire because the government has intensified the imperialist attack to gain control over jungles, villages, and natural resources to hand it over to the corporate houses. If these groups do not understand the urgency of unifying our resources to fight the common enemy, their stance would be exposed.”

During the trial of a suspected Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT) militant in June 2009, it was alleged that the CPI-M had links with the LeT. The suspect claimed that CPI-M militants from India’s Jharkhand had interacted with LeT militants in Pakistani-occupied Kashmir.

Media reports in October 2009 also alleged that the CPI-M actively supports the People’s Committee against Police Atroci- ties (PCPA), a tribal organisation which on 26 October announced that it had turned into an armed outfit called the Sidhu Kanu Gana Militia. This was evidenced on 28 October when senior CPI-M commander Kishan announced that the Maoists would provide strategic and military support to the Sidhu Kanu Gana Militia.

Two senior United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) militants also claimed in November 2009 that the CPI-M had bought weapons from them. Co-operation between the two groups increased over the next two years, especially following a split within the ULFA leadership over peace negotiations with the government. Unnamed sources within the Ministry of Home Affairs claimed in March 2011 that the ULFA faction opposed to negotiations with New Delhi, led by commander-in-chief Paresh Baruah, had attempted to establish a strategic partnership with the CPI-M in order to boost its military capability, although the extent and long-term practical implications of the proposed partnership remain difficult to assess.

In early October 2011, Indian security forces arrested two alleged senior People’s Liberation Army (PLA) militants in the capital New Delhi. Security officials subsequently revealed that they had obtained important documents during the operation which suggested that the PLA was planning to set up a number of training bases in neighbouring Myanmar in co-operation with the CPI-M. Officials further revealed that based on intelligence obtained from the two suspects they believed that the Kachin state was the most likely location of the new joint militant bases and that there was a possibility that some ULFA cadres may also be involved in running the training camps.

Threat Assessment: The CPI-M has significantly expanded its activities and area of operations since 2004. The group has increased both its political and military capabilities, and regularly launches well-planned, complex operations against key targets, at times involving hundreds of militants. While fatalities linked to other insurgencies in the country have tended to decline consistently in recent years, fatalities linked to the Maoist conflict have increased. In November 2004, Prime Minister

Manmohan Singh claimed that the Maoists represented the single gravest threat to the internal security of the Indian Union. Previously the various Pakistani-backed separatist groups operating in Jammu and Kashmir had been considered the principal threat.

The CPI-M currently operates almost at will in vast tracts of at least nine of India’s 28 states. Chhattisgarh has emerged as one of the principal centres of co-ordinated Maoist activity, displacing Andhra Pradesh as the worst affected state. The rise in violence in Chhattisgarh has been linked to the controversial government strategy of arming local villagers in militias, known as Salwa Judum, in order to defend themselves against Maoist militants. However, rather than reducing the violence, this strategy has brought villagers into the line of fire and led to a significant increase in attacks against civilians. Conversely, the decline in violence in Andhra Pradesh is linked, in part, to the successful implementation of development schemes and, more importantly, focused police action and a more coherent use of force, embodied in the creation of the dedicated Greyhounds counter-insurgency unit.

Such disparate approaches to addressing the CPI-M threat at the state level, and the lack of an overall co-ordinated national strategy, have hindered efforts to effectively tackle the insurgency, and has been one of the principal factors in the prosper- ing of the CPI-M. While there have been some isolated successes in fighting the insurgents, as demonstrated in Andhra Pradesh, regional disparities and poor communication between states and the central government ensure that other affected states remain far from prepared to deal with the threat.

Also, although New Delhi has acknowledged the threat of the creation of a Maoist ‘Red Corridor’ running from Nepal down through the eastern states of Bihar, Orissa, West Bengal, Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh and Andhra Pradesh, there has until recently been a tendency to downplay the threat posed by the CPI-M and other Naxalite groups, as state governments appear unwilling to accept the depth, popularity and seriousness of the insurgency they are facing. The CPI-M is popular in the villages, mainly because its main targets (the landlords) are highly unpopular and seen to be in league with some corrupt officials. The support enjoyed by the group has allowed it to effectively create village- and district-level parallel administrations throughout large tracts of rural and tribal land in central and eastern India.

The Naxalite threat increasingly rivals that of Jammu and Kashmir in terms of casualties, and the persistent lack of federal co-ordination in countering the Maoist insurgency means this trend is likely to continue in the near future.

So far in 2009 there has been a trend of intense and persistent attacks by CPI-M militants against state assets. The Naxalites have also deployed increasingly large formations. On 9 February, 10 police officers were killed when more than 150 CPI-M militants ambushed a police patrol in the Mahuliatand area of Nawada district in Bihar. Another 10 officers were killed on 10 April during a similar attack in Chhattisgarh. More recently in July, 36 police officers were killed in consecutive attacks by CPI-M militants in the Rajnandgaon district of Chhattisgarh. Thus the threat posed by the CPI-M seems to be intensifying and although it has not reached the third stage of Maoist guerrilla warfare, with large formations moving openly against government forces, the CPI-M has certainly reached an advanced level of the second stage.

The CPI-M also launched a concerted campaign against the Indian elections with attacks taking place in Chhattisgarh, Orissa, Jharkhand, and Assam in April and May. The most significant attacks came on 16 April. Seven soldiers and two civilians were killed when CPI-M militants set off a landmine and ambushed a bus carrying security forces to polling stations in the Latehar district of Jharkhand. Another five election officials were killed when the militants triggered a land mine in the Rajnandgaon district of Chhattisgarh.

In September 2009, Indian security officials intercepted a document produced by the CPI-M’s Polit Bureau (PB) which called on its cadres to carry out “tactical” operations against security forces. The document cautioned cadres to not become com- placent and to constantly adapt to the changing tactics used against them by security forces, citing the defeat of the Libera- tion Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka as an example. The PB document also urged the group’s cadres to increase efforts to stop multi-national corporations, naming India’s Tata Group, from taking control of mines in central and eastern India. The increased level of vigilance demanded by the PB document was evidenced in December 2009 when police officials revealed that the CPI-M had established its own intelligence wing, the “People’s Security Service (PSS)”, in order to infiltrate Indian security services, monitor communications and extract information on government counter-terrorism operations. The Director General of Police in Chhattisgarh, Vishwa Ranjan, said the spies are a “new and critical tool in the Maoist network”.

Despite continuing violence, senior Polit Bureau member Koteswara Rao alias Kishan stated on 5 November 2009 that ceasefire talks were possible if the government withdrew its paramilitary forces from the states of Andhra Pradesh, Maha- rashtra, Chhattisgarh, Orissa, Bihar, Jharkhand, and West Bengal. Kishan also called for a formal apology to tribal populations which he alleged had been abused and exploited by the state government. However, the government has previously stated that talks would only begin once the CPI-M renounced violence, and a group spokesman vowed in late November that “not even in our dreams can we think of laying down arms. We have taken up arms to defend the rights of people and to liberate them [from] exploitation and oppression. Laying down arms would be betraying them”.

The Indian Home Minister, P Chidambaram, expressed a willingness for “serious negotiations” with the CPI-M on 12 Decem- ber, stating that the group was not required to give up its weapons but only to abandon violence. Chidambaram stated that the CPI-M had “raised serious issues” and that the government was “prepared to discuss alternative structures of governance” with them. Chidambaram elaborated further, stating that such alternative governance structures could be used to facilitate development in tribal areas. However, the statement was rejected by Koteswara Rao as “double talk”, who added: “He is offering peace and talks but he is sending federal forces everywhere we are operating.” The exchange of statements continued throughout January 2010 but on 9 February Chidambaram offered the CPI-M “one last chance” to enter negotiations with the government, stating that preparations for an offensive against the group had been prepared. Chidambaram stated that the CPI-M only had to cease violence in order for negotiations to begin. Rao responded to this call by stating that the group were prepared to enter negotiations with the government, but added that four currently-detained senior members of the group - Kobad Gandhi, Amitabha Bagchi, Narayan Sanyal, and Sushil Roy - must be released before negotiations could begin. The Indian government did not respond to this demand but is unlikely to release any high-profile militants. As such, while both sides continue to profess their desire and willingness to participate in negotiations, the prospects for a negotiated settlement to the CPI-M insurgency currently appear remote.

The likelihood of a negotiated settlement deteriorated further on 15 February 2010 following a CPI-M attack on an Eastern Frontier Rifles camp in West Bengal in which 24 police officers were killed. A senior CPI-M militant identified as Kishanji stated: “This is our reply to Operation Greenhunt [the anti-Maoist campaign] that has been launched against us, especially since innocent villagers are also being targeted. Unless the operation is halted, we shall carry on with such attacks, not just in Bengal but all across the country. Our appeal to the policemen is to leave...and if they cannot do this, they should leave their jobs for their own safety. At least some innocent villagers will be spared”.

Despite the arrest of a senior CPI-M leader in West Bengal, Venkateswar Reddy on 2 March 2010, Chidambaram stated on 12 March that the threat from the CPI-M posed a much greater danger than the threat from Islamic militants. He explained: “Jihadi terrorism can be countered, usually successfully, if you are able to share information and act in real time... But Maoism is an even greater threat”. However, the Home Minister tempered his comments by saying that government forces would defeat CPI-M forces within three years if they failed to renounce violence: “We are confident that before the term of UPA II [the Government’s second term] ends, we will get rid of Naxals and will have considerably strengthened our security to face any threat”.

However, the scale of the challenge posed by the CPI-M insurgency was demonstrated on 6 April 2010 when at least 76 paramilitary police officers were killed during a series of attacks by a large force of approximately 300 CPI-M militants in the Dantewada district of Chhattisgarh. This attack was followed on 17 May by the killing of 44 people - 16 police officers and 28 civilians - when CPI-M militants detonated an improvised explosive device (IED) targeting their bus, also in Dantewada. Following these attacks, the Chidambaram offered talks to the CPI-M on the condition that violence was halted. In reply, a senior CPI-M leader identified as Kishenji rejected the offer and demanded that the Indian state cease all counter-insurgency operations. After this latest setback, the CPI-M conducted another significant attack on 29 June, killing 27 police officers in the state of Chhattisgarh.

The CPI-M has continued to conduct high profile, mass casualty attacks against security forces in its areas of operation despite the government’s launching of a series of concerted counter-insurgency offensives. Alongside these offensives, the government’s attempts to restart peace negotiations have consistently faltered due to both sides refusing to meet the preconditions of the other. While the CPI-M does not currently have the capability to achieve its objectives and overthrow state governments in its areas of operation, the group controls vast swathes of territory across a significant portion of India and has managed to effectively create no-go areas for Indian government and security force personnel. The increasing scale of its operations, both in terms of scale and intensity, have led to a proliferating number of high profile attacks which have left

scores of security force personnel dead. As such, it is extremely unlikely to be defeated in the short to medium term and will continue to pose a severe threat to the Indian government and security forces throughout their areas of operation.

High profile attacks by CPI-M militants targeting security force personnel continued into 2011. On 3 May, a combined small- arms and IED ambush in the Lohardaga district of the state of Jharkhand left 11 police officers dead and 40 others wounded. This was closely followed by several high-profile attacks in Chhattisgarh, including: an IED attack that killed seven police officers in Dantewada district on 17 May; the killing and dismembering of 10 police officers in an ambush in Gairyaband on 23 May; and an IED attack on 10 June that killed 10 police officers in Dantewada. Furthermore, on 19 August, 11 police officers and a civilian were killed, and a further three police officers were wounded, when suspected CPI-M militants attacked a security patrol near the village of Metlaperu in the Bijapur district of Chhattisgarh.

A paramilitary vehicle destroyed by a landmine lies at the scene of a blast in the Dantewada area of Chhattisgarh state, India, on 10 June 2011. (PA 1454408) The CPI-M’s stance in West Bengal shifted on 4 October 2011 when its state-based leader, identified only as Akash, and several unnamed government-appointed mediators signed a month-long ceasefire with the state government. As part of the agreement, the CPI-M demanded that the government cease counter-terrorism operations and withdraw from the Jungle Mahal region - comprising the districts of West Midnapore, Bankura, and Purulia - of the state, and if they did so, the CPI- M in West Bengal would be willing to initiate peace talks. This was subsequently confirmed in a statement by one of the government-appointed mediators, identified as Sujato Bhadra, who stated that “the ball is now in the government’s court ... If the government accepts the ceasefire and reciprocates it, [the CPI-M] will move towards peace talks”. However, in late October the CPI-M indicated that it had ended peace talks with the government in West Bengal. In a letter dated 26 October, the group described the talks as “misleading and senseless” and accused the state government of continuing to launch operations against it during the ceasefire period.

On 14 November 2011, the CPI-M in the state of West Bengal called off a month-long ceasefire with the state government. In a subsequent statement, senior local CPI-M commander Akash claimed the decision was triggered by the authorities continuing military operations against the group. Akash further claimed that a group of mediators, who had been appointed by West Bengal Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee in May to negotiate with the group, were acting against the interests of the CPI-M and left it little choice but to resume militant activity. Soon after the end of the ceasefire, suspected CPI-M militants killed an activist of the governing Trinamul Congress party and his son in a small-arms attack in Purulia district, rasing the prospect of an escalation of violence in West Bengal in the short to medium term, albeit on a limited scale.

CPI-M attacks on security force personnel continued in December 2011. On 3 December, at least eight police officers and two civilians were killed when CPI-M militants carried out a combined IED and small-arms attack targeting a convoy trans- porting a parliamentarian, identified as Inder Singh Namdhari, in the Latehar district of Jharkhand. Another CPI-M attack on security forces in Jharkhand on 22 December left one soldier dead and another wounded.

The CPI-M maintained its operational tempo throughout January 2012. On 5 January, at least three police officers were killed in an IED attack in the Kandhamal district in Odisha state. Then, on 21 January at least 13 police officers were killed and two others were wounded when CPI-M militants detonated a remote-controlled improvised explosive device (RCIED) targeting their vehicle in Jharkhand. The following day, at least four police officers were killed and two others were wounded in an IED attack in the Bastar district of Chhattisgarh.

In mid-March 2012 the CPI-M carried out its first recorded attack on Western civilians, kidnapping two Italian nationals in the Kandhamal district of Odisha state on 14 March. In a statement claiming responsibility, senior local CPI-M official Sabyasachi Panda alleged that the two hostages - a tour guide, Paolo Bosusco, aged 54, and a tourist client, Claudio Colangelo, aged 61 - had exploited local tribal people and were detained for such. As well as demanding an end to tourist incursions into tribal areas, the CPI-M released a series of other demands, including the cessation of security force operations against the group and the release of key imprisoned cadres. In the aftermath of the kidnapping, Panda initiated a ceasefire and from 22 March was engaged in negotiations with members of the local government aimed at securing the release of the hostages. Colangelo was subsequently released on 24 March, with Panda describing the move as a “goodwill gesture” towards the government and adding that the release of Bosusco would “depend on the state government”. The ongoing threat posed by the CPI-M, however, was underlined by continuing operations targeting security forces, such as the killing of 16 police officers in an IED attack in the Gadchiroli district of Maharashtra on 27 March. Bosusco was eventually released unharmed on 11 April after authorities released Panda’s wife from detention. The CPI-M also kidnapped a member of the Odisha state legislative assembly, Jhina Hikaka, in the Lakhimpur district of the state on 24 March. Hikaka was later released unharmed on 26 April.

A checkpoint in the area where two Italian tourists were kidnapped by the CPI-M in the Indian state of Odisha in March 2012. (PA 1454947) The CPI-M continued a steady tempo of attacks throughout the remainder of 2012, although a majority of its operations remained relatively small in scale, and the more deadly attacks seen early in the year and in previous years were less common. The group killed six soldiers and civilian in an ambush of their vehicle in the the Dantewada district of Chhattisgarh state on 13 May. The group’s operational activity in West Bengal state reduced considerably in 2012, likely as a consequence of the killing of Kishenji in November 2011.

Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT)

Name: Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT).

Type: Transnational Sunni Islamic Revolutionary.

Status: Active since being founded in 1990.

Leader: Hafiz Mohammed Saeed.

Summary: Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT) is a Pakistani militant Islamist group based in Pakistan and operating in India, and is one of the most capable and high-profile militant groups currently active in South Asia. It was formed in 1990 with the specific objective of waging irregular warfare in the disputed territory of India-administered Kashmir (IaK), which currently forms part of the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir, but which is claimed by Pakistan. Although supporting Kashmiri separatism in Muslim-majority IaK remains the LeT’s primary focus, over the past decade the group has increasingly expanded its area of operations into mainland India, and ultimately the group aims to establish a series of Islamist administrations throughout the Indian sub-continent. The group is suspected of responsibility for, or involvement in, several high-profile attacks on Indian cities - most notably the December 2001 attack on India’s parliament in Delhi, and the co-ordinated attacks on the city of Mumbai in November 2008. To date, the LeT has not been blamed for any attacks within Pakistan itself, and Indian authorities have long alleged that the LeT is essentially a proxy force for Pakistan’s Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). Although the Pakistani government cracked down on the group in the years following the 11 September 2001 attacks in the US, and again following the November 2008 Mumbai attacks, the LeT continues to have the capability and the intent to carry out both targeted and mass-casualty attacks. As such, the LeT remains a highly significant threat to the Indian state, both in IaK and in major urban centres throughout the country.

Group Formation: The origins of Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT) lie in the formation of the Markaz-ud-Dawa-wal-Irshad (MDI) in the Pakistani city of Lahore in 1986-87. The MDI was a Sunni religious and charitable organisation founded by Hafiz Mohammed Saeed, Zafar Iqbal, and Abdullah Azzam towards the end of the Afghan-Soviet war. Following the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, the Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT) was established as the armed wing of the MDI in Afghanistan’s Konar province in 1990, and was intended as a vehicle for continuing the struggle to reclaim what the group considered to be Muslim lands under occupation by foreign infidels, beginning with India-administered Kashmir (IaK).

The LeT was banned by the Indian government in October 2001 and designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation by the United States Department of State in December 2001 (subsequently reaffirmed). Similarly, the group has been banned by the UK (2001), Pakistan (2002), and the United Nations (2005). It is also listed by the UN as “belonging to or associated with the Al-Qaeda organisation”. In May 2008, the US froze the assets of four suspected senior leaders of the group, making it illegal for any US citizen to have dealings with them.

Hafiz Saeed (centre) was reportedly placed under house arrest by Pakistani authorities on 21 September 2009. (PA 1348529) After the United States government listed the LeT as a terrorist organisation, the MDI was dissolved and an offshoot was formed, the Jamaat-ud-Dawaa (JuD), which continued the MDI’s charity work. However, in the aftermath of the attacks on the city of Mumbai in November 2008 the JuD was classified as an LeT front by the US and Indian governments, and was named as a terrorist group by the United Nations Security Council in December. However, the JuD has consistently denied any link to the LeT or militant activity.

Similarly, charity and aid organisation the Falah-e-Insaniyat Foundation (FeF) was designated as an alias of the LeT by the US Department of State in November 2010. The department’s co-ordinator for counter-terrorism, Daniel Benjamin, stated that “LeT has attempted to use Falah-e-Insaniyat as a way to evade scrutiny”. Additionally, Benjamin announced that FeF leader Hafiz Abdur Rauf and two men allegedly associated with the LeT, identified as Mian Abdullah and Mohammed Naushad Alam Khan, had been added to its list of “specially designated global terrorists”. However, FeF Vice-President Mian Adil denied that the organisation was an alias of the LeT, stating: “We are just a welfare organisation.”

In early January 2009, Indian Foreign Secretary Shiv Shankar Menon announced that the JuD was possibly operating under a new name, which he identified as Tehreek-e-Hurmat-e-Rasool, or Movement for Defending the Prophet’s Honour, in a bid to avoid closure and sanctions. Two months later, an Indian intelligence report claimed that the LeT had opened a new militant wing called Tanzeem-e-Mohammedi to create unrest and initiate violence in the state of West Bengal near the Bangladeshi border.

Since 2002, the LeT is alleged by Indian authorities to have carried out occasional attacks in India-administered Kashmir (IaK) using the alias Al Mansourian, although this has not been substantiated.

Aims and Objectives: The overall objective of the LeT is to create a number of Islamist-run administrations on the Indian sub-continent. The group has a three-stage strategy: firstly, to force the accession of IaK to Pakistan; secondly, to create a new Islamist-run state for the Muslims of northern India; and thirdly, to create a similar Islamist-run state for the Muslims of southern India. The group is thus essentially irredentist in nature, seeking to recover what it considers to be former Muslim

lands, and has previously cited the Chechen and Afghan resistance to Russian occupation as a model for its jihad. Unlike some other jihadist groups, including some groups with which it is allied, there is no evidence to date of a revolutionary element to its jihadist ideology, and the group is not known to have carried out attacks against the Pakistani state, or to have advocated the toppling of other secular Muslim regimes.

To achieve its first objective - the secession of IaK from India - the LeT is pursuing an attritional strategy which seeks to perpetuate the conflict, and to engage and exhaust Indian security forces as much as possible. The group’s decision to expand the conflict beyond IaK in the past decade suggests it is also seeking to achieve its objective by destabilising the Indian government and wearing down the population directly. By expanding its operations throughout India, the group also seeks to foment hostility between India’s Muslim and Hindu populations. To that end, the LeT typically seeks to create the impression that such attacks are the work of indigenous Indian Muslim groups, and as a result, it is often hard to determine the relative involvement of domestic and foreign jihadist elements in these operations.

Area of Operation: While LeT operations originally occurred primarily within IaK - the disputed territory within the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir - the group soon extended its operations to southern districts of the state, particularly in winter when infiltration across the Line of Control (LoC) between IaK and Pakistan-administered Kashmir (PaK) becomes more difficult due to reduced visibility and heavy snowfall.

Over the past decade, the group has widened its operational remit considerably and has carried out - or has been blamed for - a number of attacks in major cities on the Indian mainland, such as New Delhi, Mumbai, and Bangalore. However, the full extent of the LeT’s presence and activities across India remains unclear.

For many years the LeT was based out of Muzaffarabad, the provincial capital of PaK, while its parent organisation - the MDI - was headquartered in Muridke, just outside Lahore. The Muridke compound, which is now administered by the JuD, is in an area comprising nearly 200 acres, and contains a madrassah, residential buildings, medical facilities, agricultural land and a fish farm.

Indian press reports in November 2007 claimed that the LeT was making a concerted effort to recruit Bangladeshi members. This was reinforced by an Indian intelligence report in March 2009 which alleged that the group was active on the border between Bangladesh and the Indian state of West Bengal. This was seemingly confirmed by the detention of four suspected LeT militants in the Bangladeshi capital Dhaka in 2009 on suspicion of planning to bomb the US and Indian consulates. Moreover, in September 2011 Bangladeshi security forces arrested the alleged LeT co-ordinator responsible for recruitment and rasing of funds for the group throughout the country, identified as Mohammad Imran, while information obtained during his interrogation subsequently led to the arrests of three further suspected LeT militants in Gazipur district and Dhaka in October.

The LeT has also maintained a presence in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) - renamed Khyber Pukhtoonkhwa in April 2010 - through the JuD and FeF.

These reports were followed in March 2010 when a senior US military official expressed concern over the group’s alleged positioning and expansion in South Asia, specifically in Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives.

Allegations of increased LeT regional activity were reiterated in early April 2010 when Indian government officials blamed the group for an attack targeting Indian citizens in the Afghan capital Kabul in late February. Such allegations remain unsubstantiated, however, and the group itself issued a statement denying responsibility for the Kabul attack, claiming that they do not have a network in Afghanistan. Despite this denial, Afghan and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) officials have reported that the LeT has conducted operations against ISAF soldiers in the Konar and Nuristan provinces of Afghanistan. In addition, ISAF claimed to have killed a suspected LeT commander, identified as Khatab Shafiq, along with several alleged Al-Qaeda militants in an air strike in the Watapur district of Konar on 29 June 2012.

Although the LeT is not known to have conducted operations in the West, it runs a number of training camps in Pakistan that have facilitated such attacks and trained Western nationals. According to open-source media reporting, it has been estimated that around 150 Westerners have passed through Pakistan and received military training since 2008 - including nationals from the UK, Germany, Sweden, Australia, the US and Canada - some of whom are suspected of having attended

LeT-affiliated camps. Included in this number are the following:

Shehzad Tanweer: Pakistani officials have alleged that the UK national, one of the perpetrators of the July 2005 London attacks, was trained at the LeT compound at Muridke in Pakistan.

Willie Brigitte: Australian state prosecutors claimed the French convert to Islam - arrested in 2003 and convicted in 2007 by a French court of involvement in a terrorist organisation - received training at an unspecified LeT camp.

Dhiren Barot: Unverified US media reports alleged that the UK national - convicted in 2006 for a failed bomb plot in London, and who reconnoitred buildings in New York’s financial district for Al-Qaeda - trained with the LeT before joining Al-Qaeda.

David Coleman Headley: Born Daood Sayed Gilani, the US national pleaded guilty in March 2010 to providing material support to the LeT in relation to the 2008 Mumbai attacks in India.

Omar Khyam: Unverified UK and Pakistani media reports have alleged that the UK national - convicted in 2007 for planning to attack London with chemically-based explosives - trained at an LeT camp in Pakistan in early 2000.

Alliances and Rivalries: The LeT is alleged by Indian and US authorities to maintain links with a number of domestic and regional Islamist extremist groups. The LeT is heavily associated with the United Jihad Council (UJC), a loose consultative and planning alliance of militant groups fighting against Indian rule in IaK. In addition, the LeT has carried out attacks jointly with Jesh-e-Mohammad (JeM), most notably the December 2001 attack on the Indian parliament, and is suspected of operational links with the Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI), with whom it carried out the co-ordinated bombings of seven trains in Mumbai on 11 July 2006 in which 209 people were killed.

The Indian government has also accused the group of carrying out a series of attacks in connection with the Harakat-ul- Jihad-ul-Islami (HUJI). The Indian press alleged in May 2008 that the LeT met with HUJI in PaK for a strategy meeting, and that they decided to bomb a number of Indian cities in quick succession. Shortly after this, the Indian cities of Jaipur, Bangalore and Ahmedabad were all bombed - while the Jaipur and Ahmedabad attacks were attributed to HUJI, the LeT was blamed by the Indian government for the Bangalore attack.

The group has also been accused by the US government of links to Al-Qaeda, but it is important to note that while the two groups share ideological similarities, the LeT’s goals differ substantially from those of Al-Qaeda. Uncorroborated media reports have also alleged that the LeT had links with unspecified groups fighting coalition forces in Iraq following a series of arrests made in Baghdad in March-April 2004. However, there has been no indication, or allegation, of any such links since then.

In April 2010, Indian police officials claimed that LeT militants were being guided across the Line of Control (LoC) by Khalistan Zindabad Force (KZF) cadres. The officials pointed to intercepted messages and seized KZF literature as evidence of the alleged cooperation, although neither group has attested to such a partnership.

Threat Assessment: Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT) is one of the most capable militant groups in South Asia. It has achieved international notoriety with a series of audacious attacks, from an assault on the Indian parliament building in New Delhi on 13 December 2001 - which it carried out in conjunction with Jesh-e-Mohammad (JeM) - to the 26-29 November 2008 co-ordinated assaults on multiple targets in Mumbai. In the past, such attacks have brought India and Pakistan close to war, indicating the extent to which LeT operations have the potential to de-stablise the entire region.

While the LeT is increasingly known for such high-profile operations, the group’s traditional focus has been on waging a low- intensity guerrilla campaign in India-administered Kashmir (IaK), where it continues to pursue an active campaign of explosive and small-arms attacks. Attacks in IaK primarily target Indian security forces, but the LeT has also carried out large scale attacks on non-Muslim civilian targets in the region.

However, it is the group’s expansion of its operations into India’s main urban areas that is of particular concern to Indian security structures. While damaging, its operations in IaK were essentially easy for the Indian authorities to contain, whereas the operations in its major urban centres have a range of strategic implications, from destabliisng relations with Pakistan, to

causing significant economic and reputational damage. This was amply evidenced by the 2008 Mumbai operation, when at least 163 civilians were killed and at least 248 wounded. Ten militants, of whom nine were killed and one detained, made an amphibious landing in the south of the city and attacked multiple targets including the Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus (CST), the Leopold Café, the Taj Mahal Palace & Tower hotel, the Trident-Oberoi hotel, and finally Nariman House where the Chabad Lubavitch Jewish centre was based. In the aftermath of the attack the Indian government attributed responsibility to LeT, reporting that the captured militant, Mohammed Ajmal Amir Kasab, had admitted to belonging to the group. The Pakistani government subsequently acknowledged that the attack had been carried out by the LeT and that it had been planned on Pakistani territory.

Mohammed Ajmal Amir Kasab photographed in Mumbai’s main railway terminal, where he killed 58 people, before being wounded and captured. (PA 1350126) The Mumbai operation demonstrated not just a continued operational effectiveness, but also a new level of operational sophistication. It also confirmed that despite measures to try to curtail the group in the years following the 11 September 2001 attacks in the US, when Pakistan came under concerted international pressure to clamp down on militant groups operating on its territory, it remains a strong, well-organised, and effective militant organisation. While the Mumbai operation provoked a further crack-down on the group within Pakistan - including the detention of a number of suspected members of the group on suspicion of planning the attacks, and the temporary house arrest of the group’s alleged leader, Hafiz Mohammed Saeed - the LeT remains highly capable, and has clearly not lost the intent to continue its campaign. The increased pressure on the group may have led it to scale back its operations in the Indian mainland in 2009, but it maintained a low-level insurgency in IaK in 2010 and 2011. However, the group was only linked with one attack in India throughout 2012 (as of 12 December), when its fighters killed a hotel employee in a failed attempt to ambush a security forces convoy in Srinigar on 19 October.

United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA)

Name: United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA).

Type: Local Territorial Separatist.

Status: Active since being founded in 1979.

Leader: Arabinda Rajkhowa.

Summary: The United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) is a separatist rebel group operating in the Assam state of India. While its aim to establish a sovereign Assam is local, the ULFA also has a regional presence with bases in Bhutan, Bangla- desh and Myanmar. Recent attacks by the group suggest that it retains a significant weapons stockpile, and that its cadres are mobile and can strike throughout the state. Attacks by the group’s military wing, the Sanjukta Mukti Fouj (SMF), have increasingly focused on ‘soft’ targets, primarily Hindi-speaking migrants, which has resulted in a local backlash. The group’s fighting strength has also been eroded by a faction breaking away in June 2008 to pursue a negotiated solution with the government, and by a government amnesty initiative which was successful in persuading many cadres to surrender. Never- theless, ULFA remains the most significant group operating in India’s northeast, and continues to pose a significant threat at the local level, as demonstrated by a series of co-ordinated mass-casualty bombings in Assam in 2008 and 2009. While a number of senior ULFA commanders - including Chairman Arabinda Rajkhowa - were detained in Bangladesh in 2009 and handed over to Indian authorities, the release on bail of the eight most senior detained ULFA suspects in December 2010 and January 2011 increased the possibility of a resumption of formal peace talks. On 3 September, ULFA and the government signed a Suspension of Operations (SoO) agreement in which both sides agreed not to carry out military operations against each other until a political solution to the conflict had been achieved. Under the agreement, around 600 ULFA cadres were to be transferred to special camps, but no arms or ammunition were to be surrendered.

Group Formation: According to the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) website, the group was formed on 7 April 1979 at Rang Ghar (a former royal amphitheatre) at Sibsagar in Assam state, with the group’s military wing, the Sanjukta Mukti Fouj (SMF), established on 16 March 1996. ULFA was allegedly founded by Bhimakanta Buragohain, Rajiv Rajkonwar, Paresh Baruah, Golap Barua, Samiran Gogoi and Bhadreshwar Gohain. The group was born out of a popular sense of frustration and resentment at the perceived colonisation and marginalisation of the Assamese people by the Indian state, and by the perceived expropriation of local natural resources.

Several of the original founding members of the group have since been arrested, including Samiran Gogoi, Bhimakanta Buragohain and Rajiv Rajkonwar alias Arabinda Rajkhowa. However, Rajkhowa was released from prison in Assam on bail in January 2011. Since his release from prison, Rajkhowa has maintained a positive stance towards engaging in eventual peace talks with the Indian government. However, fighters loyal to ULFA’s leader, Paresh Baruah, have established themselves as the anti-talks faction of the group, often referred to in Indian media reports as the United Liberation Front of Assam - Anti-Talks Faction (ULFA-ATF), and as such have not been included in statements regarding peace talks with government authorities.

In an emailed statement on 8 August 2012, the anti-talks faction of ULFA claimed that it had removed Rajkhowa from his position as chairman of the group. ULFA’s “assistant secretary for information and publicity”, Arunudoy Asom, stated: “We had given a three-month ultimatum to chairman Arabinda Rajkhowa to return to his post and meet the goals of the outfit. The time set for his return expired on July 29. Dr Abhijit Asom, who had been discharging his duties as chairman of the outfit since November 6, 2011, will be the official chairman of the outfit from today.” However, Rajkhowa’s pro-talks faction of ULFA refused to accept the decision, with group publicity secretary Mithinga Daimary stating: “This decision is one-sided and we refuse to accept it.”

Aims and Objectives: ULFA’s official objective is “to liberate Assam through armed national liberation struggle from the clutches of the illegal occupation of India and to establish a sovereign Independent Assam”. The group claims it represents “not only the Assamese nation but also the entire independent-minded struggling peoples, irrespective of different race-tribe- caste-religion and nationality of Assam”.

Area of Operation: ULFA operates throughout the Indian state of Assam and has bases in the border regions with Bhutan,

Bangladesh, China and Myanmar.

Following a crackdown by Bangladeshi security forces in the mid-1990s, many ULFA cadres fled across the border and established bases in Bhutan, which, after consultations and joint planning with Indian forces, carried out Operation All Clear in 2003-2004 to eradicate an estimated 20 ULFA camps. Bhutanese officials in 2009 rejected reports of permanent ULFA training bases in the country, although they conceded the existence of bases in the border area between India and Bhutan, and “occasional incursions” by ULFA into Bhutanese territory.

In early 2007, Indian and Myanmar security forces conducted joint counter-insurgency operations in Myanmar’s border region in an attempt to oust ULFA militants. According to Indian government sources, over 100 militants were killed and several camps destroyed, yet it is unlikely that the area was completely cleared as the arduous terrain hinders military operations and provides cover for those in hiding. This was proven in September 2009 when Indian intelligence officials revealed that ULFA had set up camps in Myanmar’s Kachin State.

Indian soldiers use bomb detectors to check for explosives in Guwahati, the capital of Assam. (PA) Several ULFA leaders reportedly continue to operate from Bangladesh, as was evidenced in November 2009 with the arrest of three suspected senior ULFA militants in Dhaka. There have been reports of ULFA bases being set up in Nepal, but these reports remain unsubstantiated.

According to media reports published in October 2011, members of Paresh Baruah’s anti-talks faction (ATF) of the ULFA maintained an active presence in three locations: the Rongili, or ‘Cheerful Lady’, unit, based in the Sagaing region of Myan- mar; the Lakhimi, or ‘Homely Lady’ unit, based in an undisclosed location in Bangladesh; and the Kopili, or ‘Speedy River’ unit, based in India’s Assam state. The Rongili unit was described as the most significant, comprising approximately 120 fighters, whose principle base was in the so-called ‘Unified Camp’ in the Taga area of Myanmar’s Sagaing region, which was reported to house members of several Indian militant groups, including the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the National Socialist Council of Nagaland - Khaplang (NSCN-K), the United National Liberation Front (UNLF), the People’s Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK), and the Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup (KYKL) .

In early November 2011, officials from the Indian Ministry of Home Affairs claimed that they had obtained information suggesting that Paresh Baruah, head of the anti-talks faction of the ULFA, had recently relocated with an unspecified number of militants and the entire senior leadership of his faction to the Chinese province of Yunan, where they purportedly set up a large militant training camp. The officials further claimed that Baruah had also moved his family from Bangladesh to China in response to a recent series of security operations targeting his outfit ordered by the authorities in Dhaka. Neither claim could be independently substantiated.

Alliances and Rivalries: ULFA has reportedly formed relationships with other regional insurgent groups despite ethnic rivalry. In the late 1980s it joined the Indo-Burmese Revolutionary Front (IBRF), which included the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN), the Kuki National Front (KNF) and the Chin National Army (CNA). Indian security forces alleged in No- vember 2009 that ULFA was carrying out joint training with the National Socialist Council of Nagaland - Khaplang (NSCN-K) in the border area between Assam and Nagaland.

The Manipur-based United National Liberation Front (UNLF) indicated during 2002 that the group had been conducting activities on behalf of ULFA and there was speculation by local media of a possible merger.

ULFA has also had dealings with the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) in My- anmar, both of which may have provided weapons and even training to the group. Such ties were evidenced in September 2009 when Indian intelligence officials reported the ULFA had established joint bases with the KIA, the UNLF and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in Myanmar’s Kachin State. Several unconfirmed intelligence reports have also suggested that in the past ULFA had established links with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka. Documents discovered by security forces in October 2009 indicated that the ULFA had purchased arms from the LTTE.

An official in the Assam state government alleged in July 2009 that approximately 300 ULFA militants had been trained by Communist Party of India - Maoist (CPI-M) militants in the state of Jharkhand and had recently returned to Assam in order to carry out “subversive activities”.

Indian officials alleged in August 2009 that ULFA was in close collaboration in Bhutan with the Bhutan Communist Party - Marxist-Leninist-Maoist (BCP-MLM), Bhutan Tiger Force (BTF), and Revolutionary Youth of Bhutan (RYOB). Bhutanese officials also alleged that ULFA was providing these groups with training.

Two suspected senior ULFA militants also claimed in November 2009 that the group was selling arms to the National Demo- cratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB), the National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT), and the All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF), as well as the CPI-M. The suspects also claimed in December that the group had sold arms to the Karbi Longri National Liberation Front (KLNLF).

Indian security officials also claimed on 17 December that ULFA leaders had confessed to receiving financial “benefits” from political parties, particularly during elections, although there is no evidence of any formal alliance.

ULFA officials were reported in early July 2010 to have met with counterparts from the NSCN-K, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the UNLF, Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup (KYKL), and the People’s Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK), in Bangla- desh and agreed to form a joint front against the National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM) in Manipur.

Media reports published in late September 2011 claimed that Paresh Baruah, head of the minority anti-talks faction of ULFA, who was allegedly based in the Sagaing region of Myanmar along with approximately 120 fighters, had established himself as an arms dealer throughout Southeast Asia, where he purchased arms, primarily from China, before selling them on to regional militant groups, especially the United Wa State Army (UWSA) in Myanmar’s Shan State. The reports added that Baruah allegedly dealt particularly in Russian AK-series assault rifles, NDM-86 sniper rifles, and several pistol models. Subsequent media reports in early November suggested that Baruah was also involved in selling weapons to the NDFB, with its alleged military chief, Sonbjit Ingti, reported on 9 November to have purchased a cache of at least 50 AK-47 and AK-56 assault rifles from Baruah.

Threat Assessment: The peace process between ULFA and the government remains at a stand-still, and the situation is unlikely to change in the immediate term as the positions of the two sides remain distant. A pro-talks faction of the group, led by Mrinal Hazarika, broke away in June 2008, declaring it had given up its demand for sovereignty in favour of autonomy. Hazarika said: “We are ready to sit for dialogue with the Government of India within the framework of the Indian Constitution. Instead of sovereignty, we will now fight for autonomy of the state”. In response, the ULFA leadership expelled Hazarika, and as the government continues to refuse to discuss demands for an independent Assam, the conflict is likely to continue.

The government’s military operations against the ULFA, combined with counter-insurgency operations by Myanmar and Bangladeshi security forces, have been moderately successful in reducing ULFA’s targeting of Indian security forces, yet

the authorities remain unable to prevent attacks against civilians. Violence against the non-Assamese Hindu community escalated in 2007, with the continued bombing of soft targets leading to a backlash from civilians. For example, on 30 May hundreds of protesters took to the streets condemning ULFA’s tactics.

Of more success has been the government’s initiatives designed to induce ULFA cadres to surrender. A large number of cadres have surrendered, although ULFA denies this has affected its operational capabilities and claims that those surrender- ing are only low-level recruits.

The group continued to carry out a number of low-level attacks on security forces, civilians, government buildings and critical national infrastructure throughout early 2009, but began to increase the frequency and scale of their attacks during the build up to parliamentary elections in April and May. A notable example was a bomb attack in Guwahati on 6 April which killed seven civilians and wounded 32 others. The attack took place a day before Prime Minister Manmohan Singh was due to arrive in the city and also occurred on the day before the 30th anniversary of the founding of the group.

However, following these attacks the group’s operational tempo decreased subsequently through mid-to-late 2009 with only sporadic low-level attacks being carried out. This can partly be attributed to continuing aggressive operations by security forces targeting the group and ULFA’s attempts to reorganise and conserve its strength. The increasing pressure on the group was indicated by the arrest of the group’s suspected foreign secretary, Sashadhar Choudhury, and its suspected finance secretary, Chitraban Hazarika in Bangladesh on 1 November, before their subsequent transfer into Indian custody. This was added to later in the month when ULFA’s alleged cultural secretary, Pranati Deka, who was arrested in Meghalaya in 2003, stated that the group was open to peace talks with the Indian government, a position supported by the group’s chairman, Arabinda Rajkhowa. Rajkhowa was himself then arrested, along with the group’s deputy commander-in-chief Raju Baruah, in Bangladesh on 30 November, before being transferred into Indian custody.

India’s Minister of Home Affairs P. Chidambaram stated on 2 December 2009 that “ULFA is in disarray today...In the next few days, I expect the ULFA leadership to make a political statement...a positive statement”. Further, the Chief Minister of Assam, Tarun Gogoi, declared on 3 December that with the arrest of Rajkhowa peace talks could begin, even without the presence of the ULFA commander-in-chief, Paresh Baruah. However, ULFA’s jailed publicity secretary Mithinga Daimary stated that “Rajkhowa...has no right to go for peace talks without Paresh Baruah. If he holds peace talks with the government without Paresh...the jailed ULFA leaders won’t be with him”, and Rajkhowa on 9 December ruled out any possibility of any peace talks without the involvement of Paresh. Paresh himself subsequently stated that the government was not interested in “open negotiations” with the group, citing the arrest of Rajkhowa and other senior leaders. Paresh reiterated that the group sought negotiations with the government over the issue of Assam’s sovereignty but added that any such negotiations “must be free and unfettered”. Paresh also stated that the group was willing to abide by the result of a referendum of the people of Assam on the sovereignty issue.

Meanwhile, following the arrest of Choudhury and Hazarika, a bomb attack on 22 November 2009 that ULFA was blamed for killed six civilians in Assam. Another such bomb attack killed four civilians in Assam on 10 December following the arrest of Rajkhowa. Such attacks indicate that while ULFA is under increasing pressure from security forces, and its leaders profess a desire for negotiations, the group remains determined to demonstrate its continuing capabilities.

While ULFA was reported on 13 June 2010 to have made a formal offer of peace talks to the Indian government, the group’s fighters continued to carry out attacks on security forces, most notably a bomb attack in Assam’s Goalpara district on 30 July which killed five soldiers. The group maintained a low operational tempo of attacks against security forces in As- sam throughout the remainder of the year, while government representatives negotiated with jailed ULFA leaders. Progress towards the formal resumption of peace talks appeared to be made in December, when authorities released five senior detained ULFA members on bail, including Pranati Deka and Raju Baruah. This was followed on 1 January 2011 with the release of ULFA chairman Rajkhowa on bail. Upon his release, Rajkhowa called for a resumption of peace talks and wrote to the Chief Minister of Assam, Tarun Gogoi, to offer to start negotiations. Later that month, the remaining two senior detained ULFA members, Sashadhar Choudhury and Chitraban Hazarika, were also released on bail, increasing the prospect of a resumption of peace talks.

ULFA militants sit behind the arms they surrendered during a ceremony organised by the Indian army in Rangiya, Assam, in 2008. (PA 1399823) However, despite the reported progress towards formal peace talks, ULFA’s leader Paresh Baruah - whose so-called anti- talks faction (ATF) forces are based primarily in the Taga area of the Sagaing region of Myanmar, but also in an undisclosed area of Bangladesh and on the island of Majuli in India’s Assam state - has maintained opposition to engaging in negotiations with the government. According to media reports in early February 2011, when the ULFA in Assam announced it was ready to initiate unconditional peace talks with the government, Paruah was described as still in contact with Rajkhowa, but his opinion on, or presence in any form of talks did not appear.

These positive steps led to the 3 September 2011 signing of a Suspension of Operations (SoO) agreement between ULFA and the government, in which both sides agreed not to carry out military operations against each other until a political solution to the conflict had been achieved. Under the agreement, around 600 ULFA cadres were to be transferred to special camps, but no arms or ammunition were to be surrendered. While the Home Affairs joint secretary for northeast India, Shambhu Singh, described the SoO as “the harbinger of future talks”, Sashadhar Choudhury warned that the SoO was only “a gentleman’s agreement” and stated: “We will see how the parleys go forward.”

Following a Myanmar counter-terrorism offensive targeting Indian militant groups in Sagaing region in mid-September 2011 - including the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the National Socialist Council of Nagaland - Khaplang (NSCN-K), the United National Liberation Front (UNLF), the People’s Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK), and the Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup (KYKL) - media reports claimed that Baruah maintained a militant force composed of approximately 120 fighters in Myanmar, 15-17 fighters in Assam, and “around a dozen” inside Bangladesh.

Indian security forces inspect the site of an explosion in Guwahati in May 2007 which was blamed on ULFA by police. (PA 1188845) While no further progress was reported in terms of the viability of peace talks between the central government and the so- called pro-talks faction under Rajkhowa, the anti-talks faction maintained a steadily low-tempo of attacks in Assam state throughout 2012.

5. Counter-Terrorism Environment Counter-Terrorism Campaign

From 1 December 2011 until 30 November 2012, JTIC recorded a total of 2,099 successful counter-terrorism and counter- insurgency operations in India, with successful operations classed as those leading to the arrest or death of suspected militants, or the capture of weaponry and logistics. This represented a 9% decrease from the 2,307 operations recorded in the preceding 12 months.

Counter-terrorism (1 December 2011 - 30 November 2012)

250 Operations

200

150

100

0 Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sept Oct Nov

The most common counter-terrorism tactic employed in India in the reporting period was “legal/diplomatic” – covering all detentions, arrests, and convictions of suspected militants – with the tactic utilised on 1,563 occasions. This represented a very slight 1.7% decrease from the 1,590 instances of the tactic’s use in the preceding 12 months.

The second most common counter-terrorism tactic employed in the reporting period was “attack” – covering armed actions involving combat. The tactic was utilised on 271 occasions during the reporting period, a slight 3.6% decrease from the 281 instances recorded in the preceding 12 months.

In addition, a total of 238 operations involving the discovery of weapons caches and other military equipment belonging to militants were recorded in the reporting period, representing a considerable 40.8% reduction from the preceding 12 months.

A total of 394 militant fatalities were recorded by JTIC from 1 December 2011 to 30 November 2012. This represented a minor 3.4% decrease from the 408 fatalities recorded in the preceding 12 months. Militant fatalities peaked in June 2012, with a total of 47 fatalities recorded. This was principally accounted for by a sustained armed clash between police and CPI- M militants in the Bijapur district of Chhattisgarh state on 28 June, which left 18 suspected militants dead.

Counter-Terrorism Environment Rating

1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0

Highly Extremely Very Moderately Very Extremely Highly Lax Restrictive Insecure Lax Lax Restrictive Restrictive Restrictive Secure

The national counter-terrorism environment rating assesses the vulnerability of the state to campaigns waged by armed sub-state groups active in the country. The lower the rating, the more likely it is that groups active in the country will be able to sustain themselves and achieve their objectives.

The counter-terrorism environment in India is rated Lax (2.5) based on a weighted composite of the country’s ratings for Security Environment, Political Environment and Physical Environment. A Lax environment is defined as one in which the environment slightly favours the sub-state actor. Terrorism campaigns may be sustainable indefinitely, and have a realistic prospect of achieving limited concessions. Insurgencies may be sustainable in the medium to long term, but are unlikely to be able to maintain anything other than temporary control over any territory, and pose only a moderate threat to the state.

Summary

Security Environment 3.0 Police, Customs and Intelligence 2.5

Military and Paramilitary Forces 3.0 Judicial and Penal System 3.5 Political Environment 2.0 Government Legitimacy 2.0 Socioeconomic Conditions 2.0 International Co-operation 1.5 Physical Environment 2.0 Geography and Terrain 2.0 Natural Resource Control 3.0 Weapons Proliferation 2.0

Security Environment Moderately Restrictive (3.0)

Assesses the capacity, capability and loyalty of state security forces – as well as the effectiveness of the judicial system – and the extent to which they are adapted to the threat posed by militant groups.

Police, Customs and Intelligence – Lax (2.5)

Individual state police forces are the primary force responsible for counter-insurgency in India and number approximately 400,000 personnel. Police forces are generally poorly paid and ill-equipped to face the threat posed by insurgents. Further- more, resources are typically lowest in the very states affected by insurgency – in August 2008 it was estimated that compared to the 854 officers per 100,000 population in peaceful Mizoram, and a national average of 122 officers per 100,000, there were only 57 officers per 100,000 in Bihar, 98 in Jharkhand, 133 in Chhattisgarh, 90 in Orissa, and 99 in Andhra Pradesh – with these states subject to significant Maoist insurgent activity.

There is a lack of a nationwide actionable intelligence capacity, with individual states often accusing the central Intelligence Bureau of providing intelligence that is too vague to be of use. Meanwhile, most states lack a proper intelligence wing within their own police departments, limiting their ability to track or anticipate local developments. Furthermore, almost all states lack the ability to monitor internet-based communications. As a result, counter-insurgency operations across the country tend to be reactive rather than preventive.

Corruption remains a problem within many state police forces, although the loyalty of security forces to the government is strong. This is particularly the case in those forces countering the militant Islamist threat in Jammu and Kashmir and else- where in the country, to the extent that preventing human rights abuses of suspected insurgents or associates remains an issue in many areas.

Owing to India’s extensive land borders, and the relative ease of their penetration, insurgents have little need to penetrate India’s coastal or port security. Instead, the focus of such security is more on securing these facilities against attack, rather than infiltration, with this undertaken by a number of special security forces. The extent to which this has been revised following the November 2008 Mumbai assault is unclear.

Military and Paramilitary Forces – Moderately Restrictive (3.0)

India has 12 main paramilitary forces, which together have a strength of some 1.3 million. These include the Coast Guard and the Defence Security Corps, which are subordinate to the Ministry of Defence. Paramilitary forces subordinate to the Ministry of Home Affairs include the Assam Rifles (AR), the Border Security Force (BSF), the Central Industrial Security Force (CISF), the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), the Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP), and the Rashtriya Rifles (National Rifles).

Military and paramilitary forces play a subordinate role in combating insurgency to the police. The 180,000 strong CRPF is one of the main forces supporting the state police forces, however over-rapid expansion of the force, inadequate training, poor facilities, and sub-standard equipment has meant that effectiveness on the ground is irregular. One exception is the Commando Battalion for Resolute Action (COBRA), a specialised CRPF formation trained in guerrilla warfare to combat Maoists.

While some states have requested military assistance in combating the Maoist insurgency, the central government remains opposed to the idea and the army – with strength of approximately 1.1 million troops – is not normally involved in counter- insurgency operations, except under extreme circumstances. The exception is Kashmir, where regular army units play a more active role.

Judicial and Penal System – Restrictive (3.5)

In 2002, the Prevention of Terrorism Act was introduced and considerably enhanced the powers available to the government. However, some measures were controversial, such as the ability to hold terrorism suspects without trial, and accusations of abuses of these powers saw the law repealed in 2004. Nevertheless, various counter-terrorism measures continue to be passed as components of other laws, and India’s counter-terrorism legal framework is still considered restrictive by various international monitoring groups.

Political Environment Very Law (2.0)

Assesses the extent to which the political environment and the attitudes of the population affect the state’s ability to counter the activities of militant groups operating in the country.

Government Legitimacy – Very Lax (2.0)

Although India has a long-running, viable democracy, the central government has struggled to represent the interests of all the different societal groups and in particular, to address ethnic and communal tensions, poverty, and social disparities, which have all created friction and conflict. While political threats to the system are minimal, the fate of individual parties is far less certain and there has been an increasing trend towards multi-party coalitions with strong regional representation.

A variety of secessionist groups have waged long-running insurgencies across the country, sustaining their longevity through popular dissatisfaction with government policies and representation. This is particularly acute in the northeastern states, where separatist groups have been able to count on local support due to the perceived neglect and disadvantage resulting from the policies of the central government. The Maoist insurgency has similarly expanded its support base through a reac- tion to the growing economic disadvantage in many of India’s rural areas.

Militant Islamist groups in India have been less successful in capitalising on the lack of government legitimacy in areas of unrest as, although they are able to mobilise elements within local populations, their inability to mobilise a broad domestic constituency sees them remain dependent upon external support to sustain themselves and mount operations.

Socioeconomic Conditions – Very Lax (2.0)

While India has enjoyed staggering levels of economic growth – averaging 8.8% between 2002 and 2008 and around 6.5% for 2011-12 financial year – these figures mask the disparity of wealth between the urban centres and the impoverished rural communities where the vast majority are unemployed.

The abilities of different states to maximise the opportunities offered by foreign direct investment and to manage the newly devolved spending powers properly has also varied significantly, increasing disparities between successful states such as Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Gujarat, and Tamil Nadu, and poor states such as Bihar, Jharkhand and Uttar Pradesh. Most northeastern states are estimated to be between 60 and 70% less developed than the rest of India and this has been a major factor in the emergence of separatist groups in that region and their sustainability.

International Cooperation – Extremely Lax (1.5)

The lack of regional co-operation in combating terrorism has been a key factor in the growth and longevity of the various In- dian insurgencies. The support provided by Pakistan for secessionist insurgents operating in Jammu and Kashmir, and more indirectly for Islamist militants operating throughout the country, has been a particular problem, and has led to long-term strains in the relationship between the two countries. However, while international pressure in the aftermath of the November 2008 Mumbai attacks has seen Pakistan reduce the scale of such activities, Indian authorities continued to make allegations of Pakistani involvement.

Bangladesh has also been accused by India of providing support for militants, both in the form of the provision of safe havens for recuperation and training, and in the facilitation of arms shipments and logistical re-supply. However, recent counter-terrorism co-operation has seen several senior alleged United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) militants detained in Bangladesh before being transferred to Indian custody.

Similarly, various militant groups have long been able to take refuge and establish base areas in Myanmar, Nepal, and Bhutan. Greater co-operation between these countries and India in recent years has seen a reduction in this phenomenon, with a number of counter-insurgency operations carried out by the Myanmar and Bhutan regimes. However, India remains frustrated that not enough is being done despite improved bilateral relationships.

Physical Environment Very Lax (2.0)

Assesses the extent to which characteristics of the local theatre affect the state’s ability to successfully constrain the activities of militant groups operating in the country.

Geography and Terrain – Very Lax (2.0)

India’s vast size and varied terrain present the government with significant challenges in the conduct of counter-insurgency operations, and provide the various insurgent groups operating in the country with considerable freedom of operation – whether in the mountainous Kashmir; the rugged and inaccessible terrain of the northeast; the densely forested Maoist corridor; or even the sprawling slums of India’s cities. Each of these various terrain types presents individual challenges, while together they require that Indian security structures train and maintain forces capable of operating in a wide range of diverse environments. These challenges have long been recognised, and were in part behind the decision to create the Counter- Insurgency and Jungle Warfare School (CIJWS) in Mizoram.

The problem of vast size and complex, varied terrain is compounded by the sheer length and porosity of India’s frontiers, and the hostile terrain these frontiers traverse. These borderlands – remote in themselves, and additionally offering easy infiltration, exfiltration, and procurement lines – have been adopted as base areas by a large number of insurgent groups. As such, Indian security forces have traditionally found it difficult to engineer decisive engagements with insurgent groups, or even maintain reliable area domination in unstable regions.

Natural Resource Control – Moderately Restrictive (3.0)

Several militant groups in India are motivated by gaining access to natural resources in their respective areas of operation, particularly northeast Indian separatist groups. In recent years Maoist insurgents have also increasingly targeted the extrac- tive industry. However, these resources are typically ‘unlootable’ point resources – such as oil, coal, and minerals – requiring significant expertise and infrastructure to exploit. As such, militant groups are largely unable to directly benefit financially from their presence, although the Communist Party of India – Maoist (CPI-M) and a number of northeastern groups are able to benefit indirectly through the extortion of commercial operators involved in resource extraction in their areas of operation. As such, while extortion and other forms of organised crime provide valuable revenue streams, Indian insurgent groups are typically not self-financing, making them dependent upon what they can raise from among the local population – either through ‘taxation’ or voluntary donations. This in turn requires greater integration between militant groups and local populations. The CPI-M in particular operates as a social movement embedded within the population, and places great emphasis on propaganda initiatives intended to bolster support among its target constituencies.

Weapons Proliferation – Very Lax (2.0)

Small-arms and light infantry weapons have been readily available in India for decades, and are supplemented by a ready influx of weapons from the wider region – with arms ferried through Southeast Asia, Bangladesh, and China. Primary supply routes are overland from Myanmar into Mizoram, Manipur, and Nagaland, and via sea from Chittagong in Bangladesh. One of the most spectacular examples of arms-trafficking in the region was uncovered in April 2004 when approximately 2,000 automatic rifles, 150 rocket-propelled grenade launchers, 25,000 grenades, and assorted ammunition was seized in Chit- tagong. Although the intended recipient of the haul was not confirmed, New Delhi claimed that the arms were destined for separatist groups in its northeastern states.

Militant groups also enjoy support from external militant groups and corrupt elements of the security forces, and much weaponry is stolen from security forces during attacks. For example, in an attack by CPI-M militants on a Home Guard centre in Jharkhand in November 2005, over 180 rifles were stolen, along with pistols and a “substantial quantity” of ammunition. Similarly on 15 February 2006, around 500 CPI-M rebels attacked a police training school, a district police station, and a district weapons armoury in co-ordinated attacks in the Nayagarh district of Orissa. The militants virtually emptied the armoury and training school of weapons and ammunition before fleeing with the cache in a bus they had hijacked in the district.

6. Appendix: JTIC Country Briefing Methodology

JTIC Country Briefings are consolidated reports designed to pull together all existing and newIHS Jane’s qualitative and quantitative intelligence in an effort to provide our clients with the most complete view of terrorism threats on a country-to- country basis.

The JTIC dataset, used to generate the incident and trend analysis in these reports, is compiled using reliable open-source intelligence (OSINT) collated from a comprehensive range of national and international sources, including: local, national, and international news sources; government and inter-governmental reports; and analytical articles. Every effort is made by JTIC analysts to verify the accuracy of reported events through detailed examining and cross-referencing of all available sources.

The dataset is updated with new information twice daily and event records are written and meta-tagged in accordance with the facts of an event as known at the time. JTIC regional analysts consistently review event records entered into the database, and records are amended and updated as additional information becomes available.

JTIC’s editorial and analytical procedures are designed to ensure that the maximum number of terrorism and insurgency events is recorded on the day those events occur. However, to ensure that all events are recorded, JTIC analysts periodically review the dataset on a country and group basis in an effort to capture any additional events that may not previously have been available in open-source. These events are backfilled into the dataset to allow for the most accurate statistical trend analysis.

As the JTIC dataset is compiled solely from available open-source intelligence, it is crucial to note that analysis of that data cannot be expected, in isolation, to provide a complete assessment of terrorism/insurgency trends. To achieve this, findings from the database should always be viewed in conjunction with qualitative intelligence provided by JTIC analysts in these reports, and gleaned from a multitude of sources in addition to available open-source.