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Gray ghostbusters: Eastern theatre Union Counterguerrilla operations in the Civil War, 1861—1865

Beamer, Carl Brent, Ph.D.

The Ohio State University, 1988

UMI SOON. Zeeb Rd. Ann Arbor, MI 48106

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UMI

GRAY GHOSTBUSTERS

Eastern Theatre Union Counterguerrilla

Operations in the Civil War, 1861-1865

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for

The Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate

School of the Ohio State University

Carl Brent Beamer, B.S., M.A,

*****

The Ohio State University

1988

Dissertation Committee; Approved By

A. R, Millett

W. Murray Advisor M. L. Dillon Department of History Copyright by Carl Brent Beamer 1988 For the two people who made this work possible:

My wife and ity mother.

11 ACKNOwJjEDGnJiCiNTS

I wish to express special appreciation to ny advisor. Dr. Allan R. Millett, for his guidance and assistance throughout this project. Thanks also to the other members of ity committee. Dr. Williamson Murray and Dr. Merton Dillon, both of whom provided valuable suggestions and advice. I also want to acknowledge the courtesy of the many nameless staff members at the National Archives \dio helped me find the materials needed. And last, but not least, thanks for the support provided by ny friends and family, vrtiich helped keep me going.

Ill VITA

July 20, 1954 ...... Born - Malta, Ohio

1976 ...... B.S., Ohio University, Athens, Ohio

1979 ...... M.A. in History, Kansas State University, Manhattan, Kansas

1979-1983 ...... Graduate Teaching Assistant, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio

1983-Present ...... Historian, Newark Air Force Base, Heath, Ohio

PUBLICATIONS

"Galvanized Yankees in Kansas". Kansas Quarterly. Autumn 1978, pp. 17-25.

FIELDS OF STUDY

Major Field: U. S. Military History

Studies in European Military History - Dr. Williamson Murray Nineteenth Century America - Dr. Merton Dillon Eighteenth Century America - Dr. Paul Bowers

IV TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNCWLEDGEMENTS...... iii

VITA ...... iv

LIST OF FIGURES ...... vi

INTRODÜCTICN...... 1

c h a p t e r p a g e

I. Not Quite H e a v e n ...... 14

II. Milroy was H e r e ...... 45

III. Hang 'Em H i g h ...... 85

IV. I've Been Working on the Railroads...... Ill

V. At Night All Ghosts are G r a y ...... 136

VI. Valley of the P a r t i s a n s ...... 172

VII. Exorcising the Gray G h o s t ...... 204

VIII. Gray Ghosts in the S u n s e t ...... 240

CCNCLUSICN...... 270

ESSAY m S O U R C E S ...... 286

BIBLIOGRAPHY...... 289 LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURES PAGE

1. Western Virginia ...... 15

2. Central West V i r g i n i a ...... 17

3. Eastern West Virginia and Western Maryland...... 19

4. Railroads in the Virginia Theater ...... 112

5. The Shenandoah V a l l e y ...... 173

VI INTRODUCTION

One of the least studied and understood aspects of the American

Civil War is the Union counterguerrilla caitpaign. In the literature of

the war, the Confederate guerrilla frequently sweeps from the pages,

striking shrewd blows against his enemies. The exploits of John

S. Mosby, Hanse McNeill and Lige White in the East, as well as William

Quantrill and Bill Anderson in the West, have received extensive

attention and analysis. On the other hand, the Union opponents who tried

to prevent their depredations have received little study, for

understandable reasons. The Confederate guerrilla is a colorful figure,

generally a superb horseman, adept with small arms, \dio vras fighting for

his home and country against tremendous odds. Therefore his escapades

represented swashbuckling romance that appealed to people's imagination, and if he fought for a doomed cause, it only added to his glory.

Moreover, according to his partisans, he severely haitçered the Union war effort, tying down large numbers of troops and dislocating major operations. In contrast, the Union soldier's story is drab and dull.

His life was one of long periods of boredom, garrisoning an outpost or making patrols through the countryside. He atrophied in the routine of canç life or served as the foil for his eneny's actions. Nothing about him captured the imagination.

Yet at the war's end, the guerrilla had lost and the Union soldier had won. This result in itself indicated that the former's effectiveness

1 might not have been as great as some historians believed. The guerrillas

had not prevented the North from overwhelming the regular Confederate

a my , thereby depriving the partisans of formal military support, a

necessary ingredient for any successful guerrilla war. At the same time.

Federal military efforts throughout the war succeeded in keeping

guerrilla depredations controlled. Union forces did not stanp out the

guerrillas, but they did confine their activities within acceptable

limits. Which may have helped to discourage the Confederacy from

reverting entirely to guerrilla operations after Lee's surrender in 1865.

In fact, from the amount of concern about guerrilla problems expressed by major Northern commanders, the Southern irregulars seem to have been

little more than a minor nuisance. Therefore an examination of the methods used to achieve this control seems wortliwhile. Since the best known guerrilla activity during the war was in the eastern theater, this study will focus on that area, specifically the West Virginia - northern

Virginia - western Maryland region.

The Union forces faced essentially four different types of opponents

Who received the designation guerrilla. At the bottom of the list were the outlaws, men who used the war as an excuse to pillage and destroy indiscriminately. These people preyed on citizens of both sides equally, changing their professed allegiance the opposite of their victims', thereby "justifying" their actions as an attack on the eneity. Although several references to such bands occur, they represented a very minor part of the Fédérais' concern and therefore received little consideration in this analysis. A much greater problem was the second level of guerrilla, the

bushwhacker. Unlike the outlaws, the bushwhackers openly supported the

South and concentrated their attacks on people of Northern sentiments.

Generally they consisted of local men banded together to strike against

the Northern invader, as well as their Unionist neighbors. They had no

connection with the regular Confederate forces and usually they had no

higher authority for their actions. In the early months of the war, they

received some encouragement from the Confederate government, but this

support faded as the Confederates placed greater enphasis on the need for

regular troops. Federal success in clearing out bushvdiackers, although

never complete, kept them from becoming a major threat. This control,

coupled with lack of substantive Southern aid, reduced bushvdiacking as

the war progressed. Moreover, the Fédérais often did not distinguish

between bushwhackers and outlaws, but treated both groups as criminals

vdien captured. Although the bushwhackers caused problems for the Union,

after the war's early months they proved a nuisance, not a danger.

The third and best known type of Confederate guerrilla was the partisan ranger. Raised mostly from local volunteers, the partisans were officially a part of the regular Confederate army. Their commanders held army commissions and had warrants from the Confederate government to

raise units for detached service against the eneny. In action they operated in uniforms (at least as much as Confederates wore uniforms), although between raids they dispersed to their homes and either hid or pretended to be civilians. Generally they confined their attacks to 4

military targets, such as Federal outposts and supply lines. Thus, they

most resembled the modern concept of the guerrilla, a patriot in an

organized band who struck at the enemy and then vanished into the

population. They became the best known and the most dangerous of the

foes the Union counterguerrilla forces faced.

The fourth and final category of opponents for the Union

anti-guerrilla forces was the Confederate cavalry itself. While tlie

cavalrymen were not guerrillas under any accepted meaning of the term,

their operations frequently brought them into contact with the same Union

troops who fought the latter. Several times during the war, the

Confederates mounted cavalry raids against the same Union positions and

supply lines as the guerrillas. In particular, the exploits of Turner

Ashby, Stonewall Jackson's cavalry commander, have been compared to those of the guerrillas, although his forces certainly were part of the formal

Confederate military establishment. Even if the Union counterguerrilla forces were not the target of the cavalry's activity, they assisted in trying to trap or drive off the raiders. In fact, many contemporary records indicate that most of the Union forces covered in this study were for defense against cavalry raids rather than against guerrillas.

However, the latter became a more frequent, and often the main, enemy.

These distinctions were not clearly defined during the war itself.

Particularly during the first year of the war. Union officers used the terms guerrillas, outlaws, bushvdiackers, and less conplimentary names interchangeably vdien referring to the same group. They made little effort to differentiate on the basis of actions, organization or justification fer existence. As the war progressed, however, and

recognition of the legitimacy of guerrilla activities occurred, the

Fédérais did try to distinguish between outlaws and guerrillas and accord

the latter some courtesies as legitimate soldiers. Nevertheless, some

commanders continued to consider the guerrillas outlaws and treated them

as such until the war's end.

The effort to classify the different types of guerrillas and define

the proper treatment of them partly found its expression in the War

Department's General Orders No. 100, "Instructions for the Government of

Armies of the United States in the Field." Issued in April 1863, this

document provided guidance for the behavior of armies toward all types of

hostile populations and the conditions which affected such behaviors

according to current international legal interpretations. The section

covering guerrillas identified partisans as an accepted hostile force

entitled to the privileges of prisoners of war, but dismissed all other

types of guerrillas as not entitled to such privileges. Bushwhackers and

groups lacking direct connections to an organized arity could suffer

summary execution if captured. Although not consistently practiced by

the Fédérais, these instructions did provide a base on which to justify

their actions in dealing with the guerrillas.

In addition to facing several forms of guerrillas, the Union forces had a number of different types of targets to protect. First, they had to defend their lines of communication and supply, particularly the railroads. Railroads were especially vulnerable to raiding because they 6

were static and easily sabotaged. The bending or removal of a single

section of rail could wreck a train, vÆiile destruction of a bridge could

close a rail line for weeks. Since, guerrillas could do damage anywhere

along the tracks, the Union made extensive efforts to keep them

patrolled. Moreover, the main rail artery connecting east and west, the

Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, passed through the entire region under

study, from Parkersburg, West Virginia to Baltimore, Maryland. Its

importance made it a favorite target of Confederate raiders, vAio

attempted to disrupt the flow of troops and supplies by destroying the

track. This danger necessitated extensive defenses along the length of

rJie B&O. The same problems also applied to the telegraph lines which ran

through to the region. Guerrillas could cut them almost anyvdiere, thus

severing communications between Federal forces, so the Union had to

protect them as well.

The Federal road lines were not as susceptible to damage as the

railroads, but the traffic on them still required protection. Guerrillas

could attack wagon trains and couriers almost anyvdiere along the road, thereby necessitating protective escorts for them. Unlike the railroads, however, the guerrillas actually had to attack the target itself, rather than its pathway, thereby exposing themselves to greater danger of counterattack.

In addition to the lines of communication. Federal carps and supply depots were at risk. Generally they were less vulnerable to the guerrillas' attentions, due to the large number of troops in the vicinity, but they still offered tenpting targets that required protection. Smaller caitçs and picket posts, as opposed to major

garrisons, were especially vulnerable. To defend these targets, the

North had to depend on the alertness and courage of the troops

themselves, as well as the strength of any static fortifications which

they erected.

The final concern of the counterguerrilla forces was protection of

the local Unionist population. In the Virginias and Maryland, Wiere

loyalties were divided, pro-Northern civilians ran significant risks of

suffering for their beliefs at the hands of their secessionist neighbors.

Frequently Confederates destroyed their property and threatened, if not

actually took, their lives for supporting the wrong side. One

significant problem was the frequent kidnapping of influential Unionists

bi’' Confederates in order to remove their influence from the area.

Prevention of or retaliation for these actions became a function of the

Federal forces.

To protect these targets and combat the guerrillas, the Federal forces adopted a number of methods. One of the most prevalent was the establishment of various types of static defenses. These included picket posts, blockhouses at inportant points such as railroad bridges, and large garrisons stationed in major towns. Such positions served multiple purposes. They provided warning of raids in time to interrupt or pursue the raiders, fought off attacks at least until help arrived, and discouraged the guerrillas from attacking at all by presenting a position too strong to overcome. In addition, the presence of garrisons 8

theoretically served to overawe the local population with the might and

authority of the Federal government, thereby discouraging further

pro-Confederate activity. In practice, these defenses sometimes failed

to achieve their purpose. Numerous instances occurred of pickets failing

to give the alarm, blockhouses being overrun and garrisons being

infiltrated. However, in general the system functioned with sufficient

success to reduce guerrilla damages.

A second common method of combatting guerrillas was to conduct

frequent patrols and sweeps through tiie territory. In theory these

movements caused the capture of known guerrillas, the breakup of

guerrilla bands surprised by the troops and the discouragement of others,

by the projection of Federal power. Thus the patrols would keep the

guerrillas off-balance, wear them down and eventually cause their

elimination, thereby effectively solving the problem. In practice, they

became routine and were not conducted with sufficient vigor or

unpredictability. The guerrillas could disband before the troops

arrived, thus avoiding destruction, while the patrols were not frequent

enough to curtail their activities significantly. Carefully planned

strikes against known guerrilla caitps usually resulted in Federal success and the sweeps did prevent some guerrilla operations from occurring.

However, while these movements often provided inçortant intelligence

information, they did not stanqp out the guerrillas.

Another major Federal method of trying to curb guerrilla activity was to hold local civilians responsible for it. Used mostly in areas where the population was overwhelmingly secessionist in sympathy, this method fined or imprisoned local civilians for any damage to Union

persons or property and required them to make restitution, unless they

provided information leading to the offenders' capture. By this means,

the Fédérais hoped either to remove public support for the guerrillas or

to stop their attacks by threatening retaliation on family and friends.

Sometimes, the Union commanders even moved all civilians out of a

particular area, creating a quarantined zone in which anyone found was

treated as an eneiry. This method proved basically ineffective, since it

tended to encourage defiance rather them the reverse.

A fourth anti-guerrilla technique, somewhat related to the previous

one, was to commit reprisals for guerrilla actions. This method included

arresting the families of known guerrillas or simply destroying civilian

property near the site of the guerrilla raid. Against the guerrillas

themselves, it usually involved summary execution of any raiders

captured. As with most reprisals throughout history, however, this policy had an opposite effect from its intended one. Instead of discouraging guerrilla activity through fear of punishment, it increased hostility among the civilians and expanded support for the guerrillas, thereby further aggravating the problem. Executions singly invited retaliation on Union prisoners, which caused the Fédérais to cease such efforts soon after their implementation. Therefore this method achieved virtually no positive effects.

The final major method which the Union forces adopted was the creation of special counterguerrilla units. These organizations used the 10

guerrillas' own tactics - rapid movement, surprise and ambush - against

them as a means of breaking up or destroying the guerrilla bands. They

might consist of local Unionist citizens who used their knowledge of the

area to advantage, or volunteers from the troops vho had special

abilities and/or a desire for less regimentation. These groups sometimes

were highly successful in their forays against the guerrillas, thus

showing themselves an effective means of combating the problem. However,

many of the units proved inept and either through criminal acts or defeat

at the guerrillas' hands damaged their own cause more than the enemy.

Virtually all special units had brief careers, due to acconçdishment of a

specific mission or to failure. The best known of the military units.

Blazer's Scouts, did an excellent job of harassing Mosby's Rangers during

its existence, but the Rangers ultimately annihilated it and it never was

reconstituted. Perhaps also the Union commanders involved in anti-guerrilla activities found such units inconsistent with their notions of military order and lacked the imagination to see their capabilities. Whatever the reason, the concept never was utilized to the extent vdiich their successes seemed to warrant, and these units did not have the inpact on guerrilla operations vAiich they might have had.

By themselves, none of these methods significantly decreased the guerrilla problem. Combined together, however, they enabled the Union to limit the guerrillas' inpact on the war. The long-suffering Union soldiers, \diether they were ninety-day militia called up for an emergency or three-year veterans vdio had stared at the same stretch of railroad since their enlistment, kept the guerrilla menace within acceptable 11

limits. Because of their efforts, the guerrillas in the Virginias had

little effect on major Union military operations during the war, except

for Sheridan's cançaign in the Shenandoah Valley in 1854. Even in this

instance the guerrillas failed to prevent Sheridan from achieving his

primary objective of eliminating the Valley as a Confederate resource,

but only kept him from moving up it to destroy the Virginia Central

Railroad before rejoining Grant's army at Richmond. Their failure to

achieve substantial results indicated the Union's success in controlling

them.

Two other factors, originating with the Confederates themselves,

were important for the Union's success against the guerrillas. First was

the Confederate government's disillusionment with guerrilla warfare,

which climaxed with its withdrawal of sanctions for partisan bands in

1864. Lack of substantial guerrilla success and need for more men for

the army prompted the closing of this drain on manpower. Only Mosby's

and a few other bands, vrfiose exploits had rendered valuable service to

the Southern cause, remained in existence. By this act, the Confederate

government reduced the guerrilla threat significantly and thus made the

Fédérais' task of coping with the remaining ones easier.

The second factor was the attitude of the guerrillas themselves. In

general, they saw themselves as honorable warriors in a just cause, v^o expected honorable treatment from their opponents. So long as they

received it, they were willing to 'play by the rules', to behave like

soldiers and strike at military targets. They had little interest in fighting on after the defeat of the Confederacy's field armies and the 12

collapse of its government. Once assured that they would not be punished

as criminals for their actions, they willingly surrendered and resumed

peaceful citizenship. This attitude made the guerrillas unique, since

they operated more openly and with someWiat more predictability than

their modern counterparts.

Few historians have written substantive accounts of Civil War

guerrilla operations. Most works on the war mention the guerrillas only

briefly, if at all. Furthermore, those studies which do give them some

consideration generally accept the interpretation that the guerrillas

tied down large numbers of Federal troops and may thereby have lengthened

the war. Only a handful of books have come out dealing with the

guerrilla war itself and nearly all of them exan'ne it from the Southern

viewpoint. Moreover, these works concentrate on the eastern or the

western theater. For the eastern theater, Virgil Carrington Jones' Gray

Ghosts and Rebel Raiders is the standard overview of guerrilla

operations, supplemented by two biographies of Mosby. Richard

S. Brownlee's Gray Ghosts of the Confederacy serves the same purpose

for the trans-Mississippi west, along with several biographies of the

chief guerrillas there, William Quantrill, Bill Anderson, and Sam

Hildebrand. To date, only one study has attempted to examine guerrilla operations in the entire war, Albert Castel's "The Guerrilla War" published by Civil War Times Illustrated. Basically a superficial account of significant events, Castel's work is interesting for its conclusion that the guerrillas did not have a major inpact on the war.

Aside from biographies of Col. Henry Young and Maj. Gen. Thomas 13

M. Harris, no studies dealing with Union counterguerrilla operations or

their leaders have been written. In addition to material available in

the works already mentioned, other published sources include unit histories of tiie Union regiments assigned to counterguerrilla tasks and the guerrilla organizations that opposed them, as well as memoirs of the participants.

The Federal soldiers who fought the Confederate guerrillas undertook a task that contained little recognition or glory. For four years they fought a quiet war that received attention only ■vhen they failed. That their efforts succeeded in controlling the guerrillas as much as they did, remains a tribute to these men's abilities. CHAPTER I

"Not Quite Heaven"

The Union armies that first marched into northern and western

Virginia in 1861 had the misfortune not only to enter a region ideal for

guerrilla warfare, but to find the inhabitants already practicing for it.

In the transmontane section, widespread Unionist sentiment had produced

strong opposition to Virginia's secession, with the result that

supporters of both views had begun organizing and threatening each other.

Similar diversity of opinion existed in western Maryland, vhere many

inhabitants fled south to join the Confederacy. In northeastern

Virginia, primarily the Shenandoah Valley, Confederate forces already

were in control and their cavalry, made up mostly of local citizens,

already were developing the tactics which they would use later as

partisans. From the moment of their arrival, therefore. Union forces

faced the problems of how to deal with irregular forces and guerrilla

tactics.

Western Virginia, the first entered and most militarily active

region in 1861, was perfect for irregular operations. Rugged, mountainous terrain stretched between the Appalachians and the Ohio

River, offering innumerable hiding places for small bands of men and formidible obstacles to invaders. Sparsely populated in this period, it contained only seven towns that had a population greater than a thousand,

14 15

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Figure 1; WESTERN VIRGINIA

(Source; Official Military Atlas of the Civil War. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1895; Reprinted New York, Fairfax, 1983,

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with the largest of them in the northern part of the state.^ Wheeling

was the biggest of these at 14,000 people, with Martinsburg and

Parkersburg its nearest rivals. Other towns iirçortant for their economic

role or location on transportation lines included Grafton, Guyandotte,

Charleston, Gauley Bridge, Summersville, and Meadow Bluff. With 375,000 people, western Virginia had one-third of the ^ i t e population of the 2 entire state, but less than four percent of the slaves. However, portions of the state were largely enpty, thereby providing excellent hideouts for guerrillas.

Coupled with this sparsely populated terrain, western Virginia had few major transportation lines. By far the most irrportant was the

Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, vrfiich ran through the northern part of the region from Oakland, Maryland to its terminus at Wheeling. A second line, the Northwestern Virginia Railroad, vdiich the B&O controlled, ran from the parent road at Grafton to Parkersburg. In addition to the railroads, several turnpikes quartered the country. The most important of these ran east and west, connecting to the Ohio River markets. They included the Northwestern Turnpike between Parkersburg and Winchester, which roughly paralleled the B&O; the Staunton and Parkersburg Pike which connected those two towns and met the Virginia Central Railroad at

Staunton; and the James River and Kanavdia Turnpike, which ran from eastern Virginia to Guyandotte on the Ohio River. This last road passed through Gauley Bridge, vrtiere it met the Gauley Bridge and Weston Turnpike running North to Weston and the Giles, Fayette and Kanavdia Pike running south. Farther east at Meadow Bluff, it also met up with a connecting 17

pul

Figure 2; CENTRAL WEST VIRGINIA B

(Source: Official Military Atlas of the Civil War.)

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iwool

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Bluff

road that ran northwest to join the Gauley Bridge and Weston Turnpike at

Summersville. Aside from these routes, however, only rivers and poor

country roads provided ways to penetrate the region, thus making control

of the major arteries vital for military movements.

Despite the strong Union sentiment in the region, the Confederacy

attempted to enforce its authority in the spring of 1861, when the state

government sent in officers to raise troops. Control of the B&O

Railroad, which would hamper communication between the eastern and

western Union states, and the manpower, vdiose numbers and skills the

Confederate a my sorely needed, offered practical reasons to occupy the

area. However, the Confederates only managed to raise a handful of

coitpanies, due to the Unionists' activities, Wiich included

anti-recruitment demonstrations, breaking up musters and threatening

units which did organize. The Unionists also plundered Confederate

supply trains, fought with secessionists for control of arms caches and

threatened individual Southern synpathizers. The Confederates followed

the same tactics in areas they controlled, thereby adding to antagonisms.

Western Virginia's secession from Virginia to join the Union further divided the region. The Unionist convention held in Wheeling, in June, declared secession unconstitutional, and acts to implement it illegal and called for a reorganization of the state government to replace secessionist officials with loyal ones. Accordingly, the convention elected new officials, headed by Francis H. Pierpont as governor, thereby creating conflicting authority for the divided region.^ 19

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(Source: Official Military Atlas of the Civil War.)

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:a a n d w e s t e r n Ma r y l a n d le Civil War. )

East of the mountains, events proved somevAiat more favorable to the

Confederates. Support for the Southern cause ran stronger, and the

citizens of northern Viginia welcomed Confederate protection from

Unionist invasion. This attitude helped weaken Confederate control in

western Virginia, for the Richmond authorities funnelled most of their

available force north to vhat seemed the more important theater.

In addition to the political climate, the region also differed

geographically from western Virginia. Its dominant feature was the

Shenandoah Valley, which ran between the Blue Ridge and the Allegheny

mountain ranges from the James River northeast to the Potomac River,

where Harper's Ferry, with its government arsenal and its double-tracked

section of the B&O Railroad lay. In the southern part of the valley,

another ridge, Massanutten Mountain, ran between the two longer ranges,

thus splitting the Valley into two narrow corridors.

Generally speaking, the Valley was a more populated region with

numerous towns, including Harper's Ferry, Winchester, Staunton, and

Lexington. It also contained an extensive transportation network. The

main road was the Valley Pike, vAiich ran from Williamsport on the

Potomac, through Winchester, Strasburg, and Harrisonburg to Staunton, vdiere it linked up with the Staunton and Parkersburg Turnpike and the

Virginia Central Railroad. Numerous other roads, most of them unpaved, connected the many villages with each other and with the valley Pike.

Moreover, in addition to the B&O and the Virginia Central, two other railroads ran into the Valley. One was a feeder line Wiich ran from

Winchester to Harper's Ferry, where it joined the B&O. The other was the 21

Manassas Gap Railroad, vrfiich came west from Manassas along the west side

of Massanutton to Mount Jackson. One other inportant railroad, the

Orange and Alexandria, ran east of the Blue Ridge between Manassas

Junction and Gordonsville, v^ere it connected with the Virginia Central.

This web of roads and railways offered aitple means of moving troops and

supplies between major points.

The Valley's strategic importance was two-fold. First, its crop and

horse production made it a vital source of these commodities, particularly for the Confederates. Not only would control of the Valley gain its output for the occupying side, but also it would deny those

resources to the eneiry. Second, by its geographical nature, the Valley offered a natural invasion route into the North. An a my moving down the

Valley would come out behind Washington D.C. in a position to strike that city, Baltimore, or Philadelphia. In contrast, an a my going up the

Valley would enter the interior of the central Confederacy, where virtually no targets of any consequence existed. Therefore, protection of the capital necessitated Federal control of the region, including the area east of the Blue Ridge, Wiose proximity to Washington and inhabitants' Southern synpathies conprised a further threat. Moreover,

Confederate control of the Valley posed a constant danger to the B&O

Railroad, which ran across its northern entrance. Thus, the Confederates required the Valley for its offensive opportunities, vdiile the Fédérais needed it for defensive purposes. 22

Action began late in May, 1861, vrfien detachments of Col. George

A. Porterfield's Confederates, anticipating a Union invasion of western

Virginia, began to burn railroad bridges on the B&O west of Grafton. The

burning of railroad property, which threatened to sever communications

between Washington and the West, forced General George B. McClellan,

commanding the Federal forces in Ohio, to take action. Accordingly, on

May 27, two Federal forces of approximately two regiments each entered

western Virginia at both Wheeling and Parkersburg and began advancing

along the railroads toward Grafton. The Wheeling force, commanded by

Col. Benjamin F. Kelley, a former B&O freight agent from Wheeling,

reached the burned bridges the same day, arrested a number of local

secessionists and put them to work repairing the damage, thus providing

one of the first exançles of holding civilians responsible for

Confederate acts of destruction.^ The two Federal forces subsequently

united at Grafton, which Porterfield abandoned in favor of a retreat to

Philippi. After receiving reinforcements, Kelley attacked the

Confederates there on June 3, but the failure of efforts to synchronize

his troops' movements permitted the rebels to escape without casualties.

The Fédérais' only loss was Colonel Kelley, who was wounded in the chest

as he chased the eneiiy through town and was out of action for several months. Thus, both sides lost their field commanders, for General Robert

S. Garnett replaced Porterfield, Wiom a court of inquiry subsequently found guilty of gross negligence for not taking proper precautions against surprise at Philippi.^ 23

Notwithstanding the change of command, disaster continued to fall

upon the Confederates. Garnett split his force between two fortified

positions, placing Lt. Col. John Pegram and approximately 1300 men at

Rich Mountain, vAiile he commanded 5000 troops at Laurel Hill. On July

11, McClellan attacked Rich Mountain, and drove the Confederates from

their positions. Two days later, Pegram surrendered with almost 600 men.

On the same day, Garnett was killed in a skirmish vdiile retreating from

Laurel Hill. Demoralized, the remaining Confederates withdrew to

Monterey. McClellan's victory had been overwhelming in terms of

prisoners and military equipment taken, as well as territory "liberated."

On the strength of these successes, he went east to become commander of

the Arny of the Potomac on July 22.

Further Federal gains occurred in the Kanawha Valley. This area was

more evenly split politically, so the secessionists had managed to

establish effective control with a force of about 4000 men under General

Henry A. Wise, former governor of the state. On July 10, however, four

regiments under Brig. Gen. Jacob D. Cox occupied Point Pleasant, then

advanced up the river. Cox flanked Wise out of his position on Tyler

Mountain, occupied Charleston on July 15, and pursued Wise as far as

Gauley Bridge, vdiich the Confederates burned, where he began constructing

fortifications. Wise's command, weakened by numerous desertions,

retreated to White Sulphur Springs, leaving the Kanav^ia Valley in Union hands.^

Fumbling Confederate attenpts to regain control of the situation met with no success. General John B. Floyd took charge of operations in the 24

Kanawha Valley, but spent most of his effort feuding with Wise, \dio

refused to acknowledge his authority. Both men bombarded their superiors

with letters maligning each other, with charges ranging from blundering

incompetence to a non-cooperative attitude (both of v^ich obviously were

truel). Therefore, coordinated operations against the enemy were

impossible, allowing the Fédérais to consolidate their control. General

Cox later gave Wise special credit for the Union success:

The letters of Wise show a capacity for keeping a command in hot water vdiich was unique. If he had been half as troublesome to me as he vras to Floyd, I should indeed have had a hot time of it. But he did me royal service by preventing anything approaching unity of action between the two principle Confederate columns.

Indeed, events bore out Cox's assertion. In August, Floyd attempted an

offensive against Cox at Gauley Bridge, but Wise failed to attack as

ordered, and the arrival of a Union army from Clarksburg forced Floyd to

retreat. Subsequent public outcry caused the War Department to relieve

Wise of his command, which resolved the leadership feud, but did not

reverse the Southern situation. A Union offensive by General William

S. Rosecrans in November forced Floyd to retreat deep into southwestern

Virginia, from where most of his troops then went to other parts of the Q Confederacy. By December, the Union forces in this area had become an

army of occupation, to enforce Federal authority and protect the region against further Confederate incursions. This state of affairs generally

remained constant for the rest of the war.

Confederate fortunes on the mountain front fared no better. General

William W. Loring took command in July and established defenses at Middle 9 Mountain, Allegheny Mountain, and on the Greenbrier River. However, the 25

troops' demoralization, combined with sickness and shortage of supplies,

kept him on the defensive. Moreover, Loring displayed the same

uncooperative spirit as Wise. When General Robert E. Lee arrived in the

district in August to review the situation and provide advice, Loring

proved jealous of of his authority and haitçiered operations by not

cooperating. Moreover, Lee's effort to gain the offensive by assaulting

the Federal positions at Cheat Mountain and Elkwater Camp with five

columns of troops failed, when the lead column did not attack its

objective, thus forcing cancellation of the operation. Lee then took

Loring's command to the Kanawha Valley, with the same lack of success

already mentioned. Loring's force returned to the mountains until

December, vdien it joined Stonewall Jackson in the Shenandoah Valley.

Small detachments remained guarding the passes, while the Fédérais did

not make any further gains. Thus, the Confederates remained stalemated

in their efforts to reassert control over western Virginia.

In contrast to western Virginia, the Confederates achieved the first

success east of the mountains, when they occupied Harper's Ferry in May,

thereby cutting the B&O for all practical purposes. The rebels, under

Col. Thomas J. Jackson, relieved passing trains of any goods which would aid the Union war effort, vhile the Fédérais inposed a similar blockade on Confederate supplies further east. In mid-June, Brig. Gen. Joseph

E. Johnston, vdio had superseded Jackson, decided that his position was untenable against attack, so he burned all the railroad bridges between

Williamsport and Point of Rocks, and removed or destroyed all supplies and equipment, before retreating to Winchester. This action effectively 26

closed the B&O for several months. Federal troops under General Robert

Patterson pursued, but failed to prevent Johnston from reinforcing the

Southern arny at Manassas, thereby providing the margin of victory in the

first battle of Bull Run. After that battle, Patterson's delays and

caution caused his replacement by Maj. Gen. Nathaniel P. Banks, who

pronptly retreated into Maryland. Union forces established outposts

along the Potomac and reoccupied Harper's Ferry, but made no hostile

advances until October, vhen they captured Romney.^^ Since the

Confederates had only 3000 poorly-trained, demoralized militia at

Winchester, this action caused Stonewall Jackson's return as Valley

commander. Jackson extended his earlier destruction of the B&O and

forced the Union troops to withdraw from Romney, but otherwise the

situation remained unchanged. The Yankees held Harper's Ferry, sealing

the north end of the Valley and the Confederates held Winchester,

retaining control of the produce. In this theater the conflict had

reached a stalemate, which lasted, in a broad sense, until after

Sheridan's campaign in 1864.

Like western Virginia, the area of the state between the Blue Ridge

Mountains and the Lower Potomac also quickly fell under Union control.

Concern for the safety of Washington D.C. led to Federal occupation of key points in this region during May and June. Despite the Confederate victories at Bull Run and Ball's Bluff, this control was not seriously jeopardized. However, the Southern yynpathy that permeated the area ensured that it would become a hotbed of guerrilla activity, particularly near the Shenandoah Valley where Union control was weak. 27

Almost from the time their invasion started, the Union troops faced

a guerrilla problem. As early as June 23, McClellan acknowledged the

guerrilla activity his forces faced in a proclamation to the people of

western Virginia:

— I find that enemies of the United States continue to carry on a system of hostilities prohibited by the laws of war among belligerent nations, and of course far more wicked and intolerable vAien directed against loyal citizens engaged in the defense of the common government of all. Individuals and marauding parties are pursuing a guerrilla warfare, firing upon sentinals and pickets, burning bridges, insulting, injuring and ever killing citizens

...... - m kAA'g «kM W 4*jr V..N.* C n k w w à d *

I do now therefore, make proclamation and warn all persons that individuals or parties engaged in this species of warfare - irregular in every view #iich can be taken of it - thus attacking sentries, pickets, or other soldiers, destroying public or private property, or committing injuries against any of the inhabitants because of Union sentiments or conduct, will be dealt with in their persons and property according to the severest rules of military laws.

McClellan thus established a position that guerrilla warfare was not an acceptable form of war and issued the first threats of punishment for participating in it. However, he viewed the guerrillas' existence as tied to the presence of regular Confederate forces. So long as these forces existed to protect them, the guerrillas would operate. Get rid of them and small units could break up the guerrillas easily. McClellan felt that his own experience proved this view, for after his Rich

Mountain victory he reported to Washington that: "As far as I can now learn the effect of our operations against the larger forces has been to cause the small guerrilla bands to disappear, and I think we shall have no great difficulty in securing the entire pacification of this region.McClellan therefore put little emphasis or effort on actively 28

dealing with the guerrillas. Instead he focused on eliminating the

regular Confederate forces, thereby depriving the guerrillas of their

support. As McClellan's report indicated, he felt the problem virtually

had ended by the time he left western Virginia.

In this matter, as in later ones, McClellan proved a poor judge of

the situation. As the regular Confederate forces retreated or

surrendered, local secessionist sympathizers increasingly took matters

into their own hands. Whatever, their motives - desire to strike a blow

for the Southern cause, a wish to drive out the Northern invaders,

revenge for Confederate defeats, or singly hostility toward their

pro-Federal neighbors - they formed into groups and began attacking Union

targets. These actions escalated from cut telegraph wires and ambushed

couriers to assaults on Federal detachments and Unionist towns. Sniping

at columns of troops also became a common sport. At this time, the bands were more bushvdiackers than true guerrillas. They organized and operated on their own, choosing targets (often their neighbors) more on the basis of opportunity or traditional hostility than effect on the war effort.

Contrary to McClellan's implied assunption, they apparently received no aid from the Confederate authorities other than verbal encouragement.

However, the bands did develop a semi-military organization and as the war progressed, those that survived became closer to true guerrillas - more disciplined, more permanent, and more selective in their targets.

Problems had become evident as early as July 15, \dien a private citizen informed General Cox that guerrillas were scouring the country behind his troops and requested aid in suppressing them. Only a few days later. 29

General Rosecrans learned that a band of forty to fifty guerrillas were

firing into poorly guarded trains between Weston and Bulltown.^^ Clearly

the guerrilla threat was growing rather than decreasing.

As guerrilla activity escalated and civilian demands for protection

increased, Union authorities channeled more effort towards suppressing

the marauders. Cut telegraph wires and murdered couriers were nuisances,

but did not really threaten military operations. Attacks on detachments

might do so however, vdiile protection of loyal civilians was a vital

activity from a political standpoint. Therefore, even in the early

period, when the guerrilla threat seemed minor, the Union commanders

directed some attention to it. Initially they depended on patrols to

seek out concealed arms v^ile in the course of other duties, thereby

rendering the guerrillas ineffective by disarming them. Arrested

guerrillas received their release upon taking an oath of allegiance to

the Federal government. Although these patrols succeeded in capturing or

driving out some guerrillas, they did not clean them out completely. The

guerrillas went into hiding until the troops left the area or,

increasingly, fired on the patrols themselves and fled before the soldiers could respond. This method, therefore, as practiced initially did not diminish the guerrilla threat seriously.

Also in the early stages of the counterguerrilla campaign, the Union authorities considered encouraging the organization of local forces to protect communities from marauders. The same writer who warned Cox of the guerrillas in his rear, offered to raise a force from both the local 30

area and Ohio to deal with them if he received authorization to do so.

However, the author posed several questions v^ich indicated the

difficulties attached to such forces. How should they be raised? How

should they act against the guerrillas? How should they be paid and

provided for? Mhat could Cox do for them?^^ In essence, the authorities

needed to determine wiiat inducements and terms of service they should

offer enlistees, \diat restrictions to iitçose on their actions, v^o would

be responsible for paying and supplying them and how much Federal

assistance to provide. The last three issues were most inportant. The

local forces needed some controls over them to prevent them from being

too harsh (or too lenient) or from becoming marauders themselves and thus

increasing resistance. Moreover, they generally expected extensive

Federal support in terms of arms, equipment, and hopefully funds as well

as troops to provide assistance and legitimacy.

Because of these concerns, the local forces often received limited

encouragement. Apparently the authorities decided that if they were

going to provide most of the support and guidance, they should have

direct authority over the organizations. Some units raised in response

to guerrilla activities entered directly into Federal service, such as

the 11th and 12th (West) Virginia Infantry Regiments. Several

communities also organized scouting conpanies, to provide regular troops with reliable information about the local area. Certainly, some local defense units formed as well, with colorful names such as the "Snake

Hunters" and the "Swanp Dragons". Generally, however, they became scouts also, as the former group did for General Kelley, or required extensive 31

Federal support. For exaitple, Union cavalry had to rescue the "Swairç

Dragons" \dien guerrillas besieged them in their stronghold.^® The lack of

references to such groups after 1661 might indicate that their services

were of limited value and certainly that they were not an inç)ortant

weapon against the guerrillas. Although the Union organized special

counterguerrilla units later in the war, they consisted of regular troops

rather than civilian volunteers.

Another early Federal effort to control guerrilla activity was to

strike an agreement with them. Little information about such deals

exists, but they apparently promised that Union troops would not harass

the guerrillas if the latter ceased hostile activities. However, these

contracts ultimately proved valueless, for depredations continued. For

example, Thomas M. Harris, an ardent western Virginia Unionist, reported

to Rosecrans in November 1861 that the rebels in Gilmer County Wio had

signed such an agreement were now active guerrillas who were robbing

Union men of horses and clothing and chasing them out of the county.

They had signed the agreement only to get the Federal troops to withdraw

and resumed their activities after the Yankees had done so.^^ Such

actions quickly discouraged Union commanders from making further deals

with guerrillas. The sparse mention of such agreements indicates that

they were a rare occurrence, quickly abandoned as a means of guerrilla

control vrfien the passions aroused by the war revealed their worthlessness.

As the various tactics demonstrated their ineffectiveness. Union commanders increasingly turned to some form of retaliation as a means of trying to control the guerrillas. Essentially they favored holding local

civilians responsible in various degrees for any guerrilla activity that

occurred. General Rosecrans formalized this policy in his proclamation

to the Loyal Citizens of West Virginia, dated August 20, vdiich said in

part:

...They [the Richmond authorities] have set neighbor against neighbor and friend against friend; they have introduced a warfare known only among savages. In violation of the laws of nations and humanity, they have proclaimed that private citizens may and ought to make war.

Under this bloody code, peaceful citizens, unarmed travelers and single soldiers have been shot down, and even the wounded and defenseless have been killed; scalping their victims is all that is wanting to make their warfare like that which seventy or eighty years ago was waged by the Indians against the vhite race on this very ground I therefore earnestly exhort you to take the most pronpt and vigorous measures to put a stop to neighborhood and private wars---

...To put an end to the savage war waged by individuals, Wio without warrant of military authority lurk in the bushes and waylay messengers or shoot sentries, I shall be obliged to hold the neighborhood in which these outrages are committed responsible; and unless they raise the hue and cry and pursue the offenders, deal with them as accessories to the crime.

Although vague concerning actual punishments, this proclamation

clearly stated that the Federal commanders expected the citizens to

assist actively in suppressing the guerrillas. Moreover, Rosecrans made plain that he was referring to bushwhackers, rather than commissioned

Confederate forces. He thereby attempted to establish the difference between guerrillas and legitimate trooops as the existence of a military authorization for the unit. He also underscored the Union viewpoint that the guerrillas' actions contravened the laws of war and thus permitted the infliction of special punishment on the perpetrators. 33

Rosecrans' key point, however, remained the holding of civilians

responsible for guerrilla depredations and inflicting harsh punishments

on them. General Kelley, recovered from the wound he received at

Philippi, had became commander of the Railroad District which contained 19 the B&O. He made a similar point in his proclamation to the people of

Kairpshire County and the Upper Potomac, wtien he informed them that "...if

you attenpt to carry on a guerrilla warfare against ny troops, wagon

trains or messengers, or shooting my guards or pickets, you will be

considered as enemies of your country, and treated accordingly.

Although the statement seemed aimed at actual guerrillas, the inference

of local responsibility for such activities remained clear. If the people did not help maintain peace, the Union authorities would treat

them as guerrilla sympathizers.

In practice, the Union method of holding civilians responsible for guerrilla activity took two forms: the threatened execution of hostages and the arrest and deportation of known or suspected rebel sympathizers.

Which response the Fédérais used depended on the type and frequency of guerrilla attacks. For routine activities. Union commanders generally contented themselves with arresting persons suspected of aiding the guerrillas and sending them off to Wheeling or to Camp Chase in Columbus,

Ohio. When guerrillas destroyed some mines at Bulltown. General Cox received instructions to take this step, as well as examine all letters 21 for proof of the participants. Alternatively, the authorities simply took known secessionists as hostages to force the raiders into good behavior. However, this method almost never had an effect. While 34

arresting known or suspected abettors of the guerrillas offered some

promise of curbing them, at least tenporarily, by depriving them of

needed intelligence and assistance, taking random hostages offered little

incentive for the guerrillas to cease since they seldom had a direct

stake in the prisoners' well being.

To a large extent, the Federal taking of hostages grew as a reaction

to similar practices by the Confederates. As part of their effort to

suppress Union sentiment in western Virginia and maintain control over

the region. Confederate forces frequently arrested known Unionists and

shipped them off to Richmond, so that they could not exert influence in

their communities. One of the first instances of this occurred in late

June, when Capt. Albert G. Jenkins, who made a career of conducting raids

into western Virginia, led a party of cavalry to Point Pleasant and

carried off several Unionists. In response, the Fédérais arrested

approximately thirty prominent secessionists and sent them to Canp 22 Chase. whether the intent was to acquire prisoners for exchange, to

provide hostages for the good treatment of the Unionists, or sinply to

retaliate remains unclear.

Initially, Union commanders tried to distance themselves from the

question of Union hostages. Cox could write to Pierpont in August that, vÆiile he wished to get back the people carried off to Richmond, it really was the responsibility of civil authorities to do so and the military 23 should interfere as little as possible. However, the need to discourage this activity caused a rapid shift in viewpoint. Barely two months later. Col. Erastus B. Tyler of the 7th Ohio recommended that the 35

best way to stop marauders in his area was to imprison two secessionists

for every Union man taken.Thus, the Fédérais quickly accepted the

practice of taking hostages.

The problem with the practice of taking civilian hostages, aside

from the fact that it seldom offered the marauders an incentive to cease

their activities, was that the prisoners seldom remained so for long.

The civilians sent to Canp Chase in response to Jenkins' raid were 25 released within a few days, thus negating the purpose of their arrest.

The reason for this policy is unclear, but probably involved an opinion

that the military had no legal right to arrest civilians ‘^o had

committed no actionable crime. This event became a regular occurrence.

The military would arrest civilians, and send them to Camp Chase, but the

authorities there released them. Pierpont complained to Rosecrans about

this practice, saying that it nullified his efforts to secure the release

of Unionists held in Richmond, but apparently with little effect.Even

known bushwiackers sent to Camp Chase soon returned to their old haunts,

with unfortunate results for both sides. In frustration at seeing these men return, whom they had captured with much difficulty. Union troops

stopped taking prisoners in many cases. Instead, captured guerrillas 27 suffered unfortunate, fatal "accidents" on their way back to camp.

While this practice solved the immediate problem of recycling specific guerrillas, it probably made counterguerrilla operations more difficult, since the Southerners now had no reason to surrender peacefully, but instead literally had to fight for their lives. Therefore, taking civilian prisoners was not an effective means of controlling the guerrillas. 36

For actual bushvrtiacking and the committing of atrocities. Union

commanders quickly developed a more brutal policy of executing prisoners.

In some instances, they applied a life-for-a-life policy directly against

the guerrillas, killing those vho fell into their hands. In one case,

Lt. Col. B. R. Durfee received approval to apply this method against

those bushvhackers who had been attacking his couriers and committing 28 other savage practices. At other times, the Fédérais used this

punishment on local civilians, vhom they held responsible for maintaining

the peace. For example, when bushvhackers took to firing on his pickets

and teamsters. Col. W. S. Smith took a local man prisoner and threatened 29 to hang him if his neighbors did not clear the country of guerrillas.

Whether Smith's superiors approved this tactic remains unknown, as does

the ultimate outcome of the threat. In any case, the effectiveness of

this policy is doubtful, for it probably enhanced hostility to the

Federal government. Since it apparently fell on both Northern and

Southern sympathizers, as well as neutrals, it would weaken the loyalty

of the first group, strengthen the resolve of the second, and cause the

third to favor the South. Given subsequent events, the policy certainly

did not reduce guerrilla activity significantly.

Still another anti-guerrilla method that the Union authorities

considered was the establishment of fixed garrisons to provide passive

protection to the surrounding area. To a large extent, this practice

aimed at defense against the operations of organized Confederate forces, with control of the guerrillas as an additional interim measure.

However, some authorities recommended applying this idea primarily 37

against the guerrillas. As early as August, Governor William Dennison of

Ohio proposed to Rosecrans that stationing a cortpany of troops in each

county in western Virginia would provide an excellent way to suppress the

extensive guerrilla activities there.Governor Pierpont also made

frequent demands for expanded Federal protection of the region. While

tills proposal represented a rather extreme (and impractical) solution by

politicians concerned primarily with protecting all the citizens and

voters, some military officers considered establishing garrisons at key

points in hostile areas, such as at Romney, primarily to break up

guerrilla bands operating there.In practice, these garrisons did

provide a source of stability and protection for their region, as well as

immediately available troops for more active operations against

marauders. Garrisons therefore became an inportant feature of

anti-guerrilla operations during the course of the war.

The most effective answer to the guerrilla problem proved to be more

aggressive patrolling and pursuit of the marauders. Union commanders

determined that, vdiile this method did not discourage the guerrillas, the

constant harrassment wore them down and therefore made capturing or

killing them easier. Since it could reduce the problem by eliminating numbers of notorious guerrillas, the Fédérais pursued it extensively.

The guerrilla war thus became a cat and mouse game, with each side trying

to surprise and ambush the other. Although not always successful, the method did provide substantive results.

An exaitple of the less successful forays occurred in July, v^en

Union troops from Beverly, vdio fell into an ambush, retreated, abandoning 38

three wounded men. The escorted ambulance that picked up the sole

surviving soldier three days later also got bushwhacked, forcing the

original survivor to return to Beverly afoot. In retaliation, a force of

250 men went back out beyond the first ambush site, burned the homes of a

number of known secessionists, then got ambushed in its turn. In

response, the commander left fourteen marksmen to do some bushvAacking of

their own. Two days later these men returned without having seen any

targets. In this instance the Union clearly came off second best in the

guerrilla game.

In contrast to these failures, however, the Fédérais achieved some

spectacular successes against the guerrillas. Many of them were the work

of the 36th Ohio Infantry under Col. George Crook. A West Point graduate and veteran of the 1850's Indian cançaigns in the Pacific Northwest,

Crook displayed an aggressiveness and talent for counterguerrilla warfare which the Union forces in general sadly lacked. With the 36th stationed at Summersville in a guerrilla-infested region, one of Crook's first actions was to scatter his officers throughout the area to l e a m the country and the people thoroughly. This knowledge of the inhabitants and the terrain quickly paid off in the successful capture of many guerrillas, since it enabled the officers to identify probable bushvAiackers and sympathizers, as well as anticipate their movements. However, Crook's prisoners were among those recycled from Caitp Chase, which caused his troops to kill their captives instead of bringing them in for release.

According to Crook's own statement, he "had to burn out all of Webster

County to get rid of the bushvdiackers",^^ but he achieved his goal. 39

Crook's regiment also proved adept at using the guerrillas' tactics

against them. When three guerrillas from Greenbrier County raided his

area. Crook secretly blocked two passes that they would return by with

troops. While the force he commanded personally had no luck, the second

troop surprised and killed the raiders.In another exaitple, a band of 135

guerrillas siezed and burned the town of Sutton in December. Crook

pursued them, killed six and scattered the rest towards the Glades in

Webster County, a noted guerrilla base. The following day, six coitpanies

of (West) Virginia cavalry and infantry under Col. Henry Anisansel

entered the Glades, killed another twenty-two people and burned

twenty-six houses, thereby breaking up this guerrilla band and destroying

its stronghold.These incidents not only illustrated the effectiveness

of guerrilla tactics as a counterguerrilla method when directed by a

conpetent commander, but also ended significant bushwhacker activity in

the region.

Aggressive patrolling in other parts of the region also met with

success. On December 15, a coitçany of scouts under a Capt. John P. Baggs

attacked and routed a band of bushwackers in Roane County. They killed

five guerrillas, including a noted one named Lowerburn, wounded several

more, burned the houses the rebels were in, and took nine prisoners, plus

six horses and a yoke of oxen. Although not a major victory, this affair

illustrated the Union forces' continued reduction of the guerrillas and their leaders.

One further Federal problem was the activities of Col. J. N.

Clarkson, commander of Floyd's cavalry, who conducted an active scouting 40

and raiding caitçaign against the Union occupation forces. In October,

vdiile conducting a reconaissance of the Kanavdia Valley, his troopers

fired on and damaged a steamboat, broke up elections in two localities, 38 and took forty "disloyal citizens" as prisoners, among other actions.

This raid stirred up the countryside and caused the arrest several 39 known secessionists in retaliation. Two weeks later, Clarkson seized

Guyandotte and killed or captured 146 of the 150 men belonging to the

Ninth (West) Virginia Infantry, which was organizing there. He left

just before the arrival of 200 men of the 5th (West) Virginia Infantry,

supported by some Ohio Home Guards. In revenge for the attack, which

they believed local secessionists had instigated, the Home Guards

burned the town.'**^

Clarkson's activities demonstrated how the actions of regular troops

spilled over into the guerrilla war. His raids caused Union forces to

commit retaliatory arrests and destruction, just as they did in the case

of guerrillas. Indeed, the official report of the Guyandotte attack

referred to Clarkson as "the guerrilla chief"and Union officers

reported that his activities encouraged other marauders. Clarkson was

one of the first Confederate cavalry officers to receive this designation. He was not the last.

By the end of 1861 the situation in western Virginia had stabilized to its condition for the rest of the war. The Union a my controlled an area bounded by the mountains on the east and the Kanawha Valley on the south. Small Confederate forces occupied the region below the Kanavdia 41

and periodically threatened the Fédérais' lines. However, aside from a

few big raids, which were little more than large-scale guerrilla actions,

the Confederates did not invade western Virginia again. The war here became almost conçletely a guerrilla war. The Union forces' sole purpose was to protect the loyal citizens, from the Confederates in the state's southern portion and the guerrillas in their midst. Their methods were occupation, aggressive patrolling and pursuit and retaliation. Although this struggle continued until 1865, Federal control never received a serious threat, nor did it influence canpaigns elsevdiere. In effect, for western Virginia the Civil War became a private, counterguerrilla war. 42

Chapter I Notes

1. George Ellis Moore, A Banner in the Hills. (New York; Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1963), pp. 3-4.

2. Ibid., p. 2.

3. Ibid., pp. 81-84.

4. Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan to Col. E. D. Townsend, 27 May 1861, The War of the Rebellion; A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. (128 vols.; Washington, D.C., 1880-1901), Ser. I, Vol. II, pp. 44-46; Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan to Col. E. D. Townsend, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. II, pp. 49-50; Moore, Banner in the Hills, pp. 70-71.

5. General Orders No. 30, Headquarters of the Forces, 4 July 1861, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. II, pp. 72-74; Special Orders No. 67, Adjutant and Inspector Generals Office, 8 June 1861, Official Records, Ser. I, Vol. II, p. 915; Moore, Banner in the Hills, p. 74.

6. [R. V. Johnson and C. C. Buel] eds.. Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, vol. 1; From Sumter to Shiloh. (New York; Castle Books, 1956), pp. 137-142; B. G. Henry A. Wise to Gen. R. E. Lee, 4 August 1861, Official Records, Ser. I, Vol. V, pp. 769-770; Moore, Banner in the Hills, pp. 102-103.

7. Johnson and Buel, Battles and Leaders, p. 145.

8. Johnson and Buel, Battles and Leaders, p. 143-148; Moore, Banner in the Hills, pp. 104-110, 115-117.

9. Gen. R. E. Lee to Brig. Gen. W. W. Loring, 20 July 1861, Official Records, Ser. I, Vol. II, p. 986.

10. Moore, Banner in the Hills, pp. 112-115.

11. Ibid., pp. 122-126.

12. Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan to the Inhabitants of Western Virginia, 23 July 1861, Official Records, Ser. I, Vol. II, p. 196.

13. Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan to Col. E. D. Townsend, 15 July 1861, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. II, p. 211.

14. B. D. McGinnis to Gen. Jacob D. Cox, 15 July 1861, Military Archives Division, Records of U.S. Arity Continental Commands 1821-1920, Geographical Departments, Divisions, and Military Districts, Record Group 393 (hereafter cited as Departments, RG. 393), National 43

Archives, Washington D.C.; Col. Lytle to Gen. William S. Rosecrans, 21 July 1861, Departments, RG. 393.

15. McGinnis to Cox, 15 July 1861.

16. Virgil Carrington Jones, Gray Ghosts and Rebel Raiders. (New York; Henry Holt and Company, 1956), p. 64.

17. Thomas M. Harris to Gen. William S. Rosecrans, 9 November 1861, Departments, RG. 393.

18. Brig. Gen. W. S. Rosecrans to the Loyal Citizens of Western Virginia, 20 August 1861, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. V, pp. 576-577.

19. General Orders No. 20, Department of West Virginia, 20 December 1861, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. V, p. 691.

20. Brig. Gen. B. F. Kelley to the People of Hempshire County and the Upper Potomac, 28 October 1861, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. V, pp. 638-339.

21. Gen. John C. Fremont to Gen. Jacob D. Cox, N.D., Departments, RG. 393.

22. Clement A. Evans, ed.. Confederate Military History, Vol. 11: Maryland and West Virginia. (Secaucus; Blue and Gray Press, N.D.), p. 25.

23. Gen. Jacob D. Cox to Francis H. Pierpont, 14 August 1861, Departments, RG. 393.

24. Col. E. B. Tyler to Gen. William S. Rosecrans, N.D., Departments, RG. 393.

25. Evans, West Virginia, p. 25.

26. H. J. Samuels to Gen. William S. Rosecrans, 4 December 1861, Departments, RG. 393.

27. Martin F. Schmitt, ed.. General George Crook His Autobiography. (Norman; University of Oklahoma Press, 1946), p. 87.

28. Gen. Robert C. Schenck to George S. Hartsuff, N.D., Departments, RG. 393.

29. Col. W. S. Smith to Gen. William S. Rosecrans, 11 August 1861, Departments, RG. 393.

30. William Dennison to Gen. William S. Rosecrans, 9 August 1861, Departments, RG. 393. 44

31. Brig. Gen. E. W. Lander to General McClellan, 16 January 1862, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. V, p. 702.

32. Jones, Gray Ghosts, p. 44.

33. Schmitt, Crook Autobiography, p. 87.

34. Ibid., p. 88.

35. Ibid.

36. Record of Events, Department of Western Virginia, December 1861, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. V, p. 496.

37. Ibid., p. 468.

38. Col. J. N. Clarkson to Gen. John B. Floyd, N.D., Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. V, p. 377-378; John B. Floyd to Secretary of War, 27 October 1861, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. V, p. 924.

39. Col. E. B. lyler to Gen. William S. Rosecrans, 29 October 1861, Departments, RG. 393.

40. Moore, Banner in the Hills, p. 18; J. C. Wheeler to Gen. W. S. Rosecrans, 13 November 1861, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. V, p. 411-412.

41. J. C. Wheeler to Gen. W. S. Rosecrans, 13 November 1861, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. V, p. 411. CHAPTER II

"Milroy was Here"

For the Union soldiers in the Virginia mc:antains and along the

railroad lines, 1862 probably offered more frustrations and disappointed

hopes than any other year of the war. Campaigns which seemed sure to

crush the Confederates ended in Federal reverses, while at times, the

Confederates threatened to reverse the Union successes of 1861 and retake

Virginia entirely. Yet, by the end of the year virtually nothing had

changed. The Fédérais held essentially the same lines as they had twelve

months earlier and performed essentially the same activities against

essentially the same foes. The pattern of their lives for the remainder

of the war had become established.

A number of major cançaigns occurred in or affected northern and

western Virginia during 1862. In the late spring Stonewall Jackson

undertook his whirlwind campaign through the Shenandoah Valley, which

drew all of the available Union field forces from the surrounding region

into a futile effort to entrap him. At the same time, the Fédérais

attempted an offensive in western Virginia, but they had achieved little

success. After a brief respite \diile the Confederates settled the

Peninsula problem. General Robert E. Lee, now commanding the main

Southern field army, undertook a campaign in northern Virginia against

General John Pope, vdiich climaxed in Pope's smashing defeat at the second

Bull Run. With hardly a pause, Lee then launched an invasion of

45 46

Maryland, that culminated in the Union strategic victory at Antietam.

Simultaneously, Confederate forces under General Albert Jenkins undertook

an extensive raid through western Virginia in conjunction with a second

offensive there, vdiich again achieved few substantive results. Finally

the Union debacle at Fredericksburg closed out the year. Since all of

these càiiçaigns placed demands on the troops in Virginia, 1862 was the most active year they would experience.

And in between these campaigns, there were the guerrillas, always the ubiquitous guerrillas. The Union belief, based on the successes of

1861, that it had them under control and almost eliminated proved mistaken. The guerrillas continued their activities and became more daring and more numerous than the previous year. In fact, 1862 marked a major milestone for the guerrilla war, because the Confederates launched their experiment in providing full authorization and support for guerrilla activities. Governor John Letcher of Virginia, followed by the

Confederate government, issued commissions to raise partisan units to operate as guerrillas against the eneny. This action flooded northern and western Virginia with partisan bands, vdiile at the same time it provided encouragement to independent groups to escalate their activities, thus harassing the Union forces to distraction.

However, 1862 also was the last year that independent guerrilla bands were a major force in Federal concerns. Union countermeasures resulted in the capture or death of so many bushvdiackers vrtio were outmaneuvered, inept or merely unlucky, that their numbers dwindled as rapidly as they had increased. Moreover, the appearance of talented. 47

commissioned partisan leaders ■wtio attracted the best men to their units

reduced the independents' support. Virtually all of the major partisan

commanders - Hanse McNeill, Elijah V. "Lige" White, Harry Gilmor, John

D. imboden and at the very end of the year, John S. Mosby - commenced

their activities in 1862. Henceforce, while independent guerrilla bands

remained a nuisance, these leaders dominated the guerrilla war.

Another major feature of 1862 was that the Federal government made

its only effort to establish a clear and consistent policy concerning

treatment of guerrillas. It classified guerrillas into different types

and specified the rights accorded to each. Although it was a laudable

effort to establish a standard policy, in practice local commanders

continued to apply their own methods. Coupled with the continuation and

expansion of the Fédérais' counterguerrilla tactics, as well as the

increase in Confederate guerrilla activity, this issue made 1862 an

especially active year for the counterguerrilla war.

The first three months of the year, however, were relatively quiet.

Few reports of guerrilla activity disturbed the Union troops in their winter quarters, almost as if the commanders vdio claimed the bushv^acker problem had been settled were correct. Admittedly small bands of guerrillas still remained, but they now directed their energies against

Unionist civilians rather than Federal troops. They carried off leading

Union men and harassed the remainder with threats and destruction of property. Their continued depredations soon resulted in newspaper reports that the Unionists of western Virginia were victims of relentless 48

persecution by guerrillas. This outcry in turn caused the concerned

politicians to blame the army, specifically General William S. Rosecrans,

for the situation. Early in Match, Ohio Senator Benjamin F. Wade

conplained to Edwin M. Stanton that Rosecrans had caused the inhabitants'

sufferings because he had put his troops into winter quarters, thereby

leaving them vulnerable to the guerrillas.^ Rosecrans' transfer took

place the following day, too soon for this specific complaint to have

caused it. Admittedly, the Fédérais did attenpt to stop the guerrillas'

harassment of civilians by pursuing a retaliatory policy of arresting

noted rebels and confiscating property to reimburse Unionists for their

losses, but basically they carried on a reactive policy that had little 2 effect against the foe. The message was clear that the arny needed to

develop a more effective defense against the guerrillas.

As an effort to achieve this effectiveness on March 11, the first

major military reorganization of western Virginia took place as part of

President Abraham Lincoln's War Order No. 3; " the country west of the

Department of the Potomac and east of the Department of the Mississippi

be a military department, to be called the Mountain Department, and that

the same be commanded by Maj. Gen. John C. Fremont."^ By providing a

unified command for this region, Lincoln expected that the troops there

to mount an offensive to destroy the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad and

hopefully occupy Eastern Tennessee, where Union sentiment was strong.

Also, Lincoln expected the unified command of western and northern

Virginia to provide better protection for the areas, particularly the

Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, whose defense was another of Lincoln's 49

favorite concerns.^ Although the Department's primary opponent was the

regular Confederate army, it also should control the guerrilla problem

more effectively by better coordination of the troops' activities.

Upon assuming command, Fremont found that the Mountain Department,

which included parts of Maryland, Kentucky, Tennessee, and Virginia, as

well as most of western Virginia, contained approximately 35,000 troops

scattered through six military districts. East of the Alleghanies to the

Department of the Potomac lay approximately 2800 men. South of the

railroad lines, between the Alleghanies, the Gauley Valley and the

Weston-Summervilie Road was the Cheat Mountain District, with 6000 troops

under Brig. Gen. Robert H. Milroy. The territory north, west and on the

railroad lines was General Benjamin P. Kelley's Railroad District, held

by 4000 men. The Guyandotte and Kanavrfia Valleys made up the District of

the Kanawha under General Jacob D. Cox, with approximately 12,000

soldiers. The Districts of the Valley of the Big Sandy River, commanded

by Col. James A. Garfield and the District of the Gap, west of the Big

Sandy Valley and commanded by Col. Samuel F. Carter had estimated

strengths of 4400 and 4700 men respectively.^ However, Fremont soon

received instructions that the troops in these latter two districts were

not subject to his authority, thereby reducing his forces to 26,000 men.^

Moreover, in the other districts, except the Cumberland District, the

troops were not concentrated, but scattered by regiments and conpanies at many locations. Before undertaking offensive operations, therefore,

Fremont faced the task of identifying the vital garrisons and

consolidating the remaining troops into a single force. 50

As Fremont prepared to go over to the offensive, however, the

Confederacy began actions designed to encourage increased guerrilla

activity in its Union-occupied areas. In March 1862, Governor Letcher

published a proclamation calling for the formation of guerrilla companies

in the occupied portions of Virginia and to promote it, began issuing

coiTttidssions to organize ten conpanies of Partisan Rangers. Although

officially mustered into state military service, these units would

operate independently in their local areas. A month later, the

Confederate Congress followed suit with the Partisan Ranger Act of ^ r i l

21 which authorized the organization of independent units to wage

irregular warfare under the local departmental commanders' direction.^

These authorizations represented a reversal of Confederate policy.

Only a few month earlier. Confederate Secretary of War Judah P. Benjamin

had announced that "Guerrilla companies are not recognized as part of the military organization of the Confederate States and cannot be authorized g by this department." Like their Northern counterparts, most Confederate officials felt bothered by the implications of guerrilla warfare, with its lawlessness, indiscipline and its aura of a 'dishonest' type of war.

Moreover, they may have worried about their capability to protect

Southern citizens from reprisals, as well as the guerrillas themselves from execution if captured. However, the clamor of Confederates in the occupied regions for defense against the Yankees and the inability of regular forces to provide it made some form of local service necessary.

Also, the obvious appeal of local, as opposed to regular, service promised to increase the number of men actively fighting the Fédérais. 51

Therefore, popular deirand led the Confederate governiûent to support

guerrilla operations.

Nevertheless, the South sought to avoid the onus attached to

guerrilla war by avoiding the term in favor of 'Partisan Ranger' and by

connecting these bands to the regular military establishment. According

to the Act of April 21, Rangers were enrolled in the regular service and g subject to the same regulations as other troops. They received the same

pay as regular soldiers, but also earned the full value of all arms and

munitions captured from the Fédérais - an added bonus which applied "the

rules of privateering to land war to attract those whose patriotism

needed bolstering by the prospect of profit.The authorities also

expected Rangers to wear Confederate uniforms, thereby proclaiming their

identity and entitling them to the considerations of the recognized rules

of war. In essence, these men seemed more an elite militia than a true

guerrilla force.

Response to the partisan ranger acts was overwhelming. Virginia quickly exceeded its quota of ten coirpanies, but sidestepped the limit by enrolling units directly into regular cavalry organizations, particularly

Turner Ashby's in the Shenandoah Valley, and then detaching them for local service.Numerous other units sprang up throughout the Confederacy as result of the government's authorization. Most important, though, was the fact that a number of men \dio would become the stars of the partisan effort received their commissions to raise ranger bands. Col. John

D. Imboden began organizing a force in western Virginia, as did John 52

Hanson "Hanse" McNeill, v^o had returned to his state of birth after

fighting with Sterling Price's army in Missouri. In the Shenandoah

Valley, Harry Gilmor and Elijah V. "Lige" White, both natives of

Maryland, raised their own conç)anies attached to Ashby's command, in

which they had been serving. Along with Mosby, vrfio appeared later, these

men directed the partisan effort in Virginia for the remainder of the

war.

Fremont and the other Union commanders quickly felt the effects of

the Confederacy's new policy. Early in j^ril, guerrillas attacked a

force of Union infantry near Romney and inflicted several casualties

before Union cavalry under Lt. Col. Stephen W. Downey of the Potomac Home

Brigade arrived and drove them off. The Fédérais reported killing 12 several guerrillas, including the leader, and capturing twenty. A few days later, a mixed force of cavalry and infantry pursuing guerrillas in

Webster County fell into an ambush. A running skirmish of several hours ensued, during which the guerrillas "were assailed in their own style", before the Union troops routed them, killing twelve and capturing five.^^ From the Railroad District, Kelley reported that local men were returning from the Confederate A m y with Letcher's commissions to recruit mounted rangers "for the purpose of carrying on a system of guerrilla 14 warfare." In Upshur county. Col. Thomas M. Harris reported formidible guerrilla forces threatened him from the surrounding counties.

Even General George Crook complained with frustration that the guerrillas were becoming impossible to catch because they could disperse into the mountains and only fight if they wanted to. He argued that in order to 53

stop the bushwhacking, he needed to seize the guerrilla stronghold at

Lewisburg and then clean out Greenbrier County, which supported them.^^

East of the mountains, guerrilla activity increased also. Soldiers

reported many guerrilla movements in the Shenandoah, where Letcher's

proclamation sent numerous citizens and disguised soldiers stalking

pickets and stragglers. Attacks on the telegraph lines became so

frequent that the Fédérais began providing cavalry guards for them.^^

Coupled with the actions of Ashby's cavalry and the stirrings of

Jackson's aimy, these stings made the Northern soldiers' lives both tense

and miserable. In short, throughout northern and western Virginia, the

Union forces found themselves assailed even more fiercely by a foe they

had thought suppressed.

Fremont himself quickly discovered the extent of the guerrilla

threat. Early in April he reported to Stanton that documents found on

captured rebels revealed the organization of a systematic plan of guerrilla warfare for western Virginia, sanctioned by the Richmond legislature and the Confederate Congress. Clearly Letcher's proclamation and partisan ranger commissions had come west rapidly. Fremont further announced that he had ordered his commanders to "use their utmost 18 exertions to break up and destroy these parties." Nevertheless, Fremont did not see the guerrillas as a major threat to his operations, for he continued plans for an offensive against the Southern railroads. He believed Kelley's forces and the Virginia troops left behind would provide the region with sufficient protection from the partisans. 54

Fremont and his commanders did agree that one of the most effective

tools of counterguerrilla warfare was cavalry. In his report to Stanton,

Fremont said that he needed more cavalry armed with carbines or short 19 Enfield rifles to deal with the partisans properly. Kelley in his

report of the presence of partisan recruiters, requested the return of

the Ringgold Cavalry and the Washington Cavalry, then with Nathaniel

P. Banks in the Shenandoah, because they had thorough knowledge of the

country and thus could help frustrate the rebels' scheme.These requests

seemed logical, for cavalry provided the mobile force needed to harass

the guerrillas and keep them off balance by rapid movement. However, the

nuTiJjer of cavalry available for service in the Mountain Department

amounted to only twenty-eight companies: slightly over 2000 men,

scattered in coitçany-sized units throughout the various districts, 21 thereby weakening their effectiveness. Moreover, many of these units

lacked arms, horses, and/or equipment, making them a useless burden on the commanders. A letter to General James W. Ripley, chief of the Union

Ordnance Department, at the end of 1861, reported that the cavalry lacked sufficient arms and therefore did no service for the government vhile costing $3000 dollars a day. The author pleaded for Sharps carbines to finish arming them, arguing that the roads were so bad cavalry was the 22 chief reliance for repressing marauders. Fremont's request, mentioned above, showed that the problem remained unresolved when he assumed command. Also, Fremont reported that he found one cavalry regiment 23 inactive because it lacked horses. In summary, while the commanders on the spot recognized the importance of cavalry for counterguerrilla operations, the number available was too small and insufficiently 55

equipped to perform their functions with full effectiveness. As a

result, requests for additional mounted troops flowed from the Federal

commanders in this region throughout the war.

Fremont's instructions to the troops remaining behind for

suppressing the guerrillas visualized an active defense strategy. They

would protect the local citizens from guerrillas "by the establishment of

a few posts strongly held, from vÈiich sudden and frequent attacks can be

made upon any organizations existing or forming in the department.He

further instructed his commanders to use their utmost exertions to

destroy the guerrillas, applying the eneny's o.vn tactics of rapid marches

both day and night, vigorous attacks v^enever possible, and severe 25 measures to discourage the partisans. In other words, despite the

shortage of cavalry, Fremont expected his troops to press the guerrillas

relentlessly. The Union anty would keep them off balance and wear them down until they all were dead or prisoners. Clearly he understood that

the Fédérais could not permit the guerrillas to rest unmolested and that only aggressive action against them could keep them under control.

In addition to encouraging vigorous pursuit of guerrillas, Fremont experimented with the formation of an elite unit to combat them. In late i^ril, he created a force known as the "Jessie Scouts," supposedly named after his wife, Jessie Benton Fremont. Numbering twenty-five men and wearing civilian clothes or Confederate uniforms, tliis band scouted the countryside for information about guerrillas and Southern troops. All of its members had fought under Frémont in Missouri and had been hand-picked 56

for this new organization. Unfortunately, the Jessie Scouts apparently

provided small service to the war effort and soon acquired a reputation

as bad as the guerrillas. After Fremont resigned from the a m y that

summer, the organization collapsed. Its members began wearing gaudy

uniforms and spending all of their time in the cities, rather than

scouting the eneiiy in the field. They committed numerous crimes and

disturbances of the peace, thereby establishing themselves as a lawless 26 band concealed in Union uniforms. Within the year the authorities

disbanded them, and they vanished from the record.

Although this attençt at establishing an elite, special purpose unit

ended in failure, the idea remained common in the Union forces. Shortly

after the Jessie Scouts first appeared. Lieutenant Colonel Downey

recommended the formation of a special anti-guerrilla unit as the best

method of clearing out the partisans. He suggested organizing a

battalion of 500 men to hunt them down, using the guerrillas' own mode of 27 warfare if necessary. However, his superiors apparently took no action on this idea, for no further mention of such an organization occurred.

Nevertheless, the concept continued to surface at regular intervals.

Fremont's commanders exerted themselves greatly to carry out these instructions. Early in j^ril, Kelley sent part of the 6th West Virginia

Infantry under Captain John H. Showalter to kill or capture seven men whom Letcher had commissioned to raise companies in the region: John

Righter, John Anderson, David Barker, Brice Welsh, John Knight, and

Washington Smith. Assisted by the Boothsville Home Guards, a local militia unit, Showalter's troops killed Barker, as well as two men of 57

28 Righter's conpany. Two weeks later, three Union forces converged on

the village of Addison in an effort to destroy the partisan bands in the

region. The Fédérais captured two bushvrfiackers, killed at least ten,

recovered a number of stolen horses and other goods, as well as burned

Addison for being a guerrilla rendezvous. They also captured the muster

roll of a local guerrilla company, the Webster Dare Devils, which 29 provided the means for breaking up the band. Two days later, a party of

twenty-five cavalry scouting for guerrillas fell into an ambush by almost

fifty partisans, losing three men killed. Hov.ever, they drove the rebels

into a nearby house from vrtiich they fled vrfien Federal reinforcements

arrived. The guerrillas lost several dead and wounded, including their

leader, a Colonel Parsons, as well as five men taken prisoner.A month

later. Colonel Downey chased down another guerrilla band Wiich had murdered a party of officers and convalescent soldiers at Wardensville.

This force killed the guerrilla chief. Captain John umbaugh (who held one of Letcher's commissions) and four other rebels, wounded four, and took twelve prisoners. Ironically, Downey reported that Umbaugh was wearing clothing taken from a dead Federal in an earlier skirmish.Other successful actions included the surprise of a guerrilla band on the

Savers River by a force under Col. George R. Latham, Wiich cost the partisans four men killed, including their captain, several wounded and 32 thirty guns destroyed. Another Federal force under Lt. Col. Thomas

M. Harris captured three noted guerrillas near Buckhannon, along with eleven other prisoners and some arms, besides killing three bushwhackers and wounding five.^^ Thus, in two months the Union forces inflicted 58

numerous casualties on the guerrillas, especially their leadership, while

suffering minimal losses themselves during the operations. On the basis

of such results, Kelley reported to the Secretary of War in early June

that the "guerrillas are either killed captured or driven out of most of

the counties of northwestern Virginia.

Kelley had a capacity to evaluate the enemy's condition second only

to George B. McClellan's. Only two weeks prior to his message, one Union

army captain reported guerrillas thickly infesting his area and suggested

sending two parties of twenty men each to drive them dov.’n the Mud River

into the 11th Pennsylvania infantry, thereby trapping and destroying

them.^^ This plan represented one of the most ambitious anti-guerrilla

measures, involving as it did the coordination of three separate forces

to herd them into a trap. Its aggressive thrust against a specific

large-scale objective contrasted favorably with most anti-guerrilla

sorties, vdiich, even vdien aggressively pursued, often lacked a defined

goal beyond frightening off bushwhackers and capturing any the patrol

stumbled across. Unfortunately no record surfaced of vhether this

operation was undertaken or if so, the extent of its success.

Furthermore, a week after Kelley's report, Fremont directed Colonel

Harris to furnish guards for the telegraph line between Clarksburg and

Gauley, because the guerrillas were destroying the wire so regularly that the telegraph superintendent wanted to take it down.^^ East of the mountains, guerrillas had cut the telegraph between Harper's Ferry and

Winchester, forcing the establishment of a chain of mounted couriers to maintain communications.^^ They also threatened the Manassas Gap Railroad, 59

keeping the forces guarding it in a state of panic. Clearly the

guerrillas remained unsuppressed. Union officers also blamed civilian

apathy for reducing local efforts to stop the partisans. Whatever the

reason, the Union needed to apply itself more diligently to dealing with

them.

In an attenpt to control the guerrillas' movements, the Union

commanders began coitpelling local citizens to take an oath of allegiance

to the Federal government and to requiring travelers to have passes 38 properly countersigned by local officers. Both ideas proved better in

theory than in practice. The former one depended on a person's

unwillingness to swear to a lie, a trait many Southerners lacked. To

reassure those Southerners who did feel guilty about taking the oath, the

Confederate government proclaimed that it was not binding, since the 39 individual had been forced to take it. Therefore, guerrillas took it

freely and often, resuming their depredations at the next opportunity. A

number of Federal reports pointed up this practice, but apparently the

Union never found an effective means of enforcing the oaths. The passes were somewhat more effective, but were sufficiently easy to obtain that

they did not hinder the guerrillas significantly.

Although the Fédérais recognized the Confederate Partisan Ranger

commissions as a major cause of the upsurges in guerrilla activity, other

contributions also seemed evident. Assigning base personal motives to the enemy, one diarist reported that plunder and whisky were the guerrillas major stimuli.The same writer attributed the guerrille success to the fact that Union troops carelessly gave local families 60

information concerning a my matters and pickets, thereby providing the

partisans with valuable intelligence enabling them to make successful

raids.

One particular incident during this period illustrated that the

Union forces still held an ambiguous attitude toward dealing with

guerrillas. On May 17, three guerrillas led by Captain George Downs,

came into Spencer, then under control of Col. John C. Rathbone of the

11th West Virginia infantry. Stating that a messenger from General

Kelley had requested them to come in, they negotiated a truce with

Colonel Rathbone, under which both sides would cease fighting for eight

days vhiile Down's men visited their families without fear of molestation

by civil or military authorities. At the end of this time, the

guerrillas either would surrender as prisoners of war or go join the

Confederate a my, whichever they decided to do. In either case, they

would have a further twenty days to carry out their decision. Messengers

from both sides would exchange communications every other day. In

keeping with the truce, two days later Rathbone granted a pass to one of

Downs' lieutenants to visit another guerrilla band in Braxton county and

ordered the release of a notorious guerrilla ^diom the local sheriff had

just arrested.

Kelley, however, "unqualifiedly disapproved of the vhole

arrangement."^" Although he did not deny sending the original messenger

to Captain Downs, Kelley did not condone conducting formal negotiations with the guerrillas as if they were legitimate eneny forces. He 61

instructed Rathbone to revoke the armistice at once and inform Captain

Downs that the only terms offered were protection for his men if they

would lay down their arms, return to their homes, and take the oath of

allegiance to the U.S. Government. Otherwise, Rathbone was to kill or

capture their whole force at once. In other words, Kelley offered the

guerrillas a 'surrender or die' ultimatum. Although the outcome of this

incident was not recorded, one suspects that the guerrillas accepted

neither choice, but instead continued their raids until the Fédérais

overcame them or the war ended.

The vdiole affair illustrated the conflicts which existed within the

Union Anry concerning how to handle the guerrillas which in turn revealed

the general lack of knowledge about how to control them effectively. On

the one hand were those officers vAio, through expediency or decency

wished to treat the guerrillas as regular combatants, thereby keeping

them from committing greater atrocities. On the other hand were those

officers who believed that only a harsh, uncompromising policy would

stanp out the guerrilla problem. This attitude reflected the concept that guerrilla war was not fair or legitimate. Generally, the common soldiers agreed with the second viewpoint. One soldier in the Shenandoah

Valley in the spring of 1862 wrote that guerrillas should be hanged

Whenever caught and their houses burned, or the Union should take local secessionists as hostages and hang one for every death caused by guerrillas. However the government was too soft to pursue such a course, so "we must conciliate the greatest scoundrels that ever went unhung [sic]."^^ While the Fédérais did not pursue a harsh policy to 62

this degree, the proponents of strictness increasingly dominated the

anti-guerrilla war.

While the Union forces pursued these multiple activities, a second

command reorganization at the of June eliminated the Mountain Department.

Fremont's offensive plans never developed because, almost immediately

after he had taken command, Lincoln diverted Fremont's field forces to

trap Stonewall Jackson in the Shenandoah Valley. Simultaneously, the

Fédérais under General Cox, with 9,000 men, undertook a limited offensive

in western Virginia to destroy the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad at

Princeton defended by 1,400 Confederates under Brig. Gen. Henry Heth.

After a confused battle at Princeton, however, both sides retreated and

Cox took up defensive positions on Flat Top Mountain, -vdiere he remained

for three months. A simultaneous offensive under General Crook to strike

the Virginia Central Railroad, was no more successful. Crook started his

advance late, because he had to suppress the bushvhackers in Webster

County first. He occupied Lewisburg unopposed and beat off an attack by

Heth after the Battle of Princeton, but failed to reach the railroad and

subsequently retreated due to the perceived threat of Stonewall Jackson against his line of communications.^^ Thus, through lack of aggressive leadership, the Union failed to achieve its objectives, while the

Confederates claimed honors for successfully protecting the railroad.

This failure, coupled with lack of coordination between the various Union forces, which allowed Jackson to escape to Richmond, caused Lincoln to direct another reorganization of the region. Convinced by the Valley fiasco that the Northern troops needed unity of command in order to 63

achieve any worthv^ile results, he consolidated the commands of Fremont,

Banks and Irvin McDowell into a new organization, the Army of Virginia,

under Maj. Gen. John Pope. Fremont, feeling his honor slighted,

submitted his resignation and was relieved of command at the end of June.

At the same time, the Union government abolished the Mountain Department.

Although the troops and subordinate commanders generally remained the

same, they now became a secondary part of Pope's command.

Pope's assignment to command the A m y of Virginia produced a more

severe attitude on the part of Union authorities tov.»rd guerrillas. Pope

quickly announced that the Federal troops in Virginia had not prosecuted

the war with sufficient vigor. In addition disparaging his troops'

fighting qualities in his famous proclamation "I come to you from the

West, where we have always seen the backs of our enemies,he thought that they had not applied sufficiently stern measures to suppress guerrilla activity. His General Orders No. 7, issued shortly after he assumed command, set forth his own policy. Aimed at the people living in the Shenandoah Valley, as well as along the railroad and telegraph lines, it said in part:

— they will be held responsible for any injury done to the track, line, or road, or for any attacks upon trains or straggling soldiers, by hands of guerrillas in their neighborhood. No privileges and immunities of warfare apply to lawless bands of individuals not forming part of the organized forces of the enemy nor wearing the garb of soldiers, vrtio, seeking and obtaining safety on pretext of being peaceful citizens, steal out in rear of the amy , attack and murder straggling soldiers, molest trains of supplies, destroy railroads, telegraph lines and bridges, and commit outrages disgraceful to civilized people and revolting to humanity. Evil disposed persons in the rear of our armies who do not themselves engage directly in these lawless acts encourage them by refusing to interfere or to give any information by vdiich such acts can be prevented or the perpetrators punished___ 64

Therefore vrfierever a railroad, wagon road, or telegraph is injured by parties of guerrillas the citizens living within 5 miles of the spot shall be turned out in mass to repair the damage, and shall beside, pay to the United States...the full amount of the pay and subsistence of the wiole force necessary to coerce the performance of the work If a soldier be fired upon from any house the house shall be razed to the ground and the inhabitants sent prisoners to the headquarters of this army. If such an outrage occur at any place distant from settlements, the people within 5 miles around shall be held accountable and made to pay an indemnity any persons detected in such outrages, either during the act or at any time afterward, shall be shot, without awaiting civil process. No such acts can influence the result of this war, and they can.only lead to heavy afflictions to the population to no purpose.

This proclamation reflected the knowledge that suppressing the guerrillas

required eliminating their civilian support, but carried the measures

applied to civilians to harsher limits than any of Pope's predecessors.

The general also denied the guerrillas any treatment as legitimate

combatants, offering them only execution as outlaws. One might argue

that the proclamation could be interpreted as inapplicable to the

partisan bands, who did not fit Pope's definition of guerrilla, but in

practice the point was moot.

Interestingly, this proclamation reflected a sind.lar policy which

Pope had instituted during his command in the west. At that time, he had

held local towns responsible for any destruction of the railroads and

ordered them to form safety committees to guard the tracks. The towns had to pay for any damages caused by guerrilla attacks or Pope's troops would sieze goods in compensation.^^ Apparently this program had little success in curbing attacks on western railroads, thereby raising the question vdiy Pope thought an expanded version would work in the east.

Probably, he felt that only the harshest measures would crush the guerrillas. As events proved, his expectations lacked foundation. 65

In addition to holding local citizens responsible for bushwhacking.

Pope sought to control the guerrillas by invoking more stringent

requirements for taking oaths of allegiance. His General Orders No. 11

directed his commanders to arrest all disloyal male citizens within their

lines or in their rear. Those who took the oath of allegiance to the

United States could return to their homes, but officers should escort

those wiio refused beyond Federal lines and threaten to treat them as

spies if they returned. To prevent the problem of guerrillas taking the oath regularly and then continuing their depredations. Pope directed his commanders to shoot anyone discovered violating the oath and to sieze his 48 property. Again, the policy did not represent any new anti-guerrilla strategies, but did reflect more stringent application of existing ones.

However, subsequent events indicated that it had no more success than earlier efforts of a similar nature.

Other commanders also supported the enactment of harsher anti-guerrilla policies. In early July, General John E. Wool issued a proclamation espousing a program for the Department of Virginia that was virtually identical to Pope's western one. He announced that he would hold local inhabitants reponsible for damage which guerrillas caused to railroads or other property unless they warned Federal troops of the attack. If the citizens failed to provide such warning, they would have 49 to make good the damages. Clearly the Union commanders expected the local civilians to discourage guerrilla attacks, reflecting the view that the easiest way to limit guerrilla activity was to make the local populace responsible for doing so. 66

These proclamations also reflected the attitude of many Union

officers that the citizens could and should protect themselves from

guerrillas instead of clamoring for assistance. As an example, one

officer reported in early 1862:

One bird by the name of Martin Wio wishes us to protect him from these birds of prey - was at home with three others and suffered this party [of six to eight raiders] to enter his house and take there-from his property without a shadow of resistance on their part.3"

Crook and Milroy both felt that lack of effort on the part of the

civilian population encouraged the problem. Crook charged that the

citizens used the Union troops as a scapegoat for their losses:

So long as Federal troops remain here, these people will not raise a hand to defend themselves, but rather seem to consider vdien they lose property or life that we are responsible for it; but when we all leave here they will have to depend on themselves for defense, and, in fact, they could very soon put down these bushwhackers if they w u l d try even now, since they can take them at their own game.

Milroy believed that the civilians should do more to defend themselves and suggested that Governor Francis Pierpont organize home guards in each county to protect the countryside and relieve the Federal troops for more 52 important assignments. In other words, the soldiers felt that the civilians did not take enough responsibility for their own protection, but should be required to do so, so that the troops could concentrate on the regular Confederate forces.

Efforts to get the local civilians to assume more responsibility for their own defense did have some effect. By the end of July, Cox's scouting parties reported growing Union militia organizations in the

Guyandotte region, a haven for numerous guerrillas. One such report 67

mentioned the formation of a Union company of thirty men on Pinnacle Fork

that seemed "entirely able to sustain themselves against any force likely

to penetrate such a wild mountain country. They appear to be very

determined.Concerning the formation of Union militia company at

Wyoming Courthouse, another officer noted: "All of the Union men of

those creeks are well armed and disposed to fight \dien sustained by any

regular force.The formation of such new units indicated a growing

willingness on the part of the citizens to help defend themselves,

although they still demanded some support frorri regular troops. Even with

this requirement, however, any such action by the local populace reduced

the demands on Federal garrisons and made the task of defending against

guerrillas easier.

The need for such civilian organizations became especially great in western Virgina, for Pope stripped many of the Union troops from that

region for his field army. As soon as he took command of the Army of

Virginia, Robert C. Schenck's and Milroy's brigades became its First

Division. The loss of these units had little inpact on the situation in western Virginia, because Fremont had used them as his mobile force during the canpaign against Stonewall Jackson. Therefore, they were no longer serving as garrison troops and represented no drain on the region's defenses. However, Cox proposed that his troops also should join Pope's amy, since they were among the oldest and best seasoned in the theater and therefore represented a valuable addition to an offensive force. Cox probably used reports such as those cited above to support his request, on the grounds that the region no longer needed so many 68

troops to protect it. xhe War Department approved Cox's suggestion, so

on August 14 he began moving half his command, 5000 men, by water to 55 Parkersburg vdiere they boarded the railroad for Washington. This

transfer left only the remainder of Cox's troops in the Kanavdia District

and Kelley's command to defend western Virginia against Confederate

forces. Obviously local militia organizations would have to make up for

the losses.

As the Fédérais' center of gravity shifted to eastern Virginia, the

guerrillas became more active. One officer reported parties of them

especially troublesome above Charlestown, scouring the countryside after

arms, horses and recruits. All available cavalry were out chasing them,

but he believed their numbers overestimated and, v^iile they were doing as much damage to Union men as possible, they did not represent a threat to

the railroad. Nevertheless, the guerrillas were so active and caused

such great concern to the Union commanders that troops along the B&O

received orders to report daily on all guerrilla activity in their neighborhood.^^ Additionally, the Fédérais tried to counter these forays with increased patrolling and retaliation, but generally had little success. Their reduced strength, coupled with a Confederate offensive in the southern part of the state in September, made them unable to devote sufficient attention to the problem.

The fear vhich the guerrillas caused throughout the state revealed itself in one of the exploits of a partisan group called the Moccasin

Rangers, vhich usually devoted itself to stealing livestock from Unionist 69

citizens. As a lark, the Rangers sent a messenger into Parkersburg with

word that 500 guerrillas were about to attack the city. The citizens

made hurried preparations for defense, including sending the local bank's

money to a neighboring town, sending for assistance to all nearby army

troops and forming a committee of three men to negotiate with the

Partisans when they appeared. After several hours of waiting, however,

the people discovered that the reports were a hoax, much to their 57 indignation. Nevertheless, the ease with which they believed the rumor

and the panic that it caused indicates that partisan activity was

extensive and represented a major civilian concern at this time.

Another incident from the same period reflected the growing severity

of the Fédérais' retaliation policy. Captain Henry A. Cole, commanding a

company of Maryland cavalry, received orders to investigate a report that

guerrillas had siezed a wagonload of vdieat belonging to a Mr. Winbrenner,

to recover the property, and to arrest any men with it. If the area's

inhabitants provided no information. Cole was to replace the losses -

wagon, team, wheat and so forth - by taking them from known

secessionists, making sure that he took from several people so that the

entire neighborhood suffered. Whether Cole found the original report in

error, or whether Winbrenner was a favorite Confederate target remains unclear, but two days later Cole learned that a Confederate party under a

Lieutenant Rouse had taken three of the man's horses. Rouse left a note

that the horses were for the Southern Arny and the Fédérais should not disturb the citizens. Cole took two horses from Rouse's father in exchange, as well as two prominent citizens to exchange for Union men 70

v^om the rebels had kidnapped. His superiors felt his actions

insufficient, however, and ordered him back to take all the horses on the

Rouse farm. Clearly the Fédérais were strengthening their efforts to

make harassment of Union citizens unprofitable.

Guerrillas also were active in the Shenandoah Valley and ease of eha

Blue Ridge Mountains, where they harassed Pope's lines of communications.

Union pickets were shot up around Winchester and a band of rebels destroyed a railroad train of government supplies between that town and

Harper's Ferry, although -whether they were guerrillas or Confederate cavalry remained uncertain. Whoever was responsible caused the commander at Harper's Ferry to place a company of infantry on each train going to

Winchester and to distribute a regiment of time-expiring militia at four points along the track. These dispositions in turn weakened defense of the B&O, with the result that guerrillas threatened that line at a number 59 of points. The Fédérais had a great deal of difficulty coming to grips with the partisans in this sector and failed to control them to any great degree.

A major problem in the Harper's Ferry region was that one of the guerrilla bands there operated under the leadership of Elijah V. "Lige"

White. One of the first of the noted partisan leaders. White was a native of Maryland who received his tutelage in warfare by serving under

Turner Ashby. When the Confederate government began issuing partisan commissions. White acquired one. By midsummer, he was leading the 35th

Battalion, Virginia Cavalry and putting his lessons to good use. He established a reputation for successful forays against the Fédérais, 71

while at the same time performing valuable support activities for the

regular Confederate forces.

As a counter to White and other guerrillas in this region, the

Fédérais tried another experiment with creating a special anti-guerrilla

force. In June, they established the Loudon County Rangers under Captain

Samuel C. Means. This force operated much the same way the Confederate

irregulars did (and received the same type of press from the Southern

commanders that their counterparts received from the Union). Thus it

suffered from the same indiscipline and reputation for depredations which

destroyed the Jessie Scouts. However, Means himself possessed a strong

sense of duty and attempted to make the unit fulfill its function.

Throughout the summer the Rangers concentrated on recruiting additional

men (they usually numbered less than 100) and attempting to assist in

tracking down guerrillas. However, they had the misfortune to attract

too much attention from the Confederates. Late in August, Lige White

attacked a party of twenty-three Rangers bivouacked in a church at

Waterford. After a fight lasting approximately three hours, the Rangers

surrendered, having lost one man killed and seven wounded.Less than a week later, a force of Confederate cavalry struck the remaining Rangers, accompanied by some Maryland cavalry, at Leesburg and decimated them.

The Fédérais lost eleven killed, nine wounded, and forty-seven 62 prisoners. These twin attacks temporarily eliminated Means' force as a fighting unit, thereby contributing to the appearance that special counterguerrilla organizations were ineffective. 72

The Fédérais' series of coiinterguerrilla efforts had achieved few

results, vdien Lee's offensives that climaxed in the battles of Second

Bull Run and Antietam drew all of their attention to formal military

operation. During these canpaigns, which terminated Pope's tenure as

commander and ended Lee's first attempt to invade the North respectively,

the Union leaders concerned themselves primarily with the Confederate

A m y ' s movements. General Kelley, for exaiiple, showed much more concern

about Stonewall Jackson's location and probable objectives than about the pinpricks of partisan raiders. During the Antietam canpaign, the Federal troops in the Shenandoah Valley concentrated on avoiding capture by Lee's a m y rather than the presence of guerrillas. In any case, a number of the partisans, such as Lige White, attached themselves directly to the a m y , thus curtailing their activities for a time. Only after Lee had retreated from Antietam and the Union had the leisure to concentrate on lesser matters did antiguerrilla activity again become a significant issue.

The Fédérais found much about their situation after Antietam to cause them concern, particularly in western Virginia. During Lee's campaigns, the Confederate forces under Maj. Gen. William W. Loring took advantage of the vacuum caused by Cox's withdrawal to go on the offensive. As part of it, Loring had sent Brig. Gen. Albert G. Jenkins with 600 cavalry on a raid through the state to disorganize the Union defenders and destroy the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. Starting at Salt

Sulphur Springs, the raiders swept north and west, crossed the Ohio River near Point Pleasant, then swung south, recrossed the Ohio and Kanavha 73

Rivers and eventually arrived at Beckley, vdiere Jenkins reported to

Loring. In the course of the raid, although they failed to destroy any

of the railroad, the Confederates drove off or overwhelmed all Union

garrisons they encountered, destroyed large amounts of supplies and

acquired 300 recruits. More inç)ortantly, they caused the Union

commander. Col. J. A. J. Lightburn, to retreat in the face of Loring's

offensive for fear of being cut off. The Fédérais attempted to defend

Charleston, but Loring routed them and siezed the town. Suffering

attacks by bushwhackers, the disordered Union force eventually reached

Point Pleasant, where it began to refit.

The Union met this crisis by reorganizing its departmental structure again, attaching western Virginia to the Department of the Ohio under

Maj. Gen. Horatio G. Wright and rushing Milroy's division, two regiments from Ohio, a battered division from Cumberland Gap and Cox's Kanawha

Division, now commanded by General Crook, back to western Virginia.

(Governor Pierpont, wanting a successful commander and troops familiar with the region, had asked for Crook specifically.)^^ Cox himself also returned on October 14 to command all of the troops of the new District of western Virginia. As the Federal behemoth advanced, the Confederates abandoned Charleston and retreated to their previous posts, thereby restoring the military situation almost exactly to its condition at the beginning of the year. Except for a firmer Federal hold on the lower

Shenandoah Valley, neither side had made any substantial gain in western

Virginia. 74

The returning Fédérais found, however, that the guerrilla problem

was as bad or worse as vdien they left. In addition to the numerous small

bands that haunted the Kanavha region, the Partisans had developed into a

major nuisance. Most annoying was the "regiment" of John D. Imboden, a

former artilleryman with Jackson. One of the first Confederates to

receive a Partisan Ranger commission, Imboden raised nine companies,

about 300 men "who will pull trigger on a Yankee with as much alacrity as

they would a mad dog; ...vhose consciences won't be disturbed by the

sight of a 'vandal carcass'.Operating out of the mountains, this

force made the B&O its special target, although any body of Yankees was

fair game. Therefore, Imboden became Ben Kelley's major concern.

Another effective partisan who began operating in September was John

H. "Hanse" McNeill. McNeill had served in the Confederate Army in

Missouri, vhere he was wounded and iirprisoned. However, he had been born in Hardy County, Virginia and after his escape from prison, he returned there. With Imboden's support, he received a Partisan Ranger commission and begem to raise his own company. Very quickly, "McNeill's Rangers" also became a major problem for the Fédérais.

Throughout the remainder of 1862, the Federal forces in western

Virginia pursued an active campaign of patrols and raids in an effort to break up the guerrillas. Cox's subordinate commanders - Kelley, Crook,

Milroy and Brig. Gen. Eliakim P. Scammon - scoured the state, particularly the Kanavdia region vdiere the irregulars were most troublesome. Cox reported at the beginning of November that this region

"is much disturbed by guerrilla bands, and I am devoting immediate 75

attention to their extirpation."®^ Cox's method of achieving this goal

was to order General Scammon's division to punish and destroy any

guerrilla parties infesting the country. He also directed General Crook

to take 1000 men into Logan County and burn mills and property at Logan

Court House so that the rebels no longer would use it as a rendezvous.®^

In December, Kelley received instructions from the War Department to

station troops along the South Branch of the Potomac and in Romney to

protect against guerrilla raids. Generally, however, these efforts had

Irmrted effect. The partisans and bushvdiackers remained active,

necessitating constant Federal attention to them.

Admittedly the Union commanders did have some success. In mid-November, after a sweep through five counties that netted forty-five prisoners and 100 cattle and horses, Milroy reported all of the country from Monterey to Sutton cleared of guerrillas (an undoubted exaggeration).®^ Milroy also managed to stop a raid by Imboden on the

Cheat River viaduct, vAien his own thrust against the Virginia Central

Railroad threatened the partisan's rear. Although Milroy abandoned his own raid as a result of the situation, Imboden's foray was one of his least successful ones. He abandoned the attack on the viaduct and slipped into the mountains to avoid Milroy, fumbled a chance to capture the Union supply train when his band got lost in a snowstorm, then returned to his base canp to find that in his absence General Kelley had attacked it and inflicted severe damage. Kelley reported killing and wounding many of the partisans there, besides taking fifty prisoners, 359 hogs, an unspecified quantity of arms, horses, cattle and wagons, as well 76

as burning the canç).^^ Even more galling was the fact that this was the

second time in a month that Kelley's forces had captured Imboden's base.

In early October, vdiile Imboden was off destroying the B&O's Little

Cacapon Bridge and Paw Paw Tunnel, a detachment of the 1st New York

Cavalry overwhelmed his camp, capturing twenty-five prisoners, two

artillery pieces, 100 muskets with three wagonloads of ammunition, ten

wagons, twenty mules, twenty-five horses, all of Imboden's papers and

numerous other items.Although these losses did not destroy Imboden's

band, they did hamper its effectiveness and underscored the threat that

capable Union forces posed to guerrillas.

The Fédérais also had some successes in the Shenandoah Valley

against independent guerrillas. In late November, a party of

seventy-five infantry from the 2nd Massachusetts crossed the Potomac to

Shepherdstown, surrounded the house of a notorious guerrilla named Burke

and captured all but one of his band, making a total of five prisoners.

Burke himself died while trying to escape. At approximately the same

time, a force of Union cavalry sent to Mercerville captured a guerrilla 72 named King, who had been active since the previous July. By means of

such carefully planned and quietly executed maneuvers, the Fédérais

showed that they could eliminate guerrilla bands vhen they could surprise

them.

These victories, however, did not stop the remaining partisans. In

December, Lige White's force, active again now that White had recovered from a wound received during the Antietam caitpaign, ran into Captain 77

Means' reorganized Loudon Rangers and routed them without loss.^^ Despite

his setbacks, Imboden remained threatening also. Union pickets and

patrols continually came under attack, wiile, despite the onset of

winter. Federal commanders had to worry about protecting their supply

lines. The weather slowed the guerrilla war down, but did not halt it.

The most effective method of curtailing the guerrillas, in fact,

came not from the Union, but from the Confederate government. Concerned

about the need for manpower in the regular army, convinced that the

partisan bands were ineffective in opposing the Federal A m y and

believing many of them to be committing depredations on Southern

citizens, at the end of 1862 the Confederate authorities announced an end

to partisan recruitment. Such concerns had existed almost since the

Partisan Ranger Act went into effect, but the government had tried to

deal with them by making the bands conform to military organization, so

that they could meld into the regular army vdien needed, and by requiring

the local departmental commander's approval before authorizing an

individual to raise a guerrilla unit. These methods had failed to reduce

the attractiveness of partisan service, so, given the losses from the

summer and fall campaigns, more direct means to channel men away from

independent operations and back into the a m y were necessary. Therefore,

in addition to stopping recruitment, the authorities requested many of the partisans to convert to regular service. Lige White accepted the offer of a lieutenant colonelcy and found his troop attached to Stonewall

Jackson's command, vrtiich permitted him some operational freedom occasionally. Imboden became a brigadier general v^en he brought his 78

men, including most of McNeill's, into the regular service. McNeill

himself remained independent and began recruiting a new band, despite the

strictures.Thus the Confederacy accomplished what the North had

failed to do, vrtien it removed two of its best partisan leaders from

guerrilla service, thereby easing the pressure on the Union defenders.

All things considered, the Fédérais were reasonably successful in

controlling the guerrillas in 1862. Although guerrilla activity

continued throughout the year, it did not haiiper Union activities

seriously. The Union conducted four major operations (counting the

Fredericksburg caitçjaign) in eastern Virginia during the year without any

major distraction by the guerrillas. In addition, the North withdrew a

substantial number of troops from western Virginia for campaigning

elsewhere, which indicated that guerrilla raids there did not pose a

major threat to security. Also, while guerrilla operations became more

organized with the advent of the partisan rangers, these bodies did not

develop into a significant problem until early autumn. Even then, the

Union forces obtained some successes against them and they did not weaken

Northern control of the region. In fact, by the end of the year the

Fédérais almost had congleted restoration of the entire length of the B&O

railroad, making it fully operable for the first time since the war began. Furthermore, they enjoyed several victories over the guerrillas, killed many of them and took numerous prisoners. These victories showed the value of aggressive patrolling and counterraids against the partisans. 79

Another feature of Union counterguerrilla operations during the year was increased severity towards civilians. Coirananders adopted stronger policies of holding civilians responsible for partisan activity, by assessing them for damages or committing retaliatory acts upon them.

Also, the Fédérais put more pressure on loyal civilians to take measures for their own defense, thereby freeing troops for duty elsewhere, while the latter tactic achieved its purpose, the former one actually drove men to join the guerrillas rather than discouraging the marauders. However, it did not cause an outbreak so extensive as to require additional troops. In summation, \diile the guerrillas remained a nuisance, the

Fédérais kept them under control sufficiently so that they did not pose a threat to the Union war effort. 80

Chapter II Notes

1. Benjamin F. Wade to Edwin M. Stanton, 10 March 1862, Departments, RG. 393.

2. Gen. Robert C. Schenck to George L. Hartsuff, 7 March 1862, Departments, RG. 393.

3. President's War Order No. 3, 11 March 1862, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. V, p. 54.

4. L. Thomas to Maj. Gen. John C. Fremont, 22 March 1862, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XII, Ft. 3, p. 8; Moore, Banner in the Hills, p. 149.

5. Brig. Gen. W. S. Rosecrans to Brig. Gen. Lorenzo Thomas, 22 Tîarch 1862, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XII, Pt. 3, pp. 9-12.

6. Report of Maj. Gen. John C. Fremont of Operations, March 29 - June 27, 1862, 30 December 1865, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XII, Pt. 1, p. 5.

7. Albert Castel, "The Guerrilla War 1861-1865", Civil War Times Illustrated, Vol. 12, No. 6, October 1974. p. 9; Jones, Gray Ghosts, p. 77.

8. Jones, Gray Ghosts, p. 76.

9. Ibid., p. 80.

10. Castel, "Guerrilla War", p. 9.

11. Jones, Gray Ghosts, p. 77.

12. Fremont Report, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XII, Pt. 1, p. 5.

13. Ibid.

14. Brig. Gen. B. F. Kelley to General Fremont, 9 April 1862, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XII, Pt. 3, p. 62.

15. Col. Thomas M. Harris to Gen. John C. Fremont, 4 i^ril 1862, Departments, RG. 393.

16. Col. George Crook to Capt. G. M. Bascom, 16 J^ril 1862, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XII, Pt. 3, p. 84-85.

17. Lt. Col. Darfer to the Assistant Adjutant General, Cumberland, Maryland, 7 April 1862, Departments, RG. 393. 81

18. Maj. Gen. J. C. Fremont to E. M. Stanton, 7 J^ril 1862, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XII, Pt. 3, p. 55.

19. Ibid.

20. Brig. Gen. B. F. Kelley to Major General Fremont, 9 i^ril 1862, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XII, Pt. 3, p. 62.

21. Rosecrans to Thomas, 22 March 1862, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XII, Pt. 3, p. 9-12.

22. Letter to Gen. James W. Ripley, 4 December 1861, Departments, RG. 393.

23. Fremont Report, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XII, Pt. 1, p. 6.

24. Maj. Gen. J. C. Fremont to Abraham Lincoln, 21 April 1862, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XII, Ft. 1, p. 7.

25. Jones, Gray Ghosts, p. 79.

26. Ibid, p. 81.

27. Lt. Col. Stephen W. Downey to Col. Albert Gracy, 16 May 1862, Departments, RG. 393.

28. Capt. John H. Showalter to Brig. Gen. B. F. Kelley, 12 April 1862, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XII, Pt. 1, p. 423.

29. Report of Major E. B. Andrews, 22 April 1862, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XII, Pt. 1, pp. 439-440.

30. Maj, Gen. John C. Fremont to E. M. Stanton, 24 April 1862, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XII, Pt. 1, pp. 447-448.

31. Lt. Col. Stephen W. Downey to Col. Albert Tracy, 20 May 1862, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XII, Pt. 1, p. 457.

32. Maj. Gen. John C. Fremont to E. M. Stanton, 30 May 1862, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XII, Pt. 1, p. 648.

33. Maj. Gen. John C. Fremont to E. M. Stanton, 16 June 1862, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XII, Pt. 1, p. 662.

34. Brig. Gen. B. F. Kelley to E. M. Stanton, 13 June 1862, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XII, Pt. 3, p. 386.

35. Captain Powell to Lt. Col. Richmond, 30 May 1862, Departments, RG. 393.

36. Maj. Gen. John C. Fremont to Lt. Col. Thomas M. Harris, 23 June 1862, Departments, RG. 393. 82

37. Edwin M. Stanton to Brig. Gen. John W. Geary, 2 May 1862, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. LI, Pt. 1, p. 591.

38. Special Order No. 48, Railroad Brigade, 14 May 1862, Departments, RG. 393.

39. Jones, Gray Ghosts, p. 91.

40. Willard Glazer, Three Years in the Federal Cavalry. (New York; R. H. Ferguson and Co., 1873). p. 146.

41. Major B. M. Skinner to Col. J. A. J. Lightburn, 22 May 1862, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XII, Pt. 1, p. 490.

42. Brig. Gen. B. F. Kelley to Col. J. C. Rathbone, 19 May 1862, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XII, Pt. 3, p. 213.

43. Alonzo H. Quint, The Potomac and the Rapidan. (Boston; Crosby and Nichols, N. D.). p. 149.

44. Moore, Banner in the Hills, pp. 156-158.

45. Maj. Gen. John Pope to the Officers and Soldiers of the Arity of Virginia, 14 July 1862, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XII, Pt. 3, p. 474.

46. General Orders No. 7, Anty of Virginia, 10 July 1862, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XII, Pt. 2, p. 51.

47. Richard S. Brownlee, Gray Ghosts of the Confederacy. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1968). p. 34.

48. General Orders No. 11, Headquarters A m y of Virginia, 23 July 1862, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XII, Pt. 2, p. 52.

49. Gen. John E. Wool, 7 July 1862, Departments, RG. 393.

50. Capt. William West to Col. H. B. Wilson, 4 February 1862, Departments, RG. 393.

51. Col. George Crook to Capt. G. M. Bascom, 16 i^ril 1862, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XII, Pt. 3, p. 85.

52. Jones, Gray Ghosts, p. 80.

53. Lt. Col. Hines to Brig. Gen. Cox, 28 July 1862, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XII, Pt. 2, p. 107.

54. Col. E. Siber to Capt. G. M. Bascom, 12 August 1862, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XII, Pt. 2, p. 117. 83

55. George D. Ruggles to Gen. Jacob D. Cox, 11 August 1862, Official Records. Ser. l, vol. XII, Pt. 3, pp. 560-161; Moore, Banner in the Hills, pp. 166-167.

56. Coi. Commanding 2nd W. Va. Infantry to Capt. Samaul C. Means, 9 August 1862, Departments, RG. 393; Col. Commanding 2nd W. Va. Infantry to Lt. Col. N. D. Whipple, 10 August 1862, Departments, RG. 393; Headquarters Railroad Brigade to Col. J. M. Campbell, 14 August 1862, Departments, RG. 393.

57. Jones, Gray Ghosts, p. 105.

58. Middle Department to Capt. Henry A. Cole, 8 August 1862, Departments, RG. 393; Colonel Commanding 2nd West Virginia Infantry to Lt. Col. N. D. Whipple, 10 August 1862, Departments, RG. 393.

59. Jones, Gray Ghosts, pp. 108-109.

60. Jones, Gray Ghosts, p. 109; Briscoe Goodhart, History of the Independent Loudon Virginia Rangers. (Washington D.C.: Press of McGill and Wallace, 1873), p. 27.

61. Goodhart, Loudon Rangers, pp. 33-37; Jones, Gray Ghosts, p. 110.

62. Maj. J. E. B. Stuart to Col. R. H. Chilton, 13 February 1864, Official Records Ser. I, Vol. XII, Pt. 2, p. 745; Goodhart, Loudon Rangers, pp. 41-44.

63. Moore, Banner in the Hills, pp. 167-170.

64. Moore, Banner in the Hills, pp. 172-174; F. H. Pierpont to General Kalleck, 12 September 1862, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XIX, Pt. 2, p. 279.

65. Jones, Gray Ghosts, p. 119.

66. Maj. Gen. J. D. Cox to Maj. N. H. Mclean, 1 November 1862, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XIX, p. 531.

67. Maj. Gen. J. D. Cox to Brigadier General Scammon, 2 November 1862, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XIX, Pt. 2, p. 537; Major G. M. Bascom to Brig. Gen. George Crook, 28 November 1862, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXI, p. 808.

68. Gen. H. w. Halleck to Major General Cox, 9 December 1862, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXI, p. 843.

69. Brig. Gen. R. H. Milroy to Major General Cox, 14 November 1862, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XIX, Pt. 2, pp. 155-156. 84

70. Maj. Gen. J. D. Cox to Major N. H. McLean, 12 November 1862, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XIX, Pt. 2, p. 573; Jones, Gray Ghosts, pp. 130-131.

71. Jones, Gray Ghosts, p. 119.

72. Col. S. Colgrove to Major General Morell, 25 November 1862, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXI, p. 7-8.

73. Jones, Gray Ghosts, p. 132.

74. Ibid., p. 137. c h a p t e r III

Hang 'Em High: The Search for a Consistent Policy

The question of Wiat sort of policy to apply against the guerrillas

proved a vexing one for the Federal government. Should they be treated

as outlaws to be killed or jailed without mercy, as many field commanders

proposed? Or should they receive the same rights and treatment as

regular soldiers, as the Confederate authorities insisted? In the beginning, the government tried to avoid taking a position on the issue.

It left matters in the hands of local commanders and intervened only v^en their actions seemed too harsh. As the war progressed, however, the growing guerrilla problem demanded that the Federal government commit itself. As a result, it declared a policy of treating guerrillas like regular soldiers. In practice, however, local commanders still followed their own inclinations, and the government sustained them by refusing to enforce its decree. Therefore, the field commanders ultimately practiced whatever policy they could enforce in their area. Nevertheless, the governments' position represented an inportant step in the counterguerrilla campaign, for it defined the nature of recognized guerrilla warfare and established some thoughts about it vdiich became accepted ideas on the subject into the twentieth century.

In the early months of the war, the guerrilla problem evoked little interest at the national level. George B. McClellan's proclamations,

George Crook's arrests of known bushvhackers, even the levying of fines

85 86

and the confiscation of property did not stir the government to issue any

directives concerning the handling of guerrillas. The only instance in

which Lincoln felt conpelled to intervene was in Missouri, where General

John C. Fremont, then commanding the region, had declared martial law.

As part of this decree, not only did he order the confiscation of rebels'

property, but he also announced that any persons found carrying arms in

the area behind a line drawn from Leavenworth to Cape Girardeau would be

courtmartialed and shot. Clearly this clause, directed as it was against

"bands of murderers and marauders", aimed at suppressing guerrilla attacks on Unionists. However, President Abraham Lincoln directed

Fremont to moderate his practices, because the indiscriminate summary executions invited the Confederates to retaliate by killing any Union prisoners that they captured.^ Fremont's policy of executions apparently was not a problem, for other commanders performed them without censure, but his application of it without any evidence of wrongdoing other than possession of a weapon seemed unjustifiable.

Certainly similar orders against guerrillas aroused no concern.

When General Henry W. Halleck, vdio had replaced Fremont, issued his

General Orders Number Two (of the Department of the Mississippi) he received no reprimands perhaps because his experience practicing law in

California made him more aware of the legal limits on such actions. This order stated in part;

Every man vdio enlists in [a guerrilla] organization forfeits his life and becomes an outlaw. All persons are hereby warned that if they join any guerrilla band they will not, if captured, be treated as ordinary prisoners of war, but will be hung as robbers and murderers. 87

Halleck promised death more forcefully than Fremont had done, yet he

specified guerrillas, rather than any suspicious citizens, as the target.

By doing so, he showed more respect for the recognized practices of

warfare and reduced the chances of charges of brutality from the

Confederates or their retaliation on Unionists. So long as these threats

remained small, the Federal government showed little interest in trying

to establish a universal guerrilla policy.

Despite this reticence, however, the question of retaliation on

Federal prisoners forced the Union government to address the issue. The

passage of the Partisan Ranger Act led the Confederate authorities to

take a stronger interest in the eneny's anti-guerrilla policy and

ignited both sides was the Union's capture of three men, Frederick

W. Chewning, Capt. John S. Spriggs and Capt. Marshall Triplett in western

Virginia in the spring of 1862. Chewning was a notorious western

Virginia guerrilla, while Triplett and Spriggs bore partisan ranger

commissions from Virginia. Ultimately, the responsibility for all three

men's fate came to rest on the departmental commander. General Fremont,

v^o decided that hanging them would provide a beneficial warning to other

marauders and wrote thus to Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton requesting

the government's view.^

The Confederates on their part found Fremont's proposal outrageous.

Governor John Letcher, who had signed Triplett's and Sprigg's commissions took particular umbrage, because the decision challenged his authority to make such appointments and, by extension, his authority over the Virginia 88

militia. If the Union treated men who held Virginia commissions as

outlaws, then it could consider all men in the state's service the same

way. Moreover, if Spriggs and Triplett were not legitimate soldiers,

than how could any of Virginia's militia officers or the troops they led

be so? To Letcher, the Fédérais were saying, in effect, that Virginia

had no legal authority to issue such commissions. Looking at the matter

from the Federal viewpoint, Letcher did not possess legitimate

authority, since he and his state were in rebellion against the lawful

government. Since the entire war was occurring over this question,

Letcher probably felt even greater pressure to assert recognition of his authority. Accordingly, Letcher proposed to the Confederate government that retaliation should occur on Federal prisoners. Shortly afterward.

General Robert E. Lee informed McClellan that two Union captains had been selected by drawing lots for execution upon the deaths of Spriggs and

Triplett. McClellan passed this information on to Washington, which disclaimed any knowledge of the matter but promised to investigate.

Meanvrtiile, McClellan warned the Confederates against acting hastily.^

For several months the issue remained unresolved, while the Federal authorities tried to determine lAat to do with the condemned men and vAio would make the decision to do it. Fremont notified Stanton that a military commission had tried the three prisoners and sentenced them to death, but their execution awaited final approval from Washington.

Fremont was willing to carry it out, but he was not going to take responsibility for doing so and risk official censure if the government disavowed his actions. In Washington, the officials adopted a 89

non-responsive attitude for a period, then passed the matter on to

Governor Francis H. Pierpont by stating that Fremont could release the

prisoners if the governor recommended it.^ Being no more a fool than

Lincoln or Stanton, Pierpont recognized the booby trap and chose not to

commit himself either. The prisoners remained unsure of their fate or

their status.

At this point, the Confederate government entered the conflict once

again. In a letter to the Union adjutant general, the Confederate agent

of exchange, Robert Ould, complained that the Fédérais were refusing to

exchange Spriggs and Triplett because their commissions came from

Virginia, with \diom the United States had signed no cartel, rather than

from the Confederate government. However, since the Union previously had

not refused to exchange captured Virginia troops, only Spriggs' and

Triplett's partisan status offered a rationale for doing so in their

case. Ould attacked the view that the partisans were irregulars Wio made

war without authority. They were organized troops under properly

commissioned officers and were subject to the Articles of War and Army

Regulations just like regular troops. The only difference was that they

operated on detached service rather than directly with the army. As proof of these statements, Ould cited the written instructions provided to the partisans, which enjoined them to act with strict regard for the

rules of civilized warfare. These facts held true vdiether the partisans derived their authority from the Confederate government or the state of

Virginia. Therefore, the partisans came under the regulations covering regular troops and were subject to exchange like them. The Confederates 90

closed their bombardment with the threat that if the Fédérais refused to

exchange captured partisans, then the Confederacy would refuse to

exchange Union soldiers captured by guerrillas.^

In an effort to settle the issue. General Halleck requested an

opinion concerning the legality of guerrilla warfare from Dr. Francis

Lieber of Columbia College, New York. Lieber, a German immigrant and

veteran of the wars in Europe v^o had fled Prussia in 1827, had received

international recognition for his studies of the laws and customs of war.

Therefore, his views concerning the legitimacy of guerrilla warfare and

the rights of its practitioners would have tremendous influence on the

government's policy.

Lieber's response favored the Confederate viewpoint. Halleck had

pointed out in his letter that the rebels claimed the right to send men

in civilian clothing to commit acts of destruction behind Union lines and

that if such persons did not receive the same rights as regular soldiers

when captured, they would retaliate on Federal prisoners of war.^ Lieber

replied in essence that such actions were acceptable if the bands in

question were connected with an organized army in some fashion. He noted

that international law recognized the rights of people who rose up to

repel an invasion and that lack of a proper uniform did not negate these

rights. Lieber further explained that the accepted meaning of the term guerrilla, at least in the United States, was

...an irregular band of armed men carrying on an irregular war The irregularity of the guerrilla party consists in its origin, for it is either self-constituted or constituted by the call of a single individual, not according to the general law of levy. 91

conscription, or volunteering; it consists in its disconnection with the a my as to its pay, provision, and movements, and it is irregular as to the permanency of the band, which may be dismissed and called again together at any time.

He pointed out that in the war for Greek independence thirty years

earlier, the Greeks had conducted the entire conflict with guerrilla

bands. Therefore, he inplied that guerrillas could be considered

legitimate military forces and deserve treatment as such. However,

Lieber weakened this position by asserting that bands v^ich formed no

integral part of an organized army, took up arms at intervals, and gave

no quarter were brigands not entitled to the usages of war. In summary

then, a band had to form part of a mass uprising or be attached to the

regular army in order to receive the treatment ordinarily due to 9 prisoners.

Lieber's opinion recognized the legitimacy of the partisan bands led

by commissioned officers of the Confederate national and state

governments. The officers' commissions themselves provided the necessary

connection to recognized authority, as did the practice of designating

these units as part of the regular military forces. The independent

guerrilla bands, however, were more problematical. Although Southerners

could argue that they represented a popular uprising against invaders and

that the encouragement provided to them by Confederate authorities gave

them the necessary connections to legitimate authority, these assertions were unconvincing. In the first instance, Wiile segments of the

population synpathized with and assisted the guerrillas, no mass uprising

against the Federal armies took place. In western Virginia, the

Unionists were a clear majority, vAiich precluded such revolt. In other 92

occupied areas, enough Union sentiment and/or apathy existed to weaken

possible resistance by dividing it. Therefore, a popular revolt similar

to the Greek one or to Spain during the Napoleonic Wars did not exist.

In the second instance, v^iile the Confederate authorities may have

encouraged the formation of such guerrilla bands, these forces received

no substantive support, nor did they answer to any control other than

their leaders. They had no connection with the Confederate Army and made

no effort to coordinate their activities with it. Thus, they did not

meet the protective criteria of Lieber's opinion.

The Federal government used Lieber's interpretation as the basis for

its circular dealing with the policy governing guerrilla prisoners. This directive stated in part:

The body of Confederate troops known by the designation Partisan Rangers and whose officers are commissioned by the Confederate government and v^o are regularly in the se^ice of the Confederate States are to be exchanged vdien captured.

Clearly, Lieber's definition of \mat constituted a legitimate guerrilla force, which fit the partisan rangers, led the Union to accord these men the same rights as other belligerents. For the remainder of the war, except for some occasional lapses, the partisans received the same treatment given to regular troops. The Union later modified this policy to require the recommendation of the governor of the state in Wiich the partisan resided before the exchange took place. This clause provided the loyal governors of the border states with a means to prevent the return of disruptive individuals who would disturb their state's tranquility. 93

Conspicuously absent from the circular, however, were instructions

for dealing with the independent guerrillas. Decisions concerning

treatment of these men, v^o fell outside the protective sphere of

Lieber's opinion, remained the responsibility of local commanders.

Perhaps the government felt that the dangers of retaliation were still

too great for it to authorize execution of them as brigands, as Lieber

indicated it could do. Perhaps some of the seeming contradictions in

Lieber's opinion that resulted from operational similarities between bands involved in mass uprisings and those performing acts of brigandage made establishment of a clear government policy concerning such groups seem insupportable. Whatever the reason, the government declined to define the standard policy concerning the fate of captured guerrillas, as distinguished from partisans. Union commanders on the spot continued to deal with them in Wiatever manner seemed appropriate.

The main significance of Lieber's opinion was that it legitimized the guerrilla war. By pointing out the international acceptance of mass uprisings and partisan activities, Lieber showed that they had "legal" recognition under the rules of war. Henceforth, the Union could not arbitrarily condemn guerrillas as outlaws without showing evidence that they did not follow the rules. The presence of Unionists in the border state population may have affected this view. Although no evidence exists that it did so, since it would help protect them from accidental retaliation. In practice, such condemnations occasionally still occurred, but the punishments appropriate to them were rare. The Union did not attençjt to promote extermination of the guerrillas as a broad, official policy. 94

Of course, pronouncement of the policy did not mean blanket

adherence to it either. Even without the loophole created by the silence

concerning independent guerrillas, the Union soldiers' hatred of the

partisans ensured that executions and accidents continued to happen to

them, although perhaps some^at less frequently. The casualties that the

guerrillas caused aroused great bitterness among the troops, who felt

that these attacks from ambush made the perpetrators simple murderers vdio

deserved swift death for their crimes. Therefore, the soldiers were

prone to curse comrades who brought captured guerrillas in alive instead

of giving them drumhead justice in the field. Moreover, some commanders

remained convinced both of the legality of executing guerrillas and the

effectiveness of doing so as a means to control an area, particularly if

the guerrilla problem seemed especially serious. For example, in his

report on his command of the Mountain Department, written in 1865,

Fremont stated that Letcher's commissions led the guerrillas to expect

immunity from punishment. When Fremont hanged some of them after a "full

and fair trial," it corrected this belief and thereby inproved the

security of roads and interior points throughout the department.As discussed later, Ulysses S. Grant had no qualms in 1864 about ordering

the execution without trial of any of John Mosby's men, because he considered them a major problem hanpering Union control of the Shenandoah

Valley. Therefore, even the highest Federal commanders did not feel bound by the government's policy, even vdien it clearly applied as in the case of Mosby's band, if expediency seemed to dictate otherwise. Such official support for violation of the policy rarely occurred, but it did happen and the commanders suffered no official censure for it. 95

Failure to heed official policy was even more evident in the West.

Here the viciousness of the guerrilla war, especially in the

trans-Mississippi region, made the line between brigandage and legitimate

military activity much less clear. William C. Quantrill's sack of

Lawrence, Kansas was only the most noted of many brutal actions by the

rebel guerrillas and the home guard units, ™ o were a more conspicuous

part of Union defence activity in the West, were not inclined to be

merciful to men vAio committed such acts. Throughout the war, few western

guerrillas survived long enough to be exchanged, if they received an

opportunity to surrender at all.

The proclamation did mean, however, that government officials no

longer would provide open encouragement for the execution of guerrillas,

either partisan or irregular. While the officers v^o ordered such

actions usually went unpunished, they no longer could expect official

sanction, such as the War Department had provided to General Irvin

McDowell in May 1862. At that time, in response to a report from

McDowell noting the presence of guerrilla bands in his vicinity, the

Assistant Secretary of War instructed him that:

— Like pirates and buccaneers [guerrillas] are the common enemies of mankind, and should be hunted and shot without challenge ^dierever found. Such treatment would soon put a stop to the formation of guerrilla bands and to the assassination of sentinels and other._ barbarities practiced by those \dio engage in irregular warfare.

The new policy represented almost a complete reversal of this viewpoint,

since it called for the guerrillas to receive humane treatment as regular opponents. Therefore, although execution of guerrillas still occurred on occasion, the Federal government accepted the legal (and practical) factors which made the guerrillas a legitimate part of warfare. 96

Although the Federal government now forbade summary execution of

guerrillas, other methods of controlling them generally remained at the

discretion of local commanders. Lieber had not addressed any issues

beyond the legitimacy of guerrilla warfare and the treatment of captured

guerrillas, nor had Halleck asked him to do so. However, he therefore

left another issue unresolved in which the government had a major

interest: the treatment of local civilians. Commanders already had

recognized the extent to vdiich guerrillas depended on local support for

their survival and success. A friendly population provided guerrillas

with intelligence about enemy movements, supplies, and protection from

enemy patrols. A hostile one deprived the partisans of all these things,

thereby making their operations more difficult to carry out and

increasing the chances of their capture. Given this dependence, as well as the general lack of success in eliminating the guerrillas themselves, the fact that most Union commanders viewed control of the population as the most effective means to solve the problems is unsurprising. The steps taken to achieve this control, especially after the legitimation of guerrilla warfare reduced retaliation against the partisans themselves, resulted in extensive suffering for the civilians.

The Union faced a number of problems in its efforts to control the civilian population. Federal commanders realized that the occupied regions contained many disloyal people, as well as a number of others vdio would become so if forced to choose sides. Therefore, prudent commanders needed to pursue policies which would prevent the former group from threatening Union activities, without alienating the latter group. 97

However, differentiation between the different types of citizens required

establishing a definition of loyalty. Did it mean giving full support to

all government policies or merely refraining from actually committing

disloyal acts? To \diat extent could a person deviate from the definition

of loyalty before he became classed as a danger to Federal authority?

Commanders also had to consider vmat crimes constituted disloyalty, the

extent to which they did so and the appropriate punishments for each.

Disloyalty could include active resistance, past acts of antagonism,

statements hostile to the Union, association with known rebels or family

ties to them and reports of disloyalty by informers.^^ Without answering

these questions, the Federal forces could not develop a consistent method

of controlling the civilians.

Not surprisingly, few Union commanders developed the sophisticated

answers necessary to differentiate the fine lines between loyalty,

disloyalty, and neutrality. Frustration with continued resistance and/or

a desire to pacify the region quickly and permanently led a number of

them to adopt an "anyone not for us is against us" attitude, which

undoubtedly increased opposition and made their jobs more difficult.

Moreover, the extent of hostility in an area obviously dictated the

severity of policy, thereby creating more extreme responses in regions of

high resistance than in those of relative pacification.

Of all of the regions where guerrilla warfare was rampant, Missouri proved the bloodiest and most difficult to control. Therefore, the Union

forces pursued their most severe policies in that state, to control the civilians and cut the guerrillas off from their support. In Missouri the 98

Federal commanders adopted a 'no neutrality' policy, by requiring all

citizens to support every Union order fully.Moreover, in response to

guerrilla successes during 1862, General John M. Schofield, then

commanding Federal forces in the state, issued an order drafting all

able-bodied men into military service in order to exterminate the

maraudersBoth of these orders aimed to coerce the population into

supporting the Union or at least identify Confederate supporters. In

achieving the latter goal they succeeded remarkably well, for many men

chose to join the Southern armies and guerrilla bands rather than go

against their principles, friends, and relatives. Schofield's order did

have some success in another i^ay, for it brought over 50,000 men into

Union service, vrfiich provided sufficient strength to drive all Southern

forces from the state temporarily.^^ However, the harsh, uncoitpromising

attitude of the Federal authorities actually increased resistance by

forcing many citizens who might have remained passive otherwise to choose

the opposing side. In contrast. Union commanders never issued such

blanket anti-neutrality decrees in Virginia. There they depended more on

fining local secessionists or assessing them for the damage caused by

guerrilla raids. In part because of this attitude, the guerrilla war in

Virginia never became as vicious as the one in Missouri.

Arrest and inprisonment of known secessionists and relatives of guerrillas was another method by which the Union tried to separate the partisans from their civilian support. As mentioned earlier. Federal commanders in western Virginia had applied this tactic during the war's early months, only to have their prisoners released by civilian 99

authorities. However, Congress' approval of President Lincoln's right to

suspend the writ of habeas corpus, as reflected in the Habeas Corpus Act

of 1863, made such arrests more effective, for the Fédérais could jail

the prisoners indefinitely without trial. In Virginia and West Virginia,

such imprisonments generally remained confined to vocal, influential

opponents of the Federal government in order to prevent them from

arousing greater resistance. In Missouri, however, the volatile

situation caused mass arrests of citizens who could not prove their

loyalty conclusively, which sometimes virtually depopulated entire

communities. The fact that guerrilla depredations continued despite the

arrests indicates that this practice had little impact upon their

activities, although it may have increased security in some areas by

removing hostile elements of the population. The practice also probably

strengthened the guerrillas somevdiat, since men facing imminent arrest

might join them to escape it.

Federal authorities in Missouri also experimented unsuccessfully

with the concept of arresting guerrillas' families in order to control

their behavior. In ^r i l 1863, Brig. Gen. Thomas Ewing Jr, General

William T. Sherman's brother-in-law, and commander of the District of the

Border, which included the two western tiers of Missouri counties between

the thirty-eighth parallel and the Missouri River, began arresting the female relatives - wives, mothers and sisters - of the guerrillas in his district.By doing so, he hoped to deprive the guerrillas of the material support that these women provided. Possibly he also felt that the guerrillas might curtail their activities to prevent further 100

retaliation on the women, although he never made any threat to that

effect. Whatever his reasons, Ewing quickly discovered that this policy

was unworkable. The guerrillas continued their raids and, more

importantly, the number of women arrested overwhelmed the available

prison space in Kansas City. The Union sinply lacked the facilities to

jail all of the guerrillas' families. Moreover, on August 14 one of the

buildings housing the women collapsed, killing five of the inmates and

injuring the other six. Although the cause was simply failure to ensure

that the structure was sound, the guerrillas believed that Ewing

deliberately had attempted to murder the women. Therefore, this tragedy

was an important cause of Quantrill's infamous raid on Lawrence, Keinsas

six days later. Shortly after the building's collapse, Ewing released

the remaining prisoners and banished them from Missouri, thereby 18 terminating the experiment. Although Grant later proposed a similar

policy as a means of controlling Mosby, no other Union commander actually

attempted it.

Banishment represented the most extreme method that the Federal

coirananders practiced for controlling hostile civilians and depriving the

guerrillas of their support. Used throughout the occupied areas during

the war, it generally went into effect when other policies had failed to

curtail the civilians or the guerrillas satisfactorily. Therefore its main purpose was to make an area enemy-free, although it also provided

the valuable service of removing possible spies and saboteurs from within

Union lines. In theory, banishment hampered the guerrillas by depriving them of sources of supplies and information, thereby making them less 101

likely to operate in that region. In practice, it probably strengthened

the Confederates by driving outraged, dispossessed men to join the

service, as well as increasing the resistance of the soldiers already in

the field, in response to the mistreatment of their families or fellow

Southerners.

Generally Union commanders applied banishment against individuals or

small groups \dio had made themselves intolerable by outspoken support for

the Southern cause, although some persons were banished on suspicion

alone, rather than for known acts, in order to enhance the peace and

safety of the area. However, i^ile the political authorities raised no

objections to the concept of banishment, in practice they frequently

intervened in favor of the victim. Since the banished individuals

generally were prominent men in their community, they often had little

difficulty in finding syitpathy and support for their plight in official

circles. As a result, commanders came under pressure to reverse

individual sentences or had them overturned by higher authority. In

short, such banishments merely removed troublesome individuals from the

region at best and weakened Union authority by having the sentence overturned at worst.

Occasionally, wholesale banishments of large segments of the population occurred, in an effort to achieve total security of an area.

Again, General Ewing in Missouri set the precedent. Shortly before the collapse of the women's prison building in Kansas City, he had proposed to General Schofield the idea of removing the families of known 102

guerrillas in his district as a means of bringing peace to the region:

. • .About two thirds of the families on the occupied farms of that region are of kin to the guerrillas and are actively and heartily engaged in feeding, clothing and sustaining them. The presence of these families is the cause of the presence there of the guerrillas They will...continue guerrilla war as long as they remain, and will stay as long as possible if their families remain. I think that the families of several hundred of the worst of these men should be sent, with their clothes and bedding, to some rebel district south...if sent south the men will follow, I think, and there they can live at home if they wish* in safety, and can have amnesty, idien the day of amnesty comes.

Four days after the tragedy in Kansas City, with Schofield's approval,

Ewing issued General Order Number Ten to carry out this policy. Ewing

directed that:

— The wives and children of known guerrillas, and also women who are heads of families and are willfully engaged in aiding guerrillas will be notified to remove out of this district and out of the State of Missouri forthwith. They will be permitted to take, unmolested, their stock, provisions, and household goods. If they fail to remove promptly, they will be sent...under escort, to Kansas City for shipment south, with their clothes and such necessary household furniture and provisions as may be worth removing.

Ewing's order also included provision for banishing any guerrillas \dio

surrendered themselves, along with their families. His willingness to

permit families to take their portable property indicated that he wished

to make the order as painless as possible.

Unfortunately, the effectiveness of Order Number Ten's 'modest mass

banishment' never received a test. Two days later, spurred by the

perceived suffering and hardship that the order entailed, Quantrill's

guerrillas conducted their infamous sack of Lawrence, Kansas. The

raiders killed at least 150 men and boys, burned 185 buildings and 21 destroyed property valued at two million dollars. Five days later, on 103

August 25, 1863, as a result of political pressure to punish Missourians

for this atrocity, Ewing issued the harshest banishment order of the war.

General Order Number Eleven:

All persons living in Jackson, Cass, and Bates Counties, Missouri, and in that part of Vernon included in this district, are hereby ordered to remove from their present places of residence within fifteen days from the date thereof. Those v^o,.. .establish their loyalty.. .will be permitted to remove to any military station in this district,...all others shall remove out of this district--- All hay and grain found in [the] district after the 9th day of September next not convenient to [military] stations will be destroyed.

The order exenpted persons living within a mile of the military posts,

but directed the rigorous application of Order Number Ten in the areas

not affected by the new order, which overrode such exenptions. It also

rescinded the section to the previous order covering the banishment of

surrendered guerrillas, if they had been in arms after the Lawrence

massacre, in practical terms, Order Number Eleven superseded the

previous one in approximately half of Ewing's district and Schofield

removed the other half from his control within a month in response to

abuses by Ewing's troops.

Order Number Eleven effectively desolated the counties it covered.

Their populations declined from several thousand to a few hundred. For

example, out of a prewar population of 10,000, Cass county fell to

approximately 600. Union troops burned most of the buildings, leaving 23 only blackened chimneys to mark their former existence. The destruction was so great that the area became known afterward as the "Burned

District." However, the order had little other effect, beyond increasing bitterness and hate against the Federal government. It did not stop 104

guerrilla raids in the region, for Quantrill and his conpatriots remained

active until 1865. They may have had greater trouble getting supplies

after the exhaustion of surviving stocks, but the depopulation of area

did not hamper their movements otherwise. In fact, by increasing the

guerrillas' hatred, the order escalated the violence of the guerrilla

war. It made the guerrillas more reckless and less willing to surrender,

thereby increasing the difficulty of subduing them. As an anti-guerrilla

measure, the mass bainishments therefore proved a failure in Missouri.

Generally, Union commanders in the east did not attempt to invoke

mass removals like their counterparts did in Missouri. Probably the more

settled nature of the region and its proximity to Washington D.C. made

such actions politically unacceptable, especially given the large amount

of Union sentiment in it. Suggestions for total elimination of local

secessionists through banishment, imprisonment, or execution surfaced

from time to time, but they never went into effect. For example, in July

1863, Herman Haupt, Railroad Construction Corps commander, recommended

arresting all able-bodied inhabitants within ten miles of the Orange and

Alexandria Railroad, as part of a plan to protect it from guerrillas, but

the authorities did not enact it.^^ Likewise, Grant's suggestion the

following year to imprison the families of Mosby's Rangers in Fort

McHenry as hostages for the partisans' good conduct did not receive

approval. Neither did the frequent recommendations of frustrated

officers to "shoot, hang, banish or jail" all able-bodied males in their 25 specific area. The war in the east simply lacked the desperate character required for such tactics to seem acceptable, especially as eventual Union success became more evident with the passing of time. 105

The Federal's one attempt at mass removal in the east therefore was

more modest than Ewing's, but likewise failed to achieve its purpose. In

October 1864, during General Philip Sheridan's canpaign in the Shenandoah

Valley, General Halleck directed the removal of all unfriendly persons

living within five miles of the Manassas Gap Railroad. Guerrilla attacks

had hampered severely Union efforts to rebuild that railroad, so the War

Department felt that banishing all known secessionists in the area would

solve this problem. Not surprisingly, the guerrilla attacks did not

cease, even \dien the Fédérais extended the devastated zone to ten miles 26 on either side of the line. Ultimately they gave up the effort and

withdrew, thereby granting the guerrillas one of their most significant

strategic successes of the war. Since the order affected only unfriendly

settlers and only along the railroad line, it did not inpact the same

volume of people as Order Number Eleven. Moreover, as the results

showed, it did not impede the guerrillas seriously, since they still

could approach reasonably close to the line.

The physical impossibility of arresting or banishing all known or

suspected secessionists made monetary fines and assessments the most

common means of attempting to discourage civilian support for the

guerrillas. While the Federal commanders probably did not expect such

charges to discourage the guerrillas themselves, they hoped that the

civilians \dio actually paid them would become less inclined to support

the partisans and perhaps even more willing to oppose them actively.

Also, if the Union could not stamp out the guerrillas, then by this

method at least it could offset the costs of their activities. All of 106

the regions where guerrilla warfare took place saw some system of

requiring the local civilians to pay reparations for damages incurred

and/or fines for the mere action of a partisan attack. In 1862 in

Missouri, seven counties and four towns paid over $200,000 in assessments

on disloyal people. The following year, the authorities levied

assessments totalling $300,000 on twenty-six other Missouri counties.

In a more direct attack at guerrilla warfare. General Schofield ordered

a fine of $5000 on area secessionists for every Union soldier or civilian 27 killed and fines of $1000-$5000 for each one wounded. Although levies in

the east did not reach these heights, they were a common practice there

as well.

No matter how great the amount, fines and assessments did not inpede

guerrilla activity significantly. Partisan raids continued unabated, and

disloyal citizens assisted the raiders. The failure of Schofield's

anti-guerrilla financial plan illustrates their general ineffectiveness.

Quite sinply, Schofield's plan collapsed because the guerrillas killed or

wounded so many Union men that the Fédérais could not find enough

disloyal citizens to charge for damages. Furthermore, although used

throughout the war, the practice of fines and assessments often came

under political attack. The opportunities for corruption that existed

made it an easy target for elected officials concerned about voter

opinion. Lincoln twice ordered assessments in Missouri stopped after 28 conplaints from officials there about the manner of their enforcement.

Generally, however, the fines continued unopposed so long as they were not exorbitant or roused too many complaints. The money they provided 107

toward defraying the war's cost was too useful to eliminate them

completely.

The most significant point about Union anti-guerrilla policy was

that, except for the issue of treatment of captured partisans, no

explicit general policy existed. While threats to retaliate on Union

prisoners of war made establishment of an official policy on captured

guerrillas necessary, the government preferred to leave most policy

decisions to commanders in the field. Provided policy controlled the

guerrillas so that they did not interfere greatly with Federal authority

or the war effort, Washington showed little interest in the guerrilla

problem. Occasionally government officials vetoed specific policies

enacted against civilians because they infringed too greatly on public

rights or aroused too much opposition. Usually, however, commanders were

free to tailor policy to fit the specific situation in their area,

adopting ones which appeared most effective given the amount and type of

guerrilla activity there. In practice, policy harshness correlated

directly with the viciousness of the local guerrillas and their threat to

operations. In areas vAiere the guerrillas practiced brutal, no quarter warfare, such as in Missouri, policies reflected extreme measures to drive them out. In areas idiere the guerrillas mostly conformed to the recognized rules of war, policies tended to be more moderate. Even in the East, however, threats to major operations increased the harshness of anti-guerrilla policies, as Grant's suggestion to hang Mosby's men without trial and inçrison their families indicated. 108

The second inportant point about anti-guerrilla policies is that

harshness tended to decrease success. While none of the policies,

particularly those for controlling civilians, significantly discouraged

guerrilla activity, the harsher ones promoted greater opposition, as

Quantrill's raid on Lawrence in reaction to Ewing's inprisonment and

banishment orders showed. The guerrillas became more brutal and less willing to acknowledge rules of warfare. Under comparatively moderate policies, such as those in Virginia, the guerrillas mostly behaved in a more military fashion. While other factors, such as the type of men who made up individual bands, also influenced guerrilla behavior, the fact that even Mosby executed prisoners in retaliation for the hanging of his men shows that the severity of a policy played a significant role.

Moreover, policies applied directly against the guerrillas had greater effect than those applied against civilians. Guerrillas might become angered by fines or imprisonment of their relatives, but such actions did not stop their activities. Imprisonment of the guerrillas themselves, however, reduced the problem that the Union troops had to deal with.

Because of these conditions, anti-guerrilla policy remained haphazard throughout the war. 109

Chapter III Notes

1. Maj. Gen. John C. Freniont, Proclamation, 30 August 1861, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. Ill, pp. 466-467; Brownlee, Gray Ghosts of the Confederacy, pp. 36-37; Lincoln to Fremont, 2 September 1861, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. Ill, p. 469.

2. General Orders No. 2, Department of the Mississippi, 13 March 1862, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. VIII, p. 612.

3. Maj. Gen. John C. Fremont to E. M. Stanton, 25 June 1862, Official Records. Ser. II, Vol. IV, p. 63.

4. John Letcher to George W. Randolph, 27 May 1862, Official Records. Ser. II, Vol. Ill, p. 885; Gen. R. E. Lee to Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, 17 June 1862, Official Records. Ser. II, Vol. IV, p. 45; Jones, Gray Ghosts, p. 90.

5. Major Joseph Darr to F. H. Pierpont, 22 August 1862, Official Records. Ser. II, Vol. IV, p. 422.

6. Robert Ould to Lt. Col. W. H. Ludlow, 5 October 1862, Official Records. Ser. II, Vol. IV, pp. 601-603; Gen. R. E. Lee to G. W. Randolph, 9 October 1862, Official Records. Ser. II, Vol. IV, p. 913; Jones, Gray Ghosts, pp. 92-93.

7. Gen. H. W. Halleck to Dr. Francis Lieber, 6 August 1862, Official Records. Ser. Ill, Vol. II, p. 301.

8. Richard Shelly Hartigan, Lieber's Code and the Law of War. (Chicago: Precedent Publishing Inc., 1983). p. 33.

9. Ibid.; Dr. Francis Lieber to Gen. H. W. Halleck, N.D., Official Records. Ser. Ill, Vol. II, p. 301-309.

10. Jones, Grey Ghosts, p. 95.

11. Report of Maj. Gen. John C. Fremont of Operations March 29-June 27, 1862, 30 December 1865, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XII, Pt. 1, p. 5.

12. P. H. Watson to Maj. Gen. Irvin McDowell, 11 May 1862, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XII, Pt. 3, p. 169.

13. Brownlee, Gray Ghosts of the Confederacy, p. 143.

14. Ibid., p. 32.

15. General Orders No. 19, Headquarters Missouri State Militia, 22 July 1862, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XIII, p. 506. 110

16. Brownlee, Gray Ghosts of the Confederacy, pp. 83-86.

17. Ibid., pp. 115-116.

18. Ibid., pp. 118-120.

19. Brig. Gen. Thomas Ewing to Lt. Col. C. W. Marsh, 3 August 1863, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXII, Pt. 2, p. 423.

20. General Orders No. 10, District of the Border, 18 August 1863, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXII, Pt. 2, p. 461.

21. Brownlee, Gray Ghosts of the Confederacy, p. 124.

22. General Orders No. 11, District of the Border, 25 August 1863, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXII, Pt. 2, p. 473.

23. Brownlee, Gray Ghosts of the Confederacy, p. 126.

24. Herman Haupt, Reminiscences of General Herman Haupt, (Milwaukee: Wright and Joys Company, 1901), p. 248.

25. Stephen Z. Starr, The Union Cavalry in the Civil War, 3 vols. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1979). 1:334.

26. Maj. Gen. H. W. Halleck to Brigadier General McClellan, 12 October 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLIII, Pt. 2, p. 348.

27. Brownlee, Gray Ghosts of the Confederacy, pp. 165-166.

28. Ibid., pp. 167-168. CHAPTER IV

I've Been Working on the Railroads

Of all of the targets which the Union forces defended against the

Confederate guerrillas, the most inportant were the railroads. The

Baltimore and Ohio was most vital to the Federal war effort, for it

provided the connecting artery along which the Union could move troops

and supplies between its eastern and western sections. Without the B&O,

communication and commerce between the two regions would be difficult,

and interruption of the flow of men and materials would severely hamper

suppression of the rebellion in either theater. The smaller rail lines

which ran through Union-held Virginia met the same requirements on a

lesser scale. Therefore, from the beginning of the war most of the

Union's defensive efforts in the Eastern theater, aside from guarding

Washington D.C., focused on protecting the railroads. However, while the

guerrillas represented a recognized danger and the most frequent threat,

these efforts concentrated mainly on preventing regular Confederate

forces from inflicting major damage. The garrisons, blockhouses and

technological innovations which the North utilized all aimed more at

foiling major attacks on key points than protecting every foot of the

railroad against sabotage. For the latter problem the Fédérais adopted a reactive approach aimed at rapid detection and repair of the damage.

Thus, although the Fédérais never conpletely prevented disruption of the railroad traffic, they brought it within limits vhich did not hanper the war effort.

Ill 112

=5; ^ *-3:

v - W M :

Figure 4: RAILROADS IN THE VIRGINIA THEATER

(Source: Official Military Atlas of the Civil War.) 113

From the beginning. Union commanders made protection of the B&O a

priority. After General George B. McClellan invaded western Virginia in

1861, he detached forty-eight conçianies of troops under Brig. Gen.

Charles W. Hill to guard the railroad.^ Although later recalled from this

duty in a futile effort to trap the area's Confederate forces, these

troops represented the forerunners of the central Union concept of B&O defense: a special command charged solely with protection of the

railroad. Just a few months later, in October 1861, the Fédérais established the Railroad District under Brig. Gen. Benjamin F. Kelley for that purpose. This organization remained in existence until June 1863, vrfien Kelley became commander of the Department of West Virginia. Even then, although the troops involved lost their status as a separate district and perhaps gained some responsibilities for regional protection, defense of the railroad remained their primary task until the end of the war. Furthermore, beginning in 1863 the Department of

Washington maintained a separate railway brigade (actually only one regiment) responsible for protecting the capital's railroad communications. Yet another exanple of this concept was Brig. Gen.

Herman Haupt's Railroad Construction Corps on the Orange and Alexandria

Railroad. Following the Battle of Gettysburg, vAien insufficient regular troops to guard the O&A were available, Haupt expanded and armed his corps to make it self-protecting. Clearly, railroad protection received special attention from the Union authorities.

The number of troops assigned to railroad defense apparently remained fairly stable throughout the war. Kelley's Railroad District 114

initially comprised twelve infantry regiments and an artillery battery,

approximately 12,000 men. Except for a very brief period at the

beginning of 1863, when its assigned strength approached 28,000 men, the

District contained 13,000-16,000 troops, representing thirteen infantry

regiments, three cavalry regiments and two artillery batteries. After

Kelley assumed command of the Department of West Virginia, his assigned

strength climbed to 36,000, but most of the increase came from the

assignment of non-railroad troops to the Department. During the 1864

caitpaign, vdien Kelley commanded part of the Department's Reserve Brigade

charged with regional defense, this organization's assigned strength did

not reach 20,000. The only change in the number of units assigned was an

increase to nineteen artillery batteries. Additionally, detachments

totalling up to 1,500 men guarded sections of the B&O in Maryland which 2 fell outside of Kelley's command.

During the first year of the war, the Union commanders tried to

defend the B&O primarily by driving the regular Confederate forces back

beyond striking range and gave little thought to the guerrilla threat.

Such an attitude was understandable, considering that in the same period

the Confederate armies had caused nearly all of the damage to the

railroad. By year's end, they had destroyed one hundred miles of

Baltimore and Ohio track, the vast majority of it done by Stonewall

Jackson's troops around Harper's Ferry.^ The entire line between

Harper's Ferry and Martinsburg was gone, including the only

double-tracked portion of the road, which had permitted the simultaneous passage of trains. In fact, throughout the war the major damage done to 115

the B&O and its coirçanion railroads came at the hands of regular troops.

During the Antietam caitpaign in 1862 Jackson reoccupied Harper's Ferry

and wrecked the Monocacy railroad bridge, while Lee's invasion in 1863

and Jubal Early's in 1864 also permitted the Confederates an opportunity

to destroy B&O track. Other successful attacks, such as the

Jones-Imboden raid of 1863 or the capture of New Creek, West Virginia in

1864 also were the work of regular troops. Therefore the Federal

perception of them as the major threat to the railroads was justified.

Very quickly, however, the Fédérais realized the danger the

guerrillas presented to the railroads. While they lacked the numbers to

cause extensive damage, the partisans could disrupt service by wrecking

small sections of track, burning bridges, derailing engines, sniping at

train and work crews, and cutting telegraph wires. If left unchecked,

such harassment could close a railroad line conpletely, as happened on

the Manassas Gap Railroad in 1864. Therefore, the Union forces faced the

problem of protecting the tracks from casual sabotage by guerrillas, in

addition to destruction by regular forces.

At first the Union forces atteirpted to defend the railroad

conçletely against both dangers. Garrisons occupied all major points

along the line - towns, bridges and tunnels - to protect them from large

raids. Frequent patrols scouted the track between these concentrations to discourage minor destruction.^ Thus, the troops tried to achieve total damage prevention by closely guarding every mile of track. 116

The Fédérais discovered, however, that such methods wasted

resources. During Stonewall Jackson's Valley caitpaign in the spring of

1662, the Union commanders withdrew many of the guard units for field

service and concentrated the detachments at the most important sites.

This move revealed that close protection of the railroad was unnecessary.

Instead, train crews could watch the tracks for signs of sabotage in the

course of their regular duties and thereby prevent serious mishaps, while

the bridges and tunnels, vdiere the Confederates could inflict the

greatest damage with the least effort, received increased military

protection. From that time until the war's end, vdiile other railroads in

the theater sometimes required more extensive defenses, protection of the

B&O consisted of strong detachments at the bridges and tunnels with

larger troop concentrations at key locations such as Relay House,

Harper's Ferry, and New Creek. Patrols from these locations, instead of

following the track line, now conducted a more aggressive defense focused

on searching for guerrillas and Confederate raiders.

A key element in this defense system was the blockhouse. These

structures provided protection for the units guarding the bridges and

tunnels, enabling them to defend themselves more effectively.

Construction of them began on the B&O in March 1863 at Rowlesburg, West

Virginia, site of the Cheat River Bridge, and spread along the line.^

Their basic details were as follows :

— They were barns, constructed out of the largest and longest logs that could be obtained, each barn being from forty to fifty feet square and ten to twelve feet in height. They were timbered on top to keep the shells out and notched through the side for the purpose of shooting through above the earthwork. In building them, stone is first piled around the proposed foundation about four feet high. 117

Then a deep ditch, four or five feet wide, is dug around the stone pile, the earth from the ditch being thrown upon the stones to a height of six or seven feet to protect the inmates of the house from shot and shell. The vdiole is surrounded with an abattis; and the entrance to the building was made in a zigzag fashion.

These works made the defenders virtually irroervious to guerrilla attacks,

as evidenced by the lack of reports of partisan assaults on them, as well

as enabled the Federal units to fend off larger raids as long as supplies

and the men's morale held out. General George Crook underscored their

role in anti-partisan defense in 1864 vrfien he ordered the conpletion of

blockhouses along the B&O as rapidly as possible and even detailed an

extra regiment for the purpose, in response to increased guerrilla

activity.^

To conplement the blockhouses, the Fédérais developed armored

railroad cars to acconpany the trains. Devised by Lt. John Meigs, son of

the Quartermaster General of the Union Anty, these cars were covered with

iron sheeting and equipped with cannon. Pushed ahead of the engine, they

patrolled the roads to protect trains from attack and supplemented the

O defense of bridges and tunnels. Essentially they functioned as

emergency armored blockhouses, for the Fédérais used them only in times

of increased danger or to protect reconstruction operations. Moreover, v^ile providing adequate protection against small arms, they remained vulnerable to artillery, thus making them effective only against

guerrillas and cavalry raiders. These restrictions limited the demand

for them, as one commander revealed when he reported that he needed only one ironclad car in his district and proposed returning the remainder to 9 the railroad coitpany after removing their guns. In addition to the 118

cars, the Union installed armored cabs on the train engines to protect

the crew from bushv^ackers. Both of these experiments seem to have

proven successful, but did not reduce the existing threat to the

railroads.

Another tactic that the Fédérais used to protect the railroad from

guerrillas was to disarm the local populace. General Franz Sigel

introduced it in April 1864, relatively late in the war, when he ordered

all civilians in the Department of West Virginia living on or south of

the Baltimore and Ohio line, except for scouts and members of the

militia, to surrender their arms to the nearest military authorities.^^

The extent of compliance with the directive is unknown, but it certainly

failed to curtail guerrilla activity, as subsequent events in the region

revealed.

This disarmament policy was as close as the Union authorities came

to creating a depopulated corridor along the B&O, such as had been done

in Missouri. Even along the other railroads in the eastern theater - the

Orange and Alexandria, Winchester and Harper's Ferr}'^, and Manassas Gap

lines - the Fédérais either threatened or enacted such removals. In the

first two instances. Union commanders threatened to arrest all citizens within ten miles of the line, but did not have to carry it out. As noted

elsewhere, only on the Manassas Gap Railroad in the eastern theater did

the Fédérais actually remove the population, and even then they were unsuccessful in halting attacks on it. Thus, while depopulation was one of the defensive options considered, the Union commanders did not enact it to any significant degree. 119

The fact that other railroads in the region required greater

protection efforts than the Baltimore and Ohio resulted primarily from

their geographical location. For its entire length, the B&O passed

through the ostensibly loyal regions of West Virginia and Maryland,

whereas the O&A and Manassas Gap lines lay in the hostile portion of

northern Virginia. The populations along the roads seemed to reflect

these general attitudes, for the Union reports from along the B&O did not

contain the sense of constant harassment present on the other lines.

Moreover, except for Hanse McNeill, none of the major partisan leaders

operated regularly against the B&O. The other two lines lay in the heart

of Mosby's area of activity, which earned them most of his attention,

while Lige White's band also focused more on that region. In addition,

the O&A and Manassas Gap railroads were relatively closer to the regular

Confederate forces and thus more vulnerable to raids from them. However,

the hostile population and greater guerrilla presence remained the major

factor necessitating stronger protection for these lines, as evidenced by the comment of one Union officer concerning the O&A: "No matter how large a force may be detailed to guard the railroads, the farmer guerrillas within our lines will find occasions 'vdien they can, with conçarative safety to themselves, make a raid to plunder and destroy public property.

The methods used to defend the northern Virginia railroads did not differ greatly from those used on the B&O. Garrisons and patrols provided the main basis for protection. The Union also used blockhouses. 120

although construction of the first ones on the O&A did not begin until

the end of 1863, due to delays on gathering and transporting the

materials. On the O&A, the Fédérais constructed blockhouses at all of

the bridges, while on the Manassas Gap Railroad they built stockades

within sight of each other, thereby indicating the extent of the

perceived threat against that line.^^

One aspect of railroad defense over vhich the Union authorities

showed greater concern on the northern Virginia lines was the protection

of trains themselves. To provide it, tlie Fédérais utilized two measures:

military guards on the trains to ward off attacks and the presence of

Southern civilians as passengers to discourage sabotage. Apparently they

used the latter tactic only along the Manassas Gap line in a successful

effort to stop the guerrillas from derailing trains in 1864.^^ An

extreme measure that threatened civilians' lives, its use only on the line most threatened with closure indicated that it was not a popular method with the Union authorities. Despite the train losses that the partisans inflicted on the B&O and the O&A, the Fédérais never seem to have used civilians as human shields on those lines, despite its success. Fear of

Confederate retaliation and/or political repercussions from popular outrage against the idea probably discouraged its use.

The use of soldiers as train guards was more acceptable, but the

Fédérais also did not use it extensively. As part of his defensive measures, Brig. Gen. Herman Haupt, who had charge of running the Orange and Alexandria railroad, began placing thirty to fifty men in all the trains in 1863 to protect them from increased guerrilla activity. 121

However, despite the fact that these troops foiled several assaults on

the trains, Haupt felt that the "guards afford little protection".

Apparently they failed to discourage the guerrillas sufficiently to make

their presence worthvdiile. Haupt did not use them continuously, but

only during times of increased partisan activity.

The same attitude concerning guards on trains prevailed on the

Baltimore and Ohio. The commanders along that line occasionally provided

small parties of soldiers at the coirpany's request to ride the trains

during times of increased danger. For exanple, during one of Harry

Gilmor's raids in 1864, the commander at Harper's Ferry posted forty

infantry on the express to Martinsburg and made arrangements to send a

squad on the train every night while the threat persisted.However,

such actions seem to have occurred rarely. In fact. General Winfield

Scott Hancock's proposal in March 1865 to place guards on all B&O

passenger trains, following several train robberies by guerrillas,

foundered \dien the conpany insisted that the government pay regular fares

for them. Hancock promptly withdrew the offer, and the company

subsequently agreed to provide thirty armed and reliable men to protect 17 the trains. However, with Lee's surrender and the end of the war only

a few weeks later, the problem ceased to exist. Based on these

performances, none of the methods for protecting the trains directly

received sustained attention from the Union commanders.

One problem which the Fédérais faced on the Manassas Gap and Orange and Alexandria Railroads was that no specific organization of guards 122

existed for these lines as it did for the B&O. Instead of having troops

v^ose primary purpose was to protect the railroads, the Union commanders

drew on the Anty of the Potomac or available troops within the

department. This system was satisfactory in peaceful periods, but during

cartpaigns the anty could spare few troops for railroad defense. The

problem with calling upon other departmental forces was that the

departmental commanders tended to view the railroad guards as a reserve

Wiich they drew upon for other needs. This situation had led to the

formation of the Railroad Division on the B&O to stop the departmental

drain on guards. As an exanple of the problem's effect on the railroads,

during the Second Bull Run campaign, Haupt could not get any railroad

guards. Following the battle, he received all of the troops he

requested. Within three months, however, he complained that large

sections of both the O&A and Manassas Gap lacked guards, despite guerrilla activity along them. The O&A needed an additional 200 guards in July 1863 and three months later the Superintendent of Military

Railroads observed that the line still lacked sufficient protection. For the remainder of the year, the A m y of the Potomac assigned one infantry 18 division and 500 cavalry on a rotating basis to protect the O&A. Thus the availability of guards fluctuated, but usually was insufficient. By mid-1863, however, Haupt had begun to resolve the problem by expanding his own command and providing them with arms and training so that they 19 could protect themselves. Nevertheless, no regular system of guards existed on the northern Virginia railroads during the war, thereby making their quantity and quality variable, which in turned increased the lines' vulnerability to attack. 123

In addition to defending the railroads directly, Haupt expected the

Army of the Potomac to provide more extensive protection. He believed

that effective defense not only required guards on the lines themselves,

but also detachments occupying the gaps in the Elue Ridge Mountains and

the fords along the Occoquan River, supplemented by frequent cavalry

patrols throughout the country in order to prevent Confederate cavalry

from raiding the roads.Haupt's concern in this case was the regular

Confederate forces rather than the partisans, although the patrols and

detachments might intercept some of the latter forces also. The need was

especially great after Gettysburg, v^en the Confederate cavalry was

active in attempting to avenge the South's defeat and discourage further

Union operations. In response to Haupt's requests. Federal cavalry

patrolled and guarded the area extensively during the last half of

1863.^^ However, the Union army did not maintain such defensive measures

throughout the war. Furthermore, once again active campaigning severely

reduced the number of troops available for such operations, limiting

their effectiveness.

Haupt's views on distant defense reflected one of two other methods proposed but not adapted for protection of the Baltimore and Ohio, in

1862, General Kelley suggested that the best means of protecting the B&O was to occupy key towns some distance south of it in force to prevent

Confederate thrusts against it. Clearly aimed at regular Confederate forces, this tactic would broaden the territory they would have to traverse to reach the railroad, thus reducing the possibility of surprise 124

attacks upon it. The garrisons' size would prevent all but the largest

eneny thrusts. Kelley advocated Romney, Winchester, and Leesburg as the 22 site for these garrisons. Since these towns were in or east of the

mountains their selection further eimhasized the orientation against the

major Confederate forces in central Virginia. Such a strategy clearly

could have done little against partisan activity, for the guerrillas

could bypass such garrisons. Given the actual attacks on the railroad

during the war, Kelley's plan probably would have failed, for it would

not have stopped the Confederate invasions or the Jones-Imboden raid in

West Virginia, all of which inflicted the most extensive damage on the

B&O. In any case, the War Department failed to act on the proposal,

rendering the issue moot.

The second proposal also came from one of the officers guarding the

B&O, Lt. Col. Gabriel E. Porter. He recommended establishing training

camps at strategic points along the road between Harper's Ferry and New

Creek, the section of greatest danger. Under the plan, the troops would receive training in actual war conditions, thereby gaining practical military experience which would increase their effectiveness in the field. At the same time, they could provide protection to the railroad, thus serving a dual purpose and saving the government money by eliminating separate structures for both requirements. Porter's idea had sufficient merit that the House of Representatives authorized additional 23 study of it, but apparently no further action occurred. If adopted, it probably would have provided better protection against guerrillas than

Kelley's plan, since the troops would have been stationed along the 125

railroad and could respond more effectively to such local threats.

Whether the continual rotation of green units, vdio would have to relearn

the proper tactics, through the caitps would have defended the railroad

effectively, remains speculative.

Perhaps the most iirportant aspect of these new tactics was that they

showed the Fédérais had realized that railroad protection did not have to

be absolute. The key consideration was minimal disruption to the road's

operations. Therefore, the amount of damage was not as critical as the

rapidity and ease of its repair. Accordingly, the Union devoted more

effort to efficient repair methods. As these techniques became more

effective, the danger presented to the railroads by guerrillas and

raiders correspondingly declined. Furthermore, such tactics reflected

the realization that small detachments were helpless against the large

Confederate raids which represented the primary danger. Military and

property losses would be smaller with the troops concentrated in larger

organizations which could defend themselves and their location more

effectively.

In the matter of railroad repair, Herman Haupt provided the

standard. An engineering genius long connected with railroad and bridge

construction, Haupt had come to Washington in response to a summons from

Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton in ^ r i l 1862 to repair the destroyed

railroad between Acquia Creek and Fredericksburg. Utilizing his own engineering skills and innovations, Haupt had the railroad reopened within a month, including replacing a bridge within twelve days which originally had required a year to build. Following a similar performance 126

in repairing the Manassas Gap Railroad, Haupt received authority to form

and command his own organization, the Railroad Construction Corps to keep

open the railroad lines in the Department of the Rappahannock.^^ A few

months later, following his service in operating the Orange and

Alexandria during the Second Manassas Campaign, Haupt received an 25 appointment to the rank of brigadier general. In this capacity, he

concentrated on running the railroads in northern Virginia, particularly

the O&A, until he left the service in September 1863.

The services of Haupt's Railroad Construction Corps, which numbered

approximately 10,000 men by the war's end, provided guidance for railroad 26 repair throughout the country during the war. Officers vdiom he trained

in his engineering techniques later applied them in other theaters,

notably in Tennessee and Georgia during the campaign against Atlanta.

Haupt's contributions included the use of prefabricated bridge trusses,

means of splicing rails to repair track temporarily and methods of

straightening rails bent or twisted by Confederate raiders. Through the use these techniques and trained workers the Union repaired the railroads with astonishing rapidity. Damage vAiich the Confederates estimated would take weeks or months to repair required only days. The best example of this capability was the transfer of General Joseph Hooker's corps from the Army of the Potomac to Chattanooga in September 1863. The Baltimore and Ohio carried the troops almost its entire length from Washington to

Wheeling without delay, although Lee's army had destroyed part of the 27 road four times, most recently only three months earlier. In fact, after 1862 the B&O never ceased its operations due to Confederate 127

actions for more than a few days at a time. This repair capability

permitted the Fédérais to accept some destruction and keep the railroads

operating, thereby reducing the protection requirement. Admittedly the

arn^»- sometimes had to protect the repair crews, but this task did not

require as much manpower as an extensive guard system would have.

The Federal efforts to defend the railroads had limited success. In

addition to the damage inflicted by the Confederate armies during

offensive canpaigns, vhich the defensive system was not intended to prevent, the lines suffered from the attentions of cavalry raiders and

guerrillas. The cavalry raids represented the greater danger, for they usually contained enough strength to threaten detachments guarding depots, bridges and tunnels, thereby causing greater disruption to railroad operations if successful. For exaitple, the great raid in West

Virginia in 1863 by Generals William E. Jones and John D. Imboden, discussed elsevhere in this volume, destroyed sixteen railroad bridges and one tunnel on the B&O. The federal detachments guarding these places surrendered or retreated in the face of the Confederates' superior force.

In February 1864, Brig. Gen. Thomas Rosser led a force of cavalry against the B&O near Cumberland, Maryland, destroying two bridges and capturing 28 one of the detachments guarding them. In November that same year

Rosser surprised and captured the Federal depot at New Creek, West

Virginia, along with 300 of the 800-man garrison. Clearly, the railroads were not invulnerable against determined adversaries.

In practical terms, however, such Confederate successes had little effect on railroad operations. The main target of the Jones-Imboden 128

raid, the B&O's Cheat River Bridge, resisted the attackers, vÆiile the

railroad itself reopened for traffic within a week of the Confederates'

withdrawal. Rosser's attacks near Cumberland likewise failed to disrupt

the B&O for any lengthy period, vdiile his capture of New Creek closed it

for less than a day. In fairness to Rosser, however, his main objective

at New Creek was to capture supplies, so he devoted little effort to

destroying the railroad.Nevertheless, the Southern raids failed to

close down the B&O, thereby vindicating the Union defensive strategy,

v^ich aimed at protecting against such operations.

The guerrillas proved a greater nuisance than the raiders, but even

they had little effect on the railroads' operations. They occasionally

managed to destroy a bridge or capture a garrison by surprise, as McNeill

did at Piedmont in May 1864, but such damage failed to close the tracks

for long. The guerrillas' attacks focused more on the trains themselves,

by either arranging derailments, barricading the tracks or simply firing

on trains to stop them. They also harassed repair crews and woodcutting

parties, necessitating the assignment of guards to these groups.

However, vdiile such incidents made good newspaper copy, they seldom had

any inpact on the greater war effort.

Admittedly, the partisans achieved a number of spectacular successes against the trains. In May 1863, Mosby used a howitzer to stop a train on the Orange and Alexandria Railroad. The Rangers plundered the train and escaped, although pursuing Fédérais captured their cannon. The following month. Lige White's band plundered and destroyed a B&O train near Point of Rocks, as well as captured the Loudon County Rangers vdio 129

had been aboard it. In early 1864, Gilnror introduced a new partisan

tactic \dien his men robbed the passengers of a B&O train. Mosby

performed a similar exploit in the autumn of that year, when he took a

Union army payroll of approximately $170,000 off the B&O. In fact,

during the last few months of the war, reports of partisan activity

mentioned virtually nothing but the wrecking and robbing of B&O trains.

None of these exploits, however, impacted railroad operations.

Wrecked trains stopped traffic on the line only briefly, if at all.

While the robbery of passengers probably caused an outcry for greater

railroad protection, the Union commanders did not increase their forces

for this purpose. Burned bridges and destroyed tracks proved easily

repairable, once the Fédérais had developed the technique. Moreover,

reports of such damage may have been exaggerated. Investigation of a

report that guerrillas had burned three bridges on the O&A in September

1863, revealed that two of the fires were extinguished before any damage occurred, vAiile the third did only minor harm which the crew repaired without delaying the trains.Moreover the attacks on the railroads occasionally enabled the Fédérais to capture parties of guerrillas, thereby removing them from the war, as occurred to twenty-three of Op Gilmor's men in 1863 and ten of Mosby's in 1865. Despite the partisans' efforts, the railroads generally continued to operate with little interruption.

One of the most inportant factors contributing to the Confederate successes against the railroads, particularly the B&O, was the quality of 130

the troops guarding them. While a number of excellent regiments

performed railroad duty at different times, many of them were untrained

and unfamiliar with their responsibilities. They were new units that had

not yet developed an esprit de corps, vdiich weakened their capability

to resist an attack. At times militia fulfilled the defensive function

in some areas, most notably in 1864 when eleven regiments of hundred-days

militia guarded the B&O from May to August. Such units often lacked the

capability or the will to resist a veteran enemy. Furthermore, a number

of regiments spent their entire enlistment guarding the railroad, \diere

the boredom and lack of active service lowered their morale. Those

troops detached from the field armies for guard duty probably suffered

the same results for similar reasons. Moreover, some units were

organized specifically for such duty. Often posted in lonely places in

small detachments, "they developed a morbid fear of cavalry

raiders.Under such circumstances, the guards frequently put up little resistance to the rebels. While some units did their duty successfully, most notably the defense of the Cheat River Bridge against the Jones-Imboden raid, others surrendered or fled at the first opposition. The Confederates thus often had little difficulty damaging the railroads against such defenders.

The quality of the Union officers involved also was a problem. The same factors that weakened the troops' morale similarly infected their officers. The effect of undisciplined or cowardly officers was even worse than that of soldiers, for vÆiile a good officer might inspire poor troops to perform conpetently, a bad officer could negate the 131

capabilities of good troops. Incidents occurred along the railroad of

officers surrendering men vrtio wanted to fight to inferior enemy forces.

One report noted that vmen guerrillas attacked a train on the O&A, "the

train guard acted cowardly and disgracefully [with] the officer in

charge setting the example".Colonel George R. Latham, vrtio commanded

the garrison at New Creek vdien Rosser captured it in 1864 received much

censure for his mishandling of his troops and permitting the rebels to

surprise him. Even department commanders often seemed second rate.

Some, such as Robert Patterson and John W. Wool were to old for active

service. Others, such as John C. Fremont and Franz Sigel, received

command more for political reasons than military ability. Such leadership

provided little innovation or inspiration to protect the railroads more

effectively. Even the more effective commanders, such as Generals Kelley,

Robert C. Schenck and Winfield S. Hancock, received their railroad command

assignments v^ile recovering from combat wounds, so that they probably did

not perform at their best capabilities.

Throughout the war, the Federal efforts to defend the railroads proved generally successful. Once the Union had recognized the need for

troops assigned specifically to railroad protection in order to prevent

commanders withdrawing them for other purposes, and once it had determined that only the most vulnerable points required permanent guards, it enacted a system vhich kept the lines in operation. The garrisons usually prevented small bodies of partisans from committing serious damage, v^ile train crews and patrols often spotted minor destruction before it caused accidents or lengthy delays. Innovative 132

repair techniques accelerated restoration of damaged sections, thereby

minimizing railroad disruption. The Confederates never succeeded in

shutting down any of the railroads except for the Manassas Gap Railroad,

which the Fédérais closed in 1863. Even with the Manassas Gap, the

iirçortant reason for its closure and the subsequent failure to reopen it

in 1864 was that it had no value as a supply line unless the Union Army

occupied the Upper Shenandoah Valley. Since the Northern forces chose not to do so after Gettysburg, they could put the resources required by

the Manassas Gap to better use elsevdiere. The failure of the Union authorities to increase the number of troops on railroad detail or to upgrade their quality indicated that the railroad defense functioneu adequately. In the final analysis, the trains kept moving troops and supplies vdiere they were needed Wien they were needed, which was all that the Union required. 133

Chapter IV Notes

1. George Edgar Turner, Victory Rode the Rails, (New York: Bobbs-Merrill Conçany, 1953), p. 81.

2. The material on troop strengths is abstracted from departmental returns in the Official Records. The relevant volumes are: Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. V, p. 636; Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXI, pp. 938-940, 963-964, 988; Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXV, Pt. 2, pp. 29, 32, 112-113, 181-185, 321, 586-592; Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXVII, Ft. 3, pp. 242-243, 440-445, 449-450, 638-639, 644, 809-811, 816; Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXIX, Pt. 2, pp. 28-30, 131-134, 138-141, 239-240, 405-406, 523-524, 608-611, 614-627; Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXXIII, pp. 475, 479; Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXXVII, Pt. 1, pp. 567-573, 697-704; Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXXVII, Pt. 2, pp. 543-552; Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLIII, Pt. 1, pp. 61, 974-987; Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLIII, Pt. 2, pp. 247-248, 501-515, 715-716, 846-857.

3. Turner, Victory, p. 94.

4. Festus P. Summers, The Baltimore and Ohio in the Civil War. (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1939), p. 154.

5. Ibid., p. 158.

6. Ibid., pp. 157-158.

/ , I-Iaj. Gen. George Crook to Kaj. Gen. Sheridan, 16 November 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLIII, Pt. 2, p. 635.

8. Russell F. Weigley, Quartermaster General of the Union Army. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), p. 303; Summers, Victory, p. 158.

9. B. G. Sullivan to Department of West Virginia, 24 November 1863, Departments, RG. 393.

10. General Orders No. 14, Headquarters Department of West Virginia, 12 April 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXXIII, p. 846.

11. Elias M. Greene to Lt. Col. J. H. Taylor, 2 October 1863, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXIX, Pt. 2, p. 256.

12. Virgil Carrington Jones, Ranger Mosby. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1944), p. 215; Maj. Gen. S. P. Heintzelman to Adjutant General Headquarters of Army, 4 October 1863, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXIX, Pt. 2, p. 254. 134

13. Jones, Gray Ghosts, pp. 301-302.

14. Haupt, Reminiscences, p. 204.

15. Ibid., p. 251.

16. 1st Lt. S. F. Adams to W. P. Smith, 10 June 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXXVII, Pt. 1, p. 623; Adams to Smith, 11 June 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXXVII, Pt. 1, p. 625.

17. Maj. Gen. W. S. Hancock to E. M. Stanton, 1 April 1865, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLVI, Pt. 3, p. 443; Maj. Gen. H. W. Halleck to Major General Hancock, 1 April 1865, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLVI, Pt. 3, p. 444; W. P. Smith to Gen. C. H. Morgan, 2 April 1865, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLVI, Pt. 3, p. 506.

18. Thomas Weber, The Northern Railroads in the Civil War 1861-1865. (New York; King's Crown Press, Columbia University, 1952), pp. 151, 167; Turner, Victory, pp. 206, 220; Col. D. C. McCallum to Maj. Gen. H. W. Halleck, 2 October 1863, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXIX, Pt. 2, p. 253; Maj. Gen. A. A. Hunphreys to Commanding Officer First Corps, 22 November 1863, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXIX, Pt. 2, p. 477.

19. Haupt, Reminiscences, p. 254.

20. Ibid., p. 248.

21. Brig. Gen. Rufus King to Col. J. H. Taylor, 23 July 1863, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXVII, Pt. 3, p. 786.

22. Summers, Baltimore and Ohio, p. 156.

23. Ibid., pp. 156-157.

24. Turner, Victory, p. 150-157.

25. Although Haupt used the title, he never officially accepted the commission, preferring to serve without rank or pay so that he could pursue his private affairs. His formal declination of the appointment was the basis for his departure from military service.

26. Jane A. Martin and Jeremy Ross, Eds., Spies, Scouts, and Raiders, Time-Life Series on the Civil War, (Alexandria, Virginia: Time Life Books Inc, 1985), p. 101.

27. Turner, Victory, p. 293.

28. Summers, Baltimore and Ohio, p. 140.

29. Col. George R. Latham to Capt. R. F. Kennedy, 1 December 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLIII, Pt. 1, pp. 660-661. liD

30. Summers, Baltimore and Ohio, pp. 139-144.

31. S. P. Heintzelman to Col. J. C. Kelton, 4 October 1863, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXIX, Pt. 2, pp. 253-254.

32. Michael Graham to Colonel Sharpe, 16 October 1863, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXIX, Pt. 2, p. 338; Maj. Gen. Lew Wallace to Major General Sheridan, 5 January 1855, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLVI, Pt. 2, p. 51.

33. Turner, Victory, p. 209.

34. W. Gamble to Lt. Col. J. H. Taylor, 18 January 1865,Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLVI, Pt. 2, p. 175.

35. Jeffrey D. Wert, "Attacking the Invincible", Civil War Times Illustrated, Vol. 20, No. 10, February 1982, p. 16. CHAPTER V

"At Night All Ghosts are Gray"

The opening of 1863 saw a number of changes in the Virginia-western

Virginia region, that altered the shape of the war there. By this time,

both sides had reevaluated their strategies concerning western Virginia

and changed it into a backwater of the war. The Fédérais determined that

the state had no value as a base for offensives into other parts of the

Confederacy, due to the difficulties in traversing the terrain. The only

reasons for maintaining Union troops in the region were to support the

loyal state government, provide limited defense for the citizens and

protect the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. The Confederates likewise went

over to the defensive, with the protection of the Virginia and Tennessee

Railroad and the salt works in southwestern Virginia as their major

concerns.^ They also had limited offensive objectives, including

"destruction of the Baltimore and Ohio, harassment of the Restored 2 Government, recruiting, forage and supply." However, the Confederates did not pursue these activities on the large scale or with any great vigor. With the exception of the Jones-Imboden cavalry raid against the

B&O in the spring of 1863, formal military operations virtually ceased.

Henceforth the war in western Virginia was a guerrilla war.

As the war stagnated in western Virginia, emphasis shifted to the

Shenandoah Valley and transmontane eastern Virginia. Although the

Fédérais had classed the Shenandoah as uninportant also, and the Upper

136 137

Potomac as "a mere line of defense" to protect the B&O, they proved

unable to sustain this attitude.^ The Confederates continued to use the

Valley extensively, particularly during the Gettysburg campaign, thereby

causing a number of sharp skirmishes and continued Union concern about

the area. Both the Shenandoah and the fringes of the Arny of the Potomac

east of the mountains remained favorite hunting grounds for partisans,

who grabbed an increasingly larger share of the Union's anti-guerrilla

attention.

In western Virginia especially, the guerrillas remained a serious

problem. In fact, the decline in Federal concern for the region

coincided with an upswing in guerrilla activity. Delays in establishment of the new state and the enactment of the Emancipation Proclamation on

January 1, 1863, which many western Virginians felt changed the war from a defense of the Constitution to an abolitionist crusade, weakened Union sentiment. The destruction caused by Confederate raiders and the withdrawal of Federal troops reduced it even further. The citizens felt that the Federal government was giving them little support in return for their efforts on behalf of the Union cause. Instead it threatened their institutions, reduced its protection, and left them to suffer for their loyalty, not unlike the the fate of the Unionist citizens of east

Tennessee. As a result of these views, many western Virginians switched sides, causing a new surge of secessionist sentiment throughout the state. New guerrilla bands formed to attack the machinery of the

Unionist government. With the encouragement of the Confederate authorities, vdio wished to promote instability in the area, they ambushed 138

and kidnapped officials, broke up courts and bushwhacked Unionists.

Sheriffs were special targets of their attentions, since those officers

were responsible for maintaining order and probably represented the

greatest threat to local secessionists.^ Therefore these attacks made

the office of sheriff undesirable in some areas. The extent of these

activities caused whole counties to lapse into anarchy and the guerrilla

problem in western Virginia to remain unresolved.

To meet the guerrilla threat, the Union forces maintained a

structure similar to the one of the previous year, but at a reduced

strength. Benjamin Kelley commanded the troops defending the railroad,

Robert Milroy guarded the mountain front and the Shenandoah Valley from

his main base at Winchester, George Crook commanded part of the Kanawdia

District around Gauley Bridge and Summersville and Eliakim P. Scammon

commanded the remainder around Fayetteville. However, in mid-January

Scammon assumed command of the entire district, vdien Crook's brigade was

transferred to the A nry of the Cumberland in Tennessee.^ Thus, one of

the most effective counterguerrilla leaders in the region departed with

four regiments, thereby indicating that the authorities considered the

local threat diminished eind his capabilities of greater use elsevdiere.

A further reorganization occurred in March 1863, when the government

transferred western Virginia from the Department of the Ohio to the

Middle Department commanded by Maj. General Robert C. Schenck. Troop dispositions remained essentially unchanged, but Schenck designated

Kelley's, Milroy's and Scammon's forces as the First, Second and Third

Divisions respectively. In addition, he organized the troops between the 139

B&O railroad and the Great Kanawha River into their own organization, the

Fourth Separate Brigade under Brig. Gen. Benjamin E. Roberts.^

The increase in the partisans' inportance during 1863 partially

arose from the appearance of a new leader, Capt. John Singleton Mosby. A

lawyer in Bristol, Virginia prior to the war, Mosby had joined the

Confederate cavalry and made a name for himself as a scout. His services

assisted Jeb Stuart in making his famous ride around the Arity of the

Potomac prior to the Seven Days Battles, and he provided important

assistance during the Antietam canpaign. In between these periods, he

briefly became a Federal prisoner of war after Union cavalry captured him

asleep at a railroad station. Quickly exchanged, he brought General Lee

information about Federal movements that enabled him to undertake the

Second Bull Run canpaign. Had anyone in the Union high command foreseen

the grief Mosby would cause in the future, they would have prevented that

exchange by any possible means.

Recognizing Mosby's abilities, Stuart gave him permission in

December 1862 to organize a guerrilla band for operations in northern

Virginia. Starting with nine men, he soon raised a force of several

hundred, designated the 43rd Battalion of Partisan Rangers.^ This unit

operated as did many other guerrilla organizations, relying "on stealth, g surprise, and the shock of mounted attack with revolvers". Ho'.vever,

Mosby brought a remarkable discipline and efficiency to his operations.

His rangers generally wore Confederate uniforms on active service, although between raids they usually blended into the civilian population. 140

With rare exceptions, they concentrated their attacks on Union military

forces and targets of military value. Furthermore, Mosby continually

provided information gathered from his raids to Lee's anry, thereby

serving a valuable function beyond mere harassment of the eneny.

Moreover, the frequency and efficiency of the rangers' attacks

demoralized their opponents. By the end of 1863, virtually all guerrilla

attacks in Northern Virginia were the work of Mosby's men, according to

the Union reports. Although Hanse McNeill remained active and guerrilla

raids in western Virginia continued, Mosby henceforth dominated the

guerrilla war.

Mosby's initial raids quickly forced the Fédérais to change some of

their defensive techniques. His successful attacks on outposts caused

the Union forces to increase the strength of their pickets and make

changes to their postings. As early as December 1862, shortly after

Mosby's initial victories, the entire 5th New York Cavalry regiment was

stationed at Chantilly specifically as a guard against his raids. Three

months later an entire brigade of cavalry was performing constant picket

duty against guerrillas. To provide better protection for the pickets,

guard commanders placed their main reserve within easy striking distance

of the picket posts and within a mile or two of the outermost line of

sentinels, thereby increasing the capability to respond rapidly to an

attack. At some locations, officers dismounted their cavalry pickets so g that they could withstand an attack more effectively. The Fédérais

placed guards along the fords of Rappahannock and Rapidan rivers to prevent guerrillas from crossing.In short, the Union anty went to 141

great lengths to reduce the vulnerability of its pickets and prevent

guerrillas from penetrating its lines.

Mosby illustrated the ineffectiveness of these efforts against him in March vrfien he performed his most celebrated exploit of the war.

Slipping through the Federal lines with twenty-nine men, he entered

Fairfax Court House, a village ten miles from Washington D.C. and captured Brig. Gen. Edwin H. Stoughton in the letter's bedroom. In addition to Stoughton, the raiders carried off two captains and thirty enlisted men, all of w h . c m they successfully brought back to Confederate lines. However, Mosby missed his main target. Col. Sir Percy V^dham,

\dio commanded the cavalry defending Washington and \^o had been conducting vigorous patrols against the guerrillas. This activity, plus t^dham's public reference to Mosby as horse thief had caused the letter's raid on Fairfax in order both to remove a conpetent opponent and to avenge the insult to his honor. Fortunately V^ d h a m had gone to

Washington the previous evening, thus inadvertantly escaping capture.

Despite Mosby's disappointment, the raid's overall success elated the

South and earned him a promotion to captain.

While the Confederates rewarded Mosby for the Stoughton affair, the

Fédérais responded by stepping up their efforts to remove him from the war. They immediately arrested several prominent citizens of Fairfax, v^om they suspected of complicity in the affair, including a Miss Antonia

Ford, \dio supposedly had guided Mosby into town. The other prisoners were released shortly, but strong evidence against Miss Ford caused her 12 incarceration in Washington's Old Capital Prison for several months. 142

While this action inay have salved wounded Union pride, it provided no aid

in eliminating Mosby himself. Accordingly, scouts and patrols scattered

throughout the region searching for the Partisans, while bodies of

cavalry chased down rumors of their presence. Occasionally such units

returned with word that Mosby's force had scattered upon their approach and sometimes even brought in a few prisoners identified as members of

Mosby's band. Mean^^ile, Mosby himself avoided capture and raided the

Federal lines almost at will. Sometimes, he even turned the tables on his pursuers and ambushed their detachments. In one such incident, Mosby and seventeen of his men surprised fifty troopers of the 1st Vermont

Cavalry vdiile they were feeding their horses near Aldie and captured two captains and seventeen men. Ironically, he had been pursuing a larger force of 200 Federal cavalry which was returning from a reconnaissance and which had informed the Vermonters that no eneny was around Aldie.

Even when substantial bodies of Fédérais did encounter Mosby, they generally came off second best, because of his unexpected counterattacks and/or poor planning on their part. One glaring exanple was the second drubbing the 1st Vermont received on March 31, vdien it learned that Mosby and sixty-five Rangers were encaitçed near Dranesville. Immediately 150 men under Capt. Henry C. Flint set out to destroy them. According to the

Union report of the affair:

...around this house was a high board fence and stone wall, between which and the road was another fence and an ordinary farm gate. Captain Flint took his men through the gate, and, at a distance from the house, fired a volley at Mosby and his men, vÆio were assembled about the house, doing but slight damage to them. He then ordered a saber charge, which was also ineffectual on account of the fence which intervened. Mosby waited until the men were checked by the 143

fence, and then opened his fire upon them, killing and wounding several. The men here became panic-stricken and fled precipitately toward this gate, through vdiich to make their escape. The opening was small and they got wedged together, and a fearful state of confusion followed, while Mosby's men followed them up and poured into the crowd a severe fire.... Mosby's men followed in pursuit and sabered several of our men on the road In conparison to the number engaged our loss was very heavy.

Mosby admitted to being surprised by the attack, which made the defeat

even more galling. He reported the Federal losses as nine killed,

including Captain Flint, fifteen severely wounded, and eighty-two

prisoners, or over two-thirds of their force. The Rangers had four men 15 vTrsvriHoH. The Union commander, Maj, Gen. Julius Stahel,

summed up the cause of the defeat as "bad management on the part of the

officers and the cowardice of the men.Although the Rangers' rapid

response to the crisis also was a factor, the attenpt to saber charge a

high fence supported at least the first part of this assessment.

As Mosby continued to elude his pursuers, enterprising Federal

officers developed tricky schemes to entrap him, since the traditional

patrol tactics were not working. These ambushes also proved

unsuccessful. In one instance, a lightly guarded wagon train went out

from Federal lines ostensibly on a foraging expedition. However, each wagon contained a squad of the Pennsylvania Bucktails (the 17th

Pennsylvania Reserves), one of the Amny of the Potomac's crack regiments, concealed under its cover.The Rangers duly appeared, chased the cavalry escort back to the wagons, then unaccountably drew off before they got close enough to trigger the ambush. The covers on the wagons made them suspicious, since the Fédérais normally used open wagons for foraging. Lack of attention to such detail caused the plan to fail. 144

A second Union ambush had more tragic consequences. Receiving

reports that Mosby was near Upperville, the Fédérais dispatched a mixed

force of the 67th Pennsylvania Infantry and the 1st New York Cavalry to

entrap him. The plan called for the cavalry to entice the guerrillas to

chase them along the road to vAiere the infantry lay concealed. The

Pennsylvanians then would blast Mosby's men to pieces. The first part of

the plan worked perfectly. The Rangers took the bait and pursued the

Union cavalry back to the infantry's position, vdiere the Pennsylvanians

delivered a devastating volley. Unfortunately, they fired too soon,

inflicting the damage on their own cavalry rather than Mosby. The 1st

New York lost an unspecified number of troopers killed and wounded, vAiile 18 the Rangers escaped unscathed.

Shortly before he became commander of the A m y of the Potomac,

Maj. Gen. George Meade attempted an identical trap with similar results.

As Meade reported the affair:

I came near catching our friend Mosby this morning. I had reliable intelligence of his expected passing a place about 4 miles from here at sunrise. I sent 40 mounted men and 100 infantry, v^o succeeded in posting themselves in ambush at the designated spot. Sure enough, Mr. Mosby, together with 30 of his followers, made their appearance about sunrise, but, I regret to say, their exit also, from vdiat I can learn, through the fault of both foot and horse. It appears Mosby saw the cavalry, and immediately charged them. They ran toward the infantry, posted behind a fence. The infantry, instead of rising and deliberately delivering their fire, fired lying on the ground; did not hit a rebel, vdio immediately scattered and dispersed, and thus„the prettiest chance in the world to dispose of Mr. Mosby was lost.

Although Meade did not report any Union casualties resulting from the ambush, it had failed due to the unsteadiness of the infantry involved. 145

just as the previous one had. Both of these incidents, therefore, seemed

to prove that infantry was ineffective in trying to trap the Rangers.

The Union forces apparently never used such tactics against them again.

Fortunately for the Fédérais, Mosby did not have things all his own

way. Union search parties and reconnaissance forces several times made

the Rangers disband, thereby preventing them from committing further

mischief tenporarily. Moreover, these patrols frequently brought in

prisoners identified as members of Mosby's band. By the end of June, the

Fédérais had reported capturing over a dozen of Mosby's men, as well as more than sixty guerrillas not further identified. These prisoners

represented a small but steady drain on the strength of Mosby and the other partisan leaders, even if not all of them actually were guerrillas.

Mosby himself narrowly escaped capture in June, when a party of the 1st

New York Cavalry, raided the house were he and his wife were staying.

The troopers found Mosby's horse, which they confiscated, and his personal effects, but Mosby escaped discovery by hiding in a tree outside his bedroom window in his underwear

Furthermore, early in May the Federal cavalry handed Mosby his first major combat defeat. On May 3rd, the Rangers attacked an outpost of fifty men of the 1st West Virginia Cavalry at Warrenton Junction,

Virginia. Driven into a nearby building, the troopers defended themselves until their ammunition ran low and the guerrillas had fired some hay piled against the house to smoke them out. Just after the

Fédérais surrendered, however, twenty troopers of the 5th New York

Cavalry, encaitped nearby and attracted by the sound of firing, struck the 146

Rangers in the rear. The surprise was conçlete. Mosby's men broke and

scattered, sustaining serious losses. The Fédérais reported killing

three Rangers outright and capturing approximately thirty others,

including sixteen badly wounded, as well as forty horses. They believed

that many of the Confederates who escaped were wounded also. Among the

partisan casualties were a notorious spy named Tenpleton and Kaj. Dick

Moran, one of Mosby's leading subordinates, as well as a captain and a

lieutenant captured. Union losses amounted to two men killed and 21 seventeen wounded. Although the affair did not result "in the 22 conplete annihilation of Mosby's command", as the official report

claimed, it did weaken his force and deprive it of some of its

subordinate officers. More inportantly, it broke Mosby's chain of

successes and by doing so, destroyed the aura of invincibility which he had begun to develop in Union minds. Although Mosby remained elusive and annoying, he could be beaten. This knowledge strengthened Federal

incentive to continue trying to do so.

The Fédérais also successfully terminated Mosby's first attempt to introduce artillery as a weapon of partisan warfare. On May 30, Mosby attacked a train on the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, using a mountain howitzer that J. E. B. Stuart loaned him. When the first cannonball punctured the locomotive's boiler, the small train guard fled, thereby allowing the partisans to plunder the cars. However, portions of the 5th

New York and 1st Vermont Cavalry pursued and overtook the raiders, vrfio turned the howitzer on them. After several charges and countercharges, as well as some severe fighting, the Union troopers captured the howitzer 147

and scattered the partisans. Mosby reportedly lost six men killed and

ten captured, as well as an undetermined number of wounded who escaped,

while the Fédérais admitted to losing four men killed and fifteen

wounded. Among Mosby's losses were two of his officers, Capt. Bradford

Haskins and Lt. Samuel Chapman, both wounded and captured. Haskins died 23 of his wound shortly afterwards. If the casualty figures were correct,

Mosby suffered a severe defeat, for they represented almost half of the

forty men he later claimed to have had with him on this raid, not

including any wounded vdio escaped. Moreover, he lost his howitzer after

using it only once. The Rangers' attempt to stand and fight therefore

proved costly in both lives and reputation.

Nevertheless, Mosby remained a nuisance, which caused General Alfred

Pleasanton, commander of the Army of the Potomac's cavalry, to propose

one of the most unique counterguerrilla ideas in the war: buying the

partisan off. In mid-June Pleasanton addressed a note to General Joseph

Hooker's headquarters to: "ask the general how much of a bribe he can

stand to get Mosby's services. There is a chance for him, and just now

he could do valuable service in the way of information as well as

humbugging the enemy.Pleasanton received an immediate response

encouraging him to use his own judgement and not to hesitate in the 25 matter of money. At this point, the proposal vanished as mysteriously

as it had surfaced. Whether Pleasanton came to his senses and realized

that Mosby was not corruptible, or vhether secret feelers to the partisan leader received a quick, firm rejection remains unclear. Certainly

Pleasanton revealed he knew little of Mosby's character if he thought the 148

guerrilla would accept danegeld to cease his activities. Prior to the

war, Mosby had shown an integrity and a willingness to stick to his

position against all obstacles, which did not indicate that mere money

would entice him. The fact that no other formal suggestion to bribe any

guerrillas ever occurred indicates that the Fédérais considered Mosby a

greater problem than any other partisan.

If the Fédérais could not annihilate Mosby's command directly and

could not bribe him to switch sides, they still could attenpt to deprive

him of his local support. As frustration over the failure to catch Mosby

increased, the Union forces focused more effort on the civilian

population in an attempt either to capture the partisans vAiile they were dispersed or to discourage the citizens from giving them assistance. As

General Pleasanton explained to his commanders:

"[The residents] will be made to understand that, unless they preserve order, they and theirs will be treated as enemies in arms, and that the most prompt and summary punishment will be inflicted on them. The residents must be made responsible for the preservation of good order in the districts in wtiich they live."

Thus, the Fédérais reiterated their position that local civilians had to prevent attacks on Union forces if they desired treatment as civilians.

In pursuing this policy, the Fédérais made a practice of searching all houses in the vicinity of guerrilla activity, seized all horses that the partisans might use and arrested all men known to be disloyal or capable of bearing arms. The town of Middleburg suffered these attentions twice in June, as a result of Mosby's activities in the vicinity. In fact, the second and most extensive series of arrests occurred because Hooker 27 received information that everyone in town was implicated with Mosby. 149

This accusation was ironiu because, of all of the towns in the region,

Middleburg was the only one which had made an effort to follow the Union

policy. Early in the year, as a result of similar Federal attentions,

the people of Middleburg had petitioned Mosby to move his activities to

another part of the country, Mosby had ignored the request and asserted

later that the people changed their views due to his successes against 28 the enemy. Clearly, no matter vrfiat hardships the Union arrests

inflicted, they did not discourage Mosby or any of the other partisan

leaders.

The Fédérais also threatened harsher measures directly against the

guerrillas themselves. In response to reports that the partisans wore

Union uniforms to enable them to slip within the lines and surprise

outposts. General Schenck issued a notice in the Middle Department that his men would treat any rebels found in Federal uniforms as spies and would consider proof of wearing such a uniform as sufficient evidence of spying. General Hooker went even further and directed his troops to kill 29 guerrillas, then try them, as a means of eliminating their threat. In other words, he favored summary execution of them rather than granting them rights as combatants. Apparently, the Union forces did not follow these directions to any great degree, for no reference to numerous executions as a result of them exists. In any case, guerrilla activities did not decrease significantly, thus indicating that these efforts had little inpact on the partisans.

Conpared to the amount of concern Mosby generated during this period, the other partisans seemed almost nonexistent. However, this 150

appearance did not reflect reality. McNeill and Lige Tihite were

moderately active, as were the few independent guerrillas \dio remained.

Between these men and their Union opponents, honors remained about even.

When White attacked one of Kelley's pickets and took one soldier

prisoner, a force of Union cavalry retaliated by capturing two of White's

men and driving the rest toward Aldie.A month later a force of

Pennsylvania cavalry snapped up five more of White's partisans at

Leesburg.When McNeill took twelve men from a Union foraging party.

suers killed three of his 32 recovered the wagons McNeill had taken. When a handful of unidentified guerrillas attacked the Martinsburg-Winchester coach and took several prisoners, Milroy promptly rescued them, killing one of the perpetrators and capturing another in the process.The two sides therefore traded casualties on an equal basis, which obviously favored the Fédérais' greater manpower. Moreover, the guerrillas achieved no significant successes that offset their casualties and justified their existence.

Despite the partisans' lackluster performance, the Fédérais continued to encounter frustrations in their counterguerrilla operations.

Although they foiled some raids and inflicted casualties, they could not kill or capture the guerrilla leaders or break up the bands conpletely.

Many Union patrols and scouting parties failed to encounter any bushwhackers at all. For example, Kelley reported that two expeditions he sent after White were unsuccessful because they failed to find any trace of the rebels and he opposed sending out others without reliable knowledge of White's location.By this view, Kelley showed awareness 151

that undirected activity was wasted effort and a willingness to accept

long-term resolution of the problem. Further, despite attrition,

guerrilla activity continued. Milroy reported that bushwhackers around

Winchester were particularly active in mid-May, vdiile General David

M. Gregg of Hooker's cavalry noted that guerrillas were continuing

operations in his sector and carrying them out in such a way as to defy

arrest. He further conplained that worn-out horses and insufficient

manpower prevented him from mounting efficient anti-guerrilla 35 patrols. Thus the Fédérais continued to encounter the same problems

they had met previously in dealing with the guerrillas.

A further problem that the Union commanders faced was a lack of

fighting spirit among many of their troops and the guerrillas' willingness to capitalize on it. The partisans proved quite willing to parole prisoners, especially those vdio had not resisted, thus allowing

them to go home until formally exchanged, and Union troops frequently were only too happy to accept the offer. McNeill, in particular, used paroles as one of his major weapons. Before attacking Federal parties, he would offer to parole them if they surrendered immediately and often had coirçlete success with this approach. The Union authorities also discovered that he had left stacks of blank parole certificates, properly signed, with local sympathizers, who sold or traded them to Union soldiers.The recipients filled in their own names and then reported themselves unavailable for further duty. Although the Fédérais could confiscate the blanks they found, they could do little else to prevent the Confederates from paroling their prisoners and therefore had no effective means to combat this drain on their manpower. 152

McNeill also was responsible for the last major formal military

campaign in western Virginia: the Jones-Imboden raids vdiich took place

in April. Early in March 1863, McNeill proposed to the Confederate

government that he take 600 men and make a lightning raid to destroy tlie

Cheat River Bridge on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. Such destruction

would close the B&O for some time emd therefore had made the bridge an

inportant military target. The War Department endorsed McNeill's plan

and sent instructions to cooperate with it to the generals concerned,

Samuel Jones, commander of the Department of Western Virginia, and John

D. Imboden, McNeill's superior. In the ensuing preparation, however, the

scope of the expedition changed completely, as commanders added further

objectives and more men to achieve them. In its final form, the

expedition involved over 7000 men in two separate columns under Imboden

and General William E. "Grumble" Jones. McNeill and Lige White both

participated in a subordinate capacity.

Starting on i^ril 20th, the two columns thrust into western

Virginia, and ended the raid vdien they met at Summersville on May 13th,

three weeks later. The Confederates brought back 700 prisoners, over

4000 cattle, more that 1200 horses and mules, as well as wagons, arms and

grain for a cost of twelve men killed, forty-five wounded and twenty-six

captured. They also reported destroying sixteen railroad and three

turnpike bridges, one tunnel, two trains, two sawmills, several 38 blockhouses and a large quantity of military stores. Generally, the

Federal detachments encountered offered little resistance, being heavily outnumbered, vdiile the raiders wisely avoided larger forces that might 153

defeat them. However, their efforts to close the railroad failed. After

the garrison at the Cheat River Bridge repelled one assault. Grumble

Jones abandoned the target as being too strong. Furthermore, the

Fédérais repaired the other bridges within a few days, so that the B&O 39 continued to function with little interruption. Thus, although the

Confederates penetrated deeply into western Virginia, panicked the

population, revealed the ineffectiveness of many Federal garrisons, and

captured or destroyed large quantities of supplies, they did not achieve

their primary objective. On the Union side, the rapid concentration of

forces against the raiders kept them from pushing farther and encouraged

them to withdraw, thereby preventing greater damage. Thus the Fédérais

could take some small satisfaction in their performance.

During Lee's march to Pennsylvania, the partisans actively supported

his advance, harassing Union outposts and protecting the flanks of his

arny. McNeill seized Romney, West Virginia and held it for a week before

the Fédérais drove him out, destroyed property along the B&O Railroad,

and raided Pennsylvania. White's cavalry chewed up the Loudon County

Rangers yet another time and destroyed a supply train at Point of Rocks.

Rocks.Mosby flitted about capturing Union detachments, intercepting

dispatches, and providing information to Lee. At the same time, he

inadvertently performed a service for the Union, vdien he guided Stuart's

cavalry between the Army of the Potomac's corps along a route that ultimately forced Stuart to go farther east then he originally intended.

This move delayed his rejoining the main army until July 2, thus missing

the first two days of the Battle of Gettysburg, Wien Lee sorely needed his services. 154

The guerrillas enjoyed a substantial amount of success in their

activities during the cançaign and suffered few recorded casualties in

the process. These results came less from their own efficiency, however,

than from lack of effort on the Fédérais' part. Lee's invasion

preoccupied virtually all of the Union commanders in the region. They

focused their energies on trying to determine the Confederate Army's

location and providing troops to help stop it, Wiich left them few

resources to apply against the guerrillas. Thus the partisans

encountered little opposition or pursuit during the campaign.

In the aftermath of Gettysburg, two significant changes became

apparent in the Federal ranks. Milroy, vdio had made himself hated by his

harsh treatment of civilians in an effort to stanç» out guerrilla warfare,

found himself removed from command in the Shenandoah Valley after having

fled Winchester ahead of Lee's advance. No other commander replaced him,

for the Union abandoned the lower Valley in order to concentrate on the

area east of the mountains. The second change was that Kelley now

commanded the Department of West Virginia, to which he had been promoted

late in June, and which comprised all territory west of Hancock, Maryland

through the Ohio counties adjacent to the new state.A lackluster

performance during Lee's retreat caused him to receive some of the blame

for the Confederates' escape, which damaged his military reputation, but

did not affect his appointment. Henceforth, in addition to protecting

the B&O Railroad, Kelley had responsibility for defending the citizens of

West Virginia against guerrilla raids. 155

Kelley faced a substantial challenge in discharging his

responsibilities, for guerrilla activity throughout the Virginia region

increased markedly after Gettysburg. Almost as if they realized that

only by sapping the North's will to continue the war through their

constant raids could the Confederacy now hope to win, the partisans

stepped up their attacks. In addition to Mosby's and McNeill's

activities. Lige White tençjorarily resumed operations after receiving

permission to undertake detached service. Harry Gilmor also formed his

own coitçany and frequently conducted partisan raids, although, like

White, he served as part of the regular army.

Under these leaders, guerrilla attacks occurred with irritating

frequency. The partisans ambushed patrols, sniped at pickets, captured

supply trains, stole horses, wrecked railroad trains and burned bridges.

Not only did the Union soldiers face greater danger, but loyal citizens

also felt threatened, as the number of conplaints about lack of

protection attested. In West Virginia, the citizens of Jackson County

petitioned Kelley to send a cavalry conçany to drive away a band of

guerrillas vdiich attacked them daily. Another correspondent requested

two infantry regiments, the 6th and 9th West Virginia, to clean out the

territory between the Great Kanavha and Big Sandy Rivers, which was open

to guerrillas, and to protect the region afterwards. The Kanavha Valley and Braxton County also suffered from depredations. Kelley himself acknowledged that bushvhackers and horse thieves were annoying several counties during the late summer, vAiich required constant scouting.In addition, the partisans made special efforts to destroy the B&O and 156

Orange and Alexandria Railroads, in order to disrupt the shipment of

troops and supplies. However, formidable railroad defenses combined with

Union repair capabilities, prevented any lengthy breaks in service.

Nevertheless, the guerrillas' activity placed great demands on the

Federal forces to control them.

The Union commanders' answer to this increased guerrilla activity generally was greater use of cavalry for patrols and pursuit. The recognized value of cavalry for the counterguerrilla operations made its use constant wiien it was available. Its activity might consist of continual general patrols, as General Pleasanton reported fifty men of the 6th Cavalry were doing in the vicinity of Thoroughfare Gap or as several bodies of cavalry did along the railroad lines.These forces aimed to capture or break up guerrilla bands by surprising them, or at least prevent them from reaching their targets by posing a constant threat of discovery. The cavalry also went out in response to specific incidents, as in the case of one officer who reported that his horsemen were out scouting the country and making arrests after bushwhackers had fired on his pickets.These actions interspersed with larger cavalry forays aimed at trapping or destroying the major partisan bands.

These cavalry operations enjoyed a significant degree of success.

They foiled a number of guerrilla attacks against various targets by forcing the partisans to disperse beforehand or by defending the targets themselves. Conpared to previous months, the patrols and sweeps brought in a substantial number of prisoners. Most of the cavalry parties returned with at least one or two suspects and occasionally captured as 157

many as twenty or thirty. Between August and December, the Fédérais

reported capturing over 124 guerrillas during cavalry operations. The

2nd Massachusetts Cavalry claimed credit for the greatest number of them,

taking fifty prisoners during that time. Although identification to

specific partisan bands was unreliable, Gilmor's company apparently lost

the most men, vdien the Fédérais captured thirty-seven of them attempting

to burn a B&O Railroad bridge.*' Another notable success occurred when a

cortpany of the Potomac Home Brigade Cavalry, ambushed by a party of

White's partisans, retaliated by charging their attackers and capturing 48 eleven of them without suffering any losses. Such a response showed that some Federal units remained unintimidated by the partisans and could

respond to them effectively.

One factor vdiich may have contributed to the Federal's successes during the late summer was Mosby's temporary absence from active operations. Late in August, while attempting to capture a Union horse herd, Mosby received a wound in his side and thigh. He and his men immediately withdrew, thereby allowing the Fédérais to escape, although 49 they did bring off over 100 horses and twelve prisoners. The Union forces rejoiced at the news of this event and circulated rumors of

Mosby's impending death. Scouting parties investigated reports of his location, in an effort to rapture him v^ile he was unable to flee. But the rumors proved wrong and the patrols failed. Mosby recuperated for about a month, without facing any serious threat from the Union forces.

By October, he was riding with his Rangers again. 158

Not all of the Union's efforts against the guerrillas were as

successful. The large sweeps aimed at breaking up the major partisan

bands consistently failed to achieve their objective. The guerrillas

dispersed before the Fédérais found them, while their leaders eluded

capture. For example, vdien two of Judson Kilpatrick's men reported

attending one of Mosby's rendezvous in disguise. General Pleasanton sent

out a force to capture the guerrillas, but it failed to find them.

Similarly, a regiment that Kilpatrick sent to Thoroughfare Gap in October

to deal with some of Mosby's and White's men encountered nothing.A

report that White and 350 partisans were near Dranesville caused

Col. C. R. Lowell to lead the 2nd Massachusetts Cavalry after them, but he returned without having found any sizable part of White's force and 52 with only a handful of prisoners for his efforts. Finally, in one of the closest misses, a party of 250 cavalry raided Salem, Virginia in

response to a report that Mosby's Rangers were holding a Christmas dance there. They discovered that the Rangers had fled barely ten minutes before their arrival and were safely beyond pursuit.Thus, although the Fédérais frequently brought in prisoners, they failed to engage the partisans' main bodies or to eliminate their leaders.

Numerous other incidents reinforced the fact that, despite reports of Union successes, the guerrilla problem remained present. Kelley reported to West Virginia Governor A. I. Boreman, in September that the

Confederates were preparing to send detachments and guerrilla bands into several counties simultaneously to destroy property and capture supplies.

Therefore he recommended that the governor alert the populace and prepare 159

the militia to move against the invaders.Also in September, McNeill's

partisans surprised five coitpanies of the 1st West Virginia Infantry in

camp and killed or captured 175 soldiers at a cost of only three men 55 wounded. In December, General Scammon reported that bushvdiackers

between Meadow Bluff and Gauley were preventing the mail from getting

through.But the most telling evidence of the guerrillas' continued

impact was General Pleasanton's General Order Number Forty-two, issued to

the Cavalry Corps in November:

The loss of officers and men sustained in this corps at the hands of guerrillas during the past few days demands the careful attention of all to prevent a recurrence in the future Visiting in the families of the county..., riding for pleasure, either alone or in small parties, or even any unnecessary exposure vdien in the line of duty will be abstained from in the future. Every house within or without the lines of the anry is a nest of treason, and every grove a lurking place for guerrilla bands. They are on that account to be watched and avoided.... In the transmission of orders or the conduct of the public business, care will be taken that individuals or small parties are not unnecessarily exposed, and every effort will be made to confine all officers and men to such close attention to their duties as will remove all tenptation to go beyond the lines of their immediate command.

This order clearly indicated that guerrilla ambushes were causing excessive losses in the Army of the Potomac's cavalry. Coupled with the other events, it showed that the guerrilla problem remained a relatively serious one.

The Union commanders identified a number of reasons for the guerrilla problem's continuance. An important one was lack of cavalry.

Despite the extensive use of that arm against the partisans, commanders felt that they had insufficient cavalry to control them.

Brig. Gen. D. A. DeRussy, commanding part of the Washington defenses, reported that he lacked enough cavalry both to investigate rumors of 160

Mosby's whereabouts and to maintain regular patrols.^® He iitplied that,

therefore, he would not undertake the former task, which may have

deprived the Union of a chance to destroy Mosby and certainly showed that

some officers did not consider the guerrilla problem serious enough to

disrupt routine. Brig. Gen. Henry H. Lockwood, commander of Harper's

Ferry, was even more emphatic about his cavalry shortage. Relaying

information that Mosby and White were threatening to cross the Potomac at

Point of Rocks, Lockwood averred: "Had I any cavalry here, these fellows 59 would not be so near here with iiipunity." Clearly, lack of this arm seemed to haitper some commanders in their anti-guerrilla operations.

Lockwood, however, felt that lack of cavalry was not the only problem. On the same day as his previous message he complained that the guerrillas' presence resulted from lack of Union cooperation:

There seems to be a want of co-operation on our part, which enables this contemptible body of irregulars to exist, notwithstanding the presence on our part of four times their force I am confident that proper active co-operation only is required to bring them to grief.

By the statement, Lockwood underscored that fact that Union commanders' failure to coordinate their activities contributed to the guerrillas' continued success. The partisans' operations frequently overlapped different military departments and, even within one department, might involve more than one local commander. Such situations created confusion in responding to the crisis, vhich the guerrillas then utilized in making their escape. Moreover, jealousy over authority and prerogatives probably made cooperation between officers from different departments or organizations difficult, thereby reducing the effectiveness of counterguerrilla operations. 161

A lower ranking officer. Col. Horace B. Sargeant of the 1st

Massachusetts Cavalry, effectively summarized the most prevalent view

concerning the reason for the guerrillas' continued threat. He felt that

the fault lay not within the Union Army, but in the local population:

Tonight I might, perhaps, report that there is not an armed rebel within the circuit of the country To-morrow the woods may be full of them. A policy of extermination alone can achieve the end expected. Every man and horse must be sent within the lines, every house destroyed, every tree girdled and set on fire, before we can approach security against the secret combination of a sudden force within musket range of our outposts. Attila, King of the Huns, adopted the only method that can exterminate these citizen soldiers. The people here all have sons or brothers in the cavalry. The mountains are full of men v.’ho s e statements are fair, and v^.om nothing but infantry can capture and the Dry Tortugas control. Regiments of the line can do nothing with this furtive population, soldiers to-day, farmers to-morrow, acquainted with every wood-path and finding a friend in every house and we are not safe in bands of 3 or 4; every one betrays u s With such men here there can be no clearing of a country of every armed rebel, with ten thousand mountain paths, and an Alsatia in every hill. I can clear this countrygY^th fire and sword, and no mortal can do it in any other way___

This letter reflected the ideas expressed in General Order Number

Forty-two, as well as the view of many soldiers throughout the Union

Army. The local population supplied the manpower, supplies, and support

that sustained the partisan's activities. As long as the population stayed unmolested, the guerrillas would remain a menace. The Fédérais never could hope to identify all of them from among the population, or to match their knowledge of the local terrain sufficiently to pursue them effectively. The only way to end the guerrilla threat permanently was to eliminate the entire male population by removing them from the region or imprisoning them.

Removing all the citizens certainly was the military railroads' preferred answer to the guerrilla problem. Brig. Gen. Herman Haupt, 162

chief of the military railroads, received one complaint about inadequate

protection which recommended inprisoning every man within ten miles of

the rail line. Lt. Col. Elias K. Greene, chief quartermaster for the

Department of Washington, also favored removal, since he believed the

guerrillas could conduct raids despite any number of railroad guards. He

observed: "If these doubtful characters are removed from within our

lines, danger can only come from without, from larger bodies of the

enemy's troops, and in such cases their movements would probably be 62 discovered in time to frustrate their designs." Since the railroads

and quartermaster trains suffered most from the partisans' attentions,

the trainmen understandably favored the solution which promised the

greatest effectiveness. Because the guerrillas were difficult to

identify when not caught in the act, removal seemed the most likely means

of definitely eliminating them. However, political considerations prevented such practices on any scale large enough to be effective.

Other Union commanders proposed different solutions to the guerrilla problem. Some officers felt that one good military sweep through an area would settle it permanently, despite previous evidence of this tactic's ineffectiveness. In July, Pleasanton suggested that a force of 300 men would clear all disturbers out of the country between the Rhappahannock and the Occoquan.^^ A month later, Lockwood asked for only a few hundred men to clean out Loudon County, in the heart of Mosby's Confederacy.^^

Even more ambitious. Col. George D. Wells, commanding a brigade at

Harper's Ferry, recommended three cavalry forces, each at least 500 strong, to march from Charlestown, Martinsburg, and Romney as a method of 163

clearing the Shenandoah Valley.Whether the Union put any of these

suggestions into effect remains unknown, but if it did, they proved

ineffective, for guerrilla raids in these areas continued.

Still other officers felt that increasing the guards on the supply

trains would resolve the guerrilla problem by discouraging attacks.

After the loss of some sutler's wagons to Mosby early in August,

Col. Charles R. Lowell of the 2nd Massachusetts Cavalry proposed

establishing a regular detachment of thirty to fifty men to patrol the

road on an irregular schedule and sezo/e as an escort for all unattached

wagons as a means of preventing future losses. He also recommended

establishing a special fund to reward citizens who brought in reliable

information as an incentive for them to do so.^^ When Mosby's raids

continued, Lowell later suggested ensuring all supply trains had large escorts before sending them out.^^ Such tactics may have prevented

some attacks, but did nothing to eliminate the guerrilla menace. In fact, they served the partisans' purpose by tying down troops in escort duties rather than combat service. Since they also were an implicit admission of failure to control the guerrillas, large escorts tended to remain an exceptional response during 1863.

In addition to these methods, calls for merciless extermination of the guerrillas continued. Although the Federal Government's official policy was to treat uniformed partisans as regular combatants concerning capture and exchange, such courtesies did not extend to independent guerrillas and bushv^ackers. In practice, the Fédérais did not indulge in wholesale executions of such men, but individual incidents occurred of 154

arbitrary killing of known or suspected guerrillas. In one instance.

Union teamsters vtio had beaten off a guerrilla attack murdered a tavern

keeper who had taunted them about impending danger. They believed that

he had been in league with the bushWiackers. In response to a conplaint

about such incidents. General Halleck set forth the army's view of them;

..Such acts — are deeply regretted and every effort is made to prevent them. Nevertheless such things always have and probably always will occur in a border war. Most of the difficulties are caused by the conduct of the pretended non-combatant inhabitants of the country. They give aid, shelter, and concealment to guerrilla and robber bands like that of Mosby, who are continually destroying our roads, burning our bridges, and capturing wagon trains They fight in citizen's dress and are aided in all their rascalities by the people of the country. As soon as they are likely to be caught, they go home, put out their horse, hide their arms, and pretend to be quiet and non-combatant farmers It is not surprising that our people get exasperated as such men and shoot them down vrfien they can. Moreover, men vrtio act in this manner in disguise, and within our lines, have, under the laws of civilized war, forfeited their lives.

Halleck's comments pointed out that vdiile the Anty officially discouraged

summary executions, it would not take action against soldiers who

performed them. Therefore, such executions continued.

All of the Union's efforts to control the guerrillas appeared to be

having some effect by the end of the year. In December, a band of

partisans estimated at over 200 strong invaded the KanavAia Valley, but

the strength of the Federal defenses caused them to retreat without

inflicting any damage. A guerrilla attack on the 12th Ohio Infantry

failed vdien the troops' fire drove off the attackers.More importantly, deserters reported dissatisfaction among White's and Gilmor's bands.

They claimed that many of the partisans wished to desert but feared impressment into Federal service if they did so. The officer making the 165

report recosnniended sending parties to Winchester to reassure the 72 guerrillas and encourage desertion. Although the extent of this

disaffection remains questionable, it apparently did exist and indicated

that at least some of the partisans were becoming tired of the war.

1863 was a frustrating year for the Union counterguerrilla forces in

several ways. Although the guerrillas and bushvdiackers became

increasingly less of a problem, the partisan menace increased. During

the year, Mosby's entrance into the guerrilla war completed partisan domination of it. Partisans inflicted a number of embarrassing defeats on the Union forces, such as Stoughton's capture and consistently eluded attempts to catch or kill them. The Fédérais placed greater enphasis on suppressing the guerrillas then they had previously, but achieved limited success. The increase in partisan activity after Gettysburg, vdien the guerrillas offered the only means of striking the enemy vAiile the A m y of

Northern Virginia recovered, placed even greater demands on the Fédérais.

However, the Union had its victories also. Patrols seemed more successful at inflicting at least some casualties on the guerrilla forces, vrfiile static garrisons appeared better able to drive them off.

Pickets and wagon guards remained in danger, but only total extermination of the guerrillas would eliminate that problem effectively. Most inportant, the Fédérais kept the partisans from impacting regular military operations significantly. They did not influence Union movements during the Chancellorsville and Gettysburg campaigns. Their efforts to disrupt the railroads and thereby prevent movement of troops 166 and supplies failed conpletely. If the Union failed to destroy the major partisan bands, it kept their inpact within acceptable limits. 167

Chapter V Notes

1. Moore, Banner in the Kills, pp. 176-177.

2. Ibid., p. 177.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid., p. 175-176.

5. Maj. Gen. J. D. Cox to Brigadier General Scammon, 21 January 1963, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXI, pp. 992-993.

6. Moore, Banner in the Hills, p. 178.

7. No accurate count ever V3S made. Moreover, the number probably fluctuated throughout the war.

8. Castel, "Guerrilla War", p. 17.

9. Louis N. Boudrye, Historic Records of the Fifth New York Cavalry. (Albany, NY: J. Munsell, 1868), pp. 47-52.

10. Ibid., p. 92.

11. Capt. John S. Mosby to Gen. J. E. B. Stuart, 11 March 1863, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXV, Pt. 1, pp. 1121-1122; W. H. Taylor to Capt. John S. Mosby, 23 March 1863, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXV, Pt. 2, p. 856-857; Jones, Gray Ghosts, pp. 150-157.

12. Jones, Gray Ghosts, pp. 157-158.

13. Col. Robert Johnstone to Capt. C. H. Potter, 3 March 1863, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXV, Pt. 1, pp. 41-42.

14. Maj. Gen. Julius Stahel to Maj. Gen. S. P. Heintzelman, 2 April 1863, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXV, Pt. 1, p. 78.

15. Capt. John S. Mosby to Maj. Gen. J. E. B. Stuart, 7 T^ril 1863, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXV, Pt. 1, p. 71-73.

16. Stahel to Heitzelman, 2 ^ r i l 1863, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXV, Pt. 1, p. 78.

17. Also known as the 1st Pa Rifles, this regiment consisted of lumbermen vdio brought their own rifles into service with them. Recruits also had to bring the tail of a buck they had shot to prove their marksmanship. The regiment fought in all of the major cançaigns in the east except Chancellorsville, until mustered out of service in June 1864. 168

18. Jones, Gray Ghosts, pp. 170-171.

19. Maj. Gen. George G. Meade to Gen. 0. 0. Howard, 22 June 1863, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXVII, Pt. 3, p. 255.

20. Jones, Gray Ghosts, pp. 178-179.

21. Maj. B. F. Chamberlain to Major Vincent, 3 May 1863, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXV, Pt- 1, pp. 1106-1107.

22. Maj. Gen. Julius Stahel to Capt. C. H. Potter, 5 May 1863, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXV, Pt. 1, p. 1104.

23. Maj. Gen. Julius Stahel to Lt. Col. J. H. Taylor, 3 June 1863, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXV, Pt. 1, pp. 1117-1118; Boudrye, 5th New York Cavalry, p. 58; Keven H. Siepel, Rebel; Life and Times of John Singleton Mosby. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), pp. 87-90.

24. Brig. Gen. Alfred Pleasonton to Gen. R. Ingalls, 12 June 1863, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXVII, Pt. 3, p. 72.

25. Brig. Gen. Rufus Ingalls to General Pleasanton, 12 June 1863, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXVII, Pt. 3, p. 72.

26. A. J. Cohen to Brig. Gen. D. M. Gregg, 24 May 1863, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXV, Pt. 2, pp. 521.

27. J. H. Taylor to Major General Stahel, 12 June 1863, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXVII, Pt. 3, p. 75; A. J. Alexander to Brig. Gen. D. McM. Gregg, 20 June 1863, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXVII, Pt. 3, p. 229.

28. Jones, Gray Ghosts, p. 166.

29. General Orders No. 21, Headquarters Middle Department, 29 March 1863, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXV, Pt. 2, p. 166; Maj. Gen. Daniel Butterfield to Commanding Officer 5th Corps, 18 June 1863, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXVII, Pt. 3, p. 194.

30. Brig. Gen. B. F. Kelley to Lieutenant Colonel Cheesebrough, 16 February 1863, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXV, Pt. 1, p. 19.

31. Brig. Gen. B. S. Roberts to Col. W. H. Cheesebrough, 18 March 1863, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXV, Pt. 1, p. 45.

32. Col. J. M. Canpbell to Capt. T. Melvin, 8 April 1863, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXV, Pt. 1, pp. 81-82.

33. Brig. Gen. B. F. Kelley to Lt. Col. W. H. Cheesebrough, 10 February 1863, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXV, Pt. 1, p. 10. 169

34. Brig. Gen. B. F. Kelley to Captain Means, 27 February 1863, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXV, Pt. 2, p. 109.

35. Maj. Gen. R. K. Milroy to Major General Schenck, 16 May 1863, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXV, Pt. 2, p. 496; Brig. Gen. David McM. Gregg to Col. J. H. Taylor, 23 May 1863, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXV, Pt. 2, p. 518; Brig. Gen. David McM. Gregg to Capt. A. J. Cohen, 25 May 1863, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXV, Pt. 2, p. 524.

36. Jones, Gray Ghosts, pp. 143-144.

37. Moore, Banner in the Hills, pp. 182-183; Jones, Gray Ghosts, pp. 160-163.

38. Moore, Banner in the Hills, p. 194.

39. Jones, Gray Ghosts, p. 164-165.

40. Ibid., p. 177; Evans, West Virginia, p. 120; John W. Garrett to E. M. Stanton, 18 June 1863, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXVII, Pt. 3, pp. 200-201.

41. General Orders No. 186, War Department, 24 June 1863, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXVII, Pt. 3, p. 299.

42. Citizens of Jackson County to Department of West Virginia, 22 July 1863, Departments, RG. 393; Governor A. I. Boreman to Department of West Virginia, 3 September 1863, Departments, RG. 393; K. V. Whaley to Department of West Virginia, 3 September 1863, Departments, RG. 393; 2nd Lt H. Burdir to Department of West Virginia, 5 September 1863, Departments, RG. 393.

43. Brig. Gen. B. F. Kelley to Brigadier General Cullum, 4 September 1863, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXIX, Pt. 2, pp. 153-154.

44. Maj. Gen. Alfred Pleasonton to Major General Humphreys, 31 July 1863, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXVII, Pt. 3, p. 792.

45. Maj. Gen. Alfred Pleasonton to Major General Humphreys, 2 August 1863, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXVII, Pt. 3, p. 830.

46. Col. C. R. Lowell to Col. J. H. Taylor, 20 August 1863, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXIX, Pt. 1, pp. 74-75; Col. C. R. Lowell to Lt. Col. J. H. Taylor, 26 November 1863, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXIX, Pt. 1, p. 658; Col. C. R. Lowell to Lt. Col. J. H. Taylor, 22 December 1863, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXIX, Pt. 1, p. 987; Col. C. R. Lowell to Lt. Col. J. H. Taylor, 31 December 1863, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXIX, Pt. 1, p. 994-995. 170

47. Brig. Gen. Jeremiah C. Sullivan to Brigadier General Kelley, 15 October 1863, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXIX, Pt. 1, p. 483.

48. Maj. Henry A. Cole to Capt. William M. Boone, 17 September 1863, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXIX, Pt. 1, p. 109.

49. Jones, Gray Ghosts, pp. 194-195; John S. Mosby to Maj. Gen. J. E. B. Stuart, 30 September 1863, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXIX, Pt. 1, p. 80-81.

50. Maj. Gen. A. Pleasenton to Major General Humphreys, 10 August 1863, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXIX, Pt. 2, p. 24.

51. Brig. Gen. Judson Kilpatrick to Lt. Col. C. Ross Smith, 24 October 1863, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXIX, Pt. 2, p. 380.

52. J. H. Taylor to Col. C. R. Lowell, 15 August 1863, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. v y t y p *- ? - co. ^ p t-n Taylor, 20 August 1863, Official Records. Ser. I, vol. XXIX, Pt. 1, pp. 74-75.

53. Jones, Gray Ghosts, p. 208.

54. Brig. Gen. B. F. Kelley to A. I. Boreman, 26 September 1863, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXIX, Pt. 2, p. 233.

55. Brig. Gen. John D. Imboden to Gen. R. E. Lee, 13 September 1863, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXIX, Pt. 1, p. 105-107.

56. Brig. Gen. E. P. Scammon to Brigadier General Kelley, 14 December 1863, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXIX, Pt. 1, p. 940.

57. General Orders No. 42, Cavalry Corps, 5 November 1863, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXIX, Pt. 2, p. 423.

58. Brig. Gen. G. A. De Russy to Lt. Col. J. H. Taylor, 10 August 1863, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXIX, Pt. 2, p. 26.

59. Brig. Gen. Henry H. Lockwood to Maj. Gen. H. W. Halleck, 1 August 1863, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXVII, Pt. 3, p. 826.

60. Brig. Gen. Henry H. Lockwood to Major General Couch, 1 August 1863, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXVII, Pt. 3, p. 827.

61. Col. Horace B. Sargent to Capt. A. Wright, 2 September 1863, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXIX, Pt. 1, p. 90.

62. Lt. Col. Elias M. Greene to Lt. Col. J. H. Taylor, 3 October 1863, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXIX, Pt. 2, p. 256. 171

63. Maj. Gen. A. Pleasanton to Major General Humphreys, 31 July 1863, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXVII, Ft. 3, p. 781.

64. Brig. Gen. Henry H. Lockwood to Major General Halleck, 29 August 1863, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXIX, Pt. 2, pp. 109-110.

65. Col. George D. Wells to Capt. William M. Boone, 9 October 1863, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXIX, Pt. 1, p. 211.

66. Col. C. R. Lowell to Lt. Col. J. H. Taylor, 12 August 1863, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXIX, Pt. 1, p. 6.

67. Brig. Gen. Michael Corcoran to Lieutenant Colonel Taylor, 18 October 1863, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXIX, Pt. 2, p. 350.

68. Jones, Gray Ghosts, p. 192.

69. Henry W . Halleck to Maj. H. S. Turner, 28 October 1863, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXIX, Pt. 2, p. 397.

70. B. F. Kelley to Brig. Gen. G. W. Cullum, 16 December 1863, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXIX, Pt. 1, p. 939.

71. Lt. Harrison G. Otis to Lt. J. H. Palmer, 18 December 1863, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXIX, Pt. 1, p. 990-991.

72. Col. R. S. Rodger to Capt. William M. Boone, 30 December 1863, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXIX, Pt. 2, p. 590. CHAPTER VI

"Valley of the Partisans"

The year 1854 was the period of greatest trial for the Confederate

guerrillas and and their Union opponents. On the one hand, at no other

time during the war did the guerrillas have such a clear effect on

military operations. They forced the Union army to detach thousands of

troops to guard its supply lines and thereby effectively prevented it

from sweeping up the Shenandoah Valley. On the other hand, this result

did not alter the general success of the Federal war effort. The Army of

the Potomac, now under the direct supervision of General Ulysses S. Grant

as commander of all the Union armies, besieged General Robert E. Lee's

army around Richmond, clearly making Union victory only a matter of time.

Moreover, while the partisans stopped the Fédérais from moving up the

Valley, they could not prevent them from devastating it so conpletely

that it had no further value for the Confederacy, nor could they keep the

Union forces from joining Grant by other routes. The guerrillas might

hamper Federal operations by their activities, but they did not change

the war's course.

Counterguerrilla operations during this time revealed much obvious

frustration, vdiich concealed a number of quiet successes. The Fédérais devoted more attention and resources to opposing the partisan menace, yet

the major leaders remained as elusive as ever. However, all of them -

John S. Mosby, Hanse McNeill and Harry Gilmor - felt the increased

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pressure. Failed operations became more frequent as Federal defenses

frustrated them. Thus, vtiile the Fédérais tried no new counterguerrilla

tactics, they applied the traditional ones with more effectiveness.

Furthermore, Union operations became more ruthless, which reduced the

partisans and their civilian supporters. Although the guerrillas did not

suffer the "war to the knife" that took place in Missouri, the number of

incidents in which the Fédérais refused to accord them the rights of

regular combatants increased.

The first major threat that the partisans faced however, \‘ias not the

Union anty, but their own government. On February 15, 1864, the

Confederate Congress repealed the Partisan Ranger Act.^ With the exception of a few specific organizations, all partisan units became part of the regular array.

Hostility within the South to the partisan service had existed from the passage of the Partisan Ranger Act in 1862. The aura of brigandage which surrounded it offended many Confederates' concept about the proper way to fight a war. Belief that the partisan bands were undisciplined and by their actions brought the Confederate cause into disrepute was common. Furthermore, the guerrillas siphoned off manpower \diich the regular a m y badly needed. The Confederate government had responded to such criticism at the end of 1862, vAien it asked many of the the partisan units to join the regular service. It had offered no encouragement to the formation of additional partisan units, although existing ones continued to operate freely. However, the heavy losses which the South 175

sustained during 1863 and the obvious danger it faced in the coining year

made a new effort to "regularize" the guerrillas unsurprising.

The match which touched off this issue was a letter written by

Brig. Gen. Thomas L. Rosser, one of Jeb Stuart's subordinate officers.

Serving under General Jubal Early in the Shenandoah Valley during the winter of 1863-64, Rosser had a conflict with Hanse McNeill during a

foraging expedition in January. Apparently, McNeill refused to obey

Rosser's orders, because he felt the demands Rosser made on his men and horses were too great in view of the icy roads.^ Rosser subsequently wrote to General Lee and set forth his views on the problems with partisan organizations:

— they are a nuisance and an evil to the service. Without discipline, order or organization, they roam broadcast over the country,...stealing, pillaging, plundering, and doing every manner of mischief and crime. They are a terror to the citizens and injury to the cause. They never fight; can't be made to fight. Their leaders are generally brave, but few of the men are good soldiers, and are engaged in this business for the sake of gain. The effect upon the service is bad because: First. It keeps men out of the service whose bayonet or saber should be counted on the field of battle__ Second. They cause great dissatisfaction in the ranks from the fact that these irregular troops are allowed so much latitude, so many privileges.... Third. It renders other troops dissatisfied; hence encourages desertion— If it is necessary for troops to operate within the lines of the eneity, then require the commanding officer to keep them in an organized condition, to rendezvous within our lines, and move upon the eneny vAien opportunity is offered___

Clearly, Rosser felt that the partisans were a disgrace to the cause and a detriment to the Confederate A m y due to their undiscipline, lack of concern for military objectives and the bad exanple they offered the troops. 176

The timing of Rosser's attack, vrfiich coincided with Confederate

manpower shortages, helped gain high level support for it. General

Stuart endorsed it: "Such organizations, as a rule, are detrimental to

the best interests of the army at large.Lee forwarded it to the War

Department: "I recommend that the law authorizing these partisans corps

be abolished. The evils resulting from their organization more than

counterbalance the good they accomplish."^ This backing helped convince

the Confederate Congress to repeal the Act and authorize the Secretary of

War to disband the partisan organizations. However, the Secretary exempted Mosby's Rangers, since both Lee and Stuart felt it was an efficient, disciplined outfit. The order also did not include Gilmor's force since technically it was part of a regular cavalry unit, or

McNeill's band for unexplained reasons.®

Although repeal of the Partisan Ranger Act seemed to have little practical effect since it exenpted all of the major partisan leaders in northern Virginia, the event marked a significant moral step in the anti-guerrilla war. By its repeal, the Confederate government affirmed that guerrilla warfare was not achieving adequate military or political results for the resources expended on it. In effect, the guerrillas were failing to tie down enough Union troops or disrupt Union communications sufficiently to haitçer their major operations. Therefore, the partisans' supporters could not muster sufficient arguments to overcome their opponents' attacks. By abolishing the partisan organizations in favor of the regular forces, the Confederacy was rejecting guerrilla operations as a means of carrying on the war. If the Southern armies could not save the 177

cause, reversion to mass guerrilla warfare was unlikely, despite the fears

of many high Union officials, because sympathy and support for them no

longer existed. The Federal forces probably did not notice any change for

the guerrillas continued to operate and achieve successes until the end of

the war, but they did so without the Confederacy's assistance. Supplies,

equipment and recruits now went to the regular anty. To survive, the

partisans had to steal from the eneiry or depend on local assistance, which

became scarcer as the devastations of war increased.

Shortly before the repeal of the Partisan Ranger Act, Harry Gilmor

performed a pair of exploits vAiich gave added ammunition to the

anti-partisan forces. On February 11, his band stopped a westbound

Baltimore and Ohio train and robbed the passengers, then fled vdien a

troop train approached from the other direction. One Northern story of

the raid claimed that Gilmor's men netted $100,000 in cash, nine gold

watches, two silver watches, fifty to sixty hats, thirty overcoats, 100

revolvers, a large lot of sabers, and a number of carpetbags.^ A few

days later, seven of Gilmor's men robbed a party of Jewish merchants from O Richmond, taking over $6000 in gold and silver coins and two watches.

The resulting outcry nearly ended Gilmor's career. Lee himself observed that "the enemy could claim to treat [Gilmor's men] as highway 9 robbers," and ordered an investigation, vdiich resulted in Gilmor facing a court-martial. Gilmor claimed that the robberies had taken place against his orders and conflicting testimony indicated that this might have been true in terms of the train. Concerning the Jewish merchants, however, testimony revealed that \diile drunk he had admitted planning the 178

affair and afterwards had given some of the gold to his quartermaster to

buy horses. Despite this hearsay evidence, the court acquitted him.^^

The v^ole affair put the partisan forces in a bad light. If Gilmor

was innocent, then he could not maintain discipline among his men. If he

were guilty, then he was a brigand masquerading as a soldier. Moreover,

the events provided no military benefit, since Gilmor had brought back no

prisoners nor destroyed the train. All aspects of the affair, therefore,

strengthened the anti-partisan critics by showing the bands as

ineffective, unreliable, or criminal. Unsurprisingly, the war Department ordered Gilmor's command mustered into regular service vdiere it operated

for the rest of the year under closer supervision.^^

Indeed, none of the partisan forces could boast of many successes during the first four months of the year. The Federal troops beat off most of their forays, while vigorous patrolling captured a substantial number of guerrillas. Mosby himself suffered a defeat early in January when he attempted to surprise the canp of the Potomac Home Brigade

Cavalry at Loudon Heights. A small party which Mosby sent ahead to capture the Federal commander, Maj. Henry A. Cole, somehow alarmed the camp. The aroused troopers resisted the partisans' attack fiercely so that, although Mosby later claimed to have driven them from their canp, he deemed withdrawal a prudent action. The Rangers lost eight men killed, three wounded and one captured, as opposed to Federal admission 12 of four troopers killed and sixteen wounded. Mosby called casualties severe, due to the quality of the dead men, vdio included three of his junior officers. x/y

The Rangers suffered another series of defeats in mid-February. On

the 17th, a force of 350 cavalry comprising troops from the 1st New

Jersey, 1st Massachusetts and 1st and 3rd Pennsylvania regiments, all

under the command of Lt. Col. John W. Rester of the 1st New Jersey, undertook a successful scouting raid from Warrenton to Paris. Rester

split his force into three columns, sending the Massachusetts troopers through Upperville, the New Jersey men down the Piedmont Valley and leading the Pennsylvanians to Paris via Manassas Gap. During its movement, the 1st New Jersey captured fifteen of Mosby's men and furloughed soldiers by dividing into three divisions and racing to the houses ahead of the alarm, then searching the buildings vigorously. The regimental historian later reported that the soldiers found one guerrilla hidden under a woman's mattress, another beneath a pyramid of empty hoop skirts, and a third under a Negro's bed. The most interesting capture, however, was two men discovered inside the closet of a room occupied by six women "in a state of deshabille.Likewise, Raster's column captured thirteen Rangers and furloughed soldiers between Manassas Gap and Paris, thus bringing the expedition total to twenty-eight prisoners, plus an unspecified quantity of arms, equipment, and horses.

Furthermore, during the expedition's return trip, the Fédérais foiled repeated attacks on their rear guard from a large body of guerrillas, by the sinple tactic of dropping off sharpshooters to pick off the pursuers at close range before rejoining the main body. In this manner the

Fédérais inflicted at least four casualties on the partisans without suffering any losses themselves.Although the exact number of Mosby's men taken remained questionable, since the prisoners included an 180

unspecified nuinber of regular soldiers, the raid clearly was a success,

due to the vigor and innovative tactics the Fédérais used.

Two days later, the partisans suffered another blow. A force of 200

men under Major Cole encountered about sixty Rangers at Upperville. A

sharp skirmish ensued, v^iich the Confederates eventually won by virtue of

retaining the field. However, the Fédérais claimed to have killed five

guerrillas and captured eighteen, while losing only two killed, three

wounded and an unspecified number of missing themselves. In terms of

numbers engaged, therefore, the partisans suffered heavily. Moreover,

Mosby acknowledged that his pursuit was ineffective, because Cole posted

riflemen behind stone walls to cover his withdrawal and the Rangers,

armed only with pistols, could not dislodge them, except by

time-consuming flanking movements. Once again, the Fédérais inflicted

significant casualties on Mosby and frustrated his pursuit with

successful delaying tactics.

In addition to these casualties, the guerrillas suffered small but steady losses from other Federal patrols throughout the winter. One cavalry force reported capturing six near Sperryville on January 11. On the same day as Cole's fight with Mosby at Upperville, another Union raiding party arrested eight rebels at Front Royal. In April, a pursuit party brought in five guerrillas from a band led by a Capt. James

C. Kincheloe, vrfio operated between Bull Run and Occoquan Creek. During the same month. Col. Charles R. Lowell, of the 2nd Massachusetts Cavalry captured fifty of Mosby's men and approximately forty horses in three 181

separate operations.From West Virginia, General Benjamin Kelley

reported similar successes. In January, McNeill suffered four casualties

in a skirmish near Moorfield Gap. The following month, Federal troops

killed a guerrilla chief named Mike Kane and captured four of his band, while a scouting party through Webster County brought in another noted 18 guerrilla, Daniel Dusky, and sixteen other prisoners. Although such losses did not threaten the guerrillas with extinction, they did decrease their threat by reducing their numbers significantly.

Admittedly, the partisans had some successes during this period,

McNeill cooperated with the regular forces on a number of foraging expeditions, v^ich usually brought back badly needed supplies. Mosby occasionally snapped up a picket post and proved that he remained dangerous against a careless opponent. On February 21, the day after his frustrated pursuit of Major Cole, he ambushed a force of 150 Federal cavalry near Dranesville. The Fédérais broke and fled, losing seventeen 19 killed and wounded and sixty prisoners by their c'.-m admission.

Therefore, the guerrillas still remained a threat.

However, Union energy and vigilance made such incidents rarer than in the previous year. Scouts and patrols scoured the countryside frequently, both to act against the guerrillas and to warn of intending danger, as evidenced by General Kelley's directions to one of his subordinates to "keep out small infantry scouts in the command of 20 intelligent officers or non-commissioned officers constantly." This activity disrupted the guerrillas' operations and prevented them from carrying out a number of raids. Mosby himself admitted that the Fédérais 182

showed great vigilance in guarding their communications, particularly during March and April, thus offering him few opportunities for 21 successful attacks. In short, the Fédérais seemed to be reducing the

guerrilla menace to controllable proportions.

This situation changed after the caitpaigning season opened at the beginning of May. General Grant's grand strategy, called for simultaneous pressure against the Confederacy by all of the Union field forces. In Virginia, Grant and the A m y of the Potomac, would pin down

Lee's a my . In support of this maneuver, another Union force would advance up the Shenandoah Valley and move toward Richmond, a column under

General George Crook would strike eastward from West Virginia Wiile the

IX Corps, under General Ambrose Burnside, would guard Grant's communications and protect Washington. Grant felt that these pressures would force the Confederates to weaken themselves at some point, thereby permitting a Federal breakthrough, the capture of Richmond and the destruction of the enemy's capacity for resistance. However, all of these forces concentrated their attention on the regular Confederate troops and devoted few, if any, men to controlling the guerrillas. As the effort to suppress them declined, the partisans resumed their successful raiding.

The situation in the Department of West Virginia illustrated the new attitude. At the end of February, Maj. Gen. Franz Sigel, a German immigrant and political appointee v^o had proved minimally competent, replaced Kelley as the department commander, although Kelley remained in 183

charge of the Railroad Division. Sigel's main assignment was to lead the

thrust up the Shenandoah Valley, utilizing troops from the 22,000

soldiers scattered throughout the department performing guard and

garrison duties. He accordingly began concentrating these detachments

both to make up his field army and to ensure adequate defense for a few

key locations. To replace the lost protection, the Federal government

called on neighboring states to provide special regiments to replace the 22 departed units for 100 days. In addition, it expected local militia

and defense forces to perform similar duties. The overall effect,

however, was a weakening of military protection throughout the department,

for some of the withdrawn units were not replaced, and others were

replaced by inexperienced troops, vho did not function as effectively as

their veteran predecessors.

This policy indicated that the Federal leadership, at least from the

level of army command on up, did not perceive the guerrillas as a serious problem. Except for protection of the B&O railroad, to which most of the

"hundred-days" regiments were assigned, they were willing to reduce garrisons in order to concentrate troops against significant targets.

The fact that they left anti-guerrilla protection in the hands of inexperienced units implied that they considered the threat negligible.

They made no other provisions for coping with the partisans, vÆiich further illustrated their lack of concern about them.

As the Union campaign opened, the partisans moved to take advantage of the lack of attention on them. McNeill scored the first spectacular success on May 5 Wien he raided the B&O. According to subsequent 184

reports, the raiders seized a train and used it to conceal their approach

into Piedmont, where they captured the garrison and destroyed the

railroad buildings with all of their equipment, nine engines,

approximately eighty railroad cars, and the railroad bridge as well as a mail train and two trains filled with commissary supplies. McNeill then almost contenptuously avoided pursuit. When a Union force of 450 cavalry

found them resting, McNeil's men waited until the Fédérais had deployed 23 and closed in, then mounted and fled without injury. The whole affair

reflected poorly on the Federal's vigilance and response to crisis.

On the other side of the Shenandoah Valley, Mosby also became more active as the campaign opened, carrying off prisoners and horses at every opportunity. Near the end of i^ril, he successfully struck an outpost in

Fairfax, although it cost him one lieutenant captured. On May 1, he captured eight of Sigel's wagons, v^ich yielded thirty-four horses and twenty prisoners, then entered Martinsburg, Sigel's main supply depot, and brought off more of both commodities. A few days later, some of the

Rangers attacked another wagon train near Strasburg with similar results.

Meanwhile Mosby himself captured one of Grant's ambulance trains. To round out his activities, on May 10, Mosby overran a cavalry outpost at

Front Royal, carrying off sixteen men and seventy-five horses without loss to himself.Other reports told of bushwhackers attacking wagonloads of wounded men from Grant's battle in the Wilderness. The snipers stopped the movement of casualties out of Fredericksburg until the Fédérais cleared them from the riverbank so that steamers could reach the city.^^ 185

Although these attacks provided annoying distractions for the

Federal coimnanders, they did not cause serious losses, nor did they

disrupt lines of communication to any significant extent. The Fédérais

soon made good McNeill's damage to the B&O and, as noted, they cleared

the guerrillas away from the ambulance trains. Certainly the field

commanders showed little concern for the problem. Sigel had acknowledged

that guerrilla activity was increasing even before he began to march down

the Shenandoah Valley, but aside from requesting and receiving two

additional cavalry regiments to deal with them, his only precaution was

to issue orders directing the detachment of two coirpanies of infantry to 26 provide tenporary guards for his signal stations. Otherwise, he made

no effort to control the guerrillas. Likewise, Grant concentrated on

Lee's army and paid little attention to the guerrilla activity in his

rear. Ultimately then, the partisans failed to harper the major Federal

operations or to detach troops from them.

As events turned out, Sigel's drive up the Shenandoah Valley failed even without the guerrilla problem. General John D. Imboden's

Confederate troops with help from McNeill and Gilmor smashed two forces of Federal cavalry that Sigel had detached to guard his flanks and 27 effectively removed them from the cairpaign. Then, after General John

C. Breckenridge had joined Imboden with reinforcements, the Confederates defeated Sigel at the Battle of New Market. On May 15th, Sigel retreated to Cedar Creek, vdiere within a week. President Abraham Lincoln replaced him with Maj. Gen. David Hunter. Furthermore, Crook's column also had 186

not performed its assignment. Crook reached his first objective, the

Virginia and Tennessee Railroad, with little difficulty and destroyed the

New River bridge, an unspecified amount of track, and a large quantity of military stores. However, false information that Grant was retreating

and lack of supplies caused Crook to withdraw back into West Virginia, 28 rather than pushing on to join Sigel at Staunton as planned.

Therefore, the entire campaign was a failure.

Hunter's assunption of command did not change the Union strategy for the Shenandoah, merely the leadership. Grant still vanted an armj.^ from the Department of West Virginia to push up the Valley, then turn east to threaten Lee's flank and Richmond. In order to make the plan work the second time. Hunter intended to do two things. First, he would pursue a policy of destroying property in the Valley belonging to Southern sympathizers, thereby depriving both the guerrillas and the Confederate army of its use and thus facilitating Union control of the area. Second, to give his army numerical superiority over the Southern forces, he directed a reduction in the size of the guard detachments for supply trains and refused to permit the diversion of troops in the field army to other duties. When Brig. Gen. Max Weber, commanding at Harper's Ferry, requested a cavalry regiment to clear the area of guerrillas and patrol the B&O, Hunter refused with the notation "This regiment cannot be spared 29 from operations in the field." By these actions. Hunter showed that he considered the guerrillas a minimal threat. The partisans happily corrected this view during subsequent operations. 187

To protect his forces from the partisans, Hunter put his trust in

proclamations rather than soldiers. At the beginning of June, he

distributed a notice throughout the region that he would hold local

citizens responsible for guerrilla attacks. For every train attacked or

every Federal soldier wounded or killed, he would burn the homes and

property of every Southern synpathizer within a five-mile radius of the

incident's location. For each piece of public property captured, he

would assess the secessionists within ten miles an amount equal to five

times its value. These citizens would be held in custody until payment

was made.^^ Thus, Hunter expected the citizens themselves to discourage

partisan activity out of their own self-interest.

Despite his threats. Hunter found the guerrillas, if anything, even

more active against him than they had been against Sigel. Much of the

blame for this situation lay with his own policies. By reducing the size

of train guards. Hunter made his supply trains so vulnerable that the

partisans could attack them with very little chance of failure and seldom

could resist the temptation to do so. In fact, Mosby claimed that only

two wagon trains went up to Hunter during the campaign and both of them

violated his order on escort size. The first one had a guard of 700 men

that successfully foiled the partisans' attack, vdiile the second train had even more guards and passed without hindrance.The Fédérais

forwarded no other wagons to Hunter because they could not provide sufficient escorts for them. Moreover, Hunter had ordered his troops to 32 reduce their baggage, including ammunition, to one wagon per regiment.

This action decreased the number of wagons his field force had to 188

protect, but magnified the value of each one lost, because it diminished

his troops' fighting capability and resupply from the rear was not

possible. Hunter himself had provided the partisans with the irieans to

hanper his campaign effectively.

Hunter conpounded his problem by directing his troops to live off

the land during the advance. Although he expected them to adhere to

discipline and not commit any depredations beyond taking needed supplies,

and actually punished some men caught violating his restrictions,

sanction of the practice, coupled with the general lack of supplies from

both local and regular sources actually encouraged violations. The

lootings and burnings in turn drove citizens to join the guerrillas or

give them greater support, thereby worsening the partisan problem.

Hunter's canpaign became a mismanaged affair, little more successful

than Sigel's had been, and an even greater catastrophe in its ultimate

results. The army, approximately 8500 strong, and the same size as

Sigel's, moved up the Valley at the end of May. At Piedmont, Virginia,

it encountered a force of Confederates under General William E. "Grumble"

Jones, which it routed after a ten hour battle that used up much of

Hunter's ammunition. Hunter advanced on to Staunton, vdiere Crook joined

him with 10,000 men, then continued up the Valley "destroying railroads,

rebel supplies, and manufacturing establishments.Included in the

destruction was a substantial part of Lexington, where, in addition to mills and warehouses, the Fédérais burned the Virginia Military

Institute, and Governor John Letcher's home. They looted the town as well. Finally, on June 17, the a my reached its objective of Lynchburg, 189

just as General Jubal Early, leading the Second Corps of Lee's Army,

arrived to take charge of its defense. After a brief conflict within

sight of his goal. Hunter retreated, later claiming that a shortage of

supplies and ammunition, as well as superior enemy forces, caused him to

do so.^^ While the last claim was false - Early gave his strength as

12,000 men opposed to Hunter's 18,000 - the other two certainly were

true, due to the failure of wagon trains to come up the Valley.Even

worse, instead of falling back along his line of march. Hunter

sidestepped into West Virginia, thereby' clearing the Valley for Early's

subsequent march into Maryland and attack on Washington D.C.. Thus, the

failure of additional supplies to reach him, which stemmed from the

partisan threat, caused Hunter to terminate his campaign just short of

successful completion and to clear the way for the Confederates' last

invasion of the North.

During the campaign. Hunter had a least three opportunities to put his policy of retaliation into practice. Shortly after the army began moving, bushwhackers fired on some empty wagons returning north. Federal troops immediately implemented the policy by burning the buildings from which the shots had come. Then, on May 29, Harry Gilmor captured a train of sixteen wagons just beyond Newtown. Again, Hunter ordered the town burned and sent a detachment from the 1st New York Cavalry to carry it out. However, the citizens pleaded for clemency. They presented letters to show that their men were in Lee's army, not fighting as partisans, and, perhaps most impressive, a note from Gilmor threatening to kill forty-one prisoners he held, if the Fédérais burned Newtown. Whether 190

this warning or the citizens' pleas had the greatest effect remains

unclear, but the soldiers left without carrying out their orders, and

Hunter did not pursue the matter further.In a third instance, during

Hunter's retreat through West Virginia, bushvrtiackers fired on an

ambulance near Barboursville, inflicting four casualties. The local

Union commander ordered all men living within five miles of the road to

report to him, but since all of them supposedly had taken the oath of

allegiance, he expressed reticence about carrying out the policy:

"To men i*o have taken the oath, unless charges can be made and sustained, I do not feel authorized to apply General Hunter's order. I intend applying it wherever I can find a man that is a proper subject I would..rather spare two secesh than burn up on Union man's property "

In this case, because the commander wished absolute evidence that his

victims were secessionists, he refused to enforce Hunter's policy. Thus

in two of the three incidents the troops failed to back up Hunter's

proclamation with action, thereby showing that not all Fédérais favored

stern retaliation and weakening the policy's impact. However, the

destruction his army committed during its march, such as the burnings in

Lexington, undoubtedly strengthened civilian sympathy for the partisans

and drove people to join them. Hunter's policy therefore had an effect

opposite to its intent since it increased support for and size of the

guerrilla bands. Certainly it did not stop them from continuing their

activities.

Hunter's proclamation was only one evidence of a general trend toward harsher Federal policies against the guerrillas. During the winter, the 9th New York Cavalry stationed near Falmouth tired of the 191

bushwhacking they encountered and threatened to burn all dwellings and

drive out the families in the vicinity il any more occurred. The 38 remainder of the regiment's stay in the area was peaceful. In the Arity

of the Potomac, General George G. Meade issued an order that guerrillas 39 found wearing Union uniforms were to be hanged on the spot. These

threats reflected a stronger trend to punish civilians for partisan

activity in their vicinity and to treat the guerrillas themselves mercilessly. On the other hand, difficulties still arose in putting harsher measures into practice. A number of Union commanders yet preferred a moderate policy and had the power to enforce their views. In addition to the failure of Hunter's subordinates to enforce his policy, several other examples occurred. When sent to search for guerrillas in the village of Markham, the troops involved received orders to avoid all injury to property.Meade's Headquarters censured General George

A. Custer for arresting citizens vho, he claimed, violated paroles and bushwhacked his troops. Custer's subsequent complaint that he could suppress bushvhacking if given a free hand earned him a further reprimand. Such actions indicated that the high command preferred to treat partisans within the laws of war and therefore prevented the enforcement of harsh measures vrfiich might have a positive effect.

Nevertheless, an attitude of support for such measures continued to grow.

Although the Union commanders disagreed on how to control the partisans, they reflected a general consensus that a major part of the problem was the low quantity and quality of their cavalry. Many officers felt that with more cavalry they could control the guerrillas easily and 192

cited lack of it as the reason for their failure to do so. One officer

reported in March that he lacked enough cavalry to drive Mosby from the

country. In June, General Lew Wallace complained that lack of cavalry

kept him from preventing guerrilla depredations and wanted to inpress

horses to make up the deficiency. A few days later, Kelley noted that

the transfer of two cavalry regiments to Hunter's campaign left him

without any cavalry to pursue guerrillas. Partisan activity near

Harper's Ferry during the same period caused the commander there to

request arms for an idle cavalry regiment sc that he could use it against

them. Even vdien cavalry was available, commanders questioned its

quality. Hunter, for example, complained that his cavalry was utterly demoralized.^^ The numerous instances in vdiich the partisans surprised or defeated forces of Federal cavalry led one historian to remark that the guerrillas had an advantage in "the seeming lack of ability of Union cavalry officers to anticipate and deal with their attacks.While this generalization did not apply to all cavalry officers in 1864, the mounted arm received a large share of the blame for the guerrillas' continued success.

As one effort to overcome this problem, the Union commanders began punishing officers vho performed poorly against the guerrillas.

Commanders of pickets that the partisans surprised found themselves relieved of duty, vhile officers who showed insufficient vigor during patrols faced charges of cowardice. Hunter ordered at least two officers dishonorably discharged, as a result of one attack on a picket post.

When a 15th New York Cavalry picket lost seven men and forty-five horses 193

to guerrillas, Hunter sacked both the party commander, Capt. Michael

Auer, and the officer in charge of pickets, Maj. Henry Roessle. Hunter's

orders read in part:

...all officers commanding guards, outposts, and pickets will be held strictly responsible for the performance of their duties and no excuse will be accepted for such officers, if guilty of negligence, inactivity, or misconduct before the eneiry toward derelict officers of guards, outposts and pickets, no leniency will in any case be shown, as any error on the side of mercy in such cases would be a crime against the v^ol|^command, put in jeopardy by their negligence or inefficiency.

Hunter stuck to this policy without deviation. When a petition cited

Captain Auer's personal bravery during the attack as justification for

reducing his punishment. Hunter responded: "__ personal bravery— cannot be urged as an excuse for gross neglect of a vital duty, thus endangering the lives of thousands of our fellow soldiers and the welfare of the country.

A few days later. General Kelley lodged a similar complaint involving the same regiment. He had directed Lt. Col. A. I. Root, v.-ho was taking some cavalry detachments to General Sigel, to move via

Bloomery Gap to Winchester, since this was the most direct route and he could scout that area for some guerrilla bands that were active there.

However, Root crossed the Potomac and went through Maryland instead.

Kelley felt that Root had gone the different way "from sheer cowardice, fearing that he might meet on the route indicated by the order some

Confederate force or guerrilla bands.He requested that the department commander take appropriate action. 194

The message from these incidents was clear. Officers vdio suffered

defeat at the guerrillas' hands or who seemed to fear encountering them

would receive severe punishment for their failures, “to encourage the

others". Only success was acceptable. Ultimately, however, the

government failed to support the field commanders, which may have

weakened the effects of their effort. President Lincoln revoked Auer's

dismissal, permitting his honorable discharge, and allowed Roessle to

reenter the a my at his former rank, i^parently Root suffered no adverse

action at all, because he was commanding his cavalry regiment a few

months after Kelley's complaint. Thus, the effort to inprove the

efficiency of anti-guerrilla operations by removing ineffective officers

had little success. Whether the threat increased other officers' diligence in their duties is unclear.

As guerrilla attacks increased. Union officers suggested other inprovements in countertactics. One of the more significant observations came from a lieutenant of the 6th West Virginia Cavalry, vmo felt that a major weakness in Federal operations lay in the manner in which scouting parties collected information. He commented:

...I fear our scouting parties are too much in the habit of following the public roads and going to villages instead of selecting the most obscure routes and camping concealed in groves. I would suggest that scouts be instructed to obtain information from children and servants instead of adult v^ite members of families. ‘

In essence, scouting parties apparently often treated their task as a mundane duty and made little effort to investigate remote areas vmere they were likely to discover guerrillas. Also, they seemed to depend for information on people who had an interest in misleading them, vdiereas 195

children and servants would be less likely to lie or realize what

information they had revealed. Such modifications could increase the

effectiveness of patrols and thereby reduce the guerrilla problem.

Another significant tactical suggestion came from Col. H. M. Lazeile

of the 16th New York Cavalry, who commanded the cavalry in the Department of Washington. In a letter to the Department commander. General

Christopher C. Augur, Lazeile discussed the guerrilla problem at length and his ideas for dealing with it. He felt that existing tactics were futile, for the guerrillas easily avoided forces above 500 men and usually successfully ambushed any smaller ones. Lazeile noted that:

...there are but two ways of successfully coping with this wily and almost intangible eneny. One is the occupation of his vhole country by a commanding force in every district vhich could not be spared for an enemy so insignificant in numbers.... The other way is to fight him after his own manner with the forces which we have.... It is ny belief that by adopting the tactics of the enemy, by selecting and setting aside from men of this command a sufficient number as scouts and guides, retaining them on that duty, and sending our mounted parties under their guidance to desirable forest covers, always moving by night, until information by vdiich a surprise or ambuscade of the eneny could be accomplished, that very much success could be gained, \diich our present system of acting as regular cavalry, a^g almost always openly, could never enable us to attain---

Lazeile claimed that he had had small parties operating in this fashion for over a week and that they had come close to a number of guerrilla forces, which other assignments prevented them from attacking.

Furthermore, to stop the infiltration of small bodies of partisans through Union lines, he proposed establishing a secret picket line consisting of 100 men in parties of twelve or less, five miles out from the main lines. By posting these parties at night and changing their positions each time, he believed that they could ambush the infiltrators 196

49 and thus reduce their damage. Unfortunately, the department apparently

adopted none of Lazeile's suggestions. However, they showed a growing

realization on the part of field officers that unconventional methods

were necessary to combat the guerrillas with conçlete effectiveness.

By the end of Hunter's cançeign. West Virginia also had experienced

an upsurge in guerrilla activity. The first part of the year generally was quiet, but following the withdrawal of troops for the field canpaigns and McNeill's raid on the B&O in early May, the guerrillas increased

their attacks. Kelley kept detachments constantly pursuing them, sending one conpany to Gilmer County for ten days and another scouting force, which brought back thirty-six prisoners, through Webster and Braxton

Counties. These efforts failed to settle the region, so Governor

A. I. Boreman appealed directly to Hunter for more troops:

The counties between the Great Kanawiia and Big Sandy Rivers, in the southern part of the State, have been infested with large bodies of guerrillas from the beginning of the rebellion, but the loyal people have had some little protection from U.S. soldiers stationed in these counties by order of the several commanders of the department.... There are gentlemen here now— [who] inform me that the troops which have been stationed in their county and have given some protection to the loyal people have been withdrawn within a few days past, and that they are now left to the mercy of the guerrillas. They further state that in these counties there are from 300 to 400 guerrillas under the command of three rebel captains, vAio are robbing the people of their property, and capturing and carrying off some of the loyal citizens, and are imprisoning and otherwise maltreating them Under these circumstances, I request, if possible with the force under your command, that you give orders for the occupation of the region of the country spoken of, by such numbers of troops as may give the loyal people protection and safety for their persons and property.

Needless to say. Hunter could not spare troops from his offensive, so the citizens of West Virginia continued to suffer from guerrillas. 197

Three weeks later, Mr. W. G. Pierson, a civilian scout eirployed by

Sigel, proposed another solution. Noting that the State Guards were of

little use, he offered to rid Lewis, Braxton and Nicholas Counties of

guerrillas, if given his pick of twenty men from one of the state

regiments and the stationing of one coiiçjany in the region to provide

support. Kelley turned this suggestion down with the comment that

"details of the kind are contrary to all regulations. Soldiers cannot be 52 placed under command of a citizen." No doubt concern about the ability

to control Pierson's activities contributed to this view. The rejection

underscored both the Army's view that anti-guerrilla operations take

place only under official auspices and that the guerrilla problem still

was not great enough to pull troops away from the field.

Perhaps one of the reasons that Kelley evidenced little concern

about these guerrilla bands was that he had developed a virtual obsession

about McNeill following the Piedmont raid. Only a few days afterwards,

Kelley wrote; "We must kill, capture or drive McNeill out of the

country, before we can expect quiet or safety along the line of

road.^^ Most of his messages to his subordinates directed them to remain

alert for McNeill and try to rid the area of him. In early June, Kelley

ordered Col. James A. Mulligan to take 450 men to the Moorfield area and

kill, capture, or drive McNeill out of the country. After this

expedition failed to achieve its purpose, he directed Col. Robert

Stevenson, commanding at Greenland Gap, to keep himself informed of

McNeill's location and report to headquarters often.To Kelley, the

guerrillas in the state's interior were a minor problem, since McNeill 198

represented the greatest threat within his command to the B&O, wiile the

smaller bands seldom bothered the railroad at all. Once he had dealt

with McNeill, Kelley probably felt that he could devote more troops to

the lesser problems. Until then, McNeill occupied most of his forces and

his attention. However, the only notable success Kelley had during this

period was the recovery of a wagon train captured by some of McNeill's

men. The partisan chief remained a constant threat vhich obscured most

other concerns.

Following Hunter's retreat from Lynchburg, Early took the offensive.

Driving up the Shenandoah Valley, he pushed aside the small Union

garrisons in his path and created a reign of fear on Northern soil. The

Confederate seized supplies, burned Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, and

threatened Washington, D.C.. When troops from Grant's army arrived in

time to defend the capital. Early withdrew partway down the Valley where he remained a constant threat. Both sides then settled into a period of wary waiting.

During this caitpaign, the partisans tried to cooperate closely with

Early. Gilmor operated directly with the army (and participated in the

Chambersburg arson), as did McNeill, lAile Mosby arranged his activities to assist Early as best he could. For exaitple, Mosby drove the garrison out of Point of Rocks and closed the railroad there for two days, routed a force of Federal cavalry at Mount Zion Church, and generally continued his energetic scouting forays. His most colorful exploit was the capture of thirty cavalrymen vAiom he surprised picking cherries and unable to 199

defend themselves.As if to top this feat, at about the same time

McNeill surprised and captured sixty Union troopers bathing in a

river.He performed a few other minor raids with his usual conpetence,

but generally remained part of Early's a my during the campaign. Thus,

in some quarters the partisan pressure on the Fédérais slackened v^ile

the guerrillas served with Early, wiile in the vicinity of the

Confederate a my it seemed to get worse.

Overall, Federal performance against the guerrillas during the first half of 1864 had mixed results, m'lile tlie number of partisan defeats

increased and the Union forces had significant success during the first

few months in killing and capturing numbers of them, the major leaders

remained at large and continued to pose a threat. The failure of Sigel and Hunter, particularly the latter, to take this threat seriously and make preparations to deal with it permitted the guerrillas to contribute significantly to the failure of their campaigns. In contrast to the beginning of the year, ràen the partisan danger seemed to be diminishing, by the end of Hunter's campaign the guerrillas were as great a nuisance as ever. While the Fédérais had exhibited growing efficiency and innovativeness in their tactics against the guerrillas, their dismissal of the menace once the caitçaigning season had begun allowed a partisan resurgence. 200

Chapter VI Notes

1. Martin and Ross, Spies, Scouts and Raiders, p. 126.

2. Jones, Gray Ghosts, p. 213.

3. Brig. Gen. Thomas L. Rosser to Gen. R. E. Lee, 11 January 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXXIII, pp. 1081-1082.

4. Ibid., p. 1082.

5. Ibid.

6. Gen. R. E. Lee to Gen. S. Cooper, 1 i^ril 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXXIII, pp. 1252-1253.

7. Jones, Gray Ghosts, p. 217.

8. Synopsis of Testimony, N.D., Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXXIII, pp. 152-154.

9. Gen. R. E. Lee to James A. Seddon, 6 March 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXXIII, p. 223.

10. Synopsis of Testimony, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXXIII, pp. 152-154; Jones, Gray Ghosts, pp. 216-218.

11. Samuel W. Melton to Colonel Withers, 26 ^ r i l 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXXIII, p. 1253.

12. Maj. Henry A. Cole to Capt. William M. Boone, 10 January 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXXIII, pp. 16-18.

13. Maj. John S. Mosby to Maj. Gen. J. E. B. Stuart, 1 February 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXXIII, pp. 15-16.

14. Henry R. Pyne, Ride to War. (New Brunswick; Rutgers University Press, 1961). p. 180.

15. Lt. Col. John W. Rester to Capt. Henry C. Ware, 19 February 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol.XXXIII, pp. 155-156; Pyne, Ride to War, pp. 180-181.

16. Brig. Gen. J. C. Sullivan to General Kelley, 20 February 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXXIII, p. 156; Lt. Col. John S. Mosby to Major H. B. McClellan, 21 February 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXXIII, p. 157.

17. Maj. Gen. A. Pleasanton to Major General Sedgewick, 11 January 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXXIII, p. 18; Abstract from ZUl

Record of Events, Cavalry Brigade, Department of West Virginia, 20 February 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXXIII, p. 157; Lt. Col. H. H. Wells to Colonel Taylor, 3 April 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXXIII, p. 796; Col. C. R. Lowell to Capt. W. A. LaMotte, 1 May 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXXIII, pp. 315-316.

18. Col. James A. Mulligan to Capt. T. Melvin, 18 January 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXXIII, p. 393; Brig. Gen. B. F. Kelley to Brig. Gen. G. W. Cullum, 10 February 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXXIII, p. 546; Brig. Gen. B. F. Kelley to Brigadier General Cullum, 18 February 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXXIII, p. 572.

19. Brig. Gen. R. 0. Tyler to Lt. Col. Joseph H. Taylor, 23 February 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXXIII, p. 159.

20. Brig. Gen. B. F. Kelley to Colonel Mulligan, 6 February 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXXIII, p. 530.

21. Lt. Col. John S. Mosby to Lieutenant Colonel Taylor, 11 September 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXXIII, pp. 248-249.

22. Jones, Gray Ghosts, p. 233.

23. Capt. John H. McNeill to James A. Seddon, 7 May 1864, Official Records. Ser, I, Vol. XXXVII, Pt. 1, p. 69; Jones, Gray Ghosts, pp. 233-236.

24. Col. C. R. Lowell to Capt. W. A. LaMotte, 23 ^ r i l 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXXIII, p. 508; Lt. Col. John S. Mosby to Lt. Col. W. K. Taylor, 11 September 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXXVII, Pt. 1, pp. 2-5.

25. Weigley, Quartermaster General, pp. 294-295.

26. Maj. Gen. F. Sigel to Col. E. D. Townsend, 29 March 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXXIII, p. 766; Maj. Gen. Franz Sigel to Adjutant General U.S. Amy, 15 April 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXXIII, p. 875; Headquarter Department of West Virginia to Gen. Julius Stahel, 5 May 1864, Departments, RG 393.

27. Jones, Gray Ghosts, pp. 239-240.

28. Brig. Gen. George Crook to Capt. T. Melvin, 23 May 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXXVII, Pt. 1, pp. 9-13.

29. Brig. Gen. Max Weber to Brig. Gen. Kelley, 9 May 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXXVII, Pt. 1, p. 446.

30. Jones, Gray Ghosts, p. 246. 202

31. Lt. Col. John S. Mosby to Lt. Col. W. H. Taylor, 11 September 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXXVII, Pt. 1, p. 3.

32. General Orders No. 29, Headquarters Department of West Virginia, 22 May 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXXVII, Pt. 1, pp. 517-518.

33. Jones, Gray Ghosts, p. 251.

34. Maj. Gen. D. Hunter to Adjutant General U.S. A m y , 28 June 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXXVII, Pt. 1, pp. 683-684.

35. [R. V. Johnson and C. C. Buel] eds.. Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, vol. 4: The Way to Appomattox. (New York; Castle Books, 1956), p. 492.

36. Jones, Gray Ghosts, pp. 247-248.

37. A. D. Jaynes to Major Witcher, 21 June 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXXVII, Pt. 1, p. 659.

58. Starr, Union Cavalry, 2:50.

39. General Orders No. 6, Headquarters Cavalry Corps, A m y of the Potomac, 15 January 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXXIII, p. 383.

40. Brig. Gen. D. McM. Gregg to Lt. Col. J. W. Rester, 18 February 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXXIII, p. 571.

41. Starr, Union Cavalry, 2:52.

42. Col. J. W. Fisher to Lt. William A. Hoyt, 30 May 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXXIII, pp. 259-260; Maj. Gen. D. Hunter to Maj. Gen. H. W. Halleck, 22 May 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXXVII, Pt. 1, pp. 516-517; Maj. Gen. Lew Wallace to Major General Halleck, 9 July 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXXVII, Pt. 1, pp. 617-618; Brig. Gen. B. F. Kelley to Major Meysenburg, 14 January 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXXVII, Pt. 1, p. 637; Brig. Gen. Max Weber to Major T. A. Meysenburg, 17 June 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXXVII, Pt. 1, p. 646.

43. Starr, Union Cavalry, 2:214.

44. General Orders No. 30, Department of West Virginia, 23 May 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXXVII, Pt. 1, p. 527.

45. General Orders No. 31, Department of West Virginia, 24 May 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXXVII, Pt. 1, p. 532. 203

46. Brig- Gen. B. F. Kelley to Maj. T. A. Meysenburg, 26 May 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXXVII, Pt. 1, p. 544,

47. Lt. J. H. Shuttleworth to Lt. Col. F. W. Thoitpson, 8 June 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXXVII, Pt. 1, p. 611.

48. Col. H. M. Lazeile to Lt. Col. J. H. Taylor, 19 July 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXXVII, Pt. 2, p. 389,

49. Ibid., pp. 387-390.

50. B. F. Kelley to Colonel Wilkinson, 14 May 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXXVII, Pt, 1, p. 457; Col. T. M, Harris to Brigadier General Kelley, 30 May 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXXVII, Pt. 1, p. 559.

51. A. I. Boreman to Major General Hunter, 2 June 1864, Official Records. Ser, I, Vol. XXX7II, Pt. 1, pp, 581-582,

52. W. G. Pierson to Col. N, Wilkinson, 24 June 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXXVII, Pt. 1, p. 672.

53. Brig. Gen. B. F. Kelley to Capt. Thayer Melvin, 9 May 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXXVII, Pt. 1, p. 415,

54. Brig. Gen. B. F. Kelley to Colonel Mulligan, 12 June 1864, Official Records. Ser, I, Vol. XXXVII, Pt. 1, p. 630; Brig. Gen. B. F. Kelley to Colonel Stevenson, 1 July 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXXVII, Pt. 2, p. 6.

55. Lt. Col. John S. Mosby to Lt. Col. W. H. Taylor, 11 September 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXXVII, Pt. 1, p. 4; Jones, Gray Ghosts, p. 256.

56. Brig. Gen. B. F. Kelley to Major Meysenburg, 27 June 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXXVII, Pt. Î, p. 681. CHAPTER VII

"Exorcising the Gray Ghost"

The situation %hich the Fédérais faced in northern Virginia ty mid-1864 appeared more serious than at the beginning of the year.

Althought it had failed to capture Washington, Jubal Early's army remained in the lower Shenandoah Valley, vrfiere it presented a constant threat to the Federal capital as well as Union territory in Maryland and

Pennsylvania. The Confederate partisans roamed freely throughout the region, ambushing Union detachments, raiding outposts, and attacking supply trains. The Federal forces seemed incapable of dealing with these problems. Although their presence prevented Early from advancing, they took no action to drive him away. Neither did they mount any major efforts to suppress the partisans, vAio seemed much more active and dangerous than they had a few months earlier. All of the Federal's gains against them seemed lost.

By year's end, however, the Union had managed to reverse this condition. It annihilated Early's anty and destroyed the Shenandoah

Valley as a Confederate resource. Moreover, it had reduced the partisan menace almost to nonexistence. At the end of the year John S. Mosby was out of action with a near fatal wound. Hanse McNeill was dead, Harry

Gilmor remained in disgrace, and a large number of their followers were dead or prisoners. Although the partisans continued to operate.

204 205

aggressive tactics and serious attention to the guerrilla problem had

reduced it to a minor concern.

To eliminate the danger that Early posed and settle the problem of

the Shenandoah Valley permanently. General Ulysses S. Grant replaced

David Hunter with Maj. General Philip H. Sheridan at the beginning of

August. Sheridan had distinguished himself in the western theater,

particularly by successfully storming Missionary Ridge during the

Chattanooga canpaign in 1863 and came east with Grant to command the Army

of the Potomac's cavalry. In this role Sheridan fought the Confederate

cavalry to a standstill and conducted a successful raid towards Richmond

which caused Jeb Stuart's death. Despite his youth (he was

thirty-three), his reputation for activity, aggressiveness, and success

made him appear an excellent choice for the Valley command. Furthermore,

Grant determined to provide him with sufficient authority and strength to

accomplish the task. Sheridan became commander of a new organization,

the Middle Military Division, which comprised the Departments of

Washington, West Virginia, the Susquehanna, and the Middle Department.^

For his field force, in addition to two divisions of General George

Crook's corps from West Virginia, Sheridan received from the Army of the

Potomac two divisions of the XlXth Corps, two cavalry divisions, and the

VI Corps, which had arrived in Washington in time to turn back Early's

attack, for a total of approximately 48,000 men.^ Thus, he had an

advantage over his predecessors in the availability of a large veteran anty to accoiiplish his goal, rather than building a field force from

local garrisons. 206

Sheridan's campaign against Early somevrtiat resembled Jackson's

Valley campaign in reverse. The two armies danced up and down the Valley

trying to bring on battle or to avoid it. For five v.’se k s Sheridan

maneuvered cautiously, mistakenly believing that Early's force

outnumbered him. However, vdien one of Early's divisions departed to

rejoin General Lee's army, he pounced. He defeated Early at Winchester

on September 19th, pursued him to Strasburg, and overvdielmed him at the

Battle of Fisher's Hill three days later. Believing the Confederates

finished, Sheridan fell back to Winchester and prepared to send his

troops to rejoin Grant. However, Early received reinforcements, advanced

against the Fédérais, and surprised them in camp at Cedar Creek on

October 19. Sheridan, rallied his troops and directed a counterattack

which routed the Confederates, effectively ending organized resistance in

the Valley. Although Early maintained a small force there until the

following spring, it offered no threat or obstacle to the Fédérais.

General George A. Custer's cavalry division annihilated it in March 1865,

prior to leaving the Valley. Sheridan further ensured that the

Shenandoah Valley would cause no further military concern by meticulously

carrying out Grant's orders to devastate it. His troops destroyed all

supplies, foodstuffs, and property useful to the Confederate war effort

that they could find, thereby' depriving the South of these resources and

making further operations there untenable.

During these operations, the partisans were particularly active

against Sheridan's supply lines and performed wbat probably was their most effective service during the entire war. Their attacks on supply 207

trains and couriers forced the Fédérais to detach large numbers of men as

guards as well as pursue more direct anti-guerrilla measures. While

Early's array remained intact, Sheridan focused most of his resources

against it, thereby allowing the partisans to operate with little

interference and thus achieve a series of successes. Mosby, in

particular, performed some spectacular exploits. Within a few days of

Sheridan's arrival, some of Mosby's men infiltrated his headquarters area

for an undetermined purpose - possibly to capture or assassinate him,-

but alert sentries drove them off.^ On August 13, with 300 men and two

cannons, Mosby attacked a supply train guarded by three regiments of

infantry with some cavalry. He reported capturing 200 prisoners, 200

cattle, and over 500 horses and mules, as well as destroying seventy-five

wagons loaded with supplies, vtiile suffering only five casualties

himself. The incident resulted in a Federal board of inquiry which

determined that the guard was too small for the size of the train and the

officer in charge was deficient in his duties. Sheridan himself blamed

the loss on the fact that the guard consisted mostly of '100-days men' vdio fled vtien the partisans attacked.^ Early in September, Mosby's men

stampeded Crook's ambulance train, but they did little damage to it.^

Then on October 13, the Rangers derailed a B&O train carrying two Anty paymasters and carried off $173,000 in paper currency.^ Two weeks later, they capped their exploits by capturing Brig. Gen. Albert N. Duffie, one of Sheridan's cavalry commanders, as he rode ahead of his escort.

Sheridan considered him no great loss and requested his dismissal from the service.^ Also, from September to November, Mosby harassed Union efforts to rebuild the Manassas Gap Railroad, finally forcing their 208

termination. In addition, he frequently attacked Union outposts and

patrols, costing the Fédérais casualties, horses and prisoners. McNeill,

Gilmor, and the other guerrillas contributed their share to harassing the

Fédérais, but Mosby received most of the credit. Moreover, the guerrilla

problem actually increased during the canpaign. The destruction of

property by both Hunter and Sheridan drove many settlers to join the

guerrillas as a means to vengeance, vdiile refugees from Early's army after its destruction at Cedar Creek also swelled their numbers. Thus

Sheridan's success conpounded his difficulties.

In part. Federal reaction to this stepped-up guerrilla activity followed the traditional pattern. The first response of many commanders was to ask for more cavalry. They needed one or two regiments to protect supply trains, a few hundred men to conduct anti-guerrilla raids, more troopers for routine patrols. The commander at Winchester, reporting

Mosby's presence in the area, claimed that an additional cavalry regiment

O would enable him to capture the partisan. The commander at Martinsburg requested a cavalry regiment to operate against the guerrillas in his vicinity. A week later, his replacement asked for a strong, experienced g cavalry regiment for the same purpose. The Department of Washington reported a conplete absence of cavalry to protect the Upper Potomac and requested authority to equip and mount 350 men who were awaiting both at

Canp Stoneman.^®

One of the most inportunate officers was Brig. Gen. John

S. Stevenson, commanding at Harper's Ferry. Stevenson bombarded Sheridan 209

and Edwin M. Stanton with warnings about the guerrilla threat, coupled

with requests for more cavalry to overcome it. To Stanton, he wrote that

guerrillas blocked communication with Sheridan and he lacked the cavalry

to force a passage. After Mosby's greenback raid, he excused the

partisans' escape by claiming the cavalry sent in pursuit was too weak

and poorly mounted to be effective.^^ Two days later, he observed that

"at least 1000 good cavalry should be attached to this command to protect

us against the sudden dashes of the guerrilla organizations infesting this 12 part of the country." At the same time, he complained to Sheridan that

the few cavalry he did have were unreliable, incompletely mounted and

insufficient to scout the country.Stevenson also had demanded from

General William W. Averell a thousand cavalry and a section of artillery

to scout the Charlestown area constantly and clear out the 600 guerrillas

infesting it. Averell sent 200 men, claiming this force was adequate and

the rest of his troops were needed for offensive operations with the main

anry.^'^ Although more extreme than most, Stevenson epitomized the Federal

commanders vdio saw more cavalry as the solution to the guerrillas.

However, his demands and those of the others had little effect, since

Sheridan refused to give up any of his cavalry for these purposes and none was forthcoming from other sources.

The second traditional Federal response was increased enphasis on scouting and patrols. As usual, some of these forays aimed specifically at guerrilla targets, \diile with others partisans were only an additional objective. Generally, these efforts achieved only moderate success, characterized by a handful of prisoners taken. Twice during the 210

caitpaign, patrols swept through Loudon County looking for Mosby and other

partisans. The 8th Illinois Cavalry made a raid in August, while the

Loudon County Rangers did so in September. In both cases the results

were negligible, as they were in a similar scout to Fairfax Courthouse.

A party ordered to arrest Capt. John Mobberly, one of Mosby's

subordinates, also failed in its purpose, for Mobberly still was raiding

Federal lines two months later.On the positive side, a force under

Col. Henry S. Gansevoort of the 13th New York Cavalry, following the

guidance of a prisoner, discovered the hiding place of Mosby's artillery

and captured it along with nine men. Another party destroyed a portable

distillery vdiich they claimed was one of two that the owner used to 17 supply the guerrillas. Nonetheless, v^ile the patrols continued to

inflict casualties on the partisans, during this period they had little

effect in discouraging their operations.

As a less common response to the problem, the Fédérais reacted

according to the partisans' desires: they increased the size of their

escorts for wagon trains and couriers. This reaction had begun before

Sheridan assumed command. In July, Hunter had warned General Crook that the guerrilla menace was so great that he (Crook) would need a regiment to escort him to Harper's Ferry. A few days later. Hunter detailed an 18 entire division to guard supply trains from partisans. After Sheridan took over, he attenpted to discourage the use of such large guards, with limited success. Trains usually had at least a regiment to guard them.

General Wesley Merritt received at least one order to provide a good-sized cavalry regiment to escort trains to the front and Crook 211

frequently had to provide a regiment to guard trains as far as

Charlestown. Even couriers occasionally received a regiment for 19 protection.

Moreover, as the caitç)aign progressed, the size of the guards

increased. The commanders in the rear responsible for forwarding

supplies to the front especially felt that larger guards were necessary.

Col. Oliver Edwards, commanding at Winchester, asserted that a train of

200 wagons needed a guard of at least 1500 men and sent out such a force with one early in October.General Stevenson at Harper's Ferry was worse. He reported sending forward a train of 560 wagons guarded by 2000 21 infantry and felt that this escort was too small. When Sheridan sent back 270 wagons with only 400 men as guards, Stevenson sent a dire warning both to him and to General Henry Halleck: "If General Sheridan continues his light guards the inevitable result must be the loss of a 22 train." This situation continued throughout the Valley canpaign. At one point the guerrilla threat seemed so great that Halleck suggested removing troops from the forts protecting Washington to guard trains, but this apparently did not occur. Nevertheless, the guerrillas tied down more Federal troops guarding supply lines than they had at any other time in the war. While such guards may have reduced the number of wagons lost, they did nothing toward ending the partisan menace.

The Fédérais also took steps to reduce their losses to bushwhacking.

Orders went out forbidding men to leave their cartçs in small parties or on pleasure trips, in order to provide the guerrillas with fewer targets.

General Merritt issued such an order to his cavalry brigades in August, 212 23 after the partisans captured several men close to his camps. Also, in

one effort to protect pickets from guerrilla attack, the officer in

charge directed them to build cribworks from fallen trees for defense

against cavalry. Furthermore, he had the picket conceal themselves,

placing a vedette near the road and the other four men within 200 yards.

Actual notice of the guerrillas' presence resulted in the addition of two men to each picket.In a more positive effort to eliminate some of the bushwhackers, Gen. James H. Wilson ordered the concealment of picked men in 25 some wagons, which he left in his rear as a decoy. Although no record of the results of this trap surfaced, probably it was no more successful than

\dien the Fédérais tried it on Mosby a year earlier. While the effectiveness of the other measures for reducing bushvdiacking losses also remains unknown, they presumably were insignificant.

One major shift in Union strategy, vdiich characterized Sheridan's anti-guerrilla caitçiaign, was a stronger policy of retaliation against both the civilians and the guerrillas themselves. General Grant initiated this view, vdien he sent Sheridan instructions in the middle of

August concerning the military situation;

The families of most of Mosby's men are known and can be collected. I think they should be taken and kept at Fort McHenry or some secure place, as hostages for the good conduct of Mosby and his men. Where any of Mosby's men are caught hang them without trial.

In a second letter. Grant expanded on this theme:

If you can possibly spare a division of cavalry, send them through Loudon County, to destroy and carry off the crops, animals, Negros, and all men under 50 years of age capable of bearing arms. In this way you will get many of Mosby's men. All male citizens under fifty can fairly be held as prisoners of war, and not as citizen prisoners. If not already soldiers, they will be made so the moment the rebel army gets hold of them. 213

By these two letters. Grant turned anti-guerrilla policy back to 1861.

He denied them the rights of combatants granted by Lieber and encouraged

their summary execution as outlaws. Furthermore, he recommended

destroying the partisans' base of support by treating virtually all male

civilians as synçathizers, arresting them, and destroying their property.

Although Grant later modified his views to the extent that he proposed

known Union men should suffer as little damage as possible, his desire to

deprive the Confederates of the Shenandoah's resources caused him to

encourage arbitrary destruction, thus making the guerrilla war in the

East more brutal.

Sheridan lost no time in putting Grant's suggestions into action.

The day after receiving the second letter, he issued a circular to his

arny directing the commanders to arrest "all able-bodied male citizens under the age of fifty...suspected of aiding, assisting or belonging to 28 guerrilla bands..." for confinement in Port McHenry. In the process of translating this circular into instructions for subordinate units, commanders frequently omitted the the citizens be suspected of association with guerrilla bands. Thus, in many instances the entire male populace faced incarceration, vdiich drove numbers of them to flee or to join the guerrillas.

One of the most extensive retaliations taken against civilians was the raid on Loudon County in December. Sheridan recognized this area as the heart of Mosby's support and hoped that by devastating it he would eliminate a large number of the partisans or at least reduce their threat by depriving Mosby of his base of operaLions. Sheridan's instructions to 214

General Merritt, v^.o commanded the operation, revealed how extensive the

destruction was to be:

You are hereby directed to proceed with the two brigades of your division now in canp...and operate against the guerrillas in the district of country bounded on the south by the line of the Manassas Gap Railroad as far east as White Plains, on the east by the Bull Run range, on the west by the Shenandoah River, and on the north by the Potomac you will consume and destroy all forage and subsistence, burn all barns and mills and their contents, and drive off all stock in the region This order must be literally executed, bearing in mind, however, that no dwellings are to be burned, and that no personal violence be offered to citizens. The ultimate result of the guerrilla system of warfare is the total destruction of all private rights in the country occupied by such parties. This destruction may as well commence at once, and the responsibility of it may rest upon the authorities at-Richmond, who have acknowledged the legitimacy of guerrilla bands.

Merritt meticulously carried out his orders. The Union cavalry

devastated the region like an all-consuming tornado, leaving little

behind them, except the houses. Merritt reported capturing or destroying

at least 5000 cattle, 3000 sheep, 1000 hogs and 500 horses.He could

not estimate the number of buildings or quantity of forage destroyed, but

the Reserve Brigade, which joined the raid halfway through the operation,

claimed to have destroyed 230 barns, eight mills, one distillery, 10,000

tons of hay, and 25,000 bushels of grain. The Brigade estimated that,

including captured livestock, it had inflicted over $400,000 worth of damage in two days time. Southern accounts agreed that the destruction was extensive.

The expedition's second goal of eliminating partisans proved less successful. Merritt reported that most of the guerrillas avoided all contact with his forces, by escaping into the mountains vdien spotted.

The Fédérais managed to kill or capture only about forty of them. Partisan accounts later revealed that they kept busy during the raid 32 concealing livestock and moving it to areas already devastated. The

raid also failed to drive the guerrillas out of the region. Instead it

increased their hatred toward the Fédérais, as well as the support of the

civilian populace. Therefore, Mosby's band remained intact and continued

to harass Sheridan's army.

The Federal also adopted the 'no-quarter' policy toward the guerrillas themselves. In orders to one of his brigade commanders.

General Merritt suggested that the brigade stir up and kill as many bushvdiackers as possible, in order to reduce their threat.As losses to the guerrillas increased, the soldiers adopted this advice enthusiastically. In one incident, a party of the 6th Michigan Cavalry arrested two men and a boy on suspicion of shooting a trooper of their regiment and burned the men's houses, which caused a quantity of concealed ammunition to explode. When the detachment commander asked for volunteers to shoot the men, the entire party came forward. The executions promptly took place, although the Fédérais released the boy unharmed. The commander later excused himself for not bringing the prisoners in by claiming that he feared a reprimand for doing so, thereby indicating that, at least in some Union circles, official policy preferred dead prisoners to live ones.^^ Undoubtedly a number of other roadside executions took place vrtiich did not receive such a candid explanation.

Sanction for such an attitude came from the highest government circles. In a letter to the commander at Martinsburg, the Secretary of 216

War, Edwin Stanton, suggested:

— any surplus force you may have should be used in routing out and destroying any gangs of guerrillas or robbers that may infest your vicinity. It may be possible that you can organize a small but efficient corps that may accoirplish much in destroying [them]___ If you can do so, you are at liberty to eitploy any means that may be within your power to acconplish that object, and vdien persons guilty of such transactions come within your power, you may deal with thgg as their crimes merit, without making any reports on the subject.

Stanton clearly was giving permission to deal with guerrillas in any

manner, including summary execution, without fear of censure. Such an

outlook at the top levels of command indicated that the Fédérais no

longer concerned themselves about the legalities of guerrilla warfare or

the rights due to suspects. Only the results in suppressing it counted.

Consequently, both official and unofficial executions of guerrillas

increased.

The two most notorious guerrilla killers in Sheridan's anty were

Brig. Gen. William H. Powell, commanding the 2nd Cavalry Division of the

A m y of West Virginia and Brig. Gen. George A. Custer, commanding a

cavalry brigade. Powell's record rested on his shooting of two

bush\diackers early in October in retaliation for the death of one of his

own soldiers, and the hanging of one of Mosby's men nine days later for

similar reasons. Custer, vdiose earlier activities showed his belief in

stern measures also tried and shot one bushvdiacker.^^ However, his most

noted feat was the execution of six of Mosby's men in one afternoon. On

September 23, a band of the Rangers attacked a Federal ambulance train,

only to find themselves trapped by a Union cavalry brigade \diich had been marching a short distance behind the wagons. The partisans lost eighteen 217

men as they cut their way out, as well as a number of prisoners. The

only reported Union loss was Lt. Charles McMaster, of the 2nd

U.S. Cavalry, vhom the guerrillas captured, robbed, and murdered,

according to Federal accounts. Custer had four of the prisoners shot and

two hanged in retaliation. The Fédérais placed a note on the bodies:

"This will be the fate of Mosby and all his men."^^ This action implied

that Sheridan's army had adopted a conplete no-quarter policy towards the

guerrillas.

Custer's action prompted Mosby to undertake some retaliation of his

own, vdiich effectively ended overt execution of guerrillas. Because he

was convalescing from a wound, Mosby had not participated in the attack

on the ambulance train, but as soon as he had recovered he announced his

intention to hang an equal number of Custer's men in order to warn the

Fédérais to treat his Rangers as regular combatants. Both General Lee 38 and Secretary of War James A. Seddon approved this response.

Accordingly, on November 6, Mosby forced a number of prisoners taken from

Custer's brigade, to draw lots to select seven of their number, then took

the losers close to the Union lines for execution. Two of the Fédérais

managed to escape, but the remainder were either hanged or shot and the 39 bodies left with a note explaining the reason for the killings. A few

days later, Mosby sent a message to Sheridan outlining the cause of his

actions and promising that future Federal prisoners would receive "the

kindness due to their condition, unless some new act of barbarity shall

compel me reluctantly to adopt a course of policy repulsive to humanity.Mosby was sending a clear warning that he would treat his ZJLO

prisoners the same way the Fédérais treated his own men. If the

partisans suffered execution, then so would a like number of Union

prisoners. Since the Fédérais would lose more heavily in a vrar of no

quarter, they curtailed their retaliations, for the records mentioned no

further e-^<^-tions of guerrillas in the Valley.

Another counterguerrilla tactic with which Sheridan experimented more successfully than his predecessors was the formation of special

anti-guerrilla units. Shortly after he assumed command, Sheridan

established a special band of scouts under Maj. Henry Young. Similar in concept to John Fremont's Jessie Scouts, these men roamed the Valley, often in Confederate uniforms, and gathered information about the

Southern forces. Their actual role against the guerrillas is unclear.

In his memoirs, Sheridan averred that they were useful in checking

Mosby's and Gilmor's forays, but did not explain how they did so.^^

Presumably, information they brought in about the guerrillas enabled the

Fédérais to strengthen defenses, plan counterattacks or undertake other measures vhich foiled the partisans. Although they gained a reputation for lawlessness, it seemed to have had less foundation than that of the

Jessie Scouts. They apparently maintained a reasonable amount of discipline and carried out their responsibilities conç>etently. Sheridan certainly was pleased with them and kept them in operation as long as he remained in the Valley.

At about the same time as he organized Young's Scouts, Sheridan also established a special anti-guerrilla unit, consisting of one hundred men under Capt. Richard Blazer, to deal specifically with Mosby. General ziy

Crook had created this force to suppress bushvAiackers in his district.

They proved so successful that he recommended Sheridan arm them with

Spencer repeaters and use them against Mosby.Sheridan accepted this

proposal, thereby producing one of the most effective anti-guerrilla

groups of the war.

Described as capable and resourceful. Blazer was an excellent

leader, but his background as an Indian fighter was the most important

talent he brought to his task. More than any previous commander, he applied Indian fighting tactics to the guerrillas. In the field, his

troop moved rapidly and stealthily, canping only after dark and moving 43 again before dawn, conducting patrols that usually lasted three days.

Such tactics enabled Blazer to concea] his movements from the guerrillas, thereby permitting him to surprise them. Moreover, Blazer established a rapport with the Valley inhabitants vAiich aided him in gathering information and contributed further to surprising the partisans. As one guerrilla later explained it:

Captain Blazer...by his humane and kindly treatment, in striking contrast with the usual conduct of our enemies, had so disarmed our citizens that instead of fleeing on his approach and notifying all soldiers, thus giving them a chance to escape, little notice was taken of him. Consequently, many of our.men were 'gobbled up' before they were aware of his presence.

Thus, Blazer proved that, in fighting an anti-guerrilla war, decent treatment of the local inhabitants was more effective than harsh retaliation against them. Unfortunately, this was a lesson that the

Union army as a \diole failed to understand.

Blazer's Scouts first battled Mosby on August 15, when they discovered a band of Rangers near the Shenandoah River and chased them 220

for three miles. The results of this first encounter were meager for the

rebels' only casualty was one prisoner captured. However, Blazer was

energetic and further expeditions rapidly nibbled away at the guerrillas.

A raid into Loudon County resulted in five partisans dead and three

prisoners. On September 4th, Blazer had his first significant encounter with Mosby's men, when he surprised a squadron of about seventy Rangers

resting near Myer's Ford on the Shenandoah River. Dismounting part of his force, he charged the canp and scattered the rebels. Some of them

resisted briefly, causing Blazer to report that the enemy "fought with a will, but the seven-shooters proved too much for them," thereby giving credit for the victory to his repeaters.He later claimed that Mosby lost thirteen men killed, six wounded, and five captured in this affair, including two officers, while he lost only one man killed and six wounded. The victory did not harm Mosby seriously, but it embarrassed him and gave the Rangers cause to respect their new opponent. It also boosted the confidence and morale of Blazer's men.

Following the Myer's Ford fight the Scouts and the Rangers had numerous skirmishes during September and October. Blazer reported that in these encounters "I have always defeated them, except twice.In both cases, the partisans surprised and annihilated small detachments of

Scouts. By the end of October, Blazer claimed to have killed forty-four guerrillas, wounded twelve, and captured twelve vhile losing only five men killed, seven wounded, and eight captured.Given the unit's sizf these results reflected favorably upon the Scouts' effectiveness. 221

In mid-November, Blazer had another major success when he surprised

a Ranger detachment under Capt. Robert C. Mountjoy near Berry's Ferry.

Again, most of the partisans, including “ountjoy, escaped, but Blazer

trapped a number of them in a farmhouse and overpowered them, killing

seven or eight. He also recovered the prisoners and horses that the 48 Rangers had captured.

Stung by this second defeat, Mosby detailed Maj. A. E. Richards with

100 men to settle Blazer once and for all. On November 18, Richards did

just that. Encountering the Scouts, noiv reduced to sixty-two men, near

Myerstown, Richards enticed them into charging him in an open field, then

struck both their flanks simultaneously. Outnumbered and overv^elmed,

the Scouts bolted, hotly pursued by the Rangers. Richards' men killed or 49 captured thirty-three of the Fédérais, including Blazer himself.

Blazer's Scouts ceased to exist from that time.

Given the success of Blazer's command, as evidenced by both his

reports of casualties inflicted and Mosby's detachment of a force

specifically to destroy him, the fact that Sheridan failed to create

additional anti-guerrilla units was surprising. Blazer had shown that a

conpetently led force, utilizing repeating weapons, Indian-fighting

tactics, and decent treatment of civilians, could inflict significant damage on the partisans. However, Sheridan never organized any similar units either before or after the Scouts' destruction, despite encouragement to do so. In particular. General Stevenson at Harper's

Ferry repeatedly proposed arming Cole's Maryland Cavalry with Spencers and utilizing them exclusively against Mosby. This unit, which needed 222

remounts, had performed competently against the partisans and knew the

area well, skills which promised to make them an effective

counter-guerrilla unit. Moreover, with 500 men. Cole's Cavalry offered a

formidable numerical strength against the guerrillas. Nevertheless,

Sheridan never responded to any of Stevenson's communications on the subject and the counterguerrilla war remained the same.

One reason for this failure might lie in Sheridan's ambivalent attitude towards the guerrillas. Much of the time he did not seem concerned about them at all and even evidenced some contempt for them.

Their threat increased inversely to the other dangers Sheridan faced and his desire to pursue a particular course of action. From August through

October, vdiile Early's anty was his main target, Sheridan gave the guerrillas little attention. In a letter to Grant shortly after he took command, he acknowledged that they were annoying, but he was quietly disposing of numbers of them.After Early's defeat at Cedar Creek, he observed that: "one good regiment could clear out [Mosby] any time, if the regimental commander had spunk enough to try.During the following two weeks Sheridan repeated this view twice more.

Despite this opinion, when Grant proposed that Sheridan push on up the Valley, destroy the Virginia Central Railroad and then join him at

Petersburg, Sheridan considered the guerrillas so formidable that they prevented the operation. Once he had destroyed Early's army, Sheridan felt that further penetration of the Valley had little military value and he could join Grant by a more roundabout route. Therefore, he argued 223

that he lacked supplies for the operation, that he would have to leave

too many troops behind to protect his communications and that his

intelligence indicated the Confederate were not moving any supplies on

the Virginia Central. In his memoirs, Sheridan averred that a further

advance would have necessitated opening the Orange and Alexandria

Railroad, which would have required too many guards and also he would

have had to leave Crook's command to protect the B&O, which would have 52 left him too weak to conduct operations. Sheridan also seemed

reluctant to transfer troops by sea from the Valley to Grant's a my until

he had settled the guerrilla problem. Halleck supported this view,

writing to Sheridan: "...before any cavalry is sent away, Mosby's band

should be broken up, as he is continually threatening our lines.

Thus, Sheridan claimed that the guerrillas prevented him from advancing

further or detaching troops to support Grant.

Admittedly, Sheridan's concerns about the threat to his supply lines

were valid, but he weakened his arguments by a letter to Halleck, just

before Merritt's raid on Loudon County. In it, Sheridan stated:

Heretofore I have made no effort to break [Mosby] up, as I would have enployed ten men to his one, and for the reason that I have made a scape-goat of him for the destruction of private rights--- Mosby has annoyed me considerably, but the peopleware beginning to see that he does not injure me a great deal,___

Furthermore, in his postwar report of the campaign, Sheridan claimed that he did not operate against the guerrillas because he thought them " a benefit to me, as they prevented straggling and kept ity trains well closed up, and discharged such other duties as would have required a 55 provost guard of at least two regiments of cavalry." By these 224

statements, Sheridan thus revealed that he did not see the guerrillas as

a serious problem, but used them as an excuse for pursuing Grant's policy

of devastation, as well as for avoiding operations he did not wish to

undertake.

Nevertheless, Sheridan did exhibit strong hostility towards the

guerrillas vdien their actions touched him personally. In such cases, he was likely to retaliate against any targets close to the incident without

any thought of mercy. The most conspicuous example was the death of his

topographical engineer, Lt. John R. Meigs, the son of the Quartermaster

General of the Army, Montgomery C. Meigs. On October 3rd, a small party of guerrillas encountered Meigs with some conpanions and killed him.

Both sides gave different accounts of the affair. The Confederates claimed that Meigs fired on them, and they shot him in self-defense. His conpanions asserted that the guerrillas shot Meigs in cold blood after he surrendered. Unsurprisingly, Sheridan and General Meigs believed the latter version. In response to Meig's murder, Sheridan ordered Custer to burn all houses within five miles of the site. However, after Custer had burned only a few homes, Sheridan countermanded his orders and instead directed him to arrest all able-bodied males in the area.^^ This reversal apparently resulted, at least in part, from a request from one of the units involved to spare the village of Dayton, \diich lay within the proscribed area.^^ Thus vdiile Sheridan's vengeance was not as great as it might have been, he did react strongly when the guerrillas struck close to him. 225

Meig's death and subsequent events aroused brief concern in Sheridan

about the guerrilla problem. Shortly after the incident, he conplained

to Grant that "Since I came the the Valley, from Harper's Ferry up to

Harrisonburg, every train, every small party, and every straggler has

been bushwhacked by people, many of whom have protection papers from

CO commanders vdio have hitherto been in the valley." When, shortly

afterwards, guerrillas further depleted his staff by killing his Chief

Quartermaster, Lt. Col. Cornelius W. Tolies and his Medical Inspector,

Emil Ohlenschlager, Sheridan observed that the partisans were becoming

annoying and the only way to eliminate them was to burn out the whole 59 country. However, he apparently did not put any special anti-guerrilla measures into practice as a result of this concern. Instead he soon

reverted to his previous contempt for the partisan threat. Only long after the war in his memoirs, did Sheridan acknowledge that the guerrillas were a significant problem because they necessitated large escorts for supply trains and thereby depleted combat troops.During the actual cançaign, he generally considered them a nuisance that was not worth a significant effort.

As mentioned earlier, one of the most significant problems the

Fédérais faced concerning the guerrillas was reopening and protecting the

Manassas Gap Railroad. Running from Manassas to Strasburg, this line had been closed for the past year, but since it seemed to offer a better route to supply and communicate with Sheridan, the Union high command resolved to reopen it. Since it passed through an active guerrilla area, the Fédérais realized that the railroad would need extensive protective 226

measures. They had no premonition of how extensive the requirement would

be.

Work began on the Manassas Gap line on October 3 and quickly ran

into trouble. On October 5, Mosby, who made keeping the railroad closed

his top priority, shelled the work train with two howitzers. When a

force of 200 Union cavalry advanced to drive the attackers off, the

Rangers ambushed them and took fifty prisoners. Immediately afterwards,

Mosby wrecked two trains, thus blocking the road tenporarily.^^ These

actions marked the beginning of an intensive guerrilla campaign of wrecking locomotives, tearing up track, and sniping at work crews.

The Fédérais inaugurated several measures to combat this threat.

First, they forwarded more cavalry to protect the work crews, which had little effect. In addition, the Fédérais constructed stockades along the entire length of track to serve as guardposts. They had no major impact either. The railroad superintendent proposed placing thirty guards on each train and running three trains in convoys for security. He estimated that this procedure would require 590 men per day for six 62 convoys. However, no record exists of whether he received the

troops or put the convoy plan into effect. If he did, it failed.

The Fédérais' next tactics were to apply hostages and a scorched earth policy along the railroad line. On October 11, Halleck approved a suggestion by General Auger to secure prominent secessionists on the trains to protect them.^^ The next day, he circulated additional instructions : 227

The Secretary of War directs that in retaliation for the murderous acts of guerrilla bands, coirçosed of and assisted by the inhabitants along the Manassas Gap Railroad, and as a measure necessary to keep that road in running order, you proceed to destroy every house within five miles of the road which is not required for our own purposes, or v^ich is not occupied by persons known to be friendly. All males suspected of belonging to, or assisting, the robber bands of Mosby, will be sent, under guard, to the provost-marshal at Washington, to be confined in the Old Capital prison Forage, animals, and grain will be taken for the use of the United States. All timber and brush within musketry fire of the road will be cut down and destroyed. Printed notices will be circulated and posted that any citizens found within five miles of the road hereafter, will be considered as robbers and bushvdiackers, and be treated accordingly.... The inhabitants of the country will be notified that for any further hostilities committed on this road or its employees an additional strip of ten miles on each side w i l l ^ ^ laid waste, and that section of the country entirely depopulated.

This order showed that the Fédérais were taking extreme measures similar

to ones used in Missouri to protect the railroad from guerrillas.

Unfortunately, these measures also proved ineffective. Auger had to

delay his plan to put hostages on trains, \Aen the local citizens fled

upon learning of the impending arrests.®^ When he finally began doing

so, derailments ceased but other attacks continued. Moreover, the

Confederate government directed that "...if any of our citizens are

exposed on any captured train signal vengeance should be taken on all

conductors and officers found on it, and every male passenger of the

enemy's country should be treated as prisoners.The devastation of

the surrounding region, even though the Fédérais extended it to ten miles, caused no reduction in guerrilla depredations. If anything, it

increased support for the guerrillas among the populace. Ultimately

therefore, the Union high command abandoned the effort to reopen the

Manassas Gap Railroad. Thus the partisans foiled the establishment of a 228

new Federal supply line and thereby achieved one of their most

significant successes of the war.

The Fédérais had similar problems, but better success, in restoring

the railroad between Harper's Ferry and Winchester. Again, the purpose

was to ease Sheridan's supply difficulties. Using materials from the

Manassas Gap Railroad, workers began rebuilding the Winchester road late

in the Fall, To keep the guerrillas from interfering with the work,

Sheridan allocated a cavalry brigade to guard the crews, after General

Stevenson at Harper's Ferrj' complained that he lacked the necessary

manpower for guards, which he estimated at an infantry regiment and 500

cavalry. Nevertheless, the workers felt unprotected until Sheridan added

an infantry brigade to their guards,

Stevenson's concern about protecting the supply trains led him to advise Sheridan thoroughly on defending the railroad. He proposed garrisoning completed portions of the line to prevent the guerrillas from destroying it. He also advised stationing forces at Halltown,

Charlestown, Cameron, Summit Point, Opequon Bridge and Stephenson's Depot to protect the road vAien conpleted. He thought 3,000 men sufficient to ensure its safety, and that "the [wagon] train guards that will be saved will be more than an equivalent for this force,Sheridan ultimately followed this advice. Garrison sites sprang up along the line and four regiments of infantry received orders to occupy them. In addition, Sheridan circulated a warning among the local citizens threatening retaliation if partisans attacked the railroad: 229

In case the railroad to Winchester is interfered with by guerrillas...arrest all male sucessionists in Charleston?!, Shepherdstown, Smithfield, and Berryville, and in the adjacent country, sending them to Fort McHenry, Md. You will also burn all grain, destroy all subsistence and drive off all stock, belonging to such individuals, and turn it over to the Treasury Department.

These guards and warnings proved effective, for the Winchester Railroad

did not suffer severe attacks like those on the Manassas Gap line.

However, by tying down two brigades of Federal troops, plus the garrison

regiments, the guerrillas weakened Sheridan's a my and thereby gained

another victory.

while Sheridan cleaned out the Shenandoah Valley, guerrilla problems

in West Virginia seemed to grow worse. This situation largely resulted

from the fact that Sheridan and his predecessors had stripped the region

of available troops, especially cavalry, to augment the field army,

thereby leaving it open for guerrilla incursions. Consequently, local

commanders and citizens bombarded General Benjamin Kelley with complaints

about increasing guerrilla outrages and the lack of protection from them.

Kelley in his turn attempted to do his best with what he had and blamed

his failures on lack of cavalry. He could not stop guerrilla raids

because he lacked cavalry to pursue them. When one of his efforts to

trap McNeill's band failed, Kelley cited insufficient cavalry as the

reason. A force of 200 cavalry under Col. George R. Latham had

surrounded Moorfield, McNeill's headquarters, only to find the guerrillas

canped outside their line and thus able to escape with a loss of only

eight men captured. Kelley felt that additional cavalry would have blocked the partisans' retreat.However, the only formal conplaint he made occurred when Sheridan removed the troops guarding the Cheat River 230

Pass, which, in Kelley's view "exposed the people of West Virginia to the

incursions of guerrillas and robbers,but nothing came of this

remonstration.

Because of the situation, in early September Kelley reported that

small guerrilla bands infested the country belov: Charleston and

Parkersburg and directed his subordinates to provide all possible 72 protection to that area. The Fédérais did their best, but no major

anti-guerrilla effort took place in the region until after Early's

annihilation in October, vdien Crook returned to West Virginia. At the

end of the month, he attençted inplementing Sheridan's retaliatory policy by ordering all subsistence destroyed and livestock driven off in bushvdiacker areas throughout the Kanavdia Valley.This action quieted

the guerrillas for a time, but by December, their activity had resumed sufficiently for Kelley to direct scouting parties to "either kill, capture or drive out of the country the guerrillas and horse thieves that now infest that region.Nevertheless, the problem remained a relatively minor one of dealing with small, independent guerrilla bands vdio raided civilians and had no impact on major Union military operations.

During this period. Hanse McNeill continued to dominate the guerrilla war in West Virginia, and Kelley still devoted most of his attention to exterminating him, with no success. The numerous patrols and raiding parties Kelley sent out failed to capture or kill the partisan. Early in October, however the problem resolved itself, vdien 231

one of McNeill's own men shot him during a raid, and he died five weeks

later.His son Jesse assumed leadership of the band, which dimmed

Kelley's undoubted joy at the news, but Jesse lacked his father's

leadership ability and experience. Although the unit continued to

operate, McNeill's death left it a less effective force and thus less of

a threat.

McNeill was not the only prominent partisan casualty during the latter months of 1864. In December, Mosby suffered his second wound of

the year and most serious one of the ^ r . A force of cavalry consisting of the 13th and 16th New York Regiments, vhich were part of another

Federal sweep through Loudon County and already had captured seven of

Mosby's men, stumbled across Mosby himself dining with a local family.

One of the troopers spotted a Confederate moving inside the house, fired his revolver through the window and hit Mosby in the abdomen. Mosby, however, concealed his identity, and the Union comitiander, vAo believed the wound was mortal, left him to die. By the time the Federal discovered his mistake, friends had removed Mosby to safety. On the failure to bring Mosby in, the Union brigade commander commented:

I exceedingly regret that such a blunder was made. I have given directions that all wounded officers and men of the enemy be hereafter brought in, although I thought any officer oughtgto have brains and common sense enough to do so without an order.

Nevertheless, the Fédérais took great satisfaction from the news.

Sheridan emphatically claimed Mosby was dead or dying, despite more 77 cautious pronouncements from his subordinates. Unfortunately for him and the Union, Mosby survived and returned to active duty. However, he took over two months to recover, so that by the time he resumed operations in March 1865, the war was nearly over. The wound therefore

effectively limited the Rangers' activities until too late for them to

have any further significant effect.

In addition to McNeill and Mosby, ttie guerrillas suffered numerous other losses throughout the last half of 1864. Union patrols and raiding parties continued to inflict casualties and bring back prisoners, \diich whittled away at the partisan strength. For example, the Loudon Rangers captured four of Mosby's men during a skirmish in August, v^iile a few 78 days later another Union scouting party brought in fifty prisoners.

When guerrillas captured part of Crook's ambulance train. Federal troops counterattacked, took five prisoners and inflicted an unspecified number

7 9 of casualties. On October 28, the 8th Illinois Cavalry captured fifteen of Mosby's men, then killed seven and captured nine more the 80 following day. Sheridan frequently reported to Grant his successes in reducing the partisans. On August 22 he claimed to have disposed of 81 quite a number of Mosby's men. Three weeks later he reported: "We have exterminated 3 officers and 27 men of Mosby's gang in the last 82 twelve days." When coupled with other losses already mentioned, such casualties represented an increasing drain on the partisan strength, even granting the fact that a substantial number of the prisoners probably were not guerrillas at all. With McNeill and Mosby both gone and their numbers diminishing, the guerrillas offered a significantly lesser threat than they had at the start of the canpaign. 233

The guerrillas had a greater effect on major Union operations during

1864 than at any other time during the war. Their attacks on supply

trains helped to terminate Hunter's canpaign and to discourage Sheridan

from pushing up the Shenandoah Valley to join Grant. The greater

ruthlessness of Federal responses to the guerrillas indicated the

importance of their activities, as did the large train guards and the

constant concern over Mosby evidenced in the Federal correspondence. Yet

none of the Federal efforts succeeded in breaking up any of the guerrilla

bands. Nevertheless, the partisans did not prevent the destruction of

Early's army or the devastation of the Shenandoah Valley. Furthermore,

the end of the year found them in a serious situation. The Confederate

government's backing had deteriorated to cover only Mosby and McNeill,

vhich restricted the assistance they received and the protection they got

for their status as combatants. Their base of support among the civilian population had shrunk as citizens fled the area, suffered arrest or

recognized the inevitability of Union victory. Constant attrition had

reduced their numbers. Of their major leaders, McNeill was dead, Mosby

severely wounded and Gilmor in semi-disgrace, which limited the effectiveness of their actions. While the Fédérais could not take credit for all these catastrophes, their aggressive counterguerrilla measures had contributed significantly to the overall situation. Their special anti-guerrilla units, constant patrolling and sweeps through partisan territory had reduced the guerrillas' numbers and support. Although the guerrilla problem continued to exist, by the end of the year Union commanders evidenced less concern over it. The partisans no longer had the capability to affect the war's outcome. 234

Chapter VII Notes

1. General Orders No. 240, War Department Adjutant General's Office, 7 August 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLIII, Pt. 1, p. 719.

2. Edward J. Stackpole, Sheridan in the Shenandoah; Jubal Early's Nemesis. (New York; Bonanza Books, 1983), pp. 148-149; Abstract of Return of Middle Military Division, August 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLIII, Pt. 1, p. 974.

3. Jones, Gray Ghosts, pp. 275-276.

4. Record of Board of Inquiry, 8 September - 4 October 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLIII, Pt. 1, pp. 619-632; Maj. Gen. P. H. Sheridan to Major General Halleck, 19 August 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLIII, Pt. 1, p. 842; W. h . Taylor to Gen. R. E. Lee, 15 August 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLIII, Pt. 1, p. 1000.

5. Maj. Gen. P. H. Sheridan to Maj. Gen. H. W. Halleck, 8 September 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLIII, Pt. 1, p. 23-24.

6. Brig. Gen. John D. Stevenson to Edwin M. Stanton, 14 October 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLIII, Pt. 2, p. 368; Jones, Gray Ghosts, p. 313.

7. Col. 0. Edwards to Lt. Col. James W. Forsyth, 25 October 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLIII, Pt. 1, p. 186; Jones, Gray Ghosts, p. 319.

8. Report of Col. O. Edwards, 24 September 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLIII, Pt. 1, pp. 183-184.

9. Brig. Gen. T. H. Neill to Edwin M. Stanton, 30 September 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLIII, Pt. 2, p. 222; Brig. Gen. W. H. Seward to Brigadier General Stevenson, 8 October 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLIII, Pt. 2, p. 321.

10. T. H. Taylor to Assistant Adjutant General, Headquarters of Army, 14 October 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLIII, Pt. 2, p. 365.

11. Brig. Gen. John D. Stevenson to E. M. Stanton, 27 September 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLIII, Pt. 2, p. 189; Stevenson to Stanton, 14 October 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLIII, Pt. 2, p. 368.

12. Brig. Gen. John D. Stevenson to Major General Halleck, 16 October 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLIII, Pt. 2, p. 390. 235

13. Brig. Gen. John D. Stevenson to Maj. Gen. P. H. Sheridan, 16 October 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLIII, Pt. 2, p. 390-392.

14. Brig. Gen. John D. Stevenson to Brig. Gen. W. W. Averell, 16 August 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, vol. XLIII, Pt. 1, pp. 820-821; Will Rumsey to Brig. Gen. J. D. Stevenson, 17 August 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLIII, Pt. 1, p. 828.

15. Lt. Col. James W. Forsyth to Maj. Gen. C. C. Augur, 18 August 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLIII, Pt. 1, p. 831; S. F. Adams to Capt. D. M. Keyes, 23 September 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLIII, Pt. 2, p. 160; Col. H. M. Lazelle to Lt. Col. J. H. Taylor, 5 September 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLIII, Pt. 2, p. 30.

16. Brig. Gen. J. H. Wilson to Brigadier General Chapman, 12 September 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLIII, Pt. 2, p. 74.

17. Col. H. S. Gansevoort to Major General Augur, 15 October 1864, Official Records. Ser, I, Vol. XLIII, Pt. 1, p. 618-619; Maj. John M. Waite to Maj. C. H. Raymond, 21 September 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLIII, Pt. 2, p. 132,

18. Maj. Gen. D. Hunter to Brigadier General Crook, 15 July 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXXVII, Pt. 2, p. 342; Orders, Headquarters 6th and 19th Corps, 21 July 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XXXVII, Pt. 2, p. 412.

19. William Russell to General Merritt, 8 September 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLIII, Pt. 2, p. 52; Lt. Col. James W. Forsyth to Major General Crook, 9 September 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, vol. XLIII, Pt. 2, p. 59; C. Kingsbury to Major General Crook, 15 September 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLIII, Pt. 2, p. 91; Starr, Union Cavalry, 2:253.

20. Col. 0. Edwards to Lt. Col. C. W. Tolies, 6 October 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLIII, Pt. 2, p. 304.

21. Brig. Gen. John D. Stevenson to E. M. Stanton, 6 October 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLIII, Pt. 2, p. 303.

22. Brig. Gen. John D. Stevenson to Major General Halleck, 16 October 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLIII, Pt. 2, p. 390.

23. Circular, Headquarters 1st Cavalry Division, 19 August 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLIII, Pt. 1, p. 847.

24. Col. H. M. Lazelle to Captain Lord, 1 September 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLIII, Pt. 2, pp. 5-6. 236

25. L. Seibert to Brigadier General McIntosh, 16 August 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLIII, Pt. 1, p. 818.

26. Lt. Gen. U. S. Grant to Major General Sheridan, 16 August 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLIII, Pt. 1, p. 811.

27. Ibid.

28. Circular, Headquarters Middle Military Division, 19 August 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLIII, Pt. 1, p. 843.

29. Lt. Col. James W. Forsyth to Maj. Gen. Wesley Merritt, 27 November 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLIII, Pt. 1, pp. 55-56.

30. Maj. Gen. Wesley Merritt to Colonel Forsyth, 3 December 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLIII, Pt. 2, p. 730.

31. Lt. Col. Casper Crownrnshreld to Maj. A. E . Dana, n.d., Offrcral Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLIII, Pt. 1, p. 673.

32. Jones, Gray Ghosts, p. 341.

33. Brig. Gen. V. Merritt to Colonel Di Cesnola, 20 August 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLIII, Pt. 1, p. 864-865.

34. 1st Lt. H. H. Chipman to Capt. C. H. Safford, 26 October 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLIII, Pt. 2, p. 470.

35. Edwin M. Stanton to Brig. Gen. William H. Seward, 6 October 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLIII, Pt. 2, p. 305.

36. Brig. Gen. W. H. Powell to Maj. William Russell, 27 October 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLIII, Pt. 1, p. 506-511; Starr, Union Cavalry, 2:345.

37. Starr, Union Cavalry, 2:346.

38. Lt. Col. John S. Mosby to Gen. R. E. Lee, 29 October 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLIII, Pt. 2, p. 909-910.

39. Starr, Union Cavalry, 2:346-347; Siepel, Rebel, pp. 120-121, 128-130.

40. Lt. Col. John S. Mosby to Maj. Gen. P. H. Sheridan, 11 November 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLIII, Pt. 2, p. 920.

41. P. H. Sheridan, Personal Memoirs of P. H. Sheridan, Vol. II, (New York; Charles L. Webster & Co., 1888). p. 2; Richard P. Weinert, "Maj. Henry Young - a Profile", Civil War Times Illustrated, Vol. 3, No. 1, i^ril 1964, p. 39; Jones, Gray Ghosts, p. 288. 237

42. Schmitt, Crook Autobiography, p. 135; Jeffry D. Wert, "In One Deadly Encounter", Civil War Times Illustrated, Vol. 19, No. 7, November 1980. p. 14.

43. Wert, "Deadly Encounter", p. 15.

44. Ibid., p. 17.

45. Capt. Richard Blazer to Captain Bier, 4 September 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLIII, Pt. 1, p. 615.

46. Capt. Richard Blazer to Assistant Adjutant General Army of West Virginia, 24 October 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLIII, Pt. 1, p. 616.

47. Ibid.

48. Wert, "Deadly Encounter", p. 17.

49. Maj. Gen. P. H. Sheridan to Major General Halleck, 21 November 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLIII, Pt. 2, p. 654; Wert, "Deadly Encounter", pp. 18-19.

50. Maj. Gen. P. H. Sheridan to Lieutenant General Grant, 19 August 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLIII, Pt. 1, p. 841.

51. Maj. Gen. P. H. Sheridan to Major General Halleck, 27 October 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLIII, Pt. 2, p. 475.

52. Sheridan, Memoirs, 2:54.

53. Maj. Gen. K. W. Halleck to Major General Sheridan, 26 November 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLIII, Pt. 2, p. 671.

54. Maj. Gen. P. H. Sheridan to Maj. Gen.H. W. Halleck, 26 November 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLIII, Pt. 2, pp. 671-672.

55. Maj. Gen. P. H. Sheridan to Maj. Gen. John A. Rawlins, 3 February 1866, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLIII, Pt. 1, p. 55.

56. Sheridan, Memoirs, 2:51-52.

57. Jones, Gray Ghosts, p. 305.

58. Maj. Gen. P. H. Sheridan to Lt. Gen. U. S. Grant, 7 October 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLIII, Pt. 2, p. 308.

59. Maj. Gen. P. H. Sheridan to Lieutenant General Grant, 11 October 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLIII, Pt. 1, p. 32.

60. Sheridan, Memoirs, 2:99. 238

61. Jones, Gray Ghosts, pp. 29S-301.

62. M. J. McCrickett to Brig. Gen. D. C. McCallum, 7 October 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLIII, Pt. 2, p. 312; Maj. Gen. C. C. Augur to Major General Halleck, 10 October 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLIII, Pt. 2, p. 334-335; Stackpole, Sheridan, p. 374.

63. Maj. Gen. H. W. Halleck to Major General Augur, 11 October 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLIII, Pt. 2, p. 341.

64. Maj. Gen. H. W. Halleck to Brigadier General McCallum, 12 October 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLIII, Pt. 2, p. 348.

65. Maj. Gen. C. C. Augur to Maj. Gen. H. W. Halleck, 12 October 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLIII, Pt. 2, p. 347.

66. J. A. Seddon to the Adjutant General, 14 November 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLIII, Pt. 2, p. 910.

67. Brig. Gen. Jolm. D. Stevenson to Maj. Gen. P. H. Sheridan, 2 November 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLIII, Pt. 2, p. 529; Maj. Gen. H. W. Halleck to Major General Sheridan, 9 November 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLIII, Pt. 2, p. 582; Jones, Gray Ghosts, pp. 321,334.

68. Brig. Gen. John D. Stevenson to Maj. Gen. P. H. Sheridan, 2 November 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLIII, Pt. 2, p. 529.

69. Maj. Gen. P. H. Sheridan to Brigadier General Stevenson, 7 November 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLIII, Pt. 2, p. 565.

70. Robert P. Kennedy to Maj. Gen. George Crook, 11 November 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLIII, Pt. 2, p. 606; B. F. Kelley to Capt. R. P. Kennedy, 12 November 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLIII, Pt. 2, p. 615.

71. Brig. Gen. B. F. Kelley to Brigadier General Averell, 11 August 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLIII, Pt. 1, p. 771.

72. Brig. Gen. A. N. Duffie to Major General Crook, 7 September 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLIII, Pt. 2, p. 48; Headquarters Department of West Virginia to Brig. Gen. A. N. Duffie, 9 September 1864, Departments, RG 393.

73. Maj. Gen. George Crook to Col. J. H. Oley, 30 October 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLIII, Pt. 2, pp. 496-497.

74. Capt. T. Melvin to Capt. Clarence E. Irwin, 10 December 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLIII, Pt. 2, p. 775.

75. Jones, Gray Ghosts, pp. 305-307. 239

76. Kaj. Douglas Frazar to Col. William Gamble, 31 December 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLIII, Pt. 2, p. 844.

77. Maj. Gen. P. K. Sheridan to General Emory, 31 December 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLIII, Pt. 2, p. 844.

78. Col. N. P. Chipman to Edivin M. Stanton, 20 August 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLIII, Pt. 1, pp. 858-859; Maj. John M. Waite to Lt. Col. J. H. Taylor, 22 August 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, vol. XLIII, Pt. 1, p. 882.

79. Brig. Gen. John D. Stevenson to E. M. Stanton, 5 September 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLIII, Pt. 2, pp. 33-34.

80. Maj. Gen. C. C. Augur to Maj. Gen. H. W. Halleck, 29 October 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLIII, Pt. 2, p. 488; Maj. Gen. C. C. Augur to Major General Halleck, 30 October 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLIII, Pt. 2, p. 494.

81. Maj. Gen. P. H. Sheridan to Lt. Gen. U. S. Grant, 22August 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLIII, Pt. 1, p. 880.

82. Maj. P. H. Sheridan to Lieutenant General Grant, 11 September 1864, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLIII, Pt. 2, p. 69. CHAPTER VIII:

Gray Ghosts in the Sunset

As the war entered its final months in January 1865, the Union

forces in northern Virginia and West Virginia faced a much diminished

threat. Jubal Early's Confederate army had shrunk almost to

non-existence, and the few other regular Southern forces in the region

were too weak to mount any major danger to Federal control. With the

devastated Shenandoah Valley permanently pacified. General Philip

Sheridan's troops prepared to rejoin the Army of the Potomac for its

final campaigns. Although the guerrillas still roamed the region, they

too were less prevalent. While John Mosby recovered from his wound, his

Rangers split up in order to find subsistence. Mosby returned to active duty only a few weeks before the war ended and performed no spectacular exploits in his final operations. Harry Gilmor quickly disappeared into a Federal prison, vhere he remained until the war ended. In West

Virginia, Jesse McNeill gained the last major guerrilla success, vhen he captured two Union generals in one raid, but this achievement had no effect on Federal activity. With increasingly fewer men and less popular support, the guerrilla raids became smaller and their impact correspondingly decreased. In fact. Union commanders showed little concern about the guerrillas until after the Confederate capitulation at

Appomattox, \dien they addressed the issue of how to get them to surrender and what policy to adopt towards partisans who continued to fight. In

240 241

contrast to previous years, the guerrilla problem in 1865 was minor,

which demonstrated firm Union control over the situation.

The guerrillas' poor performance during the winter eirphasized their

weakness. They conducted few raids in conparison to previous years and

had scant success on them. The departure of refugees from the Shenandoah

Valley following its devastation probably deprived the partisans of

assistance and information, thereby contributing to the ineffectiveness

of their operations. The Fédérais lost a handful of men wounded or prisoners, a few wagons captured and some trains derailed, but such

trifling incidents caused little alarm. With their major leaders neutralized, the partisans seemed to have lost their incentive for the war. McNeill's men did virtually nothing, vhile when some of Mosby's troopers attacked a hay train, a target they would have overwhelmed easily in the past, the guards' fire drove them off with minor casualties of only three men wounded.^ Such results were typical of the guerrillas' attacks.

The only significant Confederate success came not from the guerrillas, but from General Thomas L. Rosser's regular forces. On

January 11, Rosser surprised and captured the Federal garrison at 2 Beverly, West Virginia, taking 580 prisoners. Even this victory had little significance. Sheridan subsequently described the damage as minor and claimed that he had recommended abandoning the post earlier because it served no purpose except bait for the eneny.^ Its loss certainly caused no major concern among the Federal commanders, nor did Rosser offer any threat to other Union forces. 242

The Fédérais actually scored the first major victory in the new

year's guerrilla war, Wien they captured Harry Gilmor, the last major

partisan leader, early in February. Concerned over the lackluster

performance of the guerrillas in West Virginia, General Early had ordered

Gilmor to take command of all partisans in the area around Moorfield,

which included two major bands, Jesse McNeill's and one led by a man

named Blake Woodson. Gilmor was to coordinate the activities of these

forces, particularly against the B&O Railroad, as well as increase the

effectiveness of their operations.^ First, however, he had to overcome

their refusal to obey his orders, which required time that ultimately he

did not have.

Union scouts knew of Gilmor's movement to Moorfield and reported it

to General Sheridan, Wio devised a plan to capture the partisan leader.

On February 4, he sent Maj. Henry Young with some of his scouts disguised

as Confederates to infiltrate the town and seize Gilmor. To lend

credence to Young's appearance, as well as provide support against the

guerrillas, 300 Connecticut cavalry under Lt. Col. Edward W. Whitaker

"pursued" the scouts to Moorfield.

The plan worked to perfection. Although Gilmor had moved his living quarters. Young's men tracked him to two houses south of town, racing ahead of guerrilla riders to prevent the alarm from spreading. Dividing his men to search both houses. Young entered one of them, discovered

Gilmor and his cousin asleep in the bedroom and took him prisoner with no

resistance. The Connecticut cavalry then came up. Young placed Gilmor in their midst and the entire expedition headed back to Winchester. Aroused 243

partisans attacked the column several times, but the rear guard, armed

with Spencer repeating rifles, drove them off. Gilmor also made a number

of attenpts to escape, but the alert Fédérais foiled them all. Reaching

Winchester without incident, Young and Whitaker handed over Gilmor, as

well as twelve other prisoners taken during the operation. The Fédérais

subsequently inprisoned Gilmor in Fort Warren in Boston, where he

remained until after the war.^

Gilmor's capture not only removed a noted partisan leader from the

war, but also threatened the guerrillas' very existence. Already

disgusted with them, General Early saw the incident as further proof of

their ineffectiveness. He had written to General Lee requesting the

revocation of McNeill's exemption from the act abolishing partisan

rangers because of his refusal to obey Gilmor's orders. Early further

condemned all such units on the old grounds that they adversely effected

regular troops:

...all those independent organizations, not excepting Mosby's, are injurious to us, and the occasional dashes they make do not condensate for the disorganization and dissatisfaction produced among the other troops.

Lee approved the proposal concerning McNeill's Rangers and forwarded it

to the Secretary of War for action.^ Gilmor's capture caused substantial

support for the idea, because many Confederates blamed it on McNeill's

failure to obey orders.

Ironically, McNeill and his men were responsible for their own

salvation. For some time, Jesse McNeill had desired to take General

Benjamin Kelley prisoner in retaliation for the letter's arrest and 244

iirçrisonment of his mother in Ohio in 1862. Hanse McNeill originally had

planned such a raid, but never had a chance to inplement it. Now,

smarting under the criticism for Gilmor's capture, Jesse attempted the

operation. Utilizing the services of men in his command vrtio came from

the area, he led approximately sixty men towards Kelley's headquarters at

Cumberland, Maryland. In addition to Kelley, the partisans planned to

capture his immediate superior, Maj. Gen. George Crook, now commander of

the Department of West Virginia, also headquartered at Cumberland.

McNeill's plan worked perfectly. On February 26, dressed in Union overcoats and posing as Federal scouts, the raiders overran two picket posts, acquired the guards' countersign, and entered Cumberland unheralded. Maintaining their deception, two detachments entered the hotels occupied by Crook and Kelley, awakened the generals, and took them prisoner. Other bands quietly rounded up horses and destroyed the telegraph office. Then McNeill's men departed, bluffing their way past more pickets posing as General Crook's bodyguard, thereby revealing an ironic sense of humor. Furthermore, the partisans had acted so quietly that they were beyond the outermost picket posts before the Fédérais discovered the theft. Therefore, the pursuing cavalry failed to overtake

O McNeill, although it captured three of his rearguard.

This exploit restored McNeill to favor with the Confederate authorities. The kidnapping of two Union generals from their headquarters topped any other guerrilla feat of the war and changed the criticism of McNeill's men to admiring praise. Mosby, vho still was 245

convalescing in Richmond, met the raiders there and acknowledged that

they had surpassed his capture of General Stoughton. Only by bringing 9 Lincoln out of Washington could he top them. Crook himself supposedly

called it "the most brilliant exploit of the war.

In actuality, however, the raid was only a romantic incident that had no practical effect. Granted, it ended efforts to disband the

remaining partisan units, but at this late stage in the war, the

Confederate government's ability to enforce such legislation was questionable. Already l a r g e l y dependent on their own resources, the partisans at worst would have suffered the loss of their legitimacy and the protection it afforded them. The capture of Crook and Kelley did not enhance the guerrillas' effectiveness, as proven by the fact that the partisans performed no other significant exploits during the war's remaining months. After their moment of glory, McNeill and his Rangers virtually disappeared from the records.

Neither did the incident significantly effect Federal operations.

Maj. Gen. Winfield Scott Hancock, formerly one of the best corps commanders in the Army of the Potomac, replaced Crook as departmental commander of West Virginia and carried out his responsibilities with conpetence and success. The counterguerrilla war continued unabated, as did regular operations by the field armies. Thus, any potential disruptions that elimination of the two men might have caused failed to occur.

The capture, however, did mark the end of Crook's and Kelley's careers as counterguerrilla commanders. The Confederates paroled both 246

men after two weeks inçrisonment in Richmond and quickly exchanged them

for General Isaac R. Trimble.However, Secretary of War Edwin

M. Stanton, annoyed at the whole affair, wanted to muster both of them 12 out of the service "for gross negligence and as an exanple." Due to

his desire to retain Crook, Grant prevented this action. Nevertheless,

vmen Crook attempted to reassume command of the Department of West

Virginia, Hancock, having received no official notice of the change,

promptly arrested him. Grant again intervened and summoned Crook to

command the Army of the Potomac's cavalry.Thus Crook participated in

the final extinction of Lee's army and after the war made a distinguished

career for himself as an Indian fighter. The command capabilities he had

evidenced in suppressing the guerrillas had brought him deserved promotion.

Fate was less kind to Ben Kelley than to Crook. The commander vdio had spent more of the war fighting guerrillas than any other one in the eastern theater, wio had successfully defended the B&O Railroad for three years and thereby contributed greatly to the Union's success, who helped to maintain Union authority in western Virginia throughout the war, found himself unwanted. For unknown reasons, the authorities chose not to reinstate him in his former command, nor did they assign him to any other duties. Granted, Kelley's military reputation had suffered following his failure to trap Lee's army after Gettysburg, but he had carried out his responsibilities, if not brilliantly at least with a competence that had kept him in authority vhile other anti-guerrilla leaders were transferred or dismissed. Kelley remained inactive from the time of his return in 247

March until he resigned from the anty on June 1, 1865. After the war, he

resumed working for the B&O and later held a number of minor federal

appointments as reward for his service.

Although McNeill's success was the last significant partisan raid,

it did not mark the end of the guerrilla war. The bands continued their

operations and scored a number of minor successes, while reports of even

greater threats continued to flow into the Union departmental

headquarters. On the same day as McNeill's raid into Cumberland, a party

of Mosby'3 men under Maj. A. E. Richards routed a force of 120 Fédérais,

inflicting twenty-five casualties and capturing sixty-four Yankees as

well as ninety horses. The partisans' reportedly lost one man

wounded.Twice in early March, guerrillas savaged small parties of

Federal cavalry at minimal cost to themselves.Later that month, Mosby

himself, once more leading his troops, twice worsted cavalry forces under

Col. Marcus A. Reno, although in one of these encounters the presence of

Union infantry drove the partisans off with the loss of thirty

casualties.In j^ril, Mosby conducted his last major raid ^ e n he

surprised the Loudon Rangers' canp near Charlestown and shattered the unit for the last time, taking over twenty-five prisoners and all their horses.This success ended one of the longest feuds of the guerrilla war, for Mosby's men and the Loudon Rangers had fought each other since early 1863. Also during this period, guerrillas captured the mail wagon from Beverly, West Virginia, which led the local Union commander to order 18 a two-man guard placed on every wagon. 248

In Loudon County, the activities of Capt. John Mobberly and his gang became so oppressive that some local citizens offered to capture them if

supplied with government arms and a sufficient reward to enable them to

live outside the area tenporarily, in order to avoid their neighbors' 19 hostility. Brig. Gen. John D, Stevenson, commanding at Harper's Ferry, pronç)tly endorsed the idea and offered a reward of $1000 for Mobberly and

$500 for each of his three conpanions.^® Ultimately Stevenson avoided paying, for his own troops killed Mobberly and one follower early in i^ril and the end of the war terminated the remaining members' activities 21 soon thereafter.

Reports of the guerrillas' activities proved even more intimidating than their actual operations. To several Federal officers the number of partisans appeared greater than at any time during the war and increased as the Confederacy's demise approached. This attitude probably reflected a widespread fear that the Southern armies would break up into guerrilla bands, thus increasing the difficulty of subduing them and lengthening the war by years. Whatever its cause, where Union commanders had seen tens and hundreds of guerrillas, they now saw hundreds and thousands, all threatening greater disruption of the war effort. Most of these reports placed Mosby in command of the partisans. In fact, after his return to active duty became known in March the number of such messages increased significantly.

A few exaitples of such reports illustrated the Federal's confusion.

In February, Colonel Reno reported that between 1200 and 1400 guerrillas were concentrating in the Loudon Valley area, although sweeps through it 249

22 failed to find any evidence of such a large force. Two weeks later a message reached the Department of Washington that Mosby was at Waterford,

Virginia with 1600 men. Happily some sanity remained in the Federal

ranks, for the chief of staff, Lt. Col. Joseph H. Taylor, endorsed it:

"I have taken no action, as, of course, Mosby has not the force 23 reported." In contrast, a report of 800 guerrillas operating on

Maryland's Northern Neck caused the dispatch of a similar number of cavalry to assist the Navy in capturing them. The expedition achieved no substantive results.Other acco'jnts had Mosby preparing to cross the

Shenandoah River with 600 men in March and raiding the Shenandoah Valley 25 and Maryland simultaneously just after Lee's surrender. Reports from

West Virginia told that small parties of guerrillas totaling 500 men were committing numerous robberies and that other bands were being troublesome 26 in Guyandotte County. The result of these messages was a picture of large and threatening guerrilla operations which contrasted sharply with the partisans' actual achievements during the period.

The Fédérais rationalized that since their war effort in the major theaters was going so well, a major source of the guerrilla problem was poor performance by Union commanders responsible for dealing with them.

Therefore they continued to punish derelictions of duty vigorously.

Certainly, even in the war's final months evidence of incompetence existed. For example, one party of approximately 250 cavalry that was searching for guerrillas split into two detachments. One detachment fell into an ambush and lost several casualties, as well as forty prisoners and the one hundred horses it had gathered up. The officer in charge of 250

the second detachment left all except ten men in a village vÆiile he

searched the surrounding area. On his return he discovered one third of

the unit dpjnk, several men so much so that he had to leave them 27 behind. The entire operation was a fiasco due to the officers' failure

to conduct it properly.

Although the officers of this party apparently escaped censure, other commanders were less fortunate. When thirty-eight Confederates escaped after robbing a B&O train, the regimental commander recommended dismissing from the service the lieutenant in charge of the pursuit. A major in the the First New Hampshire cavalry received a reprimand for allowing some of Mosby's guerrillas to pass his pickets undetected, which argued "great carelessness in posting the pickets and organizing patrols 29 or a criminal neglect of duty." After Crook and Kelley's capture,

Grant himself directed stricter treatment of officers, vdien he ordered

Sheridan to investigate instances of Union forces being surprised for negligence on the commander's part and to punish such cases vdien discovered.^® However, no evidence exists that such penalties significantly altered the Fédérais' efficiency.

Union officers also continued to feel that they needed more cavalry.

Sheridan's plan to transfer the First Delaware Cavalry to the Department of Washington brought a protest from General Lew Wallace, who currently controlled it. Wallace asked to keep the regiment because "it is all the cavalry I have and it is very necessary.An outbreak of guerrilla activity in Guyandotte County in February caused a request for the 251

transfer of the 3rd West Virginia Cavalry to that region, since its

troops' acquaintance with the area would inçrove their chance of 32 suppressing the partisans. As late as June 1865, when only minor

mopping up activities remained, the commander of the Department of West

Virginia requested four regiments of cavalry for service there.These

pleas reinforced the perception that only cavalry could combat the

guerrillas effectively and implied that no matter Wiat level of threat

existed, the available amount of cavalry was too small.

To meet this perceived threat, the Fédérais continued their standard

practices of patrols and retaliation upon guerrilla supporters. The

results of individual operations varied, but overall the Union forces

achieved substantial success conçjared to past years. A party of 100

troopers from the 8th Illinois Cavalry which scouted through Prince

William County, Virginia in February, destroyed a gang of partisans operating there, capturing fifteen.In West Virginia the following month. Col. John K. Oley, who commanded the brigade at Charleston, received orders to clear the guerrillas out of Roane, Wirt, and Calhoun counties. At the same time, another Federal force was to move from

Buckhannon to Glenville via Weston and clear the guerrillas out of that region. These expeditions apparently accomplished their purpose, for

Colonel Oley subsequently reported that the gangs in these counties were well broken up.^^

The Fédérais also sent several expeditions through Loudon County to break up Mosby's partisans, but these endeavors were less successful.

The first patrol in February, vrfiich consisted of 200 New York and 252

Pennsylvania cavalry, suffered a loss of seventy-eight men vdien

guerrillas attacked and routed the column.Another patrol of 400 men

the following month produced no results at all, v^ile an expedition of

800 cavalry in April brought back only two prisoners and twenty horses.

General Hancock planned a fourth raid, but felt he could not spare 38 sufficient troops for the amount of time it would take. The war ended

before he could mount the operation. Thus Loudon County remained a

partisan stronghold despite all Union efforts to eradicate it.

The Fédérais also continued an aggressive retaliation policy against

civilians vdio supported the guerrillas. While he remained in the region.

General Sheridan directed particularly harsh treatment for such

individuals and escalated the punishment as partisan operations

continued. Initially he issued orders only to drive off all of the

livestock and burn the grain of citizens found harboring guerrillas, but

he showed a willingness to be more forceful if necessary, as well as an 39 unswerving belief in the illegitimacy of guerrilla warfare. Both

attitudes came through in his orders for the destruction of all forage

south of the Leesburg and Snickersville Pike early in February:

...No dwelling will be burned at present, but if the guerrilla warfare is to be maintained in that section of the county, it must be desolated Those who aid and abet robbers and murderers must go back to the Richmond authorities as the authors of their hardships and sufferings. The Confederate authorities sustain these bands and approve their infamous acts of murder and robbery.

By these statements, Sheridan revealed his belief that the Confederate government was the source of the guerrilla problem, as well as his ignorance of the hostility toward the partisans then current in Richmond. 253

Sheridan's restraint toward the civilian population did not last

long. Within two days of his warning against destroying dwellings, he

directed his subordinates to escalate from burning grain to burning

fences at houses wbere they found guerrillas.He also issued warnings

that if the people did not quit harboring partisans, he would drive them

beyond Union lines. For example, the instructions to Brig. Gen. Thomas

C. Devin's cavalry brigade for dealing with guerrillas operating against

the B&O Railroad stated:

Mo quarter will be given these persons who have destroyed by their actions the rights to be treated as prisoners of war. When a guerrilla is found on a plantation or at a habitation the fences, &C [etc], of the farm will be destroyed, and the citizens generally will be given to understand that if they continue to harbor these villains they will be turned cut from their houses and sent through our lines.

Sheridan never issued any blanket orders for destroying dwellings or

driving people south, but he willingly took other steps to discourage

support for the partisans. In v.iiat must have been the most unusual punishment of the war, he ordered his cavalry to take 150 wagon loads of fence rails from five specific individuals vdio had harbored guerrillas, 43 for the purpose of building a fence around Winchester cemetery.

Furthermore, in an effort to deprive the partisans of manpower, he directed a body of troops to arrest all unarmed citizens in Smithfield 44 who could not account for themselves satisfactorily. By such harsh measures, Sheridan deprived the guerrillas of badly-needed supplies and probably a number of supporters as well.

The Fédérais also continued to arrest prominent Southern synpathizers to hold as hostages for captured Unionists, but this 254

practice seemed confined to West Virginia and declined rapidly as the end

of the war drew near, i^parently, no such arrests occurred after January

1865. Furthermore, some reticence about making such arrests existed

among the Federal troops. Before his capture, Crook refused a request by

Governor Arthur I. Boreman to arrest several suspected collaborators on

the grounds that some of the men had taken the oath of loyalty and had

not violated it by the commission of some "overt act". Moreover, since

it was a civil matter. Crook felt that the state government rather than

the army should make the arrests.As the Confederacy declined, the

kidnapping of Unionists probably served less purpose, thus reducing the

practice. This situation, coupled with anty attitudes, made retaliatory

arrests a minor part of counterguerrilla operations during the war's

final months.

Despite Federal perceptions of a burgeoning guerrilla threat, their

countermeasures made severe inroads on the partisans' strength. Union

troops killed a number of notorious guerrillas, in addition to Mobberly,

and captured many of their followers. Most of these losses occurred in

January and February, during which time Sheridan estimated that his

forces had captured over 150 partisans. Lige White's band lost at least

five men captured including their surgeon, as well as three men killed

and eleven wounded as a result of a failed attack on a Union cavalry

canp.^^ The same Federal scouting party that picked up White's surgeon also inadvertantly brought in a noted guerrilla named Payne. The local

commander had ordered that Payne not be taken alive because of the

robberies and assaults he had committed, but his captors failed to recognize Other noted casualties included two guerrillas named

Augustine and Cox v^o had been active in Prince William County and vdiom 48 the Union cavalry brought in dead in Federal uniforms. Federal troops

also reported killing Captain Chewning and Lieutenant Cliewning, as well 49 as wounding two other officers of their band.

Reported partisan losses were smaller in March and f^ril, but still

steady. In \diat may have been one of the bloodiest guerrilla fights of

the war, the Fédérais claimed to have killed twenty-one of them in a

skirmish near Leesburg late in March.They also reported capturing at

least seven of Mcsby's men during the month, and a similar number of unidentified guerrillas during patrols early in April.Finally in one

of the last actions of the war, members of the 8th Illinois Cavalry defeated a detachment of Mosby's Rangers near Burke's Station on i^ril

10. The guerrillas lost five men killed, while the Fédérais suffered 52 only two wounded. Although these numbers were relatively low, they represented a continual depletion of the guerrillas' manpower.

These losses, coupled with the Federal counterguerrilla activity, seriously inhibited the partisans' effectiveness. When Sheridan finally moved to join Grant in March, the guerrillas proved unable to haiiper him.

Sheridan reported that although they hovered on his flanks, they inflicted no damage, so he ignored their presence. This lack of effect indicated that the partisans now were too weak to threaten anty operations. Jesse McNeill did attenpt to free the 1300 prisoners

Sheridan took vhen he mopped up the remnants of Early's a my at 256

Waynesborough, but this effort proved futile. Although attacked while

fording the Shenandoah River, the escorting force easily repulsed the

partisans and added over thirty more prisoners to its charge. The

Confederates subsequently claimed that a large number of the prisoners

escaped during this attack, but Federal reports made no mention of such a

loss.^^

Further evidence of the guerrillas' growing weakness appeared in a proposal from General Hancock for an offensive up the Shenandoah Valley.

Hancock advocated taking approximately 30,000 of the troops under his command up the Valley, leaving 10,000 infantry to protect Washington and

6,000 cavalry to protect the railroads and suppress the guerrillas.

Thus, despite the numerous reports of small bands of guerrillas causing havoc throughout the region and the coitplaints about lack of cavalry from several local commanders, Hancock believed the problem had decreased enough that half of his existing cavalry could handle it. However, Lee's arny surrendered two weeks later, making the movement unnecessary.

Lee's surrender on April 9, 1865 raised a new issue concerning the guerrilla war in Virginia: how to get the partisans to cease fighting now that the South's main field arny had disbanded. Union authorities had studied this problem since the beginning of the year, for as the

Confederacy's demise became clearer, they feared that the South would revert to all-out guerrilla warfare, which would require many more years, thousands of men, and huge amounts of money to suppress. The possibility existed that the public would refuse to support such an effort, thereby granting the South the de facto victory it had lost on the battlefield. 257

Even if no such formal plan existed, the guerrillas' continued resistance

undoubtedly would attract numbers of paroled soldiers to their ranks,

thereby strengthening the partisans and lengthening the war. Grant's

generous terms to Lee's army at Appomattox Court House undoubtedly

stemmed in part from recognition of the need to reduce the Confederate

soldiers' bitterness and thus discourage them from reverting to guerrilla

warfare. Nevertheless, the Fédérais had to find some means of getting

the partisans to cease fighting.

Grant himself set the basis for the Federal policy ^Aen he suggested

that Hancock offer the same terms to Mosby that Lee had accepted.

Hancock promptly did so, sending a copy of them to Mosby on April 11,

along with a proposal to arrange a similar surrender for the partisans.

Mosby replied four days later, refusing to surrender as yet but offering

to negotiate a suspension of hostilities vhile he verified Lee's

surrender and communicated with his superiors for instructions.

Anticipating success, Hancock agreed and ordered his troops to cease 55 offensive operations against the partisans. While awaiting Mosby's decision, Hancock outlined the surrender terms to his chief of cavalry,

Maj. Gen. Alfred T. A. Torbert, along with additional instructions for the partisans' subsequent behavior:

...The officers and men are to be paroled individually...The enlisted men are to turn in their arms and all Confederate States Government horses, or horses formerly belonging to the United States. The general will not demand the surrender of all private animals. If Colonel Mosby has any artillery or public transportation (captured or otherwise) it is to be included in the surrender. The paroles being given, the officers and men will be allowed to return to their homes. [Hancock] wishes...to inçress very clearly upon Colonel Mosby's mind the great necessity that with 258

his surrender all guerrilla operations should cease. There are known to be some independent parties operating from the vicinity of the Blue Ridge, and it will be for the interest of Mosly's men to hunt them out, as they can only bring further distress upon the people. It would also be well to say that Union people, refugees from the country he has occupied, must be allowed to return to and remain at their homes unmolested, and that-the army will be used, effectually, if necessary, to secure this.

The most interesting part of Hancock's letter was his idea that the

Partisan Rangers assist in capturing other guerrillas. While it

reflected favorable Federal opinion of their talents, it also revealed

that Hancock did not comprehend Mosby's concept of honor. The partisans

were unlikely to operate against coimatriots, except perhaps established

outlaws, for such an action would betray their fellow Confederates. By

suggesting that they do so, Hancock showed that he still considered the

partisans motivated mainly by personal considerations and less honorable

than regular troops.

Before the surrender took place however, events threatened to revive

the guerrilla war. Lincoln's assassination on i^ril 14 and the turmoil

surrounding it led many Union officials to believe that the partisan

bands had played a role in it. Federal units moved throughout the region

surrounding Washington searching for guerrillas reportedly in the

vicinity to assist the assassins' escape. For exairple. Major Waite ofc the 8th Illinois Cavalry received orders to take a battalion through

lower Maryland in search of such a band and destroy it. During the operation, he was to arrest all suspicious persons at his own discretion, as well as search homes.These powers reflected the government hysteria in response to the assassination. By blaming the guerrillas and acting against them, however, the Fédérais threatened to wreck their own 259

efforts to get the partisans to surrender. Fortunately the assassins

were captured quickly, and no major conflicts with the guerrillas

occurred.

Naturally, Mosby came in for part of the blame for the

assassination. As the premier partisan leader, the Fédérais saw Mosby's

hand in every attack upon them, and this one had been the most

devastating of all. Initially, Edwin M. Stanton, the de facto power in

the government during the crisis, hoped that Mosby might assist in

capturing the fugitives. However, after Mosby refused to surrender at

his meeting with Hancock's representative, Stanton claimed that evidence

existed implicating him in the assassination plot. This reversal and

the subsequent failure to produce any substantial evidence made Stanton's

claim specious, but it also made trying to negotiate with Mosby virtually 59 impossible.

Despite the uproar caused by Lincoln's assassination, the efforts to

get the guerrillas to cease fighting began achieving çuccess- The

partisans began surrendering within a few days of Appomattox. On April

17, during the height of the assassination crisis, one commander reported

that 200 of VSiite's and Mosby's men had asked for paroles. Since their

leaders had not yet surrendered. Grant advised having each one register

his name and residence with the nearest provost marshal, as well as sign his own parole.Brief concern arose over whether paroled Confederates

should be permitted to return to their homes in loyal states, especially

West Virginia, vdiere they might represent a disruptive influence.

Hancock favored the idea on the grounds that it might encourage others to 260

surrender.Ultimately, the government permitted paroled men to return

to West Virginia, but those residing in other loyal states first had to

comply with the amnesty proclamation. J^parently this policy caused no

major problems, for by the end of ^ r i l Hancock claimed that most of

Mosby's men had surrendered along with many other guerrillas in the

region.

As the rank and file gave up the fight, the partisan leaders soon

followed suit. On ^r i l 24, Jesse McNeill asked for suspension of hostilities while he determined his course of action. The failure of this approach with Mosby, however, coupled with general hostility toward guerrillas, caused the Federal authorities to refuse and send a body of cavalry after him instead. Although this foray was unsuccessful, McNeill surrendered the remainder of his command on the Appomattox terms on May

8. Lige White also surrendered at approximately the same time, leaving

Mosby the only major partisan leader unaccounted for.^^

Mosby had coitpounded the Fédérais' irritation with him by his independent attitude following i^pomattox. His refusal to surrender upon

Hancock's proposal led Grant to order Hancock to hunt him down without quarter if he did not accept the terms.Before the Fédérais moved, however, Mosby disbanded his Rangers on i^ril 21, thereby allowing each trooper to make his own choice whether to surrender or fight oa.®^ Most of the Rangers chose the former course, thus eliminating the band as an organized threat to the Union forces. But although his force had ceased to exist, Mosby himself refused to surrender, vdiich made him a continued 261

Union target. The Fédérais could not run the risk that he might serve as

a rallying point for diehard Confederates who would conduct terrorist

operations against the government forces. Accordingly, Hancock offered a

$2000 reward for his capture and reported that several of his former

followers were trying to collect it.^^ If so, they proved no more

successful then the Fédérais ever had been, for Mosby remained at large

in mid-May. At that time, Halleck increased the reward to $5000 if Mosby

had not surrendered by May 20, but this move had no effect either.

Mosby had some reason to fear his fate if he surrendered. Halleck already had issued instructions that he would not be eligible for parole.Although other Union authorities may have disagreed with this policy, they provided no indication Wiat treatment he would receive if he gave himself up. Faced with the possibility of irtprisonment or worse punishment, Mosby instead managed to escape to Canada. His departure marked the active end of the guerrilla war.

With the major partisan leaders disposed of, the Fédérais turned the efforts to the numerous small, nameless bands of guerrillas that still infested Northern Virginia, West Virginia, and Maryland. Although these men posed little threat to the Union forces, their depredations against civilians created a clamor for protection which, with all major opponents eliminated, the Union commanders could no longer ..gnore. Throughout

Jpril and May Federal patrols moved throughout the region in response to reports of robberies and horse stealing. However, these activities resulted in no encounters of any significance. 262

The Fédérais' major means of combating this problem was to reveal

their iron fist that the velvet glove of the i^pomattox surrender terms

had concealed. They announced a renewed policy of summary punishment for

guerrillas vdio refused to surrender. On May 5, the Department of West

Virginia issued an order that rebel soldiers in the state who did not

surrender would be treated as banditti rather than prisoners of war and

tried by a military commission when captured.The VI Army Corps published its own instructions to hang all guerrillas at once and deal with marauders in a summary manner.Most iiiportant, on May 11 the War

Department issued General Orders Number 90, which stated:

...that from and after the first day of June, 1865, any and all persons found in arms against the United States, or Wio may commit acts of hostility against it east of the Mississippi River, will be regarded as guerrillas and punished with death.

The key point in these orders was that the Union authorities had reverted to their attitude that guerrillas were outlaws subject to summary punishments. Now that the regular Confederate forces and major partisan units had surrendered the guerrillas had no base of support to protest against such treatment, vrtiile the Fédérais could devote all their energies to carrying it out. In fact, the records mentioned no executions occurring as a result of these orders, but the Union's new willingness to deal with the guerrillas ruthlessly undoubted encouraged many of them to cease their activities.

The Union forces faced one other problem in the immediate postwar period: protecting the Unionists and former rebels in the region from each other. Despite claims that state troops needed to retain their arms for protection against guerrillas and at least one report that paroled 263

Confederates were stealing arms and horses on the orders of superior

officers, the Fédérais generally found that the Unionists were causing

the most trouble. State troops in West Virginia ignored paroles and

inflicted injuries on returning rebels without provocation. Reports also 72 came in of them stealing horses and robbing citizens. In fact, the

last patrol by Union forces in West Virginia found no enemy activity, but 73 discovered many depredations committed by state units. Fortunately the

disbanding of these organizations soon solved this problem and the

Federal forces finally withdrew from the region after four years of

occupation.

The guerrilla war during 1865 proved a minor problem for the Union

forces, despite some fears to the contrary. The partisans failed to

accomplish anything noteworthy during the entire period, except for the

capture of Generals Crook and Kelley. Lack of their major leaders -

Mosby, Hanse McNeill, and Gilmor - undoubtedly contributed to this poor

performance. The numerous casualties and prisoners which the Fédérais

inflicted reduced the guerrillas' numbers, thus decreasing their

capability to attack military targets successfully. Union forces no

longer panicked upon encountering small bands of guerrillas, as shown by

the increasing success of their resistance to attacks. Furthermore, the devastation of much of the region, particularly the Shenandoah Valley, deprived the partisans of much of their civilian support, which made

their operations more difficult. Thus, most of the partisans' raids during this period involved attacks on unguarded passenger trains, which did not interfere with the Union war effort, but did hurt their claim to 264

be coirbatants rather than outlaws and further diminished support for

them.

Once Lee had surrendered, the Union authorities' major concern with

the partisans was to get them to cease operations as quickly as possible.

In this enaeavbr, the decision to extend to them the same terms as Lee's

a my had received proved a most important factor. The terms' generosity

attracted men •vdio realized that the Confederacy was played out and were

tired of fighting. Moveover, the terms offered reassurance to the

partisans that they would not be persecuted for their activities. On a more subtle note, extension of these terms inplied recognition of the guerrillas' status as combatants on the same level as the regular

Confederate army, despite Federal statements to the contrary in their threat against continued resistance. The alacrity with which the major partisan bands surrendered - all had done so within a month of Appomattox

- indicated their recognition of the futility of further resistance.

Therefore, the decision to offer the Appomattox terms to the partisans was one of the most significant policies of the counterguerrilla war. 265

Ctiapter VI11 Notes

1. Col. W. Gamble to Lt. Col. J. K. Taylor, 19 January 1865, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLVI, Pt. 2, p. 182.

2. Col. N. Wilkinson to Capt. Thayer Melvin, 20 January 1865, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLVI, Pt. 1, pp. 447-449.

3. P. H. Sheridan to Major General Halleck, 13 January 1865, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLVI, Pt. 2, p. 123.

4. Jones, Gray Ghosts, pp. 353-354.

5. Lt. Col. E. W. Whitaker to Maj. William Russell, 8 February 1865, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLVI, Pt. 1, pp. 455-457; John Bakeless, "Catching Harry Gilmor", Civil War Times Illustrated, Vol. 10, No. 1, April 1971, pp. 37-40.

6. J. A. Early to General R. E. Lee, 31 January 1865, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. LI, Pt. 2, p. 1061.

7. Ibid.

8. Maj. Robert P. Kennedy to Major General Sheridan, 21 February 1865, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLVI, Pt. 1, pp. 469-470; Forest J. Bovman, "Capture of Generals Crook and Kelley", Civil War Times Illustrated, Vol. 7, No. 10, February 1969, pp. 30-37.

9. Jones, Gray Ghosts, p. 361.

10. Bowman, "Capture Crook and Kelley", p. 37.

11. Ibid., p. 36.

12. Edwin M. Stanton to Lieutenant General Grant, 21 February 1865, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLVI, Pt. 2, p. 608.

13. Maj. Gen. Winfield S. Hancock to Major General Halleck, 21 March 1865, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLVI, Pt. 3, p. 69.

14. R. E. Lee to John C. Breckinridge, 21 February 1865, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLVI, Pt. 2, p. 1245.

15. Col. W. Gamble to Lt. Col. J. H. Taylor, 7 March 1865, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLVI, Pt. 2, p. 883; Col. W. Gamble to Lt. Col. J. H. Taylor, 12 March 1865, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLVI, Pt. 2, p. 943.

16. Maj. Gen. Winfield S. Hancock to Adjutant General U.S. A m y , 18 February 1867, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLVI, Pt. 1, p. 526; 266

Maj. Gen. Winfield S. Hancock to Maj. Gen. H. W. Halleck, 22 March 1865, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLVI, Pt. 3, p. 82.

17. Brig. Gen. John D. Stevenson to General Morgan, 6 April 1865, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLVI, Pt. 3, p. 617.

18. Col. N. Wilkinson to Maj. Augustus Dotze, 29 March 1865, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLVI, Pt. 3, p. 279.

19. Brig. Gen. J. D. Stevenson to E. M. Stanton, 28 March 1865, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLVI, Pt. 3, pp. 240-241.

20. John D. Stevenson to Brigadier General Morgan, 1 April 1865, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLVI, Pt. 3, pp. 444-445.

21. Brig. Gen. J. D. Stevenson to E. M. Stanton, 5 i^ril 1865, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLVI, Pt. 3, p. 590.

22. William Russell to Brig. Gen. T. C. Devin, 21 February 1865, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLVI, Pt. 2, pp. 621-622.

23. G. G. Horten to Lieutenant Colonel J. H. Taylor, 9 March 1865, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLVI, Pt. 2, p. 911.

24. F. A. Parker to Maj. General Augur, 16 March 1865, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLVI, Pt. 3, pp. 16-17; Col. W. Gamble to Maj. Gen. C. C. Augur, 17 March 1865, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLVI, Pt. 3, p. 25.

25. Brig. Gen. John D. Stevenson to General Morgan, 17 March 1865, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLVI, Pt. 3, p. 26; Maj. Gen. C. C. Augur to General Morgan, 11 April 1865, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLVI, Pt. 3, p. 715; Maj. Gen. C. C. Augur to Colonel Thompson, 11 April 1865, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLVI, Pt. 3, p. 715.

26. Maj. Gen. W. H. Emory to Brigadier General Morgan, 28 March 1865, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLVI, Pt. 3, p. 240; Col. John H. Oley to Maj. Robert P. Kennedy, 11 i^ril 1865, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLVI, Pt. 3, p. 716.

27. Starr, Union Cavalry, 2:363.

28. Ibid., 2:362.

29. J. H. Taylor to Major Andrews, 9 January 1865, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLVI, Pt. 2, pp. 80-81.

30. Lt. Gen. U. S. Grant to Maj. Gen. P. H. Sheridan, 21 February 1865, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLVI, Pt. 2, p. 619.

31. Lew Wallace to General Sheridan, 4 January 1865, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLVI, Pt. 2, p. 38. 267

32. H. J. Samuels to Department of West Virginia, 22 February 1865, Departments, RG 333.

33. General Emory to Lt. Col. A. E. King, 17 June 1865, Departments, RG 393.

34. Col. Charles Albright to Capt. Charles I. Wickersham, 19 February 1865, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLVI, Pt. 1, p. 468.

35. Maj. Robert P. Kennedy to Colonel Oley, 3 March 1865, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLVI, Pt. 2, p. 822; Col. N. Wilkinson to Lt. Col. H. C. Rizer, 3 March 1865, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLVI, Pt. 2, pp. 822-823; Col. John H. Oley to Maj. R. P. Kennedy, 13 March 1865, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLVI, Pt. 2, p. 961.

36. Maj. Thomas Gibson to Maj. Will Rumsey, 20 February 1865, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLVI, Pt. 1, pp. 463-467.

37. Col. N. B. Sweitzer to Capt. Charles I. Wickersham, 16 March 1865, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLVI, Pt. 1, p. 552; Col. William Gamble to Col. J. H. Taylor, 10 j^ril 1865, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLVI, Pt. 3, p. 701.

38. Maj. Gen. Winfield S. Hancock to Maj. Gen. H. W. Halleck, 8 i^ril 1865, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLVI, Pt. 3, p. 661.

39. Maj. Gen. P. H. Sheridan to Brigadier General Stevenson, 25 January 1865, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLVI, Pt. 2, p. 266.

40. P. H. Sheridan to Brigadier General Devin, 2 February 1865, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLVI, Pt. 2, p. 357.

41. Maj. Gen. P. H. Sheridan to Brigadier General McMillan, 4 February 1865, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLVI, Pt. 2, p. 385.

42. A. F. Hayden to Brig. Gen. T. C= Devin, 5 February 1865, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLVI, Pt. 2, p. 412.

43. William Russell to Maj. Gen. G. A. Caster, 14 February 1865, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLVI, Pt. 2, p. 560.

44. Brig. Gen. C. H. Morgan to Brigadier General Stevenson, 4 March 1865, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLVI, Pt. 2, p. 838.

45. Gen. George Crook to A. I. Boreman, 2 January 1865, Departments, RG 393.

46. Brig. Gen. Thomas C. Devin to Captain Hayden, 30 January 1865, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLVI, Pt. 1, p. 452.

47. Brig. Gen. Thomas C. Devin to Brigadier General Forsyth, 3 February 1865, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLVI, Pt. 2, p. 365. 268

48. Col. H. H. Wells to Lt. Col. J. H. Taylor, 18 February 1865, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLVI, Pt. 2, p. 592.

49. Col. N. Wilkinson to Lt. Henry J. Johnson, 7 March 1865, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLVI, Ft. 2, p. 885.

50. Col. H. H. Wells to Colonel Taylor, 25 March 1865, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLVI, Pt. 3, p. 168.

51. Maj. Gen. Winfield S. Hancock to Maj. Gen. H. w. Halleck, 29 March 1865, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLVI, Pt. 3, p. 277; Brig. Gen. John D. Stevenson to Brigadier General Morgan, 31 March 1865, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLVI, Pt. 3, p. 389, H. H. Wells to Col. J. H. Taylor, 3 April 1865, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLVI, Pt. 3, p. 541.

52. Col. William Gamble to Lt. Col. J. H. Taylor, 10 April 1865, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLVI, Pt. 3, p. 700.

53. Col. J. L. Thonpson to Maj. William Russell, 9 March 1865, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLVI, Pt. 1, pp. 528-529; R. E. Lee to Gen. John C. Breckenridge, 9 March 1865, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLVI, Pt. 1, pp. 540-541.

54. Maj. Gen. Winfield S. Hancock to E. M. Stanton, 24 March 1865, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLVI, Pt. 3, pp. 106-108.

55. Lt. Gen. ü. S. Grant to E. M. Stanton, 10 April 1865, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLVI, Pt. 3, p. 685; Brig. Gen. C. H. Morgan to Col. John S. Mosby, 11 April 1865, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLVI, Pt. 3, p. 714; Col. John S. Mosby to Mai. Gen. W. S. Hancock, 15 April 1865, Official Records. Ser. î. Vol. XLVI, Pt. 3, pp. 765-766; J. H. Taylor to Brigadier General Gamble, 16 April 1865, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLVI, Pt. 3, p. 801-802.

56. C. H. Morgan to Major General Torbert, 16 April 1865, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLVI, Pt. 3, p. 804.

57. J. H. Taylor to Maj. J. M. Waite, 17 T^ril 1865, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLVI, Pt. 3, pp. 818-9.

58. Edwin M. Stanton to Major General Hancock, 16 April 1865, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLVI, Pt. 3, p. 799; Edwin M. Stanton to Major General Hancock, 19 T^ril 1865, Official Records. Ser. I, vol. XLVI, Pt. 3, p. 838.

59. The basis for Stanton's claim probably was the fact that one of the conspirators, Lewis Paine, was a former member of Mosby's command. However, there was no evidence that Mosby himself had any knowledge of the plot. 269

60. Col. J. L. Thoirpson to Lt. Col. J. H. Taylor, 17 ^ r i l 1865, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLVI, Pt. 3, pp. 817-818.

61. Maj. Gen. Winfield S. Hancock to Maj. Gen. H. W. Halleck, 18 Jpril 1865, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLVI, Pt. 3, p. 828.

62. Col. John H. Oley to Capt. J. M. Rife, 20 April 1865, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XL^/I, Pt. 3, p. 873; Maj. Gen. Winfield S. Hancock to E. M. Stanton, 22 i^ril 1865, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLVI, Pt. 3, p. 897.

63. Maj. Gen. W. H. Emory to Brig. Gen. C. H. Morgan, 24 ^ r i l 1865, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLVI, Pt. 3, p. 934; William Russell to Capt. C. McK. Leaser, 6 May 1865, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLVI, Pt. 3, p. 1104; Maj. Gen. W. H. Emory to A. I. Boreman, 8 May 1865, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLVI, Pt. 3, pp. 1116-1117.

64. Lt. Gen. U. S. Grant to Major General Hancock, 19 ^^ril 1865, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLVI, Pt. 3, p. 839.

65. Siepel, Rebel, p. 153.

66. Hancock to Stanton, 22 April 1865, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLVI, Pt. 3, p. 897.

67. Maj. Gen. H. W. Halleck to Commanding Officer Charlottesville, 18 May 1865, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLVI, Pt. 3, p. 1173.

68. Maj. Gen. H. W. Halleck to Major General Hancock, 10 April 1865, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLVI, Pt. 3, p. 699. In fact, Mosby eventually did receive a parole and became a strong supporter of Grant and the Republican Party.

69. General Orders No. 56, Headquarters Department of West Virginia, 5 May 1865, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLVI, Pt. 3, p. 1092.

70. General Orders No. 13, Headquarters Sixth Army Corps, 7 May 1365, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLVI, Pt. 3, p. 1107.

71. E. D. Townsend, "Punishment of Guerrillas", General Orders No. 90, War Department, 11 May 1865, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLVI, Pt. 3, p. 1134.

72. General Emory to Brigadier General Morgan, 6 May 1865, Departments, RG 393; General Emory to A. I. Boreman, 8 Mav 1865, Departments, RG 393.

73. Col. W. Owens to Maj. T. Melvin, 15 June 1865, Official Records. Ser. I, Vol. XLVT, Pt. 1, pp. 1325-1326. CONCLUSION

The Union counterguerrilla operations in the eastern theater

revealed a number of inportant facts about the guerrilla war. First, the actions or lack of them by the chief authorities showed that the guerrillas were only a minor concern in the general conduct of the war.

Second, the partisans had little impact upon Union operations and the

Federal field commanders had almost total responsibility for dealing with them. Third, although the Fédérais never stanped out the guerrillas, they achieved their major objectives of keeping the supply lines open and protecting their depots. Neither did major campaigns suffer much disruption as a result of partisan activities. While the success of individual Union methods for controlling the guerrillas varied, taken as a vhole they achieved their purpose. Furthermore, the events of the anti-guerrilla war illustrated a number of lessons about handling partisans vdiich could apply not only to the Civil War but to other counterinsurgency conflicts as well.

Throughout the war, counterguerrilla activity remained a low priority for Federal authorities. The Union never made any effort to develop a clear, consistent strategy against the guerrillas or to create a tactical doctrine for defeating them. Except for directing that captured partisans receive the same treatment as regular soldiers, the

Federal government made no attempt to establish any broad policy concerning them. Even on this one point, local commanders received

270 271

little censure and sometimes actual encouragement for violating it.

Captured guerrillas occasionally suffered fatal "accidents" before

reaching caitç, wiiie at different times Henry W. Halleck, Edwin

M. Stanton, and Ulysses S. Grant encouraged the pronpt execution of

captured partisans. Generally, however, local and departmental

commanders adopted a strategy that seemed expedient, or most likely to

achieve the desired results, regardless of official views. In short the

Fédérais placed no eitçhasis on developing a coordinated, effective

strategy, vdiich serious concern with a major guerrilla problem should

have caused.

At the same time, the Fédérais made no effort to develop special

anti-guerrilla tactics. For most officers, the tactics for regular

operations as outlined in the standard military manuals seemed adequate

for use against the partisans. Those officers vdio realized that saber

charges and volley fire seldom were effective against foes who depended

on surprise and seldom fought stand-up combats found little acceptance

for the alternatives they suggested. The officers v^o proposed

patrolling away from the regular routes or vdio used squads of riflemen to

discourage partisan pursuit did not see otiiers adopt their ideas. The

lack of tactical development indicated that the guerrilla problem was not

serious enough to create a need for consistent practice.

The general quality of the troops and commanders involved in the

counterguerrilla war also indicated that the Fédérais placed a low priority on it. One historian has asserted that "Most of the troops enployed against the partisans were militia...[The] regular troops... 272

were stationed in the rear not so much to combat bushwhackers as to

protect against the cavalry raids This view underestimates the

role of regular units against the partisans and overestimates the amount

of militia involved. However, the Fédérais did expect the militia to

supplement or replace regular troops when needed, most n o t a b l y during the

1864 canpaign. Furthermore, they promoted the formation of home guard and state units to bear most of the burden for defending the loyal people of West Virginia, so that by 1863 regular troops occupied only the

railroad cind a few key Cow.is, such as Charleston. The numerous requests

from West Virginia communities for regular troops to deal with local guerrillas inplied that the home guards were not very effective.

However, aside from conducting occasional sweeps through the area in question, the Union authorities ignored these pleas. They did not increase the number of troops available for counterguerrilla operations or transfer troops from the main a my or other duties to meet the demand.

This failure indicated that the Union officials did not view the problem as serious enough to warrant greater effort.

The quality of the regular troops themselves also was questionable.

While some of them performed conpetently, as the guerrilla defeats and casualties revealed, many others did not. A number of the regular units posted to the region served throughout the war as garrison troops. As a result, morale and military discipline suffered, which weakened their ability to conduct operations or resist the partisans. The fact that none of the regular units managed to kill or capture any of the major partisan leaders - one of Hanse McNeill's own men killed him and 273

Maj. Henry Young's scouts captured Harry Gilmor - provided evidence of

their weaknesses. By the war's end, several units had acquired a

reputation for poor performance. Nevertheless, despite failures and

conplaints. Union authorities showed little inclination to reassign

experienced troops to counterguerrilla duty, thus providing further

indication of the problem's low priority.

The quality of the officers assigned to command the departments that embraced the region further revealed the secondary nature of the counterguerrilla operations. With the exception of Sheridan, the government never appointed a first-class commander to the area and

Sheridan's primary target was the Confederate a m y rather than the guerrillas. William S. Rosecrans in 1861 and George Crook in 1864 both were coirpetent, but neither remained in command in the region for more than a few months. Both went on to duty with major field armies, where greater need for their abilities existed. Crook, in fact, was transferred to field operations twice, in 1862 after his successes in western Virginia as a regimental commander and in 1865 after the

Confederates exchanged him.

Most of the other departmental commanders were political appointees of questionable military capability or casualties not fit for field service. John C. Fremont, Nathaniel P. Banks, Franz Sigel, and David

Hunter all fell into the former category, and none of them achieved any great successes while in command. The second class included Robert

Schenck, Winfield Scott Hancock, and Ben Kelley. All three seem to have 274

performed conpetently, but their availability due to wounds was an

inportant factor in their appointments. Again, none of them achieved any

spectacular successes. Kelley, who spent the entire war in West

Virginia, deserved tremendous credit for successfully defending the B&O,

but he never wiped out the guerrillas in his department and gained a

reputation for poor military performance.

The major subordinate commanders reflected the same quality as their

superiors. After satisfactory performance in western Virginia during the

war's early months, Jacob D. Cox was transferred to field sen/ice in the

western theater. Robert Milroy and Julius Stahel proved inept and

eventually were removed from active command. John D. Stevenson, who had

resigned from the a m y and then returned to command Harper's Ferry,

overestimated the partisan menace and proved too cautious in dealing with

it. Sheridan's cavalry commanders, Alfred Torbert, Wesley Merritt, and

George Custer were coupetent, but anti-guerrilla operations were not

their primary duty. Moreover, they returned to the A m y of the Potomac

with the rest of Sheridan's forces.

The general quality of the commanders assigned to the region

enphasized the fact that the Federal authorities did not view the

guerrillas as a major problem. The departments were dunping ground for

inconpetents, political appointees, and incapacitated officers vho could not participate effectively in field operations. Those commanders vho did prove conpetant usually found themselves transferred to more active

theaters where their talent could make a greater contribution to the war 275

effort. That some of them did prove capable in their counterguerrilla

duties was more a matter of luck than intent.

One other factor underscored the low priority assigned to

counterguerrilla operations: the general failure to increase the number

of troops assigned to the duty. Throughout the war the number of troops

assigned to the region seems to have fluctuated between 30,000 and 40,000

men. The Department of West Virginia had 38,000 men assigned to it in

October 1861. In December 1862, now a district in the Department of

Ohio, it had 33,000 men, 18,000 of which made up Kelley-s and milroy's

commands. Transferred to the Middle Department, Kelley's assigned

strength declined from a high of 27,000 to 16,000 within three months as

units shifted within the department. When the government reestablished

the Department of West Virginia under Kelley in June 1863, his assigned

strength grew from 18,000 to 26,000 men, primarily through the

acquisition of responsibility for troops already in the region who were

assigned to other commands. The department reached its greatest strength

of 49,000 in May 1864, but the assignment of fifteen "hundred-days"

militia regiments to it accounted for the increase. By the war's end it

had declined back to 18,000. Actual strengths usually were between 4,000

and 7,000 less than the assigned strength.

The inportant fact about these figures were that the changes in them did not result from the formation or transfer of new units. Such activities did occur to some extent, but usually did little more than balance the loss of units sent to other theaters or disbanded. Most of the changes occurred simply as a result in shifting departmental 276

authority over units already in the region. For exairple, at different

times the Department of Washington, the Middle Department, and the

Department of West Virginia controlled the troops at Harper's Ferry, but

the number of troops there did not necessarily change. Siitçly put, the

region never received a major augmentation in military strength, which

implied that the guerrilla problem was not serious enough to require the

diversion of troops from other commands to deal with it.

Of the various methods the Fédérais used to combat the guerrillas,

the creation of special counterguerrilla units offered some of the best

results. Utilizing the partisans' own hit-and-run tactics, such units

proved very effective against the guerrillas when properly led. Blazer's

Scouts provided the best example of this concept in action. Their

constant pressure on Mosby and the casualties they inflicted made them a

significant threat to his operations. Mosby supported this assessment by

his detachment of a force specifically to wipe out the Scouts. Sheridan

also claimed that Maj. Henry Young's body of scouts contributed greatly

to the anti-guerrilla struggle, although, except for the capture of

Gilmor, the basis for this view is unclear. Nevertheless, his evaluation

seems acceptable, given the lack of conflicting evidence. Even the

Loudon County Rangers, vho suffered defeat so often at the partisans'

hands, occasionally hampered the guerrillas' activities. For exaitple, vhen they wounded and captured six of Mosby's men at a dance in 1863, the

losses forced Mosby to cease his attacks on Union picket posts for a 2 time. Such achievements indicated that special units offered the most efficient means for inhibiting partisan activity. 277

Unfortunately, the Union authorities never encouraged the develoEHnent of special forces. Possible reasons for the failure to do so

included the conservative attitude that guerrilla warfare did not require different tactics and the belief that such units either were ineffective or undisciplined. The early attempts during the war to create such forces reinforced the latter attitude. The civilian organizations raised among local-pro-Union men did little damage to the guerrillas, but acquired a reputation for banditry which harmed the Federal cause. The same conçlaints applied to Fremont's Jessie Scouts, the first military special unit formed, and led to their dissolution. The Loudon Rangers gained a reputation for failure throughout the war. Given such exairples, the reticence of many Union commanders to sanction the creation of special units is unsurprising. However, the successes achieved by Blazer and Young showed that such organizations could be effective. They also enphasized the inportance of proper leadership and discipline to gain such results. Had the Fédérais raised more such units and utilized them more extensively, they might have crushed some of the partisan bands earlier in the war and reduced the guerrilla menace to a negligible concern. In the final analysis, their failure to do so was an error which increased the cost of the counterguerrilla war.

In terms of actual results achieved, patrols were the most successful method of combatting the guerrillas. During the war, aggressive patrolling led to the capture of numerous known or suspected guerrillas, as well as the deaths of many others. This drain on the 278

partisans' manpower gradually weakened their capability to inflict damage

and thereby reduced the threat they offered. Moreover, the cumulative

effect of such losses undoubtedly weakened the morale of the survivors to

the extent that they were more willing to cease operations at the end of

the war. In addition, active patrolling helped disrupt partisan activity

by providing warning of the guerrillas' presence and possible intentions,

as well as sometimes causing them to abort their plans. However, the

patrolling by itself was not sufficient to suppress the guerrillas,

especially \dien the Federal units treated it as a routine duty and did not leave the main roads or question local inhabitants carefully. Under

such conditions, the partisans easily avoided discovery. Therefore, vdiile the patrols inflicted numerous casualties on the guerrillas, they did not exert the same pressure against them that special units could.

The patrols harmed the partisans, but could not destroy them.

Passive defenses were an important complement to the patrols, but their success as an anti-guerrilla tactic was more varied. The larger garrisons at major supply depots, headquarters, and railroad targets generally could resist partisan attacks, but were vulnerable to infiltration, as the captures of Edwin Stoughton, Crook, and Kelley revealed. The partisans also could overcome such garrisons by surprise, as McNeill did at Piedmont in 1864. More frequently, the garrisons fell victim to cavalry raiders, the main foe they were meant to defeat. These factors combined to make their reliability problematical. As an anti-guerrilla measure, pickets and guard detachments proved even less successful. Despite experimentation with various types of arrangements. 279

the Fédérais never found a way to make the pickets immune to guerrilla

attacks. Throughout the war, the partisans consistently overran them,

killing or capturing the soldiers. Railroad and wagon train guards also

proved inconsistent. Some units repelled guerrilla assaults and

inflicted extensive losses on the attackers, while others collapsed at

the first fire. Ultimately, the success of passive defenses depended

entirely upon the morale and quality of the Federal troops involved.

They prevented the partisans from causing major disruptions to Union military operations, so they achieved their purpose, but because they were reactive they did nothing toward destroying the guerrillas.

Of all of the methods the Fédérais used against the partisans, the least successful ones were holding the civilian population responsible for guerrilla attacks and reprisals against the guerrillas themselves.

The former method sometimes provided a way to make good the damage the partisans caused, by forcing the people to repair it or pay for it. The latter tactic contributed to the casualties among the guerrillas, but not by a significant amount. Neither method had any effect on curbing the partisans' activities. Rather than frightening either the citizens or the guerrillas into stopping depredations, both tactics actually increased the problem. Citizens' support for the partisans increased rather then diminished, especially vdien Federal retaliation included the destruction of private property, as it did in 1864. Then some citizens might join the guerrillas to get revenge, thus increasing the Union's problem. Retaliation against the partisans only encouraged them to fight harder, thereby making the task of subduing them more difficult. It also 280

pronpted them to commit reprisals against Federal soldiers, as Custer's

and Mosby's exchange of executions revealed. In the eastern theater the

Union commanders proved unwilling to accept such consequences and

utilized reprisals only briefly. In short, both methods exacerbated,

rather than reduced, the guerrilla problem.

One of the most important factors in the Union's success against the

partisans was the attitude of the Southerners themselves toward guerrilla

warfare. Many Confederate political and military leaders opposed it on

the grounds that it deprived the army of needed manpower and harmed the

morale of regular troops vdio envied the partisans their independence.

Such critics observed correctly that the guerrillas were not inhibiting

Union military operations or having any other significant impact on the war. Furthermore, the nature of their activities conflicted with the

concept of a "fair and honorable" war, so that many Southerners felt that

they demeaned the cause. The occasional train robberies and disobedience

to the orders of regular officers reinforced the impression that the partisans were mere brigands. The result of these attitudes was that first the Confederate government ended partisan recruitment late in 1362 and enticed a number of them into regular service. This step prevented further proliferation of the partisan units and removed two of the major leaders. Lige White and John D. Imboden, from irregular operations, thereby reducing the threat vrfiich the Fédérais faced. Second, in 1864 the Confederacy repealed its Partisan Ranger Act, which, although it failed to eliminate any of the major partisan forces then operating, deprived them of official support. The partisans no longer could depend 281

on aid from the government and had to turn more of their efforts to

meeting their own needs. More inportantly, the repeal implied rejection

of the use of massive guerrilla operations to carry on the v.’ar . With the

decline in support, the Union gained increasing dominance over the

partisans during the war's final months until their threat became

negligible.

A related factor in the Union success was the attitudes of the

partisans themselves. In general, they viewed themselves as patriots

fighting for the Confederate cause. So long as they received recognition

and treatment as regular combatants, they tended to operate within

recognized rules of war. This attitude aided the Fédérais both because

it discouraged atrocities and because it made the partisans willing to accept honorable surrender vhen defeat became apparent. Thus the Union did not face a prolonged war vrfiile it destroyed each guerrilla band.

The course of the counterguerrilla war illustrated a number of inportant lessons for dealing with partisans effectively; lessons applicable not just to the Civil War, but to any conflict in which guerrillas were a factor. The first one was the inportance of mobility, as exemplified by cavalry. Only cavalry could move rapidly enough to have a chance of surprising and catching partisans. Infantry could handle the responsibilities of static defense, but only cavalry could undertake the offensive operations necessary to suppress the guerrillas.

Cavalry carried out all of the major anti-guerrilla operations during the war and achieved the most significant Union successes, from wounding

Mosby three times to capturing Gilmor. It conducted the pursuits. 282

patrols, and raids which inflicted casualties on the partisans and

interfered with their operations. The constant demands for additional

cavalry throughout the war revealed that many commanders recognized the

inportance of this mobile capability for counterguerrilla warfare, and

the failure to provide more cavalry to the departments gave further evidence of the guerrilla problem's low priority with the Union high command.

The second important lesson was that a moderate policy toward the guerrillas and civilians was more effective than a severe one. Harsh retaliation such as summary executions and destruction of property, increased support for the partisans rather than reduced it. Furthermore, it encouraged the guerrillas to fight harder and to commit reprisals on

Federal troops, thus making the war more brutal. As events in Missouri and, to a much lesser extent, in Virginia revealed, harsh policies did not stop guerrilla attacks. Moderate policies, on the other hand, provided less incentive for the citizens to join or support the partisans. While such treatment might not reduce existing support, it lessened the likelihood of support increasing. It also aided the effectiveness of counterguerrilla operations, by reducing the aid citizens gave the guerrillas. The partisans themselves credited Blazer's success to his polite treatment of civilians, thereby putting them off their guard so that they failed to warn the guerrillas of his presence.

In addition, moderate policies encouraged the guerrillas themselves to conduct their operations within the recognized parameters of war, thus reducing atrocities. Despite the feelings of many Fédérais, who believed 283

only a harsh policy was effective, throughout the war the Union pursued

relatively moderate policies in the eostern theater and had better

success against the guerrillas there than in Missouri. Furthermore, the

eastern guerrillas proved willing to surrender at war's end rather than

fight on, once they were assured of fair treatment. While moderate

policies did not suppress the guerrillas, they kept the war from

escalating.

The third lesson of the counterguerrilla war was the importance of

the partisans' support stricture to their continued operations. The

partisans relied not only on the assistance provided by local civilians,

but also on the support of the Confederate government. This backing gave

them legitimacy for their operations, thus offering some protection

against reprisals. It also provided a reliable source of supplies and

equipment. Without such official support, the partisans became outlaws,

dependent on local aid for survival. While the repeal of the Partisan

Ranger Act removed the Confederate government's support, only war-weariness and a desire to return to order cut off civilian aid.

Union commanders recognized the importance of dismantling the civilian support structure, of winning the people's "hearts and minds," but never came up with an effective means of doing so. Nevertheless, without the backing of the regular Confederate forces, the partisans faced eventual destruction at the hands of overwhelming Union forces. Without the information and assistance of local citizens, such destruction would come much more quickly. As the support declined, defeat became inevitable. 284

In the final analysis, the Union's counterguerrilla war was an effective one. Although often poorly planned and filled with frustrations, it achieved its nsjor objectives. The guerrillas failed to break the Union's supply lines, particularly the Baltimore and Ohio

Railroad, for any significant length of time, or to distract Federal troops from major campaigns, while the Union forces proved less successful in protecting loyal citizens from guerrillas, since they abandoned much of this duty to home guard units, this failure did not alter the war's course. Admittedly, the attitudes of Confederate officials and the partisans themselves were a factor in the Union's success, but the Federal's ability to keep the guerrilla depredations controlled resulted from their own efforts. The final Union victory showed that these efforts succeeded. 285

Conclusion Notes

1. Castel, "Guerrilla War", p. 50.

2. Virgil Carrington Jones, Ranger Mosby. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1944), p. 81. Essay on Sources

Due to the nature of Civil War historiography, a study of guerrilla

and counterguerrilla operations must depend mostly on primary source

materials. One of the most inçjortant of them is The War of the

Rebellion; The Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies.

Conpiled from surviving documents during the post-war years, the

Official Records form the starting point for Civil War research. It provides the factual framework for the events connected with the

counterguerrilla war, as well as the attitudes of the major commanders and political leaders concerning it. In addition, the holdings of the

National Archives contain many documents omitted from the Official

Records which shed further light on the events and concerns of the counterguerrilla war. Inportant records groups include those pertaining to the relevant military departments, the Office of the Secretary of War, and the Adjutant General's office. Another source is the report of the

Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, although this contains little material directly relevant to counterguerrilla operations. Furthermore, the private papers of many of the key political and military figures are available and provide some insight into the individuals role and attitudes concerning the guerrilla-counterguerrilla war. Newspapers of the period also covered guerrilla activities, but they require cautious use due to the errors and false reports contained in them. They are useful for understanding the feelings of the period, but their reports require cross checking for accuracy.

286 287

Another major category of primary sources are published accounts by

the participants. These works basically fall into two categories,

memoirs and unit histories. An abundance of both types exists for the

region involved, but their usefulness varies. Many of them contain

little or no information pertaining to guerrilla operations, Wiile in

others such material is superficial. The user also must be alert to

bias and factual errors which weaken the work's reliability. However, many such works provide valuable, detailed information concerning events

of the counterguerrilla war. They also give insight into the attitudes of the common soldiers involved in it.

Secondary works pertaining to the counterguerrilla war are fewer in number and mostly biase’ in favor of the guerrillas. Most general works on the war, even the most recent ones, either contain little material on the topic or concentrate on the guerrillas' inpact on Union operations, rather than the measures taken to deal with them. Specialized studies of the region involved or the compaigns through it sometimes contain useful information, but again a pro-guerrilla bias is prevalent. Specific works dealing with the topic also reflect this tendency. Virgil C. Jones'

Gray Ghosts and Rebel Raiders, Wiich is the only major study of guerrilla war in the eastern theater, is strongly pro-guerrilla, while the only other books on the subject are biographies of Mosby. However,

Jones is a valuable source for Union reactions to the guerrillas.

Because of the varying quality of the sources, the following bibliography does not list oall of the ones consulted, but only those which supplied 288 useful information for this work. It does not include materials vdiich contained no information or only information found in other sources. BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources

Manuscript

Military Archives Division. Records of the U.S. Army Continental Commands, 1821-1920, Geographical Departments, Divisions, and Military Districts, Middle Department 1862-1865, Record Group 393, National Archives, Washington D.C..

Military Archives Division. Records of the U.S. A m y Continental Commands, 1821-1920, Geographical Departments, Divisions, and Military Districts, Middle Military Division 1864—1865, Record Group 393, National Archives, Washington D.C..

Military Archives Division. Records of the U.S. A m y Continental Commands, 1821-1920, Geographical Departments, Divisions, and Military Districts, Mountain Department March-June 1862, Record Group 393, National Archives, Washington D.C..

Military Archives Division. Records of the U.S. A m y Continental Commands, 1821-1920, Geographical Departments, Divisions, and Military Districts, Railroad Brigade March-September 1862, Record Group 393, National Archives, Washington D.C..

Military Archives Division. Records of the U.S. A m y Continental Commands, 1821-1920, Geographical Departments, Divisions, and Military Districts, Department of the Shenandoah 1861-1862, Record Group 393, National Archives, Washington D.C..

Military Archives Division. Records of the U.S. A m y Continental Commands, 1821-1920, Geographical Departments, Divisions, and Military Districts, Department of Washington 1863-1866, Record Group 393, National Archives, Washington D.C..

Military Archives Division. Records of the U.S. A m y Continental Commands, 1821-1920, Geographical Departments, Divisions, and Military Districts, Department of West Virginia 1861-1862, Record Group 393, National Archives, Washington D.C.. military Archives Division. Records of the U.S. A m y Continental Commands, 1821-1920, Geographical Departments, Divisions, and Military Districts, Department of West Virginia 1863-1865, Record Group 393, National Archives, Washington D.C..

289 290

Printed

Boudrye, Louis N. Historic Records of the Fifth New York Cavalry. Albany, NY: J. Munsell, 1868.

Buel, C. C. and Johnson, R. V., eds. Battles and Leaders of the Civil War. 4 Vols. New York: Castle Books, 1956.

The Canpaiqn Life of Lieutenant Colonel Harry Harrison Young. Providence: Sidney S. Rider, 1882.

Cox, Jacob Dolson. Military Reminiscences of the Civil W ar. 2 vols. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1900.

Egan, Michael. The Flying, Gray-Haired Yank; or The Adventures of a Volunteer. Philadelphia: Hubbard Brothers, Publishers, 1888.

Evans, Cleinent A., ed. Confederate Military History, Vol. 11; Maryland and West Virginia. Secaucus: Blue and Gray Press, n.d..

Forsythe, John W. Guerrilla Warfare. Algona, Iowa: Republican, 1892.

Glazier, Willard. Three Years in the Federal Cavalry. New York: R. H. Ferguson and Conpany, 1873.

Goodhart, Briscoe. History of Independent Loudon Virginia Rangers. Washington D.C.: McGill and Wallace, 1896.

Haupt, Herman. Reminiscences of General Herman Haupt. Milwaukee: Wright and Joys Company, 1901.

Newcomer, Christopher A. Cole's Cavalry. Baltimore: Cushing, 1895.

O'Connor, Richard. Sheridan the Inevitable. New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Conpany, Inc., 1953.

Pyne, Henry R. Ride to War. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1961.

Quint, Alonzo H. The Potomac and the Rapidan. Boston: Crosby and Nichols, 1864.

Russell, Charles Wells, ed. The Memoirs of Colonel John S. Mosby. Boston: Little, Brown and Conpany, 1917.

Schmitt, Martin F., ed. General George Crook, His Autobiography. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1946.

Sheridan, P. H. Personal Memoirs of P. H. Sheridan. 2 vols. New York: Charles L. Webster and Conpany, 1888. 291

The War of tl.^- rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Annies. 128 vols. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1380; Reprint ed., Harrisburg, PA: The National Historical Society, 1971.

Williamson, James J. Mosby's Rangers: A Record of the Operations of the Forty-Third Battalion Virginia Cavalry. New York: Ralph B. Kenyon, 1896.

Secondary Sources

Books

Ashby, Thomas A. The Valley Campaign. New York: The Neale Publishing Coitçany, 1911.

Brownlee, Richard S. Gray Ghosts of the Confederacy. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1968.

Dyer, Frederick H. A Compendium of the War of the Rebellion. Cedar Rapids, Iowa: Torch Press, 1908; reprint ed., Dayton, OH: The Press of Morningside Bookshop, 1978.

Hartigan, Richard Shelly. Lieber's Code and the Law of War. Chicago: Precedent Publishing, Inc., 1983.

Jones, Virgil Carrington. Gray Ghosts and Rebel Raiders. 2 vols. New York: Ballantine Books, 1973.

______. Ranger Mosby. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1944.

Linderman, Gerald F. Embattled Courage. New York: The Free Press, 1987.

Lord, Francis. Lincoln's Railroad Man, Herman Haupt. Rutherford: Fairleigh Dickenson University Press, 1969.

Matheny, H. E. Major General Thomas Maley Harris. Parsons, WV: McClain Printing Company, 1963.

Martin, Jane A. and Ross, Jereny, eds. Spies, Scouts and Raiders. Time-Life Series on The Civil War. Alexandria, Virginia: Time-Life Books Inc., 1985.

Meredith, Roy, and Meredith, Arthur. Mr. Lincoln's Military Railroads. New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1979.

Moore, George Ellis. A Banner in the Hills. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1963. 292

Myersf Frank M. The Comanches. Baltimore, Kelly, Piet and Conpany, 1971; reprint ed.. Marietta, GA; Contenental Book Conpany, 1956.

Siepel, Keven H. Rebel; Life and Times of John Singleton Mosby. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983.

Stackpole, Edward J. Sheridan in the Shenandoah: Jubal Early's Nemesis. New York: Bonanza Books, 1961.

Starr, Stephen Z. The Union Cavalry in the Civil War. 3 vols. Baton Rouge: LSU Press, 1979.

Summers, Festus P. The Baltimore and Ohio in the Civil War. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1939.

Tanner, Robert G. Stonewall in the Valley. Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1976.

Turner, George Edgar. Victory Rode the Rails. New York: Bobbs-Merrill Conpany, 1953.

Warner, Ezra J. Generals in Blue: Lives of the Union Commanders. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1964.

Weber, Thomas. The Northern Railroads in the Civil war 1861-1865. New York: King's Crown Press, Columbia University, 1952.

Weigley, Russell F. Quartermaster General of the Union Army. New York: Columbia University Press, 1959.

Articles

Bakeless, John. "Catching Harry Gilmor." Civil War Times Illustrated, 10:1, April 1971, pp. 34-40.

Bowman, Forest J. "Capture of Generals Crook and Kelley." Civil War Times Illustrated, 7:10, February 1969, pp. 28-37.

Castel, Albert. "The Guerrilla War 1861-1865." Civil War Times Illustrated, 13:6, October 1974, pp. 3-50.

Gibboney, Douglas. "Bested At Berryville." Civil War Times Illustrated, 24:8, December 1985, pp. 36-9.

Longacre, Edward A. "Profile: Sir Percy ^’^d h a m . " Civil War Times Illustrated, 7:8, December 1968, pp. 12-9.

McClelland, Russ. "We Were Enemies." Civil War Times Illustrated, 22:8, December 1983, pp. 40-5. 293

Nichols, William E. "Fighting Guerrillas in West Virginia." Civil War Times Illustrated, 6:1, April 1967, pp. 20-5.

Weinert, Richard P. "Maj. Henry Young - a Profile." Civil War Times Illustrated, 3:1, April 1964, pp. 39-42.

Wert, Jeffry D. "Attacking The Invincible." Civil War Times Illustrated, 20:10, February 1982, pp. 8-17.

______. "In One Deadly Encounter." Civil War Times Illustrated, 19:7, November 1980, pp. 12-9.