Draft: August 10 2003

Learning the Lessons of Europe’s Role in the Failed Peace Process and the EU’s Barcelona Framework

Gerald M. Steinberg Director of the Program on Conflict Management and Negotiation Bar-Ilan University, Ramat Gan, [email protected]

Summary of presentation at the conference on “Troubled Waters: Europe And Its Relations With The United States And Israel”, The Helmut Kohl Institute for European Studies, Hebrew University , May 2003

Overview Europe’s policies towards Israel, in the Middle East peace efforts, and in the broader EU Barcelona/Euromed framework have produced few, if any successes.1 On the contrary, European policy has been shown to be highly unrealistic, while relations with Israel are highly confrontational2, including politically and ideologically motivated boycotts, and Europe is accused of playing a leading role in the international campaign to delegitimize Israel and Jewish sovereignty.3 The exceptionality of Israeli democracy and the very difficult circumstances in which it survives is all but ignored in this framework, in striking contrast to the attitudes of the U.S. And in blatant violation of the policies of transparency that it preaches to others, the EU provides funds in secret for activities designed to manipulate and intervene in Israeli politics and society. Regarding the peace process, European policies, and the competition between Washington and Brussels contributed to the catastrophic failure of Oslo. EU funding for the Palestinian Authority lacked accountability, allowing resources to be diverted by corrupt leaders and for arms purchases used in terror attacks. And, despite the billions of Euros for the EMP/Barcelona framework, there is very little to show for these efforts, in terms of economic improvement in the Southern Mediterranean, development of civil society in countries such as Syria, or in CBMs. In the specific case of Syria, it is necessary to compare the good intentions declared by the EU with the results, which have increased conflict and been counter-productive. The virulent antisemitic statements from Syrian President Bashar Assad and others have increased in this period, while Assad was welcomed warmly in Paris and London. Beyond these specific examples, the evidence points to EU foreign and security policies that consist of lofty declarations, flawed analyses, and

1 In this presentation, the term “Europe” is used in a generalized manner, referring to the political policies of the countries in Western Europe, including but not exclusive to the members of the EU. When the term EU is used, it is generally with respect to official policies and actions of this framework. 2 EU officials acknowledge the situation, while attempting to shift blame to Israel, thereby increasing the anger. See “Letter from the Ambassador: Hard facts and Israeli Anti-EU Feelings”, Europe in Israel, 68 April 2003. 3 Douglas Davis, “French envoy to UK: Israel ("that shitty little country" ) threatens world peace” Jerusalem Post 20 December, 2001 unrealistic goals. The flood of official statements emanating from Brussels is vast, and not matched by action on the ground. The tone of such declarations can often be characterized as patronizing, paternalistic, and ill-informed. In examining this record, the absence of serious European self- analysis is striking. For example, in the Challiot Papers series published by the official European Union Institute for Security Studies (formerly under the aegis of the Western European Union), the first analysis of these issues was not published until July 2003, and repeated much of the conventional wisdom.4 In this publication, the stilted and narrow analysis of the interests and domestic political factors contributing to U.S. policies in the region, stands in sharp contrast to the absence of a similar analysis of the influences on EU policy. As the same EU officials with the same failed policies continue in office, there is apparently no stock taking from policy failures, and the lessons of major mistakes seem to be unlearned. In this policy arena, at least, the EU and its constituent components can hardly be described as a dynamic learning organization.

The EU’s Uncommon Foreign and Security Policy The observation that despite the collective framework of the EU and the CFSP, “Europe still speaks in many voices”, is certainly valid for Middle East policy. Member countries and national leaders take independent positions on issues such as the war in Iraq, Iranian WMD development, support for terrorism, etc., making it difficult to deal with the “EU”, per se. Given the central role of the U.S. in these issues, the divisions within the EU in support (i.e., the UK and Spain) or opposition to American policy in the region (France and Germany) exacerbate the problem.5 On the Arab-Israel conflict, France leads a consistently strong pro-Palestinian and pro-Arab position, while the German (Joschke Fischer) and British leadership (Tony Blair) display some understanding for the Israeli threat assessment. Furthermore, the appointment of Javier Solana as Foreign Policy czar (High Representative) and the broader CFSP framework, despite the rhetoric of coordination, often adds to the chaos.6 Solana’s activities and organization are often in competition with those of External Relations Commissioner Chris Patten and his group, so that Europe rarely speaks with a clear and unified voice. This results in inconsistent policies, and worse, unrealistic, emphasizing goals that are politically correct, and reflecting the conventional wisdom, but unattainable.

Europe’s Negative Contributions to Peace Efforts Very often, the intense European effort to “contribute” to the Middle East peace process appeared to be motivated by the desire of decision

4 The European Union and the crisis in the Middle East, edited by Martin Ortega, Challiot Papers No. 62, the European Union Institute for Security Studies, July 2003. A shorter study of the Barcelona process, and limited to technical analysis, can be found in Dorothée Schmid, “Optimiser le processus de Barcelone”, Occasional Paper 36, July 2002 5 Christopher Coker, “Empires in Conflict: The Growing Between Europe and the United States”, RUSI, Whitehall Paper no. 58, 2003; Robert Kagan, Of Paradise And Power America and Europe in the New World Order. Knopf, 2003 6 Hans-Georg Ehrhart, “What model for CFSP?” Challiot Papers No. 55 October 2002 European Union Institute for Security Studies makers to be seen as important, rather than to actually have a positive impact. Thus, as Muriel Asseburg notes, after the Oslo DOP in 1993, “the EU was eager to become engaged….”.7 This action for its own sake can be highly destructive, particularly when the decision making process is dangerously uninformed.

From the Israeli perspective, Europe is also widely seen as projecting a strong anti-Israeli policy based on myths of “Palestinian victimization” and Israeli power (“excessive use of force”). This European policy is reflected in media distortions, academic boycotts, and government and government- funded NGO campaigns to demonize Israel (as in the UN’s Durban Conference on Racism in 2001)8. The major increases in attacks on Jews and Jewish centers in Europe in the wake of Durban are seen as reflecting a transformation of classical antisemitism into anti-Israeli and anti-Zionist policies. , from the , has noted that, “expressions of hatred – including cries of ‘Death to the Jews’ on the streets and campuses of Europe and elsewhere in the world – alongside thundering silence or convoluted explanations that blame Israel for the events, characterize what is now being called ‘the new antisemitism”.9 Europe’s moral equivalence, equating Palestinian terror with Israeli actions to protect the lives of its citizens,10 is viewed as a core betrayal of the ethical code that Europeans are fond of preaching to others. In April 2002, immediately after the Passover murder of Israelis in Netanya and other Palestinian attacks, Chris Patten condemned defensive actions in very hostile and crude language, declaring “…the Israeli defence forces are trampling over the Geneva Convention, and any notion of international law is being torn up…”11 Referring to the absence of negotiations in 2001, the EU’s Institute for Security Studies makes the factually unsupported but politically balanced claim that “the two parties considered that they would have more to gain from acts of violence than from negotiations and agreements.”12 And when the EU belatedly woke up to the basic immorality of Palestinian terrorism, the statements in opposition to such brutality were often weak, “balanced” and lacked commitment.

7 Muriel Asseburg, “From declarations to implementation? The three dimensions of European policy towards the conflict”, The European Union and the crisis in the Middle East edited by Martin Ortega, Challiot Papers No. 62, the European Union Institute for Security Studies, July 2003, p. 13 8 Irwin Colter, “Durban's Troubling Legacy One Year Later: Twisting the Cause of International Human Rights Against the Jewish People”, Jerusalem Issue Brief, Vol. 2, No. 5, 20 August 2002, http://www.jcpa.org/brief/brief2-5.htm 9 Avi Beker, “Anti-Semitism in the guise of intellectualism”, Ha’aretz, 7 October 2002; see also Andrea Levin, “The European Disease”, Jerusalem Post, July 15 2003; Glenn Frankel, “For Jews of France, a ‘Kind of Intifada’: Escalation in Hate Crimes Leads to Soul-Searching, New Vigilance”, Washington Post, July 16 2003; “Anti-Semitism in Western Europe”, http://www.antisemitism.org.il/english/articles/eu.htm 10 Such “moral equivalence” is reflected in many statements issued by Chris Patten. For example: “…while Israel has totally legitimate security concerns the Palestinians have totally legitimate political concerns”. April 2 2002 http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/med_mideast/news/ip02_488.htm 11http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/news/patten/sp02_146.htm 10 April 2002 12 “The European Union and the crisis in the Middle East”, edited by Martin Ortega, Challiot Papers No. 62, European Union Institute for Security Studies, July 2003, p.9. Based on this behavior, Europe is generally viewed as biased and motivated by the goal of denying Israel and the Jewish people the basic human right to self-defense, even in the face of horrendous terrorism. For many members of the European intellectual and diplomatic elite, the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict begins in 1967, and is based on the unsupported conclusion that a removal of Israelis settlements and an end to the “occupation” will end the Palestinian, Arab and Islamic rejectionism and violence against Israel that began decades earlier.13 In addition, the extreme demonization of Ariel Sharon, as reflected in the legal process that took place in Belgium, and in many other actions and statements, was entirely out of proportion. The EU has also consistently supported the Palestinian goal of “internationalizing” the conflict, in form of peacekeepers and external forces, which Israelis see as a ploy to force withdrawal while avoiding binding agreements to end the conflict. These simplistic approaches certainly do not contribute to the regional stability or conflict management.

Over two decades of European involvement and initiatives (since the Venice declaration) have failed to contribute to peace and security. The EU’s special envoy, Miguel Moratinos, the longest- serving envoy in the region, achieved nothing from the very frequent visits to Mr. Arafat and numerous photo opportunities with the Palestinian leadership.14 Despite the formation of the coordinating framework known as the “Quartet” (the U.S., EU, UN, and Russia), Europe continued to chart an independent course. The EU’s highly visible reaffirmation of Arafat’s position in 2003 was designed primarily to snub the U.S., but its impact on the goal of Palestinian regime change as the first stage in the “Roadmap” process, was entirely negative and perhaps fatal. In response, the U.S. excluded the EU from the Aqaba summit and Israel has lowered the level of contacts with the EU. At the same time, the EU’s limited contact with Israeli society, largely filtered through the shattered remnants of the peace movement, has been sterile. Long after they were rejected by the Israeli public, the official institutions of the EU continued to view Israel through the eyes of Peres, Beilin, Peace Now and a small group of fringe journalists and extremist academics. An illustrative example of European distortion of events and adoption of contentious Palestinian terminology is provided in the report of the Centre for European Policy Studies, (2003), entitled “The Rubik Cube of the Wider Middle East”, and edited by Michael Emerson And Nathalie Tocci. On page 23, the authors present their (and the standard European) version of recent history: “Ariel Sharon's promenade on the al-Aqsa esplanade [Note the use of this term and not temple mount or even Haram e-Sharif – GMS] on 28 September 2000 dealt the final blow to the moribund Oslo peace process.. …..Israel has carried on expanding settlements contrary to the Oslo agreement as well as reoccupying militarily the West Banks or in Oslo terminology making redundant the distinction between areas A and B. The reoccupation, devastating use of force, curfews, closures, checkpoint and

13 Situation in the Middle East, Speech by Chris Patten, Plenary Session of the European Parliament - Strasbourg, 9 April 2002 - SPEECH/02/143, http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/news/patten/sp02_143.htm 14 Isi Leibler, “Wake Up Europe”, Jerusalem Post 6 July 2003. human rights and humanitarian law violations, are resulting in a rapidly rising number of civilian Palestinian casualties. Furthermore, the infrastructure of the Palestinian Authority is progressively being destroyed, marking a clear reversal in the path towards Palestinian statehood.” This entirely fictitious version of history – on every point – and inherently biased language reflects the Palestinian narrative, and ignores political incorrect factors, such as terrorism. The sources cited for this analysis include from extremist fringe personalities with strong ideological agendas, including Gershon Baskin (IPCRI), Ilan Pappe, as well as PA press statements.

On a related topic, the large budgets provided by the EU as well as member states to the Palestinian Authority and to Palestinian organizations that have the status, if not the substance of NGOs, has also been counter- productive. Following the standard pattern in which noble intentions strongly contrast with actions, EU officials spoke repeatedly of “Palestinian state- building” while the funds went to the corrupt and anti-democratic elite. In the absence of any controls, the money provided by the EU’s taxpayers was diverted into the pockets of and bank accounts of officials15 and for the purchase of weapons.16 Textbooks funded by Europe became vehicles for increased incitement and denial of Israeli legitimacy, thereby undermining the very goals claimed by the EU in the hundreds of press statements, email reports and official declarations.17 EU funding for Palestinian NGOs, particularly through the Euro- Mediterranean Human Rights Network (EMHRN) provides another example of activities that undermined the peace process. The EMHRN established a reputation for anti-Israel political activity, including calls for suspension of the Association Agreement with Israel.18

The Moribund Barcelona Process Similar symptoms and failures can be seen clearly in the analysis of EMP/Barcelona process, on which billions of Euros have been spent since the

15 Caroline B. Glick, “Column One - The Peres Center scandal”, Jerusalem Post, 26 April 2002; See Herb Keinon, “B’nai Brith charges EU ignores Palestinian channel of aid to terrorists”, Jerusalem Post, 26 December 2002 16 Calls by 177 members of the European Parliament for an independent investigation of the EU’s funding were strongly opposed by Chris Patten, and when he forced to accept an investigation by a 13 member working group, the framework was closed, creating another example of the EU’s anti-transparency practices. The terms of reference also reflected an anti-Israel political agenda, focusing on those bringing the petition, rather than the questions of how the aid to the PA was used, and on “Israeli destruction of EU funded projects”, like airport in Gaza, which was used by the PA to smuggle arms used for terrorism. See Herb Keinon, “B’nai Brith charges EU ignores Palestinian channel of aid to terrorists”, Jerusalem Post, 26 December 2002; “EU funding to the Palestinian Authority: Commissioner Patten responds to a letter from Mr. Laschet, MEP Brussels, 21 January 2003 - D(2003)61”, http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/mepp/eufundspa.htm 17 Briefing by Colonel Miri Eisin, IDF Intelligence Officer, April 23, 2002, Jerusalem Media Center, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.imra.org.il/story.php3?id=11596; http://www.pmw.org.il/new/schoolbooks.html, 18 NGO Monitor No. 9, 25 May 2003, “Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network (EMHRN)”, http://www.ngo-monitor.org/editions/v1n08/v1n08-1.htm inception in 1995. A broad assessment of this process is beyond the realm of this survey, particularly with respect to the MEDA program’s central focus on North Africa and the European effort to prevent mass immigration through economic growth and job creation. There is certainly a great deal of activity, with meetings involving up to 35 delegations, and activities spanning negotiation of bilateral association agreements, annual foreign ministers meetings, etc. but they produce little more than grand statements of intentions. In this 8-year period, over 300 Euromed Synopses, Reports, Calendars etc. have been produced (in both English and French).19 The activities listed in the official EMP reports are impressive, but also reflect the absence of substance. These reports and publications also do not provide clear and measurable criteria by which the outcome and impact of the EMP activities can be assessed.

The lack of a realistic approach, particularly to the security and socio- cultural dimensions of the EMP, is reflected in the process of writing grand “action plans” for one year that are quickly forgotten and rewritten a year later. For example, the 'Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Peace and Stability”, modeled on the entirely inapplicable European CSCE/OSCE experience, and intended to “institutionalize political dialogue among partners,” was a major effort which was wasted, as the EU ignored all of the evidence of the imminent collapse of the Oslo process in 2000. The plans for establishing crisis prevention and crisis management procedures were similarly unrealistic in the existing political environment. The ambitious Valencia Action Plan (2002) was modified extensively to reflect political reality in the latest meeting in Crete (2003). The Crete declaration including a grand effort entitled “Guiding Principles of the Dialogue of Cultures and Civilisations”, as well as the establishment of a Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for the Dialogue of Cultures, and measures for “deepening political and security co-operation, notably against terrorism; Improving respect for human rights and democracy, etc.” On 22 May 2003, the European Commission released a declaration on “Reinvigorating European Union actions on Human Rights and democratisation with Mediterranean Partners”, again reflecting the distance between the noble rhetoric and difficult reality.

Based on the results of the past 8 years, the likelihood of any substantive and positive outcome based on these very noble intentions must be considered very low. None of the talk about civil society, human rights, free trade, etc. has been realized on the ground. Syrian membership in the EMP has not had any visible impact on support for Palestinian terror groups operating out of Damascus, support for Hizbollah, or the visible and ugly outbursts of antisemitism. Syrian denial of Israeli legitimacy has not changed.

The Negative Impact of the EMP on EU-Israel Relations Beyond the failure to achieve positive outcomes, the incorporation of Israel into the Barcelona framework has done serious damage to an already frayed relationship with the EU. Under the bureaucratic framework of the EMP, with its emphasis on reforming civil society, Israeli democracy is not only ignored, but EMP and EU related activities often constitute very crass

19 http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/euromed/publication.htm attempts to interfere with the democratic process. For all intents and purposes, Israel is treated in the same way as countries with no democratic processes and very limited civil societies, such as Egypt and Syria. A clear example of this behavior is seen in the massive EU funding for extremist Israeli domestic political groups, in the effort to influence policies and public opinion. In direct violation of the principle of transparency that it preaches to others, the EU does not practice any transparency in its own activities in this realm. However, some information is available, and this evidence shows the role of the EU in Israeli politics. For example, causes that are linked to the political activities and ambitions of Yossi Beilin (such as the ECF) have enjoyed major funding for advertising, staging of rallies, etc. Similarly, a group known as PHR-I (Physicians for Human Right – Israel) receives significant funding from the EU commission office in Israel as well as the Finnish embassy. PHR-I uses these funds to promote offensive political pamphlets that reflect a extremist post-Zionist agenda20, and the blatant biases of this organization has led to a rare decision by the Israel Medical Association to end any links with this organization.21 While providing funds (in secret) for Jeff Halper’s housing demolition protest group, EU officials ignore the evidence demonstrating the political biases and inaccuracies in this group’s activities.22 And the interest group (lobby) Peace Now has also received major funding from the EU, thereby greatly increasing its visibility, if not impact. Radical NGOs in the Israeli-Arab sector, which disseminate false allegations of discrimination and Israeli human rights abuses, are also funded by the EU and the EMHRN.23

Recommendations – Towards a Constructive Dialogue and a Positive Role for the EU Europe, in the form of the EU, NATO, and other collective institutions, is changing, particularly with the addition of Eastern European countries, whose recent experience with the reality of totalitarianism under the Soviet Union resulted in different political perspectives. The former Communist nations and societies have little tolerance for the double-talk on human rights and anti-American assertion of power that is common among some of the major EU powers. Furthermore, there is more understanding of the Israeli realities and greater appreciation of the uniqueness of the Israeli democracy. Thus, the increased influence of “New Europe” is likely to bring some positive changes. At the same time, if the Old Europe wishes to be taken seriously in the Middle East and by Israel, it must re-examine its principles, jettison the policies based on myths, and act with accountability and transparency. An EU policy that claims to be based on morality, human rights, and democracy

20 “PHR apologists skirt the issues funders decry anti-Semitism charge” November 22, 2002 Haaretz (English edition); Physicians for Human Rights boss hits back at signatories of petition," November 15, 2002 Haaretz (English edition) 21 http://www.imra.org.il/story.php3?id=15998 22 Justus Weiner, Illegal Construction in Jerusalem, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, 2003 23 The EMRHN website 'news provider' for Israel is the Arab Association of Human Rights (HRA). See NGO Monitor No. 9, 25 May 2003, “Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network (EMHRN)”, http://www.ngo-monitor.org/editions/v1n08/v1n08-1.htm

cannot continue to ignore incitement, tolerate terror (including Arafat’s role), silence in the face of antisemitism and Holocaust denial (including pronouncements by Syrian and other Arab leaders), and the political abuse of human rights NGOs in order to undermine Israeli democracy. By removing relations with Israel from the distorting framework of the EMP/Barcelona process, and learning the lessons from the contribution to the failed Oslo peace process, the EU will be able to play a positive role in the future. The opportunity for change has been presented by the appointment of a new special envoy (Marc Otte from Belgium) to replace Miguel Moratinos, allowing for a new start in relations with Israel, and a review of the failed cliches and myths. For its part, the Israeli government has also recognized the importance of reducing the tensions and re-establishing a “constructive dialogue” with the EU, and the response from Javier Solana suggests the potential for progress. Prime Minister Sharon’s official and positive visits to Britain and Norway (not a member of the EU) in July 2003 were further indications of a possible transformation in European attitudes. Whether these small steps can be translated into a more realistic and positive and principled policy vis-a-vis Israel, terrorism, and the conflict management efforts remains to be seen.