Coca, Eradication and Development in the Andes Thomas Grisaffi* and Kathryn Ledebur†

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Grisaffi, T and Ledebur, K 2016 Citizenship or Repression? Coca, stability Eradication and Development in the Andes. Stability: International Journal of Security & Development, 5(1): 3, pp. 1–19, DOI: http:// dx.doi.org/10.5334/sta.440

RESEARCH ARTICLE Citizenship or Repression? Coca, Eradication and Development in the Andes Thomas Grisaffi* and Kathryn Ledebur†

For over two decades the US has funded repressive forced coca eradication in Peru, Colombia and Bolivia to reduce the illegal cocaine trade. These policies have never met their stated goals and have generated violence and poverty. In 2006 Bolivia definitively broke with the US anti-narcotics model, replacing the militarized eradication of coca crops with a community-based coca control strategy. The program substantially reduced the coca crop while simultaneously respecting human rights and allowing farmers to diversify their livelihoods. This article outlines the elements of the Bolivian initiative that ensure its continued successful functioning. It explores to what extent this model can be translated to other Andean contexts.

Successive US administrations have described Latin American leaders have begun to illicit drugs as a threat to national security openly critique the failure of present policies and have taken the battle to source regions. to achieve their goals and the high cost Over the past 30 years the US has channelled of implementing supply reduction efforts billions of dollars to South American military (in terms of violence, corruption and insti- and police forces to enable them to under- tutional instability). They have argued for take counter-narcotics operations. In the more effective and humane alternatives and Andean region the US has focused its efforts some countries have even made unilateral on the eradication of illicit crops (mostly coca changes to drugs policy (see Grisaffi 2014b). leaf – which is used to produce cocaine – As a result of pressure from Guatemala, but also opium poppy and marijuana), law Colombia and Mexico, the United Nations enforcement and the interdiction of drugs has scheduled a General Assembly Special shipments. The aim of ‘supply side enforce- Session (UNGASS) on drugs for April 2016. ment’ is to curb the flow of illicit narcotics The outcomes of the Special Session will reaching the United States. guide global drug policy cooperation for the Historically, the US has dictated the coming years. The last UNGASS regarding terms of the ‘war on drugs’, and has used drug policy in 1998 adopted the slogan ‘a its political and economic might to crush drug free world, we can do it’, but eighteen any debate on alternatives. However, some years later it has become clear that this is an unrealistic goal (Bewley Taylor 2012). This Special Session, then, provides an opportu- * University College London, GB nity for a profound shift in the global drug [email protected] policy debate. † Andean Information Network, BO This article adds to the discussion through Corresponding author: Thomas Grisaffi an analysis of illicit coca cultivation and the Art. 3, page 2 of 19 Grisaffi and Ledebur: Citizenship or Repression? Coca, Eradication and Development in the Andes

Figure 1: The security forces respond to a coca grower roadblock in the Chapare (Photo courtesy of Godofredo Reinicke). policies to tackle it in the Andean region, with the elements of the Bolivian initiative that a specific focus on Bolivia. It draws attention permit its continued productive implementa- to the harms generated by US-backed milita- tion and explore their potential applicability rized eradication and the aerial fumigation to other Andean contexts. of coca crops, and explains why this policy This article is based on extensive long- ultimately fails to stem coca and cocaine pro- term ethnographic fieldwork and interview duction. The article then introduces Bolivia’s data.1 Grisaffi is an anthropologist who innovative model for coca control, which has spent over thirty months carrying out shifts the focus from reduced hectares of fieldwork in the Chapare (a coca-growing coca to farmer subsistence, citizenship and region of Bolivia) over several visits span- respect for human rights. The model, known ning the period 2005 to 2015. Ledebur has as ‘cooperative coca reduction’, allows regis- researched coca production in Bolivia since tered farmers to grow a limited amount of 1999 as director of the Andean Information coca while working with coca grower federa- Network. The authors carried out interviews tions and the security forces to voluntarily and participant observation with a broad reduce any excess coca production. Since range of informants, including coca farmers 2010 Bolivia has reduced coca acreage while and their families, landless labourers, simultaneously respecting human rights agricultural union leaders, low-level coca and successfully diversifying the economy paste producers, members of the security in coca-growing regions. It is argued that services and municipal officials. They have cooperative coca control represents a more also interviewed Bolivian, US and EU policy- humane, sustainable and productive alterna- makers, government officials, NGO agency tive to the forced eradication of coca crops. staff and representatives of international In the final section the authors examine organizations. Grisaffi and Ledebur: Citizenship or Repression? Coca, Art. 3, page 3 of 19 Eradication and Development in the Andes

Coca Regulation leaders have started to question the sustain- Coca is a perennial shrub native to the ability of this approach. Andean region; it grows in tropical areas at In Peru coca consumption is common in elevations of between 200 to 1500 meters. highland areas but is also consumed by mid- Coca leaf has been used for millennia by dle class urban professionals, and is served indigenous peoples in the Andean countries to tourists in Cusco to help them cope with and is most commonly chewed or prepared the high altitude. Peru’s coca legislation is as a tea. The people who consume coca less rigid than Colombia’s because while the value its properties as a mild stimulant but state officially condemns coca chewing and it also serves important social, religious and prohibits private coca cultivation, it never- cultural functions (Carter & Mamani 1986). theless authorizes limited coca production Despite its many positive benefits and and commercialization for medicinal, scien- the coca trade’s historic importance to the tific and industrial purposes. Like Colombia, regional economy, the leaf has always occu- Peru receives significant US counter-drug aid pied an ambiguous position in Andean and has ambitious plans to eradicate half the society. Since the Spanish conquest, activ- country’s coca crop over the coming years ists, legislators, scholars and the clergy have (Gootenberg 2014). debated the legality of coca and its derivative Bolivia has the strongest coca culture of all products (Gootenberg 2008). In 1961 the UN the Andean countries. A recent EU-funded classified coca leaf as a restricted drug (along- study calculated that about one third of side cocaine and heroin) under the Single Bolivia’s population regularly consumes coca Convention on Narcotic Drugs. The convention – or coca-based products, including coca teas, signed by Peru, Colombia and Bolivia – skin creams and liquor (CONALTID 2013). establishes that ‘the parties shall so far as Bolivian President Evo Morales has led the possible enforce the uprooting of all coca battle for the decriminalization of coca leaf bushes which grow wild. They shall destroy at the international level, arguing that the the coca bushes if illegally cultivated,’ and, ban on traditional use is not only a historic ‘coca leaf chewing must be abolished within mistake,3 but also discriminatory towards twenty-five years’ (Metaal et al 2006). The Andean peoples. In an unprecedented move, 1961 convention thus established the legal in 2011 Bolivia withdrew from the 1961 UN framework for future US-imposed coca eradi- Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, before cation efforts. re-joining in 2013 with a reservation that Peru, Colombia and Bolivia each have permits coca consumption within its terri- unique histories, cultures and traditions tory. Bolivia thus successfully reconciled its related to coca and, as a result, each nation international commitments and its 2009 pursues a different approach to enforcement. Constitution, which declares that the state Colombia penalizes coca most severely, out- has a duty to preserve and protect coca chew- lawing all aspects of production, consump- ing as an ancestral practice. tion and commercialization. Colombia has comparatively limited traditional consump- Coca Cultivation tion2 and so unlike in Peru and Bolivia, there Peru, Colombia and Bolivia are the world’s is no widespread support for its traditional largest producers of coca leaf. The most uses (Ramirez 2011: 55). Furthermore, in recent UN coca surveys estimate that Peru Colombia revenues derived from the illegal has 42,900 hectares of coca (UNODC 2015c), coca trade have fuelled the country’s civil Colombia 69,000 hectares (UNODC 2015a) conflict (Peceny & Durnan 2006; Thoumi and Bolivia 20,400 hectares (UNODC 2015b). 2002). The Colombian state has long In each country coca cultivation is concentrated embraced US-designed and funded forced in marginal areas, characterized by minimal eradication strategies, although recently its civilian state presence, limited infrastructure Art. 3, page 4 of 19 Grisaffi and Ledebur: Citizenship or Repression? Coca, Eradication and Development in the Andes

Figure 2: A girl helps her mother dry coca leaves in the Chapare (Photo courtesy of Thomas Grisaffi). and high rates of poverty. In this context coca region of Bolivia, the people who process complements subsistence farming and, in the cocaine paste are generally young men with absence of other income generating activi- no land or hope of decent jobs. They set ties, is one of the few pursuits that provide up artisanal laboratories in isolated areas, farmers with access to cash income – see where they macerate shredded coca leaves Figure 5). in a range of chemicals including sulphu- Small-scale farmers grow coca because ric acid and gasoline to extract the cocaine it has several comparative advantages as alkaloid. The drug workers earn low wages a cash crop. Coca can be harvested every for work that is dangerous, illegal and harm- three to four months; it is light and easy to ful to their health (Grisaffi 2014a). transport; and almost all of the investment While coca has provided small farmers corresponds to labour costs and not to tools with economic opportunities, its cultiva- or other inputs, which leads to elevated lev- tion is also associated with a range of nega- els of employment – see Figures 2 and 4). tive environmental and social impacts. As Coca leaf generates far higher returns per coca is grown in isolated areas it expands hectare than any other crop and, most the agricultural frontier and contributes to importantly, there is always a guaranteed significant deforestation. In addition, the market. Given the lack of legal alternatives chemicals used to process cocaine paste, and the high prices, much of the coca crop including gasoline and sulphuric acid, drain is sold to traffickers who process it into into streams and rivers, damaging delicate cocaine paste (the first step towards refining aquatic ecosystems (Young 2004; Salisbury & pure cocaine). In the Chapare coca-growing Fagan 2013).4 Researchers also point to Grisaffi and Ledebur: Citizenship or Repression? Coca, Art. 3, page 5 of 19 Eradication and Development in the Andes the negative social impacts; in Colombia Eradication is inefficient; it generates the major guerrilla groups, including the incentives for poor farmers to replant as it Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces forces up the price of coca, while simulta- (FARC by its Spanish acronym) and right neously denying farmers their only source wing paramilitaries, finance their activities of income. Thus when crops are reduced in by taxing coca production. Farmers have one area, production inevitably expands in been caught in the crossfire as illegal armed other geographic locations; analysts refer groups struggle for control over this lucra- to this as the ‘balloon effect’. For example, tive trade (Angrist & Kugler 2008; Ibáñez & forced eradication in Peru and Bolivia in Eduardo Vélez 2008). the 1990s pushed production to Colombia, which in 2009 became the world’s largest Forced Eradication coca leaf producer. Consequently, although A cornerstone of US strategy in the Andean the amount of land under coca cultivation region has been the eradication of coca crops. in Peru, Colombia and Bolivia fluctuated Eradication is often carried out manually; between 1987 and 2008, the total coca acre- teams of eradicators accompanied by heav- age in the Andean region remained stable, at ily armed members of the police enter small around 190,000 hectares (Youngers & Walsh farmsteads to uproot illicit crops. Colombia 2010: 3).5 was the only Andean country to allow the aer- Eradication has no obvious effect on drug ial fumigation of coca crops. US policymakers production or the supply of drugs reaching are strong supporters of forced crop eradica- consumer markets. Farmers have found ways tion; however, a growing body of research to protect their crops from herbicides and to indicates that it does not meet its targets and generate higher yields per hectare by increas- generates wide-ranging harmful impacts. ing the density of coca plants and using new

Figure 3: Military police search Chapare residents (Photo courtesy of Godofredo Reinicke). Art. 3, page 6 of 19 Grisaffi and Ledebur: Citizenship or Repression? Coca, Eradication and Development in the Andes combinations of fertilizers and pesticides. Russler 2008). The Colombian government Moreover, cocaine paste manufacturers have acknowledges the poor results of fumiga- employed new technologies and processes tion and since 2007 has downscaled crop to extract more cocaine alkaloid from lower spraying and stepped up manual eradication volumes of coca leaf. As a result, in spite of missions, finally ending aerial fumigation in eradication efforts, potential cocaine produc- October 2015. tion in the Andes has also remained virtu- Forced coca eradication has provoked ally unchanged (Mejia 2010; Mejia & Posada political instability in the Andean countries. 2008). In Peru and Colombia peasants have held Forced eradication puts the burden of national-level protests to campaign against the war on drugs onto small farmers (who coca eradication and in both countries ille- gain the least from the trade) and generates gal armed actors (Sendero Luminoso [Shining multiple harms. Forced eradication immedi- Path] in Peru and the FARC in Colombia) ately wipes out the family’s main source of have, on occasion, sided with coca grow- income, frequently leaving people destitute ers to resist government eradication efforts and struggling to survive. Eradication also (Durand Ochoa 2014; Ramirez 2011). In imperils targeted growers and their com- Bolivia, US-backed coca eradication catalysed munities by orienting the security forces mass discontent and demonstrations – see towards internal ‘enemies’, often leading Figure 1 (Grisaffi 2010). to human rights violations – see Figure 3. In all three countries eradication teams The Myth of Alternative have killed, abused and seriously wounded Development scores of coca farmers, torched homesteads The UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and incarcerated and tortured hundreds of has increasingly come to view drug control people. Institutional damage has been com- as a ‘development issue’. Whilst ‘alternative pounded by the impunity that US-backed development’ approaches have changed security forces frequently enjoy (Youngers & over the years, the aim remains the same: Rosin 2005). to wean people off cultivating illicit crops. Under the auspices of ‘Plan Colombia’6 However, with few exceptions, these pro- the Colombian government sprayed more grams have not offered poor farmers real- than half a million hectares with herbi- istic alternatives to growing coca (Buxton cide between 2000 and 2010 (Ramirez & 2015; Mansfield 2011). An examination of Youngers 2011). The government has always US Agency for International Development argued that the chemicals used to spray coca (USAID)-designed and -funded programs in are benign; however, anthropologist Maria the Chapare, one of Bolivia’s principal coca- Clemencia Ramirez (2011) has reported that growing regions, illuminates some of the people who live in spray zones suffer from limitations of ‘alternative development’. a variety of ailments including skin, respira- USAID promoted export crops, such as tory and gastrointestinal problems. They also bananas, coffee, cacao, palm heart and tim- complain that spraying is indiscriminate and ber, even though these are unsuitable for carried out without warning. The herbicides the small peasant producer. Crops such as have caused environmental damage (includ- bananas and palm heart require a large initial ing water contamination and land degrada- investment, a sizeable workforce and large tion) and have affected food and cash crops, tracts of land in order to be profitable. Citrus undermining food security. Given the lack fruit and cocoa beans take a long time to of alternatives, farmers often replant coca mature so any potential dividends take sev- deeper in the jungle. Thus all that eradication eral years to appear (thus many farmers went achieves is to displace coca cultivation and bust in the intervening period). USAID did spread the civil conflict to new areas (Dion & not carry out viability studies to see if there Grisaffi and Ledebur: Citizenship or Repression? Coca, Art. 3, page 7 of 19 Eradication and Development in the Andes were markets for these products and made USAID refused to work with the existing little effort to open out new ones. Thus most agricultural unions (hereafter the Coca farmers found that they could not sell their Federation) or, until 2004, the municipal ‘alternative’ crops and sank into debt, unable governments (which have been run by the to repay loans they had been encouraged to Coca Federations since 1995). From 1998 take out in order to plant the crops in the first farmers had to cut their ties with the Coca place (Farthing & Kohl 2005; Lupu 2004). As Federations and join one of the USAID- one middle-aged female farmer told Grisaffi,7 backed producer associations to receive development assistance. Associacionistas, as Sure, we have other products. . . you they came to be known, had to promise to can grow just about anything in the no longer grow coca and denounce neigh- Chapare; it is a fertile place. But these bours who continued to do so. Many coca products are only good to eat. The growers saw this as an attempt by USAID to prices are too low. We have oranges, divide and conquer the Coca Federations. thousands of oranges, but when we As one Federation leader put it ‘we realized take them to the market they don’t that the Yankees were trying to make us fight sell. Sometimes you invest all of your between comrades (community members).’ money transporting them to the city Others said, ‘the [USAID-contracted] NGOs but then you don’t make back what came here to destroy the unions.’ In 2008 you paid out. You cannot make a liv- the Coca Federations refused to permit any ing that way! further USAID alternative development projects in the Chapare (AIN 2008). US Development budgets for the Chapare In Peru and Colombia the government, were high, with estimates ranging from USD donor agencies and development contrac- 229 to USD 310 million spent between the tors replicated these failed initiatives with beginning of the 1980s until 2004 (Farthing & little variation. In both countries there has Kohl 2005: 186). However, most of the been a lack of meaningful consultation money went to USAID contractors (wages, with peasants’ organizations, poor sequenc- hotels, transport, offices and other over- ing of development assistance (conditioned heads) instead of the nominal ‘beneficiaries’, on prior eradication), a lack of long-term provoking farmer resentment. Coca farmers planning and the promotion of crops aimed had a clear narrative relating to these fail- at the export market, which have proven ures. A community radio manager in the to be unsuitable as there were often no Chapare explained, markets for them (Buxton 2015; UNODC 2005). USAID’s emphasis on promoting On my show I used to say, ‘Alternative private agribusiness has had a range of development has the highest wages in harmful impacts including generating few Bolivia!’ Look – a driver for USAID had jobs at low wages, damaging ecologically to spend 200 Bolivianos (about USD sensitive environments and encouraging 30) a day just on gasoline. Imagine the concentration of land ownership, thus that; they don’t even go 100 km. contributing to rising levels of inequality – How much do you think a taxi driver including within coca grower communities spends on gasoline in a day? Not even (Cabieses 2010; Vargas 2011; Youngers & 80 bolivianos (about USD 12) and Walsh 2010). In Colombia this develop- they run around all day. How about a ment model has been particularly damag- technician? They have to spend fifty ing. Paramilitaries have forced peasants dollars a day just on subsistence. . . So from their land to allow for the expansion I used to say, ‘we would be better off of large-scale commercial farming (Ballve administering the money ourselves!’8 2013; Hristov 2009). Art. 3, page 8 of 19 Grisaffi and Ledebur: Citizenship or Repression? Coca, Eradication and Development in the Andes

As coca growers have long known, no sole cornerstone of his coca control strategy and source of income will replace coca, especially extended it to other coca-growing regions, in fragile tropical environments with poor including the La Paz Yungas (Bolivia’s largest infrastructure and minimum state presence. coca-growing region). Morales also increased As a result, crop ‘substitution’ and ‘alterna- the previous cap on coca cultivation from tive’ constitute two of the fundamental 12,000 to 20,000 hectares nationally. With myths presented as justification for forced funding from the EU, the Morales adminis- eradication and their inevitable failure guar- tration designed and implemented a multi- antees endless cycles of repression, poverty faceted strategy to support the project. The and replanting of coca leaf. It is therefore six pillars include: essential that policymakers move beyond this spurious, yet damaging, precept. 1. Land titling for coca-growing families with catos. Bolivian Community Coca Control 2. Biometric registry of coca growers The death of two coca growers at the hands authorized to grow the cato. of government eradication forces in October 3. The registration and recurring meas- 2004 (just weeks after a negative evalua- urement of each cato of coca by the tion of Bolivian eradication efforts by the US state monitoring organization, the government) sparked massive social unrest Economic and Social Development in the Chapare region of Bolivia. To calm Unit (UDESTRO by its Spanish the growing tension the Mesa administra- acronym). tion (2003-2005) accepted a longstanding 4. The creation and maintenance of a demand of Chapare coca growers, the right sophisticated database (SISCOCA), for each family to cultivate a small plot of which aids the monitoring of coca cul- coca, or ‘cato’ (1600 square meters) destined tivation and traces coca leaf transport for the licit market. The concession, which and sales. flew in the face of US eradication mandates, 5. Integrated development projects to effectively ended forced eradication in the complement subsistence income gen- region. The initiative marked a shift in vision erated by the cato. away from the US-imposed narrative, which 6. The empowerment of the community portrayed coca farmers as active participants to self-police in order to restrict coca in the drug trade, to subsistence farmers cultivation to the one-cato limit. This working to feed their families. includes training for union representa- With the launch of the cato policy, pro- tives on database use and community tests, violence and human rights violations joint action to monitor and restrict subsided immediately. Union members went coca planting. from staunch resistance to the government to active citizen participants, working to limit This innovative program did not emerge their crop to one cato per union member. overnight but rather was built on the pre- The program’s underlying logic helped to vious efforts of the Coca Federations and guarantee its success: the equitable distribu- the EU’s municipal strengthening program tion of the small plots of coca among estab- (PRAEDAC by its Spanish acronym). Initiated lished union families effectively increased in 1998 (during the peak of US-driven forced leaf prices and provided each family with the eradication), the landmark EU initiative func- equivalent of a monthly minimum wage. tioned on the premise that poverty reduction The ‘cato accord’ was initially designed as (through providing basic services), engaging a temporary measure;9 however, on entering coca grower organizations, land titling and office in 2006 President Evo Morales (an strengthening local governments can con- ex-coca grower) adopted the cato system as the tribute to break farmers’ reliance on coca Grisaffi and Ledebur: Citizenship or Repression? Coca, Art. 3, page 9 of 19 Eradication and Development in the Andes

(Farthing & Kohl 2005: 191). The German chains for dairy produce and built fruit and Technical Cooperation observed, ‘A key func- honey processing plants in the region. These tion of the EU’s policy has been to offer an initiatives have expanded the market for local alternative to the military focus and prohibi- produce. One farmer explained that the fruit tionist paradigm that USAID simultaneously juice processing plant (a state-owned enter- proposed and implemented.’ Within this prise run by a local union) buys his oranges context, the PRAEDAC project has been the at a set price and does not require him to be best ‘alternative example during the most part of a ‘producers association’. Others gave conflictive period in the Cochabamba Tropics similarly upbeat appraisals. (Chapare)’ (Addicks et al 2010: 35). One coca In contrast to US-driven initiatives, these grower mayor affirmed, government-led programs recognize the importance of restricted coca cultivation and Alternative development was pre- the strategic advantage of working with the viously conditioned on coca eradi- well-organized union structure. The Chapare cation. In contrast, PRAEDAC has farmers are making the most of these oppor- supported the municipalities uncon- tunities and are successfully diversifying ditionally and has been open to par- their sources of income. Giovanni Terrazas,13 ticipation and [community] control. the architect responsible for UDESTRO’s This means that PRAEDAC respects development arm, spoke about the success the population and our local leaders.10 of fish farming in the region: ‘we set up twelve model ponds and they were a success. Nicolaus Hansmann, attaché to the The farmers saw that it was profitable and Cooperation Section of the European Union they said, “I can do it too” and they started to in Bolivia, told the authors that beyond its dig their own pools; now there are 82 such concrete on-the-ground achievements, one ponds.’ The farmers concur with Giovanni’s of PRAEDAC’s most significant contributions analysis. One woman explained to the was to change the image of alternative devel- authors that her fishpond generated twice opment and to build trust in government the revenue of a cato and she said that she and legitimate the state in the region.11 Evo might abandon coca altogether. These pro- Morales described the EU-funded project jects are reducing the farmers’ dependency as ‘allies’ who, unlike USAID, ‘didn’t condi- on coca, with many now describing coca in tion or blackmail.’ (Los Tiempos 2006). In terms of a ‘savings account’ rather than their other words, PRAEDAC created a credible main source of income for daily expendi- foundation for community coca control. In tures. The fact that coca growers are willing fact, the Morales administration hired many to assume the risk associated with alternative ex-PRAEDAC Bolivian professionals to help income sources – be it fish farming or grow- design the country’s coca control initiative.12 ing oranges – marks an important subjective Building on this groundwork, once in power change. In 2011 the UNODC noted that for Morales’s Movement Towards Socialism the first time there had been a significant (MAS by its Spanish acronym) administration expansion of non-coca crops in the zone channelled development assistance to coca- (UNODC 2011: 47); even USAID echoed the growing regions and increased state pres- sentiment (GAO 2012: 17). ence through investments in roads, schools Chapare residents claim that today there and health posts to bring the region into are more jobs in non-agricultural work, gov- the economic and social mainstream. The ernment scholarships have allowed their government has also provided farming com- children to study at university and access to munities with access to mechanized tools cheap government loans means that they are to speed up production, such as rice husk- now able to start their own businesses. The ing machines and tractors, established cold economic upturn is visible. Until 2006 most Art. 3, page 10 of 19 Grisaffi and Ledebur: Citizenship or Repression? Coca, Eradication and Development in the Andes people used bicycles to get around but today Today Bolivian government and UNODC they have Chinese-built motorcycles and monitoring teams can accurately measure some even have cars. The coca growers have the coca crop and its distribution in situ.15 begun to replace their wooden shacks with As a result, for the first time in any country, houses made from bricks and mortar and, as there is a consensus amongst major play- a result of government infrastructure pro- ers and the international community about grams, access to basic services has expanded how much coca there is and where it can dramatically. be found.16 The data shows that in 2010 PRAEDAC’s initial efforts to strengthen the Bolivian coca crop stood at 31,000 hec- Chapare local government and reduce pov- tares but by 2014 it had declined to 20,400 erty allowed for the successful transition of hectares, less than half the coca found in coca control agencies (previously funded either Peru or Colombia (UNODC 2015b). and supervised by the US Narcotics Affairs Significantly, Bolivia has dramatically Section, NAS) to be efficiently run by farmer reduced its coca supply while respecting new representatives. The state offices that moni- benchmarks for success, including respect tor the distribution of the coca crop and plan for human rights, full citizenship rights for its reduction (UDESTRO) now integrate local farmers, empowering local communities and civil society representatives into state insti- developing long-term economic alternatives tutions, further enhancing their legitimacy. to coca (Farthing & Ledebur 2015; Youngers & Coca growers told the authors that workers Ledebur 2015). Undoubtedly, a negotiated at UDESTRO are now viewed as compañeros approach like Bolivia’s community control (partners) as opposed to enemies. One takes longer to show results than forced female farmer explained, ‘they understand eradication, yet coca reduction under the that we depend on coca’ and ‘we can talk to new system can be more readily sustained them, if there is a problem, then we can find as farmers are provided with real economic a solution.’14 Credible, first-hand knowledge alternatives. of coca farming, rapport and capacity built through training has led to the development How Community Coca Control Works on of transparent and efficient systems and the Ground guidelines that protect the subsistence rights Strong agricultural unions characterize the of the farmer. Chapare region. At the grassroots are the The control initiative also demonstrates sindicatos, territorially bound self-govern- Bolivia’s commitment to addressing the ing units composed of anything from 20 international community’s concerns about to 200 people. The sindicatos are grouped coca cultivation for the illegal market. The into sub-centrals, which in turn make up six Morales administration has made efforts to federations representing more than 40,000 industrialize coca for licit uses, including set- families. In the past policy makers viewed ting up coca processing plants to manufac- Bolivia’s coca grower organizations as an ture coca tea in sachets, along with a range of impediment to coca control. In contrast, other products. However, for the meantime today they are seen as key to the effective these plants run well below capacity because implementation of the cato policy and com- coca remains on the UN list of restricted plementary development initiatives. substances; as such, these products cannot In order to gain a cato, each member of be legally exported and the domestic legal a sindicato has to acquire a land title, regis- market cannot soak up Bolivia’s current coca ter for a bio-metric ID card and have their production. An EU-funded study suggests cato measured and logged by the state coca that Bolivia needs 14,000 hectares to satisfy monitoring institution (UDESTRO). It is then domestic consumption (CONALTID 2013), largely up to the sindicatos to exercise inter- far below Bolivia’s current production levels . nal controls to ensure that nobody exceeds Grisaffi and Ledebur: Citizenship or Repression? Coca, Art. 3, page 11 of 19 Eradication and Development in the Andes

Figure 4: Chapare coca leaf drying (Photo Courtesy of Thomas Grisaffi). this limit. The sindicatos are well positioned Farmers have good reasons to self-police. to do this as they have a long history of self- They designed the policy through partici- governing (Grisaffi 2013). Over the periods pation at grassroots meetings, giving them 2005-2007 and 2013-2014, Grisaffi attended a strong sense of ownership over it. Indeed regular Coca Federation meetings in the farmers often refer to the accord as ‘our lit- Chapare where he witnessed farmers evalu- tle cato’, others say that they respect the ating coca policy and enacting decisions cato because, ‘we fought for it’. Moreover, with the participation of the entire commu- the farmers know that by restricting coca nity. Base level sindicatos carry out regular cultivation the price of coca goes up. Thus checks of coca plantations to ensure that envidia (jealousy) plays an important role; all members comply with the agreement. one farmer said, ‘look – everyone knows First time offenders lose their right to grow how much coca I have and they don’t want coca for one year while repeat offenders lose me to get rich at their expense.’ As a result, coca-growing rights permanently and can be he said, ‘…they would not hesitate to turn expelled from their community. Coca grow- me in.’18 Finally the coca growers identify ers confirmed that the rules of the game are strongly with the goals of the MAS admin- clearly defined and they perceive the conse- istration; they sincerely believe that they quences for breaking the agreement to be have a duty to respect the cato as a support fair and logical (Grisaffi 2016). The sindicatos to Morales who they know is working to are serious about self-monitoring; indeed, legalize coca at the international level. One farmers claim that the controls are tighter Federation leader explained, ‘We respect today than when the US ‘zero coca’ policies the cato to shut up the international were enforced.17 community.’19 Art. 3, page 12 of 19 Grisaffi and Ledebur: Citizenship or Repression? Coca, Eradication and Development in the Andes

In spite of these advances, challenges per- this, the program also meets stated US goals sist with policy implementation, including to reduce coca acreage. In this sense it is a a minority of farmers who refuse comply win-win situation. with the regime. When a sindicato fails to exercise adequate control, representatives Best Practices from Bolivia from UDESTRO negotiate with community The United States has been highly critical of leaders and, if need be, they will organ- Bolivia’s coca policy; in September 2015 the ize for the coca to be forcibly eradicated. White House renewed the ‘decertification’ of However, violence no longer accompanies Bolivia for the eighth consecutive year, stat- eradication; as one female coca leader ing that the country had ‘failed demonstrably explains, ‘we no longer rebel when they in the past twelve months to make substan- come to cut the coca – we just show them tial efforts to adhere to its obligations under where it is and let them get on with their international counter-narcotics agreements’ work.’ Another explained that before they (The White House 2015). Not all evaluations were afraid of the security forces but now have been so negative, however. In 2014 the they see them as partners.20 EU Ambassador to Bolivia explained, ‘our Since the launch of the cato accord the efforts have been a success; you can also see coca growers are now motivated to actively the impact in the effective and sustained collaborate in the fight against drug produc- reduction of coca production…The European tion. Each sindicato takes on the responsibil- Union’s experience has been very positive’ ity to ensure that none of its members are (ERBOL 2014). The Organization of American involved in processing cocaine paste. If a States (OAS) cited Bolivia’s community coca production site is found on a members’ plot, control program as an example of, then the landowner will immediately lose their cato and potentially also their land. The best practices that are not just well profits derived from processing cocaine paste known but are also available for are so slim that most farmers are not willing implementation and replication. . . to run this risk. Rather, they are much more initiatives that enrich dialogue and likely to denounce traffickers to the police. can inspire each country to under- As a result of this pressure, the cocaine paste stand how it can successfully manage producers have been forced to alter their the various challenges posed by drugs behaviour, with many shifting their opera- within its particular context and eco- tions deeper into the jungle, but also outside nomic, political and social circum- of the Chapare and into urban areas (Grisaffi stances (Briones et al 2013: 6). 2014a). Community coca control is not easy and The 2016 UNGASS will see a significant lobby demands constant negotiations with coca- (including the EU and OAS) to advance ‘alter- growing communities; however, the long- native development’ instead of militarized term impact far outweighs its shortcomings. enforcement (Buxton 2015). It is essential From the perspective of the Chapare coca then that policy makers do not repeat the growers, the new policy is a step in the right same old mistakes. Bolivia provides valuable direction. The violence provoked by forced insights into how a different and more effec- coca eradication is regarded as a thing of the tive development strategy might be pursued. past and they have been able to re-establish The Bolivian case shows that successful crop themselves after years of impoverishment. reduction depends on the state treating coca Most coca growers agree that limiting coca farmers as citizens and partners, rather than cultivation is a small price to pay for peace, as criminals who actively stimulate the drug full citizenship and economic stability. trade. Land titling combined with the legal Although the US refuses to acknowledge recognition of a limited amount of coca can Grisaffi and Ledebur: Citizenship or Repression? Coca, Art. 3, page 13 of 19 Eradication and Development in the Andes create the framework for non-repressive The continuing presence of violent non- state engagement and the protection of citi- state actors and competing interests on the zen rights. The Bolivian experience illustrates ground – including various illicit industries that strong social organizations, with a sense like mining and logging – complicate the of group efficacy, have to be permitted within implementation of similar initiatives in Peru a state structure and be recognized as valid and Colombia.21 Yet, in spite of the crimi- counterparts in local coca control and devel- nalization of the coca farmers and on-going opment. Thus another important step is the conflict, civil society organizations exist in strengthening of local government (includ- both countries, often organizing to resist ing capacity building and guaranteed budget state eradication efforts (Durand Ochoa provision) to allow it to act upon coca grower 2014; Ramirez 2011). Following the Bolivian demands. The EU’s municipal strengthening example, the authors argue that rather than program in the Chapare region is a key exam- an impediment to coca control or a ‘threat’, ple in this regard. these organizations and their members are National governments and their local the key to successful implementation of operators also need to focus on provid- coca control policies, income diversifica- ing adequate social services, such as road tion programs and ensuring the rule of law. infrastructure, health and education (basic For example the presence of strong social responsibilities of all states) without condi- organizations in some coca-growing regions tioning them as rewards for eradication of of Peru, paired with a significant licit coca coca crops. Delinking human development market, provides potential tools to work from crop and drug control objectives is an with to implement community coca control. indispensable prerequisite to establish the However, Peru’s President Ollanta Humala legitimacy of state actions and the trust to remains firmly committed to US-funded implement further initiatives. Control efforts forced eradication.22 will inevitably fail if policymakers continue The Colombian coca farmers have long to operate a system that encourages people advocated alternative approaches to coca in coca-producing regions to perceive the control. For example in 1994 (before the government as a repressor and not as a ser- advent of aerial fumigation) Colombian vice provider. farmers proposed a coca-for-subsistence Finally, coca production cannot be signifi- model with production ceilings for com- cantly reduced without implementation of a munity coca reduction. The government viable sustainable livelihoods approach. It is rejected this innovative approach and coca common sense that proper sequencing is a production spiralled thereafter.23 The end of crucial element to integrated development aerial fumigation and increased potential for in coca producing regions. Yet, the Bolivian a peace accord between the Colombian gov- approach goes further by employing sub- ernment and the FARC indicate that there sistence income from coca (which has no is political will to look for alternatives. The comparable substitute in terms of income draft agreement on ‘The Solution to the Illicit generation) as the anchor for unprecedented Drug Problem’ calls for voluntary crop reduc- income and crop diversification. It is not fea- tion, integrated sustainable development ini- sible to apply Bolivia’s unique home-grown tiatives and the active participation of local strategy in other coca-growing or illicit communities in planning and execution, all crop production regions without significant features of the Bolivian model. However, in modification appropriate to each context. spite of these positive steps, the Colombian Nevertheless, the community coca control government continues to insist on the total initiative presents some fundamental ele- elimination of coca production and that crop ments that could be adapted and integrated ‘substitution’ is possible and viable (Schaffer & into strategies elsewhere. Youngers 2015). Art. 3, page 14 of 19 Grisaffi and Ledebur: Citizenship or Repression? Coca, Eradication and Development in the Andes

The draft version of the peace accord con- modification, this strategy risks falling ditions development assistance and state short of its objective and justifying further engagement on farmers meeting prior agree- violent forced eradication, fumigation and ments for coca eradication. It puts timelines repression. for compliance in place without establish- ing similar deadlines for the state initiative. Conclusion The accord also sets unrealistic timespans Peru, Colombia and Bolivia share a long for the provision of aid that will guarantee history of ineffectual forced eradication, subsistence until other sources of income criminalization of coca farmers and failed can be implemented. The government pro- development initiatives. So long as external poses six months while the FARC has sug- demand for illicit drugs remains, people will gested two years (Mesa de Conversaciones keep growing coca because it presents a solu- 2014). Looking at the Bolivian experience the tion to families’ subsistence needs, which authors would suggest far longer is needed. cannot be easily replaced. Thus all that drug Bolivia’s sustainable development initiatives policy makers can realistically ever achieve took almost a decade to be consolidated and is to affect how and where coca is grown. still farmers are dependent on coca. In short, Given these parameters, if US policymakers the FARC-Government of Colombia accords remain committed to supply-side initiatives borrow key pillars of Bolivia’s community then they should opt for reduced coca pro- coca control strategy without adopting its duction with guaranteed subsistence as a indispensable cornerstones: coca for sub- human alternative to the myth of total eradi- sistence and lack of conditionality. Without cation. Less coca grown by engaged citizens,

Figure 5: A Chapare family bags coca leaves (Photo courtesy of Thomas Grisaffi). Grisaffi and Ledebur: Citizenship or Repression? Coca, Art. 3, page 15 of 19 Eradication and Development in the Andes who can feed their families, is preferable to as they represent a very small segment continued eradication with the associated of Colombia’s population (around 3 per violence, poverty and recurring failure. cent) coca use is very restricted. To achieve sustainable, effective and safe 3 The justification for classifying coca as coca reduction, the Bolivian experience an illegal substance has its roots in a teaches that governments should provide UN study published in 1950. This study basic services and infrastructure in compli- has since been discredited as inaccurate ance with their obligations to their citizens and racist for its characterization of coca and not as incentives for crop reduction. chewing as a disgusting, backward and States and the international community dangerous habit. should seek to empower grassroots organi- 4 These negative environmental impacts zations and create the conditions for their are not restricted to coca farming. We inclusion and collaboration with coca policy. might expect similar results if tropical Finally, the international community must colonization was provoked by gold min- shift its focus and demands away from mean- ing, logging or ranching. ingless eradication statistics to human devel- 5 Since 2009 UNODC data shows that over- opment indicators to measure progress in all coca crop acreage has decreased (mostly coca-growing regions. Bolivia’s experiment driven down by efforts in Colombia). with community coca control opens the door 6 In 2000 the US and Colombia jointly for other countries to experiment with alter- launched Plan Colombia, an eight-billion native approaches to reduce coca acreage. dollar ‘aid’ package (80 per cent of which is destined for the police and military) Competing Interests with the stated aim to reduce narcotics The authors declare that they have no com- production by half within six years and to peting interests. regain security in the country. 7 Author interview with coca farmer 2006 Acknowledgements 8 Author interview, Egberto Chipana. The authors would like to thank the partici- Chipiriri, Chapare, 2006. pants at the ‘Insecure Spaces in Latin America: 9 The terms of the October 2004 accord Encounters with Violence and Drugs’ work- stipulated that the cato policy and coca shop, held at the University of Oxford distribution would be re-evaluated (27th November 2014). The authors would also after the publication of a broad-based like to thank the following people and organ- legal market study. Publication of the isations, Insa Koch, Linda Farthing, Nicolaus long-awaited study occurred in October Hansmann, Pedro Arenas, Ricardo Vargas, the 2013. Unidad de Control Social Vice Ministerio de 10 Feliciano Mamani, Villa Tunari Mayor. Defensa Social, and The Federación Especial Author interview 12 December 2007 de Trabajadores Campesinos del Trópico de 11 Nicolaus Hansmann, EU. 11 November Cochabamba (FETCTC). 2014, electronic communication 12 Author interviews with Carlos Hoffman, Notes 2010, 2011, 2012 and Jonas Rojas 2010. 1 This research was funded by the Open 13 Author interviews with Giovanni Terazzas, Society Foundation, the SSRC/Open Shinahota, Chapare 2013. Society Foundation’s Drugs, Security and 14 Author interview with farmer, Chapare Democracy Fellowship, the Leverhulme 2013 Trust and the Economic and Social 15 Bolivia shares its coca data with the United Research Council. Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. 2 In Colombia, some indigenous peoples 16 Coca data in Bolivia is now so accu- have traditionally used coca; however, rate that in 2013 the United States Art. 3, page 16 of 19 Grisaffi and Ledebur: Citizenship or Repression? Coca, Eradication and Development in the Andes

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How to cite this article: Grisaffi, T and Ledebur, K 2016 Citizenship or Repression? Coca, Eradication and Development in the Andes. Stability: International Journal of Security & Development, 5(1): 3, pp. 1–19, DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/sta.440

Submitted: 26 October 2015 Accepted: 07 March 2016 Published: 31 March 2016

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