CEU eTD Collection Second Reader: Professor Julian Casanova Géro András Professor Supervisor: Regaining the Homeland: How Middle-Class Soldiers and Officers Came ToFight For Károlyi and Kun In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Central European University European Central Budapest, Hungary History Department Timothy Helmick Timothy Master of Arts Master Submitted to Submitted 2012 CEU eTD Collection instructions may not be made without the written permission of the Author.” the of permission written the without be made not may instructions must form a part of any such copies made. Further copies made in accordance with such lodged in the Central European Library. Details may be obtained from the librarian. This page may in and part, full be in given by with Author only or made instructions the the accordance “Copyright in the text of this thesis rests with the Author. Copies by any process, either Statement of Copyright i CEU eTD Collection soldiers throughout both the Károlyi and Kun governments, and show how the level of level the how show and governments, Kun and Károlyi the both throughout soldiers nationalism and patriotism expressed by soldiers and officers of the Hungarian Army. Miklos Lojko’s theory of sovereignty of the Hungarian Holy Crown to explain the element of boundaries undermining resistance to outside interference. Iwill also use Ferenc Eckhart and conception; ultimate sovereignty is sought, and the latter stressing the social aspects in a Marxian gain used to in formerpower) from the of perspective the arguing which political-conflict are directed tocorrectly identifying revolution, (whichboth Károlyithe and Kun governments 2 1978. University Press. Cambridge, 1979. Tilly, Charles. ability to be an effective coercive power over the soldiers. the over power be coercive aneffective ability to violence by the state, multiple sovereignty in the separated territories, and the state losing its monopoly mylossof of validate of the part second the thesis; that factors principal three regimes. Theoretically I will draw upon both Theda Skocpol and Charles Tilly to establish sovereignty as the defining motivation that allowed these middle class soldiers to fight for both of the military under the Károlyi and Kun regimes; providing the loss of homeland/threat to 1 Skocpol, Skocpol, Theda. My research will highlight the commonality of the demand placed on the state by the I will employ the tool of comparative history to invoke the differences and similarities States, 2 and allowme to explain the effect of the loss of clearly defined national pgs. 6-16 pgs. States and Social Revolutions A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China, Abstract From Mobilization to Revolution to From Mobilization ii 1 Both the Tilly and Skocpol theories Skocpol and Tilly the Both , Addison Wesley, Reading. Cambridge CEU eTD Collection governments attained in pursuit of the reclamation effort. these level of measured by success wasdirectly the governments tothese commitment iii CEU eTD Collection to the Hungarian officers and soldiers to whom it is written about, your legacy lives on. time tohelpme my develop sovereignty Finally,argument. like Iwould dedicate to this work you have given me for paperthis has been immense, anditwas very of kind you to yourtake Ger with the necessary knowledge to operate at a graduate degree level. Tomy advisors, Professors others didn’t. To my professors at the Virginia Military Institute, thank youfor imbuing me Rutman, for always treating me like the son they never had, and believing in me even when brother, Casey Helmick,for his support and good humor. My grandparents, Cathy and Tim meencouraged in getting agood education and to continue thateducation my life.entire My because Iwouldeven not be in positionthe doto something of magnitudethis had they not keep things I felt nervous about. I have to thank my parents Jerry and Colleen Helmick, I have been. Her listening skills gave me the confidence to strike out things not needed, or to many sleepless nights while I typed away in the other room, enduring my moods, as difficult as were indispensable in writingthe of this work; notably my lovely wife whoDóra has endured that people several Thereare other andsuccess. disaster between is difference guidance the continued His me, upon bestowed has He talent the for God praise to like would I Firstly Ę and Casanova, thank you for the many revisions and advice. To Professor Lojko, the help Acknowledgments 1 CEU eTD Collection ODE...... 55 SOLDIER...... CHAPTER 4 EXIT THE WHITE (ASTER) KNIGHT: ON STORMS THE RED FOOT CHAPTER 3 ENTER THE WHITE (ASTER) KNIGHT: 41 KAROLYI’S NEW ...... DIRECTION CHAPTER 2 DISSOLUTION: 27 IS HOME STILL HOME?...... CHAPTER 1 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK...... 12 ...... 5 INTRODUCTION LIST OF MAPS, FIGURES AND ILLUSTRATIONS...... 4 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS...... 1 ...... II ABSTRACT II. I. III. II. I. III. II. I. II. I. III. II. I. III. II. I. T T B. A. C. B. A. B. B. What to do now that we madeit home? A. T HE HE HE T R S T T T S T S S N ZÉKELY ITUATION ECURING OVEREIGNTY FOR S HE RYING TO PICK UP ALL THE PIECES THE ALL UP PICK TO RYING HE HE HE TWOSIDES ESIGNATION OF ESIGNATION THE E OUTHERN ORTHERN Advantage [N]Vixed D Army Alliance: Is War-making or Politics more important? Starting to Unravel A Failed Negotiations (Choosing Sides) Familiar strains of the same song (Echoes of 48’) M Ex-soldiers…New Sovereignty…Hungary’s new (old) ideaof territorial integrity and what meant it Where do we go from here? ASTERN T B ESPERATE A ONOPOLY OF ONOPOLY B RANSITION FROM RANSITION EGINNING OF THE OF EGINNING RMY MAKES ANASSESSMENT LEAK D IVISION S R F OVEREIGNTY F F EPORT RONT RONT RONT C T IMES CALL FOR CALL IMES HRISTMAS : ( V ...... 34 ...... S A : WHERE THE PIECES FELL PIECES THE WHERE OLDIERS ...... 32 ...... 31 ...... IOLENCE W T RANSYLVANIA HERE DID THE P E ...... 37 ...... ASSIVE TO ASSIVE ...... 52 ...... K ND ...... 62 ...... ÁROLYI GOVERNMENT , (C ...... 41 ...... 36 ...... W D OMMUNISM ON THE RADAR THE ON OMMUNISM HO IS IN CHARGE HERE CHARGE IN IS HO ESPERATE ...... 27 ...... 46 ...... F S ORCED K Table of Contents TALWART ÁROLYI GOVERNMENT STAND ...... 64 ...... M A ...... 31 ...... 46 ...... EASURES CTIVE ) ...... 57 ...... 47 ...... 55 ...... 2 (C ...... 39 ?...... (A OMMUNISM GETS IT CHANCE AT GOVERNANCE CTIVE ...... 41 ...... ) R ...... 50 ...... ESISTANCE ...... 43 ...... ? ...... 55 ...... 59 )...... ) ...62 ...... 36 .. CEU eTD Collection BIBLIOGRAPHY...... 98 MAPS, FIGURES, IMAGES, ILLUSTRATIONS...... 97 SZÉKELY DIVISION BEING INSPECTED BY KÁROLYI FIGURE 6...... 96 1919 OFFENSIVES FIGURE 5...... 95 NORTHERN CAMPAIGN IN SLOVAKIA ...... 94 FIGURE 4 HUNGARIAN-ROMANIAN-CZECH POSITIONS MAY 1, 1919 ...... 93 FIGURE 3 HUNGARIAN-ROMANIAN POSITIONS APRIL 1919 FIGURE 2...... 92 DEMARCATION ZONES IN HUNGARIAN PERIPHERY ...... 90 FIGURE 1 CONCLUSIONS...... 83 CHAPTER 5 THE IMPLEMENTATION OF AN AGGRESSIVE 70 FOREIGN POLICY...... III. II. I. III. B. A. C. S C TEP ONTINUING ORGANIZATION ONTINUING French Intervention (Fait accompli) O Initial Success (A Weak link in the tightening chain) Recruitment for the Reds R ED VERALL MILITARY OUTLOOK MILITARY VERALL T WO A IMS (W ...... 66 ...... HAT OPTION DO WE DO TAKE HAT OPTION ...... 68 ...... (O : RIGIN OF RIGIN J UNE ...... 81 ...... 1, ?) 1919 B ...... 74 ...... ATTLE ...... 78 ...... 3 P LANS ...... 70 ...... ) ...... 70 ...... CEU eTD Collection SZÉKELY DIVISION BEING INSPECTED BY KÁROLYI FIGURE 6...... 96 1919 OFFENSIVES FIGURE 5...... 95 NORTHERN CAMPAIGN IN SLOVAKIA ...... 94 FIGURE 4 HUNGARIAN-ROMANIAN-CZECH POSITIONS MAY 1, 1919 ...... 93 FIGURE 3 HUNGARIAN-ROMANIAN POSITIONS APRIL 1919 FIGURE 2...... 92 DEMARCATION ZONES IN HUNGARIAN PERIPHERY ...... 90 FIGURE 1 List of Maps, FiguresandIllustrations of List 4 CEU eTD Collection Press. New York, 2002. pg. 62 they were freed from obligation to the Emperor but forced to choose to either return home,either choose return to to butforced Emperor tothe from freedobligation they were Hungarian soldiers whohad been serving in Austro-Hungarianthe Imperial Army,in which 4 defense. insulting and provocative prospect for men whom hadjust shed blood, sweat and tears for four years inits 3 never want to see another soldieragain!” never to want of the new Minister of Defense, Béla Linder, who proclaimed “We want no armed forces! I situation,many of soldiersthe chosetoreturn homeward; perhaps heeding the public statement post-Hapsburgthe Hadik governmentandfacing anambiguous anddangerously lawless to join newlythe independent Hungarian Republic. With noreal clear direction being given by chronologically set forth the events. The Hadik government, quickly replaced following the military gave situation, fighting.up the military foughtto regain homeland;their and when goalbecamethis untenable, dueto the governments? This paper will argue that soldiers of newlythe formed independentHungarian middle and upper class fight for the primarily pacifist Károlyi and relatively bellicose Kun Ignác Romsics. Ignác Notnecessarily within the boundaries of the previous Kingdom ofHungary following the border revisions; an Following the signing of the Armistice at Padua in early November, a new era began for But thispresuppose is to outcomethe investigation, of inour which I would prefer to The Dismantling of Historic Hungary The Peace Treaty of Trianon, 1920 Introduction 4 This begs the question, then, why did soldiers of the 5 , Columbia University 3 or CEU eTD Collection political and social challenge. 5 the Rumanian Army was near Budapest. To stem the advance, class instinct merged with republic, and the Soviet Republic that followed. Péter Pástor remarks that in “the end of April, an orderly fashion. Soldiers had an essential role in all aspects of both the Social Democratic recruits, but also in securing the frontier so that a sizeable force would have the time to form in Their expertise and know-how would be notonlyinvaluable in andtraining preparingnew Army. former Imperial of the werethe andsoldiers officers borders to defend country’s the quickly, was a priority. In this situation, the only available forces already trained and prepared of negotiation. table the at aplace given Károlyi notfound that only were Hungary’s arguments going unheard; evenshe would not be Austria and Germany, and therefore was undesirable as a partner in mediation. Therefore Unfortunately, was this unsuccessful to due perceptionthe Hungary that hadalongside stood arena. solve in itsdilemmas to diplomatic all was desperately trying the government making respectively were toPowers, borders AlliedGreat Károlyidemands the territorial the delayed. As the Serbian, Romanian, and Czech forces surrounding the south, east and northern be longer no could question military the borders, Hungarian new the surrounding nations Károlyi’s semi-Socialist government, and the creation and consolidation of the newly formed was pushed aside for ashort time. However, with the coming to power in November 1918 of White Aster revolution, Whichswept Mihály Károlyi into power asfirst Prime Ministerand then later President, also facing adaunting At this point, it became apparent that the necessity of a military, and one formed one and military, a of necessity the that apparent became it point, this At 5 had its hands full politically and socially so that militarythe question 6 CEU eTD Collection (Columbia University Press. New York, 1976) pg. 150 convictions tounite toprotect Hungarianthe national from territory foreign Forencroachment. Serbs and Romanians. It was hoped that these men could disregard their own political their homeland would be lost foreverHungary to through machinationsthe of Czechs,the appeal to patriotism; butmore importantly, by praying on the fears of these same soldiers that and goal,homelandultimate Hungarian borders their within control. reestablishing for them was the what towardsachieving it step was seen as as aproactive join cause, the middleencouraged class andofficers soldiers whowerebefore undecided abouttheirloyalty to areas of Hungary that had been seized during the Károlyi diplomatic failure. This further back totake wereconceived operations for first the offensive increased and time training was Republic of Hungary and to reject Allied demands.The Hungarian army recruitment and government to resign rather than capitulate, paving the way for Kun to declare the Soviet Transylvania (to become part of the Kingdom of Romania) forced the decision of the Károlyi in from borders retreat Hungarian Upper Hungary established both the and (Slovakia) power in March of 1919. The Vix Ultimatum requiring the Hungarian army and bureaucracy to themilitary.was accomplished through 6 Hungarian Red Army.” national pride andhalf workingthe population Budapestof enlisted in newly formedthe Péter Pásztor, This recruitment of middle class soldiers and officers was primarily done through an through done primarily was officers and soldiers class middle of recruitment This This recruitment continued under the Kun government, which unexpectedly seized Hungary Between Wilson and Lenin: The Hungarian Revolution of 1918-1919 and the Big Three 6 Support for Support military, the forit, andthrough the support two regimes 7 , CEU eTD Collection both both regimes, even though their political military and goals were differently. executed loss of homeland as the defining motivation that allowed these middle class soldiers to fight for differences and similarities of the military under the Károlyi and Kun regimes; providing the which I use it, a new approach. I will employ the tool of comparative history to invoke the 15 years. The methodological way in which I will use them, however, is, in the manner in revelatory, norhave most of publicationsthe Ihave used for been support in published lastthe analysis. without correspondence, of context general in the only then and the correspondence and personal thoughts of officers and soldiers and theirmotivation to fight, 7 book, his of section aspecific details Fogarassy Laszló Only motivations. andofficers of soldiers issue the economic, and diplomatic considerations, which lead to the poverty of time spent addressing in part of a larger context of the entire inter-war period, and also coupled with political, social, haveOrmos addressed issue the of Hungarianthe military during thistime period; butmostly Kun government. Noted Hungarian historians such as Ervin Liptai, Béla K. Király, and Maria justification of Admiral Horthy to allow these officers to continue careers after the fall of the the of analysis the further to only or factors secondary as examination broader in a only but publications, prior in with dealt been have reasons These army. Hungarian independent new by the dissolution of the former Imperial Army,but having the possibility of renewal under the the officers, another consideration that plays a part is the continuation of their careers, cut short The Military Collapse of the Hungarian Council Republic Most of the material I have used is notand cannot be considered tobe new or A Magyarországi Tanácsköztársaságkatonai összeomlása, 8 (1988) 7 to addressing CEU eTD Collection 10 1978) University Press. Cambridge, 1979) Tilly, Charles. 9 longer conducive to the recaptureof thehomeland. 8 conception; which ultimate sovereignty is sought, and the latter stressing the social aspects in a Marxian revolution, correctly formeridentifying from the in arguing perspectivethe of political-conflict validatesecondpartofmy the that factors principal thesis; Theoretically I will draw upon both Theda Skocpol and Charles Tilly to establish three effective coercive power over the soldiers. the over power coercive effective the state, multiple sovereignty in the separated territories, and the state losing its ability to be an former Austro-Hungarian inAustro-Hungarian former fight soldiers to for turn newly the establishedRepublic Hungarian Stephen,its particular importance for Hungarian sovereignty, and themotivation it provided for state will be expanded upon. The theoretical aspect of the effect of the Holy Crown of saint sovereignty, howit is applied, and towhat purpose it affects the struggle for existence of the sovereignty and the maintenance of national territory to the foreground. A definition of governments attained in pursuit of the reclamation effort. these level of bythe success measured wasdirectly governments tothese of commitment level the how show and governments, Kun and Károlyi the both throughout soldiers by the state the on placed demand the of commonality the highlight will research My interference. outside theory of the effect of the loss of clearly defined national boundaries undermining resistance to ThedaSkocpol, The reluctanceto continue fighting forthe Károlyi and Kun governments when the military situation was no Skocpol, The first chapter will establish the theoretical background, bringing the importance of States, 10 and allowme to explain the smaller picture of motivation through the greater States and Social Revolutions A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China, p. 6-16 From Mobilization to Revolution to Mobilization From 9 Both the Tilly and Skocpol theories are directed to 9 8 loss of the monopoly of violence by , (Addison Wesley, Reading. (Cambridge CEU eTD Collection remaining Hungarian territory, and how this undermined the regime in the eyes of the military this legitimacy. Particular attention will be paid to the lack of military success in holding onto secure to werewilling soldiers the whether and rule will be reviewed, capitulate. Legitimate or Károlyi’s execution of negotiations, the issue of Army politics, and the choices to either defend intentions, their revealing takeover, Kun subsequent the and regime Károlyi the of study agreement. peace ever-changing an and borders of shifting constant the with along state, former their of of governance and adjustment of the soldier’s and their families to life outside the boundaries soldier’s loyalty. A section will be devoted to the effect of the changing of the former system the for in exchange areas inthese sovereignty its reassert to state the of responsibilities the and entities, foreign to homeland of loss the cleavage, national the of aspect psychological the to benchmarks must be achieved to secure the loyalty of the armed forces. Attention will be paid andwhat is expected of what it; upanexpectation setting thereby serving soldiers the war. of years long four after battles of series another fighting continue to desire the understanding admiration. The motivation and indoctrination of the soldiers critically plays a role in Hungarian soldiers, and a patriotic symbol that carried enormous amounts of respect and will also be treated. Its importance cannot be overstated; as an anchoring factor in the minds of The third followed chapter, by complementingthe fourth, will address empiricalthe and of state the relationship the of aspect theoretical the willexplore The secondchapter 10 CEU eTD Collection giving the reader an idea of what their post-revolutionary careers were. careers an idea reader theirpost-revolutionary of what giving the insight into the further careers of the primary source soldiers and officers whom were involved; governments whom politically couldnot normally count on their allegiance. Itwill also give the motivation of middle class soldiers, who under adverse conditions accepted the control of morelight onto once focus casting on control.will Theconclusion foreign state of acceptance be examined, as well as the acquiescence in the total loss formerof Hungarian territories and lack loyalty of will subsequent andthe giveandin indoctrination, to areluctance to government the eastern front. The psychology of defeat in victory, disillusionment with the Communist to the demoralization of the armed forces and the eventual collapse against the Romanians on forprospect continued campaigning, capitulation the and Clemenceauto the leading ultimatum, to strike andagainstwhom. and the military campaign waged tosecure it, and finally the decisions taken to choose where of for the repatriation lostterritory that reconquestpreparation territory, of topursue soldiers class middle by the politics of aside setting the address will Sections policy. military on aggressive foreign policy, driven by its communist ideological world-view, solely in its effect over time will deal with the emergence of the Kun government, and its abrupt shift an to The fifth chapter will discuss the effects of the victory in Upper Hungary/Slovakia, the 11 CEU eTD Collection which I will show that the Hungarian middle-class soldiers were aware of sovereignty as a regard to sovereignty. Finally I will bring together the methodology of comparative analysis,in following the provisional armistice in late 1918,and how militarythe itsformulated goals in Then I will apply this theory specifically to the empirical case of the Republic of Hungary itself of the state, the need for, maintenance of, and pursuit of which defines the state and its goals. be as weexplore for myfindings. readertorefer the to astructure creating thereby elaborated; must tool methodological a as history comparative employ will I which in manner the Kun regimes. To begin this analysis however, some normative definitions of sovereignty, and their fight to regain lost territory in the former Kingdom of Hungary, during the Károlyi and of comparative history, Iplan to analyze the reasoning of middle-class Hungarian soldiers in even survives. Sovereignty is in and of itself an historical study, and through the methodology it not alsobut whetheror isstate future successof the the of only states indicative not other to relation in externally and population own its over internally both achieves it that sovereignty Winston Churchill up the best alternative open, and if so, it is folly not to work for it with all your might.” 11 Winston Churchill as quoted in: Roy Jenkins, First, Iwill deal with the theoretical aspects of sovereignty in its defining characteristics Sovereignty is the key principle in which every state is measured; the level of “In war as in life, it is often necessary when some cherished scheme has failed, to take Theoretical Framework Churchill, A Biography, Chapter 1 12 (New York, Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 2001) 11 CEU eTD Collection service, or yield other resources.” yieldother or service, [the state] provide men for its armies, feed its functionaries, honor its symbols, give time to its of framework definitions by thatclaiming permanent the population normally “paysit, taxesto Macropolitical Theory, had at some point both gained and lost forms of sovereignty in the course of their existence, revolution, civil war, or invasion. elements are missing or altered, the state itself can be in jeopardy, such as during times of potential with actual anditor states.” other competes order, state, when she argues that a “state normally performs two basic sets of tasks: It maintains the of expectations further two out points Skocpol Theda somewhat, definition this strengthen 14 political entity that encompasses the most widely recognized criteria: permanent population, defined territory,permanent government,and the capacity criteria: to enter into relations with other states. recognized widely most the encompasses that entity political Skocpol and Charles Tilly. The Montevideo Convention requirements for a state are that itis a provide the framework is that coming sought, from Convention Montevideothe 1948, Theda of its boundaries,its expectations and its responsibilities. Three definitions of the state will regime, while still supporting its aims, toadvance their professional careers. mechanism fromabstention of politics and wereable toavoididentifying themselves with the 13 12 Tilly, “Revolutions and Collective Action” in Skocpol, Montevideo Convention of 1948 Absolute sovereignty and the state arenot always mutually interdependent; many states A normative definition of the state is also necessary beginto the study of sovereignty; States, p. 30 p.520-521 14 These criteria are necessary for a state to function; when to function; for astate necessary are These criteria Handbook of Political Science, 13 13 Charles Tilly rounds off the ed. Greenstein and Polsby, Vol. 3, 12 To CEU eTD Collection 18 Columbia University Press, 1998) p. 8 17 195 2010) p. 16 independence many times during the 19 the exact timeperiod being discussed, and Yugoslavia, and the countries contained within have gained and lost Skocpol asSkocpol describingquotes as state the “basically coercion.”organized that best functions in the explanation of these aims comes from Charles Tilly, whom Theda How does the state accomplish these two parts of the ultimate goal of sovereignty? The theory that further enumerates Gombár Csaba light, inanother theory this put To border. external the maintain and protect to force the state must be able torely on absolute control of the populace to allow the use of armed their borders are secure in order to recognize the legitimacy of the state, while at the same time mustfeel that Population other. is establish the of control one the because required to tandem in they must beaccomplished each other; external nor precede sovereignty internal Neither most notably in the struggle to establish the state. sovereignty multiple times in the 19 15 itas: defines Jamesareas. Tully border external it the and internal mustin both as equation, be the is territory established a two-part Skocpol, Csaba ElémerGombár, Hankiss,László Lengyel, GyörgyiVarnai, James Tully in Hent Kalmo, Quentin Skinner Examples in Central Europe abound, for example Poland, throughout its tumultuous history has gained or lost internally but externally as well. circumscribed by state boundaries, where the central authority is recognized not only Sovereignty is aqualified state of the supreme authority in a political system from external subordination. people or association of peoples to govern themselves by their own laws and ways free Sovereignty in thisnon-absolute sense means the authority of aculturally diverse State and Social Revolutions, Social and State th and 20 16 p. 26 from Tilly, th and 20 17 th century alone; the Kingdomof Romania grew and shrank during Sovereignty in Fragments th centuries also. 14 From Mobilization, 15 It must also be mentioned that sovereignty The Appeal of Sovereignty , (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p. 52 18 , (New York, CEU eTD Collection If that loyalty is questioned or challenged, then police and auxiliary forces within the state’s foremost. first and threat focus primarily on the military aspect of sovereignty, which in this case deals with the external sovereignty, but this naturally lies outside of the focus of this study because I have chosen to the two forms of sovereignty. I will briefly treat what is needed to maintain internal the maintenance of the legitimacy of the state, we must decide with what tool the state secured Therefore, if we are to activate these two theories as the basis for the primacy of sovereignty in takeover. Communist the and Kun through then and quasi-Socialism, with Monarchy place in the context of revolutions in Hungary,first through Károlyi replacing the old Dual include theirregimesas both theories inthe comparativediscussed methodology I usetake Although Tilly and Skocpol primarily deal with revolutionary causes, Ifeel itis important to of stateas derivingthe from directly tied to a regime’s legitimacy for its populace. Skocpol therefore defines the is legitimacy sovereignty how to inregards theory coercion Tilly’s with beneficial mutually but context, are included in the bibliography. Hungarian Communist regime, and their use within the internal situation between March and June 1919, which 20 19 Someexcellent articles and books have been written about the use of the newly formed Red Guard within the Ibid, p. 32 Internal sovereignty is therefore dependent on the loyalty of the populace to the regime. situation. international the in developments by also and structure organizations, these as are conditioned by developments in the economy and class breakdown. But the of regime basic causes analysis willan in be found variable in the structuremediating a as and capacities figure may of groups state powerful The ebbing (of a regime’s legitimacy) in the eyes of its own cadres and other politically Skocopol has a slightly different view of the methods of state control, Marxian in 20 15 19 CEU eTD Collection University Press, 1990)p.18 University 23 22 Cambridge University Press, 2006) p. 80 and territoriality pillars] important [as history: its of elements distinctive two places legitimacy itswith populace.David Heldin “the same argues the modernpublication state that by which the Army is able to provide the external sovereignty that the state needs to gain Either the maintenance or the expansion of territory, therefore, is the primary method or means that Hall foes.asserts Stuart external against maintained legitimacy of governmentthe is calledinto question. then the borders, within contiguous the order maintain to necessary armedforces are the defined territory, perform the necessary task of providing uniform presence of rule of law. If States and Social Revolutions 21 violence that sovereignty. Therefore, the Army’s primary purpose is to execute the monopoly of violence, against other peoples (or in the modern era against other states) that seek to challenge specifically, the Army. This is because external sovereignty is historically established through used by the state to maintain external sovereignty is primarily the armed forces, and line of reasoning then leads to the necessary discussion of necessary leadsdiscussion tothe then line of reasoning StuartHall inGregor McLennon, David Held,StuartHall, Tilly, Michael Brown, From Mobilization toRevolution Mobilization From and legal rule. legal and members of a state; but mainly because of the need establishto the boundaries to power senses of “belonging,” sentiments of loyalty, are important constituents of being sovereignty… Yet territory matters for the definition of sovereignty, partly because the remains land a powerfulto element in the complex attachment The of attitudes and feelingsmobilized “territory.” around with ways complex in linked also is Sovereignty 22 that the state controls, against the external threats faced by the state. Following this International Dimensions of Internal Conflicts, 23 , p. 5-28, Stathis N. Kalyvas 16 The Logic of Violence in Civil War The Idea Modernof the State 21 (Cambridge, MIT Press, 1996) p. 1-29, Skocpol 1996)p.1-29, MITPress, (Cambridge, More importantly for this study, the tool how this monopoly of violence is violence of monopoly this , (Philadelphia, Open , (Cambridge, CEU eTD Collection that have a stake in political participation was the addition of military asasuccessful military service of addition was the in haveastake that participation political gatheringfurther portions of populationthe into foldthe of responsible voting constituencies major usedin tools the Oneof andhave usedthem accordingly. of changes, these directions have been cognizant of several political tools which allow them to control the pace and nation’s debates and issues. Following that path, governments and elites within these states larger portions of its populace, and their inclusion in the political process that shapes each path the plural to democracies, primarily thethrough of process largerenfranchisement of and andhow it is unique ascompared European to other nations. be some historical analysis of the specificity of the Hungarian historical claim of sovereignty, needsto there in are addressed, time period question the of circumstances Before the followed. only for the first revolutionary government, but also for the more extreme Communist one that couldunderstandinmiddle-class have what fightsoldiers caused army Hungarian the notto the Romanian army. By establishing the motive, the background, it will allow us to better led tothe collapse of Kungovernmentthe in July of 1919 and theoccupation by of Budapest Hungary following the loss of the First World War, and the political and military events that the state ultimately faces revolution, civil war, or invasion. violence.” 25 24 Tilly, Ibid, p. 62 From Mobilization toRevolution Mobilization From Many nations in haveEurope emerged from beginningthe of monarchiesabsolute along Thus we emerge into a position in which we can discuss the specific circumstances of 24 Without this “ultimate sovereignty,” , p.202-209 17 25 i.e. both external and internal sovereignty, internal and external both i.e. CEU eTD Collection megalakulasa legenda kritikajahoz (A szt. korona eredetkerdese) Europe’s surviving monarchies, is at best acontentious issue. the Holy Crown of Saint Stephen. members ofher noble classconsistently played asatrumpin opposition to theDual Monarchy; that hadapeculiar HabsburgMonarchy, complex the tradition relationshipincreasingly to thought throughout Europe, kings made the passage of their power hereditary, and thereby relationship changed through Reformation, Enlightenment, the advancement the and political of responsible, but the idea of kingship in absence of the body was also entirely relevant. As this origins, and was king in both a physical and spiritual sense. The physical body was centuries, was connected to a monarch, who in all likelihood derived his power from divine itA was knowncrown, as to most Europeans during eleventh the to through eighteenththe approaching late the nineteenth century middle itswithin upper the class,sets meaning aside. relationship that the noble class within Hungary had, with the so-called Holy Crown, with investment in the state system based on previous service. of malepopulace the alarge portion created states intoprocess, political the integrated citizens prerequisite for voting privileges. By formerturning subjects (under rule of King)the into 27 them to create conditions in whichsome oftheir politicaldemands couldbe met. they lacked the status of “peoples of the state,” while the place of the Austrian-Germans and Hungarians allowed two groups is thatthe first group hadno real impact on the processespolitical Franzin Jozsef’s Slav territory, as continuation ofthe Habsburg Monarchy, Austrian-Germans, and Hungarians did. The difference between the anditself, although it canbe argued for example that Czechs, Poles,and Ruthenians had little or no stake in the 26 Ferenc Eckhart, Thisdoes not indicate necessarily political allegiance, but more an investment in the continuation of the state The issue of the Hungarian Crown, the meaning of which was different in each of in A Magyar Tortenettudomanyi Intezet evkonyve, A szentkorona eszme torténete, , (Budapest, AKIF, 1942) Joszef Deer, (Budapest, Attraktor Kiado, 1941), Zoltan Toth, 18 (Budapest, 27 26 However, the special Hungary, however, with her Athenaeum, 1943) A magyar kiralysag A Hartvik- CEU eTD Collection the Crown, rather than personal holdings of the King, the of holdings personal than rather Crown, the demands of the noble class. satisfy and political the to neglected state awayif histo the perform duties not taken hedid Crown itself, then, became the real source of power, which could be conferred upon a king, or Stephen as the sole legitimizing factor that would satisfy the Hungarian noble elites. The Holy Arpad dynasty; resulting in the requirement of the coronation with the Holy Crown of Saint Hungarians. the of elites the Carpathian Basin, and therefore the choosing of the king was in all senses a decision by the made invadersof Hungarian that upthe from original tribes the were elected and earlier) even Géza, Stephen, (including in kingsArpad dynasty of earliest the the this movement; precedent Sigismund andMátyás. 30 through which the will of God is proclaimed here on Earth. benevolent Creator, indicatesit still that to have a legitimate Kingof Hungary, the noble class isthe instrument 29 general European trend of associating the crown with the king himself. families to claim the right to compete for royal seigniorial control. of elite for set aspecific legitimacy provided the narrative that dynastic from romantic the members of the royal dynasty could claim protection and right to rule. This was all descended transferred their personal divine sanctioned legitimacy to an extended umbrella under which all 28 Thistheory was consolidated afterthe decline of royal power following the reign of the kings following Even by factoring in post-pagan rational that every king chosen was chosen with the implicit consent of a Eckhart, One of the privileges of the Hungarian Holy Crown was that all state land was vested in As early as the sixteenth century, however, Hungary began to see a change in the A szentkorona , pg. 72, 79, 81, 84-87, 102 84-87, , 72,79,81, pg. 29 This was only reinforced after the death of the male line of the 19 30 and therefore the meaning of Crown- of meaning the therefore and 28 Therewashistorical CEU eTD Collection minisztertanacsi jegyzokonyvek az elso vilaghaboru korabol 1914-1918 34 the phrase Holy Crown as a territorial reference. 33 is independentof all countries,”other By recognizing that the “Lands of the Hungarian Holy Crown constitute an onallo allam which creating the Dual Monarchy, gavelegality thisto claim as incentivean tojoin with Austria. territory considered to be with the state sovereignty of Hungary. The Compromise of 1867, the First World War, the title of the ‘Lands of St. Stephen’s Crown’ were used to describe national territory. through till early the last1920s, when the Habsburgwas finally ejected from Hungarian military and political, of the Habsburg monarchy,and created a strong bond that carried diet. by lands, in asdemanded allnoble class their crown with retained the territory the lost reinstate late seventeenth century, the Habsburgs, as kings of Hungary, were expected to retake and three parts following the invasion of the Ottomans. From the late sixteenth century until the consequences; without territory of pieces Crown protection and maintenance. No longer in this sense was the King able to simply ransom or sell state investiture and gave each member of the political nation (i.e. the elites) a stake in its land, rather than being invested solely in the personal prestige of the King, became a matter of 32 209-229, 298-322 31 Preamble to the bill On the Austro-Hungarian Personal Union, 20 October 1918: Emma Ivanyi (ed.), LawXII ofthe 1867 Compromise, preamble, paragraphs 1, 18, 27. alsoknown as the Settlement Law and using Eckhart, Pál Engel, 32 Their ability doto this further invested the nobles of the country in the service, both This is obviously what is meant when, from the late eighteenth century until the end of A szentkorona The Realm of St. Stephen, A History of Medieval Hungary 895-1526 , pg. 222, 245 222, , pg. 34 the Holy Crown became the ultimate arbitrator of the 20 31 especially with the division of Hungary into Hungary of division the with especially , (Budapest, 1960)pg.516-17 , (Budapest, , (London, I. B.Taurus, 2005) pg. Magyar 33 CEU eTD Collection surrounded by surrounded newthree neighbors, and one old butexpanding one. former union. The Republic of Hungary was to emerge from what was the Kingdom; now to Holy the Crown to which they had invested theirmilitary service andnational allegiance. soldiers were not only concerned with their own homes and families; but also with their fidelity and south. The burden was heavy on the new Republic, still smarting from its derived afforded by friendly neighbors to the west and north, with the only hostile borders to the east new for situation theHungarian Army, beforeitcould as count on supportandthe protection regardless of the political affiliation of the government in question. Holy Crown to the of service lay expectation able to been a continued have collapse would the political loyalty after the removal of the Habsburg Emperor, any new government that followed ultimate their with identified have would soldiers middle-class and officers Army Hungarian the Holy Crown itself as a will and extension of territorial sovereignty, and the object towhich king of Hungary was nolonger possible. However, by falling back on the inalienable claim of as the former relationship with the Hapsburgs crumbled and the legitimacy of a Habsburgian sovereignty of state territory; it maintained itself as the symbol of Hungarian state power even Hungary of Romania, and the south the new Yugoslavia, comprising Serbia, Croatia, and Slovenia all with borders next to 36 Pál Halász, ‘A jogi gondolkodas alakulasa a Magyar Tanácsköztársaságban’ dictatorship ofthe proletariat, the aswellrights asthe obligations of the Holy Crown had been transferred” in Revolutionary Directorate “the repository of the Holy Crown towhich, by virtue of the declaration ofthe the Kun regime because it “aimed at the preservation of the country’s territorial integrity” and calling the explaining that they had become trustees of the Holy Crown, as well as speaking in public lectures in support of 35 Tothe west the new Austrian First Republic, to the north the newCzechoslovakia, east the previous Kingdom Károly Kmety, a professor of Hungarian Public Law in Budapest from 1902 to 1929, sent memos to Károlyi Following the dissolution of the Habsburg lands, new states were created from the 21 Jogtudomanyi Kozlony, 14, 1959, p. 59 35 36 These officers and This created anentirely Thiscreated CEU eTD Collection potential, giving as a primary potential, asaprimary the cause giving Movements andRevolutionary Revolutions experienced one revolution, another seemed to be imminent. James Defronzo, whose book to establish the rules of engagement for their respective theaters. After having already evenfailing noor giving Army clear the direction went, and came ministers defense successive now defunct Monarchial army, and to define the responsibility of the Army. The challenge then,facing the new government, was to create an Army from the pieces of the struggle to claims and counter-claims ran rampant. Ian Kershaw attributes the ensuing violence and victorious successor states on one side, and Hungary on the other, created a situation in which and the Entente the between peacenegotiations within unacceptable Monarchy. the The status for its former asretribution immediately came privileged under attack sovereignty territorial propaganda and the previous grievances feltby Czechs,Romanians, andthe Serbs,Hungary’s complicity in the direction and subsequentloss of the First World War. Because of the level of 14, 1,2005)p.115 37 IanKershaw, However, setting that task was no simple matter. As the negotiations dragged on, four same territory. of nationalism which gained definition ideology by exclusion of ethnic minorities, often sharing the internal-organic aggressive, an and superiority ethnic of rooted mentality culturally a with hand in hand going frequently of nationality, basis ethnocultural humiliation….(becausenational of sense of)profound territorial resultant a losses,and disputed War World territorial First in the claims….. defeat and also an mentalities; The absence of solidly established pluralist-democratic structures, values and Wars and Political Violence in Twentieth Century Europe 37 , lays out some basic prerequisites for revolutionary 22 , (Contemporary European History, Vol. CEU eTD Collection 39 38 aggressiveness of the demands challenging Hungarian territorial sovereignty; mainly the Vix the mainly sovereignty; territorial Hungarian challenging demands the of aggressiveness Another majorfactor that gave impetus to the regime change was the step-up in the sovereign for thestate territory. in andprovide its protection state, traditional the role regain were under south and occupation. lost westthat east, north, the to reacquire territoriesto the Communist rhetoric; insteadit was build-upthe of monthsfour offrustration notof being able to Army the of reorientation motivated a politically not absolutely was takeover Communist political circumstances facing theKárolyi Its subsequentgovernment. lack of insupport the denied its traditional role of defending state territory from aggression by the diplomatic and an Armycreated legshad cutoutfrom itswhich it it, theoretical because was beingunderneath jurisdiction,” autonomy action of over andgroups and against economic arrangements within its is of in potential network abasisfor states international an involvement “athat state’s andneighboring states successor provide aclear-cut orientation for theArmy. Skocpol argues Therein lies the basic fault of the Károlyi regime; that it could notnormalize relations with Skocpol, James Defronzo, The state then becomes incapable of carrying out its normal functions and cannot cope effectively with an opposition cannot revolutionaryand movement. functions normal its out ofcarrying incapable becomes then state The serve the Károlyi government] legitimacy in the eyesof the public, and other resources. revolution]….may deplete the state of loyal personnel, [lack of a professional army to Crisis, which may be caused by a catastrophic defeat in war, [Károlyi White Aster One of the causes of the Kun takeover then can be attributed to an Army desperate to toanArmy desperate canbeattributed then takeover Kun of the One ofthecauses States and Social Revolutions 39 and therefore must be established to gain ultimate sovereignty. This in turn Revolutions and Revolutionary Movements , p. 31 23 , (Boulder, 2011) p.10-11 Westview Press, , (Boulder, 38 CEU eTD Collection revolutionary revolutionary itarmy,is howdoubtful many middle-class soldiers would have been willing to was able to score a major victory in the Slovak theater; had he instead insisted on a communist Hungarian territory, and not attempting to politically convert and create a Party army, Bela Kun nationalism and preyed on theirfear of what might happen to their homeland otherwise. as rightful Hungarian possessions. He did this through an appeal to their patriotism, back hepromisedreason; then chancetotake the them the former occupation under territories create the Kun regime. Kun was able tomobilize the support of the Army for one simple 42 Comparative Analysis for sparking internal conflict.” for sparking innocent victims of turmoil in their regions. In some cases neighboring states are responsible the always not are states states…neighboring neighboring involves and affects often “it Ultimatum. 41 Károlyi, andultimately leading tothe resignation of said government. by Colonel Vix of the French Army as liaison for the Entente Powers in Budapest to theborders in both Uppergovernment Hungary (Slovakia) and Transylvania (to become ofpart oftheMihály Kingdom of Romania), given 40 classes.” andhence different two polities each of composed by and andvarious supported groups proper amount of security, that “multiple sovereignty emerge[s]: there were two governments, territory through Entente pressure.national Julian Casanova explainsHungarian that when a regime cannotformer provideof the acquirement legitimate a as governments Romanian Brown, Julian Julian Casanova, The Vix Ultimatum required the Hungarian army and bureaucracy to retreat from theestablished Hungarian By appealing to their nationalist instinct and their natural desire to regain former regain to desire natural their and instinct nationalist their to appealing By International Dimensions, 41 Michael interprets this typeinternalBrown conflictasbeing becauseimportant of 40 This ultimatum was driven and sustained by the neighboring Czech and Czech neighboring by the sustained and driven was ultimatum This Civil Wars, Revolutions, and Counterrevolutions in Finland, Spain, and Greece (1918-1949) A , (International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society, Vol. 13, 2, 2000) p.525 p. 2-8 42 This perfectly describes the Vix note, which did somuch to 24 CEU eTD Collection writer, to see why essentially apolitical or right-wing sympathetic soldiers and officers so in both reaction regimesto andthen thisplacing intothe contextof questionthe by asked this history.” and fortheory mediating as between an idealstrategy serves analysis historical comparative for two left-wing governments. Skocpol argues that “when itis successfully employed, an excellent way to gain a better perspective of the reasons why middle-class soldiers fought This signaled the end of Hungarian state sovereignty. Army, effectively and remainingsurrendered the territory state invadingto the states. successor in regaining their part of the homeland, the Kun government lost its power of coercion over the the suffering they experienced at the hands of the new occupation forces, and the bleak outlook sovereignty multiple byfamilies experienced within ledtheir which captured territories, the to Slovakia were simply annulled with the Entente-enforced withdrawal. Coupled with the economic, and social inupheaval Budapest, and lost heart when hard-foughtthe victories in Soldiers saw their primary motivation of effective resistance taken away by the political, longer thefront effective monopoly provide quicklyviolenceof within state, the fell apart. 44 supposed there to be two enemies, Bolshevism and the enemy without. enemy the and Bolshevism enemies, two be to there supposed and soldiers in divisionsthe from Transylvania and regionsother under occupation even fight according to Party principles. As I will showin subsequent chapters, many of the officers 43 Skocpol, József Breit, Comparative history Comparativein history context the of the revolutionstwo in in 1918-1919 Hungary is 44 States and Social Revolutions By utilizing this tool, the reader is able to easily see the comparison and the contrast A Magyorszagi 1918/1919 evi Forradalmi Mozgalmak es a VörösHabóru Torténete I Resz , p.39-40 25 43 Once Kun could no (Archival) CEU eTD Collection determined to protect,determined to andin some casesexpand saidterritory. is a question that ultimately must be resolved by firm and resolute soldiers and officers who are and prestige of a state is unquestioned; but the mannermethod and in itiswhich accomplished faithfully served these two regimes. That sovereignty of state territory is a basis for the power 26 CEU eTD Collection its neighbor its neighbor states 1918-1919 career soldiers, middle-class in economic and political ideals, place their trust in socialist and in socialist trust their place ideals, political and in economic middle-class soldiers, career vicious as it involved control of contested ethnic disputed homelands? In what way could morebe in even the of method would warfare which again battlefields on them serve to once former comrades in arms from the Austro-Hungarian Imperial army. What motivations led fighting of idea the at enthused been have not could front the from returning men of majority popular do decision to so;havingjustfour ended long years of war within vastthe Europe Indeed, who were these individuals who chose to fight for the borders of Hungary? It was not a process. peacetreaty the of integral actors whose participation significantly affected both the process and the outcome of following the First World War, historian Sándor Szakály raises an interesting query about a set 45 SándorSzakály, As we explore the issue of the loss of sizeable portions of former Hungarian territory A. Republic? commanded the armies ofthe liberal democratic People’s Republic and then the Soviet counterrevolutions? Who were the commanders, the officers whoorganized, soldiers,and the military leaders,who participated in revolutions and following World War I is bound to face sooner or later the question of: Who were the Where do we go from here? The historian exploring the Hungarian revolutions and counter-revolutions War and Society in East Central Europe Vol. XX Revolutions and Interventions in Hungary and 45 , ed. Peter Pástor, (Columbia University Press, New York, 1988) p. 169 Dissolution: Is home still home? Chapter 2 27 CEU eTD Collection Press, New York, 1986) p. 16 48 encompassed European/Eurasian continent from the Alps to the Pacific Ocean. had that empires multi-national three the of one Monarchy; Habsburg former inthe occurred lastedthat well into themiddle of 1920s.Onethe of biggestthe territorial/population shifts but only changedfrom form open warfare torevolution, counter-revolution, and border clashes that the historian looks within Europe, however, the more likely that hostilities did not cease, the laying down of arms on the Western Front, and the cessation of hostilities. The further east minds? in their existed communist governingforces? What price were they pay willing to defendto borders those that 47 dynasty, and the Hohenzollern German Empire. 46 village as fast as possible. village as fast anythingreminded that them of miserytheir in thearmy, getting and to their hometown or had three things inmind which they planned toaccomplish; findingeat, something to toshed the western front in Italy, Hungarian soldiers of the Austro-Hungarian Imperial Army generally As they streamed back from the eastern front in Russian territory, and alsofrom the Piave on as IgnácRomsics tosuppose, argues is premature Istvan Istvan I. Mócsy, Ignács Romsics, Ignács Thethree empires of course referring to the Habsburg Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, theRomanov Russian November 1918was a time in manywhich Western European soldiers fondly remember [Hungary, T.H.] that was in the grips of revolutions and counterrevolutions. strategic interests of the victorious Great Powers and conditions inside a country form of the new order; these were determined by the outcome of World War I, the Whatwas not predestined, however,was manner the ofthe collapse and the precise War and Society in East Central Europe Vol. XII The Effects of World War I Hungary in the Twentieth Century, 48 These three goals were not as easily accomplished as one would (Corvina-Osiris Kiado, Budapest, 1999) p. 81 28 47 , College (Brooklyn 46 However, this CEU eTD Collection tér 2-4. , Archives) was to facilitate the return of the Hungarian military units were without recourse, without any job whose officers and officers non-commissioned becausethe This wasimportant experience them apart from civilians. from apart them definedsetting that asoldier, becausetherewereotherdistinguishing characteristics Rock, beg what remained. Shedding their army identity was notso simple as taking off the Kaiser’s the subordination of foodstuffs for the war effort, leaving soldiers little choice but to steal or suppose for retreating soldiers. The countryside for the most part was stripped bare because of 50 there, excessive drinking, and the preference to fraternize withother soldiers were hard habits to break. that one has acquired over a4 year period is quite hard; loud noises causing a man todive fora foxholethat isn’t reluctant to up give as they provided protection andin case of foraging, intimidation. Also to shed an identity police or army military police, soldier’s ration cards, army-issued weapons, which ofhaircut, bearingmilitary course in demeanor, war wounds,soldiers discharge papers which were essential werein case stopped by the 49 [presentday Transylvanian part of Romania,H.] remarked T. in his Bácso, who was a First Lieutenant in 1918, and who was born and raised in Nagyszeben, themselves, which consequently led to increasedthe amount indiscipline of andlooting. Béla was broken, and the basic servicesit formerly providedlonger wereno available. options. Certainly the Imperial Army was no longer functioning; its organizational structure Béla Bácso, Kaiser’s Rock was a nickname for the ImperialArmy uniform, other defining characteristics included ashort these men had given everything, they were expected to survive even longer without. distrust and the desire to just “move on” were expressed by both sides…Even though former borders, and the poor civilian population nothing to manygive, scenesof mutual Without a structural cohesion to hold onto, soldiers felt that they needed to fend for Csaladjanak iratoi The retreat was chaotic at best, with all the soldiers streaming back across the 49 , [Family Remembrances] (Hadtörténelmi Levéltár, 1014. Budapest, Kapisztrán Yet, the retreat continued unabated because of lack the becauseof of other unabated continued retreat Yet,the 29 Family Remembrance 50 that CEU eTD Collection home that could not becouldnot countered. home that became more than just anational affront, but both a physical and emotional loss of psychological both shock to returningthe soldiers and civilians the alike, becauseit The pushing in of the borders of the former Monarchial area was a definite 53 of national borders. Ignác Romsics asserts that fairly simple, yet complicated at the same time; food, protection, and the maintenance This in turn caused a mass discontent within the civilian population, whose aims were Kingdomthe Hungary,of andalsowithin morethe central locations near Budapest. vestige of control. The result of this exodus was chaotic conditions within the border areas of 52 51 Ibid Romsics, Ibid, p. 16 existence. of their basis former entire the lost had many swoop fell one at shock; psychological a just than more was descent of non-Hungarian populations large with country of the areas ofthose occupation the and Monarchy ofthe dissolution the them For army officers. membership of the most belligerent groups wasmade partly up of serving or reserve the country’s historical borders first and then its Hungarian-inhabiteddefend inner to core. The intervention armed for demands strident increasingly added they To these criticismsof the government’s domestic policies, from late November 1918 sides. three cities. Even if an army could have been raised, Hungary would have to face enemiesreform, on hurried home to their villages. Others plunged into revolution in the major fronts in total disarray. Peasant soldiers, excited by the news of the imminent land armistice. Soldiers deserted their units by the thousandsand flocked home from the The Hungarian Army ceased to be an effective fighting force within a few days after the Hungary in the Twentieth Century 53 51 52 , p. 96 30 CEU eTD Collection Bohemia and Moravia; even though no Slovak state had existed before this time. to declare in themselves comprisedwith union newCzech state the of historical and political weight. In the north, Slovakians were prodded by their Czech compatriots and southern border areas, minority had begun areas shifting toan local entirely differenttheir base of power. All within along the northern, eastern, situation military and political the that realized slowly upon upon between Hungarianthe representatives and the officials Entente inPadua,which agreed agreements made armistice military the anappeal to was apparent, became state Czech of the newrepresentatives and officials Hungarian between conflict inevitable York, 1985)p.23-26 York, I. B. What to do now that we made it home? of Hungary, this proved tobe anillusory concept. homeland. For those whose domicile was located on the peripheries of the Kingdom put warbehindthe them inand toreturn peacerelative totheirintact [hopefully] Having decidedtoavoid anymore uselessservice, these soldiers and hoped officers to 55 the Magyarization policy, they had been considered as a minority within the Hungarian nation 54 Mócsy, Inactuality numerically Romanians, Slovakians, and Serbians were the majority, however, culturally, based on T As former soldiers and officials returned from the war fronts homewards, they HE War and Society in East Central Europe Vol XII The Effects of World War I N ORTHERN F RONT 54 populations assert began to independencetheir 31 , (Brooklyn College Press, New 55 As CEU eTD Collection reached everyone.” population…even before Serbian the crossed troops frontiers…the the threat of violence part of the Serbs, T.H.] the idea of revision alone led to the “retreat of the Hungarian themselves. Even with the restraint this would impose on territorial revisionism, [on the French forces alongside Entente of presence hadasizeable Serb forces there the II. power within the region, namely the Entente. the namely region, the within power only wasdirected appeal the that legitimate towards Hungarian to Padua kingdom,the of in what peripheries were formerly the beginning intervention with Atearly stage, this 58 57 (Columbia University Press, New York, 1976) Ch. 2 59 areas within the Lands of Saint Stephen. had stipulated that Hungarian officials were to be left in charge of all formerly governed 56 Mócsy, Ibid, p. 65, 69 Ibid, p. 20 Pásztor, T HE The situation becamein evenmore pressing because area, southern border the European allies and a trust in the good will of the West. lay preserved, be betweento resumption was of hostilities country against the of the Great Powers and their integrity East Central territorial the if choice, remaining only The neighbors might use provocateurs to force disputed areas to be transferred into their control. own into transferred be to areas disputed force to provocateurs use might neighbors thatwere under Hungarian sovereignty… [this led to] Hungarians fear[ing] thattheir War and Society Vol. XII S Hungary between Lenin and Wilson: The Hungarian Revolution of 1918-1919 and the Big Three OUTHERN The Czechoslovaks were the first to embark on military intervention into the lands the into intervention military on embark to first the were Czechoslovaks The 57 59 The Entente forces were led by General Franchet d’Esperey, F RONT , p. 16 56 Peter Pásztor remarks that Pásztor Peter 32 58 , CEU eTD Collection 136 Yet, even having surveyed these areas, there remained a modicum of Entente influence amodicum of Entente remained even areas,there these surveyed having Yet, anarchy. into order and discipline from disintegration slow the immense; been have must crisis psychological The known. had they order of manifestation familiar only the with retreating Hungarian officials, civilians, and crumbling social structures that were Thousands of professional soldiers streaming back to the north and south borders met because months of the war, postulated that because of the Entente’s victor mentality, and last the during authorities French the by detained also Károlyi, Mihály Government, army!” French the of mercy the at homeland the prisoner-of-war camp at the mercy of the French government, than to be in my formerly of the Austro-Hungarian army, even remarked that “I would much rather be in sergeant, master a military Baldavari, police Janós captors. mood Entente to the of the from Central Powers. the nation Hungary from tobeintended as adefeated harsh to were Paris implicitorders whose 61 Levéltár, book], (Hadtörténelmj 1014. 2-4.Budapest, , Kapisztrán Archives, tér 1929-1964)p.28 60 Mihály Károlyi, Janós Baldavari, “A Francia Hadifogságban,” [French Prisoner-of-war camp] Emlekirasa III [Memoirs, Third infringement would fall on them. interestour in to accepttherefore thewas It Armistice, entitled. for if our neighbors themselves did not keep considered to they it which theto blame for country, its the centre of Hungary…the The Czechs, towards likewise,moving was and were Sad) ready to (Novi seizeUjvidek the northern occupied had districts Army of Serbian The camps inFrance attest in of officers Hungarian prisoner-of-war Several accounts Memoirs of Mihály Károlyi, Faith Without Illusion 61 60 33 Even the new leader of Even Socialist leader of the thenew , (Jonathon Cape Publishers, London, 1956) p. CEU eTD Collection Transylvania general information requests from officerthe whohas returned Budapest to briefly from memoirs his In War. World Second River the of line the to advance to forces Romanian allowing drawn Kingdom of Romania. This was supported by the Entente, and a demarcation line was 1 AlbiaDecember on Iulia to declare at vacuumencourage theethnic of advantage power the to within Romanians Transylvania Habsburg the in Kingdom Monarchy of 1918,the November Romania decided totake to go into great detail about it. Briefly outlining the scenario; after the capitulation of Kingdom of Hungary colored the border dispute; it is notwithin the scope of this work Albert Bartha, Albert aDefenseBéla Linder following Ministerboth General by recorded Lieutenant officer an and betweenaretired general conversation III. however,was amuch prospect. riskier long border, tothe eastern looking and Serbs the effecton Czechs/Slovaks; as abraking 63 62 Ofthe previously mentioned famous “We want no more soldiers” comment See Appendices 1 for map of demarcation line T HE Long-standing disagreementbetween Kingdomthe Romaniaof andthe The situation was andconfusing information was conflicting; establishedas in a E ASTERN F RONT Kétszer akommunizmussalszemben st , 1918the union of Transylvania with the 34 63 and again after the Mure , in which the ƕ . 62 CEU eTD Collection 16 67 defending the border in Transylvania. 66 65 Back] government took charge of took national government territory. Hungarian the FirstWar, World provide would apool professionalsof new for whatever ready-made conducive toinoculating resistance, which with their recently acquired skills during the anformen officersand was This foreknowledge created atmosphere enlisted that Kratochvil Károly time General that Captain) (at Lieutenant distinctly knew what was at risk by allowing the advance of the Romanian army; as werepresent.” units military borders, onNovember 13,1918in all Transylvaniaof only fewa administrative official shows record “No that regular Hungarian units wereguarding Romanian [the] the line, demarcation the original to forward moved Army Romanian as the fact, In 64 Károly Kratchovil, Who will play a much more involved role later in the dialogue as the Colonel commanding the Székely Division Mócsy, Albert Bartha, (Hadtörténelmj Levéltár, 1014. Budapest, Kapisztrán tér 2-4, Archives, 1960) p. 4 reclaimed violently. reclaimed shot…it must spell disaster for usthat we give up without afight…it will surely only be Many of the former officers and enlisted men of the old Austro-Hungarian army predicament… of their word no have we and there, live relations and care about you this?, do Why asked truth? thethe is officer. what so Because I am bulletins, a Transylvanian, army Romanian allthe of of my relatives provenance of the What is with the Romanians? Day in and day out there is bad news, but we are unsure around the Mure line. The Hungarians Mure must the to clear the forward areamove immediately to units army within the Romanian demarcation zone Transylvanian-based the to order the gave command Entente eastern the and d’Esperey Franchet War and Society XII, Kétszer szemben a Kommunizmussal,[Twice between Communism] Memoirs ƕ ; afterward the Romanian cavalry was able to advance without firing a , (Hadtörténelmi Levéltár, 1014. Budapest, Kapisztrán tér 2-4, Archives, 1920) p. 13- p.32 67 65 35 66 argued 64 Visszaemlékezések [Looking ƕ demarcation CEU eTD Collection 70 Europe Vol. VI, and the Big Three, Pastor, Peter 2007), Jersey, New 69 2010) p.65 Cambridge, 68 Stephen,its “inalienability of territory,” the “king’s obligation to recover what had framework.” although italways possessed attributes of withinstatehood the given imperial asovereign state, was not its modern “Throughout history, Hungary that Gombár asserts occupation, was in reality a much more intimately familiar principle for them. Csaba of years hundred three over following soldiers Hungarian to alien and foreign Sovereignty, a concept which has been argued by several historians several by argued been has which a concept Sovereignty, Gombár, Hankiss, Lengyel, Varnai, Lengyel, Hankiss, Gombár, Maria Ormos, Maria PärtelPirramäe in Hent Kalmo, Quentin Skinner, Pärtel in argues Pirramäe Pärtel I. B. territorial integrity and what it meant new ideaEx-soldiers…New Sovereignty…Hungary’s (old) of territory. domestic sovereignty or the supremacy over all other authoritieswith a certain a modern one, invented to distinguish the international dimension of sovereignty from realize their claim externalto sovereignty…The concept of external sovereignty itself is In international politics ever since Westphalia, most states have lacked the power to S OVEREIGNTY FOR 70 (Brooklyn College(Brooklyn NewPress, York, 1982) Hungary in the Age of the Two World Wars 1914-1945 These attributes, namely the inviolableness of the Holy Crown of Saint 68 (Columbia University Press, New York, 1976), Béla K. Kiraly, Hungary between Wilson and Lenin: The Hungarian Revolution of 1918-1919 Sovereignty inFragments S The Appeal, OLDIERS p. 1 Sovereignty in Fragments, 36 that , (AtlanticResearch and Publications Inc., (Cambridge University Press, University (Cambridge War and Society in East Central 69 to have been to CEU eTD Collection 72 been (temporarily) alienated and reincorporate itwith the rest of the 71 itwouldbe commanded andhow governmentthe wouldmake its decisions. consciousness of the government when it chose its form, the form of the new army,how adventure;on an immature andHungarian itcounterparts proved tobe in the mentality amongst the Hungarian officers that the Austrians had draggedtheir officers and enlisted men who had served in the First World War. There was a common Hungarian the of conscience the on heavily weighed had it and council, War Imperial Meeting these three principles had not been a priority for the Austro-Hungarian entails actually war justified what of definition through the concept of just war. St. Thomas Aquinas in his Summa Theologiae gives a as itis therejob to both defend state territory and possibly invade state’s other territory concept. sovereign that of integrity the maintain to soldiers to given mandate the was Defronzo claims that Defronzo the neighboring countries’ military incursion on its sovereign territory? James St. Thomas Aquinas, Eckhart, II. How then formedHow hopeforcecould togather torepel the newly together the army existence of amaterial must cause not beexploited for other aims suchasconquest). as self defense, recovery ofproperty, orpunishment for injuries) andrecta intention (the must be waged by a legitimate authority) iusta causa (a material cause is needed, such For a just war (bellum iustum) three conditions had to be fulfilled: recta auctoritas (war sovereignty, of concept the with familiar intimately be in reality must Soldiers S A szentkorona eszme tortenete, ECURING Summa Theologiae, S OVEREIGNTY (Budapest, Attraktor Kiado, 1941), p. 222 and 245 (London, 1964)in (London, Kalmo, 37 Sovereignty , p. 87 corona territory,” 72 71 CEU eTD Collection 74 precedence over all all policy,basedprecedence over government solely other urgency.on government, in which pressingneedthe tosecure the very territory of nationthe took formations seemed to be kilometers apart. This was the crisis facing the new Willingness to secure sovereignty and the ability to form cohesive units and build new serve in the new Hungarian Army. Maria Ormos asserts that costly was the failure to capitalize on the availability of highly-trained professionals willing to civilian control of military whileforces, dictatorships demand military subordination. dictatorships that soldiers serve the government that exists; democracy only works with in assuredly andmost states society inof majority democratic/free tradition the of the political affiliation of the government giving them its orders. It is a long-standing soldiers, but instead a question of accomplishing the mission set before them, regardless The basis of the defense of sovereignty therefore, is not political or economic for 73 Ormos, Defronzo, legitimate defense of assigned demarcation lines and for internal security reasons. security internal for and lines demarcation ofassigned defense legitimate for need urgent an was there although months, for off put were ones new of formation averse to the old officer’s corps, and so deployment ofthe remaining andunits the was particularly damaging in the military field. Some members of the governmentwere demobilization the authorities failed to disarm soldiers being discharged…the mistrust Cardinal errors were made. The disciplined units were not retained, and in the feverish The biggest failure at the end of the First World War from a military perspective domination. endtheir to effort an in together join can country or group another by exploitation of victim the been has group national or ethnic their that perceive who culture and Hungary in the Age, Social Movements and Revolutions, Regardless ofclassor ideological orientation, people sharing the same language 73 p. 23-25 p. 15 38 74 CEU eTD Collection Forces loyal Mihályto Károlyi started to make theirmove to seize power, thereby waited in turmoil, revolutionary events were beginning to come to ahead in the capital. surrounding countryside. As anxious refugees demobilizedand soldiers and officials to be. leavingdisintegration, the Hungarians tocontemplate what theirnextstep would need and dissolution its forcing dilemma, this for answer no had government Habsburg The from isthe comes in threatened thestate which threatened this monopoly. Defronzo claims that a key component of any real revolution of Romania, Czechoslovakia, and Serbia, and to some extent even the Entente, revolutions. By encroaching on perceived national sovereign territory, governments the of the army and police] played a pivotal role throughout the time period of the two namely that it have the monopoly over organized violence, [in plainer terms the control 75 Defronzo, As mentioned before, Charles Tilly’s principle of the legitimacy of government, of legitimacy the of principle Tilly’s Charles before, mentioned As III. This atmosphere of uncertainty pervaded Budapest and restof the the Budapest This atmosphere of pervaded uncertainty threats. external with deal to best how regarding segments population of the prerevolutionary regimes, which were also undermined by divisions within elite Social Movements Inability to resist foreign aggression [which T.H.] reduced the perceived legitimacy M ONOPOLY OF ONOPOLY , p. 24 V IOLENCE , W HO ISINCHARGE HERE 39 ? 75 CEU eTD Collection White Aster Revolution. in sceneforthedramaticthe that subsequent andthe Novemberoccurred events 1918, political change, a new direction in terms of securing sovereignty would occur. This set the with that hope the also but situation, political the of instability further to both adding 40 CEU eTD Collection independence, wide-ranging democratic reforms and reconciliation withnational minorities. 78 National Council.At this critical point in the White Aster Revolution, so-called army units stationed within the city to rally to the government,and oppose the new by then the sitting Hadik appointed by government, Emperor. the few days, was able tocome up with 12 points of contention that needed to be reconciled The National Council was a decidedlyanit-Habsburg organization, andduring next the in established Astoria quartered Hotel, and the nightof the on 23 the setting up a new political organization, named the National Council, officially years last war. the of the Károlyi, awell-known aristocrat who had been urging the Monarchy to sue for peace in Mihály named parliamentarian former a was France from contingent that among prisoner exchanges and a show of good will for the armistice negotiations. Included officers were released from prisoner-of-war camps in France and Italy as part of 77 76 Included among the 12 points were demands for the cessation ofhostilities, declaration ofHungarian Romsics, Károlyi, The Hadik government, already shaky in its support, called upon called police andthe upon already shaky in its support, The Hadik government, As the warcame toaclose in 1918/November some Hungarian 1918, October I. A. T Familiar strains of the same song (Echoes of 48’) Enter the White (Aster) Knight: Karolyi’s New Direction Faith Without Illusion, HE Hungary in the Twentieth Century, B EGINNING OFTHE EGINNING 76 Upon Upon return to Hungary, Károlyi immediatelywork went to p.96 E ND p.89 Chapter 3 41 78 rd of of October. 77 CEU eTD Collection 81 80 mutiny and aid the demonstrators, and not unfounded concernand one that later proved to be truthful. the front werepresent in Budapest, and were ordered outside ofthe city as there was a fear thatthey would Hadik government wasineffective, the war must end,and Károlyihad their confidence. Actual army unitsfrom wanted to demonstrate in front ofthe Royal Palace in Buda to remonstrate to the Archduke Joseph that the and As Hungarian statehood. theevents unfold, comparisonsof 1848/49 will also be Stephen of Saint Holy Crown the ofloyalty in favor to Monarchy Habsburg reject the to actively choosing soldiers Hungarian namely werepresent; samethe circumstances Imperial symbols were knocked down, and soldiers quickly switched sides. exchanges. telephone and stations, railway stores, food country; the of governance Council occupied many mainthe of necessary buildings public to everydaythe After the deaths at the Chain Bridge, soldiers supporting Károlyi and the National legitimate.be to believes government the a populace who from loyalty at heart; interestpeople’s which Theda isaccordingSkocpol to abasic for prerequisite in 3 deaths.This shattered any confidenceremaining in government’sthe having the marched revolutionaries on Chain the Bridge a demonstration of of identification each other, lapels as andmethod of a in White flowers Aster their wearing hats of and soldiers the because revolutionaries 79 Romsics, Skocpol, Occurring on October 28 At this point in the narrative, a comparison to 1848/49 is inevitable. Many of the existing governmental authorities lose their legitimacy. members of society…(what matters inexplaining the outbreak of revolution is) whether supported by some combination of normative andmajorityconsensus preference of the the rules of the political game and in governmental leadership andpolicies. These are One ideal-typical view is that the state is the arena of legitimate authority embodied in Explaining Social Revolutions, Hungary in the Twentieth Century, th , the crowd was made up of workers, revolutionaries and off-duty soldiers, who p. 25 p.90 79 42 , and were fired upon by police, resulting 80 81 CEU eTD Collection arbiter before the Romanians had a chance to do the same.” Hungarians. Its purpose would be secureto favorable lines demarcation from Alliedthis Pásztorargues d’ Esperey “an that for meetingPeter the with early was desirable Franchet in Belgrade. in representatives military the to relation Entente situation the of clarification immediate problem was before him that could not be put off for even one day. This was the major agencies of the state with personnel. The process of governance had begun; however, an That parallels existed is not in question, but how similar was the military situation in reality? German languagememoirsGerman that and scope. Soldiers themselves were aware of this, Dr. Gustáv Gratz writing in his list of demandsmirrors also Pet borders of the periphery. In addition to the military situation being similar, the 12 point the along Army Hungarian formed newly the facing situation military the to made 82 83 p.5 1922) Archives, Dr. Gustáv Gratz, Béla K. Kiraly, At thebeginning of November, Károlyi had his formed cabinetand had begunstaffing the II. necessary because the general regarded the protocols of cease-fire thathad been signed Orient in the Balkan theater, which was duly signed on 13 with General Franchet d’ Esperey, the French Commander of the Entente Armee d’ S before. personally sympathetic for him, because of the separation from the likeHabsburgs Count Michael Károlyi- I kept myself away from politics. With Károlyi I was There came the time of the first Hungarian Revolution,- [White Aster] the Regime of ITUATION The government’s first important action was to parley for a new military accord military a new for parley to was action important first government’s The War and Society in East Central Europe Vol. VI, 82 [Reference to 1848] Visszaemlekesre, [Looking Back] R EPORT : W Ę fi’s 12 points in the 48’ inrevolution; both substance HERE DIDTHE HERE (Hadtörténelmi Levéltár, 1014. Budapest, Kapisztrán tér 2-4, 43 K ÁROLYISTAND GOVERNMENT (Brooklyn College Press, New York, 1982) p. 260 83 th Romsics emphasizes that November. This was ? CEU eTD Collection south ofthe River Maros, outof Bacska and Drávaon a line runningSzeged-Baja-Pécs-Varasd, allowingastanding 86 85 84 contention. of points military with dealing An 18 point demand was put forth by the French general,its substance almost entirely leniency in favorof a state’s rightdefend to itself aggression.against coming hard down Hungary against aviolator of as the sternness for argument the hand one the on balance; in the hung sternness and Leniency state of Austria-Hungary. aggressor the of was seen integral part whatas an treat and ananarchic Hungary,in of terms public opinion theirhands were tied inhow to that wasstanding newlyKárolyithe formed Hungary a governed between government without any moral or just cause to fall back on. Even though the Entente forces knew only was without acompetent military defense but also in the eyes of the world was any to accept and him; placed before adefeated nation, all not demands as Hungary beginning hadthe upperhandin all negotiations.the Heknew Károlyi that havewould d‘ meetingEsperey, with Károlyi himself and his delegation in from Belgrade, the 18pointagreement highlights included: clearing troops fromTransylvania and Banat east ofthe River Samos, JensBartelson in Kalmo, Skinner, Romsics, were poised to enter Hungary at the Croatian border. Croatian the at Hungary enter to poised were at Padua as invalid, and his forces, having crossed the River Sava on 5 Sava River the crossed having forces, his and invalid, as Padua at wage to warto defend itself authority the against has its enemies.a state enemies…Thus external and internal against community governments derive their legitimacy from their ability to defend the political disorder and that would ensue violence the in to its absence…many have reference impliedwith that states and their legitimized been frequently has authority this two way street: not only does thejustification of warrequire legitimate authority, but to conceive of the relationship between legitimate authority and the use of force as a Therefore, if we want to make some historical sense of the just war tradition, we ought Hungary in the Twentieth Century, Sovereignty in Fragments p.91 86 This demand was a result of collaboration 44 85 , p. 82-84 just war 84 tradition, on the other th November, CEU eTD Collection (Columbia University Press, New York, 1995) p. 84-88 greater autonomy within the Hungarian state system. state autonomy Hungarian the within greater the periphery areas to allow their territory to remain within Hungary in return for made by Hungarian the governmentwas to try andco-opt national the minorities within be to play non-confrontational most the that believed Jászi, Oskar Portfolio, without Minister Affairs/Minorities Interior his and Károlyi beginning, the In north-east-south. from any arranged forces three with the hostilities of of recommencement unnecessary Hungarian Army in beginningreflectthe the need for caution, toavoid provoking an response wouldbe regardless of scenario.the Károlyi this;knew hisinstructions tothe as what an Entente to thevictors amongst consensus very little was Hungary, there were still in infantstages the of negotiation; unfoldedconsequently as events in spoils. nations to arrive in Paris, set up shop, and take positions on post-war distribution of Entente victorious all of contingents the for waited they as other, the or way one stand a of the French, Serbs, and Romanians, with a neutral Britain, US, and Italy not yet taking 87 the whole country as they please. Romsics, Hungarian Army of only 6 Infantry divisions and 2 Calvary divisions, and Entente forces must have free transit of Ignác Romsics, Ignác overrun by the Magyars. been had it when state ‘Czechoslovak’ of a part formed century, tenth the before had, Slovakia because] so [Did consent…, their for population the asking without territories occupied the incorporate to proceeded who Czechs, [the] neighbors… their the historical Hungarian state would prefer to remain there rather than be absorbed by The Hungarians expressed the confidence that the great majority of the peoples living in decide peacesettlement in meetingthe shapeof forcesto the Paris The Entente War and Society in East Central Europe Vol. XXXIII 20 87 Hungary in the Twentieth Century, 45 th Century Hungary and the Great Powers p.91 , CEU eTD Collection that found cohesive arguesthatinstead they plan; Romsics immediate defense unfortunately Entente forces pushingin peripheries.the They looked to Károlyi create an to secure their homes in the face of pressure from the Czechs, Romanians, Serbs and the to recourse they ofbecause were without army the and reduction of the because there this first policy initiative emboldened many of the ex-officers who were on the fringe; same extent from the Czechs in the north and the Serbs in the south. in the Serbs the and north in the Czechs the from extent same the face of continued nationalistic pressure from the Kingdom of Romania, and to the agreement could be reached; events however, proved that this policy was impotent in demanding. and more persistent became Czechs from and Romanians asthepressure the measure becoming amore andmorereconcile desperate need minorities Jászi’smission to for As November waned, Károlyi found his political options to be steadily weakening, the from Masaryk and his newly formed Czech national government. state system, but this agreement was quickly quashed andforgotten under pressure from Prague emanating 88 In In Slovakia, Milan Hodza made apreliminary agreement to hold theSlovak contingent within the Hungarian I. B. Jászi traveled toTransylvaniaJászi express for traveled the purpose of seeing if any bilateral T Sides) (Choosing Failed Negotiations RYING TO PICK UP ALL THE PIECES 46 88 The failure of CEU eTD Collection theaters, who theaters, 91 90 create some create form local of defense. to andtried armed whoresistance offered and peacetreaty, others a future at conscience decision to abandon resistance inhopes of legal tothe Entente’s appealing moral and Officers andinto officials quicklysplit camps, two one supporting government’s the BárthaAlbert arguesin his memoirs that To former officers and soldiers, this was a betrayal both from without and within. 89 Mócsy, Bartha, Romsics, II. lost no Transylvania time in and establishing resistance Hungary organizations.eastern of Székelys, the including Hungarians, but Hungary) northern (in sporadic best at was resistance Organized possible. was resistance bestof at part loss of the Transylvania, to resigned Hungarians,less or more includingwere Jászi the and Székelys, Károlyi still believed that resistance…[although] demobilized officers tried to mobilize the populationHungarian for In town after town, politicians of the old regime, county and local officials, or István Mócsy describes the second group, in both the Czech and Romanian T Romanians in throwingTransylvania, back the the bandits. against head to head stood always had team Maroknyi the what like valley, Vág to become a fait accompli, whatever it took to go successfully against the Czechs in the Romanians, and more help was given to the Czechs, but I refused to allow this situation Romanians atany cost… I am exceedingly sorry that the Entente decided to help the I wanted to create a new task, in which my main point was to keep out the Czechs and lines. demarcation agreed the even infringing already were places in which states, Hungarian government] to hold up the advancing forces of the hostile surrounding Hungary might have chances future at any peace conferences…no effortconcerted was made scupper [by the would resistance military any that felt advisors his and Károlyi War and Society Vol. XII, Visszaemlékezések HE TWO SIDES HE TWO Hungary in the Twentieth Century, [Looking Back] p. 41-42 ( WHERE THEPIECES FELLWHERE p. 25,30 p. 93 47 ) 91 90 89 CEU eTD Collection challenges from challenges from as this group they formed more clandestinely in western the border someThis deterred of men,the for unfortunately Károlyi, would future the hold more discipline as best it could. Károlyi made it clear, that although they had been enact chose to government track,the on and theperipheries, staying living on soldiers and ex-officers the with unpopular wildly be to proved which policy a continuing which threatened tocompletely theirnon-aggressionunbalance policy? Stuck between boil quickly to dark;threatening quickly.over turned mother country was felt beto catastrophic, and themood of Hungarianthe inhabitants from the The separation occupants. of largestnumber Hungarian possessedthe that This was especially true in Transylvania, the largest of the theaters of war, and the area forever. possibly lostbe areaswould these then initiative, the if notthat take did they their duty in much samethe lightas soldiersthe called upin 1848/49. They keenly felt This second group, made up of officers and soldiers from the areas under threat, saw 92 93 Mócsy, Károlyi, been waiting for the first opportunity to regain their past positions, started to organize illegal to military detachments, which,started needless to say, were dissolved when discovered.positions, past their regain to opportunity first the for waiting been Encouraged by this attack, the ex-officers of the Austro-Hungarian Army, who had How did the Károlyi deal government potentiallywith this explosive situation, officers. non-commissioned and grade junior from mostly created, also were formations Transylvania…Simultaneously, in many parts of Transylvania irregular military fromdemanded it Budapest some consequently forceful action to rebellion; repel open and the invaderstreason and as to Iulia) secure [Albia sovereignty in at Gyulafehérvár Romanians of the actions the interpreted ofTransylvania population Hungarian The War and Society Vol. XII, Faith Without Illusion 92 , p. 150 p. 35-36 48 93 CEU eTD Collection Levéltár, 1014. Budapest, Kapisztrán tér 2-4, Archives, Personal Memoirs of Kamil Aggházy) 96 95 Hungary and its Neighbor States 1918-1919 Aggházy suspicions must have also played on theirminds, as pointed out by Lt. General Kamil amongst neighbors, especially as they were sworn to defend it. Their personal partitioned homeland their watch to men these for agony been have must it Surely to loyalty;this chief among them being the desire continue to theirmilitary careers. willing to throw theirlot in with the Károlyi government? Several factors contributed follow the regime, came from the same socio-economic background. What made them state and saw little or no future before them.” in democratic felt still in newbourgeois officers anduncertainty service the reserve protection. In fact, Ervin Liptai succinctly writes that “Most of the 8000 professional region of Hungary, within Vienna, and more importantly, in Szeged, under Entente 94 still sympathetic to immediate action, but were also balancing this through their Even with guarded optimism, these officers and soldiers that followed their orders were that hestates in Party, which Independence KamilAggházy, Letterdated February1919, written from Dorottya street, V district, Budapest, (Hadtörténelmi At that time only 25 years of age and a Captain in rank Ervin PetérPásztor,Liptai in The first group, however, composed of officers and soldiers more willing to Independence Party, so that we can move forward for Hungary. for forward move we can that so Party, Independence that we should replace anyone against thisplan with the oldermembers of the Károlyi line with our values. János Hock, the President of the National Council, has indicated generally maintain the government, we mustmove away from anything that is not in Democratic allies, while continuing to protect the peace, keep the worker’s rights, and To keep the program in line with our initial aims, and to cooperate with our Social 95 in his letter to a fellow committee member of Károlyi’s National War and Society in East Central Europe Vol. XX Revolutions and Interventions in , (Columbia University Press, New York, 1988) p. 27 94 49 96 CEU eTD Collection official capacity that “Not one Czech foot set down on Hungarian soil.” Albert Bartha was the new Minister of Defense; he boasted that while he was in this be capable of from abarrierpresenting incursionsfurther into Hungarian territory. playing for time, now as a way to mask the raising of National Guard units that would Serbs continued to present achallenge to the border demarcations. Károlyi was still 99 of war also began returning from the Russian camps where they had been held by the by held been had they where camps Russian the from returning began also war of beginning of a new yearmightbring amore favorable for Hungary.situation National Council,members expressed the hope that after the end of December, the 98 cadre that could then train divisionsthe allowed bythe agreement Entente in Belgrade. With these reluctant followers, Károlyi was able tobegin the process of setting up a that had yet to find its cohesion. Liptai describes them as of viable thoughts bethe cognizant thatcould aforming on placed expectations army 97 Bartha, Romsics, Ervin Liptai, As November turned into December, the demands of the Romanians, Czechs, and By the end of November/beginning of December, many of the former prisoners III. the only force that could be matched against foreign expansion. foreign against matched be could that force only was the movement worker’s domestic and international the view of points organizational Hungary’s foreign and internal situation, they became convinced thatfrom political and the basis of their education and personalexperience; partly, too, because, considering democratic administration, partly because they were more susceptible to democracy on A smaller group of former professional officers [who] collaborated with the liberal Visszaemlékezések Hungary in the Twentieth Century, A A B Magyar Köztársaság [The Hungarian People’s Republic] LEAK C HRISTMAS [Looking Back] p. 42 (C OMMUNISM ON THE RADAR OMMUNISM ON p. 90 50 (Osiris 1965) Kiadó, Budapest, (Osiris p. 82-88 97 ) 99 Within the 98 CEU eTD Collection 138 promises of active resistance against foreign aggression were “[even more] successful more] were “[even foreign aggression against of active resistance promises control of the Army and the government. Tökés argues that the Communists, with their werepreparingtherefore pass to informationthis on when they had found away take to fighting in the Soviet Union’s civil war against the Whites and the Entente, and indoctrination and experience of Communistthe military fighting while structure The ex-officers and soldiers who returned with Kun, had received their political for aCommunist party than any other single factor, saying that November 24,1918. on officially party, Communist Hungarian the of creation in the direction political agitator from Szilágycseh, [Lelei] Transylvania. His return signaled a more aggressive man named Béla Kun, a former reserve officer and in peacetime a journalist and Communist party within Hungary. Prominent among these returning soldiers was a by Bolshevik propaganda and releasedfor theintent purpose of covertly setting upa in front; from fact manyindoctrinated western of hadthe them were politically returned new Bolshevik government. These returning soldiers were a very different type than 100 Béla KuninRudolf L.Tökés, Kun himself remarked that the war had done more to help the creation of conditions and the development of acollectivist psychology among soldiers the at front. wartime governmental interference in the lives of individuals, regimented existence, cohesion of a society in the process of building socialism. These were increased psychological and administrative precedentswhich could greatly useful of contribute toward the number a created had war concluded recently the (Kun) opinion his In Béla Kun and the Hungarian Soviet Republic, 51 (Pall Mall Press, New York, 1967) p. 100 CEU eTD Collection received their proper compensation. received their proper [soldiers]their services,”for that was paid for those soldierssettlement who hadsum fought atlump the front and not “modest the including adopted; were measures social decision-makerin regards to future military policy.By this point, even some of his not primarily change his function as the head of the government, and he was still the Republic, being replaced by Dénes Berinkey, the former Justice Minister. This role did its start training program. December and continuing through the end of February, which would allow the Army to A period without international pressure was to begin, starting in the middle of Kun Democratic newspaper, and many imprisoned. his Communistof associates were ofNépsava,aSocial headquarters the at andcivilians policemen of both deaths governmentfelt tobe this a threat; and subsequently anincidentafter involving the propaganda as Károlyithe governmentwas less lessand successful. Károlyi’s peripheries, and they be to proved more and more susceptible Communist to disabled veterans associations.” veterans disabled in influencing operations the of 20,000strongthe non-commissioned and officers 102 101 Romsics, Ibid, p. 106 Károlyi Károlyi switched roles on 11 the C. Starting toUnravel Hungary in the Twentieth Century 101 Many of these 20,000 contingents were from the 102 th of January, becoming the first President of the . p. 94 52 CEU eTD Collection and “told him that under the circumstances the Soldiers Council was an impossible having Csernák leftistat cease-fireideato negotiations, atthe turned such a represented Worker’s Council, DezsóBokanyi, whom upon hearing Franchetd’ Esperey’s disgust However, the idea of the Soldier’s Council was put in its place by the President of the it Belgrade. hadrepresentative [Imreof Károlyi’s Csernák] to accompanied delegation commands. and their officers challenged form that grumbling,influencing soldiers tosetup Soldier’s Councils on model the of Sovietthe democratization of the army. Communist propaganda also played a part in the discontent among soldiers who had subscribed to the more left-leaning aspects of the of rumblings began the there defense, amore active planned Festetics, Sándor gained would buy more time for the regime. As Károlyi and his new Defense Minister, benefits political the be that in hopes enacted, to policy the was defense finally active an did notauthorize an offensive of any kind, especially as there were no reserves. But in Bihar County, one of the largest counties in Transylvania at the eastern front. non-resistance was going be to abandoned infavor of defensive preparations, tobegin a new policy was going to be enacted for the military; namely that the policy inactiveof 103 Kiraly, The Soldier’s Council was notnew in the beginning of 1919,in fact, a On January 23, 1919,Károlyi and Berinkey made plain in acabinet meeting that War and Society Vol. VI, p.265 53 103 This CEU eTD Collection Press, New York, 2002) p. 63 106 1919, seemed to inevitably loom over the horizon. the over loom inevitably to seemed of further aggression within the eastern and northern theaters, and a second revolution movement was starting to grow bolder, the frontiers were again contracting in the face As this crisis developed within Army the and government, the the Communist political tribunals. wereplaceddisciplinary decisions in military hands the popularly of elected whenin officer’s wassecure Bartha Bartha. HisDecember over Albert victory appointed, József Pogány, he and challenge began to the previous Minister of Defense, civilians as was maintained by ‘that idiot Linder.’ institution. Soldiers would have to remain soldiers, he acclaimed, and not become 105 104 organization and training suffered for it. Romsicsand sufferedorganization training remarks that Ignác Romsics, Ignác Andrew C. Janos, William B. Slottnam, Pásztor, (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1971) After the return to Budapest, however, ahead of the Soldier’s Council was of the right to impose punitive disciplinary measures. disciplinary punitive impose to right of the officers commanding deprived which 2December on issued directive a by compounded dual power crisis developed over the command of the armed forces. The anarchy was many locations the soldier’s councils turned against their commanding officers…Thus a The striking aspect of the slowly building new army was also weakened by the fact that 105 Hungary between Lenin and Wilson, This was a direct challenge to the structure of the Army, and Army The Dismantling of Historic Hungary The Peace Treaty of Trianon, 1920 Revolution in Perspective Essays on the Hungarian Soviet Republic of p. 64 54 104 106 , (Columbia University CEU eTD Collection Belgrade and Bucharest, and also through the services of Romanian, Czech, and was accomplished in two ways, by direct representation to Entente military officials in both Czechsthe further andRomanians, attempt a atterritorial aggrandizement. This The Entente forces in Serbia had decided to move forward with proposals put forth by Hungarian Army was quickly coming under pressure from the international situation. Exit the White (Aster) Knight: On Storms the RedFoot Soldier As February slowly faded into March, the lull that had been afforded to the to afforded been had that lull the March, into faded slowly February As I. military faceda dire such crisis? when thestate support the democratic government? How could politics take a frontseat over war-making passively sit by while the sovereignty of the nation was challenged, while continuing to In what way did Károlyi prepare the Army for the task it faced? Was the Army prepared to A. Army Alliance: Is War-making or Politics more important? more orPolitics Is War-making Army Alliance: T HE T RANSITION FROM RANSITION P ASSIVE TO ASSIVE Chapter 4 55 F ORCED A CTIVE CEU eTD Collection 108 and newborders being laidin the former Habsburg Empire. and worked in Central Europe that wereable to worm their wayinto the proceedings deciding the boundaries several so called ‘experts’ who were everything from cartographers,to journalists, to businessmen who had lived 109 for example realizing that for example knew was at what stake by process the out drawing of territorial expansion; Czechsthe decisions by committee “extensive” knowledge of their region.the Western European Francophile observers whoseposition was secured within peace 107 supply. mention to not problems, communications and logistics simple on based Army even insufficient aweakened against Transylvania were Hungarian and disorganized their position winter the throughout months and early Their1919. in troops 8-10,000 consolidating slowly only Transylvania, within drive in their conservative initially be in the Ukraine. This caused the Romanians to split theirmilitary forces, forcing them to also being usedby tomaintain Entente the with contact Whitesthe fighting theSoviets Romanians wereoccupied with a two-front war,both pressuring Hungarians the and In Romania, a similar situation was to be found, as throughout the winter months, the Mócsy, Ibid, p. 32 Laszló Botos, Laszló Many shrewd politicians and nationalistsin surroundingthe neighbor countries 109 satisfactory agreement between Hungarian and Slovak. and Hungarian between agreement satisfactory Hungarian sentiment ofearly November to subside and for the negotiation of a War and Society Vol. XII Any delay in occupation might have provided the necessary time for the anti- The Road to the Dictated Peace, , p. 23 (Arpad Publishing Company, Cleveland, 1999) There were 56 108 107 CEU eTD Collection made upentirely soldiersof whohad previously servedin elite units within the The Székely Division on the other hand, was prepared to defend its territory, being Romanian troops from the eastern front against the Soviets. which the Romanians had advanced, grew intoan acute problem, with the freeing of aggression and consolidation of territory to the east of Kolozsvár, [Cluj-Napoca] to 1919 progressedinto month the February,of general the Romanianconcern about and most committed Hungarian Army formation on any of the three fronts. As the year a middle-class soldier. As leader of the Székely Division, he commanded the strongest His complaints were numerous, but perhaps most pressing, was that part. most at thenorthern Mare] [Baia in Kolozsvár,ending Nagybánya to [Deva] north establishingline a runningalong [Mures] Maros the River tothesouth, Déva through Kratochvil onbeingremarks given command with of troops line frontthis area, 111 Romanian soldiers to disengage fromthe eastern front and be shippedto Transylvania. forces were forced to withdraw from the Romanian border and deal with the new threat, which allowed under the command of the Ukrainian Symon Petliura, after the defection ofa key Ukrainian commander, Soviet 110 Károly Kratchovil, Upuntil March 1919,Romanian soldiers hadbeen engaged borderin clashes with advancing Soviet forces Colonel Károly Kratochvil, was a figure central to the defense in Transylvania, and II. Maros line. and unprepared to defend. I sent them to Nagyenyed, Torda, and other places along the commanded the 21 command of the Transylvania sector, and alone [besides the Székely Division] I The Romanian cavalry pushed forward without firing to the demarcation line. I was in S ZÉKELY Memoirs 111 D IVISION st , p. 13 Koloszvár Regiment, who were untrained, without key equipment : A T RANSYLVANIA 57 S TALWART 110 In his memoirs, Col. CEU eTD Collection on to their territory. The Székely Division will again play a prominent role in the around the entire periphery of Hungary; that armed resistance was the only way to hold consensus of this group of soldiers was the same asmany of their contemporaries general the government, the of task thankless the for sympathy personal showed executions.” missions responding to news or rumors of an impending Romanian atrocity or Col. Kratochvil was even proactive, ordering “Székely units [to] cross(ed) the lines on undermined official policy. Col. Kratochvil,however, was not deterred. winter months of 1918, theincreasingly war-like stance ofits defensive positions ingovernment As Budapest. thepolicy passive non-resistanceof developed during the did nothave; esprit decorps and a dedicated, able commander. army retreating 1918. late in It also many Hungarian hadsomething formations other Army;lackedImperial itit what was able from to obtain General Mackensen’s Communism. The Division had retained a good portion of its equipment from the university students, andother tradesman, they were quite critical anythingwith todoof Habsburg army. They also, for the most part, were middle-class, artisans, shop-keepers, 112 113 Mócsy, Ibid regardless of orders from Budapest; consequently, between January and April, the front stabilized. remained the April, and January between consequently, Budapest; from orders of regardless stand a make to resolved Division Székely of the Commander the 1919, mid-January In The resolve of the Székely Division was notappreciated, however, by the War and Society Vol. XII, 113 Although not dismissive of Károlyithe Kratochvil government, even 112 p. 36 58 CEU eTD Collection breathed newlifea into struggling government thatwas starting tocrumble under tohear,it firm holding were desperate andofficers soldiers the what This was exactly and there, soldiers amongst the stirring support the Parliament. Károlyi even went sofar as to travel to the front line,in the hopes of constituency. They were key to helping Károlyi govern, as they were the majority in class members,including the soldiers and officers whobelonged totheparty Böhm was a memberof and whichwas for mostthe partfilled with staunch middle- cabinet was a direct political attempt to bring in the Social Democrats, a party which Defense, a much more aggressive head of department. His inclusion intoKárolyi’s loses. This decision was taken in consultation with Vilmos Böhm, the new Minister of reached that military action would have to be taken to discourage any more territorial Romanian Army and surprisingly, another against perceived enemy. coming springmonths andsummer of 1919; as a bulwark both against invadingthe 114 Kiraly, At the beginning of March, the Károlyi government met and the consensus was III. sign such peace terms! peace such sign never I will soldiers, you, I promise offered, is dismemberment territorial demanding not do materialize Principles and, insteadWilson’s If of a peace baseddeclared- on a mutual address an in agreement, and Mare] adictated [Satu peace Szátmárneméti in Division] Székely the [specifically troops the inspected Károlyi 2, March On War and Society Vol. VI, R D ESISTANCE ESPERATE ) T IMES CALL FOR 114 p. 267 D 59 ESPERATE M EASURES (A CTIVE CEU eTD Collection and theoretically, the most powerful of the three armies. In reality it was much more a most organized, supplied, easily best forces were the Entente negative,asthe absolute asan military the observer appear to this Atcould Szeged. first, to adjacent located line On the southern front, the Entente forces under General d’ Esperey were poised on a assessment. military in a negatives and positives both showed situation the of analysis war, and was capable of covering the three fronts in which threats resided. A quick There upon, the task was to clandestinely create anarmy that create clandestinely wasto the task There upon, comments that reflected the seriousness of the situation. He freely admitted that territory. of Hungarian sovereignty secure the andto cooperation, have areal opportunity atorganization, achance introduction of Böhm, and his working relationship with Pogány, the Army seemed to wordsmostthe certainly have bewould to followed bymatching actions, butwith the embodied their idea of the Hungarian nation. It was a temporary measure to be sure; cling to agovernment that had embraced their way of life, theirideology, and that injustice. back benational They whatto againstfight were desperate they to perceived pressure. It appealed to their middle-class ideals,of a strong nation and a willingness to 115 Károlyi, war. The four battalions permitted by the Armistice were naturally not sufficient forwaging War…Theof army, Minister ouras main support inorganizer, case of crisis…had excellent an to Böhm, be built [Vilmos] up from nothing. William appointed I had The speech bymorewas followed from proclamations Károlyi, private and Faith Without Illusions, 115 p.156, 159 60 was capable of capable of waging CEU eTD Collection force a decision that the Hungarian government was unprepared for. It began with the It occurred outside of Hungary, and once again the Entente military forces were able to landscape. military entire the changed completely again that happened something Then defense of the homeland, and it resonated well with many men from the outer areas. strong; just as Kossuththe governmenthad done, the appealwas topatriotism and and and were organized, orders prepared for defense. Again parallelthe 1848/9is to fronts to service the influx of incoming recruits; arms and munitions were searched for men in all the affected peripheral areas. Cadres were moved into positions behind the be defended. area to of and amount command, the by unrestrained Entente opponent the front-line, of distance the becauseof was in Transylvania, therefore threat The greatest mainlyscale offensive further south than operations because Eperjes, between Czechs two connections the the launchhadbeen territories, large- to unable front, the Czechs had strong-armed the Slovaks into aunion; butbeyond consolidating northern the On line. demarcation the maintaining precariously and front southern acted as a leash on the Serbian Army’s revisionist claims, effectively stabilizing the had forces there Entente French presenceof Army, asthe for theHungarian positive 116 Mócsy, Preparations continued at pace, with at military-age continued tomobilize Preparations Böhm preparing whiletroops, its an alternative of method wasadvance worked out. further any temporarily halt to Czechoslovakia forced Hungary by resistance military of promise The County. Nyitra and [Bratislava] Pozsony to reinforcements strong sent and troops own its by counterattack a ordered therefore, and, The Károlyi government considered these military moves (4000 m probe) totally illegal War and Society Vol. XII, p. 22 61 116 CEU eTD Collection conclusion of the two revolutions, he as an example self-determination. Hungarian andpopulace, slightest without the justification for Wilson’s principle of state; not to mention also giving areas that were clearly composed of a majority formed newly the to demands most Czech’s of the inaccorded theater actuality northern in the line The Vix. Ferdinand a Colonel Hungary, for bound representative Entente communicated thisthe It decision to and Romania/Hungary. Czechoslovakia/Hungary separating theaters northern and eastern the for taken be to positions the regarding brought ominous forebodings. and March of hopes the burst that bombshell inescapable an Paris, from instructions a arrival representative French toBudapest, the Colonel of Entente andhis Vix, Károlyi was later to remark that after meeting with Masaryk following the following after Masaryk meeting with toremark later that Károlyi was On February 28 I. B. R Vixed [N] Advantage ESIGNATION OFTHE ESIGNATION AT GOVERNANCE th , 1919, the Allied demarcation committee came to a final decision ) K ÁROLYI GOVERNMENT 62 (C OMMUNISM GETS IT CHANCE IT GETS OMMUNISM CEU eTD Collection mile. Károlyi then decided to allow his new Defense Minister and his staff to make a giving aninch, saying asthe Romaniansthe goes, wereprimed take to proverbialthe Romanians torefrainfrom unleashing dogs the of war at stagewasafarce;that by reason.” same advance for the to not Romanians Romanian foradvances the sake of avoidingbloodshed, and promised tocall on the could wastohave give “asked Hungarians [the] not to theirorder troops to resist This message however, wasnotconveyed to Hungariansthe until March 19 119 118 deadline of deadline of March 22 lost lines and thereafter. areas the new demarcation complied whether with, not Hungary or hadlegitimate any claim/counter-claim the to be pressed, the timeline, what punishment should be meted out if the demands were not any that the Allies themselves were divided over the message itself, how hard it should communicated, and how firm the messenger needed to be. It also did not help matters and confirming the exact wording anddirection messagethe needed tobe rechecking checking, cables, of diplomatic decoding necessary of delays the intravel, 117 Ibid Pásztor, Károlyi, Entente without having been asked for. asked been having without the by Entente Czechoslovakia [the] upon thrust been had Hungarians) by entirely (inhabited Col. Vix himself was at odds with the note, finding the terms too harsh and the Admitted to me thethat Csallóköz [Ve Faith without Illusions, Hungary between Lenin and Wilson, nd too soon to realistically comply. realistically to soon too p.171 p. 86 Đ 117 ký Žitný ostrov] and Komárom [Komárno] 63 119 Bothpartiesexpect knewthat to the 118 In fact, the only advice he th , because CEU eTD Collection confident enough to do its job, orjoin sides with a political party that many in the Army was nowfaced with a choice; remain loyal to agovernment that no longer was released communists, whowere willing to exercise the power of government. The Democrats, with their parliamentary majority, who in turn, made way for the recently nation. tothe presentable couldmake these demands that Democrats Social with the andmade afrank call;his governmentwas nolonger able toprovide a viable coalition This assessment was given to President Károlyi, he then discussed it with his colleagues describes scenethe inhis military threat assessment and response plan to the Vix Ultimatum. Peter Pásztor Stromfeld and Colonel Jen Defense Minister Böhm and his two newly militaryappointed Coloneladvisors, Aurél cabinet andmake cabinet critical the decision. strategic assessment. Once this recommendation was prepared, he would convene his 120 Pásztor, II. Unable to accept or decline the ultimatum, Károlyi made way made Social forKárolyi way the decline ultimatum, acceptor the Unable to orders. tofollow refuse would in Transylvania Division Székely At the same time Böhm was informed that, if the ultimatum were accepted, the crack would result in the complete economic, political, military and destruction of Hungary. hour,they suggested the rejection of the Vix Ultimatum, claiming that the new borders with new borders and to give their advice on how acceptable they were. Within a half- military advisors, Colonel [s] Stromfeld and Tombor. He asked them to prepare a map That same morning, after the Vix encounter, Defense Minister Böhm called on his two T HE Hungary between Lenin and Wilson, A RMY MAKESASSESSMENTRMY AN Hungary between LeninandWilson Ę Tombor, then, were tasked with coming up with a viable p. 139 64 , reporting , 120 CEU eTD Collection personnel. having trained of of necessity in factonly them retained,andthe out were that retained mutual on both sides; Kun and his functionaries were wary of the soldiers and officers governement and faithfully serve the Kun-led Communist one. But the distrust was 123 122 Arad. newthe line railway the established line along Szatmárnémeti- connecting to full had they couldlittle their do; hands retreating Székely Division was the there that however, time, that At rebellion. and insubordination considered he that Communism reflections of a middle-class soldier, whose political ideology was so far from accepting are just as much against Kun Béla as the Romanians.” alone, without any help from the Romanians, because we are not Bolshevists, and we Székely Division was just aswilling to aroundturn andfightKun Béla [Béla Kun] confirmed by Colonel Kratochvil in his memoirsown in hewhich remarked that “The in reality were but politician, cast-aside comments of a bitter the These werenot go of the reins of power, he did however state in his memoirs that military profession had negative feelings towards. Károlyi himself was resigned to let 121 See Appendice 2 for map Kratchovil, Károlyi, 123 The Army was therefore forced to make the decision to follow the change of were protecting our frontiers from the Romanians, would have been loyal to me. to loyal been have would Romanians, the from frontiers our protecting were (against the Communists) andthe fight regimentof to Széklers who, under ready General Kratochvil,were officers the bodyguard; personal my own rallied have I could Faith without Illusions, Memoirs , p. 24 p.155 65 122 These were the serious Nagyvárad- 121 CEU eTD Collection territory and then to lead the vanguard of the proleterian revolution. revolution he Europe, throughout planned use to Hungarianthe Red Army lost regain to direction of spread firmly nation; the his Communist basedupon the to conviction himself the task of aRedArmy. of creating task himself the indaring thought tomaintain their positionsalso, and by beginningthe April, of set advisorsallowed and other had in who officers shownaggressiveness planning and continued the appointmentof Böhm because of Social his Democratic background, he Army; the for cadre leadership a of creation the to came it when man hands-on reforms, appealing to theirleftist sensibilities. Kun was absolutely in this sense a officers, alsomaking use of officers who had shown support for Social Democratic tobuild Communist Communist-oriented started indoctrinated acadreof dedicated The Army could rightly feel that its authority was being challenged; Kun as an 1993) p. 152-153 1993) p. 125 124 György Borsányi, Romsics, Kun made itclearfrom beginningthe whathis plans werefor Armythe forand the III. though it was, had been dragging on. dragging been had was, it though Thus he was directly operations. involvedmilitary in of setting charge in up the Hungariandirectoire Red Army, atask five-member the of which, part essential became also At the beginning of April, in addition to his job as Commissar of Foreign Affairs, Kun upon to defend the dictatorship. the loyalities of these units on the ground, which meant they could not always be relied servicemen kept on from old forces. As aresult there were often grave suspicions about comprised in part of Guard, demobilized Red the by over soldiers taken and were armed workers,gendarimerie in and part of police officersof the and functions The Hungary in the Twentieth Century, R ED The Life of a Communist Revolutionary Béla Kun, A IMS 124 p. 101 125 66 (Columbia University Press, New York, Press, University (Columbia CEU eTD Collection 143 instigated unruly soldiers tomarch in frontof commisariatthe building anddemand the Military Affairs and the future Commander of the 6th Division of the Red Army this rival, and on April 3rd, Tibor Szamuely and Béla Szánto, the Commissar for not help that Pogány was a Social Democrat. Agitation began immediately to remove directly controlled by the Communist party was deemed a threat and neutralized. It did not form, in Communist however any of military; true the organization organization and control political of ideology Communist the of principles the with conincide to already leadership existed. that as he imagined. There was still the issue of the Soldier’s Council, and the Army recruits he planned to bring into the Army, were however, not as simply carried through His plans to form a Red Guard, as a cadre to instruct and indocrinate the rest of the wrote for the Social Democratic Népszava, on March 30, 1919, in which he argued he article newpaper in a naysayers non-Communist the for clearer even it made Kun 126 127 Mócsy, BélaKun, the “On Unityof the Proleteriat,” Although the Soldier’s Council was at first glance an organization that seemed proleteriatof the or to lay the revolution country’s fortunes international the on the behind altar of Wilsonian firmly pacifism? ourselves place to of chance- game the is Which ask: to this only I have revolution, world of coming the on gambling sheer but is in Hungary proleteriat of the dictatorship the that say who those To revolution. great a in engulfed be would world the soon and Europe State survived, the example would be followed in the other nations of East Central Like many faithful Communists of his time, he believed that if the Hungarian Soviet War and Society Vol. XII, p. 28 Népszava 67 in Tökés, in Béla Kun and the Hungarian Soviet Republic 126 127 , p. CEU eTD Collection this in but causedasituation “notonly workers Communist oldandwhich the officers recruitingmeasures of patriotism and nationalism alongside their political propaganda; To this end, the Communist were intelligent enough to combine the successful twin under its banner. For historians,it appears as an anomaly; with Communism; instead they madecautiously a deal with devil the and embarked This should have been agroup waspoliticallythat directly any to opposed partnership with an aggressiveness and willingness to regain the country’s sovereign territory. conflict with the Soldier’s Council; it ultimately came down to choosing a government and officers to switch allegiance, lay in a far more simple reason than winning the Council. by the challenged being constantly than was better indocrination control with political that made the compromise battling with the Soldier’s Council for control over discipline and overall command, and 129 resignation of resignation of Pogány. 128 Mócsy, Tökés, C. pacifism with one of national resistance, even if Communist. even resistance, ofnational one with pacifism antipathy to the regime, for, in it, they saw the replacement of a foreign policy based on number ofofficersand middle class refugees. They served in significant spite of theirof a ideological Army Red the in participation the was surprising more Somewhat The main reason, however, for the Army and within it the middle-class soldiers Recruitment for theReds Béla Kun and the Hungarian Soviet Republic, War and Society Vol. XII, 128 The Army of course welcomed this interference; it had been , p. 98 68 p.150 129 CEU eTD Collection necessary, as Churchill said, to walk hand in hand with the Devil to cross the bridge. enemies; this did notmean that the enemy myof enemy is my friend, but it was what Col. Kratochvil had said, both the Communist and the Romanians/Czechs were the willing to lead them intobattle. For many middle-class officers and soldiers, justlike for was whoever fight main to motivation was the stunted, economically and weakened state and and being uprooted forced findto anewplace within much a smaller Hungary, livingand therewithin homeaHungarian between going difference men,For these the reasons. nationalist and patriotic for fought too they classes, economic susceptible Communist to propaganda aboutland redistribution and equality for all class wasmore the peasant Although werepatriotic. and soldiers officers middle-class posters crying To Arms! To Arms!” soldiers, intellectuals and even some of the peasantry responded to the call of the Soviet 131 130 Ibid. p. 98 Ibid, p. 89 homes and their lands,lying often just behind the Romanian front lines. choice for them to join the Red Army, which promised to regain for them their last Red Army were recruited from the ranks of the refugee peasants. It was a simple They joined in large number; in fact a majority of the peasant soldiers who served in the only that imply to not is this soldier; of all classes for similar were reasons The 130 69 131 CEU eTD Collection regime.” Republic a hadinherited force of barely men from 40,000 bourgeoisthe democratic movements and to clearly analyze strategy from their previous military were military experience from their previous andclearly analyze strategy to movements soldiers and officers within its ranks; ability there plan to and unit coordinate encroachment. good Its fortune was tohave the continued middle-class supportof the territory under the Károlyi regime when its stated goal was only preventto further hope any lost itcouldto regain not moreover be an force; active to efficiency required would beexecuted? the middle-class soldiers and officers who were in charge of creating the operational plans that hope to overwhelm any itsof neighboring enemies? In what way was the decision shaped by accomplish these aims? How, with its weak organization and relative inexperience could it aimingoutwards, toregain allsome if not lostanddisputed the of territory. Whereit could 132 Romsics, “As Hungary’s army organization had been neglected, [Hungarian]the Soviet I. As the Hungarian Army itcould developed, onlyhope to become aggressive and branch A. C chain) Weak linkinthetightening Initial Success(A 132 ONTINUING ORGANIZATION ONTINUING Hungary in the Twentieth Century, The Implementation of an Aggressive Foreign Policy While nota disaster, the order and organization of the army lacked the p.105 (O Chapter 5 RIGIN OF RIGIN 70 B ATTLE P LANS ) CEU eTD Collection 134 the overall chain ofcommand. Normally an Army would consist ofbetween 2-4 divisions, in this case not. connotation, it instead refers totheir autonomy withinthe chainof command, and their oflevel attachment to The term Székeler Armies does not denote the size of the formation, as it normally would within a military would be able tocomplete the task of an offensive,but that they would be able to This immenserequired an of amountconfidence in at troops the hand; not only they that workers militia and regular army recruits, early July was to be the period of fruition. early April at being three to four months away,indicating that at full readiness, with the fastestthe they could rush necessarythe into200,000 troops place in wasestimated staff]flowed along with this plan. At their proposed rate of recruitment and training, Defense Minister Böhm hisand Aurél subordinate Stromfeld [essentially his chief of army. victorious recruitment through the addition of military laurels and the chance to be part of a time to arm, train, and deploy the needed soldiers effectively and toinspire more occur independently, there would be an attempt at an offensive somewhere to buy the chance Czechsand the successfully Romanians.” better at repelling authorizing thecall-up of “18 divisions and 3 SzékelerArmies, which would enablea himself gives the orders through documents sent to Lieutenant Colonel Jen as Chief of Staff, tocarry through the recruitment process nationwide. Stromfeld in neededsorely assets crucial the Kun stage. authorizedplanning Stromfeld, therefore Archives) Stromfeld personal memoirs and papers, also mentioned in Botos, 133 Romsics, AurélStromfeld Orders to LTC Tombor, (Hadtörténelmi Levéltár, 1014. Budapest, Kapisztrán tér 2-4. , Kun’s new Red Army had the stated goal to regain Kun’s hadgoal regain andtherefore, newRedArmy stated territory, the to The Dismantling of Historic Hungary, p.97 71 The Road to Dictated Peace 133 This would not Ę Tombor, 134 , p.232 CEU eTD Collection had correspondence with Major Gyula Gömbös, a key counter-revolutionary afigure, hadMajorkey with Gyula Gömbös, correspondence counter-revolutionary guardedly optimistic. As the offensive would later develop, Colonel Stromfeld even note, that any successful offensive there could turn to his advantage to the east,was the north if the eastern theater was not held successfully, and as any good soldier would in to inherent offensive the realized threat but the change, regime the about incredulous in remained east, commanderthe facto theater and de Division, Székler command of the within Budapest, believing the offensive to be folly. Colonel Kratochvil, at the remainedGratz an in as officer staff RedArmy,wouldthe only but conduct work Communism to be a bigger evil than the foreign invasion of his country. Dr. Gustáv before, chose to retreat to Vienna after the fall of the Károlyi regime, believing who weencountered Szeged.Capitan Bácso, or in Vienna camp either revolutionary of offensive,the guarded others optimism, others while chosetodefect counter- the long a require term sacrifice. reclaiming lostwould all andthat beexceedingly former would difficult, territory the ahead task realize the that to enough realistic hand,were other on the counterparts middle-class their nations; neighboring in brothers their to revolution the carry to them commanding propaganda Communist the all by fired bellies their optimistic, very were sustain their gains once they inevitably ran out of steam. The working class soldiers Some of the middle class soldiers and officers voiced fears before the beginning 72 CEU eTD Collection 137 136 [Stromfeld Letters], (Hadtörténelmi Levéltár, 1014. Budapest, Kapisztrán tér 2-4. ,Archives) and Papers, Stromfeld, military military philosophy. military committee and the Army High Command, a thing unheard of in Communist thepolitical between effort theCzechs acollaborative attack was to The decision territory. Maria Ormos reasons that political concessions were critical to the success of the spring offensive into the Slovak and the6 Szánto and sometimes take the place of army and division commanders, as was the case of political wouldcommissars accompany and formations, all critically, accompany would cohesiveness wouldbeimpossible it. He without was able do to this by compromising; during Kun the regime by convincing governingmilitary the that any committee of sort positions. propaganda and place regularmiddle-class Army withofficers training in key it obviousthe had good accomplished. seeking to justify his decision to join the Red Army by the success of the offensive and 135 Ibid, p. 48 Ormos, Bácso, One of the first steps that Böhm took was to cut through all the Communist attack the Czechoslovak army, the weaker of the two invaders. Budapest workers, it was possible to send in a competent military force by May 9, to enlistment ofmany young officers from the old army, and the initial enthusiasm of the who took on Aurél Böhm, Stromfeld by headed to be his Command chief High Army of of an staff. hands Thanks the in to was their actions, the organization Military Csaladjnak iratoi [Writings for my family], Hungary in the Age 136 It was a task he had started during the Károlyi regime, he continued it th Division. Böhm and Stromfeld still kept overall control, but their Letter from Stromfeld toGyula Gömbös, Szeged, June27, 1919, Stromfeld Levelese , p. 32 135 Gratz, 73 Visszaemlekesre, [Looking Back], 137 Kratochvil, Memoirs CEU eTD Collection People’s Republic(Soviet) of Hungary led by Béla Kun.” the of encirclement’ ‘capitalistic in the ‘weakest-link’ the was front Czecho-Slovak Kalvoda writes that “Since the Romanians secured their positions in Hungary, the back, the response was unanimous from the High Command; intoSlovakia. Josef Staff to give a critical assessment of where the Hungarians could realistically strike the northern theater was composed of “73 battalions of infantry of of “73 46batteries and wascomposed of battalions theater northern the military units.” fighteffective worker’s intothe convert to willingness andwork…to organizational inexperienced men who hadonly inworked factories, and needed “considerable training Hungarian army, the worker’s militia was comprised mostly of young and Austro- previous the from training with weresoldiers regularthe recruits army divisions, armed with rifles and machine guns, artillery, and mortars. While many of army recruits were organized intocompanies, battalions, regiments, and eventually armedworkers andsentto northernthe theaterledwhile byCommunist cadre, regular 139 138 Borsányi, Josef Kalvoda in Kiraly, When the military committee met, Kun asked the Defense Minister and his Chief of II. S TEP The Life of a Communist T 139 WO When finally set upin position, the Hungarian Army strike force in (W War and Society Vol. VI, HAT OPTION DO WE TAKE DO WE OPTIONHAT , p.170 p. 287 74 ?) 138 Munitions were builtup, CEU eTD Collection cadres and the regular middle-class army officers alike; namely that if truly the goal was feltthe pull to also secure territories that were lost from the state. Communist hisfirstresponsibility tospread was revolution;the butas a Hungarian he time.” that return to their homelands, atthe hand of a victorious army, was only a matter of and be temporary only would boundaries new the “that was fighting for reason the that well with those whose job it was to perform in the regular army. They firmly believed This essentially, was a political goal carried out through military means. It did not sit governmenthad a certain goal in mind, and that 142 143 infantry and 32 batteries of of artillery.” 32batteries and infantry forceartillery. would This forceface a combined Czech/Slovak of 90 battalions of 141 was fairlynegligible, as both sides were equipped with similarstyle fromthe Austro-HungarianArmy leftovers. Czechs slightly more than 3, while the Hungarians had a slight advantage in artillery. Any differential in weapons total of 27 battalions inone division, therefore the Hungarians hadslightly lessthan 3 divisions of infantry, the military terminology, there are 3 battalions in a regiment, 3 regiments in a brigade, 3 brigades in a division, a 140 Mócsy, Kun, Personal Memoirs, as recorded in Tökés, in recorded as Memoirs, Personal Kun, Tökés, Romsics, The first offensive was to commence on May commence on wasto20 first offensive The 142 Kun’s variance of emphasis reflected a dilemma faced by both the Communist occupy Eastern Slovakia and to establish a Soviet Republic there. against the Czech lines offensive an defending theinitiated Slovak frontiers. Jannasak, TheAntonin and purpose of thisMünnich, attackFerenc was to Rákosi, Mátyás Szánto, Commander of the Hungarian Red Army, Sixth Division, with the help of To this end, the communists intensified preparations in two directions. First, Béla Béla Kun, Kun was of two minds when it came to starting the offensive, as an ardent War and Society Vol. XII, The Dismantling of Historic Hungary, p.175 p. p. 14 140 Béla Kun, p. 103 To break those numbers down into more sizeable 75 p.162-163 th . Tökés reports that the 143 141 CEU eTD Collection existence was to allow them to regain their identity, not to force a new political systemdaily on former them their into back outside trapped been had who Hungarians the bring to way best the that knew they consequently populace; the by faced been had that hardships the knew soldiers and officers These territory. further into forward pushing on focused instead and propaganda and the mentality of the middle-class soldiers and officers, who refrained from making political for the good organization within the offensive, however, was undoubtedly due experienceto the Communist officers and in part by regular middle-class army commanders. The main reason by part in controlled militia, worker’s recruited newly the and Command High Army of the stunning success for the Kun regime, and was onlymade possible by the continued cooperation became a flight, especially when they ran out of munitions and supplies and munitions of out ran they when especially a flight, became Kalvodaaccording “The weretaken to by Czechoslovaks surprise; their attimes retreat militia and army. regular the worker’s middle-class officers. As the leader of the government was divided, so too would be the Hungary over any territory returned, directly at variance with the intent and will of the which would mean the nullification of any and all nationalist and sovereign rights of spreading of one political ideology. Problem two centered on the execution of that idea, worldwide must unite and therefore the sovereignty of the state is irrelevant in the following Communist doctrine should theoretically know no nationalism; all workers planned offensive. Problem one was definitely ideological,in that a fighter strictly to spreadCommunist problems revolution, the two existed in logic their regarding the 144 Kalvoda in Kiraly, The offensive, on the other hand, was militarily wildly successful, and War and Society Vol. VI, p.287 76 .” 144 This was a CEU eTD Collection May, Tibor Hetes argues argues that Hetes May,Tibor the actual scope of the plan, however, was a matter of contention. At the beginning of commenced. Getting the military committee and the Army High Command to agree on finally when peacetalks the negotiating table the expected to behelpful was at Entente, weaknesses of the Czechs, combined with the effect an offensive would have on the and strengths the test to offensive, limited A officers] middle-class Tombor.[Also and plain through the battle plans created by Böhm and his principal advisors, Stromfeld for means. Themilitary madethe justification longerhad its wasenough casevery behind military reasoning atsuchfarstrategy with was odds each other end the that no officers and Communist political officers almost from the start had a falling out, as their Theregulararmy soldiers. middle-class and regular the Communist the ranks between Stephen. Saint of Crown Holy the of lands the to returned being was territory sovereign Hungarian as long burden that could be shouldered as long as the victories over the Czechs kept piling up, and as in their time of vulnerability. The political officers who accompanied them were a burden, but a Czechoslovaks. Böhm, on the other hand, opposed an attack from the direction of direction the from attack an opposed hand, other the on Böhm, Czechoslovaks. the plan was dangerous as it could force the Romanians to come to the aid of the Kun dislikes the first plan, Stromfeld doesn’t like the second. Stromfeld believed that 2)Attack along the way ofSalgótarján. Miskolc-Kassa[Košice] via to prevent Romanian-Czech link-up. [Nitra] Nyitra towards north-west Counterattack 1) Campaign. The government had reached a consensus in connection with the plan of the Northern Even though things were going well militarily, there was dissension within the 77 CEU eTD Collection next line of defense, causing the Hungarian army to have to fall back on the Tisza. The the taking of the cities of Nyiregyháza, Debrecen, and Békéscsaba, which were meant tobe the toprevent they in militia butwere unable form of sent worker’s the Army of Red detachments from the demarcation line set by the Entente and reach the Tisza river. Reinforcements were front, from own offorceseastern of because freeing the their military success enjoyed by the Romanians, who easily possessed a numerical advantage of Romanian forces in April to the line set by the Vix Ultimatum; but because of the initial prevailed besides victory. The offensive in the Northern theater was prompted by the advance move forward. in wasuninterested Kun, frank for andpressed theoffensive however, this advice, to consistently. well-supplied not were and veterans, middle-class the for save experience as little units hadvery the assessment, This ishardly unprepared. a conservative of the offensive were widely divided, because many of them believed that the army was Within their own ranks, the military officers whose mission it was to set the parameters companies and 1 armored train. regiments (about 7 divisions) 28 cavalry companies, 192 artillery batteries, 3aircraft squadrons, 2 engineering batteries, 2aircraft squadrons, “some cavalry”and 3 armored trains…Facing a Romanian Army with 64 infantry 146 145 TheHungarians could boast of the Székely Division, 35 infantry battalions (about 1 and ½ divisions) 20 artillery Pásztor, These events did not occur alone, however, as on the other fronts, other circumstances other fronts, other the on as however, alone, occur not did events These III. Overall military outlook: June 1, 1919 June1, militaryoutlook: Overall troopsof and numbers firepower. adequate possessed Army Red the that believe not hedid as Salgótarján, War and Society Vol. XX, p. 57 145 78 146 they push decided to onward CEU eTD Collection workers he was sent, the military situation mighthave he been wassent, saved. the military situation workers as untrained earnest heto the opposed butpolitically class army requested, officers and soldiers was to lament years later in his memoirs that had he had the right amount of regular,middle- hand because the Communist government could not rely on them politically. Col. Kratochvil opportunity for the worker’s militia to take all the glory in any military victory, on the other an handtocreate one onthe sacrificed; wasdeliberately Székely the Division that thought be superior to the worker’s militia, now theirfears were confirmed. It was even secretly officers; the middle-class soldiers with their professional training had already felt themselves to soldiers and and officers middle-class militia/political the worker’s between the accusations final the battle Hungary for had even begun. furtherand This created mistrust mutual were unable to do so and therefore the Kun government lost its best military formation before supposed to hold several bridgeheads across the Tisza to facilitate the Székely’s escape; they before their eyes with each defeat. The worker’s battalions sent to reinforce them were soldiers and officers of the Red Army, because the main reason for fighting was slowly eroding which hadin fought Austro-Hungarianthe army, weredesperatetohold on to homeland.their times duringits retreat. Its personnel,made upentirely Transylvanians,of agoodportion of several encircled was and two, the of stronger the wing, northern Romanian entire the back Székely Division, engaged on the northern part of the front near Nyiregyháza, could not hold 147 Kratochvil, p.27-30 Memoirs, Kratochvil, Theirretreatingfurther despair atadded dilemmafaced to the being by middle-class the 79 147 CEU eTD Collection middle-class soldiers and officers who so far had rallied to hisfarso cause. whoto hadrallied and soldiers officers middle-class bargaining positionand Entente, the with hethus hoped to keep allegiancethe of all the three sides and critically short of trained army personnel. Thus Kun hoped to strengthen his morelittle than weeksoffighting,for achievement astate surroundedtwo on aremarkable northern and eastern theaters. Both were achieved by the end of the first week in June, after the a of part northeastern the on contact Czech and Romanian of splitting the also and Slovakia military aim became split by this situation into two parts; both a reclamation of the lost land in communication line uninterrupted between Ententeand the Themain Romanians/Czechs. the common front ranging from Tokaj in the north down to the city of Szeged in the south, an military dilemma, in that now all three neighboring hostile armies were connected through a visible target to pin offensivethe to.This presentedof alsocourse the Hungarians with a area, was a bastion of the former middle-class identity in the Hungarian nation, and presented a military objective all the more desirable to accomplish. Tokaj, as a famous wine producing many middle-class officersupper werefrom; its loss was keenly by felt them and made the campaign launchedwas by Hungarians.the Tokaj had been a key middle-class city where Slovaks/Czechs on the pivot point of the city of Tokaj,from the end of April until the Northern This drive also allowed the Romanians to at first maintain contact with the 80 CEU eTD Collection north, but that this withdrawal must also be accompanied by a simultaneous retreat butalso be must north, by that accompaniedwithdrawal retreat of this a simultaneous public would with occur a guarantee of withdrawalthe not of only forces in Hungarian the and viable agreed the that Böhm only a retreatway could befoisted that on Hungarian the recommended that the new Entente Ultimatum should be followed, with one caveat. Both Kun cooperate. it caused losthadmakeregain what neighbors uptheir the beingto thetime for and differences mightHungary actually the fearthat with militaryhis success; intohe them cooperation drove between between andYugoslavia Italy.” Serbs andRomanians; Hungary…conflicts for favorably military alsothe situation [which] affected factors foreign policy “certain described as KunVietor capitalizewhat Martin hadto on hoped theaters. southern and in eastern the forces both Romanian and of Serbian, French, attack faceor coordinated the hadthat been established, retreat and 15kilometers to behind theoriginal linedemarcation set, wording, towithdrawfrom all in gains territory,Slovak torenounce Slovakthe SovietRepublic itscontrol of of direct because French so-calledPrimethe Minister’s note, Clemenceau military campaigns. The Hungarians were ordered by the military council of the Entente in the Command and the military committee alike a hard as any artillery shell that rained down in the 148 Pásztor, Kun’s hand was forced, as was the resolve of his Army High Command, which When the Clemenceau note was delivered to the Kun government, it hit the Army High B. French Intervention (Fait accompli) (Fait Intervention French War and Society Vol. XX, p. 443 81 148 Instead CEU eTD Collection Hungarian Army at its most critical point. critical most its at Army Hungarian class soldiers and officers for the Kun regime; it undoubtedly proved to be the downfall of the sweat and tears. This, ultimately, was the undoing of the support of the majority of the middle- unexpectedly tobeginasked a retreatfrom territory they hadthat just purchased with blood, were victory, with flush and motivated highly officers, and soldiers middle-class Hungarian So government. by Hungarian with any becomplied could circumstance underno that made their retreat contingent on the demobilization of the entire Hungarian Army, ademand The Romanians had nointention of retreating, to deflect any criticism of their decision they idea werepromised Entente, Even though the guarantees tobeillusory.these bythe proved cause to look for other means to accomplish their goals without a Communist government. support of regimethe for themiddle-class soldiers and officers wasweakening, giving them Even then, as the situation was again involving a loss of sovereign territory for Hungary, the for recalls, Romanian forces occupying the line of the Tisza River in the eastern theater. And so, as Tökés 149 Tökés, insurrection. the breathing spell gained by the retreat from Slovakia. They decided to organize an armed to represent the interests of ‘homicidal terrorists’ and that his political ineptness would endanger socialists, led by Böhm, Kunfi, and Erdelyi, concluded that the irresolute Kun was being forced compliance with Clemenceau’s request for a ‘cessation of hostilities’ in northern Hungary and Hungary retreat from northern in Slovakia, orderedhostilities’ of the Hungariana ‘cessation Red for Army to request withdraw June Clemenceau’s 30 with compliance socialists nor the communist left. On June 21 the Revolutionary Governing Council, in His [Kun] simultaneous call for retreatand international revolution satisfied neither the Béla Kun, p.192 149 82 th atthe latest. The CEU eTD Collection mindset of men. of these mindset political values to do it. This is a statistic that should notbe taken lightly when considering the reclaim theiridentity was so strong and so persistent they were willing to compromise their areas of formerthe Kingdom of Hungary had that been claimed byits neighbors; their needto politics. Over 50% of the soldiers and officers who served in the Red Army were from the bind enough to a men these to cause they tobebelieved of a more dire thanimportance mere prejudice and unite under the banner of first Socialism and then Communism were strong their class could group overcome of soldiers middle-class which asocial economic and guarantee of their atall support for either The government. factors created a that situation in muchless sowasthe Kun theKárolyi for regimes; andand soldiers officers middle-class two leftist governments in the first place? The collapse of support was not inevitable from the motivated the Hungarian middle-class officers and soldiers to participate in the military of the developments, they developments, they nodo predetermine them.” historical dominate certainly forces other and social economic, while history; in assumption subject of historical asBéla development, Kiraly “Inevitabilitywrote, is a questionable 151 150 Szákály in Pásztor, Kiraly, As with any historical scenario, the reader shouldbe careful when approaching the War and Society Vol. VI, War and Society Vol. XX, 151 p.16 Conclusions p. 172 83 150 Why did a collapse of support occur? What CEU eTD Collection tired of fighting, but knew that to give in to the aggressor in the form of the Entente or its and an affiliation with a state entity that could no longer afford them its protection. They were the families of soldiers of the old Austro-Hungarian army, suddenly deprived of a homeland intask ishindsight obvious. he chose to stand and try to hold the line was admirable; that he was not the man to finish the and assaulted from all sides, it can hardly be said enough that his was an unenviable job. That by insultedpersonally members of and Ententeduring negotiations, the torn armistice tattered radicals forarestoration calling of monarchy the and aggressiveforeign and policy, rebuffed territory on the periphery hisof state, unwilling to compromise with counter-revolutionary end towar, unable toguarantee the safety of Hungarian citizens living within the affected inhis interference political he was program; to appeasethepacifistsunable thatcalledfor an His failure to do this can be attributed to a combination of international and domestic revolutionary government, leaderfirst the of Károlyi, the Mihály awaited task that the describes Vigh succinctly involvement on the side of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy in the First World War. Károly difficult, andmade more soby relationshipsthe developed with itsthat neighbors due to its 152 Károly Vigh in Kiraly, And what of those citizens he could not protect? Many of them were either soldiers or conquerors. Romanian and Czech against attacking country the the defend and state independent an for conditions the create to was personality, prestigious most its and Republic of the President new Károlyi, awaited which task The were in Hungary rule Habsburg followed that governments the facing job enormous The War and Society Vol. VI, p. 66 84 152 CEU eTD Collection disputed pieces of their own homeland. Kun had his own political agenda according to his lost and the sovereignty over to gainbackHungarian makeleast would fighting attempt at a soldiers and officers, but they tempered this uncertainty with the hope that the Communists made way for Kun. This striking change in the political landscape was also unsettling for the bow to the Vix Ultimatum was bold, but not bold enough to start active resistance, and so he to regain identity,that because itwithout theirlives lost all meaning. foundation, thisdeeply them. unsettled They eventually became willingwhatever do to it took sense of belonging and worth to have washed away, and like a house without a steady despair;felttheir they to absolutely ones,were driven middle-class the especially These people, in situation create which to calculated forces, Entente These were policy systematic exercised by options incoming the Romanian, Serbian, Czechand the sight of petty revenge and the ‘righting’ of whatever slight, however small itmay appear. the treatmentthey received from neighbors and formerfriends, Transylvania in was particular be applied to all who sought its embrace, victor and vanquished alike. They were shocked at would self-determination of Principle Wilson’s that believed reverently they people; these for mostpart todowhatitchallengetook to fate. that inevitabilityThere wasno their futureabout auxiliary forces would condemn them a lifeto outside their own country; they resolved for the 153 Mócsy, Károlyi could not offer an option aggressive enough for these soldiers; his refusal to unthinkable. be would resistance organized inwhich climate a create to served all Hungarian workers; of striking arrests mass Army, Austro-Hungarian old of the officers of the internment the taking of hostages, random and nuisance forarrests brief periods of time, public flogging, War and Society Vol. XII, p. 38 85 153 CEU eTD Collection 155 one clause, and with the retreat, it was violated and became null and void. Tökés argues that which to beat these middle-class soldiers into following him any further; their contract had only continuedin success regaining Hungarian territory. Without carrot, the Kunhad nostick with griptenuous he exerted over these trained professionals in his armyabsolutely onthe depended height of his success; not so much because of the loss of face, but more importantly because the them all marchingfor ashort time tohis tune. keeping soldiers, middle-class these of infront sovereignty reclaimed of carrot the hold still yet homeland would be lost forever. Kun was able to play to his base of hard left communist and more cunning still was his preying on their fear, the fear that their own ‘small slice’ of the accomplish nothing. His open appeal theirto nationalism andpatriotism was cunning; but officers, whose training was essential to the success of his military goals, that he could was shrewd know enough withoutthat to thesupport of ordinary middle-class soldiers and course of world revolution by establishmentthe of a SovietRepublic in Hungary.” Communist doctrine, describing his alliance with the Social Democrats as “further [ing] the 154 Ibid, p. 200 Tökés, Hungarian units. Hungarian Czech Army- contrary to the provision of the Clemenceau note- to pursue the dejected pride of the trade-union battalions, caused mass desertions from the Red Army, and induced the was a fatal strategic and tactical mistake. The withdrawal had irreparably damagedBy the middlethe nationalof July it had become painfully clear that the decision to retreat from Slovakia Kun’s biggest mistakehowever, wasgivinginto demandsthe of at Entente the the Béla Kun, p.145 155 86 154 But he But CEU eTD Collection who chose toserve,whenhe arguesthat who chose between; isand so noteasily defined as black andwhite. in somewhere lies truth The control. their of out largely were that in events participants and two-faced, back-stabbers reluctant haveportrayedopportunists, others cost; them as sacrificing their lives and own fortune tostand upfor their country regardless of personal the men as heroes, these stake. Some have portrayed spacewas at historians sovereign Hungarian until completion so that they could safeguard a future for theirfellow citizens whose part of the wing. They in chose a time hardship of and doubt for their country to see their task through upper middle class, but they can neither be described as Communist nor as extremely right- lower to from similar,ranging mainly backgrounds tosocialist, their economic conservative were all true patriots of whom much was asked. Their political affiliations ranged from Tombor, Dr. Gustáv Gratz, and Károly Kratochvil,and enlisted men such as Janos Baldavari, Captains József Breit, Kamil Aggházy, and Béla Bácso, Colonels Aurél Stromfeld, Jen perform. to incentive more no had service its within men the in, performed be to Red Army by guided national sentiment.” Peter Gosztony writes that “as for the bulk of the officer corps, they entered into service in the 156 Peter Gosztony in Pásztor, country: for the majority of the officers imbued with the nationalistic ideals this meant the The Soviet Republic’s political and military leaders undertook the task of defending the men summary facingthese agood of very situation the Szákály writes Sandor cleverly Men like Minister of Defense Albert Bartha, Minister of Defense Vilmos Böhm, War and Society Vol. XX, 156 Once that sentiment no longer had a viable outlet 87 p. 76 Ę CEU eTD Collection 158 government they didn’t believe in? Szákály also that writes in his experience, study? What purpose do we have in getting to know the reasons behind their loyalty to a goal the political method being with.was accomplished their homeland reclaimed and their homes returned, they were able to turn a blind eye to the lost ofidentity, their keen sense of the violation of their nation’s sovereignty, the desire to see perform the duties that they had sworn to fulfill; protect, preserve, and defend. Because of their men who lived and died in these times, it was unthinkable to do anything other than continue to any great respect for my state’s sovereignty, what choice would I have made? For some of the then was called upon to defend my homeland against neighbors who neither liked me nor felt really? If I had given five, ten or twenty years of service to the Austro-Hungarian Army, and themselves, what could Ihave done in the same situation? What were the right decisions resides outside of Hungary. However, it is also the duty of the historian to look back and ask As a historian,its easy to look back and see the inevitability of the loss of the territory that now 157 Ibid, p. 169 Szákály in Pásztor, [Hungarian] Soviet Republic analyzed completely has the composition work no of the officers corps ofRepublic, the armiesof the Soviet People’s Republic and the ofthe[Hungarian] proclamation the and revolution In the course of the almost seventy years which have elapsed since the liberal democratic What historianthe must really ask thenis why group this of soldiers tohistorical matter defense of the Soviet Republic. homeland and the liberation of the Hungarian territories under occupation as ajustfight of self and Serbian Armies, orlying outside Czechoslovak, the demarcation lines. These officers Romanian, saw the defense the of by their occupied territories the from came or service, army, in the in engaged serving of officers majority The integrity. territorial ofHungary’s protection War and Society Vol. XX, . 158 157 p. 172 88 CEU eTD Collection answers questions, tothese andopen furtherinto to this study subject. bizarre and incomprehensible. This historical comparative study has striven to enumerate the a government that was unabashedly the first Soviet Republic west of Ukraine, would seem men conditioned to abhor Communism, and what it stood for, might actually fight in defense of Hungary modern in political Without landscape. today’s theideathis historical that treatment, comes into amore focused picture, and even backgroundgives toideas of revisionism in larger discourse, in which the origins of Hungary’s involvementin the Second World War pursuit of Hungarian sovereign interests following the First World War. It lends its gravity a to classes can work together for acommon goal; and how that common goal was asserted in the patriotism nationalismand can asituationcreate inwhich even diametrically politicalopposed The purpose is in understanding how the role of sovereignty or in the minds of these soldiers’ 89 CEU eTD Collection Demarcation Zones in Hungarian Periphery Figure 1 90 CEU eTD Collection the north with the Czechs, the south with the Serbs, and the east with the Romanians. Lines: Demarcation Map showing the demarcation lines around the peripheries of Hungary, to 91 CEU eTD Collection Hungarian-Romanian Positions April 1919Figure 2 Positions of the Romania and Hungarian armies in the eastern theater in April 1919 92 CEU eTD Collection Hungarian-Romanian-Czech Positions May 1, 1919 Figure 3 is prior to the Northern Campaign offensive. the two theaters of war. Italso shows the retreat of the Hungarian forces to the Tisza River. It This map link-up showthe between Czech the and Romanian forces part in northeastern of the 93 CEU eTD Collection recovered territory, Red area indicates size of People’s Republic of of Hungary. Republic of indicatesPeople’s size Redarea territory, recovered Kingdom of Romania byApril 1919, Pink areashows extent of Northern Campaign’s lost to territory area indicates Brown by lostYugoslavia, to Hungary territory Blue areashows Northern Campaign in Slovakia Figure 4 94 CEU eTD Collection during the conflict between the Czech/Romanian/Serb/Entente forces andthe Hungarians. Czech/Romanian/Serb/Entente between the conflict the during extent of the Romanian-Soviet war, while the yellow-red-blue show the military offensives This map the shows overall number of in offensives 1919. Thegreen and blue areasshow the 1919 Offensives Figure 5 95 CEU eTD Collection Székely Division being inspected by Károlyi Figure 6 Székely Division being inspected by Károlyi in Transylvania. 96 CEU eTD Collection mestamp=20070922185707 http://hu.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=F%C3%A1jl:Szekely_Hadosztaly.png&fileti http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Hungarian-Romanian_War.de.png http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Nepkoztarsasag.png May_-_English.jpg http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:HungarianRomanian_War_of_1919,_positions_on_3_ nce_to_Tisza_-_English.jpg http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:HungarianRomanian_War_of_1919,_Romanian_adva Maps, Figures, Images, Illustrations Bibliography 97 CEU eTD Collection Károlyi, Mihály, Levéltár, 1014. Budapest,Levéltár, 1014. Kapisztrán 2-4, Archives.tér Kun, Béla, “On the Unity of the Proletariat,” 2-4,Archives. tér Kapisztrán Károlyi, Kratochvil, 1956. Grotius, Hugo, 4, Archives. 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Press, jtemeny 1914-1999I jtemeny Addison-Wesley, Reading, 1978. , Corvina-Osiris Budapest, Kiadó, 1999. Handbook ofPolitical Science The HungarianQuarterly Vol. V.,No.3, Frances Pinter, London, 1983. , Pall Mall Press, New York, , Osiris Kiadó, Budapest, , Atlantic Research and th Century Hungary , Vol. 31979. CEU eTD Collection 102 CEU eTD Collection 103