The Concept of Community in Social Work Practice

Home , Community practice, Sense of community

As we neared the end of the twentieth century, the rich were richer, the poor, poorer. And people everywhere now had a lot less lint, thanks to the lint rollers made in my hometown. It was truly the dawn of a new era. Michael Moore, American fi lm maker, writer

Th is is the duty of our generation as we enter the twenty-fi rst century— solidarity with the weak, the persecuted, the lonely, the sick, and those in despair. It is expressed by the desire to give a noble and humanizing meaning to a community in which all members will defi ne themselves not by their own identity but by that of others. Elie Wiesel, writer, political activist, Nobel laureate

Th e American city should be a collection of communities where every member has a right to belong. It should be a place where every man feels safe on his streets and in the house of his friends. It should be a place where each individual’s dignity and self- respect is strengthened by the respect and aff ection of his neighbors. It should be a place where each of us can fi nd the satisfaction and warmth which comes from being a member of the community of man. Lyndon B. Johnson, 36th president of the United States

We all have a mental image of community. clubs, congregations, teams, neighborhood Fraught with personal meaning, the word com- groups, town meetings, and even virtual community conjures up memories of places where munities experienced through chat rooms. It we grew up, where we now live and work, physi- evokes special events and rituals — Fourth of July cal structures and spaces — cities, towns, neigh- fi reworks, weddings, funerals, parades, and the borhoods, buildings, stores, roads, streets. It fi rst day of school. It stirs up sounds and smells calls up memories of people and relationships— and feelings— warmth, companionship, nostalgia, families, friends and neighbors, organizations, and sometimes fear, anxiety, and confl ict as associations of all kinds: congregations, PTAs, well. We all grew up somewhere; we all live in Copyright © 2011. Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. May not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except fair uses permitted under U.S. or applicable copyright law. 94 EBSCO Publishing : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 9/9/2015 2:45 PM via COLLEGE OF ST SCHOLASTICA AN: 357093 ; Hardcastle, David A., Powers, Patricia R., Wenocur, Stanley.; Community Practice : Theories and Skills for Social Workers Account: s8889607 The Concept of Community in Social Work Practice 95

communities somewhere; we all desire human 3. a symbolic unit of collective identifi cation” associations, some degree of belonging to a (p. 1) human community; we all carry around some sense of community and communities of We also borrow from Willie, Willard, and memory within us. It goes deep into our souls. Ridini ( 2008 ) with our concern for horizontal But it is hard to imagine a more elusive con- and vertical community linkages and the nature cept than the idea of community. Its elusiveness of the institutional interactions. comes from its multidimensionality. Cohen Th is conception of community is compatible ( 1985 ), as cited in Chapter 1, found 90 diff erent with that used by other community practice defi nitions of community in the 1985 social sci- authorities (Butcher, Banks, & Henderson with ence literature. Community means a lot and it Robertson, 2007 ; Delgado & Staples, 2008 ; means diff erent things, from the romantic and Hardina, 2002 ) and has the value of recognizing mystical to the mundane. Bellah and his col- the spatial, interactional, and emotional compo- leagues defi ne a community as a “group of people nents of community. who are socially interdependent, who participate Th is chapter establishes the basic concepts, together in discussion and decision making, and variables, and changes related to community life. who share certain practices that both defi ne the Th e following two chapters examine methodolo- community and are nurtured by it” (Bellah, gies of studying communities and methods for Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler, & Tipton, 1985 , hearing community concerns. To change com- p. 333). Cohen’s (1985 ) conception of commu- munity, its parts, processes, and particularities nity has emotional charging, personal identifi ca- must be understood. tion, and symbolic construction by people. Th e common elements in sociological defi ni- Resting on its meaning, community is “a system tions of community are geographic area, social of values, norms, and moral codes which pro- interaction, common ties, and shared senti- voke a sense of identity to its members. . . . ments. While connection to a territorial base is Structures do not . . . create meaning for people. common with neighborhoods, villages, or cities . . . [Without meaning] many of the organiza- fi tting the defi nition, functional and cultural tions designed to create `community’ as pallia- communities or “communities of interest” with- tive to anomie and alienation are doomed to out clear geographic bases (such as the social failure” (p. 9). “Community, therefore, is where work community, the Chicano community, the one learns and continues to practice how to ‘be gay and lesbian communities) are also included. social’ (p. 15).” Th e British Columbia Ministry of Spatial units with clearly defi ned geographic Children and Family Development (2003 ), fol- boundaries are seemingly becoming less impor- lowing Mattessich and Monsey (1997 ), defi ne tant to a sense of community because rapid elec- community more dryly as “people who live tronic communication technology enables within a geographically defi ned area and who virtual communities and ease of physical mobil- have social and psychological ties with each ity. We can be connected to several communities other and with the place where they live.” Berry of interest because we are geographically mobile (1996 ) argued that community has no value that and increasingly tied together though electronic is economically or practically benefi cial. Th e rea- and other media. We can interact globally on soning is that if something can’t be assigned an collective interests. As social workers, we need to economic value, it serves no purpose. understand that our clients belong to multiple We take a less neoliberal economic position communities of identity. and argue that communities have consummate Communities provide people with rich social value. We have adopted Fellin’s ( 2001 ) formal and personal lives. Th ey shape the way we think defi nition of communities as “social units with and act. Th ey surround us with values and norms one or more of the following three dimensions: of behavior, explicit laws, and unwritten rules of conduct. Th ey furnish us with meanings and 1. a functional spatial unit meeting sustenance interpretations of reality and assumptions about needs the world. Th ey provide resources and opportu- 2. a unit of patterned interaction nities, albeit highly unevenly — places to work, to Copyright © 2011. Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. May not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except fair uses permitted under U.S. or applicable copyright law.

learn, to grow, to buy and sell, to worship, to hang to the civic culture, local setting, and institu- out, to fi nd diversion and respite, to care and be tional context that also are part of the “environ- cared for. Th ey confront us with challenges, ment-surrounding-the-person” (Johnson, 2000 ). problems, and traumas; they intrude on our lives, Your public life is available to others. Lappé and and they hold out the possibilities for solutions. Du Bois ( 1994 ) provide a delineation of some Communities are where we live our lives. roles in the various sectors of public life. Th e social work ecological model’s emphasis Geographic communities evolve in many on person-in-environment places communities forms and have been classifi ed in numerous ways as objects of social work intervention as much as such as enclave, edge, center, retreat (Brower, individuals, families, and groups. Social workers 1996 ); white versus blue-collar; and boom versus can build competent communities. A competent bust. Th ese descriptive structural ideas cannot community, according to Fellin (2001 ), is a com- substitute for the community narrative. munity that “has the ability to respond to the Community is more than just local physical wide range of member needs and solve its prob- space, especially in urban areas, and needs social lems and challenges of daily living” (p. 70). identity (Fellin, 2001 ). Residents can share the Community competence is enhanced when resi- same geographic space and hold widely diff ering dents have (a) a commitment to their commu- ideologies and particularistic religious, ethnic, nity, (b) self-awareness of their shared values and class identities. Th ey may not constitute a and interests, (c) openness in communication, community. Gays, Cuban Americans, and (d) wide participation in community decision Hassidic Jewish Americans inhabit South Beach, making, and (e) a sense of collective self-effi cacy Florida, without sharing the same private lan- and empowerment. guages, political agenda, social interests, or social institutions. A London resident may think about himself more as a businessman or an immigrant Basic Community Concepts from Pakistan than as a Londoner. People in physical proximity — that is, expatriates, interna- Community, Neighborhood, and tional travelers, guest workers, or illegal immi- Public Life grants— can still share more cultural affi nity with Community empowerment, community control, those back home than with the new neighbor- and community partnership abound in political hood. and policy discussions. Community and grass- People in our caseload and communities also roots have a salient kind of social currency. Th ey have complex allegiances and affi liations. Th ink are buzzwords in politics and ideologies of the of a child who has a father in urban Michigan left and right. By grassroots, we mean a bot- and a mother in rural Montana and, in either tom-up approach, starting with the people who state, bounces from one relative’s neighborhood to live in a geographic and social community. the next— bringing along clothes, attitudes, hair- Community and neighborhood are sometimes cuts, and slang from the last school that is always used interchangeably to mean a local area (e.g., a one step behind and never quite fi ts at the new section of a city or a county, where many resi- school. dents develop a shared worldview). Residents We oft en bemoan the loss of community with can unite as indignant utility ratepayers or exu- its fragmentation, alienation, and increased berant sports fans in ways that can facilitate mobility accompanied by a decline in public life, shared community identity and action tran- with fewer residents involved in voting and vol- scending deep diff erences. unteering. Today, many people choose their Community suggests people with social ties degree of commitment to their neighborhoods sharing an identity and a social system, at least and towns. Using length of stay as a variable, partially, while neighborhood suggests places that Viswanath, Rosicki, Fredin, and Park (2000 ) are grounded in regional life where face-to-face found four types of residents: relationships are possible. See Fellin ( 1995 , 2001 ) for an in-depth discussion and defi nition of Drift ers: Less than 5 years of stay and a high like- community and neighborhood. Public life refers lihood of moving away from the community Copyright © 2011. Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. May not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except fair uses permitted under U.S. or applicable copyright law.

Settlers: Less than 5 years of stay and less like- more amorphous type of community. Social lihood of moving away from the community workers must pay attention to an individual’s or Relocators: More than 5 years of stay but likely family’s diff use nonplace social networks, non- to move away from the community place communities, and solidarity bonds. Place Natives: More than 5 years in the community and nonplace communities represent two forms and unlikely to move away (p. 42) of “we-ness” and identity. Box 4.1 compares the two types of communities. We have added an additional type, dreamer, A client’s or case’s complete social history not discussed by the authors, someone who ought to include the client’s and case’s com- lives in a community without commitment munity history and a client’s experiences in com- to the community and dreams of being some- munities as well as personal and family where else, either a past community or a mysti- history— not only where was a person born, but cal one. Dreamers can fi t into any of the above what the person gained from living in prior types. locales. Social workers will want to get a com- Natives oft en blame problems on new arriv- plete picture of how both types of communi- als, such as have the nativists in America and ties— place and nonplace— fi gure into an Europe blaming illegal immigrants. individual’s present life.

Place and Nonplace Communities The Changing U.S. Community Th e real estate agent’s mantra is location, loca- To understand the modern community as a con- tion, location . Th e community practitioner’s text for social work practice, we will briefl y mantra is context, context, context . Where do review some important changes in U.S. life that people come from? To whom do they relate and have occurred over the past 50 years. Th e con- why? Where is their identity and communities of temporary U.S. community has undergone sig- sentiment? What gives meaning to their lives? nifi cant and perhaps profound changes over the Social workers should learn about their clients’ past half century. Th e United States has vast place and nonplace communities. Locational resources and ambitious people with the free- communities are a defi nable area, with bounda- dom and energy to invent, to explore, to develop, ries that oft en constitute a political jurisdiction and to challenge. We also are a very ideological (Ginsberg, 1998 ). It focuses attention to a physi- and jingoist people. Some of the changes are cal and social environment surrounding provid- positive, but many, unfortunately, are not. Except ers and consumers of services. However, within for its wealth and power, in many ways the and outside such spatial and structural commu- United States approaches Th ird World status. nities are other infl uential nonplace groupings Th e United States has fallen to 15th from 2nd in based on identity, profession, religion, ideology, 1980 on the United Nations’ Human Devel- interests, and other social bonds that represent a opment Indices (Conley, 2009 ; United Nations

BOX 4.1. Diff erences and Similarities Between Place and Nonplace Communities

D i ff erences Place — Bounded Location Nonplace — Bounded Interest Collective territorial identity Relationship identity and dispersion Intertwined processes Specialized processes Empathetic connections Mixed allegiances S i m i l a r i t i e s Traditions Mutual constraints Lack of absolute boundaries Copyright © 2011. Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. May not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except fair uses permitted under U.S. or applicable copyright law.

Development Programme, 2008 ). It also ranks others. Welfare, crime, and taxes decreased while fi rst among industrial nations in infant mortality income inequality, corporate power, and the rates, with a higher rate than Cuba (United infl uence of money in politics increased. Nations Development Programme, 2008 ). Th e Privatization of social welfare and public serv- United States has a higher incarceration rate and ices as well as government became trendy. more actual inmates than do 36 European Prisons are a growth industry, with many oper- nations combined (Blow, 2009 ). ated by proprietary corporations, and the United During most of the last half of the twentieth States led the world in incarcerations (Blow, century, the U.S. economy expanded and espe- 2009 ). Th ese all spoke of complex forces at work cially boomed to end the millennium, only to in U.S. society, seemingly unresponsive to easy welcome the new millennium with severe eco- fi xes. Americans are no longer as optimistic nomic recession, corporate greed, fi nancial about the future as they once were (Pew Data system collapse, and falling in 2006 to 8th glo- Trends, 2009 ). Let’s now consider some of the bally in gross national product per capita (United more important forces and trends to deepen our Nations Economic Development Programme, understanding for social work practice in the 2008 ). We were clear about the constellation of a twenty-fi rst century. Th e changes reviewed in good family and family values, even if we were the following paragraphs refl ect our views of not always faithful to them and were growing what seems signifi cant. Th ey are not presented socially more intolerant. Th e new millennium is in any particular order of importance. accompanied by threats to retirement income and Social Security, with an expanding duration • Urbanization and suburbanization continues of work life for an aging population. College (Scott, 2001 ). Most U.S. citizens (over 83% ) education, seen as an American birthright until live in metro areas with a core city of 50,000 or the 1980s and 1990s, has become inordinately more. Less than 10% live in low-density rural expensive. Tuition and room and board at all areas (U.S. Census Bureau, 2008 ). Population four-year institutions rose in 2006-2007 dollars continues to shift from the old Rust Belt, mill from an average of $2,577 for 1976-77 to $19,362 towns, and smokestack cities of the Northeast in 2007-08 (Snyder, Dillow, & Hoff man, 2009 ). and Midwest to the Sunbelt of the South and World peace and stability, on the horizon with Southwest, especially California, Florida, and the end of the Cold War and the breakdown of Texas. California and Florida had a growth the Soviet Union in 1991, appears to have col- slowdown with the Great Recession’s burst lapsed into global ethnic strife and terrorism. housing bubble. Refl ecting the population And on September 11, 2001, global terrorism shift is a change in the economy from manu- came to the United States. facturing and farming to information, per- As Bob Dylan predicted, “Th e times they are sonal, and entertainment services, technology, a-changin’” (Dylan, 1963 ), but not in the ways and e-businesses. Most metropolitan area he prophesized. Th e social movements of the growth is in the new outer ring suburbs beyond 1960s — civil rights, community action, women’s the old suburbs. Even with periodic energy liberation, peace — together with the Vietnam crises, costs, and chronic dependence on for- War did much to shake the complacency of the eign energy sources, the automobile and high- 1950s United States. However, the radicalism of energy consuming, single-family homes still the 1960s was followed by conservatism since are preferred. Metropolitan area growth hasn’t the 1970s, and it’s still with us. compelled metropolitan government to coor- Th e 1980s saw the need for two wage earners dinate the multiple jurisdictions within the to support a family; burgeoning health care costs; metro areas. Probably the greatest resistance expansions of unemployment, welfare rolls, to metropolitan governments comes from homelessness, and crime; and a growing income wealthier suburbanites’ not wanting to mingle and wealth disparity between the wealthy and their public amenities and tax resources with the poor and middle classes. Th e 1990s and the the poorer neighboring core cities. Th e metro- beginning of the twenty-fi rst century have politan areas are becoming increasingly bal- reversed some of these trends and accelerated kanized and hyper-segregated with more Copyright © 2011. Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. May not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except fair uses permitted under U.S. or applicable copyright law.

centers of ethnic minorities and poverty, while been an extensive loss of well-paying, stable the outer suburbs are less ethnically, economi- manufacturing blue-collar jobs, with job cally, and socially diverse (Scott, 2002 ). growth in lower-paying service jobs. During • Diff erences between rural, urban, and subur- the Great Recession living costs outran wage ban areas will increase, with rural and city increases (Grynbaum, 2008 ). Unemployment problems neglected for at least the fi rst part of in August 2009 reached 9.7 % , up from 4.1 % in the 21st century. Poverty will continue to be August 2000 and the highest since the 1980s, disproportionately greater in rural areas than and this trend shows no signs of abating in metro areas; most of the poor counties in (Andrews, 2009 ; Bureau of Labor Statistics, the United States are rural (Samuels & Whitler, 2009 ). Th e 21st century has seen high and per- 2008 ). Most rural poor residents are white and sistent rates of unemployment and underem- non-Hispanic, but poor rural counties, like ployment among older industrial workers and poor urban areas, have a disproportionate unskilled men and women of all ages. A rising number of poor ethnic minorities (except for retirement age is reversing a decade-long trend the poor Southern mountain counties). Rural of earlier retirements (Walsh, 2001 ). Later areas are less healthy than metropolitan retirement ages will be accelerated with the counties (Samuels & Whitler, 2008 ), and the decline in value of stock-based retirement plans county in America with the lowest Human and pensions and the increasing age require- Development Indices score is a rural California ments for Social Security retirement benefi ts. county, Kings County (Conley, 2009 ). Th e natural resources and economic base of rural Even with the Great Recession; the Enron, areas will continue to decline, with low-skill Lehman Brothers, and AIG fi ascos; the Wall jobs largely lost to even lower-wage global Street meltdown; the Troubled Asset Relief competitors. Th e wage gap between metro and Program (TARP); and other corporate failures rural areas continues to widen, as does the gap and bailouts, executive and management salaries in college completion rates in favor of metro and bonuses have continued to increase areas (Snyder, Dillow, & Hoff man, 2009 ). (Executive Pay, 2009 ). From 1983 to 2004, the Distance and a lack of suffi cient density hinder median net worth of upper-income families grew rural economic development. Rural localities by 123 % , while the median net worth of middle- will continue to lose population, especially income families grew by just 29 % (Pew Research younger and more educated residents (Snyder, Center, 2009 ). Th e middle class made some abso- Dillow, & Hoff man, 2009 ). Th e proportion of lute progress but fell behind in relative terms the nation’s population that is nonmetropoli- during the economy’s boon years (Krugman tan continues to decrease (U.S. Census Bureau, 2002 ). Infl ation during this recession is rising 2009a , Table 28). Agriculture is declining in faster than the working-class America’s income the United States based on acreage cultivated, (Cavanagh & Collins, 2008 ; Grynbaum, 2008 ). total farmland, and number of farms. Large During 2007, CEOs of major U.S. companies col- farms (over 2,000 acres) account for 3 % to 4 % lected as much money from one day on the job as of the total number of farms, 52% of farm average workers made over the entire year. Th ese land, and 34% of cultivated land. Th e number, CEOs averaged $10.8 million in total annual but not the size, of corporate farms is decreas- compensation, according to an Associated Press ing (U.S. Census Bureau, 2009b , Tables 793, survey of 386 Fortune 500 companies, the equiv- 794, 796). Th e exceptions to these trends are alent of over 364 times the pay of an average the scenic, high-amenity rural areas with mild American worker (Anderson, Cavanagh, Collins, climates, which are becoming gentrifi ed and Pizzigati, & Lapham, 2007). From 1980 to the gaining populations, and also the growing end of the century, the average pay of ordinary green movement in small farming slowing the working people increased by 74% , while the aver- decline in the number of farms (Hoppe, Korb, age compensation to corporate CEOs exploded & O’Donoghue, 2007 ). by a gigantic 1,884% (Executive Pay Watch, 2000 ; • Th e 1990s and beyond have seen an escalating Executive Pay, 2002, 2009; Johnston, 2002c ). Th e economic inequity in the workforce. Th ere has average pay for chief executives was 36 times that Copyright © 2011. Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. May not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except fair uses permitted under U.S. or applicable copyright law.

of the average worker in 1976, 131 times in 1993, of U.S. society have seen their share of the and 369 times in 2005. In 1976, if an average national income fall from 53.6% in 1980 to worker’s annual pay was $10,000 and a chief 46 % by 2006. Th e highest fi ft h improved their executive’s was $360,000, the income diff erential share of the national income from 46.6 % in was $350,000. In 2005, if the average worker’s 1990 to 50% in 2008. Th e bottom 80 % saw a annual pay increased to $20,000, the CEO’s com- decline in their share from 53.3 % to 50 % over pensation engorged to $7,380,000, for a $7,360,000 the same period (U.S. Census Bureau, 2009a , compensation diff erential (Mintz, 2007 ). p. 10). According to von Hoff man ( 2007 ), “[A] Studies indicate there is no direct correlation mere 300,000 people had incomes equal to the between executive compensation and corporate total income of the bottom earning half of the performance (Madrick, 2009 ). As the 2008 fi scal entire population.” Only people at the very top burnout indicated, many poor corporate per- made any real economic improvements during formers continued to receive huge bonuses and the boon years, and they saw little or no decline severance packages (Leonhardt, 2002 ; Madrick, during the recession (Madrick, 2009 ). Tax 2009 ; McGeeham, 2003; Mintz, 2007 ). Th e U.S. policies, economic policies, the recession, and worker now works more hours a year than work- a devolving welfare state have led to increasing ers in other industrial countries. Th e hours in poverty in the fi rst years of the new millen- the work year are increasing in the United States nium. According to some economists, includ- but decreasing in other countries (Greenhouse, ing the conservative libertarian economist 2001 ). Milton Freidman (Hamilton & Derity Jr., 2009 ) and an economics founding father • Unfortunately, social workers’ salaries did not Adam Smith ( 1922 , p. 17), one’s position in even keep up with infl ation during the boon the unequal income distribution is largely a era (Gibelman & Schervish, 1996 , p. 166), and matter of birth. James Hechman, a libertarian they suff ered more from the Great Recession. University of Chicago economist, as quoted by According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics in Stille (2001 ), asserts, “Never has the accident 2008, the average salary for community organ- of birth mattered more. If I am born to edu- izers was $41,790 (Bureau of Labor Statistics, cated, supportive parents, my chances of doing 2009 ). Other social work practice areas had well are totally diff erent than if I were born to similar salaries in 2009. Social workers in a single parent or abusive parents. . . . Th is is a mental health and drug treatment has a mean case of market failure: Children don’t get to or average salary of $41,350, social workers in ‘buy’ their parents, so there has to be some health care mean salary was $48,350, and all kind of intervention to make up for these envi- other social workers’ mean was $50,470. Th e ronmental diff erences” (p. A-17). salary distributions were skewed with the median or midpoint social worker salaries Adam Smith, the Scottish Enlightment phi- lower than their mean salaries: $38,200 for losopher and later labeled economist wrote, mental health and drug treatment, $46,300 for Th e diff erence of natural talents in diff erent men is, in health care, and $49,420 for all other social reality, much less than we are aware of; and the very workers (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2010 ). s. diff erent genius which appears to distinguish men of Th e highest mean annual social work catego- diff erent professions, when grown to maturity, is not ry’s salary was $50,470; this was less than on many occasions so much the cause, as the eff ect of 00.5% of the average CEO compensation. It the division of labour. Th e diff erence between the will require approximately 214 years for the most dissimilar characters, between the philosopher average social worker to earn as much as the and a common street porter, for example, seems to average CEO’s compensation. arise not so much from nature, as from habit, custom, • As would be expected from the earnings and and education....they came into the world … very much compensations diff erences, the United States alike… .(Smith, 1922 , p. 17) now is more income unequal, with a greater concentration of income at the top, than any • Th e 1990s saw the U.S. economy and world other industrialized nation. Th e middle 60 % economy globalize and the nation-states and Copyright © 2011. Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. May not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except fair uses permitted under U.S. or applicable copyright law.

welfare states begin to devolve. It should be powers, national marginal personal tax rates recognized that globalization has been going declined in all seven countries, with the greatest on since humankind became more mobile decline in the United States. Globalization than simply by walking. What makes our cur- increases aggregate national wealth, poverty, and rent globalization diff erent is the speed that social and income inequality within and between current technology allows in communication nations (Deacon, 1997 , pp. 34–35; Halsey, and mobility. Economic globalization aims to Lauder, Brown, & Wells, 1997 , p. 157; Room, treats the world as a single economic system. 1990 , p. 121). All suff er from the economic meltdown it causes. Globalization’s intent is to reduce state sover- With our current globalization, labor is no eignty and the constraints of national borders longer a signifi cant force in the political econ- and any social and cultural arrangements and omy. Labor, both as a component of production relationships that hinder economic exchanges and a social institution, is weaker today than at (Dickens, 2003 ; Gray, 1998 ; Held & McGrew, the middle of the 20th century. Labor’s decline is 2007 ; Stiglitz, 2003 , 2009 ; Tanzi, 2002 ). partially due to technological innovations, par- Globalization weakens the economy’s basic tially due to the anti-labor social policies began social partnership by shift ing the balance of by U.S. President Ronald Reagan and British power to capital and corporations, and it reduces Prime Minister Margaret Th atcher and carried the power of labor and the state (land) (Dickens, on by their successors, partially due to the suc- 2003 ; Gray, 1998 ; Mishra, 1999 ; Stiglitz, 2003 , cesses of the welfare state (retirement, social 2009 ; Tanzi, 2002 ). Transnational corporations, security, health services and insurance, limited especially fi nancial ones, have reduced public work week, publicly funded education, etc.), and regulation and responsibilities for community partially due to the loss of community with glo- social welfare and any ecological agenda. As seen balization. Labor is more local as a force in the by the environmental unilateralism of the United global political economy. While capital is allowed States, sustainable global growth limits can be greater freedom of movement, the U.S. and set but they need not be heeded by a single nation European Union (EU)’s problems and resistance or global corporation (Deacon, 1997 , p. 54; to free immigration indicated that labor is not Dickens, 2003 , Gray, 1998 ; Stiglitz, 2003 , 2009 ). seen similar to capital. Even within the EU there Competing nation-states pursuing global corpo- is debate and dissent regarding the free move- rations in a global economy discard social obli- ment of labor between member nations, while gations to their citizens, with a subsequent there is far less debate regarding capital’s erosion and downward spiral of social provisions movement (Dickens, 2003 ; Joppke, 1998 ; Tanzi, that can lead to the lowest social welfare denom- 2002 ). Th ere are no true international labor inator (Deacon, 1997 , p. 196). unions or labor movement, but there is a profu- Th e economic upheavals of the globalized sion of global corporations. Th ere are simply few, turbo-economy have been as dramatic as those if any, countervailing forces to capital, certainly of the industrial revolution. Th e Great Recession not labor or governments, within the global followed a global boom and with a global eco- economy. nomic meltdown A global economy encouraged Capital has increased in power at the expense and achieved cheap labor, lower or no taxes on of labor, and it dominates the political economy. the rich and on corporations (Gray, 1998 ; A global corporation can increase the market Johnston, 2002b , 2002c ), corporate welfare, tight value of its stocks by terminating a portion of its money, market deregulation, protection of capi- labor. Capital has an inherent advantage in a tal over labor and anti-labor policies, and a global political economy over labor and land. decline in welfare state provisions and benefi ts Capital is more mobile, liquid, and global, as for labor as employees and as citizens of a wel- represented by global corporations and fi nancial fare state (Freudenheim, 2002 ; Gray, 1998 ; Held institutions. Capital is more mobile, with off - & McGrew, 2007 ; Johnston, 2002a ; Mishra, 1999 ; shore tax havens available regardless of nation, Pear, 2002 ; Stiglitz, 2003 , 2009 ; Wagner, 1997 ). trade within global corporations, the state’s ina- In the G7 nations, the globe’s top economic bility to tax the mobile individual or corporation, Copyright © 2011. Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. May not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except fair uses permitted under U.S. or applicable copyright law.

and substitution of highly mobile electronic rejected in 2009 as socialistic. Globalization’s money for hard currency (Tanzi, 2002 , p. 125). logic undermines the Keynesian welfare state Globalization has always been accompanied as a means of mutual communal support and by arrogance and violence, but technology now a fi rst line of defense against poverty. It creates makes it more rather than less volatile. downward pressures on the welfare state and Globalization cultivates national fragmentation its social protections supported by public taxa- and a civic decay, manifested by increasing tion, undermines the ideology of social pro- income and social inequality, poverty, fear, vio- tection and community undergirding the lence, family breakdown, fundamentalism and welfare state, subverts national community political and social intolerance, social and eco- solidarity, and legitimizes inequality of rewards nomic ghettoization, social isolation and social as a necessity for economic growth. Th e results exclusion, political and social marginalization, are welfare reform’s punitive and abstemious and political authoritarianism (Berry & Hallett, approaches. Th e welfare state’s devolution is to 1998 , pp. 1–12; Dahrendorf, 1995 ; Gray, 1998 ; motivate the poor to accept and depend on Held & McGrew, 2007 ; Mishra, 1999 ; Pear, 2002 ; marginal, low-wage employment, and to Stiglitz, 2003 , 2009 ; Th urow, 1995 ). As the econ- reduce and keep taxes low on corporations omy becomes global, people seem to want and the extremely affl uent (Tanzi, 2002 ). First smaller niches of identity. Trends indicate a instigated by conservative government, devo- demand for social work’s and community prac- lution has been subsequently embraced and tice’s community development and social justice expanded by traditionally liberal or left politi- mission to challenge the growing community cal parties, especially in the United Kingdom fragmentation. and the United States (Deacon, 1997 ; Gray, Globalization challenges the need for and 1998 ; Held & McGrew, 2007 ; Kramer & Braum, viability of multi-ethnic nation-states such as the 1995 ; Mishra, 1999 ; Pear, 2002 ; Stiglitz, 2003 , old Soviet Union, China, the United States, and 2009 ; Wagner, 1997 ). European conservative even smaller nation-states. Contrary to histori- political parties have adopted many of the wel- cal globalization, since the advent of our current fare state policies (Erlanger, 2009 ). globalization 25 additional nation-states have • Privatization, proprietarization, and commer- been created over the past quarter century cialization are currently trends and shibbo- (Glain, 2009 ). We also have seen a growth of leths in the welfare state’s as well as the separatist movements within large and small nation-state’s rollback. Th ese also are manifes- multi-ethnic nation-states (Schaeff er, 1997 ). tations of the conservative trend. Th e United States has privatized prisons and war-making • Welfare states, as well as the multi-ethnic by widely using mercenaries (Risen, 2008 ). nation-states, are generally devolving globally Th e privatization movement assumes that eco- as is the United States with its regional fac- nomic market forces serve as the best means tionalism, Red State - Blue State divisions, and of allocating and conducting services anti-federal rhetoric (Dodds, 2001 ; Berry & (Gibelman & Demone, 1998 ; Moe, 1987 ; Hallett, 1998 , pp. 1–12; Gray, 1998 ; Held & Morgan, 1995 , Salamon, 1997 ). Th e primary McGrew, 2007 ; Mishra, 1999 ; Pear, 2002 ; argument of the privatization ideology is that Stiglitz, 2003 , 2009 ; Th urow, 1995 ). We com- it forces government to be more businesslike mented in Chapter 1 on the growing political and effi cient as well as smaller —leaner and conservatism in the United States. Liberal meaner — although just the opposite is true. government’s traditional function in a market Privatization reduces public sector costs and economy— to help communities manage and competition for money either through taxes or protect themselves from the excesses and by borrowing. Privatization diminishes public vagrancies of the market economy — has been sector involvement in enterprise decision reduced with global deregulation. Even aft er a making through deregulation (Morgan, 1995 ). year into the Great Recession, no signifi cant Privatization takes the focus and political re-regulation occurred. Universal, public pressure off government if poor services are option health care in the United States was provided, places a buff er between the public Copyright © 2011. Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. May not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except fair uses permitted under U.S. or applicable copyright law.

and politicians, and transfers any onus for (Giving USA, 2009 ; Marx, 1998 , p. 34). poor services and ineffi ciency to the market, Philanthropic giving largely serves the donor resolvable by market forces. Privatization of community’s social and political ends and cul- government-fi nanced vendor services also tural institutions. Th e socially marginalized provides political spoils to the government’s are eff ectively excluded from benefi t (Abelson, backers in terms of contingent employment 2000 ; Marx, 1998 ). Th e very affl uent tradition- and contracts (Berstein, 1997 ; Metcalf, 2002 ). ally donate smaller portions of their income to philanthropy than do middle-income people Privatization and commercial enterprises are (Phillips, 1993 , p. 143; Salamon, 1997 ). increasing their share of education, health, and Th erefore, donations will continue to deterio- human services. In the United States, the for- rate even aft er the Great Recession is over as profi t sector has over a third of the social serv- income concentrates at the top of the income ices market, with further growth projected over distribution, a sense of a general community the next few years. Some of the proprietary fi rms declines, and tax codes make giving less fi nan- involved are mammoth, vertically integrated cially attractive (Freudenheim, 1996 , p. B8; global companies such as Lockheed Martin, Phillips, 1993 , p. 143). Magellan Health Services, and Crescent • Th e United States is more ethnically and Operating, Inc. (health and mental health), socially diverse and is approaching the time Wachenhut (corrections), and Xerox (for con- when no ethnic grouping will have a majority. text, see Berstein, 1996 ; Fein, 1996 ; Freudenheim, California, Texas, and New Mexico currently 2002 ; Kuttner, 1996 ; Levenson, 1997 ; Myerson, have no ethnic majority (U.S. Census Bureau, 1997 ; Nordheimer, 1997 ; Rose, 1997 ; Salamon, 2009b , Table 18). Over a fi ft h of the popula- 1997 ; Swarns, 1997 , pp. A1, A12; Strom- tions of California, New Jersey, and New York Gottfried, 1997 ; Uchitelle & Kleinfi eld, 1996 ). are foreign-born (U.S. Census Bureau, 2009b , Th e business model of social welfare transforms Table 39). social workers into producers and clients into consumers. As with most public policy pro- While projections are always tentative, espe- nouncements, privatization’s effi ciency claims cially with a concept as nebulous as ethnicity, have not been rigorously tested and are not gen- Table 4.1 illustrates both the growing diversity of erally supported (Morgan, 1995 ). the population as well as the absurdity of ethnic classifi cations (Patterson, 2001 ). Th e total white • United Way and charitable giving in the United population, including white Hispanics, remains States has decreased, especially during the the majority population into the next century. Great Recession years (Giving USA, 2009 ; However, the number of non-Hispanic whites is Press, 2009 ; Strom, 2009a , b, c). Over two- projected to decline to less than 50 % by 2060, as thirds of public charities suff ered a funding Hispanics increase to over a fourth of popula- decrease in 2008, despite the increased needs tion. Non-Hispanic whites, however, will remain (Giving USA, 2009 ). Foundations also are dominant in political and economic power. retaining more of their funds during the high Appiah ( 1997 ) thoughtfully observes the stock market growth era of the late 1990s. inconsistencies in our obsession with race, mul- With the collapse of their investments they ticulturalism, and diversity: also distributed a smaller portion of swinking endowments (Giving USA, 2009 ). Many char- Some groups have names of earlier ethnic cultures: ities feel abandoned by the government Italian, Jewish . . . Some correspond to the old races — (Strom, 2009b ); some have sought bankruptcy black, Asian, Indian; or to religions. . . . Some are basically regional — Southern, Western, Puerto Rican. Yet protection (Strom, 2009a ). Corporate contri- others are new groups modeled on old ethnicities — butions to health and human services have Hispanic, Asian American — or are social categories — dropped and constitute less of total giving women, gay, bisexuals, disabled. . . . Nowadays, we than prior to the corporate and income tax are not the slightest bit surprised when someone reductions of the past two decades as the char- remarks on a feature of the “culture” of groups like itable giving deductions are less attractive these. Gay culture, Deaf culture . . . but if you ask what Copyright © 2011. Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. May not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except fair uses permitted under U.S. or applicable copyright law.

Table 4.1 . United States Population Projections by Grouping in Percentages: 2010, 2050, 2100

Population Grouping 2010 2050 2100 Foreign-born 11.2 13.3 10.9 Total white 80.6 74.3 70.9 White, non-Hispanic 67.3 51.1 40.3 Total black 13.3 14.8 15 Black, non-Hispanic 12.5 13.3 13.3 Total American Indian 0.9 1.1 1.1 American Indian, non-Hispanic 0.8 0.8 0.7 Total Asian and Pacifi c Islander 5.1 9.8 13.2 Asian and Pacifi c Islander, non-Hispanic 4.8 9.3 12.6 Total Hispanic 14.6 25.5 33.3

Note. Data in this table are adapted from National Population Projections: I. Summary Files, Total Population by Race, Hispanic Origin, and Nativity: 1999-2100. U.S. Census Bureau, May 16, 2008. Retrieved October 1, 2009, from http://www.census.gov/ population/www/projections/natsum-T5.html

distinctively marks off gay people or deaf people when compared with the genocide, ethnic or Jews from others, it is not obviously the fact that cleansing, and other types of violence that have to each identity there corresponds a distinct culture. occurred in other parts of the world. However, (p. 31) America has a history of all of these evils. We An increased emphasis on the constructions have seen citizens come armed to political of race and culture is misplaced and leads to debates in 2009. If we are to avoid these plagues greater balkanization, social marginalization, in the future, we must emphasize our common and challenges to a cohesive community (Appiah, community rather than our diff erences. As noted 2005 ; Longes, 1997 , p. 46). Th ere are data to above, diversity doesn’t promote community or indicate that an increasing emphasis on multi- the development of social capital. culturalism leads to less hyper-segregation and balkanization. Coff e and Geys (2006 ) found that • Despite advances in civil rights and the election ethnic diversity was inversely related to social of an African-American president, American capital accumulation in communities. Appiah communities are highly ethnically and eco- (1997 ) again provides some insight: nomically segregated; diff erences are especially notable in some urban areas and between To an outsider, few groups in the world looked as cul- urban and suburban areas. Th is creates a sig- turally homogeneous as the various peoples — Serbs, nifi cant barrier to upward social mobility. Croats, Muslim— of Bosnia. (Th e resurgence of Islam in Bosnia is a result of the confl ict, not a cause of it.) . Poverty of women and children remains sig- . . . [T]he trouble with appeal to cultural diff erence it nifi cant. Female-headed households repre- that it obscures rather than illuminates … . It is not sented 17% of all families but 48% of poor black culture that the racist disdains, but blacks. Th ere families in 2006 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2009c ). is no confl ict of visions between black and white cul- Twenty-two percent of black families are poor, tures that is the source of discord. No amount of and black families represent 26 % of all poor knowledge of the architectural achievements of Nubia families. Most black families live in central or Kush guarantees respect for African Americans. . . . cities due to historical, still extant patterns of Culture is not the problem, and it is not the solution. . racial segregation and economic entrapment . . So maybe we should conduct our discussions of (U.S. Census Bureau, 2009b , Table 694). education and citizenship, toleration and social peace, • Another product of globalization has been the without the talk of cultures. (pp. 35–36) increased vulnerability of the United States to Th e United States is becoming more cultur- terrorism, and the resultant impact of the war ally and ethnically diverse. Race as a social on terrorism and two wars we have subse- descriptor and divider has not been made obso- quently entered. Th e drama and fear following lete (Morning, 2008 ). We have done relatively September 11, 2001, was powerful, but it was well in our diversity during the past two decades oft en more symbolic than real for most Copyright © 2011. Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. May not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except fair uses permitted under U.S. or applicable copyright law.

Americans. Th e United States instituted no • Th e United States and the world are aging. military draft despite the two wars but did Americans are getting older and working limit carry-on liquids on commercial airlines. longer. Th e growth of the population between Th e United States has become “the Homeland,” 65 and 85 and the population over 85 is a sig- an appellation coined for political purposes nifi cant factor in health and welfare spending aft er September 11, 2001, that was rarely if (U.S. Census Bureau, 2009b , Table 33). Th e ever used before then. 1 Flags and other patri- frail elderly, in particular, require costly in- otic symbolism are everywhere: in offi ce and home and institutional support, as well as home windows, on cars and lapels, and espe- more complex and expensive medical care. cially in commercial and political advertising. With a devolving welfare state and a privatiza- Politicians wave fl ags at every opportunity. Th e tion ideology, despite the political power of political scientist Robert Putnam, based on an the elderly, Social Security’s benefi ts and an October 2001 poll, claimed that one positive improvement of elderly health care through consequence of Sept. 11 was that “whites trust Medicare or a national health insurance are at blacks more, Asians trust Latinos more, and so risk of cutbacks (Mitchell, 2002 ). on, than did these very same people did a year • Th e spiraling, pervasive, unbounded techno- ago” (as cited in Morin & Dean, 2002 ). Th e logical revolution in the United States— and impact, sadly, on the U.S. sense of community our love of it— will continue. Th e widespread has been more jingoistic than profound in use of computers and other instant communi- producing solidarity and cohesion. Th e cation equipment for information access, data increase in trust from 22 % to 29 % , a 7 % gain, processing, and communication will continue was probably a function of social desirability to decrease the virtual time and space between responses brought on by a near-universal people, organizations, and communities and emphasis on the concept “United We Stand.” will also reduce face-to-face interaction. As we Even in the face of universal media eff orts to balkanize, we are simultaneously served by create national unity aft er Sept. 11, 71 % of national economic franchises, shaped by those surveyed indicated no increase in trust. national and global media, and connected • And other polls and indicators are less opti- internationally by a high-tech information mistic than Putnam’s (Clymer, 2002 ). Since superhighway. Use of computer and electronic Sept. 11, 2001 hyper-social segregation or technologies can allow human and social serv- extreme segregation by class, income, and eth- ices to be more widely distributed. A single nicity has been maintained. Devolution of the professional can serve more people, and fewer welfare state, with decreasing government professionals can serve more people. E-mails, general welfare services and increasing priva- Web pages, and tweets provide more opportu- tization, continues unabated (Pear, 2002 ). Th e nity for public information distribution, mar- Pew Research Center’s report Trends 2005 keting, and case coordination. Internet chat indicates we remain divided along religious, rooms and social networking sites such as political, and social ideological lines (Pew, Facebook and MySpace are used for informa- 2005 ) and are less optimistic about the future tion sharing and emotional support groups. (Pew, 2009 ). Th e affl uent enjoy disproportion- As everyone from the liberal political advo- ate relief from taxes and public responsibility cacy organization MoveOn.org, and the for the nation’s welfare. Corporate fl ag-waving Obama campaign to the radical right have is accompanied by relocations to off shore tax demonstrated, networks, Web sites, and online havens to avoid paying taxes in support of the chat rooms can be used for organizing both war against terrorism and other assumed ene- virtual and physical communities. mies of “the Homeland” (Johnston, 2002a , 2002c). Rules of secrecy are imposed and due- Perspectives for Practice process protections are weakened, also in the name of homeland security, recalling a dark As we become involved in developing new social Vietnam War–era slogan of destroying the vil- work programs and services and redesigning old lage to save it (Broad, 2002 ; Ignatieff , 2002 ). ones, as we provide community education and Copyright © 2011. Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. May not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except fair uses permitted under U.S. or applicable copyright law.

client advocacy and help structure support net- community’s subsystems rarely are rationally works, the models that follow suggest the kinds organized and coordinated by a centralized of information, contacts, and activities we should authority to achieve a common goal. An consider in our practice. 2 American community as a political jurisdiction with a city with a mayor and a city council has important subsystems with limited or no central The Community as People: A control, such as the nonprofi t sector, the eco- Sociodemographic View nomic sector where multiple business fi rms pro- Th e U.S. Census Bureau collects, compiles, and duce and distribute necessary goods and services, distributes a huge quantity of information about the underground economy, and the illegitimate the characteristics of the U.S. people and their sectors. Communities evolve as people develop activities. Th e annual Statistical Abstract of the common needs, interdependencies, and senti- United States, for example, contains aggregate mental bonds. information about the numbers of people, births, We use Warren’s (1978 ) conception of com- deaths, homeownership, occupations, income munity. It best serves our purposes of under- and expenditures, labor force, employment and standing community for intervention on both earnings, health and nutrition, business enter- micro and macro levels. Following Warren’s prise, manufacturing, and more. In addition, the system analysis of the U.S. community, we may Census Bureau disaggregates information by view the community as “that combination of census tract, its smallest spatial unit at the local social units and systems that perform the major level. Th e local municipal or county planning social functions having locality relevance” (p. 9). department and local libraries usually have Warren conceived of community functionally as census tract information that reveals a good deal the organization of social activities to aff ord about the composition and character of the local people daily local access to those broad areas of community. Th us, one can learn about the ages, activities and resources necessary in day-to-day nationalities, average income, and educational living. A community, in this defi nition, has a levels of people in diff erent local areas, for exam- locality but needs no well-defi ned and rigid geo- ple, and the data are available for comparative graphic boundaries. Social work is concerned purposes across census tracts and municipali- with where people live and, more important, ties. Comparisons can also be made for geo- with the infl uences of where they live on how graphic areas over time, so that community they live. Social work is immersed in people, changes can be examined. Social indicators of families, social relationships and networks for the relative well-being of a community can be education, jobs, and values, and how people developed, for example, by tracking crime statis- develop and maintain their social relationships tics, infant mortality rates and various other and networks. Communities can be compared health statistics, and so on. Th e utility of socio- on the dimensions of (a) the relative degree of demographic information to plan social pro- dependence of the community on extracommu- grams and to understand the community is nity (vertical patterns) institutions and organiza- readily apparent. And, as indicated above, the tions to perform its locality-relevant functions way the U.S. Census Bureau chooses to divide (autonomy), (b) the extent that the service areas people tells us something about the American of local units (stores, churches, schools, manu- community’s perception of itself. facturing, and so on) coincide or fail to coincide, (c) the psychological identifi cation with a common locality, and (d) the relative strength of The Community as a Social System the relationships between local, intracommunity Th e concept of a community as a social system units (horizontal pattern) (Mulroy, 2004 ; Warren, essentially views a community as a system of 1978 , pp. 12–13). interrelated subsystems that perform important Warren proposes fi ve critical locality-relevant functions for their members. What diff erentiates social functions: (a) production-distribution- the community as a system from an organization consumption, (b) socialization, (c) social con- that is also a system of systems is that a trol, (d) social participation, and (e) mutual Copyright © 2011. Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. May not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except fair uses permitted under U.S. or applicable copyright law.

support. Th ese social functions are required for mutual support only if its commonly socialized survival and perpetuation of a community and values support public welfare and voluntary its members. A community fulfi lls the functions giving. through a pattern of formal and informal organ- Before we consider each of the fi ve functions izations, groups, and networks. While an organi- in more detail, we need to lay a foundation by zation or entities can be identifi ed with a primary examining the concepts of vertical and horizon- social function and are discussed in terms of the tal integration, reciprocity, and social exclusion. primary function, such as a school system with Th ese are critical to understanding the great the socialization function, the same social units changes within the community’s functions and generally perform more than one function. For to understanding community. example, a school provides socialization and also provides jobs, opportunities for social participa- Changes in Communities From Horizontal to Vertical tion, mutual support, and social control. Th e Systems. Communities are undergoing great units that provide these functions may have local changes in transforming from locality-focused physical sites but may not necessarily be control- and horizontally organized communities empha- led by members of the community or be truly sizing primary and holistic relationships and “of” the community. A supermarket can serve responsibilities to vertical integrated communi- several diff erent communities and belong to a ties and extensions of a global economy. Th e regional, national, or global corporation with terms vertical entity and horizontal entity interests adverse to the local community. A child describe the relationship between the entity or protective service unit may serve several neigh- organization and the local community, and not borhoods, but the number of workers it can hire the internal structure (Willie, Willard, & Ridini, to meet the local needs, and even its conception 2008 ). It is important to know whether an organ- of child abuse and neglect, are controlled by state ization has a vertical or a horizontal relation to laws, the state’s child welfare department, and the community. Horizontal organizations share federal grant-in-aid funding limits and laws. the same geographic domain with a community Th e community as a social system operates and coincide or fi t within the community. Th eir systemically, with its entities interacting and ultimate locus of authority situs is within the aff ecting one another. Th e entities and institu- community, and their relationship with the com- tional structures interact, shape, and contribute munity is horizontal; they are on the same to shared purposes and support or hinder the plane. capacity of the others to accomplish their social Th e locality limited horizontal community is functions. Each component of a system is neces- a community where people live and have their sary for the system to achieve its purposes. All of needs met by structures and institutions that are the social functions and social structures are contained within the same community. Th e hier- interdependent and have an impact on our well- archical structures of authority and loci of deci- being or welfare. A school system’s capacity to sion making are at a community level horizontal educate and to socialize is aff ected by its com- to one another and their constituencies. Th e munity’s economic viability and social stability. locality limited horizontal community, with ulti- In turn, the school system contributes to the mate decisional authority for the fi ve community community’s economic and social viability. functions located in the same community, is A poor community has consumption needs becoming rare as community functions become but lacks production and has externally control- global and increasingly specialized in their divi- led distribution system. Its socialization struc- sions of responsibilities; become complex in tures may be weak, with community members internal structures and fragmented; lack congru- suff ering from anomie. Social control is largely ence with one another or with a locality; and externally imposed, when it exists. Th e poor have little or no community loyalty. community has greater demands for mutual sup- Vertical entities, organizations, and structures port, the welfare function, but has less capacity are characterized by hierarchical levels of author- to provide mutual support. In contrast, an affl u- ity and decision making beyond the local com- ent community has a capacity, but it may provide munity to regional, state, federal and national, Copyright © 2011. Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. May not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except fair uses permitted under U.S. or applicable copyright law.

and global levels. Th e entity’s verticality refers to principles. Th e few community hospitals remain- its relationship with the local community and ing are controlled by the national insurance the community’s capacity to infl uence its deci- community and federal regulations and funding sional authority and rule-making capacity in sat- requirements. Th e mom-and-pop family busi- isfying community needs. ness has been replaced by the multinational In a vertical community, the decision makers mega-corporation. Th e global multimedia enter- for a community’s social functions are beyond tainment-industrial conglomerate has deposed the local community and have little interest in it. the local newspaper. Decision making for all Factories are closed regardless of community these structures is distant from the local com- need. Decisions that aff ect one community social munity and is based on narrowing economic function may not correspond geographically or self-interest rather than a consideration of com- socially with decisions aff ecting another social munity well-being. function. Th is creates greater community com- Community practice is concerned with verti- plexity and makes decision making more remote cal and horizontal relationships because they from the individual. Th e local community and infl uence the relationships within and between its welfare are unimportant to the vertical enti- communities: cohesion, power, dependency and ties; a particular local community is simply one interdependency, community commitment, and of many communities in its domain. Interests are the capacity and willingness of the organization specialized by functions, even when the vertical to respond to local community needs. Vertically entity is a multifunctional entity. Economic enti- related structures have less community interde- ties are concerned with their economic interest pendence and cohesion. rather than with the local community’s economic As communities have become more vertically and social well-being and quality of life. Verti- integrated, the conception of locality has cally integrated communities have few defi nable expanded for fulfi lling the functions. Today geographic and social boundaries for functions, some functions have a global or national com- fragmented social relationships based on more munity. Not only is the economy global, but explicit social contracts, extensive divisions of social welfare, socialization, and social control labor, and secondary and tertiary modes of social entities are also global. With the expansion and interaction. Individuals have a growing sense of complexity of community, unfortunately, as isolation and increasing anomie, with a loss of Nisbet (1953 , p. 52) has stated, “For more and community values to guide behavior. With alien- more individuals the primary social relation- ation and normlessness comes a loss of local ships [of community] have lost much of their social control and a growth of a splintered life- historic function of mediation between man and style and social identity; special interest enclaves the larger ends of our civilization.” spring up in an eff ort to recreate community A primary criterion in assessing whether an within the amorphous national and global social organization or agency has a vertical or horizon- ecology (Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, & Tipton, tal relation is the ultimate locus of authority and 1985 , 1991 ; Etzioni, 1993 ). a local unit’s decision-making ability to commit Although our current conservative political resources to local community interests. A prac- rhetoric is for smaller, more local government tice task for the community practitioner, in addi- and more individual responsibility, the reality is tion to assessing whether the entity is a vertically that our governmental and nongovernmental or horizontally related entity, is to help commu- organizations are becoming larger, global, more nities develop relationships with a more hori- remote in decision making from the community, zontal character and greater power equivalency more intrusive on and dominant over the indi- and interdependence with these vertically related vidual and community, and more unregulated, entities. uncontrolled, and uncontrollable. Th e community hospital and the independent family doctor Reciprocity. Community cohesion requires reci- have been supplanted by the proprietary and dis- procity and responsibility commensurate with tant profi t-driven national health maintenance rights and benefi ts, whether individuals or larger organization operating under managed-cost social entities. People and corporations need to Copyright © 2011. Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. May not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except fair uses permitted under U.S. or applicable copyright law.

give to the community on the basis of what they Community Functions get from the community. Th is extends beyond the simplistic, though important, notion that Production-Consumption-Distribution public welfare recipients should reciprocate for Production-distribution-consumption (P-D-C) the assistance received from the community. It is the system of organizing individuals and other includes obligations of the affl uent to “give back” resources for the production and distribution of to the community for their prosperity. Global goods and services for consumption. P-D-C is corporations have an obligation to all the com- the economy. It is the most important commu- munities where they operate at least equal to the nity function. Heilbroner ( 1962 , p. 5) pointed gains they make. Adam Smith ( 1922 ), hardly a out that societies and communities must meet collectivist, advocated proportionate reciprocal only two interrelated needs for short-run sur- community responsibilities: vival: Th e expence [sic ] for defending the society . . . are laid out for the general benefi t of the whole society. It is 1. Th ey must develop and maintain a system for reasonable, therefore, that they should be defrayed by producing the goods and services needed for the general contribution of the whole society, all the perpetuation. diff erent members contributing, as nearly as possible, in 2. Th ey must arrange for the distribution of the proportion to their respective abilities. … Th e subjects of fruits of production among their members, every state ought to contribute towards the support of so that more production can take place. the government, as nearly as possible, in proportion to their respective abilities; that is, in proportion to the rev- A community must meet its current and the enue which they respectively enjoy under the protection next generation’s need for goods and services of the state. [italics added] (pp. 300, 310) (until the next generation is able to provide for itself). If a generation doesn’t have consumption Social exclusion. Th e growth of the global turbo- needs met, there will be no succeeding genera- economy and vertically structured communities tion of producers and hence no continuation of has been accompanied by increasing social community. Without production and its distri- exclusion in the United States and Europe. Social bution, there is no consumption. Without pro- exclusion “restrict[s] or den[ies] people partici- duction there are no goods and services for pation within society. . . . Individuals or groups mutual support. Without consumption there is are wholly or partially excluded from full par- no energy for socialization, social control, social ticipation in the society in which they live . . . participation, or production. P-D-C therefore is [and represent] a failure or inability to partici- necessary for a community’s survival, but alone pate in social and political activities” (Berry & it is not suffi cient: communities are so much Hallett, 1998 , p. 2). more than economic systems. Social exclusion refers to individual social P-D-C doesn’t require a particular economic marginalization and alienation. Social exclusion system or model. Economic systems are social is the fl ip side of the concept of social solidarity inventions to support the production, distribu- and social capital. Social exclusion can be a trait tion, and consumption of goods and services by of powerless groups that are prevented from the community. P-D-C’s organization is highly integrating themselves within the community. fl exible. Th e models can range from a wide vari- Th e poor tend to be the most structurally socially ety of collectivist approaches ranging from the excluded. Social exclusion is a byproduct of the family and clan through to nation-state collec- globalization that excludes most of us from eco- tivism on one hand to individualistic laissez- nomic and political decision making (Room, faire and wanton neoliberal corporate capitalism 1990 ; van Deth, 1997 ). A critical objective of on the other. No particular model represents community practice is to reduce social exclusion “the natural order of things” or “a higher pro- in its pursuit of social justice and empowerment gression of humankind” more than any another for the socially disadvantaged and isolated model. Laissez-faire and corporate capitalism (Butcher, Banks, Henderson, with Robertson, are social inventions of fairly recent historical 2007 ). vintage. In Adam Smith’s classic and seminal Copyright © 2011. Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. May not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except fair uses permitted under U.S. or applicable copyright law.

work on laissez-faire capitalism, An Inquiry into (Warren, 1978 , p. 177). Socialization is necessary the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, for people to gain a shared set of values. It’s a life- fi rst published in 1776, Smith’s concern was with long formal and informal process of learning the wealth of nations as communities, not with social values, constructions, roles, and behav- individuals or corporate wealth. Th e failure of iors. It’s how we learn how and what to think and the corporate model of neoliberal capitalism in do. Th e community is the primary arena that the early 21st century reveals its weaknesses, instructs in the particular structures and stric- such as the fact that it is susceptible to economic tures of social behavior for that community. bubbles. A P-D-C system exists to serve a com- Socialization initially was the responsibility munity’s needs, rather than, as it currently oft en of such primary and secondary social entities as appears, for a community to serve an economic the family, religious bodies, informal peer system’s needs. Th is axiom is ignored by the neo- groups, and, more recent, the tertiary institution liberal economic ideology that fragments, if not of schools. Research is indicating that a commu- destroys, community cohesion and values. New nity’s organizations and social patterns and char- models have been proposed that will return the acter have a signifi cant impact on socializing its focus of the economic system to community members (Eamon, 2002 ; Mancini, Bowen, & well-being rather than fi scal growth (Goodman, Martin, 2005 ; Sharkey, 2008 ; Vartanian, & Buck, 2009 ). 2005 ). However, these primary and secondary P-D-C’s structure has become increasingly community associations now are losing their vertical, with a concurrent distancing of decision grip on socialization. Control of socialization making from the community and the individual in the contemporary community has moved without much regard for the community’s inter- beyond the local community and its structures ests and needs. As we move more totally to to becoming the province of vertical, priva- global, highly vertical economic structures, we tized, and proprietary structures. Education, should keep in mind several propositions: religion, entertainment, and information distribution are no longer local but national, global, 1. Economies are social creations and not cre- and proprietary. ated by nature or divinely inspired. Economics Th e commercial, monopolistic, and global as a discipline has largely left science for ide- media, the Web, and the Internet are now signifi - ology. cant instruments of socialization. Young people 2. No economic system has greater inherent spend more time with television, video/compu- morality than other systems. Any morality is ter games, and the Web than with family, reli- determined by how well it serves its commu- gious groups, or schools. Th e values imparted are nities, not by how well it serves itself. the values of the media’s proprietors and not nec- 3. Economies should serve communities rather essarily a community’s values. Th ese values will than communities existing for economies. become the community’s values as young and Th is was forgotten with TARP and the eco- not-so-young Americans learn them (Stein, nomic stimulus package in 2009. 1993 ). Television and the other components of 4. While structures for P-D-C — an economic an increasingly monopolistic global media (“Th e system— are necessary for community viabil- Big Media,” 2002) are most concerned with ity, economic systems alone are insuffi cient attracting viewers for advertisers and with shap- for a viable community. Th e other functions ing public opinion to support their sponsors’ ide- also must be fulfi l l e d . ology. Cable “news” focuses less on reporting events than on shaping opinions, attitudes, and values. Socializing viewers to community values, Socialization educating them, or transmitting information has Socialization is the process “through which indi- given way to tactics for luring and holding view- viduals, through learning, acquire the knowl- ers. If random sex, frontal nudity, frequent vio- edge, values and behavior patterns of their lence, “reality television,” erectile dysfunction society and learn behaviors appropriate to the ads, and entertainment “news” attract viewers, so various social roles that the society provides” be it, regardless of their socializing implications. Copyright © 2011. Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. May not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except fair uses permitted under U.S. or applicable copyright law.

Schools sell information systems, use commer- state and sustains morality by drawing on the gentle cially sponsored closed-circuit television for prodding of kin, friends, neighbors and other com- instruction, import fast-food franchises for food munity members rather than building on government service, sell sports facility naming rights to controls or fear of authorities. . . . No society can func- national corporations, and buy commercially tion well unless most of its members “behave” most of the time because they voluntarily heed their moral com- packaged teaching packages and tests (Metcalf, mitments and social responsibilities. (pp. 15, 30, italics 2002 ). Privatized and proprietary profi t- original) driven school systems are touted as educational reform. Th e goal of public education of creating If socialization and civic society are weak- community has been replaced by pecuniary ened, more demands are placed on social control motives. structures external to the individual in an Without strong socialization to a congruent extremely heterogeneous and diff erentiated and shared set of values, there is no internal con- community. As solidarity wanes, external social trol of behavior based on these values. And with- controls must be maintained for social order. out internal behavioral control, there is a greater Th ese controls are most oft en represented by the need for external social control to regulate regulatory powers of the state’s legal system and b e h a v i o r . extragovernmental groups, usurping the power of the community. External social controls Social Control represent a failure of socialization. Th e growth of external and imposed social Social control represents the processes communi- controls is an argument for improving socializa- ties use to obtain compliance with their prescribed tion to a common set of community values. But and proscribed social roles, norms, and behav- as we have seen, socialization by communities 3 iors. Social control is inherent in any community has weakened and they have become more verti- and society. Th e concept is inherent in the notion cal, more sophisticated, more interdependent, of social living. Without social controls, there is and more pluralistic. Primary societies, the chaos. Th e question is not whether a community gemeinschaft societies, had no formal contracts will regulate and control its members’ behavior, or separate social control organizations. Pre- but how it will do so and for what reasons. Columbian Amerindian nations generally had Behavioral control can be done in two ways: no separate police forces. Th e rules of contract (a) by internal controls developed through and law have replaced the more informal means socialization processes and (b) by external social of social control through socialization. Tertiary, controls, with a system of allocating rewards for vertical social control systems have led to formal acceptable behaviors and punishments for for- limits on individual freedom and an expansion bidden behaviors imposed by the community. of government and corporations into people’s Most social institutions perform some social personal lives, justifi ed as a community good control function. Trattner ( 1999 ) includes social and “security.” Constraints on personal freedoms work and social welfare as social control agents. and local community authority have been con- Trattner sees social control as “those processes in strained by a national government since Sept. 11, a society that supported a level of social cohe- excused by the claim that they are protecting us siveness suffi cient for a society’s survival, includ- from terrorism and preserving “the American ing measures that enabled the needy and the way of life.” Again, we are burning villages to helpless to survive and function within the social save them. Th e state too frequently reneges on its order— the very things we now call social work social responsibilities for the public good and— 3 or social welfare” (p. xxvii). as a creature of the community — is abandoning Etzioni’s ( 1993 ) communitarianism discourse its socialization responsibilities for an increased off ers that when external social control is neces- reliance on social control. It is using draconian sary, it is done best by primary groups in the social control approaches such as the ineff ectual community: “three-strikes-and-you’re-out” prison sentenc- We suggest that free individuals require a community, ing, a ready use of capital punishment, which backs them up against encroachment by the imprisonment for mental illness and drug use, Copyright © 2011. Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. May not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except fair uses permitted under U.S. or applicable copyright law.

limiting constitutional protections, and com- community’s physical and geographic bounda- mercializing social control with the privatization ries, and movement to a contract society. Social of police and prisons. Law enforcement and interaction and participation is more complex corrections are growth industries in spite of and distant, intricate, socially isolating, and cutbacks in education funding. detached. Tertiary social structures of larger and more impersonal communities have replaced Social Participation. Social participation is the direct, integrating, and bonding social interac- essential community function that allows— in- tions. Town meetings and informal face-to-face deed, requires — its citizens to participate in the discussions and debates as consensus-building life and governance of the community if they modes of political interacting have been replaced and their community are to be socially healthy by political parties, extensive media political and competent. Research is replete with the advertising, political action committees (PACs), importance of social participation for the indi- public opinion polls, impersonal media talk vidual as well as the community (Fogel, Smith, & shows, and the virtual reality of Internet chat Williamson, 2008 ; Ohmer, 2008 ; Putnam, 2009 ; rooms, Facebook, and Twitter. As the town-hall Saegert & Winkel, 2004 ; Shaw, Gallant, Riley- meetings of 2009 indicated, civil civic discourse Jacome, & Spokane, 2006 ; Sobeck, 2008 ). Social oft en has been displaced by gun-packing seekers participation is necessary to develop social capi- of TV exposure. Th ese techniques allow politi- tal. Fellin (2001 , pp. 70–71) emphasized social cians and marketers to bypass the mediating participation in his defi nition of community structures of associations, including grassroots competence as “the capacity of the community political parties, and appeal directly to the to engage in problem-solving in order to achieve voters. Th e mass marketing approach reduces its goals.” Various parts of a community collabo- the mediating function, reciprocity, and com- rate, share decision making and power, and munity accountability mechanisms. Participation work together to address community needs. in these more impersonal and technological Community competence is enhanced with com- modes may be virtual, but whether they enhance munitywide participation in decision making. the social capital and reciprocity necessary for Social participation is the core of community a community’s social cohesion is unclear practice and a social component of social work (Beaudoin & Tao, 2008 ; Cliff ord, 2009 ;

practice. It is essential to participatory democ- Everything 2, 2001 ; Kaiser, 2005 ; Menchik & racy. Social participation is indispensable to Tian, 2008 ). ameliorating possible adverse and arbitrary Th e current decline in social participation eff ects of a community’s social control institu- and engagement (other than the virtual form) tions and policies. It is the restorative to social within communities and an impotence of the marginalization. Th e very concept of commu- political system contribute to contemporary nity entails direct and unbuff ered social interac- social problems. Civic participation’s decline, tion and involvement by its members to develop including voting, by the poor, the working class, communal character and to transmit and imple- the middle class, and the young, is accompanied ment communal values. by a diminished government interest in and Social participation entails social structures responsiveness to the interests of the non-voting that develop, maintain, and mediate regulate community strata. Th is decline enhances their communal life and the other community func- social marginalization and eventually social tions of P-D-C, socialization, social control, and exclusion. It has also accompanied the relative the next community function of mutual support. economic decline of these groups. Governments It ranges from participation in informal primary generally favor the economic interests of the and secondary group activities to civic participa- elites, who control both government and the tion in the community’s more formal tertiary economic institutions. 4 rule-making governance. Full social participation requires civic partici- Civic participation has become more pation in the governance of local and national remote and fragmented with industrial society’s communities. Th e core and necessary trait or separation of work from home, extension of the concept is primary and secondary participation Copyright © 2011. Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. May not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except fair uses permitted under U.S. or applicable copyright law.

rather than just checkbook membership (Ladd, political infl uence through mediating organiza- 1999 , p. 16; van Deth, 1997 ). tions. Th e totalitarian danger of mass society, Arneil ( 2006 , pp. 210–223) argues that for according to McCollough (1991 ), lies less in a diverse communities to be just communities, dictator’s seizing control of the governmental social capital must rest on more than simply par- apparatus than in atomizing eff ects of mass soci- ticipation. Social capital exists less in heteroge- ety arising from the vacuum of community where neous communities (Coff e & Geys, 2006 ). Trust nothing stands between the individual and the is necessary for social capital, and trust requires state. Social and civic groups are an important connectiveness. Trust is distinct from participa- infl uence on government. Th ese structures and tion. In diverse communities trust is still being interests compete for resources. Th ey diff er in negotiated, and until trust is negotiated the com- infl uence on a variety of factors, not the least munities are more likely to be aggregations of being a willingness to develop and use infl uence. individuals, or diverse groupings, than a collec- tivity. Diverse communities that have marginal- Voluntary Associations. A remedy against the ized groups as part of their diversity have an social atomization and social disintegration aggregated history rather than a common his- characteristic of mass societies is, of course, the tory and values. In these communities, barriers active membership of individuals, especially to both participation and trust must be addressed. including our clients, in all kinds of voluntary As Judt ( 2009 ) observed: associations (van Deth, 1997 , p. 5). Voluntary [I]t is not by chance that social democracy and welfare associations provide the opportunity to meet states have worked best in small, homogeneous coun- and network with new people, learn to work with tries, where issues of mistrust and mutual suspicion them, expand reciprocity that integrates society, do not arise. … where immigration and visible have develop social and civic engagement skills, and altered the demography of country, we typically fi nd expand social supports that reduce the impact of increased suspicion of others and a loss of enthusiasm mass society. Participation breeds participation. for the institutions of the welfare state. (p. 86) People who participate tend to participate even Th e United States has the challenge of creat- more and have more social and political partici- ing a common community from its diversity by pation opportunities. Without participation on making diff erences of color and ethnicity incon- the level of association, an individual is limited sequential. in most forums of civic participation. Associations Social and civic participation is especially provide the individual with a network of con- important in democratic communities. Demo- tacts, whether or not the associations are overtly cracies, especially in a diverse mega-state, political (Foster-Fishman, Cantillon, & Van depend on their many organizations to infl uence Egeren, 2007 ; Geoghean & Powell, 2006 ; Hannah, policy. If people do not participate in this proc- 2006 ; Ohmer, 2008 ; Nicotera, 2008 ; Pyles & ess, they are essentially excluded and not consid- Cross, 2008 ). Van Deth’s (1997 ) meta-research ered in the rule-making processes of government. led him to conclude that social participation and In democracies, as Phillips (1990 ) has observed, political behavior had a clear and direct relation- the government’s interests and policies refl ect ship, “even when socioeconomic status or politi- the interests of those who select the government: cal orientation are taken into account” (pp. “Since the American Revolution the distribution 13–14). Political and social participation rein- of American wealth has depended signifi cantly force one another (Dekker, Koopmans, & van on who controlled the federal government, for den Broek, 1997 ; Moyser, 1997 , p. 44). what policies, and in behalf of which constituencies ” (p. xiv, italics original). Mediating Structures. Increasing social participa- Democracies respond to collective action. An tion is a critical social work task. It is vital to individual voter exerts very little political infl u- countering complexity and size. Community- ence in the act of voting, although an individual based associations are mediating structures with great economic and social resources can and act as buff ers between the individual and have great infl uence in the commercialized polit- the uncongenial, complex mega-structures. Th ey ical processes. An individual voter can share are necessary to protect the individual and Copyright © 2011. Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. May not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except fair uses permitted under U.S. or applicable copyright law.

Individual Mediating Structures Society’s Megastructures and Institutions

Figure 4.1. Mediating structures.

democracy from the imposition of the mega- mediating structures will follow a developmen- state and mega-corporations of the global turbo- tal course similar to that of the mega-structures economy. Th ey provide the individual with and become impersonal, imposing mega- protective zones (Berger & Neuhaus, 1977 , p. 2; structures themselves (Maloney & Jordan, 1997 ). Nisbet, 1953 ; van Deth, 1997 , p. 6). Voluntary Th is seems to be the path of mediating structures associations as mediating structures are an ano- such as labor unions, political parties, and large dyne to the social fragmentation, atomization, voluntary checkbook membership associations and social disintegration characteristic of our such as the Red Cross. mass societies. Ladd (1999 ) points out that “join- Social participation’s relevance for social work ing face-to-face groups to express shared inter- practice is explored more fully in the practice ests is a key element of civic life. Such groups areas of community organization, networking help resist pressures toward ‘mass society.’ Th ey and coalition building, and community social teach citizenship skills and extend social life casework. Social participation is imperative to beyond the family” (p. 16). People who partici- social work’s obligation to social justice. Clients pate in voluntary organizations have more civic need to be brought into civic associations and trust (Moyser, 1997 , p. 43). Examples of mediat- social action coalitions. Integrating clients into ing structures are family, churches, advocacy community-based social support networks and groups, labor unions, support groups, and neigh- organizations allows them to be in contact with a borhood associations (Fig. 4.1 ). range of social support resources, provides social With a global turbo-economy populated and structures for reciprocity, and provides opportu- dominated by mega-transnational corporations, nities to develop social capital for social and individual and even additional communities as political empowerment. Grassroots community independent consumers become less relevant to organizations need to coalesce and form mediat- a market without real competition. Competition, ing structures for individuals to survive in our in the classic sense of no single or few vendors global economy. Social workers need to promote or purchasers are able to highly infl uence or local and national participation of communities/ control a market, is an archaic concept. Just as an constituents as social and political actors rather individual voter in a mega-democracy is essen- than as customers, consumers, and victims. tially powerless to infl uence the political market- Socially marginalized clients need to be linked to place, an individual consumer has little power to local and global networks of organizations (van infl uence the global marketplace. In contrast, a Deth, 1997 , p. 3). Social welfare organizations single multinational and multifunctional corpo- and social welfare professionals hold some poten- ration has great infl uence. “Some are “too big to tial as positive mediating forces if we can develop fail”. ” Without mediating structures, an individ- the fortitude and skills to intervene against the ual is relatively powerless compared to the mega- excesses of the corporate and social conservatism institutional structures of government and that has captured the nation, states, and commu- commerce. With mediating structures, individu- nities. As Henderson asserts in Critical als can aggregate their infl uence and seek social Community Practice, if the issue is not moved to justice. Th e organizations, associations, and coa- the center of the profession now, participatory litions serve as mediators as well as action groups democracy may be lost (Butcher, Banks, in dealing with mega-corporations and the Henderson, with Robertson, 2007 , p. 161). mega-state. Mediating structures need to be as continu- Mutual Support ous as the mega-structures. Th ey need to parallel the mega-structures both horizontally and verti- Th e mutual support function, the social welfare cally. However, there is a risk that continuous function, is the community’s provision of help to Copyright © 2011. Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. May not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except fair uses permitted under U.S. or applicable copyright law.

its members when their individual and family thrive with such a disparity between the rich and the needs are not met through family and personal poor, the access people and the disenfranchised— that resources. Mutual support is helping one another hasn’t seemed to really strike a chord with in time of need. Primary and secondary groups — Americans. family, neighbors, friends — traditionally pro- To be part of this mutual support arrange- vided the fi rst line of social support and ment, does a person need to be a citizen of a cer- protection. As communities have become more tain political entity (the United States, Maryland, complex, more secondary groups and tertiary or Baltimore), or is a member of the community formal organizations have been developed to defi ned as simply someone who identifi es with perform the mutual support function, such as and is identifi ed by the community as “one of governmental agencies, for-profi t and nonprofi t us”? Th e identity position moves the conception health and welfare agencies, other proprietary of community toward the ethnicity and tribal organizations such as insurance companies and position. Th e concern in the conception of com- day-care centers, and a host of voluntary, non- munity is the community cohesion required for profi t organizations such as burial societies, mutual support with minimum coercion. If credit unions, and child-care co-ops. Th e help- membership requires legal citizenship of a state ing structures may be temporary or permanent. and not simply functional membership in or Mutual support helps to delineate a community identifi cation with a community, then coercion from a simple aggregation of people. Under this probably plays a part in the process of mutual conception of mutual support, social welfare is support. If functional citizenship and identifi ca- caring for others by virtue of their membership tion in a community is required of welfare recip- in the community. Inherent in mutual support ients, community responsibility and reciprocity are the reciprocity obligations and the develop- is inferred. Th e current debates on the exclusion ment of social capital. of illegal (and in some cases legal) aliens from Th e functional and systemic questions for public mutual support and the denial of consti- mutual support relate to community member- tutional protections to aliens emphasize the ship and community cohesion. Fullinwider problems in defi ning citizenship. (1988 ) argues, “We almost never encounter We are back, again, to the importance of civic people, even strangers, whom we think of as participation by all in a community, especially by ‘simply humans’; we encounter fellow citizens, the poor and welfare clients. Civic participation coreligionists, neighbors, historic kinsmen, creates the networks and social bonding neces- political confederates, allies in war, guests. Our sary for social support as well as social justice. It typical moral judgments and responses are provides opportunity for reciprocity and gives a almost always made in the context of some con- claim and mechanisms for exercising the claim nection between us and others that goes beyond based on reciprocity. being members of the same species” (p. 266). Trust is required to develop the cohesion and In our current social climate, the strength of bonding between people that is necessary for our social connectiveness may not be suffi cient mutual support. People need trust each other to for adequate mutual support. During the 2009 avoid the “free riders and the sucker’s challenge” health care debate a Bozeman, Montana, physi- (de Jasay, 1989 ). Th e 2008–09 California drought cian off ered the following gloomy observation illustrates such a “free riders and suckers” quan- (Smith, 2009 ): dary. Th e drought was the state’s worst in several decades. California needed to conserve water. American culture simply has never been based on Individuals were asked to sacrifi ce for the sake of caring about what happened to your neighbor. It’s the community and limit all water use. Th is is a been based on individual freedom and the spirit of, if classic case of individualism versus the commu- I work hard I’ll get what I need and I don’t have to worry about [the] fellow that maybe can’t work hard. nity good. It is in an individual’s interest to … I’ve done my job, I’ve worked hard, I’ve gotten what shower daily, water the yard, and wash the car; I’m supposed to get. I have what I need and if the other his or her use will only marginally decrease the people don’t, then that’s sort of their problem. And community’s supply, and the individual is better unfortunately the big picture— that our nation can’t off and no one else is appreciably worse off , if all Copyright © 2011. Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. May not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except fair uses permitted under U.S. or applicable copyright law.

others follow the rules . Th e individual is a free commons — are suckers. If we as donors view rider and makes no sacrifi ce but rides on the sac- recipients as free riders, then we must view our- rifi ces of the community. If no one makes a selves as suckers. If we do not wish to remain sacrifi ce, then the individual is only following suckers or to view ourselves as suckers, we must the behavior of the collective, and the collective rid the community of free riders. Th is is called made it worse. Now, if the individual makes the welfare reform in current political rhetoric. sacrifi ce but the collective doesn’t, the individual Trust is imperative to avoid the free riders/ is a sucker : the collective is better off in the short suckers dichotomy and tragedy of the commons. run and probably worse off in the long run, the Trust and bonding are dependent on some individual conserving is worse off both in the mutual identity. Trust stems from and builds short and long run— a sucker. community. It involves commitment to others Th e free riders and suckers quandary is the (Haley, 1999 ). Trust and mutual identity are tragedy of the commons argument made against diminishing factors between U.S. citizens and the welfare state (Schmidtz, 1991 ). Th e tragedy people globally. of the commons argument, simply stated, is that A welfare state exists where state or public if we all can have our needs met by doing noth- appliances provide mutual support. Th e welfare ing — the use of the commons or communally state provides a public structure and resources for held resources such as water— there is little moti- mutual support and community building in vation for each of us to exercise restraint. We response to the impersonal social contract of an individually will be no better off . If the individ- industrial society. When there is a reliance on ual does not get his or her needs and preferences state appliances for mutual support without an met from the commons, someone or everyone underlying sense of community, community else may use up the common, thus leaving noth- cohesion, and trust, there is a general increase in ing for the fi rst individual or for future genera- using social control to implement mutual support. tions. Personal denial ensures that our current Vertical approaches relying on taxes and transfers needs will not be met, and it doesn’t ensure that instead of community cohesion are used. our future or future generations’ needs will be met. Th us, the global warming conundrum. Th e Communities as Local, Global, or commons can perpetuate itself only when all are Virtual Networks in harmony and act in common. In other words, there must be strong community responsibility. People have varying commitments to a variety of Th e fear of a tragedy of the commons is evi- communities. Bennett Berger (1998 ) contends dent in our public health and welfare policies that people have “limited, partial, segmented, and programs. We do not feel responsible either even shallow, commitments to a variety of as donors or as recipients. As donors, we resent diverse collectivities— no one of which com- the intrusion of the state on our resources and its mands an individual’s total loyalty” (p. 324). We making us share them with people who contrib- live in many communities and may feel totally a ute little to our well-being. We have little bond- part of none. Wellman’s (1999 , pp. 97–100) anal- ing with the recipients as individuals or concern ysis leads him to conclude that we in the Western, about them as fellow community members. Th ey largely urban world live in a new type of world of are not us. If recipients have little sense of com- loosely coupled communities with the following munal responsibility, they are marginalized and characteristics: excluded from the community. If mutual support recipients, whether from welfare, education, 1. Community ties are narrow and specialized health, or disaster relief, fulfi ll no public or relationships are not broadly supportive. common good, if they demonstrate no commu- 2. People fl oat in sparsely knit, loosely bounded, nal responsibility and make no contributions frequently changing networks, not traditional to the commons or prudently use it, then they cohesive, tightly bound communities. are free riders. And if recipients are free riders, 3. Communities are not neighborhood-bound, then donors — the taxpayers and those who are supportive, and are socially dispersed communally responsible by not exploiting the networks. Copyright © 2011. Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. May not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except fair uses permitted under U.S. or applicable copyright law.

4. Private and virtual intimacy has replaced as much as those not engaged. Th ere is no strong public sociability. statistical association between Internet use and 5. Communities have become more women- active participation”in any community (pp. 124- centered, although community power has 125). On the face of it, internet usuage doesn’t become less so. seem to matter. 6. Political, economic, and social milieus aff ect Critics of the notion of a virtual community, the nature of communities. such as the communitarian William A. Galston 7. Cyberspace supports globalized communities. (1999), argue that the virtual community may be and contributes to many things, but it is not a As we lose the cohesive traditional commu- community. It provide social interaction and sup- nity, new models of communities are being port, communication and contact, but the virtual formed, including the virtual community. A vir- community does not meet the conception of tual community is a group of people “who inter- community by fulfi lling its varied functions. Frey act primarily through computer-mediated (2005 ) argues that virtual communities suff er communication and who identify with and have from being “like-minded” and homogeneous and developed feelings of belong and attachment to having less density and intensity of relationships. each other (Blanchard, 2004 , p. 55).” Th ey are less cohesive than physical communi- Proponents argue that rather than lament ties, although they tend to be homogeneous as fewer bowling leagues (Putnam, 2000 ) and a loss communities of interest, because their members of a pub-culture camaraderie, we should appre- can easily leave the community (by logging off ), ciate coming together in new ways through the and they tend to be less authentic, because com- Web, use the Internet with its Facebook and munity members are limited in their information MySpace to fi nd each other, and recognize that about other members and members can present we participate diff erently in civic and commu- themselves as they wish. Virtual communities’ nity life (Kirchhoff , 1999 ; Ladd, 1999 ; Oldenburg, social capital and trust are virtual, not extant. 1999 ). Electronic linkage in a cyberspace com- Procopio and Procopio ( 2007 ) concluded aft er munity reduces social isolation (Cliff ord, 2009 ; an online survey of Hurricane Katrina’s displaced McLeod, Bywaters, Tanner, & Hirsch, 2008 ). residents about the connection between geogra- Internet support groups whose members are dis- phy and the Internet that “researchers interested persed geographically but share narrow interests in promoting social capital need to recognize that provide some of the functions of natural helpers the Internet is neither the panacea for building and community face-to-face support groups community that some suggest nor the harbinger (Beaudoin & Tao, 2008 ; Kaiser, 2005 ; Menchik & of civil anarchy others fear” (p. 82). Th e authors Tain, 2008 ; Pruden, 2006 ; Wellman & Gulia, urge that community practitioners, especially 1999 ). While research on the effi cacy of the those working in crises, consider Internet con- Internet to create real community for the virtual nectivity issues as important as other staples. community is mixed, it does indicate it should Th e proponents of the loosely coupled new be pursued. Th e Internet can’t be ignored. It has community conception, including the virtual value for social contact in rural areas (Kaiser, community, hearken back to Nisbet, who, over a 2005 ), between cancer patients (Beaudoin & Tao, half-century ago in Th e Quest for Community 2008 ; McLeod, Bywaters, Tanner, & Hirsch, (1953), argued that freedom came from multiple 2008 ), and between the elderly (Cliff ord, 2009 ), associations and authorities. Th us, “while the and within as well as between communities best life was to be found within community, (Quan-Hasse & Wellman, 2004 ). Some research people should not limit themselves to one com- and observers indicate that its use strengthen munity. Th ey should experience many commu- communities beyond the virtual community nities” (Brooks, 2000 , pp. 244–245). (Artz & Cooke, 2007 ; Kaiser, 2005 ; Pruden, 2006 ; Shull & Berkowitz, 2005 ; Stern & Dillman, The Community as an Arena of Conﬂ ict 2006 -7). Quan-Hasse and Wellman, ( 2004 ) report that “people who engage in political and Viewing the community as a social system has organizational activities tend to use the Internet some built-in biases that make it insuffi cient Copyright © 2011. Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. May not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except fair uses permitted under U.S. or applicable copyright law.

alone to serve as a framework for social work Power and community. As discussed in Chapter practice in the community. Th e systems perspec- 2, power is present in most social relationships. tive’s basic bias assumes a set of integrated sub- Power is the ability to get what you want when systems generally working together smoothly for you want it despite the opposition of other the benefi t of the whole. But there oft en are disa- people. As Box 2.2 indicates, power is varied. greements between powerful groups in diff erent Generally people exercise power to gain more subsystems of the community system. We know, and give less than those over whom power is for example, that powerless groups’ fundamental exercised. Power is about gaining and losing, interests are not acknowledged or taken ade- about control and infl uence (Willer, 1999 , p. 2) quately into account by the powerful. Th e good (Box 4.2 ). of the system as a whole— that is, the inclusive Even for very powerful individuals and community— does not necessarily mean the groups, however, power is rarely total. Jean Baker good of all of its subsystems. Th e recognition of Miller ( 1983 ) off ers a more feminist conception community as an arena of confl ict suggests that of power. She defi nes power, similar to infl uence, confl ict and change are characteristic of U.S. as “the capacity to produce a change— that is, to communities and that the process of determin- move anything from point A or state A to point ing the public interest therefore involves confl ict B or state B. Th is can include even moving one’s and negotiation as much as it does rational plan- own thoughts or emotions, sometimes a very ning, collaboration, and coordination. Issues of powerful act. It can also include acting to create power do not seem to enter into the systems per- movement in an interpersonal fi eld as well as spective, but viewing the community as an arena acting in larger realms such as economic, social, of confl ict brings power and politics to the fore. or political arenas” (p. 4). We are forced to ask a variety of questions: What In this view, fostering another’s growth or does it mean to say that the community has a increasing another’s resources, capabilities, and collective identity? How do we take into account eff ectiveness to act exercises power. People who community diff erences in values and beliefs, nurture, socialize, and educate — parents, teach- goals, and interests? Does the community have ers, social workers— hold and can exercise a an overriding public interest, and, if so, how is great deal of power or infl uence. Th is is quite dif- that public interest determined? Who is infl uen- ferent from a masculine conception of power, tial? Is the public interest synonymous with which oft en involves limiting or controlling the the interests of the most powerful people in behavior of others. the community? To answer these questions, we Most theorists distinguish power from author- must turn to conceptions of power and power ity, defi ning authority as legitimated power that s t r u c t u r e . has been legally, traditionally, or voluntarily

BOX 4.2. . Facets of Power in Our Work

Power is the ability to control one’s own destiny [Inter]personal power is the ability to infl uence and the ability to form support systems that aff ect the human surround, and it is dependent upon one’s life. Power has three dimensions: personal, social competence, on the ability to interact eff ec- interpersonal, and political. Th e work of psycholo- tively with others. Political power is the ability to gist Robert White [enhances] and understanding alter systems, to bring about some change in social of personal power. . . . [He] has suggested that all structure or organization, to redistribute resources. human beings have a basic drive, which he calls the eff ectuance drive, a drive to experience oneself Source: Excerpts from a speech by Ann Hartman, then editor as a cause, to interact eff ectively with the environ- of Social Work , at “Integrating Th ree Strategies of Family Empow- ment— in other words, to experience oneself as erment,” School of Social Work, University of Iowa, 1990. having power. Interpersonal power is closely related to personal power because it carries it into the social domain. Copyright © 2011. Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. May not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except fair uses permitted under U.S. or applicable copyright law.

granted to the holder of a particular position, a group composed of the leaders of (a) global such as a corporate CEO, an elected governmen- mega-corporations, (b) the federal government tal offi cial, or royalty in traditional societies. In executive branch, and (c) the military. Th is group the U.S. form of democracy, authority is granted controls large national and multinational corpo- to various elected offi cials to enact laws; to exec- rations and their corresponding public organiza- utives to carry out the business of the state; and tions. Th ey control the means of political power, to the courts to interpret, arbitrate, and enforce production, and destruction. Th ey have the the laws in a tripartite system of balanced powers. power, through the control of dominant institu- Th e distinction between authority and power tions and the media, to manipulate public opin- notes that while authority is a form of power, not ion and ensure that the rest of society accepts all persons in authority are powerful, and pow- their decisions. Th e intervention of the U.S. erful persons exist apart from authorities in any Supreme Court in the outcome of the 2000 pres- social system. Other than formal authority, the idential election and the fact that national politi- sources of power are multiple, including access cians oft en seem to be either part of or in the to and control of strategic information, eco- service of corporate and economic elites lend nomic resources, connections to other powerful support to this version of elitist theory. people, charisma, intelligence, wisdom, age, and Th e people who make the rules and who can more. change them at will generally win any competi- Finally, some theorists diff erentiate between tion. From an elitism perspective, top leaders reputed or potential power and actual power. We determine the fundamental direction of public argue that power exists in its use. Potential power policy and shape the public interest to coincide is only powerful in the threat to exercise it. If a with their interests. In the United States, as dis- threat to use it serves to constrain the actions of cussed earlier in this chapter, most of the others, it is power. Th e classic example is the resources have aggregated to the power elite as a labor union, which has the power to strike. Th e result of policy changes. potential for a strike oft en acts as a stimulus to Surrounding this power elite is a circle of syc- negotiation and a resolution of diff erences. An ophants who are advisers, technical experts, actual strike, should it occur, is sometimes diffi - powerful politicians, regional and local upper cult to sustain and is oft en costly, so in this case classes, and celebrities. Some eventually may be a threat may be more potent than the reality. Or elevated to the top level. the capacity of bosses to fi re can keep a work- Th e second tier of the pyramid, at a middle force docile, even though workers may rarely be level of power, consists of a variety of special fi r e d . interest groups, such as labor unions, media, religious and professional associations, and farm Power distribution. Communities can seldom organizations, that struggle with modest infl u- express a clear and overwhelming public interest ence only within the parameters established by because they are composed of competing inter- the power elite. ests for limited resources. Th e public policy Unorganized mass society falls into the process invariably favors some interests, those of bottom level of the pyramid — the majority of the elites, over others. Th e question, though, is the populace. Th is group has little power over “Does the process always favor the same inter- the decision makers at the top; rather, it is those ests?” in this level to whom the top leaders send orders, Th e gist of elitist theory is that community information, and interpretations of events. Th is life is dominated by a small group of people with base is becoming more socially and economi- suffi cient economic and political power to con- cally marginalized and excluded. trol public decision making in their own inter- A number of studies using reputational meth- ests. Citizen participation, in this conception, is ods (Hunter, 1953 ) have found evidence of an limited or ineff ectual, or both. Mills (1956 ) con- elitist power structure in both smaller and larger tends that the structure of power in the United communities, although the makeup of these States resembles a pyramid with three levels structures does not strictly follow Mills’ concep- (Kornhauser, 1968 ). At the top is the power elite, tion. Numerous studies have also found the Copyright © 2011. Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. May not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except fair uses permitted under U.S. or applicable copyright law.

members of this group to be related by social mainly wants to protect its own power and pre- class (Domhoff , 1967 , 1974 , 1990). Th e reputa- rogatives by blocking the eff orts of other com- tional method essentially involves asking many peting groups. Th ere is no dominant ruling people (who are in a position to know) who they group; instead there are multiple power centers, think the top community leaders are. Names that thereby creating a much more amorphous struc- frequently recur are selected as the top leaders. ture of power. Th e lowest level of the pyramid, as Th en, through interviews and further commu- with Mills, consists of an unorganized mass nity investigation, the researcher begins to sort public, but in this case the public is pursued as out the extent of these leaders’ infl uence, how an ally rather than dominated by interest groups they exercise power in the community, and their in their struggles for power (Kornhauser, 1968 ). patterns of interaction with each other. Th erefore, pluralist power fi gures are potentially Pluralist theorists have strongly criticized more responsive and accountable to the majority these elitism theorists along three lines. First, of citizens than are elitist power holders. they argue that the basic premise of an ordered Elitism theories imply that democracy is at system of power in every human institution is best a weak institution or at worst a sham alto- faulty. Researchers who begin their studies by gether, because the public interest is basically inquiring, “Who runs this community?” are determined by a relatively small (though not asking a loaded question because the question necessarily conspiratorial) group of powerful assumes someone or a small group is running leaders. Pluralist theories suggest that the politi- the community, and therefore that the research- cal process is complex and increasingly remote ers are sure to fi nd it. Second, they argue that the due to the large number of interest groups pro- power structure is not stable over time, as the tecting their turf and struggling for power. elitism theorists contend, but rather is tied to Because it is so hard to get anything done, lead- issues that can be transitory or persistent. ership is weakened and political alienation Th erefore, the assumption of a stable coalition or begins to set in. Whether an issue involves the set of coalitions in the community is inaccurate. community or the country as a whole, no indi- Th ird, they contend that the elitism theorists vidual or group leadership is likely to be very wrongly equate reputed (and positional) power eff ective due to the presence of entrenched veto with actual power: power does not exist until it is groups— consider, for example, the battles to actually exercised successfully. enact health care legislation during the Clinton In contrast to the elitism theorists, the plural- and Obama administrations. For Banfi eld (1961 ), ist theorists propose that power is distributed this struggle leads to public decision making that among many diff erent organized groups, with is seldom the result of deliberate planning. For control shift ing depending on the issues. Citizens Lindblom ( 1959 ), it leads to “disjointed incre- participate in the public policy process through mentalism.” a variety of interest groups. Because individuals Th ere can little argument with the data. potentially have the freedom to organize a group Wealth, income, and political infl uence have and compete in the policy arena, diff erences can become concentrated at the top (Krugman, 2002 ; be resolved amicably. Th e political system there- Mintz, 2007 ). Even during the Great Recession fore operates much more democratically than the concentration continues: wealth and income the elitism theorists would have us believe, the continues to move to the top 1 % and 5 % despite public interest being whatever comes out of the Democratic Party control of both Congress and pluralistic melting pot aft er the process is com- the executive branch (Cavanagh & Collins, 2008 ; pleted. Executive Pay, 2009 ; Forbes, 2008). David Riesman (1951 ) argued that the power Th ere are several lines of criticism of the plu- structure pyramid has only two levels, corre- ralistic approach. One main criticism is that the sponding roughly to Mills’s bottom two tiers. pluralists present a rather idealized version of Th ere is no power elite. “Th e upper level of the the political process. Since interest groups cannot Riesman’s pyramid consists of ‘veto groups’: a be easily organized and sustained without many diversifi ed and balanced body of interest groups” resources, a large part of the community cannot (Kornhauser, 1968 , pp. 39–40). Each group participate. Furthermore, the notion that the Copyright © 2011. Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. May not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except fair uses permitted under U.S. or applicable copyright law.

pluralist process operates amicably and eff ec- guilty of the same criticism they level at the elit- tively by a set of institutionalized political rules ists. Pluralism appears to exist only on less does not conform to the experience of challeng- important issues than on fundamental commu- ing groups, who have succeeded primarily by nity welfare concerns. using norm-violating, disruptive tactics Although both elitism and pluralist theories (Gamson, 1990 ). talk about “groups” in the political policy proc- Another main line of criticism is that pluralist ess, most of the early theories tended to focus on theory does not recognize a hidden face of power powerful individuals rather than powerful (Bachrach & Baratz, 1962 , 1963 , 1970 ). Th at is, organizations. As communities become larger by assuming that power is played out solely in and more complex and their institutions become relation to concrete issues, pluralists omit the vertically integrated, power is exercised by a possibility that in any given community there loose network of compatible interests rather than may be a group capable of preventing contests a small, tight cabal. Powerful fi scal corporations, from arising on issues that it considers impor- such as Goldman Sachs, with their need to main- tant. Power may well be at work in maintaining tain a stable business market, and the growing the directions of current policy, limiting the power of government in American life have led parameters of public discourse to fairly safe power structure theorists to focus on networks issues— in short, the power elite, by controlling of organizations as sources of widespread and an increasing share of the media, can prevent enduring power (Perrucci & Pilisuk, 1970 ; some items from ever reaching the community Perrucci & Potter, 1989 ). Th rough such arrange- agenda and even becoming issues. Moreover, as ments as interlocking boards of directors and the pluralist methodology off ers no criteria for government/corporation executive exchanges adequately distinguishing between routine and (see Box 4.3 for some of the Goldman Sachs– key political decisions, by accepting the idea that government exchanges), interorganizational in any community there are signifi cant, visible leaders can mobilize the resources of a network issues, the researcher is examining only what of organizations (including governmental/mili- are reputed to be issues. Hence, the pluralists are tary/media) to infl uence public policy. With the

BOX 4.3. Goldman Sachs and the U.S. Government

N a m e P r i o r t o Government Service Administration Post Government Government Service Service Stephen Chair and CEO, Assistant to President for George W. Bush Chair, Stone Point Friedman Goldman Sachs Economic Policy; Director, Barack Obama Capital (private equity National Economic Council; company) Chair, Federal Reserve Bank of New York Robert E. Chair and CEO, Secretary of the Treasury William J. Clinton Senior consultant, Rubin Goldman Sachs Citigroup Henry M. Chair and CEO, Secretary of the Treasury George W. Bush Visiting scholar, Paulson Goldman Sachs Johns Hopkins University Jon S. Co-Chair and U. S. Senator NA Governor, Corzine CEO, Goldman New Jersey Sachs

Goldman Sachs in 2010 was being investigated for criminal and civil violations. Copyright © 2011. Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. May not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except fair uses permitted under U.S. or applicable copyright law.

vertical structuring of society, these sorts of mirror the hierarchical character of the public and interorganizational arrangements operate on the private bureaucracies with which they contend. (pp. local level as well as state, national, and global 186–187) levels. In the fi nal analysis, it is not the specifi c people who occupy the organizational linking Conclusion roles that are critical; the people change. It is the elite interests that shape the interorganizational Th e crucial premise of this chapter is that for networks that represent the enduring structur- social workers to be eff ective, we need to under- ing of community power. stand how the community aff ects our lives and the lives of the people we work with. We live and work and play in multiple, overlapping local Mediating Structures and Community- communities of diff erent kinds. eseTh commu- Sensitive Social Work Practice nities are oft en culturally diverse and generally Th is chapter argues that there is value in strength- quite diff erent from the communities where we ening local communities and other mediating ourselves grew up and now live. Th e importance structures to meet the onslaught from larger of community calls for a community-based forces outside their control. As discussed earlier, social work practice. Some examples of how we agree with Berger and Neuhaus ( 1977 ) and community may bear on practice will help clar- propose a strengthening of mediating structures. ify this idea. Th ey have great value for linking and empower- Consider the social worker employed by a ing ordinary people. Th ey stand between and church-sponsored nonprofi t social work agency. protect individuals in their private lives from the In her practice she has begun to see more and alliance of global mega-corporations and the more clients who are HIV-positive or who have state. Berger and Neuhaus argue that “public AIDS. How should she deal with this problem? policy should protect and foster mediating struc- Suppose that the church has strong anti-gay sen- tures and wherever possible, public policy should timents and sees AIDS as “a gay problem.” utilize mediating structures for the realization of Suppose that the church refl ects values that are social purposes” (p. 6). In general, we support prevalent in the community. What kinds of serv- these propositions, but neither of them is simple ices can be provided for these new clients? How to fulfi ll. As always, we have to fi nd a balance do clients themselves feel about their circum- between individual rights and community rights stances, given the community’s values? What and between the protective functions of the state kinds of services are needed in the community? and the defensive functions of the mediating How might the social worker begin to address structures. that need? (Obviously many other kinds of It is also possibly that mediating structures problems, such as homelessness, substance themselves, due to size and patterns of decision abuse, and teenage pregnancy, might raise making that are not truly participatory, may have similar questions.) diffi culty in building a strong sense of commu- Take another example. Assume that, as a nity among their participants. In a study of school social worker, you have encountered a Baltimore’s African-American community, Hispanic immigrant child, possibly illegal, who McDougall (1993 ) made a potent argument for appears abused. You are obligated to involve even smaller, informal community building Child Protective Services (CPS). Do you need to blocks called base communities: know how the Hispanic community views CPS workers or the nature of the relationship between Mediating institutions, such as churches, schools, and the school, the Hispanic community, and U.S. community organizations, are essential to this task [of community strengthening, institution building, and Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)? networking], but small base communities of one or How will the situation be handled if the police two dozen people, spun off from mediating institu- become involved? Will the police refer the case tions or growing independently, are essential to coun- to USCIS? How do the school authorities feel terbalance the tendency of mediating institutions to about CPS and USCIS and potential disruptions Copyright © 2011. Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. May not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except fair uses permitted under U.S. or applicable copyright law.

of the school day and possible bad publicity? How do you approach the family and the child? section and try to answer them. Identify the How can you get CPS to work with you to mediating structures and their roles in your answer. manage the situation in the most helpful fashion 4 . Identify an issue in your community relevant to for all parties involved? the provision of social services, and try to follow A third example. Suppose that you are a social it through a public policy process. Identify the worker in a large university hospital’s depart- stakeholders for various sides and facets of the ment of family medicine. You suspect that the issue. What are the roles of the media, elected children in the family you are seeing have been offi cials, public agency representatives, leaders of poisoned by lead paint from their substandard voluntary associations, and corporation leaders apartment house. How can you prevent further in the process? Is the process democratic? Who damage? What about the children who live in has power? Who is left out? Is there a hidden other units in that building? Might there be legal face of power infl uencing the process? or political issues that you should know about? 5. What is the best community you have even lived in? Why do you select it? What made What if the corporation owning the building is a it the best? List the characteristics of this large donor to the university and politically well place. How can that community be made even connected? What are some of the diff erent pro- better? fessional roles you might have to play to help your clients and their neighbors? Th ere are no simple answers to the questions posed in these illustrations. Th e answers require a sound understanding of community. Notes

Th e fragmentation of some communities and the 1. An exercise: Find a reference in the political litera- sense of distance between them and state institutions ture to the United States as “the Homeland” prior are major challenges. So too is the search by individu- to September 11, 2001.

als for ways of acquiring a more meaningful sense of 2. In proposing these approaches, we are mindful community. If these issues are not addressed then the that the literature off ers many other useful models, fragility of representative and participatory democ- such as the community as a system of interaction racy, … , will be threatened. Our contention accord- (Kaufman, 1959 ), as a system of human ecology ingly, is that critical community practice needs to (Fellin, 2001 ; Poplin, 1979 ), as shared institutions move to centre stage — urgently. (Butcher, Banks, and values (Warren, 1978 ), and as an ecology of games (Long, 1958 ). Henderson with Robertson, 2007 , p. 161) 3. For a more sinister description of social control and public welfare, see Piven and Cloward (1971, 1982). 4 . For a review of the use of the state’s police powers and policies to create wealth for particular classes D i s c u s s i o n E x e r c i s e s and community interests, see Barlett and Steele 1 . How have vertical and horizontal changes in (1992, 1994) and Phillips ( 1990 , 1993 ). community functions aff ected social work practice? Give examples. 2 . Select a client and describe the specifi c institu- References tions and organizations in the client’s life Abelson , R. ( 2000 , May 8). Serving self while serving that are used to fulfi ll the fi ve locality-relevant others . Th e New York Times , p. A16 . functions. How much do the organizations coin- Anderson , S. , Cavanagh , J. , Collins , C. , Pizzigati , S. , & cide in their service areas? What is the locus of Lapham , M. ( 2007 ). Executive excess 2007: Th e stag- decision making for the organizations? Repeat gering social cost of U.S. business leadership, 14th the exercise for yourself. How many of the annual CEO compensation survey. Washington, specifi c structures are the same for yourself as DC : Institute for Policy Studies and United for a for your client? Do any serve as mediating Fair Economy . organizations? Andrews , E. L. ( 2009 , September 23). Fed to lower 3. In a small group discussion, consider the exam- safety net, but gingerly . Th e New York Times.com . ples and questions posed in the “Conclusion” Retrieved January 7, 2010, from http://www.nytimes. com/2009/09/24/business/economy/24fed.html Copyright © 2011. Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. May not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except fair uses permitted under U.S. or applicable copyright law.

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