Environmental Science and Policy 99 (2019) 37–47

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Environmental Science and Policy

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Building urban resilience and knowledge co-production in the face of weather hazards: flash floods in the Metropolitan Area () T ⁎ Ismael Aguilar-Barajasa, , Nicholas P. Sistob, Aldo I. Ramirezc, Víctor Magaña-Ruedad a Departamento de Economia and Centro del Agua para America Latina y el Caribe, Tecnologico de Monterrey, Monterrey, Nuevo Leon, Mexico b CISE (Centro de Investigaciones Socioeconómicas), Universidad Autonoma de , , Coahuila, Mexico c Departamento de Tecnologias Sostenibles y Civil and Centro del Agua para América Latina y el Caribe, Tecnologico de Monterrey, Monterrey, Nuevo Leon, Mexico d Instituto de Geografia, Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico, Mexico City, Mexico

ARTICLE INFO ABSTRACT

Keywords: In 2010, flash floods triggered by Hurricane Alex caused fifteen fatalities in the Monterrey Metropolitan Area urban resilience (MMA). In contrast, an estimated 225 people died in the 1988 disaster and reputedly, over knowledge co-production 5,000 in the historical flood of 1909. The magnitude of hurricane-related impacts thus appears to be decreasing, fl oods indicating higher resilience to this hazard. This paper analyses the process of building resilience to flash floods in Monterrey the MMA over the last several decades. Knowledge co-production plays a significant role in that process, par- Mexico ticularly through the Nuevo Leon State Reconstruction Council, the multi-institutional, public-private-civil group of stakeholders established to guide and coordinate reconstruction efforts following the Hurricane Alex disaster. Findings reveal a complex, protracted and incremental resilience building process, conditioned by the nature of the hazard (infrequent but liable to cause significant damages) and contingent upon the city’s socioeconomic and institutional local context. This local context is embedded in a highly fragmented national water governance architecture that lacks inter-institutional co-ordination and has limited the city’s adaptive responses. Despite definite gains in building resilience, the city faces challenges notably in terms of the conservation and continuing development of knowledge co-produced in the aftermath of disasters.

1. Introduction urban resilience and knowledge co-production (in brief, the process by which multifaceted knowledge for tackling complex problems is colla- Urban population growth - 6.5 billion people will live in urban areas boratively constructed by stakeholders). Knowledge co-production by 2050 (UN, 2014) - and concomitant social, economic, environmental likewise is not a simple concept and is open to different interpretations and political pressures, pose major challenges for the management of and normative prescriptions (Muñoz-Erickson et al. 2017). increasingly larger and more complex urban systems (Editorial note, The link between knowledge co-production and urban resilience has Environ. Sci. Policy, 2016). A key challenge is to foster resilience, de- not been fully appreciated in the resilience literature, or the actual fined (at a minimum) as the ability of an urban system to maintain or practice of building resilience. This paper proposes to shed some light rapidly return to desired functions in the face of a disturbance. Cities on the varied ways this link is key to building urban resilience. To this face a variety of hazards of consequence within and beyond their own end, the paper offers an in-depth analysis of an actual case of building boundaries, for example floods that damage their infrastructure but also urban resilience and knowledge co-production in the face of hurricane affect the wider economy (Pant et al., 2018). This is in part why induced flooding, a hazard that triggers a specific type of disaster: in- building urban resilience is arguably of vital necessity (Sharifi and frequent (once in a generation), rapid onset, impossible to forecast at Yamagata, 2014). more than a few days’ notice, and liable to cause significant damage to Urban resilience as a concept is amenable to different disciplinary life, property and infrastructure. Specifically, the paper analyzes how perspectives and may be applied to a variety of distinct hazards or the Monterrey Metropolitan Area (MMA) - Mexico’s third most popu- groups of hazards (Meerow et al., 2016). Building resilience, however, lous urban area - has built up resilience to flash floods over time, ultimately requires designing and implementing solutions on the basis through a thick and detailed description of the different historical, of available knowledge. This introduces a close connection between political and economic dimensions of resilience building and

⁎ Corresponding author. E-mail address: [email protected] (I. Aguilar-Barajas). https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envsci.2019.05.021 Received 19 August 2018; Received in revised form 19 May 2019; Accepted 23 May 2019 1462-9011/ © 2019 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. I. Aguilar-Barajas, et al. Environmental Science and Policy 99 (2019) 37–47 knowledge co-production in that city over the past several decades. The storms, e.g. Ingrid in 2013) do occur (Fig. 2). These downpours in- evidence reveals a complex resilience building process: protracted, in- variably overwhelm the city’s storm drainage system and cause loca- cremental, contingent on the city’s internal context as well the external lized, short duration problems particularly to transit. context in which the city is embedded, and conditioned by the nature of The MMA’s distance from the nearest coast (about 200 km) protects the hazard and stakeholder’s perception of the risk it poses. Moreover, it from the direct onslaught of hurricanes, but its location at the foot of knowledge co-production shows its own complexities. In particular, the range exposes it to a significant flash flood there is no guarantee that knowledge co-produced can be sustained, as hazard. Powerful hurricane remnants from the occa- it depends crucially on local social capital as well as the wider national sionally reach the region and discharge large amounts of precipitation governance architecture. within a short period of time over critical catchment areas in the From this case study, three key messages emerge. First, for me- mountains high above the city. Three to four times per century, these tropolises like Monterrey that contribute significantly to their national events result in sudden and profuse surface flows notably in the Santa economy, increasing their urban resilience to floods clearly is a matter Catarina River (Fig. 2), the MMA’s principal watercourse which crosses of national interest. Second, the case of the MMA illustrates that in- the whole urban area west to east. creasing urban resilience is an achievable goal; moreover, the process is comprehensible although its complex nature precludes simple ex- 2.3. Major flooding events: a brief historical summary planations (and hence, easy replication elsewhere). Third, beyond the five basic questions of resilience for whom, what, when, where and why Monterrey has a long history of flood-related disasters since its (Meerow et al., 2016) lie three major ones, which are often not dealt foundation over 400 years ago. The great flood of 1909 remains the with in the literature or in practice: how, at what cost and who finances. worst catastrophe in the city’s history: the Santa Catarina River burst its How is resilience achieved? For example, what is the appropriate banks and an estimated 5,000 people lost their lives (Graham, 1911). In combination of hard infrastructure (e.g. flood control dams) and soft 1938, floods curtailed transit across large swathes of the city (El Por- infrastructure (e.g. land use regulations)? How do we make sure venir, 29 August 1938). in 1967 caused flooding but knowledge co-produced in a resilience building process is sustained relatively minor damages. With Hurricane Gilbert in 1988, the Santa over time? How do we equip stakeholders with a proper understanding Catarina River again broke its banks and attained its highest-ever re- of risk, so that they come to perceive both the costs (flood damages) and corded flow (CONAGUA, 2018). An estimated 225 lives were lost and benefits (water supply) of hurricanes? Finally, how much should be the flood caused severe damages to bridges, roads and other infra- spent on resilience and who pays? Answers to the last question must structure, disrupting transit not just locally but regionally (Bitrán, involve all levels of government and society, including the private 2001; OECD, 2013b, Benavides and Lozano, 2013). Structures built on sector. the river’s margins (mostly private homes) and on the river bed itself The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the (recreational and commercial outfits) were swept away, revealing loose study area and the flood hazard it faces. Section 3 presents the con- land use regulations and enforcement (Chávez Gutiérrez, 1995; Salazar, ceptual framework and the methodologies employed. Section 4 and 2008; de León Gómez, 2009). Section 5 respectively address urban resilience up to and following the Hurricane Alex in 2010, one of the strongest storms to ever impact most recent 2010 flash flood disaster. Section 6 contains conclusions, Nuevo León and the MMA, generated torrential rains in the city. The with the major lessons learned and the way forward. river reached its second highest recorded flow (CONAGUA, 2018)- Fig. 3 provides a view of the Santa Catarina River on the day of the 2. The city, the region and the hazard event. Damages - although not as severe as the previous Gilbert disaster - significantly affected the MMA (Sisto and Ramírez-Orozco, 2015) and 2.1. The city and the San Juan River Basin resonated widely in Mexico given the city’s weight in the national economy (OECD, 2013b). 15 people lost their lives, more than 12 The Monterrey Metropolitan Area (MMA) congregates 12 munici- thousand were rescued or evacuated and over 68 thousand households palities including Monterrey, the capital of the state of Nuevo León. required emergency help (food, water, cleaning supplies and materials). Located in the San Juan River basin (a sub-basin of the Rio Bravo/Río Around 148 thousand homes were left without power and close to 400 Grande which straddles the border with the United States), the MMA thousand homes (about 1.7 million residents, i.e. 37% of total MMA draws half of its water supply from three downstream reservoirs: El population) lost access to water services (SADM, 2010a; SADM, 2010b). Cuchillo, Cerro Prieto and La Boca (Fig. 1). Mexico has exclusive rights The event caused extensive and severe damages to public infra- over the San Juan River Basin waters according to the 1944 Interna- structure: 7.8 million square meters of pavement washed away, 154 tional Water Treaty with its northern neighbor. The metropolis of 4.5 culverts obliterated, 100 bridges damaged or ruined, 54 km of piped million people is a major national economic hub and the birthplace of water lines and 45 km of sewerage lines wiped out, 1,502 schools and several of Mexico’s largest industrial and financial companies. The 211 health clinics affected at various levels (CERNL, 2013). Of en- MMA’s water services authority, Servicios de Agua y Drenaje de Mon- ormous relevance for large sectors of the population were the transit terrey (SADM) is a pioneering organization: it is one of the few in the restrictions, traffic congestion and extended daily commutes that per- developing world that provides drinking-quality tap water twenty-four sisted for several months; reduced mobility impacted more than 3,700 hours a day, seven days a week, and treats 100% of its wastewater firms (OECD, 2013b). No consensus on the monetary value of damages (Aguilar-Barajas et al. 2015). Water governance in Mexico, however, is has been reached: estimates vary between 1.35 and slightly over 2 fragmented and limited by significant inter-institutional coordination billion dollars (OECD, 2013b). A significant portion of damages to problems (Aguilar-Barajas et al., 2016; Torregrosa et al., 2015; OECD, private property occurred on land officially classified as unfit for urban 2013c). development, notably on the margins of rivers and creeks (Leal Diaz, 2012; CERNL, 2013; Barragan, 2013). In the sparsely populated upper 2.2. The hazard: moderate recurrent flooding, disastrous but infrequent reaches of the Santa Catarina river basin, significant erosion and some flash floods landslides (in part due to deforestation) resulted in a great accumula- tion of sediments downstream in the city and beyond. The MMA receives only 600 mm of rain per year on average and local creeks and rivers usually run dry or carry only minimal flows. 3. Conceptual framework Nonetheless, every 3 or 4 years intense rain showers of 100 mm or more within a 24 -h period (sometimes associated with named tropical Building urban resilience to a hazard implies a complex process,

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Fig. 1. Monterrey Metropolitan Area and San Juan River Basin (Northeast Mexico).

Fig. 2. Peak flow (Santa Catarina River) and maximum precipitation within 24 hours (MMA), 1947-2016. Source: Authors’, with observational data from CONAGUA (2018). Precipitation data was ob- tained from the Monterrey Rain Gauge. Max- imum discharge data for 1947-1988 is from the (now defunct) Monterrey Gauging Station; for 1989-2016, from the Cadereyta Gauging Sta- tion.

conditioned by stakeholders’ perception of the risk involved and cru- return to desired functions in the face of a disturbance. This involves cially dependent on their capacity to co-produce and sustain the short-term coping as well as long-term adaptation (Sharifi and knowledge required for the design and implementation of solutions. Yamagata, 2014). Urban resilience encompasses numerous and interrelated social, economic, institutional and political dimensions: “…enacting urban 3.1. Urban resilience resilience is inevitably a contested process in which diverse stake- holders are involved and their motivation, power-dynamics, and trade- ff Urban resilience as a concept is amenable to di erent disciplinary offs play out across spatial and temporal scales” (Meerow et al., 2016). ff perspectives to address a diversity of distinct hazards a ecting complex From that standpoint, “soft” socio-political infrastructure may be as urban systems (Meerow et al., 2016). In its simplest form, urban resi- relevant as “hard” physical infrastructure (Eakin et al. 2017). lience refers to the ability of an urban system to maintain or rapidly

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Fig. 3. Santa Catarina River during Hurricane Alex (July 1st, 2010). Source: realidadrxpuesta.org. (http://www.realidadexpuesta.org/2010/07/llena-huracan-alex-el-rio-santa.html). Creative Commons CC BY-NC-SA 4.0.

Urban resilience viewed as a dynamic, socio-ecological process, 1111/jfr3.12344) and the first issue of the International Water does not necessarily require a system to return to its initial equilibrium Resources Association´s Policy Brief series focusses on this theme state following a disturbance (Frommer, 2013; Barata-Salgueiro and (Hartman and Stavikova, 2018). This Brief proposes that a compre- Erkip, 2014). The ability to bounce back to a desirable state requires the hensive basin-wide approach is necessary in order to integrate three timely recovery of basic structures and crucial functions (Meerow et al., scales of flood storage strategies: in the catchment; upstream of cities; 2016). This depends on communities’ access to resources and their and, in the cities themselves. Since in all three cases affected land is organizational capacities prior to and during the occurrence of a dis- often privately owned, flood risk management should be closely linked turbance (UNISDR, 2015; UNISDR, 2017; Hallegatte et al., 2018). The to land management, paying special attention to the issue of jurisdic- emergence of innovative measures also plays a role (Miller et al., 2018). tion. The dynamic nature of urban resilience implies that policy responses Adaptive risk management requires inclusive consultation and often derive from an interrelated set of decisions, in a decision cycle communication with stakeholders. The public needs to be better in- where factors that shape initial decisions affect further decisions (Wise formed but also more educated about the implications of risk-based et al., 2014). policy scenarios (Aguilar-Barajas et al., 2015). It is not uncommon for Urban resilience analysis and policy design require a comprehensive people to ignore or be unaware of the risks they face; the combination understanding of cities as complex adaptive spatial systems (Bourne of inadequate knowledge and unfortunate choices leads to the occur- and Simmons, 1978; Friedman, 2002; Ernstson et al., 2010). Depending rence of disasters (Miller et al., 2018). From a psychological perspec- on their configuration, urban systems will show distinct capacities for tive, the likelihood of future hurricanes tends to be underestimated, the coping in the short term and adapting and improving in the long term. experience of past ones may be forgotten, but the impacts of an im- For instance, integrated flood management must link water and land minent hurricane tend to be overestimated (Shaw, 2005). People need use planning (WMO, 2009). Addressing the two as separate or rival to become “…more aware, less comfortable, and hence more reflective issues will lead to inappropriate urban development (infrastructure and about how we intervene, in word or deed, in the changing order of human settlements on land at risk of flooding) and thus increase ex- things” (Jasanoff, 2010). There is thus a direct connection between posure to risk. This issue is of particular significance in metropolitan urban resilience, risk and knowledge. areas where multiple jurisdictions often overlap.

3.3. Knowledge co-production 3.2. Adaptive risk management The design of effective resilience policies that take risk into account Urban resilience is directly related to stakeholders´ perception of require multifaceted knowledge collaboratively constructed by stake- risk and their behavior in the face of risk. There is a growing recogni- holders (Hallegatte et al., 2018). This is referred to as knowledge co- tion that adaptive management must address risk explicitly and ap- production and is essentially the result of a social process: “…knowl- propriately (WMO, 2009; UNESCO, 2012; UN, 2013; OECD, 2013a)to edge making and decision making are social activities that take place inform decision-making based on an understanding of the environment within social contexts, institutions, communities…” (Miller et al. 2010). in which risks and opportunities emerge (World Bank, 2013). The Consequently, knowledge co-production for urban resilience is open to World Economic Forum places extreme weather events, natural dis- different interpretations and normative prescriptions (Muñoz-Erickson asters and failure of climate change mitigation and adaptation in the et al. 2017). top 5 of the Global Risks Landscape (WEF, 2019). The Forum also In principle, there is a beneficial role for collaboration between the highlights the interconnectedness between these risks and their im- scientific community, government and civil society in the co-identifi- pacts, for example the risk of a water crisis and consequent disruptions cation of problems, the production of knowledge and its application to critical infrastructure and basic services. (Sarewitz and Pielke, 2007; Muñoz-Erickson et al. 2017). Co-production Land reserved for flood risk management is an emerging topic for of knowledge however is a costly activity and does not occur sponta- urban resilience. In 2018, the Journal of Flood Risk Management (Vol. neously (Jasanoff, 2010). There are several competing models of 11) published a special issue on this (https://doi.org/dx.doi.org/10. knowledge-making and governance but trusting relationships need to

40 I. Aguilar-Barajas, et al. Environmental Science and Policy 99 (2019) 37–47 be constructed and fostered (Frantzeskaki and Kabisch, 2016). The in- number of advanced technical features) was designed for a return terrelated issues of legitimacy-credibility are also linked to both science period of 10,000 years (i.e. the probability of an event surpassing the and policy making (Miller et al. 2010). dam’s capacity is only 0.01% per year); it controls about two-thirds of In the wake of a disaster, reconstruction offers multiple and rich overall flows in the river’s upper catchment area (Ramírez, 2011). opportunities to deploy more resilient alternatives and new models of The Nuevo León State Government under Governor Sócrates Rizzo institutional design (Miller et al. 2018). Reconstruction should focus on first proposed the project in 1994 – six years after the Gilbert disaster. future resilience and be inclusive, but it cannot substitute for sound Construction only began in 2002 at the end of the Fernando Canales/ prevention and preparedness measures - institutional, technical and beginning of the Fernando Elizondo administrations, and concluded in financial capacities are crucial in this regard (Hallegatte et al., 2018). 2004 at the beginning of the Natividad González administration. It took Knowledge for prevention is key for urban resilience policy. therefore 16 years and four distinct state governors for the project to materialize after the 1988 disaster (Flores Longoria and Maldonado, 4. Building urban resilience in the MMA: from Hurricane Gilbert 2009; Aguilar-Barajas et al., 2015). (1988) to Hurricane Alex (2010) Since its inauguration the dam has proved effective on several oc- casions. The first test came in 2005 with Hurricane Emily: despite co- Building resilience to floods has taken place in Monterrey since its pious precipitations of 250 mm, peak flow in the river did not surpass 3 beginnings, including the wholesale relocation of the original settle- 600 m /s (Fig. 2) and impacts in the city were modest (Salas and ment hundreds of years ago. For reasons of space and availability of Jimenez, 2014). Neither of the following two named storms (Dean in evidence, our analysis focusses on the post-Gilbert period. In the 2007 and Dolly in 2008) produced any significant peak flows or da- aftermath of that disaster, a notable process of resilience building began mages. With Hurricane Alex in 2010 the Rompe Picos dam fulfilled its 3 at both the local and national levels. State and local authorities un- original purpose: it reduced the peak flow by at least 750 m /s and dertook the construction of major preventive engineering works: a prevented flooding in downtown Monterrey and immediate surround- regulating dam upstream from the city (the Rompe Picos Dam) to ings (Ramírez, 2011; Benavides y Lozano, 2013). Without the dam, dampen peak flows in the Santa Catarina River and within the city, an peak flow in the Santa Catarina River probably would have equaled or 3 improved network of storm drains. At the national level and in the even exceeded the 4,400 m /s registered during the Gilbert event 22 countrywide context of extreme weather hazards (in particular, tropical years earlier (Ramírez, 2011; Leal Diaz, 2012). Fig. 5 presents an aerial storms), federal authorities developed an early-warning system. view of the dam (facing downstream), the day after the Alex event.

4.1. The Rompe Picos Dam (2002-2004) 4.2. The Storm Drains Project (2002-2009)

The Rompe Picos Dam, located 22 kilometers upstream of the MMA Insufficient and deficient infrastructure to collect and evacuate in the Sierra Madre Oriental mountain range (Fig. 4) was built to reg- runoff from even moderate storms had frequently created transit havoc ulate flows in the Santa Catarina River. The dam (which presents a in many parts of the MMA (Barragan, 2008; Flores Longoria and

Fig. 4. Geographical location of the Rompe Picos Regulating Dam. Source: Authors´.

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Fig. 5. The Rompe Picos Dam one day after Hurricane Alex (2 July, 2010). Source: Courtesy from the National Water Commission.

Maldonado, 2009; Leal Diaz 2012). Towards the end of the 1990s, the capabilities were incipient in Mexico. At 22:40 on September 16 1987 abundant and critical reporting on the issue (the influential local the first official bulletin about the storm was emitted; at three o’clock in newspaper El Norte played a significant role in this) reflected a wide- the morning of the following day, State Governor Treviño got a call to spread grievance among Monterrey’s residents (Canales Clariond, 2011; inform him the storm had reached the city (Benavides y Lozano, 2013). Leal Diaz, 2012). This set the stage for a solution involving several state Clearly, there was no opportunity to prepare for the contingency. actors: the Storm Drains Project. Between 1999 and 2000 the federal government’s National Agency The Project initiated in the context of a very restrictive legal, fi- for Civil Protection, with the collaboration of various universities and nancial and political environment (Canales Clariond, 2011; Aguilar- research institutions, developed and implemented Mexico’s first in- Barajas et al., 2015). The responsibility for storm runoff management at tegrated system to deal with meteorological hazards: the Tropical the time rested with the State government (Secretariat of Urban De- Early Warning System (TC-EWS). The TC-EWS was designed to velopment and Public Works) and the metropolitan municipalities, but monitor the position and intensity of hurricanes as well as coordinate none of these entities had the technical know-how or financial re- emergency procedures at the federal, state and municipal level. The sources to solve the issue. The state (and metropolitan) water and basic goals of the system were to have people move out of the path of sewerage authority (Servicios de Agua y Drenaje de Monterrey, SADM) dangerous storms in advance (a day or two) from vulnerable locations however did possess the required resources. In 2000 the state congress to safer ones, as well as to put in place emergency supplies and mate- changed SADM’s statutes to allow it to take on the Project and use its rials where potentially needed. In this way, recovery after the impact of own revenues to finance the enterprise. a would be simpler and shorter, improving the resi- In 2002, SADM personnel had identified 420 points across the city lience of communities. Following the implementation of the TC-EWS at risk of flooding from runoff (SADM, 2019). Between 2002 and 2009 nationwide, the number of fatalities associated with tropical in about 200kms of main and secondary drain collectors were laid (Fig. 6), Mexico diminished dramatically, by one or two orders of magnitude reducing by 90-93% the risk of flooding in the city’s most exposed lo- (Magaña et al., 2014) cations (SADM, 2019; Benavides y Lozano, 2013). The equivalent of In 2010 several days before the Alex event ample and continuously USD250 million was spent in the process, 80% from SADM’s internal updated information about the storm was being made available. funds and the rest paid for by the federal government. Around 1.2 Between 18:00 on June 25 and 23:00 on July 1, 53 notices on the Alex million people directly or indirectly benefited from the storm drainage Hurricane and 13 warnings for likely affected locations were emitted project (Flores Longoria and Maldonado, 2009). (CERNL, 2013). This time the city was not taken by surprise and pre- In 2007, a new state congress reversed the previous administration’s ventive civil protection measures, including evacuation of residents in initiative and devolved responsibility for storm runoff management to exposed locations and emergency transit restrictions, were put in place the state government and metropolitan municipalities. The decision in a timely fashion. The relatively low count of fatalities from Hurricane effectively left the MMA without an integral program to handle storm Alex certainly can be attributed to this. water and signaled a major step backward in the matter (Barragan, The TC-EWS obviously did not emerge in direct response to the 2013). Such a reversal illustrates clearly the difficulties in building Hurricane Gilbert disaster. Disasters of that nature had been a nation- resilience (Aguilar-Barajas et al. 2015) and the non-linearity of the wide concern well before then, and continue to be – for example, more public decision-making process (also identified in the case of Mexico than 100 people died when hit the country’s Pacific City, see Tellman et al., 2018). coast in 2013. In this case the MMA has gained resilience not through its own volition but rather as a consequence of this external context. fi ffi 4.3. The national early warning system (1999-2000) Due to a number of modi cations intended to make it more e - cient, in recent years the TC-EWS arguably has lost some effectiveness At the time of the Hurricane Gilbert disaster, early warning (Magaña et al. 2014). The National Center for Disaster Prevention

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Fig. 6. Storm water infrastructure in the Monterrey Metropolitan Area, 2019. Source: Adapted from authors, based on a map produced by SADM.

(CENAPRED) is developing a new, more sophisticated version of the storm (Flores Longoria and Maldonado, 2009; SADM, 2010b; Leal Diaz, system. The main feature of that new version will be a focus on risk and 2012; Benavides and Lozano, 2013; and CERNL 2013). The Alex dis- not solely the characteristics of the hazard. aster nonetheless revealed a significant level of social and economic vulnerability (OECD, 2013b) and in its aftermath, a new round of re- silience building initiated. 4.4. Water governance before Hurricane Alex

Prior to the Alex disaster, water governance in Mexico and the MMA 5.1. The immediate reaction to Alex did not evolve significantly: it remained fragmented between the three levels of government (federal, state and municipal) and dysfunctional The immediate reaction to the Alex disaster illustrated well the due to the lack of coordination between these actors (Aguilar-Barajas city’s store of technical capabilities. Piped water offers a case in point. et al., 2016). Meanwhile urban development proceeded with little to no As mentioned earlier, about 1.7 million inhabitants were left without regard for the region’s hydrological reality. In particular, this had led to the service (about 37% of total population). Within three days 85% of the obstruction or alteration of natural channels and the occupation of the MMA’s population had access to the service which was fully re- land exposed to flooding despite federal regulations prohibiting its use established within 15 days; at the end of July, tap water was safe to (Leal Diaz, 2012). Fig. 7 reveals, for example, how in one section of the drink again (SADM, 2010a; SADM, 2010b). Repairing the city’s ser- Santa Catarina River, the width of the channel had been dramatically iously damaged water infrastructure required concerted efforts on the reduced from 275 m to 165 m by residential development and recrea- part of the water and sewer authority; for several weeks, crews totaling tional and commercial activities. This aerial view was captured on May 2,200 workers using 300 vehicles worked around the clock. During that 13, 2009, slightly over a year before Hurricane Alex. It is noteworthy to time, SADM regularly emitted press communiques to inform the public consider that official state-level development plans at the time on the progress being made. Another example of rapid rebound was (Gobierno Constitucional del Estado de Nuevo León, 2010a) did not offered by schools: despite many installations having been damaged, refer to the concept of risk management in the face of weather hazards. children started classes in August on time after their summer holidays Moreover, the draft of the state’s first Risk Atlas (Gobierno (CERNL, 2013). Constitucional del Estado de Nuevo León, 2010b) was still under review In parallel with immediate recovery initiatives, the city promptly months after the Alex event. embarked on a collective and innovative process of collaboration among numerous institutions and sectors of society, to develop solu- tions to the substantial challenges posed by the damages from the flood. 5. Knowledge co-production and urban resilience in the aftermath Just three weeks after the disaster, the Nuevo León State Reconstruction of Hurricane Alex Council (CERNL) was formally established. With Hurricane Alex, the MMA to an extent demonstrated an in- creased resilience to floods, in the wake of the resilience building 5.2. Reconstruction: the Nuevo León State Reconstruction Council (2010- process undertaken after the 1988 Gilbert disaster. The regulating dam 2013) upstream from the city, the expanded network of storm drains within the city and enhanced early warning capacities and civil protection 5.2.1. The Council’s architecture and operation protocols, all worked to significantly limit the impacts of the 2010 The Council brought together stakeholders from the three levels of

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Fig. 7. Obstruction of the Río Santa Catarina channel (aerial view, May 13, 2009). Source: Authors’, with data from Google Earth. government as well as civil society, mainly from the city’s powerful 5.2.2. Results business sector and main universities and research centers. The state The reconstruction of transport infrastructure proceeded gradually, government tasked the Council with guiding and coordinating all re- as damages to the city’s two main east-west arteries that follow the construction efforts. Ten work committees were created to handle a course of the river (Constitución on the north bank and Morones Prieto on wide range of issues: 1) Design and management of a Reconstruction the south bank), as well as bridges over the river connecting the north Master Plan and Information System; 2) Financing and transparency; 3) and south sides of the city, were extensive. These arteries are funda- Meteorological risks and water works; 4) Logistics, roadways and mo- mental for mobility in the MMA and also play an important economic bility; 5) Educational infrastructure; 6) Housing and urban planning; 7) role in the regional transport network linking the MMA to national Aid for vulnerable households; 8) Economic recovery; 9) Health; and, markets and . Reconstruction of these arteries and bridges natu- 10) Communications. Each committee was to interact with several rally constituted one of the main and most important tasks of the federal, state and municipal departments and agencies (CERNL, 2013). Council. The Council soon faced face coordination challenges (CERNL, The new infrastructure put in place, offered significant improve- 2013). In the Mexican context, such problems are not uncommon and ments over what the flood had destroyed in terms functionality, capa- derive from the country’s fragmented water governance architecture city and robustness to withstand future floods (Sisto and Ramírez- (Aguilar-Barajas, 2016; Torregrosa et al., 2015; OCDE, 2013c). Co- Orozco, 2015); for example, elevated bridges replaced the old culverts ordination among the three levels of governments itself proved difficult that had been washed away. Nonetheless, it later became apparent that and the process surrounding the financing and contracting of public the two rebuilt arteries lacked su fficient storm drains: in 2013, large works, convoluted. In particular, access to funds from the FONDEN pools of water formed in several sections when Hurricane Ingrid (Fondo Nacional de Desastres Naturales), a federal entity created in 1996 dumped copious amounts of rain over the city. State authorities ad- to provide financial help to states and municipalities affected by natural mitted the flaw present in the new infrastructure but argued that the disasters (OECD, 2013b), was sluggish. reconstruction budget had not permitted to do more. Since then, people The following illustrates the previous points. When SADM com- have come to expect water problems on the new roads whenever it rains pleted the reconstruction of the water and sewerage infrastructure af- hard. fected by the storm, it could not proceed and carry out maintenance In July 2013, three years after the Alex event, the Council disbanded work on the Rompe Picos Dam because of the poor state of the access after presenting its final report – cited here as CERNL (2013). That road (CERNL, 2013). The federal communications and transport min- document reported 5,523 actions completed (99.5% of the list of ac- istry, responsible for the rehabilitation of that access road, could not tions contemplated initially) and estimated total reconstruction ex- begin work as FONDEN had not released the required funds. The same penses at 16.9 billion pesos (approximately USD$1.3 billion). In terms ministry also complained that reinforcing riverbanks was being made of funding, 62% originated from federal sources and 38% from state difficult by the lack of progress on the part of the federal water au- sources. In terms of spending, 28% of expenses were exercised by fed- thority as well as the Nuevo León sustainable development secretariat. eral authorities - nearly all of this went to hydraulic works – and 72% Meanwhile, work on rectifying the course of the Santa Catarina River were exercised by state authorities. In that case, nearly all was spent on came to a halt when engineers realized that the data made available by road works and urban infrastructure; less than 5% of state authorities’ the federal statistical agency (INEGI) did not meet the spatial resolution expenses went to education, housing, health and the environment. requirements previously established (Ramírez, 2011). In order to pro- Reconstruction expenses amounted to 1.83% of the 2010 state Gross ceed, new data had to be generated through reconnaissance flights over Domestic Product (OECD, 2013b) – note that more than 90% of the the river, which had not been originally planned or budgeted for. state’s economic activity takes place in the MMA. The considerable sums involved motivated many instances of rivalry, bickering, or worse. For the duration of the reconstruction period, the state and federal

44 I. Aguilar-Barajas, et al. Environmental Science and Policy 99 (2019) 37–47 administrations belonged to two distinct, antagonistic political parties. expression of this. So is the absence, more than 8 years after the 2010 Roadside billboards proliferated at reconstruction sites to inform mo- Hurricane Alex disaster, of a plan to build the additional regulating dam torists and passers-by which authority (state or federal) was in charge. recommended by the Nuevo León State Reconstruction Council in 2013. In the rush to deliver projects, norms and rules (technical, legal and The previous exemplifies how some of the knowledge co-produced financial) were violated, in some cases leading up to abuse and cor- in the wake of the 2010 disaster seems to have been, if not lost, at least ruption (Leal Diaz, 2012). temporarily forgotten. How to ensure the conservation and continued The reconstruction process nonetheless proved successful overall development of this knowledge raises important questions. At a and fairly rapid. This achievement can be credited in part to the work of minimum, this should be an explicit objective of a permanent state the reconstruction Council but also to the general social environment development strategy. The experience of the Council may be of great that characterizes the MMA. Monterrey has a history of entrepreneur- value in this regard, especially the institutionalization of its major re- ship, innovation and public-private collaboration. This has enabled the commendations. The continuous updating of the Risk Atlas is another city to overcome the multiple challenges described earlier, beginning example of what could be done. with the Council’s creation and operation. Monterrey’s experience il- The city’s cultural and socioeconomic context has abetted its resi- lustrates well the complex nature of building urban resilience: multiple, lience building process. The immediate reaction to the 2010 disaster varied stakeholders engaged in a web of intricate (and sometimes revealed the city’s capacity to quickly recover essential functions fol- contradictory) relationships within a rich multi-layered context, with lowing a major disturbance and the prompt creation of the Council, its outcomes that do not lend themselves to simple explanations. ability to innovate. The relatively rapid and effective reconstruction of the city and the significant work of the Council during that period also 5.3. Legacy: the Council’s main recommendations reflected that local context - examples of effective multi-stakeholder working groups in Mexico such as the Council are to say the least, not Knowledge produced within the Council was presented in a sys- common. Monterrey’s tradition of industry, commerce, higher educa- tematic and ordered fashion in its final report. The main takeaways in tion and cooperation between the business community and local au- terms of recommendations for increasing resilience to floods consisted thorities, has produced an environment that has enabled resilience in: to build an additional regulating dam in the upper Santa Catarina building. Nonetheless, the institutional capital and knowledge built up River Basin to complement the existing Rompe Picos Dam (arguably, in the aftermath the disaster have begun to dissipate to an extent. Most two or more additional dams would be of use); to relocate people living of the recommendations formulated by the reconstruction Council have in areas at risk of inundation and impede their return (i.e. to enforce not translated into concrete action, with the exception of the proposal existing federal land use laws); to reform and simplify existing regula- to reforest the upper Santa Catarina River basin. The MMA Water Fund tions on the operations of FONDEN as well as procedures for public (FAMM) currently undertaking reforestation work upstream from the works contracts (i.e. to cut red tape); and to reforest the upper basin of city is a notable example of the MMA’s currently dampened but con- the Santa Catarina River to limit runoff downstream and into the city. tinuing resilience building process. The MMA Water Fund created for that specific purpose, which gathered The wider external political and administrative context in which the stakeholders from government, the private sector, academia and civil city is embedded has made varied contributions. On the one hand, the society in general, has been working systematically on this issue. In weak national water governance architecture (understood as the whole 2016 the Fund purchased 1,200 hectares of land for reforestation in the social apparatus through which decisions are made) has hampered the upper basin and currently in 2018, is in the process of acquiring an coordination of stakeholders’ actions in the aftermath of the 2010 dis- additional 1,000 hectares. aster and limited the extent of improvements to infrastructure. On the Towards the end of its mandate, the Council at the invitation of the other hand, the national early warning system implemented after state government participated in the creation of a new state Strategic Hurricane Gilbert saved dozens of lives in the city in the 2010 disaster. Planning law. A new council for Strategic Planning was also estab- Monterrey has also benefited from the federal government’s financial lished. The purpose of that civil-governmental body was to craft de- contribution to reconstruction – a sound investment for the country as a velopment policies and monitor their application. Out of this came out whole given the city’s strategic importance for the Mexican economy. the state’s first Strategic Plan for 2015-2030 (CNLPE, 2015). This Plan The MMA’s history of damages from storms shows that more than surprisingly barely mentions risks from weather hazards such as hur- “natural disasters” these events are the consequences of inadequate ricanes and makes no reference to the knowledge produced during the prevention, poor land use planning and insufficient resilience (Leal years of the Council’s operation. This illustrates that knowledge about Diaz, 2012; Zuñiga and Magaña, 2018). In the Mexican context, urban building urban resilience does not simply accumulate over time and land use patterns are the result of complex social, economic, institu- may even be lost. tional and political processes involving a multiplicity of actors, at times The city to this day still faces significant risk from large storms of antagonistic. The current legal framework where federal regulations the Gilbert or Alex category. Fig. 8 presents areas in the city’s down- prohibit development on riverbanks but local authorities manage their town currently classified at risk of flooding from urban runoff (dots) own urban development plans and administer construction permits and from the river overflowing (light shaded areas), considering a re- does not help, but the solution to this conundrum requires more than turn period of 1,000 years. Clearly the process of building resilience has simple regulatory changes. Appropriate mechanisms for effective en- not reached completion, but more than eight years after the Alex dis- forcement of existing regulations are needed. Political rivals must rea- aster, complacency appears to be taking hold. lize that urban resilience is a necessity that transcends any particular agenda, and collaborate towards finding solutions. The public at large 6. Conclusions: lessons learned and the way forward also bears responsibility: people need to appreciate the rationale for land use regulations and act accordingly. The MMA has built a degree of resilience to floods through a com- Torrential rains and floods pose obvious risks for the MMA but also plex process - drawn out, incremental and non-linear. This process has present significant benefits. In the region’s relatively dry climate, ex- been conditioned in part by the nature of the hazard the city faces: the ceptional rains help replenish reservoirs and aquifers that provide water infrequency of catastrophic floods has shaped stakeholders’ perception to the city. For example, in mid-2013 after a prolonged dry spell re- of the risk, fostering complacency and adversely affecting risk man- serves in the MMA’s three reservoirs reached below 20% of their agement decisions. The 16-year delay after the 1988 Hurricane Gilbert combined capacity; the city was on the brink of a water crisis when disaster in implementing the city’s foremost element of preventive re- Hurricane Ingrid fortuitously appeared to replenish reserves (Sisto et al. silience infrastructure - the upstream regulating dam - is a clear 2016). In a future where the MMA has reached a high level of resilience

45 I. Aguilar-Barajas, et al. Environmental Science and Policy 99 (2019) 37–47

Fig. 8. Areas at risk of flooding risk, Downtown Monterrey (return period of 1,000 years). Note: areas at risk of flooding from urban runoff (dots) and from the river proper (light shaded areas). Source: Authors’, based on Atlas de Riesgos AMM (2019). to storms and hurricanes, these should come to be perceived as bene- Systems. 2 (2), 2–7 ISSN: 2571-628X. ficial. Resilience and water security are in this way intimately linked for Barata-Salgueiro, T., Erkip, F., 2014. Retail planning and urban resilience: an introduc- – fi tion to the special issue. Cities 36, 107 111. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cities.2013. the MMA and stakeholders will need to re ne their perception of risk 01.007. and risk management with a view “…to mitigate the losses and improve Barragan, J.I., 2008. Hacia una política integral del Suelo Urbano para la Región the benefits that people experience when they face risk and opportu- Metropolitana de Monterrey”. Rizoma – Revista de Cultura Urbana, No. 10, pp. 22–26 …” fi October-December. nity (World Bank, 2013). This shift in perception would require, rst Barragan, J.I., 2013. El gran drenaje…que Monterey no tiene. El Horizonte, October, 17th, and foremost, educating stakeholders on the multifaceted issues in- 2013. (accessed 14.03.2019. http://www.elhorizonte.mx/local/el-gran-drenaje- volved and the advantages of preventive, integral risk management que-monterrey-no-tiene/854728. over a reactive, emergency-based approach. This shared knowledge and Benavides, H., Lozano, J.D.L., 2013. Huracán Gilberto 25 años después. Voces y prota- gonistas (Hurricane Gilbert 25 years after. Voices and Leading Actors. Mutimedios, understanding would facilitate the building and sustaining of a social Grupo Milenio, Monterrey, N.L. consensus on policy, including the necessity of adopting a broad urban- Bitrán, D., 2001. Características del impacto socioeconómico de los principales desastres regional system scale that links explicitly urban resilience to flash ocurridos en México en el período 1980-99. Serie. Impacto socioeconómico de los fl desastres en México. Centro Nacional de Prevención de Desastres, Mexico City, oods with water supply security. Informed risk-taking, including the Secretaria de Gobernación ISBN: 970-628-592-X. analysis of the consequences of making or not making a given decision, Bobrow, D.B., Dryzek, J.S., 1987. Policy Analysis by Design. University of Pittsburgh should be the guiding policy principle. Press, Pittsburgh, P.A. Bourne, L.S., Simmons, J.W., 1978. Systems of Cities: Readings on Structure, Growth and Ultimately, this speaks to policy by design as proposed in Bobrow and Policiy. Oxford University Press, New York, pp. 565. Dryzek (1987). The concept implies a strong and wide shared knowl- Canales Clariond, F., 2011. Sí se puede. Crónica de un cambio. D.F., Grijalbo, México. edge base - which often includes contending frames of reference – and a CERNL, 2013. Juntos Reconstruyendo Nuevo León. Memorias del Consejo Estatal para la Reconstrucción de Nuevo León. Gobierno de la República and Gobierno del Estado de deep relationship between policy and politics. Policy by design relates Nuevo León, Monterrey, N.L Unpublished Document. directly to a given policy context. Viewed in this light the specificities of Chávez Gutiérrez, J., 1995. El Sistema Hidráulico. G. Garza Villarreal (coord.), Atlas de the MMA discussed in this paper must matter a great deal in the crafting Monterrey. Gobierno del Estado de Nuevo León, UANL, INSEUR and COLMEX, Monterrey, San Nicolás de los Garza, and Mexico City, pp. 215–222. of future urban resilience policy. A proper understanding of adaptive CNLPE, 2015. Plan Estratégico para el Estado de Nuevo León 2015-2030. Consejo Nuevo risk management should be at the heart of this design. 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