United States Institute of Peace Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Iraq/Afghanistan Provincial Reconstruction Teams: Lessons Learned
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United States Institute of Peace Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Iraq/Afghanistan Provincial Reconstruction Teams: Lessons Learned Interview #1 Interviewed by: Edward Marks Interview date: August 25, 2009 Copyright 2009 USIP & ADST EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Participant’s Understanding of the PRT Mission Originally the mission was undefined. At first the mission involved just reporting on local developments but over time the mission definition evolved to exercising an influence in the area of operations, helping to implement U.S. foreign policy on the ground, and making the government of Afghanistan more functional at the district and provincial level. While no formal strategy for the PRTs was ever issued, the ISAF International Security Assistance Force Handbook was useful. Relationship with Local Nationals Observations: Excellent in Helmand and Ghor province. Americans have a very good reputation in Afghanistan, dating back decades to the 1940s with the work of American development/aid officers. Insights: Social interaction in the traditional manner, regular office visits, long luncheons and dinners, were important. Length of time on the ground was crucial to developing this interaction, and it was important that PRT officers returned hospitality. Lessons: Adequate representational allowance was important, and somewhat lacking; upwards of $10,000 annually per officer would be optimal. Local staff can be vital; lack of funds to hire them is a limitation. Longer tours are important for developing effective interaction with local nationals. Did the PRT Achieve its Mission? (Impact) Observations: Little was achieved up to 2009. The biggest achievement was maintaining and then expanding the areas of security in Helmand province. There has also been progress in bringing and coordinating Afghan resources to expand the security zones around the population centers in Helmand province. 1 Insights: Civilian leadership and adequate resources were the key to success in this British run area. Lessons: Civilian leadership is key: “The military-led PRTs are destined for the history bin.” Overall Strategy for Accomplishing the PRT Mission (Planning) Observations: There was no overall strategy for a long-time, but one is evolving. The Afghan National Development Strategy and the ISAF Handbook are useful. Insights: Officers on the ground, in the PRTs, would use the Development Strategy and the Handbook as general guidelines, as no formal overall strategy existed. Generally the approach was to seek the possible as time was critical so “you can’t shoot for the gold plated standard, you’ve got to shoot for what can get us to the next level.” Lessons: Only some of the local officials had the capability to understand and pursue their own government’s national strategy. Interaction and coordination among the foreign community (various military and official civilians, NGOs) was often lacking. Even if national strategy were more robust, it is important to create local coordination and planning boards. Furthermore, some discretionary funds are necessary. What Worked Well and What Did Not? (Operations) Observations: What worked well - Military implementation/operations worked well when under civilian control. Civilian subject matter experts were very successful. Traditional diplomatic representation conducted along local lines. Local development projects to meet local needs (roads, airport, government office facilities, etc). Local planning boards. Relations with the Embassy (the PRT oversight) were excellent and collegial. What did not work well - American civilians in PRTs were inadequately resourced for office facilities, local staff, and representation. Relations with ISAF were unproductive. Other Comments: The State Department has been remiss in exerting control over policy and strategy and in providing adequate funding. In the absence of civilian control and management (i.e. State), “the DOD will step in and do what it thinks it knows it’s doing, but it’s usually not right and then you have not good things happening out there. There are certain things in this field that have got to be controlled by the civilian efforts, otherwise there’s serious trouble ahead.” 2 The U.S. model is still the model from 2003 and is out of date. The British brought in contractors who had worked in the Balkans and Iraq and based them in the PRT while the U.S. PRTs were limited to USG personnel with relatively short tours and constant rotation. Dedicated transport and security details are crucial; civilians in the PRTs cannot depend upon adequate military support for either. State Department support for local staff and facilities is inadequate. Notes: Interviewee was about to return to his third one-year tour in an Afghanistan PRT; his comments clearly reflected his long time on the ground – especially as compared to others. His experience was in British-run PRTs with their civilian-led organization. THE INTERVIEW Q: Let’s start with the basics. What is your understanding of the PRT mission in Afghanistan? A: I’d say it’s changed in the couple years I’ve been there. Initially, when I arrived in May of 2007, they said, “Here’s your helmet and flak jacket, here’s where you’re going. Go out there and tell us what’s going on!” The mission was that vague. Fortunately, before that I had gotten a copy of what was called the ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) Handbook, which actually explained ISAF’s mission over there - to help stand up a functional government of Afghanistan in control of its own territory. So you’re able to train yourself about what the larger mission was. But I would say as time has evolved, the understanding of the PRT mission has become more about not just reporting what’s happening but actually having an influence in your area of operations to fulfill that ISAF mission. I would come up to the office on several occasions in Kabul and say, “You just don’t want us to report on stuff up there, you want us to roll up our sleeves and get our hands dirty and make things move forward here ” and they would say, “Well, if you think you can, go ahead.” They don’t tell us no. I would say now the mission of the PRT has evolved. You’re a functional officer. You’re helping implement U.S. foreign policy on the ground, to get the government of Afghanistan, at the district and provincial level, more functional, across the board. Q: At the beginning, it was a less defined operation but more of a reporting function? A: It wasn’t defined whatsoever. It was simply “Go out and tell us what’s going on, both good and bad.” My first assignment, two months in Ghor province, mostly was good. Ghor was just poor and needed development assistance. In July of ’07, when I moved to 3 Helmand, things still weren’t that bad, but you knew additional resources were needed to fulfill the ISAF mission, to help the government get functional. The operation had to change to actually make progress on the ground. Q: When you left the last time, or near the end, you say the mission had changed? How formally had it changed? Did you have written instructions? Were there guidelines coming out? And were they coming from where? A: That’s been the problem. It’s still not formal enough. It’s largely still personality driven. My title is still PRT officer. That’s a very vague title. I still am rated as a State Department political officer, with a very embassy-centric job description. Very little of that equates with my actual job at the provincial reconstruction team. That’s bad. The good point is it’s vague enough that it allows the go-getters, the self starters to get down to the PRT and informally take hold of many different aspects. In Helmand I took over the whole rule of law and police mentor training coordination cell simply because there was no one else to do it. I took it upon myself. I had a very good USAID officer, so he took over most of the development and then on the political stuff, which was my day to day job, I did that, but I assumed more and more responsibility, simply because there weren’t other officers to do it and we weren’t told to do it. But you understood on the ground you needed to do this to get the government functional. Q: You’re saying you were doing this down on the ground? What about PRT leadership? Were they telling you to do it, inferring you should do it, ordering you to do it? A: In Ghor province, which was led by the Lithuanian PRT, the leadership was Lithuanian and had Croatian and Danish members. First of all, none of them had seen the ISAF Handbook, and when I pulled it out and said, “Well, here’s the mission statement which we can all work towards, we don’t have to overcomplicate this,” there really wasn’t the kind of long term expertise to have a cohesive, coordinated effort to help get development started across Ghor province. After I kind of assumed control, we found out we actually had quite a few funds in Ghor province to do small scale development. In Helmand, which is a British-led PRT and has been since May 2006, there is British leadership there and it’s a civilian-run PRT, but they’ve been refining their status. Originally they had seven to eight officers. Now I think they’re up to close to eighty or ninety officers, that is, civilian officers with military embeds. It is the largest PRT in the country and they are still experimenting with the formula. And what I’ve been able to do as the only U.S.