The NGO Safety Office Issue: 03 May 16th - 31st 2008

ANSO and our donors accept no liability for the results of any activity conducted or omitted on the basis of this report. THE ANSO REPORT -Not for copy or sale-

Inside this Issue COUNTRY SUMMARY Central Region 2 A record number of Southern Region 5 425 406 AOG initiated attacks 400 8 375 Eastern Region 350 were reported in May 318 325 300 10 (the highest on record). 300 Western Region 275 Factors contributing to 250 Northern Region 12 225 218 this include: surging 200 188 14 175 ANSO Info Page AOG activity in Ghazni, 150 125 Paktika, Zabul and Kan- 100 dahar City in the south; 75 YOU NEED TO KNOW 50 the escalation in fighting 25 0 JAN FEB MAR APR MAY • Record number of AOG in Kunar in the east; and attacks recorded this substantial increases in 2006 2007 2008 month. AOG activity in Logar and Wardak in the Central Region. • Attacks continue against NGOs in . Although AOG attacks are at a record high, information received during this report- ing period suggest that worse is still to come. The peace agreement in Pakistan has • High abduction risk and now freed-up hundreds of fighters and some Taliban commanders have AOG actions in Ghazni already publicly stated their intent to focus on Afghanistan. • Ongoing threat to NSP Most provinces bordering Pakistan are already seeing high infiltration rates and the staff in the south and effects of this AOG migration will no doubt drive AOG attack rates to new record southeast of the country. heights in the coming months.

ANSO is supported by

NGO DATA & TRENDS

8 , 1 6 % 1 0 , 2 0 %

7 , 1 4 %

1 0 , 2 0 %

8 , 1 6 % 7 , 1 4 %

CENTRAL EAST SOUTH WEST NORTH NORTH-EAST

This graph shows the number and percentage of NGO incidents by Region to date. It demonstrates clearly that NGOs are affected relatively equally in every region. THE ANSO REPORT Page 2

NGO Incidents KABUL Year to Date 4 20 This Report Period 0 So far this year, the number of 15 total AOG incidents in Kabul itself was low, and most reports province is more than double that seemed to be a recirculation of 10 previous warnings rather than of the first five months of last 5 year, with Kabul city overwhelm- new threats. ingly the locus. We anticipate a Notably, in May there were two 0 JAN FEB MAR APR MAY steep increase in security incidents suicide attacks (one vehicle-borne, in the coming month. one body-borne) targeting inter- AOG ACG The general threat level is up, es- national military forces. These are pecially in Kabul city. This is re- the first suicide attacks we have for the government and asking questions flected primarily by the antici- recorded in the city since Decem- about international staff. (These are separate pated climb in incidents. Reports ber, and the threat of such attacks from known government visits.) of planned AOG attacks against is likely to remain in the coming Unless more information becomes available, westerners, police, and security months. these incidents will remain suspicious and forces occurred, but threat traffic The trend in Kabul continues to may evidence plans to target NGO in the suggest that military forces are the future. KEY THREATS & CONCERNS primary target, and NGO, thus !"Attacks against high profile targets far, are not directly threatened. !"IED and rocket attacks That said, there are unresolved cases in which NGO have been !"Suicide attacks against military visited by people claiming to work

NGO Incidents KAPISA KAPISA Year to Date 1 20 This Report Period 1 Intensive military and police op- 15 erations in April may have helped Nijrab and especially Tagab dis- reduce the AOG presence in tricts have the highest AOG pres- 10 ence and consequently are the Kapisa this month, as security 5 incidents were down in May com- main battle areas for AOG and pared to March and April. security forces. These districts 0 should be considered unsafe for JAN FEB MAR APR MAY Given Kapisa’s strategic impor- NGO operations. NGO working tance as an AOG staging area for in Mahmud Raqi report no nota- AOG ACG attacks in Kabul, the current lull is ble security problems, and that likely temporary. district appears relatively safe for night letter warning them to stop opera- NGO activity. tions. Though a definitive source has not KEY THREATS & CONCERNS The only direct NGO threat so been identified, this appears to have been !"Attacks, especially in Tagab and the work of someone with personal griev- Nijrab far this year occurred during this ance rather than an AOG-related threat. !"Spread of attacks to schools reporting period. An INGO working in Kohistan received a

NOTICE: Your input is invaluable for the production of this report. While we appreciate information on incidents, we also need general information on the security situation in your area. So please remember to call or email us regularly. THE ANSO REPORT Page 3

NGO Incidents PARWAN PARWAN Year to Date 2 This Report Period 0 10

Parwan maintains its typical stand- 8 ing as the safest of Kabul’s central to NGO operations in Parwan 6 region border provinces. However can still be considered low. the past month saw AOG activity Ghorban warrants extra caution 4 in the districts of Chaharikar, due to this month’s incident spike. 2 Siagard, Salang, and especially Kohi Safi, given its border with 0 JAN FEB MAR APR MAY Ghorban. While incidents are up the troubled in Ka- compared to last year, the threat bul Province and Tagab district in AOG ACG Kapisa, is another area that has KEY THREATS & CONCERNS the potential for problems. How- !"Security and poppy eradication ever, for the few NGO that do likely targets will be military/police forces operations in Kohi Safi have operations in Kohi Safi, any conducting security and poppy eradication !"AOG presence in Ghorban current threat is indirect, as the operations in the area.

NGO Incidents

BAMYAN Year to Date 1 10 This Report Period 0 Bamyan has not experienced any 8 notable AOG activity since March old ordinances uncovered during 6 de-mining operations in the area. when a PRT and international 4 military vehicle were struck by Criminal incidents are relatively 2 IEDs. Last week the discovery of high in the province. Though these typically pose little threat to 0 land mines in JAN FEB MAR APR MAY was reported. But these are likely NGO, armed highway robbery is a concern. ANSO-recorded rob- AOG ACG beries since January are up com- KEY THREATS & CONCERNS pared to last year. By the end of !"Armed robbery along roadways May 2007 we had only one re- six incidents, only one of which has occurred corded armed highway robbery. in the last month. So far in 2008, we have recorded

NGO Incidents DAYKONDI

DAYKUNDI Year to Date 0 10 This Report Period 0 Information from Daykundi re- 8 But these appear to have been mains extremely limited. Last 6 week, there were reports of erroneous. Until additional infor- 4 planned Taliban attacks in Nili. mation is available we believe our previous assessment of Daykundi 2 remains valid— i.e the northern KEY THREATS & CONCERNS 0 part of is be- JAN FEB MAR APR MAY !"AOG infiltration in Kiti, Gizrab, and Kajran lieved to be safe and the south AOG ACG !"Low security force presence (Kiti, Gizrab, and Kajran) unsta- ble. THE ANSO REPORT Page 4

NGO Incidents LOGAR Year to Date 2 LOGAR This Report Period 0 20

AOG incidents in Logar this year 15 began with two in January, dipped The declining percentage of in- to one in February, then climbed crease each month compared to 10 last year is a promising trend that steeply over the next three 5 months to around 20 in May. This will hopefully continue. Even so, June will likely see an increase in 0 pattern virtually mirrors the same JAN FEB MAR APR MAY time last year, though with inci- incidents over this month. dents up roughly 140% in March, Two threats currently stand out as AOG ACG 60% in April, and 12% in May possible problems. One is a report compared to last year. (unconfirmed) that AOG are planning to take over the District May. Either threat could destabilize Logar Centre in Kerwan (southwest even further and increase the risk for NGO KEY THREATS & CONCERNS Logar) in the near future. The operations. This particular danger dimin- ishes quickly with time, and it is promising !"Collateral damage from attacks on other is the ultimate reaction to security forces/police the killing of a mullah during mili- that as of this writing we have heard of no !"Abduction tary operations by international violent incidents related to either threat. forces, which occurred on 26

NGO Incidents WARDAK

WARDAK Year to Date 0 35 This Report Period 0 30 As expected AOG incidents 25 climbed in May, more than dou- With the exception of the west/ 20 northwest districts of Markazi 15 bling the number of incidents in 10 April. The incident types are a Bihsud and Hisa-i-awali, almost entire province has recently been 5 mixed bag of IED, small arms, 0 and rocket attacks typically di- impacted by AOG activity, espe- JAN FEB MAR APR MAY cially in the eastern areas of Nirk, rected at military and police forces AOG ACG during travel. Maydan Shah, and Sayadabad. Last month, with the emergence of threats against schools and still pose a significant threat to activities of NSP projects, groups outside of their choosing. So while NGO have not KEY THREATS & CONCERNS the usual security targets appeared been targeted, the AOG presence coupled !"Steep increase in AOG incidents to face increase risk of becoming with the potential for collateral damage from !"Collateral damage from AOG AOG targets. There has been no frequent AOG-security force clashes makes attacks and clashes with security further evidence of such threats Wardak extremely risky for NGO opera- forces recently. While the reason for this tions, and the level of risk is anticipated to is not known, it is likely that AOG increase in the coming months.

CENTRAL REGION NGO DIRECT INCIDENTS 2008

WARDAK LOGAR PARWAN

KAPISA KABUL DAYKONDI BAMYAN

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NGO Incidents

KANDAHAR Year to Date 6 60

This Report Period 0 50

Recent reports indicate that in- 40 creased numbers of AOG are mi- cidents (to include successful detonation, premature, and pre- 30 grating into multiple districts of 20 Kandahar with the intent of carry- vented) reported from within occur within 10 ing out offensive operations 0 against national and international Kandahar City limits. This figure JAN FEB MAR APR MAY is compelling and clearly indicates military forces. The most compel- AOG ACG ling of these reports suggest that a that AOG elements not only group is intent on carrying out freely exercise a considerable level direct actions within Kandahar freedom of action (likely borne City itself. While the veracity of out of a sense of security), but Along with this, criminality continues to be an this report cannot be confirmed, also suggests some level of sup- issue affecting the security within Kandahar regular attacks against ANP units port from the local population, City with three separate incidents of armed stationed within the city, frequent though this may be less complicit robbery during this reporting period. The suicide attacks, as well as IED than it appears and instead a result prevalence of this issue has not gone unno- trend analysis indicates that AOG of intimidation and fear of repri- ticed by the populace with dissatisfaction cul- elements insitu already enjoy a sal. While the primary targets of minating in a peaceful demonstration on the significant level of freedom of these devices remain security 25th of May. A large group of local shopkeep- movement and action. IED forces and GoA installations and ers gathered to protest the levels of serious placement patterns from across personnel, the prevalence of this crime in the city and demanded resolution the province indicate that an esti- threat suggest it does pose some from the local government and security forces. mated 30% of all IED related in- form of risk to NGO staff, Though no NGO have been affected by this though further analysis is required threat as of yet, they nonetheless need to be KEY THREATS & CONCERNS to understand how this may affect cognizant of crime and their vulnerabilities to !"IED within Kandahar city limits activities and what mitigation it and continue to implement policies and pro- !"Abduction threat strategies are available. cedures designed to limit staff risk levels. !"Increase migration of AOG

NGO Incidents ZABUL ZABUL Year to Date 0 25 This Report Period 0 Unlike other provinces within the 20 operational tempo in Zabul SR, Zabul AOG activity trends 15 continue to be reported at levels peaked in May of last year with well below those from 2007. The 2008 developing in similar fash- 10 past two months have accounted ion. This month reports the high- 5 est incident levels for the year for an average 50% decrease over 0 last years monthly totals for AOG thus far, though still below those JAN FEB MAR APR MAY reported from 2007. Though Za- initiated events, something that AOG ACG can be at least partially attributed bul has been mostly unaffected by the widespread increase in volatil- to force migration to neighbour- population dominating reporting. The overall ing Ghazni and attrition resulting ity region wide, at present it is too early to assess how the situation security situation within Zabul is assessed as from previous security force op- volatile and as such is considered high risk for erations. In addition, the AOG will develop in the mid to long term. Incident composition con- NGO activities. KEY THREATS & CONCERNS tinues relatively unchanged this !"Abduction threat along Hwy 1 reporting period with roadside !"AOG checkpoints IED, small scale ambushes against security forces, and intimidation !"Roadside IED measures taken against the local THE ANSO REPORT Page 6

NGO Incidents HELMAND HELMAND Year to Date 0 50 This Report Period 0 While the overall suicide attack 40 trends are down country wide this tions) has already been reached. 30 With recent reporting indicating year, Helmand remains one prov- 20 ince unaffected by this reality. As that further suicide assets have 10 witnessed last year, AOG ele- been deployed to the SR (with a high probability many deploying 0 ments within Helmand continue JAN FEB MAR APR MAY to utilise body borne suicide at- to Helmand), as well as the fact tacks with a singular regularity and that monthly incident volumes are AOG ACG intent, with a specific focus on averaging 55% higher over those targeting GoA and security ele- reported last year, it is likely that tion as a result of the regular clashes between ments within Lashkar Gah (thus Helmand will continue to be an the opposing forces, along with discontent far accounting for half of all inci- aberration and suicide attack lev- over civilian casualties, has resulted in one dents reported alone). By end- els will continue unabated, meet- demonstration thus far, an event that will likely May this year, a full 63% of 2007 ing or surpassing 2007 figures. recur as no short to mid term conclusion to totals (totals to include successful, NGO are advised to continue these operations appears likely at present. premature, and prevented detona- minimising their exposure to this NGO are advised to cease all activities and threat by limiting their presence movements within this district. at, or in the vicinity of, security Helmand is assessed as volatile and unstable KEY THREATS & CONCERNS and governance facilities. !"Ongoing military operations in and as such is considered high risk for NGO Garmser The military operations in Garm- activities. !"Increased suicide attack threat ser are an ongoing issue affecting !"Roadside IED threat provincial wide stability. The dis- location of the local civil popula-

NGO Incidents PAKTIKA PAKTIKA Year to Date 1 30

This Report Period 0 25

There have been no updates re- 20 garding the fate of the INGO were well below those reported 15 staff member kidnapped on the from 2007, since April AOG initi- 10 3rd of April in the Urgon District. ated events have been 40-45% While the NGO had been previ- higher per month when compared 5 to the previous year. 0 ously contacted by the AOG re- JAN FEB MAR APR MAY sponsible and their demands were AOG elements continue attempts outlined, the negotiations are to influence the local population AOG ACG presently ongoing. through acts of intimidation, with are widespread, with the incidents being re- Though AOG activity levels dur- three separate incidents occurring ported from three separate districts, suggest- ing the opening months of 2008 during this reporting period which included the execution of a pri- ing that the AOG presence continues to be vate construction company em- diffuse with no significant concentration KEY THREATS & CONCERNS ployee, a case of arson against a points, something previously identified in !"IED attacks against security school, and the discovery of 2 2007 trend analysis forces executed ANP officers who had The security situation is assessed as volatile !" Abduction threat previously been abducted. As and as such is considered high risk for NGO !"Attacks against IMF convoys with other AOG activities within activities. this province, these occurrences THE ANSO REPORT Page 7

NGO Incidents GHAZNI GHAZNI Year to Date 1 60 This Report Period 1 The steady and dramatic upsurge 50 in AOG activity within this prov- 40 ince that began in the opening The abduction incident on the 30 weeks of May continued this re- 29th of May of two national 20 porting period. Ghazni has INGO staff members in the 10 eclipsed other provinces with well (along with a 0 established levels of volatility local leader) during a planned JAN FEB MAR APR MAY (such as neighbouring Zabul), meeting at a project location AOG ACG marking an estimated 45% in- marks the first NGO related secu- crease in incidents in comparison rity incident reported for 2008. May, further highlights the pervasiveness of between April and May. While While 2007 noted multiple NGO this threat within Ghazni at present and indi- this can be partially attributed to related kidnapping incidents cates a singular intent to identify relevant indi- the opening of the summer (primarily along Hwy 1), the pri- viduals for kidnapping/abduction. “campaign season” it is also in mary targets of this activity within This incident also furthers the previous as- line with established AOG migra- 2008 have been GoA associated sessment that NGO staff (especially those tion patterns, specifically the shift personnel. The seamless execu- with NSP links) are now considered viable of operational focus to areas tion of this incident indicates that targets by AOG elements within the SR, a viewed as more permissive for there is an increasing level of so- reality that should be factored into NGO ac- their activities due to limited secu- phistication and professionalism tivity planning. NGO are advised to restrict rity force presence allowing for of AOG elements engaging in this road movements along Hwy 1 within the SR. greater freedom of action. The activity, as well as “tactic migra- If road movements are to be undertaken, pre- reporting of two abduction inci- tion” within the SR as aspects of viously advised threat mitigation strategies dents, as well as the temporary this incident mirror similar NGO (sterilisation of staff, cover story, etc) should occupation and subsequent de- incidents in Kandahar. The segre- continue to be observed and strictly imple- struction of a District Centre, are gation and identification of per- mented. As well, if staff suspect they are un- clear indicators of an established sons of interest through on site der observation, appropriate security focal AOG presence and intent. “tactical questioning”, as well as points/agencies should be notified and activ- the reality that the staff affected ity patterns and plans altered or ceased in or- KEY THREATS & CONCERNS has been under prior observation der to disrupt the kidnappers planning cy- !"Kidnapping/abduction threat and targeting for a period of time cle. The security situation within Ghazni is (primarily along Hwy 1) prior to being kidnapped support assessed as volatile and unstable and as such !"Attacks on District Centers this conclusion. The abduction of is considered high risk for NGO activities. !"Ongoing security force opera- French national (identified as the tions owner of a private construction company) also on the 29th of

SOUTH REGION DIRECT NGO INCIDENTS

ZABUL

URUZGAN

PAKTIKA

NIMROZ

KANDAHAR

HELMAND

GHAZNI

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NGO Incidents NANGAHAR NANGARHAR Year to Date 1 This Report Period 0 25 Demonstrations continue to be an 20 governance/security force re- issue within this province, with 4 15 separate occurrences during this sponse. This last issue resulted in 10 reporting period. However, local the largest demonstration (an esti- governance recognisance of this mated 3500 people) and illustrates 5 issue has resulted in effective se- the impact they can have on 0 JAN FEB MAR APR MAY curity force response, both prior NGO activities. As previously to and during, and as of yet there mentioned, effective local security AOG ACG have been no relapses to the vio- force response has limited the lent, destructive protests seen in destabilising effects of violent previous years. 3 of these protests protest, though peaceful demon- security forces as well as informing those iden- occurred in City with the strations nonetheless cause restric- tified as IMF “spies” that they will face dire 4th occurring in the District of tions to NGO freedom of move- consequences. These letters also invited the Achin. The reasons behind these ment. Cessation of movement local population to join the conflict against the protests are diverse but include: (particularly in built up areas) dur- current government and IMF and support student dissatisfaction over gov- ing demonstrations remains the AOG forces. These distributions mark the 4th ernment policies affecting the uni- most prudent, and effective, and 5th reported occurrence within this prov- versity; local reaction to IMF ac- threat mitigation measure and ince since the 16th of February, affecting a tions (i.e. detention of suspected continued observation of this is total of 4 districts. As of yet there have been AOG); and the ongoing issue in- recommended as the possibility of no indicators or reports suggesting that AOG volving the abduction of a local violent escalation always exists elements have conducted any follow up to the parliamentarians family members during any demonstration. threats outlined in the letters, and as of yet and their frustration with local Following military operations in there have been no specific mention of NGO the Achin and Shinwar Districts activities or staff. Having said this, the devel- KEY THREATS & CONCERNS by national and international mili- opments in Khost regarding night letters and !"Suicide attacks against GOA tary forces, AOG distributed a attacks on NGO facilities are provocative and !"Demonstration in Jalalabad number of night letters. The let- the possibility of tactic migration to other areas !"AOGs in southeast districts ters warned against the local com- (i.e. Nangarhar) is possible. munity cooperating with GoA and

NGO Incidents NURISTAN NURISTAN Year to Date 1 10 This Report Period 0 On the 26th of May a staff mem- 8 of a road construction company, ber of a construction company 6 working on road rehabilitation though in this event all 4 of the 4 was abducted in the Kamdesh abducted staff were subsequently District. This incident has been executed by their captures on the 2 30th of January. While there is attributed to AOG and marks the 0 second such abduction reported little detail regarding this recent JAN FEB MAR APR MAY in this province for 2008. The abduction, this sole precedent AOG ACG previous incident was also re- suggests that a positive outcome is ported from the Kamdesh Dis- unlikely and that these abductions trict, and similarly involved staff are occurring for activity disrup- are likely due to a lack of reporting (to ANSO) tion and intimidation purposes. in the area, not from a lack of activity. As seen Recent reports indicate that AOG in other provinces, the advent of the summer KEY THREATS & CONCERNS elements are expanding and in- months suggest the possibility of increased !"Clashes in east districts creasing their activities within this actions. !"High threat to non-local staff province, and the low number !"High criminal threat in western shown in the graph on the right THE ANSO REPORT Page 9

NGO Incidents KHOST KUNARKHOST Year to Date 3 This Report Period 1 35 KunarThere havehas consistently been three separatebeen the 30 25 mostsecurity volatile incidents province involving within NGO the incidents, 3 different districts) also 20 ER,facilities accounting reported for this an year,average with suggests a level of AOG com- 15 40%the latest of all one AOG occurring initiated on attacks the mand cohesion and some level of 10 reported27th of May in the in Khostregion Districtduring definition to their operational 5 0 2008,which aaffected trend that an isINGO in line health with goals for this province. AOG ele- JAN FEB MAR APR MAY AOGclinic. activity All of these patterns incidents from 2007.have ments appear willing to accept the Theinvolved steady the downwards destruction trend of NGO of negative local repercussions from AOG ACG AOGstructures activity (the witnessed immediate during goal of the disruption of NGO programs thethese past attacks), 3 months though has AOGceased, ele- in order to further perceptions of they may take) to senior management (as withments May have marking demonstrated an definitive a level insecurity. well as ANSO) and to maintain local situ- ational awareness. An evaluation of com- upswing,of restraint accounting in that no for staff an have esti- Related to this, these attacks have matedbeen harmed 40% increase thus far. in WhileAOG initi-the pound security measures would also be pru- been preceded by the distribution dent. This evaluation should include the atedtwo previousattacks. Thisincidents deterioration were NSP is of night letters (the latest of which likelyrelated, to thiscontinue, recent withevent reports involving identification and exercise of clearly defined was distributed on the 14th of escape plans and routes. As most of these indicatinga health facility ongoing suggests infiltration that of May), though these have been AOG elements intentwithin onthis conduct- prov- attacks occur outside regular operating KEY THREATS & CONCERNS relatively generic in content, warn- ingince attacks (who have on security already forces, clearly spe- hours, all night staff should be briefed and !"Pech and Sirkanay Districts ing the local population against advised accordingly. cificallydemonstrated focused a willingnesson engaging to di- supporting the GoA and working ANBPrectly!"Potential target installations forNGO demonstrations activities) in the border are Khost has consistently reported the second !"Rocket attacks on Asadabad city with national and international regions.expanding The their Districts targeting of scope.Dara-I- security forces. This suggests that highest level of AOG initiated attacks within PechIn addition, and Sirkanay the geographic continue disper-to be NGO need to take the appearance the ER during 2008, though this incident sion of these events (3 separate of night letters seriously and con- volume fell by 27% this month in compari- sider them as a probable precur- son to those reported in April. Taking into consideration the opening of the summer KEY THREATS & CONCERNS sor to AOG action and adapt “campaign season”, incident volumes are !"Attacks on NGO facilities their security posture accordingly. (particularly in the border region) It is highly recommended that unlikely to decrease any further, rather they will begin to steadily increase through to a !"IED along main routes NGO advise their staff to report ANY threats (in whatever form peak in July as seen in 2007.

EAST REGION NGO DIRECT INCIDENTS 2008

PAKTYA

NURISTAN

NANGAHAR

LAGHMAN

KUNAR

KHOST

0 1 2 3 4 5 THE ANSO REPORT Page 10

NGO Incidents KUNAR Year to Date 2 KUNAR This Report Period 0 60 Kunar has consistently been the 50 most volatile province within the indicating ongoing infiltration of 40 ER, accounting for an average AOG elements intent on conduct- 30 40% of all AOG initiated attacks ing attacks on security forces, spe- 20 reported in the region during cifically focused on engaging 10 2008, a trend that is in line with ANBP installations in the border 0 AOG activity patterns from 2007. regions. The Districts of Dara-I- JAN FEB MAR APR MAY The steady downwards trend of Pech and Sirkanay continue to be AOG ACG AOG activity witnessed during particularly volatile, these areas the past 3 months has ceased, being ongoing focal points for with May marking an definitive clashes between AOG and secu- rectly attributed to AOG highlight this upswing, accounting for an esti- rity forces. threat, one being of a local leader in Sirkanay mated 40% increase in AOG initi- (ironically following a tribal leadership meet- Along with regular attacks against ing pledging to deny support to AOG), and ated attacks. This deterioration is security forces, AOG elements in likely to continue, with reports the second involving the abduction of 5 local this province have also been en- residents following a funeral in Wata Pur. In gaging in regular intimidation ac- addition, on the 22nd of May in the Godar KEY THREATS & CONCERNS tivities, apparently with the intent area of the Pech Valley, a group of AOG !"Pech, Chawkay and Sirkanay on disrupting local support for the established a temporary mobile check point. !"Indirect fire to Asadabad City GoA as well as asserting their au- While manning this checkpoint, AOG physi- !"Demonstrations re: Hazrat Ali thority. Two abduction incidents cally assaulted several motorists and pedes- during this reporting period di- trians over the length of their beards.

NGO Incidents GHOR GHOR Year to Date 0 10

This Report Period 0 8 As with a number of other towns in Afghanistan, saw a with coalition forces, who used the 6 large demonstration, which had its Holy Qu-Ran for target practice, 4 sparked the demonstration.. Four impetus, not in Afghanistan, but in 2 Iraq. A US Soldier serving in Iraq people died as a result. Such events 0 can crop up, often with little warn- JAN FEB MAR APR MAY ing. After the demonstration, ANP KEY THREATS & CONCERNS patrolled the streets and as a result, AOG ACG !"Tribal tensions were able to restore and maintain !"Crime calm. Other than this incident, !"AOG activities increase saw very few inci- dents over the reporting period.

NGO Incidents BADGHIS BADGHIS Year to Date 0 20

This Report Period 0 15 After ANA operations in Badghis came to a close, the province fell movement. This may be due to a 10

relatively quiet. There have been tactical withdrawal by AOG from 5 no major incidents or indeed any the area after confronting the 0 substantial sightings of AOG ANA/ISAF. AOG activity JAN FEB MAR APR MAY

should still be expected in the AOG ACG KEY THREATS & CONCERNS northern region of Badghis as the !" opium season progresses. Activi- AOG presence in the north along the roads systems. Encounters with !"Illegal road blocks ties which could affect NGO are likely to be illegal checkpoints smugglers are also likely, particularly in the !"Armed clashes Murghab & Ghormach districts. THE ANSO REPORT Page 11

HERAT NGO Incidents Year to Date 5 20 This Report Period 0 As in previous reports, Herat 15 Province continues to see an esca- lation in predominantly criminal that the harvest season and associ- 10 ated trafficking activities are in- based activities. It was previously 5 assessed that there would be a creasing. 0 greater visibility in narcotic traf- Coupled with this increase in JAN FEB MAR APR MAY

ficking, which in fact has turned opium related activities, is the dis- AOG ACG out to be the case. More and more covery of large quantities of weap- Opium has been seized over the ons and ammunition. The quan- months. This will allow AOG commanders to reporting period compared to re- tity of items within the cache conduct operations more effectively with rear cent months in Herat; indicating could have a bearing on the echelon supplies being well developed. ANP amount of opium being traded for operations have been successful in the recent weapons, ammunition, equipment KEY THREATS & CONCERNS discovery of caches containing, opium, weap- and capital. !"ACG activities to increase ons and ammunition in ‘occupied houses’ and or in registered motor vehicles in and around !"Serious abduction risk It can be expected, that will see more related Herat; yet there seems to be a substantial lack !"Increasing AOG activity activities into the summer of arrests relating to these discoveries.

NGO Incidents FARAH FARAH Year to Date 3 20 This Report Period 1 AOG armed attacks led the main 15 incidents in during is the high number of kidnappings this reporting period. This form along the very same road. Farah is 10 of activity is predominantly con- also seeing an increase in the use 5 ducted by AOG units operating of suicide bombings and roadside IED. Kidnap for ransom remains 0 along the Herat-Kandahar ring JAN FEB MAR APR MAY road. Coupled with armed attacks, of high-risk to NGOs, particularly along the Herat-Kandahar ring AOG ACG KEY THREATS & CONCERNS road and along the road from !"Abduction along the Ring Road. Farah City to Delaram. It is envis- tions for the mid to long term. Farah remains !"AOG activities increasing aged, based on current trends, that the main hot spot for the Western Region and !"Increased use of IED the activities above will remain a is classified as a high-risk area constant threat to NGO opera-

WEST REGION DIRECT NGO INCIDENTS 2008

HERAT

GHOR

FARAH

B A D G H IS

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NGO Incidents FARYAB FARYAB Year to Date 0 10 This Report Period 0 Faryab remained calm overall in 8 Province) areas continues to fluc- spite of sporadic AOG and IMF/ 6 ANSF operations continuing tuate with an increase in AOG 4 across the province. Some AOG associated incidents reported in have reportedly migrated deeper recent days. 2 into western provinces (Ghor and Factional issues flared up again 0 Farah). These groups may return during this period. The leader of JAN FEB MAR APR MAY to the area as security forces shift the Azadi Party and some sympa- focus to other locations in the NR thisers apparently conducted ille- AOG ACG over time. The security situation gal searches of residents in Ghu- surrounding the Qaisar border nad Sang Village (believed to asso- bers maintain long term Junbesh affiliation) (Ghormach District, Badghis ciated with the commander the requested that security organs take stern action Junbesh Party) and allegedly to prevent a return to factional violence, which seized a number of weapons. In KEY THREATS & CONCERNS this event suggests is probable. Therefore cau- reaction to this event, the Faryab !"Factional tensions tion is advised when operating within Alamr, peace and reconciliation associa- Qaisar and Pashtun Kot districts. !"Crime, primarily road robbery tion (whom the majority of mem-

NGO Incidents TAKHAR TAKHAR Year to Date 2 This Report Period 0 10 The overall security situation was 8

calm but one significant incidents a night security guard being 6 reported. A hand grenade was slightly injured. Initial reports hurled inside an International Or- suggest that this was an AOG 4 ganization (IO) in Khwaja-e-Ghar attack, but this has not yet been 2 District. The explosion resulted in confirmed. Although the motive 0 for this attack is not yet clear, it is JAN FEB MAR APR MAY KEY THREATS & CONCERNS safe to assume that there is an !"Increasing AOG activity increase risk to IOs and NGOs at AOG ACG the moment.

NGO Incidents KUNDUZ KUNDUZ Year to Date 1 This Report Period 0 15 ANSF, IMF and Private sector (communication towers) remained complex attack on an ANP check 10 the favored targets for AOG asso- post which resulting in two ANP ciated elements in and around members being killed and an at- 5 Kunduz. Examples include the tack upon an AREEBA commu- 0 nication tower resulting in slight JAN FEB MAR APR MAY KEY THREATS & CONCERNS damage in Qala-e-Zal District. AOG ACG !"Escalating AOG activity Extreme caution should be exer- !"Risk of IED related incidents cised within Khan Abad, Ali Abad, Char Dara and Kunduz districts. THE ANSO REPORT Page 13

NGO Incidents BALKH Year to Date 3 12

This Report Period 0 10

Balkh remains calm buts act of 8 crime continue to be reported ongoing drought will likely make 6 regularly. Home invasion and gen- matters worse and lead to an esca- 4 eral theft continue to be a signifi- lation in criminality in the North- 2 cant issue, particularly in Mazar-e- ern Region in the coming weeks and months. This will probably 0 Sharif and surrounding areas. The JAN FEB MAR APR MAY be most evident in areas such as KEY THREATS & CONCERNS Balkh and more specifically Ma- AOG ACG !"Crime zar-e-Sharif. These regional cen- !"Drug related activity. tres will probably also see an in- food stores become depleted over the course flux of people in search of food as of the summer.

NGO Incidents BADAKSHAN BADAKSHAN Year to Date 3 10 This Report Period 0 Badakshan Province remains calm 8 with no significant incident re- gradually (as can be seen on the 6 ported this period. graph on the right). Local clash / 4 dispute are still common and are AOG attacks targeting GoA es- 2 often associated with local militias tablishment continue with some 0 involved in drug smuggling. The JAN FEB MAR APR MAY regularity and are increasing possibilities of further demonstra- AOG ACG KEY THREATS & CONCERNS tion still exist due to the recent !"Escalating AOG activity religious insult by IMF members !"Possibility more demonstration in Iraq. Recent demonstrations have ended peacefully. !"Elevated threat of IED/ rocket

NORTH REGION DIRECT NGO INCIDENTS 2008

TA KHA R

KUNDUZ B A GHLA N

B A DA KSHA N

SA R-I-PUL

SAMANGAN

JAWZJAN

FARAYAB

B A LKH

012345678910 THE AFGHANISTAN NGO OFFICE - CONTACTS AND INFORMATION

CONTACT ANSO MISSING This report ANSO could not provide CENTRAL REGION OFFICE (KABUL) analysis for the prov- Blake Kehler - [email protected] - 0799 323 792 ANSO is hosted by inces of: Deutsche Welthungerhilfe Hedayatullah - [email protected] - 0799 322 116

NORTH REGION OFFICE (MAZAR) PANJSHIR Mathew Russell - [email protected] - 0799 404 617 PAKTYA Firoz Fahez - [email protected] - 0799 408 252 JAWZJAN SAR-E-PUL To Register with ANSO EAST REGION OFFICE (JALALABAD) contact: SAMANGAN [email protected] John Binns - [email protected] - 0799 248 362 BAGHLAN Khisrow Shohar - [email protected] - 0798 778 014 URUZGAN NIMROZ SOUTH REGION OFFICE (KANDAHAR) ANSO is managed by an NGO Nathan Ronaldson - [email protected] - 0797 414 100 Board. If you have any MohammadI - [email protected] - 0700 300 730 This is because we feedback, good or bad, let do not know enough them know on: about the area to WEST REGION OFFICE (HERAT) [email protected] comment on the sig- Russel Hutchings - [email protected] - 0799 322 192 nificance of the inci- Najma Fazly - [email protected] - 0700 540 225 dents. ANSO ACRONYMS COUNTRY MANAGEMENT (KABUL) If you can help us IMF-International Military Nic Lee - [email protected] - 0799 325 349 understand the prov- ince better please Forces / AOG-Armed Oppo- Sebastien Hogan - [email protected] - 0797 165 017 sition Groups / GOA- contact us. Government of Afghanistan Chona Bollos - [email protected] - 0797 093 073 / ACG-Armed Criminal Groups / ANA-Afghan Na- tional Army / ANP-Afghan National Police / IED- UPCOMING SECURITY TRAINING AT ANSO Improvised Exploding De- vice / AEF-Afghan Eradica- tion Forces / RPG-Rocket The following NGO security related courses will be offered at ANSO in June by Propelled Grenade / IDF- the Armadillo Group. Indirect Fire (ex: mortars) / VBIED-Vehicle Borne Impro- vised Exploding Device / June 3-5: Personal Security & Safety PRP-Previous Reporting June 8- 12: Management of Security & Crisis Management Training Period / ANBP-Afghan Na- tional Border Police / SAF- Small Arms Fire / NDS- For more information, please contact Armadillo directly: National Directorate of Se- curity (intelligence) / PSC- The Armadillo Group Private Security Company / www.armadillo-group.co.uk DC-District Centre Email: [email protected]