The Afghanistan NGO Safety Office Issue: 03 May 16th - 31st 2008 ANSO and our donors accept no liability for the results of any activity conducted or omitted on the basis of this report. THE ANSO REPORT -Not for copy or sale- Inside this Issue COUNTRY SUMMARY Central Region 2 A record number of Southern Region 5 425 406 AOG initiated attacks 400 8 375 Eastern Region 350 were reported in May 318 325 300 10 (the highest on record). 300 Western Region 275 Factors contributing to 250 Northern Region 12 225 218 this include: surging 200 188 14 175 ANSO Info Page AOG activity in Ghazni, 150 125 Paktika, Zabul and Kan- 100 dahar City in the south; 75 YOU NEED TO KNOW 50 the escalation in fighting 25 0 JAN FEB MAR APR MAY • Record number of AOG in Kunar in the east; and attacks recorded this substantial increases in 2006 2007 2008 month. AOG activity in Logar and Wardak in the Central Region. • Attacks continue against NGOs in Khost Province. Although AOG attacks are at a record high, information received during this report- ing period suggest that worse is still to come. The peace agreement in Pakistan has • High abduction risk and now freed-up hundreds of Taliban fighters and some Taliban commanders have AOG actions in Ghazni already publicly stated their intent to focus on Afghanistan. • Ongoing threat to NSP Most provinces bordering Pakistan are already seeing high infiltration rates and the staff in the south and effects of this AOG migration will no doubt drive AOG attack rates to new record southeast of the country. heights in the coming months. ANSO is supported by NGO DATA & TRENDS 8 , 1 6 % 1 0 , 2 0 % 7 , 1 4 % 1 0 , 2 0 % 8 , 1 6 % 7 , 1 4 % CENTRAL EAST SOUTH WEST NORTH NORTH-EAST This graph shows the number and percentage of NGO incidents by Region to date. It demonstrates clearly that NGOs are affected relatively equally in every region. THE ANSO REPORT Page 2 NGO Incidents KABUL KABUL Year to Date 4 20 This Report Period 0 So far this year, the number of 15 total AOG incidents in Kabul itself was low, and most reports province is more than double that seemed to be a recirculation of 10 previous warnings rather than of the first five months of last 5 year, with Kabul city overwhelm- new threats. ingly the locus. We anticipate a Notably, in May there were two 0 JAN FEB MAR APR MAY steep increase in security incidents suicide attacks (one vehicle-borne, in the coming month. one body-borne) targeting inter- AOG ACG The general threat level is up, es- national military forces. These are pecially in Kabul city. This is re- the first suicide attacks we have for the government and asking questions flected primarily by the antici- recorded in the city since Decem- about international staff. (These are separate pated climb in incidents. Reports ber, and the threat of such attacks from known Afghan government visits.) of planned AOG attacks against is likely to remain in the coming Unless more information becomes available, westerners, police, and security months. these incidents will remain suspicious and forces occurred, but threat traffic The trend in Kabul continues to may evidence plans to target NGO in the suggest that military forces are the future. KEY THREATS & CONCERNS primary target, and NGO, thus !"Attacks against high profile targets far, are not directly threatened. !"IED and rocket attacks That said, there are unresolved cases in which NGO have been !"Suicide attacks against military visited by people claiming to work NGO Incidents KAPISA KAPISA Year to Date 1 20 This Report Period 1 Intensive military and police op- 15 erations in April may have helped Nijrab and especially Tagab dis- reduce the AOG presence in tricts have the highest AOG pres- 10 ence and consequently are the Kapisa this month, as security 5 incidents were down in May com- main battle areas for AOG and pared to March and April. security forces. These districts 0 should be considered unsafe for JAN FEB MAR APR MAY Given Kapisa’s strategic impor- NGO operations. NGO working tance as an AOG staging area for in Mahmud Raqi report no nota- AOG ACG attacks in Kabul, the current lull is ble security problems, and that likely temporary. district appears relatively safe for night letter warning them to stop opera- NGO activity. tions. Though a definitive source has not KEY THREATS & CONCERNS The only direct NGO threat so been identified, this appears to have been !"Attacks, especially in Tagab and the work of someone with personal griev- Nijrab far this year occurred during this ance rather than an AOG-related threat. !"Spread of attacks to schools reporting period. An INGO working in Kohistan received a NOTICE: Your input is invaluable for the production of this report. While we appreciate information on incidents, we also need general information on the security situation in your area. So please remember to call or email us regularly. THE ANSO REPORT Page 3 NGO Incidents PARWAN PARWAN Year to Date 2 This Report Period 0 10 Parwan maintains its typical stand- 8 ing as the safest of Kabul’s central to NGO operations in Parwan 6 region border provinces. However can still be considered low. the past month saw AOG activity Ghorban warrants extra caution 4 in the districts of Chaharikar, due to this month’s incident spike. 2 Siagard, Salang, and especially Kohi Safi, given its border with 0 JAN FEB MAR APR MAY Ghorban. While incidents are up the troubled Surobi district in Ka- compared to last year, the threat bul Province and Tagab district in AOG ACG Kapisa, is another area that has KEY THREATS & CONCERNS the potential for problems. How- !"Security and poppy eradication ever, for the few NGO that do likely targets will be military/police forces operations in Kohi Safi have operations in Kohi Safi, any conducting security and poppy eradication !"AOG presence in Ghorban current threat is indirect, as the operations in the area. NGO Incidents BAMYAN BAMYAN Year to Date 1 10 This Report Period 0 Bamyan has not experienced any 8 notable AOG activity since March old ordinances uncovered during 6 de-mining operations in the area. when a PRT and international 4 military vehicle were struck by Criminal incidents are relatively 2 IEDs. Last week the discovery of high in the province. Though these typically pose little threat to 0 land mines in Bamyan District JAN FEB MAR APR MAY was reported. But these are likely NGO, armed highway robbery is a concern. ANSO-recorded rob- AOG ACG beries since January are up com- KEY THREATS & CONCERNS pared to last year. By the end of !"Armed robbery along roadways May 2007 we had only one re- six incidents, only one of which has occurred corded armed highway robbery. in the last month. So far in 2008, we have recorded NGO Incidents DAYKONDI DAYKUNDI Year to Date 0 10 This Report Period 0 Information from Daykundi re- 8 But these appear to have been mains extremely limited. Last 6 week, there were reports of erroneous. Until additional infor- 4 planned Taliban attacks in Nili. mation is available we believe our previous assessment of Daykundi 2 remains valid— i.e the northern KEY THREATS & CONCERNS 0 part of Daykundi Province is be- JAN FEB MAR APR MAY !"AOG infiltration in Kiti, Gizrab, and Kajran lieved to be safe and the south AOG ACG !"Low security force presence (Kiti, Gizrab, and Kajran) unsta- ble. THE ANSO REPORT Page 4 NGO Incidents LOGAR Year to Date 2 LOGAR This Report Period 0 20 AOG incidents in Logar this year 15 began with two in January, dipped The declining percentage of in- to one in February, then climbed crease each month compared to 10 last year is a promising trend that steeply over the next three 5 months to around 20 in May. This will hopefully continue. Even so, June will likely see an increase in 0 pattern virtually mirrors the same JAN FEB MAR APR MAY time last year, though with inci- incidents over this month. dents up roughly 140% in March, Two threats currently stand out as AOG ACG 60% in April, and 12% in May possible problems. One is a report compared to last year. (unconfirmed) that AOG are planning to take over the District May. Either threat could destabilize Logar Centre in Kerwan (southwest even further and increase the risk for NGO KEY THREATS & CONCERNS Logar) in the near future. The operations. This particular danger dimin- ishes quickly with time, and it is promising !"Collateral damage from attacks on other is the ultimate reaction to security forces/police the killing of a mullah during mili- that as of this writing we have heard of no !"Abduction tary operations by international violent incidents related to either threat. forces, which occurred on 26 NGO Incidents WARDAK WARDAK Year to Date 0 35 This Report Period 0 30 As expected AOG incidents 25 climbed in May, more than dou- With the exception of the west/ 20 northwest districts of Markazi 15 bling the number of incidents in 10 April. The incident types are a Bihsud and Hisa-i-awali, almost entire province has recently been 5 mixed bag of IED, small arms, 0 and rocket attacks typically di- impacted by AOG activity, espe- JAN FEB MAR APR MAY cially in the eastern areas of Nirk, rected at military and police forces AOG ACG during travel. Maydan Shah, and Sayadabad. Last month, with the emergence of threats against schools and still pose a significant threat to activities of NSP projects, groups outside of their choosing.