Curriculum Vitae Simon Gächter 23 August 2021
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Herbert Gintis – Samuel Bowles – Their Distribution Preferences, and That They Robert Boyd – Ernst Fehr (Eds.): Moral Do So Differently in Different Situations
Sociologický časopis/Czech Sociological Review, 2008, Vol. 44, No. 6 social capital theory, which shows that so- the face of the evolutionary logic in which cial collaboration is built on social networks material advantages can be achieved by that underlie norms of reciprocity and trust- adopting self-interested preferences? worthiness. The development of these pro- social dispositions is in turn enabled in so- Clara Sabbagh cieties that further extra-familial ties and University of Haifa disregard or transcend purely ‘amoral fa- [email protected] milist’ interactions [Banfi eld 1958]. This research project nevertheless References leaves several unresolved problems. First, Banfi eld, Edward C. 1958. The Moral Basis of a Backward Society. Glencoe, IL: Free Press. there is the problem of causality, which de- Camerer, Colin F. 2003. Behavioral Game Theory. rives from a major theoretical dilemma in New York: Russell Sage. the social sciences. To what extent are pro- Deutsch, Morton. 1985. Distributive Justice. New social dispositions the result of structur- Haven: Yale University Press. al constraints, such as market integration, Giddens, Anthony. 1997. Sociology. Cambridge, or rather an active element in structuring UK: Polity Press. these constraints [Giddens 1997]? Joseph Putnam, Robert D. 1993. Making Democracy Work. Henrich (Chapter 2) discusses this prob- Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton, NJ: lem on a theoretical level by explaining the Princeton University Press. different mechanisms through which the Sabbagh, Clara and Deborah Golden. 2007. ‘Jux- structure of interaction affects preferences. taposing Etic and Emic Perspectives: A Refl ec- tion on Three Studies on Distributive Justice.’ Yet only future longitudinal research will Social Justice Research 20: 372–387. -
Surviving the Titanic Disaster: Economic, Natural and Social Determinants
A Service of Leibniz-Informationszentrum econstor Wirtschaft Leibniz Information Centre Make Your Publications Visible. zbw for Economics Frey, Bruno S.; Savage, David A.; Torgler, Benno Working Paper Surviving the Titanic Disaster: Economic, Natural and Social Determinants CREMA Working Paper, No. 2009-03 Provided in Cooperation with: CREMA - Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts, Zürich Suggested Citation: Frey, Bruno S.; Savage, David A.; Torgler, Benno (2009) : Surviving the Titanic Disaster: Economic, Natural and Social Determinants, CREMA Working Paper, No. 2009-03, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA), Basel This Version is available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/214430 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. personal and scholarly purposes. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle You are not to copy documents for public or commercial Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, If the documents have been made available under an Open gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence. www.econstor.eu CREMA Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts Surviving the Titanic Disaster: Economic, Natural and Social Determinants Bruno S. -
Curriculum Vitae
CURRICULUM VITAE Prof. Dr. Rosemarie Chariklia Nagel phone numbers: Department of Economics office: 34-93-542-2739 Universitat Pompeu Fabra fax: 34-93-542-1746 Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27 Office: Jaume I 206 email: [email protected] Barcelona 08005, Spain video http://www.barcelonagse.eu/research-nagel-beauty-contest-engineer.html update April 2018 Academic Employment: Febr 2007-present ICREA Research professor at Universitat Pompeu Fabra (similar to distinguished professor or chaired professor in the Anglo-American universities) March 2006-Jan 2007 Full professor at Universitat Pompeu Fabra March 2002 –February 2006 Associate professor at Universitat Pompeu Fabra Sept.1995 - Febr. 2002: Assistant professor, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona Sept.1994 - May 1995: Postdoctoral Fellow in the University of Pittsburgh with Al Roth July 1991 - Aug. 1994: Research Fellow in the Institute of R. Selten, University of Bonn Sept 1990 - Dec. 1990: Teaching assistant at the London School of Economics, London. Mar. 1989 - Sept.1989: Research Fellow in the Institute of R. Tietz, University of Frankfurt Visiting Positions Sept 2012-June 2013 Visiting professor, NYU, CESS, department of economics July 2011 1 month visit in University of Trento, Center for Mind/Brain Sciences (Cimec) 2010 3 months visiting professor to Center of Rationality and Institute of Advances Studies, Hebrew University Sept 2006-August 2008 7 months visiting associate professor at HSS Caltech, Pasadena Febr-March 2006 Visiting professor at CES - Munich Education: 1989-1994 University of Bonn: European Doctoral Program (EDP), Doctor rer. Pol.in Economics, advisor: R. Selten, reader Avner Shaked 1990/1991 Academic Year at London School of Economics, London (England), advisor: Ken Binmore 1989 University of Bonn, Diploma in Economics (Diplomvolkswirtin) advisor: R. -
Strong Reciprocity and Human Sociality∗
Strong Reciprocity and Human Sociality∗ Herbert Gintis Department of Economics University of Massachusetts, Amherst Phone: 413-586-7756 Fax: 413-586-6014 Email: [email protected] Web: http://www-unix.oit.umass.edu/˜gintis Running Head: Strong Reciprocity and Human Sociality March 11, 2000 Abstract Human groups maintain a high level of sociality despite a low level of relatedness among group members. The behavioral basis of this sociality remains in doubt. This paper reviews the evidence for an empirically identifi- able form of prosocial behavior in humans, which we call ‘strong reciprocity,’ that may in part explain human sociality. A strong reciprocator is predisposed to cooperate with others and punish non-cooperators, even when this behavior cannot be justified in terms of extended kinship or reciprocal altruism. We present a simple model, stylized but plausible, of the evolutionary emergence of strong reciprocity. 1 Introduction Human groups maintain a high level of sociality despite a low level of relatedness among group members. Three types of explanation have been offered for this phe- nomenon: reciprocal altruism (Trivers 1971, Axelrod and Hamilton 1981), cultural group selection (Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman 1981, Boyd and Richerson 1985) and genetically-based altruism (Lumsden and Wilson 1981, Simon 1993, Wilson and Dugatkin 1997). These approaches are of course not incompatible. Reciprocal ∗ I would like to thank Lee Alan Dugatkin, Ernst Fehr, David Sloan Wilson, and the referees of this Journal for helpful comments, Samuel Bowles and Robert Boyd for many extended discussions of these issues, and the MacArthur Foundation for financial support. This paper is dedicated to the memory of W. -
Walrasian Economics in Retrospect
A Service of Leibniz-Informationszentrum econstor Wirtschaft Leibniz Information Centre Make Your Publications Visible. zbw for Economics Bowles, Samuel; Gintis, Herbert Working Paper Walrasian Economics in Retrospect Working Paper, No. 2000-04 Provided in Cooperation with: Department of Economics, University of Massachusetts Suggested Citation: Bowles, Samuel; Gintis, Herbert (2000) : Walrasian Economics in Retrospect, Working Paper, No. 2000-04, University of Massachusetts, Department of Economics, Amherst, MA This Version is available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/105719 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. personal and scholarly purposes. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle You are not to copy documents for public or commercial Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, If the documents have been made available under an Open gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence. www.econstor.eu WALRASIAN ECONOMICS IN RETROSPECT∗ Department of Economics University of Massachusetts Amherst, Massachusetts, 01003 Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis February 4, 2000 Abstract Two basic tenets of the Walrasian model, behavior based on self-interested exogenous preferences and complete and costless contracting have recently come under critical scrutiny. -
The Nature of Human Altruism
review article The nature of human altruism Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher University of Zu¨rich, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, Blu¨mlisalpstrasse 10, CH-8006 Zu¨rich, Switzerland ........................................................................................................................................................................................................................... Some of the most fundamental questions concerning our evolutionary origins, our social relations, and the organization of society are centred around issues of altruism and selfishness. Experimental evidence indicates that human altruism is a powerful force and is unique in the animal world. However, there is much individual heterogeneity and the interaction between altruists and selfish individuals is vital to human cooperation. Depending on the environment, a minority of altruists can force a majority of selfish individuals to cooperate or, conversely, a few egoists can induce a large number of altruists to defect. Current gene-based evolutionary theories cannot explain important patterns of human altruism, pointing towards the importance of both theories of cultural evolution as well as gene–culture co-evolution. uman societies represent a huge anomaly in the animal a psychological13—definition of altruism as being costly acts that world1. They are based on a detailed division of labour confer economic benefits on other individuals. The role of kinship and cooperation between genetically unrelated individ- in human altruism is not discussed because it is well-known that uals in large groups. This is obviously true for modern humans share kin-driven altruism with many other animals14,15.We societies with their large organizations and nation states, will show that the interaction between selfish and strongly recipro- Hbut it also holds for hunter-gatherers, who typically have dense cal individuals is essential for understanding of human cooperation. -
Economic Engineering of Human Cooperation and Competition
The University of Cologne New York Office, the German Research Foundation (DFG) and the German Center for Research and Innovation (GCRI) cordially invite you to a Leibniz lecture on: Economic Engineering of Human Cooperation and Competition Tuesday, October 23, 2018 6:30 p.m. - 8:00 p.m. Prof. Dr. Axel Ockenfels Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz Award 2005 Professor of Economics University of Cologne Location: German House, 871 United Nations Plaza, New York, NY 10017 Please RSVP by October 21. Registration is required to attend the lecture. What do climate change, shortage of organ donors, and traffic congestion have in common? They can all be addressed with behavioral economics. Join us for a lecture by Leibniz Prize recipient Professor Axel Ockenfels. Many economic and societal challenges can only be addressed with a change in human behavior. Market design can offer solutions because market rules affect our behavior in predictable ways. Traffic jams, for example, cost time, money and impact our health, while recent advances in technology would allow for the design of new markets for road use that promote cooperation and prevent congestion. Climate change is fundamentally a problem of insufficient cooperation that can be addressed if recognized as such and acted on accordingly in international climate negotiations. In his lecture, Professor Ockenfels will show how market rules can be engineered to promote cooperation and trust even in large communities and to encourage competition in small markets. Professor Ockenfels’ focus will be on human behavior in markets, which responds to market rules, but rarely in a fully rational way. He will show how market design can take on real-world challenges. -
Curriculum Vitae}
CURRICULUM VITAE Dorothea Kübler May 2021 General WZB Berlin Social Science Center Reichpietschufer 50 D-10785 Berlin Germany Faculty of Economics and Management Technische Universität Berlin Straße des 17. Juni 135 D-10623 Berlin Germany E-Mail [email protected] Tel. +49 30 25491 440 Fax +49 30 25491 442 Born 10th January 1966 in Tübingen, Germany Two children born in 2000 and 2005 Research Interests Behavioral and Experimental Economics, Game Theory, Market Design, Matching Markets, Labor and Organization Economics, Economics of Education Current Academic Positions since 2009 Director of the Research Unit “Market Behavior” at the WZB Berlin Social Science Center since 2004 Full Professor of Economics at the Technische Universität Berlin Education 2003 Habilitation and venia legendi in Economics, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin 1997 Dr.rer.pol., Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin and RTG in Applied Microeconomics 1992 Diplom in Economics (VWL), Freie Universität Berlin 1989 Vordiplom in Economics and Philosophy, University of Konstanz 1985 – 1986 College of Arts and Sciences, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia (Economics, Philosophy, Social Anthropology, Russian) 1 Previous Academic Positions and Extended Research Visits Aug. 2016. – Feb. 2017 Visiting Professor, Economics Department, Stanford University Sep. 2008 – Feb. 2009 Visiting Fellow at ELSE, University College London 2004 Associate Professor, Faculty of Economics and Management, Technische Universität Berlin Sep. 2001 – May 2002 Visiting Scholar, Harvard Business School April 2000 – Dec. 2003 Post-doctoral Fellow, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin Sep. 1999 – March 2000 Visiting Scholar at KSG, Harvard University, Cambridge Sep. 1997 – Aug. 1998 Research Fellow, University of California, Berkeley 1992 – 1997 Assistant, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Institute for Economic Theory I (Prof. -
The Evolved Functions of Procedural Fairness: an Adaptation for Politics
March 2015 The Evolved Functions of Procedural Fairness: An Adaptation for Politics Troels Bøggild Department of Political Science Aarhus University, Denmark E-mail: [email protected] Michael Bang Petersen Department of Political Science Aarhus University, Denmark E-mail: [email protected] Chapter accepted for publication in Todd K. Shackelford & Ranald D. Hansen (Eds.), The Evolution of Morality, New York: Springer. 1 Abstract: Politics is the process of determining resource allocations within and between groups. Group life has constituted a critical and enduring part of human evolutionary history and we should expect the human mind to contain psychological adaptations for dealing with political problems. Previous research has in particular focused on adaptations designed to produce moral evaluations of political outcomes: is the allocation of resources fair? People, however, are not only concerned about outcomes. They also readily produce moral evaluations of the political processes that shape these outcomes. People have a sense of procedural fairness. In this chapter, we identify the adaptive functions of the human psychology of procedural fairness. We argue that intuitions about procedural fairness evolved to deal with adaptive problems related to the delegation of leadership and, specifically, to identify and counter-act exploitative leaders. In the chapter, we first introduce the concept of procedural fairness, review extant social psychological theories and make the case for why an evolutionary approach is needed. Next, we dissect the evolved functions of procedural fairness and review extant research in favor of the evolutionary account. Finally, we discuss how environmental mismatches between ancestral and modern politics make procedural fairness considerations even more potent in modern politics, creating a powerful source of moral outrage. -
An Introduction to Sociobiology: Inclusive Fitness and the Core Genome Herbert Gintis
An Introduction to Sociobiology: Inclusive Fitness and the Core Genome Herbert Gintis June 29, 2013 The besetting danger is ...mistaking part of the truth for the whole...in every one of the leading controversies...both sides were in the right in what they affirmed, though wrong in what they denied John Stuart Mill, On Coleridge, 1867 A Mendelian populationhas a common gene pool, whichis itscollective or corporate genotype. Theodosius Dobzhansky, Cold Springs Harbor Symposium, 1953. The interaction between regulator and structural genes... [reinforces] the concept that the genotype of the individual is a whole. Ernst Mayr, Populations, Species and Evolution, 1970 Abstract This paper develops inclusive fitness theory with the aim of clarifying its appropriate place in sociobiological theory and specifying the associated principles that render it powerful. The paper introduces one new concept, that of the core genome. Treating the core genome as a unit of selection solves problems concerning levels of selection in evolution. 1 Summary Sociobiology is the study of biological interaction, both intragenomic, among loci in the genome, and intergenomic, among individuals in a reproductive popula- tion (Gardner et al. 2007). William Hamilton (1964) extended the theory of gene frequencies developed in the first half of the Twentieth century (Crow and I would like to thank Samuel Bowles, Eric Charnov, Steven Frank, Michael Ghiselin, Peter Godfrey-Smith, David Haig, David Queller, Laurent Lehmann, Samir Okasha, Peter Richerson, Joan Roughgarden, Elliot Sober, David Van Dyken, Mattijs van Veelen and Edward O. Wilson for advice in preparing this paper. 1 Kimura 1970, B¨urger 2000, Provine 2001) to deal with such behavior. -
Bowles, Samuel; Camerer, Colin; Fehr, Ernst; Gintis, Herbert
www.ssoar.info Henrich, Joseph; Boyd, Robert; Bowles, Samuel; Camerer, Colin; Fehr, Ernst; Gintis, Herbert (eds.): Foundations of Human Sociality: Economic Experiments and Ethnographic Evidence from Fifteen Small-Scale Societies Sabbagh, Clara Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version Rezension / review Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation: Sabbagh, C. (2008). Henrich, Joseph; Boyd, Robert; Bowles, Samuel; Camerer, Colin; Fehr, Ernst; Gintis, Herbert (eds.): Foundations of Human Sociality: Economic Experiments and Ethnographic Evidence from Fifteen Small-Scale Societies. [Review of the book Foundations of Human Sociality: Economic Experiments and Ethnographic Evidence from Fifteen Small-Scale Societies, by J. B. R. B. S. C. C. F. E. G. H. (. Henrich]. Sociologický časopis / Czech Sociological Review, 44(6), 1205-1208. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-65298 Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt. Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non- Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares, transferable, individual and limited right to using this document. persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses This document is solely intended for your personal, non- Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt. all copyright information and other information regarding legal Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie document in public. -
Bibliografía
No part of this book may be distributed, posted, or reproduced in any form by FIRST PROOFS - © Copyright 2017 digital or mechanical means without NOT SUITABLE FOR TRANSLATION Princeton University Press. prior written permission of the publisher. Bibliografía Abbe, Emmanuel A., Amir E. Khandani, and Andrew W. Lo. 2012. “Privacy- Preserving Methods for Sharing Financial Risk Exposures.” American Economic Review 102, no. 3: 65– 70. Acharya, Viral V., Lasse Pedersen, Th omas Philippon, and Matthew Richardson. 2009. “Regulating Systemic Risk.” In Restoring Financial Stability: How to Repair a Failed System, edited by Viral V. Acharya and Matthew Richardson, 283– 303. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons. Adolphs, Ralph, Daniel Tranel, Hanna Damasio, and Antonio R. Damasio. 1994. “Im- paired Recognition of Emotion in Facial Expressions Following Bilateral Damage to the Human Amygdala.” Nature 372: 669– 672. Alchian, Armen. 1950. “Uncertainty, Evolution and Economic Th eory.” Journal of Po- litical Economy 58: 211– 221. Alexander, Sidney S. 1961. “Price Movements in Speculative Markets: Trends or Ran- dom Walks.” Industrial Management Review 2: 7– 26. American Cancer Society. 2016. Cancer Facts and Figures 2016. Atlanta, GA: Ameri- can Cancer Society. Andersen, Espen S. 1994. Evolutionary Economics: Post- Schumpeterian Contribu- tions. London, UK: Pinter. Anderson, Philip W., Kenneth J. Arrow, and David Pines, eds. 1988. Th e Economy as an Evolving Complex System. Reading, MA: Addison- Wesley. Andrews, Edmund L. 2008. “Greenspan Concedes Error on Regulation.” New York Times, October 23. Aristotle. 1944. Aristotle in 23 Volumes. Vol. 21. Translated by Harris Rackham. Cam- bridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Arrow, Kenneth J. 1964. “Th e Role of Securities in the Optimal Allocation of Risk- bearing.” Review of Economic Studies 31: 91– 96.