Turkmenistan Capital: Ashgabat Population: 5.37 million GNI/capita, PPP: US$15,760 Source: World Bank World Development Indicators. Nations in Transit Ratings and Averaged Scores NIT survey year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 National Democratic 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 Governance Electoral Process 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 Civil Society 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 Independent Media 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 Local Democratic 6.75 6.75 6.75 6.75 6.75 6.75 6.75 6.75 6.75 6.75 Governance Judicial Framework and 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 Independence Corruption 6.75 6.75 6.75 6.75 6.75 6.75 6.75 6.75 6.75 7.00 Democracy Score 6.93 6.93 6.93 6.93 6.93 6.93 6.93 6.93 6.93 6.96 NOTE: The ratings reflect the consensus of Freedom House, its academic advisers, and the author(s) of this report. If consensus cannot be reached, Freedom House is responsible for the final ratings. The ratings are based on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 representing the highest level of democratic progress and 7 the lowest. The Democracy Score is an average of ratings for the categories tracked in a given year. The opinions expressed in this report are those of the author(s). EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Turkmenistan is a rentier state ruled by an authoritarian regime that utilizes natural resource revenues to invest in political patronage and fund pervasive security structures. On taking office in 2007, President Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov tried to present himself as a reformist by improving the country’s relations with foreign governments, while passing laws and issuing declarations that paid lip service to political liberalization, human rights, and the market economy. At the same time, Berdimuhamedov claimed that Turkmen statehood was too young and its people too unprepared to manage drastic political changes. He extolled the benefits of a “step-by-step” approach to both political and economic liberalization. In practice, this has meant that his reforms have remained superficial, attempting to project an image of change and prosperity to the international community without bringing lasting benefits to the wider population. The regime has continued violating basic human rights, jailing outspoken activists, and allocating valuable government and business positions to members of the presidential family. In 2016, the president responded to a severe economic crisis by strengthening his and his family’s institutional position through the enactment of constitutional changes that removed the age limit for presidential candidates, extended the presidential term from five to seven years, and abolished term limits for the presidency. To deflect local and international criticism of such changes—which effectively established a presidency-for-life—Berdimuhamedov created the position of ombudsman for human rights. The president also empowered his family members by appointing them to prestigious positions in both the public and private sectors. In 2016, Berdimuhamedov’s son, Serdar, was elected to the parliament and also appointed to a deputy ministerial post in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Although nepotism is not a new phenomenon in Turkmenistan, it is new in presidential politics. Former president Saparmurat Niyazov built a cult of personality, but he was an orphan and also failed to promote the career of his only son, who did not live in Turkmenistan. The stability of the Berdimuhamedov regime is partly ensured by its success in politicizing public resources and leveraging them for political advantage. Controlling resource revenues allows Berdimuhamedov to manage the bureaucracy through non-merit-based appointments, career advancements, or regular firings. However, the regime’s persistent use of easy cash from resource extraction has increased its fundamental vulnerability to commodity price fluctuations. As global energy prices have fallen in recent years, revenues from oil and natural gas exports in Turkmenistan have plummeted. The country’s GDP grew by only 6.2 percent in 2016, compared to 10.3 percent in 2014.1 Depressed foreign assets have also led to a current account deficit of 13.3 percent of GDP2 and have reduced the state budget in U.S. dollar equivalent from $33 billion in 2014 to $17 billion in 2016.3 In an effort to hold on to hard currency, the government has banned the sale of U.S. dollars, delayed the payment of public sector salaries, introduced mandatory monetary “donations” from the public, and increased taxes on the private sector. Many private firms have shut down under the pressure of economic stagnation and governmental interference. To shift the blame for the crisis, in 2016 Berdimuhamedov not only fired government officials but also jailed them for usually unidentified “shortcomings in the workplace.” Although these problems were triggered by low gas prices, the underlying causes of Turkmenistan’s economic crisis are fundamentally structural. In particular, Turkmenistan’s economy struggles from the government’s intrusive intervention, a general lack of diversification, overreliance on hydrocarbons, and a weak private sector. Score changes: • Corruption rating declined from 6.75 to 7.00 due to evidence of total state capture, extending from petty bribery at the local level to embezzlement at the highest reaches of the government, and new evidence of nepotism for the president’s family. As a result, Turkmenistan’s Democracy Score declined from 6.93 to 6.96. 2 Outlook for 2017: President Berdimuhamedov has put in place constitutional changes to ensure the longevity of his rule. However, he has yet to comprehensively address the worsening socioeconomic crisis, which is challenging the stability of his regime. Berdimuhamedov needs enough cash not only to pay voters’ wages and cover the costs of mega-projects but also to buy off members of the ruling elite who might otherwise question their allegiance to the president. Berdimuhamedov’s idiosyncratic personnel policy could, in this sense, lead to the defection of more or less prominent cadres. As economic hardship persists, the regime could face pressure from both Turkmenistan’s disenfranchised masses and, significantly, some disgruntled members of the ruling elite. 3 MAIN REPORT National Democratic Governance 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 • Turkmenistan is a textbook example of a state with a widening gulf between its legislative dictates and its governance methods. The constitution stipulates that Turkmenistan is a democratic, secular state that takes the form of a presidential republic and guarantees separation of powers between the legislative, executive, and judicial branches.4 In practice, however, Turkmenistan is ruled entirely by the presidency: the parliament serves as a rubber stamp for presidential decisions, and the judicial system is appointed and directed by the president. The stability of the state is ensured through various means, including the politicization of public resources, political patronage, recurrent elite purges, inducements to key public institutions, and coercion. Political patronage allows the regime to provide favorable treatment to family members and regime supporters who then promote the status quo. Conversely, continuous purges of the elite dissuade mid-level officials from cultivating their own power bases to challenge centralized authority.5 • In 2016, growing socioeconomic difficulties and the decreasing popularity of his leadership motivated Berdimuhamedov to secure his post and institutionalize his authoritarian rule by amending the country’s constitution.6 This is the sixth amendment to Turkmenistan’s constitution, which was first adopted in 1992.7 State media justified the latest round of amendments by claiming, “[Turkmenistan’s] extensive political, social and economic reforms … necessitated changes to the constitution.”8 Moreover, the government not only makes Berdimuhamedov a prerequisite for a successful democratization but also the sole guarantor of future political, economic, and social developments. As stated on the government’s website, “the democratization process in Turkmenistan develops on the basis of continuity … and the current constitution is important for the gradual and consistent deepening of democratic reforms.”9 As a result, the new constitution grants Berdimuhamedov a de facto right to rule Turkmenistan for life. Specifically, it eliminated the age cap of 70 for presidential candidates and extended the presidential term from 5 to 7 years, while putting no limits on the number of possible reelections.10 • To offset the increased powers he granted to himself, Berdimuhamedov introduced new provisions on human rights, political freedoms, and political pluralism. By eliminating the stipulation of 15 years of public sector experience from the list of eligibility requirements for presidential candidates, it became possible, at least on paper, for anyone to run for the presidency.11 Similarly, Article 17 of the amended constitution recognizes political pluralism, ensures the necessary conditions for developing Turkmenistan’s civil society sector, and treats public associations equally before the law.12 • The amended constitution also includes a whole new section on Turkmenistan’s economic, financial, and credit systems. While reaffirming Turkmenistan’s commitment to the principles of market economy, Article 13 stipulates that “the state shall regulate economic activity in the interests of the individual and society.”13 This speaks to Berdimuhamedov’s “step-by-step” approach to both political and economic liberalization, which goes “without haste and steadily,” as he said in his first year in office.14 This not only provides a legal basis for state intervention in the economy but also hints at the fact that Turkmenistan is unlikely to liberalize in the near future.