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Judicial Systems of the European Union Countries

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Judicial Systems of the European Union Countries Judicial systems of the European Union countries Analysis of data by the European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ) Council of Europe Jean-Paul Jean Advocate General at the Court of Cassation Associate Professor at the University of Poitiers and Hélène Jorry Expert on European Union law Associate expert in the CEPEJ June 2013 This study is based on the data collected during the preparatory work carried out by the CEPEJ’s Working Group on Evaluation of Judicial Systems (GT-EVAL)1 with a view to preparing the latest, 2012 report on “European judicial systems” by the European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice. The fourth edition of the CEPEJ’s report (2010 data), presented in Vienna on 20 September 2012 to the Conference of Ministers of Justice of the 47 member states of the Council of Europe, provides public decision-makers and legal professionals with a data base and an analytical tool to learn more about the functioning of Europe’s public judicial service so as to be able to increase its efficiency and quality. This study makes use of the methodology devised by the CEPEJ’s expert group on evaluation, chaired by Jean-Paul Jean. Readers therefore are referred to the report for all the details on methodological aspects which are described in particular in this context. The aim of the study before you is to make a specific comparative analysis of the 27 European Union member states. With a view to the future, Croatia was included in the list of member states to take account of the fact that it is joining the European Union on 1 July 20132. The candidate countries (Iceland, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Turkey) and potential candidates (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina) were also added. The quality of the data available makes it possible to compile and analyse some significant sets of statistics in important areas to assess the major trends in Europe’s judicial systems and tie these in with reform processes that are needed or already under way. Drawing on these data, the CEPEJ proposes tools to help with the process of devising, implementing and assessing public policies to improve the efficiency of judicial systems in the European Union, based on the principles of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the Charter of Fundamental Rights. All the data sent in by member states, which were used as the basis of this report are available on the CEPEJ website at www.coe.int/CEPEJ. They should be read in conjunction with the national replies, which are also freely available and include descriptions of judicial systems and explanations which help to understand more about some of the data and trends identified. To avoid hasty judgments and meaningless parallels, it should also be stressed that this comparison of quantitative and qualitative data comes from states with varying historical, geographical, economic and judicial situations. Although the whole development of the European Union as a legal and judicial area is directed towards bringing together justice systems on the basis of shared values, the comparison must always take account of specific national characteristics such as size, levels of wealth, or judicial culture and traditions, particularly the differences between states with systems based on Roman law and common law and states in transition. 1. DEMOGRAPHIC REPRESENTATIVENESS AND LEVELS OF WEALTH The countries have been divided into two groups, the first made up of the EU 28, including Croatia, and the second of the candidate and the potential candidate countries. Data on population and wealth (GDP and average gross wage) make it possible to establish ratios with which to adjust raw data, particularly budgetary data and data linked to the activity of courts. 1 The CEPEJ working group, chaired by Jean-Paul Jean (France), was made up of Munira Dossaji (United Kingdom), Beata Z. Gruszczyńska (Poland), Ramin Gurbanov (Azerbaijan), Adis Hodzic (Bosnia-Herzegovina), Georg Stawa (Austria), Frans van der Doelen (Netherlands) and the scientific experts, Julien Lhuillier and Daria Solenik. The data base was managed by Svetlana Spoiala, consultant. 2 Treaty on the Accession of Croatia signed on 9 December 2011 in Brussels. 2 1.1 Demographic representativeness and levels of wealth in the EU member states and candidate countries Per capita GDP (in Average gross annual STATES Population euros) wage (in euros) EU 28 Austria 8 387 742 34 120.00 28 715.00 Belgium 10 839 905 32 400.00 39 165.00 Bulgaria 7 364 570 4 789.00 3 165.00 Croatia 4 412 137 10 394.00 12 647.00 Cyprus 804 536 21 569.00 23 424.00 Czech Republic 10 517 247 14 324.00 11 395.00 Denmark 5 560 628 42 446.00 49 882.00 Estonia 1 340 194 10 674.00 9 508.00 Finland 5 375 276 33 608.00 36 516.00 France 65 026 885 29 805.00 33 512.00 Germany 81 751 602 30 566.00 44 532.00 Greece 11 309 885 20 108.00 24 460.00 Hungary 9 986 000 9 712.00 9 291.00 Ireland 4 581 269 34 892.00 36 371.00 Italy 60 626 442 25 727.00 23 976.00 Latvia 2 229 600 8 096.00 7 588.00 Lithuania 3 244 600 8 378.00 6 910.00 Luxembourg 511 840 82 100.00 42 000.00 Malta 417 617 20 200.00 14 466.00 Netherlands 16 655 799 35 414.00 50 900.00 Poland 38 200 000 9 359.00 9 769.00 Portugal 10 636 979 16 245.00 20 500.00 Romania 21431298 5 700.00 5 355.00 Slovakia 5 435 273 12 125.00 9 228.00 Slovenia 2 050 189 17 286.00 17 939.00 Spain 45 989 016 23 100.00 30 819.00 Sweden 9 415 570 39 408.00 38 078.00 United Kingdom (England/Wales) 55 200 000 21 547.00 31 728.00 United Kingdom (Northern Ireland) 1 799 392 18 155.00 26 895.00 United Kingdom (Scotland) 5 222 100 22 632.00 28 915.00 CANDIDATE COUNTRIES Iceland 318 452 29 857.00 34 174.00 FYR Macedonia 2 057 284 3 383.00 5 930.00 Montenegro 620 029 5 006.00 8 580.00 Serbia 7 1206 66 3 981.00 5 694.00 Turkey 72 561 312 7 541.00 11 501.00 POTENTIAL CANDIDATE COUNTRIES Albania 3 195 000 3 149.00 3 772.00 Bosnia and Herzegovina 3 843 126 3 257.00 7 467.00 1.2 Map showing populations and levels of wealth 3 1.3 Populations and wealth in the eurozone countries The distinction between eurozone countries and others will be applied when calculating budgetary ratios, bearing in mind the variation in the exchange rates of some currencies on the reference date (1 January 2010). 4 1.4 Populations and wealth in the non-eurozone countries 2. STATE BUDGETS FOR JUDICIAL SYSTEMS 2.1 State budgets for judicial systems in the member states and candidate countries The budget for judicial systems according to the CEPEJ’s definition is made up of total spending on courts, public prosecution services and legal aid. Depending on the state, methods of funding of courts, public prosecution services and legal aid may be common or separate. In this study, these three components have been divided up to enable comparisons to be made, both between the funds allocated to prosecution and judgment and the amounts earmarked for access to justice. These data make it possible to compare the budgets allocated to their judicial system by all the EU member states and candidate countries. Only eight of the 35 countries (and seven of the 28 member states) have a system which makes it impossible to distinguish the budget for the public prosecution service from the budget for their courts, as they are managed jointly, namely Germany, Austria, Belgium, Spain, France, Greece, Luxembourg and Turkey. This is part of the Napoleonic legacy, as the growing trend is for there to be an administrative separation between the prosecuting bodies and trial bodies in line with the legal separation called for by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (for instance, Spain is moving its system towards separation). 5 Annual state budget Annual state budget Annual state budget Total budget STATES allocated to all allocated to legal aid (in allocated to public (in euros) courts (in euros) euros) prosecution (in euros) EU 28 Austria NA 18 400 000 NA 709 980 000 Belgium NA 75 326 000 NA 934 837 000 Bulgaria 112 211 184 3 867 730 79 203 203 195 282 117 Croatia 211 304 301 229 550 41 296 176 252 830 027 Cyprus 33 546 827 NA 15 964 412 NA Czech Republic 346 497 809 28 361 213 83 446 289 458 305 311 Denmark 216 795 693 87 896 311 NA NA Estonia 26 797 340 2 982 213 9 135 614 38 915 167 Finland 243 066 350 58 100 000 42 937 000 344 103 350 France NA 361 197 138 NA 3 935 548 101 Germany NA 382 382 576 NA 8 171 552 490 Greece NA 2 500 000 NA 623 470 911 Hungary 259 501 133 304 823 102 321 320 362 127 276 Ireland 148 722 000 87 435 000 43 854 000 280 011 000 Italy 3 051 375 987 127 055 510 1 249 053 619 4 427 485 116 Latvia 36 919 820 842 985 15 913 545 53 676 350 Lithuania 50 567 945 3 906 105 29 555 000 84 029 050 Luxembourg NA 3 000 000 NA 70 458 676 Malta 10 260 000 85 000 2 569 000 12 914 000 Netherlands 990 667 000 359 000 000 615 642 000 1 965 309 000 Poland 1 365 085 000 23 244 000 312 514 570 1 700 843 570 Portugal 528 943 165 51 641 260 119 901 622 700 486 047 Romania 355 246 737 7 915 238 162 428 333 525 590 308 Slovakia 138 493 788 1 357 776 63 702 886 203 554 450 Slovenia 178 158 919 5 834 338 19 263 376 203 256 633 Spain NA 237 898 199 NA 4 202 016 219 Sweden 557 260 358 195 683 782 127 316 425 880 260 565 United Kingdom (England/Wales) 1 182 000 000 2 521 000 000 755 810 000 4 458 810 000 United Kingdom (Scotland) 146 420 820 NA 135 475 200 NA United Kingdom (Northern Ireland) 83 154 000 96 280 000 43 500 000 222 934 000 EU 28 AVERAGE 446 652 008 169 418 812 185 036 527 1 334 021 731 CANDIDATE COUNTRIES Iceland 7 413 547 4 004 810 872 985 12 291 342 Montenegro 19 943 898 169 921 5 176 984 25 290 803 Serbia 111 016 635 NA 22 608 698 183 772 111 FYR Macedonia 28 541 751 NA 4 740 867 NA Turkey NA 79 338 098 NA 1 234 286 802 Albania 10 552 685 21 429 8 901 893 19 476 007 Bosnia and Herzegovina 69 300 099 5 906 637 20 400 465 95 607 201 AVERAGE FOR CANDIDATE 41 128 103 17 888 179 10 450 315 261 787 378 COUNTRIES OVERALL AVERAGE 362 750 310 146 459 626 147 625 196 1 139 070 030 There are major disparities between the member states where it comes to the budget they allocate for the functioning of the judicial system.
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