Supreme Court of the United States

APPENDIX A

No. 17-6242

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

GEOFFREY M. YOUNG, Plaintiff-Appellant,

V. ORDER SANNIE L. OVERLY, ET AL., Defendants-Appellees.

BEFORE: BATCHELDER, GRIFFIN, and LARSEN, Circuit Judges.

The court received a petition for rehearing en bane. The original panel has reviewed the petition for rehearing and concludes that the issues raised in the petition were fully considered upon the original submission and decision of the case. The petition was then circulated to the full court. No judge has requested a vote on the suggestion for rehearing en bane.

Therefore, the petition is denied.

ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT Deborah S. Hunt, Clerk

FILED: Aug 27, 2018 2a APPENDIX B NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION No. 17-6242

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

GEOFFREY M. YOUNG, ) Plaintiff-Appellant, ) ON APPEAL FROM ) THE UNITED V. ) STATES DISTRICT ) COURT FOR THE SANNIE L. OVERLY, et al., ) EASTERN Defendants-Appellees. ) DISTRICT OF ) KENTUCKY )

ORDER

Before: BATCHELDER, GRIFFIN, and LARSEN, Circuit Judges.

Geoffrey M. Young, a Kentucky resident proceeding pro se, appeals the district court's order dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights action. He has filed a motion to amend the case caption. This case has been referred to a panel of the court that, upon examination, unanimously agrees that oral argument is not needed. See Fed. R. App. P 34(a).

In his complaint, Young challenged the activities of certain Kentucky Democratic Party officials relating 3a to his campaign for political office in Kentucky' He alleged that a "conspiracy by powerful Democrats, both in and out of Kentucky government, . . . deprived [him] of his due process rights guaranteed by the United States and Kentucky Constitutions and statutory law." He asserted specifically that the defendants: (1) conspired to install Sannie Overly and Neville Blakemore as chair and vice-chair of the Kentucky Democratic Party, In violation of 18 U.S.C. § 241; (2) conspired to install Clint Morris as chair of the Fayette County Democratic Party, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 241; (3) denied him due process by failing to provide an adequate process for resolving disagreements amongst Democratic Party members; (4) unlawfully intimidated him in connec- tion with his political activities, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 245(b); (5) deprived him of his rights under color of law, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 242; (6) engaged in honest-services fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1346; (7) nullified Kentucky Revised Statutes Annotated § 118.105(1) and 118.176; and (8) unlawfully threatened to seek sanctions against him for his state court activities. He named Overly and Morris as defendants as well as Attorney General Andy Beshear, Secretary of State Allison Lundergan Grimes, former Attorney General Jack Conway, the Kentucky Democratic Party State Central Executive Committee, and the Fayette County

The current lawsuit represents Young's third attempt to challenge the activities of the defendants. His prior two suits, both filed in state court, were dismissed for failure to state a claim, with the judge in Young's second case imposing sanctions upon him. 4a

Democratic Party Executive Committee. He sought compensatory and punitive damages as well as temporary and permanent injunctive relief. In separate motions, he moved for the imposition of sanctions against the defendants.

The defendants filed separate motions to dismiss. Young moved to file an amended complaint detailing new allegations pertaining to a separate 2 political campaign.

The district court granted the defendants' motions to dismiss and denied Young's request for sanctions. After observing that "there are multiple avenues this Court could take to dismiss all of [Young's] claims," the court held that Young failed to state a claim against any of the defendants. The court also warned him that he could be subject to sanctions for future frivolous filings. The court did not address Young's proposed amended complaint. On appeal, Young argues that the district court erred by dismissing his complaint for failure to state a claim.

Before we determine whether the district court properly granted the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, we must determine whether the Eleventh Amendment bars the exercise of jurisdiction over certain claims. Cady v. Arenac Cty., 574 F.3d 334, 339, 344-45 (6th Cir. 2009). In this case, Young sued Beshear and

2 The complaint would have been Young's second amended complaint. 5a

Grimes in both their official and individual capacities. The Eleventh Amendment generally bars a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity. Id. at 344. But there is an exception to that general rule "if an official-capacity suit seeks only prospective injunctive or declaratory relief." Ic!. (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 276-78 (1986)). To the extent Young sued Beshear and Grimes in their official capacities for damages, his suit is barred by the Eleventh Amendment, and the district court lacked jurisdiction over those claims. The exception allowing suits for injunctive relief does not apply when the official is alleged to have violated state law alone. Papasan, 478 U.S. at 277 (citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 106 (1984)). The district court also lacked jurisdiction, therefore, to consider Young's seventh claim against Beshear and Grimes in their official capacities because it alleged only that the defendants' actions violated Kentucky state law.

We review de novo a district court's dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Total Benefits Planning Agency, Inc. v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 552 E3d 430, 433 (6th Cir. 2008). In order to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P 8(a)(2). A complaint must have "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Ati. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the Ga misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Igbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Facial plausibility "depends on a host of considerations, including common sense and the strength of competing explanations for the defendant's conduct." 16630 Southfield Ltd. P'ship v. Flagstar Bank, F.S.B., 727 EM 502, 504 (6th Cir. 2013). A complaint that offers "labels and conclusions," "formulaic recitation[s] of the elements of a cause of action," or "naked assertion[s]' devoid of 'further factual enhancement" will not survive a motion to dismiss. IQbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557).

To state a viable § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must allege (1) a deprivation of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Federal Constitution or laws of the United States (2) that was caused by a person while acting under color of state law. See Flag Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155-57 (1978); Harbin-Bey v. Rutter, 420 F.3d 571, 575 (6th Cir. 2005).

Young's first, second, fourth, fifth, and sixth claims did not state claims upon which relief may be granted. In these claims, Young alleged that the defendants violated certain federal criminal statutes-18 U.S.C. § 241, 242, 245, and 1346. However, criminal statutes generally do not create private causes of action, see Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 190 (1994), and none of the statutes Young specifically invoked provide private causes of action, see United States v. Oguaiu, 76 F. App'x 579, 581 (6th Cir. 2003) (affirming the dismissal of claims brought under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242 "because [plaintiff] has no private right of 7a action under either of these criminal statutes"); RJ Prod. Co. v. Nestle USA, Inc., No. 10-0584 (ESH), 2010 WL 1506914, at *2 n.1 (D.D.C. Apr. 15, 2010) (holding that plaintiff lacked a claim under 18 U.S.C. § 1346 and related statutes because "these criminal statutes do not provide for private causes of action"); Cooley v. Keisling, 45 E Supp. 2d 818, 820 (D. Or. 1999) ("18 U.S.C. § 245 is a criminal statute and does not grant the plaintiff a private right of action."). Section 1983 "is not itself a source of substantive right,' but merely provides 'a method for vindicating federal right elsewhere conferred." Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). Because the federal criminal statutes Young alleges that the defendants violated do not confer any rights on him, these claims did not state claims upon which relief may be granted.

Young's seventh claim also did not state a claim upon which relief may be granted. In his seventh claim, Young argued that various defendants effectively nullified Kentucky Revised Statutes Annotated § 118.105(1) and 118.176 by ignoring them and by representing to Young that he lacked a cause of action under either statute. However, Young, as the Kentucky Court of Appeals previously informed him, does, in fact, lack a cause of action under section 118.105(1). See Young v. Beshear, No. 2015-CA-000669-MR, 2016 WL 929653, at *3 (Ky. Ct. App. Mar. 11, 2016). Like his claims based on violations of federal criminal law, then, this claim fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Young's claim that section 118.176 was violated is devoid of any clarifying details that would suggest that he has a viable claim. See Directv, Inc. v. Treesh, 487 E3d 471, 476 (6th Cir. 2007) (observing that, at the motion-to-dismiss stage, courts do not need to accept legal conclusions as true).

Young's eighth claim additionally did not state a claim upon which relief may be granted. In his eighth claim, Young contended that Conway improperly threatened to move for sanctions against him in Young's second state court lawsuit. Conway did request sanctions, which the trial court granted. Young has not pointed to any authority that would suggest that a request for judicial relief gives rise to a cause of action, and such activity is, in fact, generally constitutionally protected. See, e.g., Kno1ogv Inc v. Insight Commc'ns Co., 393 F.3d 656, 659 (6th Cir. 2004). Finally, Young's third claim did not state a claim upon which relief may be granted. In his third claim, Young maintained that the defendants lack a "genuine process . . . to resolve serious disagreements between Kentucky Democrats" in violation of his due process rights. He cited the defendants' handling of his challenge to the election of Morris as the chair of the Fayette County Democratic Party, Grimes's refusal to investigate a criminal complaint that Young submitted to the Kentucky Board of Elections, and Grimes's refusal to ask Kentucky Governor Matt Bevin to appoint a special prosecutor to investigate the defendants' actions. The constitutional guarantee of due process prohibits "arbitrary and unfair deprivations of protected life, liberty, or property interests without procedural safeguards." Howard v. Grinage, 82 E3d 1343, 1350 (6th Cir. 1996). Young has not identified a 9a protected liberty or property interest that the defendants infringed. He has no protected interest in making Grimes, Kentucky's Secretary of State, investigate allegations of criminal misconduct or in having a special prosecutor appointed to investigate such allegations. See Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973) ("[A] private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another."). He also lacks an interest in being able to compete for elected positions within the Kentucky Democratic Party. e.g., Rosenberg v. Republican Party of Louisville & Jefferson Cty., 270 S.W2d 171, 172 (Ky. 1954) ("Courts do not interfere with internal party matters."). Because Young did not establish that he was deprived of a protected liberty or property interest, the defendants were not required to afford him due process and his claim therefore fails.

As a final point, Young, on appeal, argues that the district court held his pleadings to an improperly high standard, effectively dismissing his complaint for his failure to precisely identify the legal theories he needed to invoke. He cites Johnson v. City of Shelby, 135 S. Ct. 346 (2014) (per curiam), in which the Supreme Court reversed the dismissal of a civil rights action for the plaintiffs' failure to specifically invoke § 1983 in their complaint. See id. at 347. The district court, however, did not dismiss Young's action because he made an "imperfect statement of the legal theor[ies] supporting" his claims. Id. at 346. Rather, the court determined that, "even if Young's claims are true, they are not capable of being resolved in this Court." Young, even l0a as a pro se plaintiff, was obligated to "provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitle[ment] to relief" in his complaint. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Although the factual allegations in his complaint are voluminous, Young did not, for the reasons noted, identify a viable legal theory in his complaint. The district court's dismissal was therefore appropriate.

Young additionally maintains that the district court erred by not granting him leave to file a second amended complaint.

The district court did not address Young's attempt to add a second amended complaint, but the court's error was harmless. Courts do not need to grant leave to amend where a proposed amendment would be futile. See SFS Check, LLC v. First Bank of Del., 774 EM 351, 354 (6th Cir. 2014). "Amending would be futile if a proposed amendment would not survive a motion to dismiss." jj at 355. Young's proposed second amended complaint, addressing a separate political campaign, would have added new allegations and new defendants, but not new claims. Because Young's first amended complaint was subject to dismissal and his proposed amendments would not have changed that outcome, amendment would have been futile and therefore improper. See id.

Young finally argues that the district court erred by warning him about possible sanctions, rather than granting his motion to sanction the defendants. The district court properly denied Young's request for sanctions. A court may award sanctions under Federal ha

Rule of Civil Procedure 11 where a party's conduct is "objectively unreasonable" or where a party lacks a "reasonable basis for making [a] claim." Montell v. Diversified Clinical Servs., Inc., 757 E3d 497, 510 (6th Cir. 2014).

We review a district court's ruling on a request for sanctions for an abuse of discretion. Id. The district court did not abuse its discretion. Young, as the district court observed, essentially "condemn[ed] the Defendants and their counsel for the practice of law, namely citing relevant legal authority and presenting thoughtful legal analysis." Such conduct does not warrant the issuance of sanctions. See id.

Because the district court lacked jurisdiction over certain claims against Beshear and Grimes in their official capacities, properly granted the defendants' motions to dismiss as to the remaining claims, and did not otherwise commit reversible error by denying Young's request for sanctions and by not granting his motion to file a second amended complaint, we AFFIRM the district court's judgment. We DENY Young's motion to amend the case caption as unnecessary.

ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT /s/

Deborah S. Hunt, Clerk 12a

APPENDIX C

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY CENTRAL DIVISION FRANKFORT Sep 29, 2017 Civil No. 3:16-cv-00062-GFVT (E.D. Ky. Sep. 29, 2017) Gregory F. Van Tatenhove United States District Judge

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER

*** *** *** ***

Not all disputes are capable of resolution in Federal Court. Here, Plaintiff Geoffrey M. Young ran for Governor in the Democratic Primary. Young takes exception to a variety of actions taken by Democratic Party officials as part of that endeavor. As explained below, even if Young's claims are true, they are not capable of being resolved in this Court of limited jurisdiction. Consequently, Defendants' Motions to Dismiss [R. 15; R. 17; R. 18] will be GRANTED and Young's Motions for Sanctions [R. 28; R. 34; R. 35.] will be DENIED. I A

Young alleges a number of violations of various statutes related to his bid for the Democratic nomination for Governor. Even construing his claims liberally, addressing Mr. Young's various concerns is difficult. There are multiple avenues this Court could take to 13a dismiss all of his claims, though no arguments in the alternative will be fully fleshed out here. As one example, many, if not all of Mr. Young's complaints are likely barred by resfudicata.

Young filed his original complaint on August 19, 2016, and an amended complaint on October 28, 2016. The amended complaint is nearly identical to his original complaint, except for repeated references to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in an apparent attempt to rectify the issues identified by Defendants in their original Motions to Dismiss. [R. 9; R. 10; R. 11.]

Essentially, Young alleges that Defendants violated his constitutional right to run for chairperson or vice-chair of the Kentucky Democratic Party and the Fayette Democratic Party [R. 19-1 at 36, 37.] He makes various arguments related to how meetings were conducted in secret and inappropriately. [Id. at 38.1 Young also makes allegations that Defendants violated criminal statutes.

For all of these violations, Young seeks general, compensatory, and special damages; punitive damages; emergency injunction; and any other relief the court deems proper. [See R. 19-1.] Young also requests a settlement conference and for this court to freeze all assets of the KDP and FCDI among other requests. [See Id] B

Federal Rule of civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows a defendant to seek dismissal of a complaint which fails to 14a state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P 12(b)(6). In making such a motion, "[t]he defendant has the burden of showing that Young has failed to state a claim for relief." DirecTT( Inc. v Treesh, 487 F.3d 471, 476 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Carver v Bunch, 946 E2d 451, 454-55 (6th Cir. 1991)). Federal Rule 8 requires only "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P 8(a)(2). However, to survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint "must contain either direct or inferential allegations" establishing each material element required for recovery under some actionable legal theory. Bishop v Lucent Technologies, Inc., 520 F.3d 516, 519 (6th Cir. 2008) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).

When reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court "construe[s] the complaint in the light most favorable to Young, accept[s] its allegations as true, and draw[s] all reasonable inferences in favor of Young." DirecTh,T Inc., 487 F.3d at 476 (citation omitted). The Court, however, "need not accept as true legal conclusions or unwarranted factual inferences." Id (citation omitted). Moreover, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v IqbaI, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v Trvomblj 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). In other words, the facts that are pled must rise to the level of plausibility, not just possibility - "facts that are merely consistent with a defendant's liability . . . stop[ ] short of the line between possibility and plausibility." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombljç 550 U.S. at 557). According to the Sixth Circuit, "[a] claim has facial plausibility when Young 15a pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.' DfrecTEInc., 487 E3d at 476 (citing Jvomb1jç 550 U.S. at 556). Thus, Young must at least "provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief, [which] requires more than labels and conclusions. . . ." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

When ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a district court generally may not consider matters presented outside the pleadings unless it converts the motion into one for summary judgment under Rule 56. Fed. R. Civ. P 12(d); Heinrich v Waiting Angels Adoption Servs., Inc., 668 EM 393. 405 (6th Cir. 2012). The district court, however, also has the discretion to ignore such evidence and resolve the motion solely on the basis of the pleadings. Heith*h, 668 EM at 405; Max Arnold & Sons, LLC v WL. Halley & Co., Inc., 452 F.3d 494, 502-03 (6th Cir. 2006) (collecting cases). Certain matters beyond the allegations in the complaint, such as "matters of public record, orders, items appearing in the record of the case, and exhibits attached to the complaint, also may be taken into account." Amini v Oberlin College, 259 F.3d 493, 502 (6th Cir. 2001) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Additionally, the Sixth Circuit has held that when a defendant attaches undisputed documents to a motion to dismiss, they "are considered part of the pleadings if they are referred to in Young's complaint and are central to [his] claim." Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

Finally, pro se pleadings are held to "less 16a stringent standards" and are "entitled to liberal construction,' which "requires active interpretation in some cases to construe a pro se petition to encompass any allegation stating federal relief." &ank1in v Rose, 765 E2d 82, 85 (6th Cir. 1985) (internal quotations omitted).

II A

Though Young makes several claims that his "Constitutional rights" were violated, the only explicit reference to a right conferred by the Constitution is Young's third claim for relief. This is his claim that he was denied due process in violation of 42 U.S.0 § 1983. [Id] Though Young attempted to correct his original complaint by adding in language pertaining to 42 U.S.0 § 1983 throughout his amended complaint, 42 U.S.0 § 1983 "is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred." Molciowan v Cizy of Warren, 578 F.3d 351, 376 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Baker v MeCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). The first step in analyzing a 42 U.S.0 § 1983 claim is to determine "whether Young has been deprived of a right secured by the Constitution and laws." Baker, 443 U.S. at 140 (internal quotations omitted).

Young alleges that Defendants operated a "kangaroo court" on April 30, 2016 when he appealed and argued against the election of Clint Morris to the chair of the Fayette County Democratic Party. [Id at 18.] Young makes various allegations. For example, he claims 17a

Defendant Overly did not distribute copies of his appeal to board members; that Defendant Overly herself inappropriately oversaw the proceedings; and that he was asked hostile questions by board members present. [Ic!. at 20.1 Further, Young alleges Defendant Grimes did not fully investigate Young's criminal complaint that he presented to the Kentucky Board of Elections and refused to ask Governor Matt Bevin to appoint a special prosecutor to do so. [Ic!. at 39.1

To assert a due process violation according to § 1983, Young must either demonstrate that he has been "deprived of property as a result of established state procedure that itself violates due process rights"; or prove "that the defendants deprived him of property pursuant to a random and unauthorized act and that available state remedies would not adequately compensate for the loss." Macene v HJW, Inc., 951 E2d 700, 706 (6th Cir. 1991) (internal quotations omitted). Due process "generally requires some type of hearing prior to a state's deprivation of an individual's liberty or property." Macene, 951 F.2d at 706.

Young references the "kangaroo court' on April 30, 2016, as a violation of his due process rights. However, there was no property or liberty taken away from Defendant; he merely thought the meeting was run poorly. This is not a violation of due process. Young also alleges that Defendant Grimes refused to investigate or appoint a special prosecutor for the allegations Young brought before the Kentucky Board of Elections. Young has no Constitutional right to make the Secretary of State investigate any crime and has no Constitutional 18a right to ensure a special prosecutor is appointed to investigate his allegations. See Linda R.S v RichardD., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973) ("[A] private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another."); Young v Herald, No. 04- CV-245-WOB, 2005 WL 1048117, *8 (E.D. Ky. May 3, 2005) (recognizing same). Again, there was no deprivation of Young's property or liberty, no due process was needed, and no due process rights were violated. Because Young has not established that the state deprived him of his property or liberty, no due process was needed. Therefore, Young has not demonstrated any violations of due process. Young's third claim for relief for violation of due process is dismissed.

Young's first and second claims for relief are pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 241. Young's first claim for relief is for violation of Young's alleged constitutional right to run for chairperson or vice-chair of the Kentucky Democratic Party. [R. 19-1 at 36.] Young alleges that no election was held on June 14, 2016, when Defendant Overly was installed as the state leader of the Kentucky Democratic Party. [Ic!. at 37.1 Young's second claim is for violation of Young's alleged constitutional right to compete for the position of chair of the KDP on January 30, 2016, and chair of the Fayette county Democratic Party on April 16, 2016. [Id.] In both cases, Young claims that the meetings held to elect these positions were held in secret. [Id. at 38.1 Though Young claims these are Constitutional violations, there is no Constitutional right to run for chairperson or vice-chair of a political party, no 19a right to compete for the position of chair of a state political party, and no right to compete for chair of a county political organization.

Young's fourth claim for relief is pursuant to 18 U.S.0 § 245(b) for intimidating a candidate through the threat of force. [Id.] Young alleges that Liza Fossett and Josh Monroe threatened to have Young arrested and thrown in jail and this would have hurt his reputation had they actually arrested him. [Id at 40.] Young's fifth claim for relief is pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 242 for deprivation of rights under color of law. [Id.] Young alleges that because Defendants violated 4 U.S.C. § 1983 while in a quasi-government institution, they were acting under color of law. [Id. at 41.] 18 U.S.C. § 241 is a criminal statute criminalizing certain conspiracies. Sections 245 and 242 are criminal statutes criminalizing deprivation of rights under color of law. However, there is "no private right of action under [any] of these criminal statutes." United States v Oguaju, 76 F. App'x 579, 581 (6th Cir. 2003). Therefore, Young's first, second, fourth, and fifth claims are dismissed.

Young's sixth claim for relief is for deprivation of his right of honest services according to 18 U.S.C. § 1346. [Id] Young alleges that Defendants Conway and/or Beshear should have appointed a special prosecutor to investigate the various claims he brought against Defendants. [Id. at 44.] 20a

18 U.S.C. § 1346 states, "[for the purposes of this chapter, the term 'scheme or artifice to defraud' includes a scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of honest services." This is a definition and there is no right of action pursuant to this statute, as a private citizen cannot initiate a federal criminal prosecution. See, e.g., In re Morris, No. 3:10-BK-04143, 2010 WL 4272868, *4 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2010) (explaining that section 1347 merely defines a crime and does not provide a private right of action, and compiling cases). Even construing pro se Young's complaint liberally, this Court is unsure what relief he is seeking under this definition. Accordingly, Young's sixth claim for relief is dismissed.

I*J

Young's seventh claim for relief is for nullifying valid statutes according to 42 U.S.0 § 1983. [Id] Young alleges that various Defendants and state court judges nullified KRS 118.105(1) by not correctly nominating candidates for office. {R. 19 at 44.1

This statute merely lays out how nominations in political parties should be made. As Young has already been told in an opinion issued by the Court of Appeals of Kentucky, "Kentucky Revised Statutes 118.105(1) [does not] provide[] any remedy for Young. The statute merely directs that political parties nominate all of their candidates." Young v. Besheai No. 2015-CA-000669-MR, 2016 WL 929653, at *3 (Ky. Ct. App. Mar. 11, 2016), review denied (June 8, 2016). Young's seventh claim for relief is dismissed. 21a

Young's eighth claim for relief states that he was intimidated by various Defendants, who threatened him with sanctions according to Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure 11. [Id. at 46.] In a case before Jefferson Circuit Court, Young alleges that Defendants' attorney asked Young to dismiss his case or they would seek sanctions against Young. [Id.] Young admits that he was in fact sanctioned in that case before Jefferson Circuit Court. [Id.; R. 11-3 at 220.] The order from state court states, "Young has previously filed the same action in another division of Jefferson Circuit Court. This action was dismissed on the merits. .. . Young illustrates no set of circumstances that would entitled him to relief." [R. 11-3 at 3.1 Judge Angela McCormick Bisig of Jefferson Circuit Court then ordered that Jack Conway be awarded the reasonable costs of litigation. [See Id.]

Regardless, Young has stated no cause of action in his eighth claim of relief but merely lay out facts that have already been resolved in Jefferson Circuit Court. He claims he was intimidated by sanctions but cites no statute or authority under which this Court may grant relief. In fact, he was threatened with sanctions because his frivolous lawsuit was sanctionable and was in fact sanctioned. Young's eighth claim for relief is dismissed.

Finally, Young seeks sanctions against all the Defendants and their counsel. [R. 28; R. 34; R. 35.] The three Motions for Sanctions are largely similar and can 22a be analyzed together.

In his Motions for Sanctions, Young brings up new allegations of being banned from Democratic meetings. [See R. 34 at 2.] Young summarily states that nearly all the case law as stated by all parties is inaccurate. [Ic!. at 7.] He makes assertions that he has already proven certain elements of his claim, so for Defendants to disagree with him is sanctionable. [See Id at 12, stating "Young provided that Argument III about res judicata is untenable, so for the KDP Defendants to insist on it now would violate FRCP 11(b)(1), (2) and (3)."1

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 generally prohibits frivolous arguments and allows the Court to sanction parties for bringing forth arguments that do not have a basis in law or in evidence. Young's Motions for Sanctions do not bring any information before this Court that should lead to sanctions. Young condemns the Defendants and their counsel for the practice of law, namely citing relevant legal authority and presenting thoughtful legal analysis. Simply making a statement of law does not make it true, as Young would have us rule. A legal argument, even if ultimately ruled against, does not bring sanctions, and is simply how the legal system operates. Accordingly, each Motion for Sanctions is denied.

On the contrary, this Court agrees with Defendants' argument that Young should be wary of being sanctioned himself. [See R. 37 at 8; R. 22 at 6; R. 29 at 11.1 As Young is a pro se litigant and is without formal training in the law, the Court does feel compelled to 23a extend a word of caution on filing claims in federal court when there are no factual circumstances to support the causes of action he alleges. It is simply not the case that anyone who pays the Court's filing fee may air any grievance in federal court, no matter how speculative or whether such grievances are grounded in fact. Federal substantive and procedural laws contain provisions that can cause plaintiffs alleging baseless claims to be sanctioned by the court or to be responsible for paying the attorney's fees of the adversary that was wrongfully hauled into court. It has been long recognized that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 applies to pro se plaintiffs and permits sanctions by the Court when the asserted action is frivolous or without evidentiary support. Graham v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 1:08-CV-299, 2009 WL 1034942 at *4 (E.D. Tenn. Apr. 17, 2009) (citing Bus. Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Commcns. Enters., 498 U.S. 533, 564 (1991)). Under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, a prevailing defendant may recover attorney's fees when the Court finds that the "Plaintiffs action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation." Fox v Vice, 563 U.S. 826. 833 (2011) (citations omitted). The purpose of that provision is to "protect defendants from burdensome litigation having no factual basis." Id. (citing Christiansburg Garment Co. v Equal Emp 't Opportunity Comm'n, 434 U.S. 412, 420 (1978)). Additionally, under 28 U.S.C. § 1927, "[a]y attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court .. . who so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct." 28 U.S.C. § 1927.10 (2012). 24a

The Court does not at this time make any findings that these provisions are applicable here and sua sponte assess sanctions or require fee shifting. However, the Court does alert Young that such consequences 'exist in the federal system and could be requested by current or future defendants or assessed by the Court if his claims are found to be unsupported by fact and frivolous. This warning is certainly not given to discourage Young from filing whatever meritorious claims that he might have, but to provide guidance going forward.

III

Accordingly, and for the reasons set forth above, it is hereby ORDERED:

Motions to Dismiss the Original Complaint filed by Defendants are DENIED as MOOT ER. 9; R. 10; R. 11];

Motions to Dismiss the Amended Complaint filed by Defendants are GRANTED ER. 15; R. 17; R. 181;

Young's Motion to Strike his Original Complaint is GRANTED [R. 20];

Young's Motions for Sanctions are DENIED [R. 28; R. 34; R. 35];

Defendant Beshear's Motion for Extension of Time is DENIED as MOOT [R. 38]; and

This action is DISMISSED with prejudice and 25a

STRICKEN from the Court's active docket.

This the 29th day of September, 2017. /5/

Gregory F. Van Tatenhove

United States District Judge