ARMOR July-August 2007

The Professional Bulletin of the Armor Branch PB 17-07-4

Editor in Chief Features LTC SHANE E. LEE 7 Six Easy Ways to Lose a War at the Tactical Level Managing Editor by Colonel Jeffrey Sanderson and Major Jay Miseli CHRISTY BOURGEOIS 11 A Commander’s Guide to the Forward Support Company by Major Trenton J. Conner Commandant MG ROBERT M. WILLIAMS 18 “King of the Killing Zone,” How Well Has It Held Up? by Lieutenant Colonel Benjamin Harris

ARMOR (ISSN 0004-2420) is published bi- 21 Integrating Armor into Personnel Recovery Operations month ly by the U.S. Army Armor Center, by Captain Romeo P. Cubas, U.S. Marine Corps ATTN: ATZK-DAS-A, Building 1109A, 201 6th Avenue, Ste 373, Fort Knox, KY 40121-5721. 26 Retaking Sa’ad: Successful Counterinsurgency in Tal Afar Disclaimer: The information contained in AR- by Major Niel Smith MOR represents the professional opinions of the authors and does not necessarily reflect 36 So You Want to Train an Iraqi Mechanized Brigade? the official Army or TRADOC position, nor does it change or supersede any information by Major William T. Nuckols Jr. presented in other official Army publications. 40 Falklands Armor Official distribution is limited to one copy for by Retired Brigadier General Raymond Bell Jr. each armored brigade headquarters, armored cavalry regiment headquarters, armor battalion headquarters, armored cavalry squadron 46 Winning in Degraded Mode headquarters, reconnaissance squadron head- by Wakeland K. Kuamoo and Sergeant First Class Brian Reel quar ters, armored cavalry troop, armor company, and motorized brigade headquarters of 48 My Kingdom for a Proper Fitting Fan Belt the United States Army. In addition, Army li- by Lieutenant Colonel Scott Fowler braries, Army and DOD schools, HQ DA and MACOM staff agencies with responsibility for armored, direct fire, ground combat systems, organizations, and the training of personnel Departments for such organizations may request two copies by sending a request to the editor in chief. 2 Contacts Authorized Content: ARMOR will print only 3 Letters those materials for which the U.S. Army Armor 4 Commander’s Hatch Center has proponency. That proponency in- 5 Driver’s Seat cludes: all armored, direct-fire ground combat 6 From the Boresight Line systems that do not serve primarily as infantry carriers; all weapons used exclusively in these 51 Reviews systems or by CMF 19-series enlisted soldiers; 53 Armor Strong any miscellaneous items of equipment which armor and armored cavalry organizations use exclusively; training for all 19-series officers and for all CMF-19-series enlisted soldiers; and information concerning the training, logistics, history, and leadership of armor and armored cavalry units at the brigade/regiment level and below, to include Threat units at those levels. Material may be reprinted, provided credit is given to ARMOR and to the author, except where copyright is indicated. Periodicals Postage paid at Fort Knox, KY, and additional mailing ofﬁ ces. Postmaster: Send address changes to Editor, ATTN: ATZK-DAS-A, ARMOR, 201 6th Avenue, Ste 373, Fort Knox, KY 40121-5721. Distribution Restriction: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. July-August 2007, Vol. CXVI, No. 4 USPS 467-970 “From My Position...”

“This is just not another training pamphlet; it is a magazine and of an after-action review often lead to markedly improved perfor- like all good magazines it will be interesting, stimulating and, I hope, mance during subsequent missions. Their article is designed to at times amusing. In it you will find current military thought, tips on promote the kind of discussion that will lead to improvement at the training, and the lessons of war illustrated by experience in battle. level of responsibility of most of the readers of this journal — the tactical level. “You will be the authors of the articles; you will contribute the ideas and suggestions that will make alive your training and your lead- Unlike more recent editions of ARMOR, this issue has no control- ership. We have all got a lot to learn and we have all got some- ling theme. It is a collection of articles that touch on recent armor thing which, out of our own experience and study, we can teach. history, lessons learned, and professional development. Leaders This magazine is to enable us to share the results of that experi- unfamiliar with the capabilities of the forward support company in ence and that study. I want every officer and NCO to read the heavy brigade combat teams for example, will find Major Trenton [journal] and I want a lot of you to contribute to it.” Conner’s article, “A Commander’s Guide to the Forward Support Company,” to be a very useful summary of the roles, missions, and Field Marshal Viscount Slim of Burma organization of this vitally important unit. Additionally, Major Niel Forward to the first edition of the British Army Journal, Smith provides some valuable insights into the planning and ex- later renamed British Army Review ecution of a successful counterinsurgency operation in Sa’ad in his article “Retaking Sa’ad: Successful Counterinsurgency in Tal Although ARMOR is a professional bulletin, according to Depart- Afar.” In it, he not only recounts the major events of the opera- ment of the Army Pamphlet 25-40, I could not have found a better tion, but also discusses the thought processes behind the selec- description of our publication than the one Field Marshal Slim ar- tion of Sa’ad as the target of the effort. For this reason, it may be ticulated for his own army’s journal in 1949. ARMOR is a reflec- especially useful to leaders facing similar situations in their areas tion of the force it serves. As such, it serves to educate mounted of operation. soldiers and encourage them to think more deeply about their profession. Every edition of ARMOR is a brief sound bite of an unbro- If it has been a while since you last read ARMOR’s “Letters to the ken dialogue that began in 1888. Long before we knew anything Editor” section, make sure you take a look at this month’s version. about knowledge management or communities of practice, our Dr. Robert Cameron’s article, “Scouts Out — But Not in HMMWVs!,” mounted ancestors came together on the pages of this publica- which appeared in the March-April issue, has sparked the kind of tion to learn from each other. We are very proud of our branch’s passionate response that has been the hallmark of our journal for professional journal and constantly seek ways to improve its qual- many years. Recently, we were somewhat concerned that either ity and relevance to the armor force. the force was too busy to respond to our articles or the articles themselves were not sufficiently thought provoking to motivate our Frank, but professional, discussions will always find a welcome readers to write. The responses to Dr. Cameron’s article have at home in this publication. Although it has a provocative title, “Six least temporarily put those concerns to rest. We constantly seek Easy Ways to Lose a War at the Tactical Level,” by Colonel Jeffrey to find articles that promote thoughtful and professional discus- Sanderson and Major Jay Miseli, is not one of those articles in- sion on any subject that affects the armor force. If you have an tentionally designed to be offensive. At times, it is an uncomfort- opinion on a particular issue, take time to organize your thoughts, able read, but it is uncomfortable in the same way that mid-rota- conduct some supporting research if necessary, and write them tion after-action reviews at our combat training centers are uncom- down. In the end, we will all benefit from your efforts. fortable. No one likes to sit through those events, but most of us recognize their usefulness. Discussions started during the course S.E. LEE

By Order of the Secretary of the Army: Official:

JOYCE E. MORROW GEORGE W. CASEY, JR. Administrative Assistant to the General, United States Army Secretary of the Army Chief of Staff 0712401 DSN prefix – 464- Points of Contact Commercial prefix– (502) 624-

ARMOR Editorial Offices U.S. Army Armor Center

Editor in Chief Commanding General (ATZK-CG) LTC Shane E. Lee 4087 MG Robert M. Williams 2121 E-mail: [email protected] E-mail: [email protected]

Managing Editor Deputy Commanding General (ATZK-DCG) Christy Bourgeois 4582 COL Peter Bayer Jr. 7555 E-mail: [email protected] E-mail: [email protected]

Editor Chief of Staff (ATZK-CS) Vivian Oertle 2610 POC: Jessica Miller 1101 E-mail: [email protected] E-mail: [email protected] Art Director Command Sergeant Major (ATZK-CSM) Mr. Jody Harmon 3923 CSM Otis Smith 4952 E-mail: [email protected] E-mail: [email protected] Editorial Assistant Kathy A. Johnson 2249 Command Sergeant Major to DCG (ATZK-DCG-CSM) E-mail: [email protected] CSM Raymond Chandler 7091 E-mail: [email protected]

Special Assistant to the CG (ARNG) (ATZK-SA) ARTICLE SUBMISSIONS: To improve speed and accuracy in edit- COL Marlin Levendoski 1315 ing, manuscripts should be originals or clear copies, either typed or print- E-mail: [email protected] ed out double-spaced, with a 3½-inch disk in Microsoft Word, Rich Text Format, or ASCII (please indicate wordprocessing format on disk or Directorate of Training, Doctrine, and Combat Development cover letter). Tape captions to any illustrations or photos submitted. Ad- COL Robert Valdivia (ATZK-TD) ditionally, we accept articles as e-mail or attachments at: E-mail: [email protected] 8247

[email protected] TRADOC Capability Manager for Heavy Brigade Combat Team When sending articles via e-mail, please include a complete mailing ad- COL Jeff B. Swisher (ATZK-TS) dress and daytime phone number. E-mail: [email protected] 7955

SUBMISSION POLICY NOTE: Due to the limited space per issue, TRADOC Capability Manager, Platform Battle we will not print articles that have been submitted to, and accepted for Command/Combat Identification (ATZK-PBC-CID) publication by, other Army professional bulletins. Please submit your COL Alan Mosher 4009 article to only one Army professional bulletin at a time. E-mail: [email protected]

GRAPHICS AND PHOTOS: We prefer conventional photo prints, but Office, Chief of Armor (ATZK-AR) will accept electronic graphic and photo files in no less than 300 dpi Aubrey Henley 5155 format. (Please do not send photos embedded in PowerPoint and Word.) E-mail: [email protected] FAX 7585 If you use Power Point for illustrations, please try to avoid the use of ex- Unit of Action Maneuver Battle Lab (ATZK-UA) cessive color and shading. If you have any questions concerning elec- Joe Hughes 5050 tronic art or photo submissions, call Vivian Oertle at the phone number E-mail: [email protected] above. Assistant TRADOC Capability Manager ADDRESS CHANGES, PAID SUBSCRIPTIONS, AND ST. GEORGE- Soldier - Mounted Warrior (ATZK-ATS) ST. JOAN AWARDS: For paid subscription ser vice, address chang- Larry Hasty 3662 es, and delivery problems, or for awards informa tion, contact Con- E-mail: [email protected] nie Stiggers or Connie McMillen, United States Armor Association, P.O. Box 607, Fort Knox, KY 40121; E-mail: [email protected]; phone (502) 942-8624; or FAX (502) 942-6219. You can also access the Association through their web site at www.usarmor-assn.org. U.S. Army Armor School UNIT DISTRIBUTION: To report unit free distribution delivery problems or changes of unit address, e-mail us at knox.armormag@conus. Director of the Armor School (ATZK-DAS) army.mil; phone DSN 464-2249, commercial (502) 624-2249; or FAX POC: Barbara Walker 1050 DSN 464-5039, commercial (502) 624-5039. Requests to be added to E-mail: [email protected] the official distribution list should be in the form of a letter or e-mail to 1st Armor Training Brigade (ATZK-BAZ) the Editor in Chief. (Reflagging to 194th Armored Brigade 10 July 2007) COL David Hubner 8736 EDITORIAL MAILING ADDRESS: ARMOR, ATTN: ATZK-DAS-A, E-mail: [email protected] Bldg 1109A, 201 6th Avenue, Ste 373, Fort Knox, KY 40121-5721. 16th Cavalry Regiment (ATZK-SBZ) ARMOR MAGAZINE ONLINE: Visit the ARMOR magazine web site COL Robert R. Naething 7848 at www.knox.army.mil/armormag. E-mail: [email protected] ARMOR HOTLINE — DSN 464-TANK: The Armor Hotline is a 24- NCO Academy (ATZK-NC) hour service to provide assistance with questions concerning doctrine, CSM Samuel Wilson 5150 training, organizations, and equipment of the armor force. E-mail: [email protected]

2 — July-August 2007 Scouts Out — But Not in HMMWVs! er platforms in the U.S. Army’s inventory. In a against the Germans owes at least as much to COIN fight, the fight is for the populace. We the bravery of the cavalry troopers as to the Dear ARMOR, cannot win this fight if we are not engaging adequacy of doctrine and equipment. the local populace, and the HMMWV allows us Kudos to Dr. Cameron for his detailed study This problem continued to plague the Army on how we really “got it wrong” in the armor to do this with relative ease due to its low intimidation factor. during the early and middle period of the Cold and cavalry force! Those of us serving in the War. Reverting to prewar concepts, the Army field at the time of this wrong-headed decision I agree, the HMMWV does not have the pro- developed a series of underarmed, underpow- were amazed that the senior leadership of our tection larger platforms offer, but it offers a de- ered, and underprotected command and re- force could come to the conclusion that send- gree of flexibility in direct engagements with connaissance carriers such as the M114. All ing scouts out in a HMMWV was a rational idea. the center of gravity in Iraq — its local citizens. of these vehicles shared the commonality of Obviously, decisionmakers were not thinking As long as we continue to “button-up,” and re- using a single heavy machine gun as arma- clearly about the demands of armored recon- main secluded from the local populace, we will ment, even though it was a step backward from naissance when operating forward of a heavy need more and more armored vehicles. I will the trend in 1944-1945! To be sure, tests were or light task force — it requires the ability to accept that the decision to use a HMMWV, giv- made to provide adequate armament — to al- survive and actually fight, at times, to complete en the current enemy situation, is a tactical de- low recon by fire with a decent chance of sur- the mission. cision based on such considerations and may vival — but none was ever mounted. As a re- Then on top of irrational leadership, we make not always be the best platform. However, the sult, the Army retired the vehicles after only the same blunder in fielding the suicidal bri- logic that the HMMWV is a “dead” platform due brief use (and no combat use that I am aware gade recon troop. Where is the common sense? to survivability considerations alone is logic not of), issuing M113s to cavalry units that actual- Perhaps it died during the infamous Armor considering all the facts of a COIN fight. ly were engaged in combat operations such as in Vietnam. Conference when the “Broken Saber” speech It is worth remembering and noting the key was delivered by a man who understood ar- points CPT Schwan discusses on the strengths Simultaneously, the Army was unable to field mored reconnaissance. Somewhere along the of a motorized platoon, and that it was a weight- a proper light tank, being forced to rely on the line, we became lost and overly enamored with ed decision on how to employ these platoons M41 for way too long. This was, of course, not the concept of stealth. Scouts are not long- in respect to risk. The HMMWV is a limited plat- for want of trying. A number of potentially use- range surveillance detachments (LRSDs). form in our current operating environment and ful light tanks were designed, only to be reject- If we are going to send our best and brightest provides limited protection and firepower; how- ed on various grounds. The apex of this light forward to find and report on the enemy, we ever, it provides the most in terms of engaging tank crisis came in 1962 when the Tank-Auto- should send them in combat systems capable the populace and tearing down the walls of motive and Armaments Command (TACOM) of fighting for the intelligence that we so des- isolation between the Iraqi people and our sol- cancelled the T92 project because it was not perately need. Send them in cavalry fighting ve- diers. The decision to use HMMWVs is one that amphibious! I have dealt with the T92 exten- hicles and tanks! Give brigade combat team must be weighed heavily in terms of force pro- sively in a previous article (published in AFV commanders an armored cavalry troop that is tection and mission intent. News, volume 42, #1, pp. 10-13), and will only summarize. The T92 was a small, light, highly combined arms and not a “Broken Saber!” Oh, MARK S. LESLIE mobile gun platform designed around the re- and leave the concept development to com- MAJ, U.S. Army mon-sense oriented combat veterans, not op- con-by-fire mission. The crew of four sat to- erations research systems analysts (ORSAs)! gether at the vehicle’s rear, with the engine mounted in the front (as on the Israeli Merka- Data points are interesting, but won’t stop hot Scouts Out!!!! Six Decades lead! va), and the armament mounted externally in of Studying the Wrong Problem a cleft turret. This resulted in a vehicle that was OWEN T. EDWARDS Dear ARMOR, only 80 inches tall overall and weighed 18.6 LTC, U.S. Army, Retired tons. Mobility was in the range of 35 miles per I would like to thank you for printing LTC Ches- hour, but could easily have been improved by ter A. Kojro’s astute letter (May-June 2007) re- mounting a slightly more powerful engine. Like- The HMMWV is an Effective Option lating to scout doctrine in the present force. wise, armament was a potential problem, as in COIN Operations However, I would like to point out that LTC Koj- the T92 mounted the same 76mm gun as the ro neither traced this problem back far enough Dear ARMOR, M41. It should be noted, however, that a num- in the past nor projected it far enough into the ber of 90mm low-velocity weapons were being I am writing in reference to Captain Gavin present (and, presumably, future). In reality, the tested at the same time as the T92 and the de- Schwan’s article, “An Ad Hoc Motorized Platoon Army has been asking the wrong questions sign included sufficient room for the increased in Tal Afar,” in the May-June 2007 issue of AR- and offering the wrong answers to these ques- size of such a weapon. After cancellation, the MOR. I felt compelled to comment due to all tions for the better part of the mechanized era. Army replaced the T92 with the M551, a vehi- the debate currently involving the HMMWV, Thus, it is important to recall that in the 1920s cle plagued with many problems — mainly due and its role in Iraq, especially in recent articles and 1930s, the cavalry was not permitted to to the untested nature of the technology mount- and positions proposed in ARMOR. have “tanks,” since they were considered an in- ed in the vehicle. While many of the authors make valid points in fantry support weapon. This led to creating the Still, advocates continued to call on the Army reference to the vulnerabilities of the HMMWV, “combat car,” a vehicle that was, except for its to field a vehicle that would support the caval- few, if any, make reference to the benefits of name, a tank; however, it also implied the mount- ry’s need. This ended in the late 1960s and ear- the HMMWV in a counterinsurgency (COIN) ing of lighter armament to obtain stealth and ly 1970s with tests of the tracked and wheeled environment. In his article, CPT Schwan, by speed. This absurdity ended with the beginning scouts (XM-801). Both vehicles mounted a 20- subtle intention or innocently, contributes to of World War II and the deployment of a mixed mm gun, which was considered adequate for this debate by describing what I believe is the bag of vehicles for the mechanized cavalry, a the role of recon by fire. After much debate, HMMWV’s greatest strength, “The key strength force that was supposed to serve in the tradi- TACOM selected the tracked XM-801 scout, of the HMMWV in this environment [Iraq] is ex- tional cavalry role (scouting, flank protection, only to have Department of Defense pull the ecuting soft attacks via engagements with economy-of-force missions, and rearguard op- rug out from under the project entirely when the the people.” The HMMWV, while not a perfect erations). Unfortunately, the vehicles — a com- scout was folded into the XM-723 mechanized platform for a combat vehicle in direct action, is bination of unarmored Jeeps, M3A1 scout cars, infantry combat vehicle (MICV) project, which not a dead vehicle in a COIN environment. As M8 armored cars, M3/M5 light tanks, and M8 finally emerged in the 1980s as the M2/M3 CPT Schwan points out, it provides the mobil- assault guns — did not mesh well as their Bradley infantry/cavalry fighting vehicle. ity and flexibility to reach people in built-up capabilities were widely divergent. American and remote areas, often inaccessible to oth- success in reconnaissance during operations Continued on Page 50

July-August 2007 — 3 Your Next Tank? by Major General Robert M. Williams, Commanding General, U.S. Army Armor Center What will your next tank look like? I think en us to a vehicle that weighs over 70 tons! it is time to start the debate. Now do not With that much weight, it is extremely chal- get me wrong, the Army’s number one pri- lenging to deploy over strategic distances ority is the Future Combat System (FCS), and it is an enormous undertaking to bring and that is the right answer. The mounted the sustainment forward to allow it to op- combat system (MCS) will be the tank in erate in a remote environment. We must the future brigade combat team (FBCT) reduce the weight of the vehicle, and the formation. Its contribution to the FBCT technologies of the FCS may allow us to will be enormous, and its individual capa- do this. How much mobility could we gain bilities will be impressive. That being said, with a re-engineered Abrams? How much the Abrams tank has done, and continues weight could we harvest from the tank by to do, the job we need it to do. It has prov- incorporating an autoloader, shrink ing the en itself to be the best tank ever deployed data bus, shortening and lightening the gun to combat, but the debate about the M1’s tube, replacing certain parts with titanium future needs to begin now. We are all very and adding an active protection system aware that this enormously successful ve- (APS) or updated armor packages? These hicle is over 25 years old, and if it is to re- are some of the questions that we should flage, smart materials, and active protec- main relevant in the future we must mod- ask ourselves, and there are probably oth- tion systems. In addition, by pursuing EM ernize it, as well as the other systems in the ers as well. One thing we do know is that technology, we could potentially reduce or heavy brigade combat team (HBCT). the technology to do all this is going to be even eliminate the onboard warheads and a reality, if it is not already. propellants inside our turrets that present The fact is, the tank is a microcosm of our such a devastating threat to our crews. The branch; its mission is to close with and de- Lethality has been defined as “the qual- technology is coming. stroy the enemy through fire, maneuver, ity of being deadly.” The challenge today and shock effect, and right now it does that is to stay deadly. While we currently have Last, but not least, we must incorporate with relative impunity. Over the next 40 the ammunition to kill just about anything the network into the HBCT formation. This years, we must continue to upgrade this we see, what about killing that which we is the key capability of our future force “King of the Killing Zone” to ensure over- cannot see? When can we move into the and it is what allows that force to truly be match against our enemies, guarantee crew realm of beyond line of sight (BLOS) en- a “system of systems.” The network pro- survivability, and guarantee that we can gagements? Again, this is a place where vides security through situational aware- operate in a joint and combined environ- we can borrow technology from the FCS ness and lethality through a shared view ment in conjunction with the FCS. Cur- program. It is no secret that the FCS mount- of the battlefield. It will allow us to maxi- rently, the FCS program will not be a re- ed combat system will have a 120mm can- mize the strengths of our combined sys- placement for the HBCT. The two organi- non similar to the M1. This cannon is be- tems and minimize their weaknesses. The zations will fight separately and together ing engineered to shoot a mid-range muni- network will be the key component that al- to destroy our enemies wherever they de- tion (MRM) that has already been tested lows the HBCT formation of the future to cide to take us on. For our part, we must on an Abrams tank and is capable of hit- operate seamlessly alongside the FBCT. ensure our HBCT formations stay current ting a moving target beyond 8 kilometers. Now up until this point, I have just been as we approach what some people are call- We must incorporate this capability into dreaming on paper. While many of the ing the “next technological revolution.” our heavy fleet, if the HBCT is going to ef- changes I propose are possible now and in So how must our tank change to meet fectively fight alongside the FBCT. As we the future, we still have much work to do, these future needs? First, let me start by look long term, there are some amazing and the time is right to begin working to- saying it is not about what it is called. We initiatives ongoing with electro-magnetic ward some of these options. The HBCT could make so many modifications that it (EM) technology, and there is a possibility was designed from the ground up as a task gets a new nomenclature, or by 2050, we that by 2050 this technology will be small organized, self-contained unit. Much like could be riding in the M1A6. That part is enough to mount inside our tanks. That our premier modernization effort, the FCS, not important. What is important is the technology could lead us to innovations the HBCT must become a “system of sys- capability the vehicle brings to the future that will contribute to a lighter tank, more tems” to stay on the leading edge of the bat- battlefield. It must stay mobile, lethal, and lethal tank, and, perhaps most important- tlefield. For our part at the Armor Center, survivable, and perhaps most importantly, ly, a more survivable tank. we are working hard to secure funding for it must be interoperable with other sys- Survivability has been the critical design research and development of some of the tems on the battlefield. Let’s look at each parameter when engineering our current aforementioned technologies. Our future of those characteristics briefly. fleet of vehicles. We pay careful attention depends on ensuring that FBCTs, HBCTs, Mobility has been the cornerstone of our to this issue to ensure our Soldiers are in SBCTs, and IBCTs can work together to heavy force ever since Major Ernest Swin- systems that will protect them. The best destroy our enemies. What will your tank ton had the bright idea to use tracked, ar- way to be protected from the enemy is to look like in that fight? I do not know for mored vehicles to cross the “no man’s not be observed, targeted, and hit by the sure, but I do know that it is time to start land” of the World War I battlefield. Unfor- enemy. In the future, there will be tech- the debate — I look forward to your input. tunately, threat weapons systems have driv- nology breakthroughs in active camou- Forge the Thunderbolt!

4 — July-August 2007 CSM Otis Smith Command Sergeant Major U.S. Army Armor Center Heat Injuries are Preventable

As summer temperatures rise, so does • Soldiers who fail to report they are the risk of heat injuries. With high heat not feeling well. and high humidity, this summer is already • Training soldiers if they have a fever off and running. Summer heat, especially or are suffering from other illnesses ear ly in the season, may be harmful to sol- such as diarrhea or flu. diers unless leaders are aware of how to • identify, treat, and prevent heat injuries. Soldiers who do not drink enough water. more effectively than less-fit and dehy- The human body gains heat continuous- • The well-motivated soldier who will drated soldiers. ly through various channels. This gain is not “fall-out” easily. Leaders must understand the physical in- even more significant in a soldier exert- • Soldiers performing strenuous exer- ing himself physically in a hot and humid dicators of dehydration, which will help cises on a hot and humid day. in identifying and confirming the level of environment. There are many processes • through which body heat is lost. A soldier Soldiers in a poor state of health. dehydration in soldiers. Physical indica- can regulate his body temperature and stay • Soldiers who are overweight. tors of dehydration include: safe. However, factors, such as hydration • Previous victims of a heat injury. • Skin is less elastic; on pinch test, the and rest, play a very important role. Poor • Soldiers who have not had sufficient skin regains its shape slowly. physical fitness, obesity, illness, and a rest before, during, and after activities. • Higher sweat rate; if sweat production lack of instinct to drink water adequately • suddenly stops despite continued heat are major risk factors for heat injuries as Soldiers who wear thick clothing or additional layers of clothing in hot exposure, dehydration has reached a well. These factors are commonly found severe level. in newly recruited soldiers. weather. • Reduced physical endurance. The Three Types of Heat Injuries Heat injuries are preventable. When a • heat injury occurs, it is an indication of Accelerated onset of fatigue. The three types of heat injuries include: failure in one or more components of the • Faster heart rate. Heat cramps, which are the result of ex- prevention system. This makes preven- • Unusual tiredness and an increased cessive salt and water losses due to pro- tion at the leader’s level even more im- rapid heart rate after minimal physi- fuse sweating in soldiers whose bodies are portant. A good understanding of how to cal exertion. attempting to rapidly lose heat. It presents identify and prevent heat injuries amongst • Suppressed appetite; food intake is re- as intermittent muscle cramps, which usu- leaders goes a long way toward reducing duced during water deprivation and ally occur in the legs (calves and thighs). the incidences of heat injuries. The fol- water intake reduced during starvation. lowing are important factors in identify- • Heat exhaustion is a more severe form ing and preventing heat injuries: Less alert, increased lethargy, diffi- of heat injury. It implies a significant loss culty concentrating, confusion, and of water from the body. The signs and Dehydration. Dehydration refers to the irrational behavior. symptoms include weakness, exhaustion, reduction of body water content to that Hydration. Soldiers tend not to sense headaches, dizziness, and profuse sweat- below the normal physiological (and safe) that they are dehydrated and must there- ing with an elevated body temperature. level. Some degree of dehydration is in- fore be consciously reminded to replace evitable when working in a hot and hu- Heat stroke is the most serious form of the water that is lost through sweating. mid environment. This is due to water “Voluntary” dehydration can be mini- heat injury. It manifests with a body core loss through sweating. temperature of 106 degrees Fahrenheit mized by providing cool water and suffi- and above. Soldiers may become con- New soldiers are more prone to dehy- cient time for drinking. Leaders should fused, aggressive, or even comatose. dration as they generally tend not to have en sure soldiers have a regular consump- a “drinking habit.” They tend to drink wa- tion of fluids. Leaders can help prevent “Soldier at Risk” Profile ter only when extremely thirsty and this heat injury by enforcing these six simple Certain factors place soldiers at risk for is too late. Having not trained regularly steps: heat injury. Leaders are advised to “pro- in hot and humid conditions, they do not • Soldiers should drink water until they file” soldiers who may be at risk, as well have an “instinct” to drink water beyond are no longer thirsty and then drink a as monitor conditions that may increase the point of thirst. They must be trained to little more. a soldier’s risk. Leaders should be watch- do so. Soldiers who are well trained, fit, ful of: and fully hydrated tolerate heat exposure Continued on Page 45

July-August 2007 — 5 From the Boresight Line: Maverick 7 Signing Off the Net

by First Sergeant Robert Hay

“It is not the strongest of the species that survives, nor the most intelligent, but the one most responsive to change.” — Charles Darwin

I will unstrap my tanker boots for the last time in July and hand over the responsibilities of chief, Master Gunner Branch. As I look back over my 26-month ten- ure, I leave without re- gret and am satisfied that my term was a success. It has been both an honor and a pleasure to serve in this position. As I prepare for retirement, I would like to share a few thoughts with my fellow being as efficient as possible. We man- Last, but certainly not least, I would tank ers on the changes we have made aged to reduce the course without re- like to remind everyone that the armor to the Master Gunner Course and the moving any of the tasks being taught by force is in a perilous state. For the past plans for its future. developing a stand-alone M1A2 Mas- four years, our focus has been urban ter Gunner Course. Beginning in fiscal operations, which has been one of the The course has under gone several year (FY) 2008, we will schedule both contributing factors to the degradation changes to remain relevant and better A8 and K8 producing classes. This move of tank and gunnery skills. Master gun- serve the armor force. Most significant- was necessary to accommodate the in- ners have the responsibility to carry the ly is the reduction of the course from 11 creas ing number of units that are now torch; they have proven to be invaluable weeks to 9 weeks. This was a tough one equipped with M1A2 tanks. An M1A2 assets to the armor force and must lead to crack. We had to reduce the training unit can now send a soldier to school, the way into the future. Tank and gun- by 2 weeks, yet ensure that we did not have a master gunner trained on spe- nery skills can be preserved at the unit compromise the quality of training or the cific vehicle variants, and will not have level by continually assessing crew pro- integrity of the course. We had to make to be scheduled for a transition course. ficiency, identifying crew procedural er- certain the force received highly trained Once again, this enables us to quickly rors, and providing training for crews to master gunners who had all the skills and fully train master gunners. operate the tank to its designed capa- and knowledge needed to be success- bilities. Master gunners have the skills ful while enhancing their unit’s gunnery In 2008, the Master Gunner Course will necessary to sustain and improve the proficiency and combat lethality. become mobile. In August of 2007, we unit’s tank gunnery proficiency. Master were directed to look at the possibility As of the time of this writing, we have gunners hold the key to preserving the of taking the course on the road. The conducted three successful pilot pro- armor force’s tank and gunnery skills, mobile training team (MTT) is steadily grams using the 9-week program of in- thus shaping the force for its future role. coming together. By the end of this year, struction (POI) with great success. We we will have a first-class mobile set up, did not experience any abnormal fail- As mentioned before, the past two which includes two 53-foot trailers, with ure rates and the master gunners grad- years have brought about many suc- enclosed awnings, that will support six uated with the same skill set required cessful changes to the Master Gunner tanks. During training, one of the trail- by the 11-week program. This success Course, much of which is owed to the ers will be used as a classroom and the is attributed to the course’s extraordi- outstanding instructors, soldiers, and other will display and house the train- nary master gunner instructors. They civilians assigned to the master gunner ing aids needed to support the Master have worked many long hours develop- branch; without their assistance and Gunner Course. Other than a few minor ing and rewriting lesson plans and were dedication, we could not have success- miscellaneous requirements, the only 100 percent dedicated to the success of fully completed our undertakings. thing the host unit will provide is a place the pilot programs. to setup and plug in the trailers. This So with that, to the instructors and staff, The difficult task of remodeling the setup will allow us to be virtually self- thank you! Your selfless service and course to meet the 9-week constraint sufficient, thereby reducing the burden dedication to training have been vital to required us to take a hard look at each on the unit. The MTT also served as a what we do, and without your efforts, we task, make changes to streamline each basis for creating the two separate M1 could not have accomplished so much block of instruction, and ensure we were courses mentioned above. with so little. “I am a Master Gunner.”

6 — July-August 2007 Six Easy Ways to Lose a War at the Tactical Level by Colonel Jeffrey Sanderson and Major Jay Miseli

“It takes a long time to train a good hunting dog, but a few and organizational effectiveness within the unit. More often than minutes handled by an idiot will make the dog gun shy.” not, they are successful. At the conclusion of a good AAR, we immediately begin focusing organizational energy on the items — Appalachian Proverb listed in the “improve” category. The American public has given its Army a “bye” on this war Below is an attempt to begin the AAR process; there are many — so far. The public has not turned against our Army as it did “sustains,” but this article focuses on six major “improves.” a generation ago. The Army’s mission is to fight and win the Therefore, these six easy ways to lose a war at the tactical level Nation’s wars, regardless of circumstances. Counterinsurgency are historically significant; however, they remain relevant in the (COIN) may not be the fight we want, but it is the fight we have. contemporary operating environment (COE): Thus far, we have not lost the war, but we have not won either; Failure to Maintain Contact in many eyes, that equates to losing. As young leaders, we were taught that once the enemy makes It is always easier to fix blame than fix a problem; it is easy to contact, we maintain that contact until decision. Today (after re- blame politicians and strategists because strategy wins wars. ceiving small-arms fire or an improvised explosive device strike), Strategy has its primacy, but at the tactical level, we play a piv- do we universally maintain contact or do we quickly exit the en- otal role in victory or defeat. gagement area and continue movement? Our enemy enjoys be- Has the Army conducted a thorough “mid-rotation like” after- ing illusive, taking their best shots, and then blending into the pop- action review at the tactical level? Many will immediately point ulation. It is a difficult tactical proposition, but we cannot afford out all the great work the Center for Army Lessons Learned to break contact with the enemy. In a COIN COE, the enemy of- (CALL) and countless other organizations are doing to collect, ten chooses the time, place, and circumstances to initiate contact. analyze, and disseminate data points from the front. No doubt, He primarily uses visual, direct, indirect, and obstacles as pre- there are many great soldiers and civilians who are working over- ferred forms of contact. In terms of force ratios, unless we are time to “spread the word” on various data points. traveling with a very small party, we have the ability to (as a minimum) maintain contact until relief arrives. If we fail to maintain After-action reviews (AAR) are not just data points, however; contact, we embolden and encourage the enemy, creating a vi- they are designed to positively influence the collective missions cious cycle of allowing the enemy to have the initiative. Historically, this is the most difficult tactical principle to fol- All too often, however, success is defined by “bringing all my low. The enemy is smart, has studied us extensively, and knows soldiers home.” While this is laudable and speaks well of lead- our tactics for both entering and exiting an engagement area. ers, it does not answer the fundamental question of whether or Although it is often stated that there are no wrong tactics, mov- not we accomplished the mission. Gifted tactical leaders work ing miles out of the area or attempting to ignore an improvised hard to accomplish both. We all want our casualties treated when explosive device (IED) strike in hopes the enemy will not do it the enemy initiates contact, but if the casualties become our sin- again falls squarely into the wrong-tactics category. gular focus, then we have (once again) played into the hands of Gaining and maintaining contact with the enemy involves ma- the enemy. Our warrior ethos is non-negotiable, regardless of neuver skills (achieving positional advantage) vice movement the circumstances at hand. (point A to point B) skills. Leaders who can transition from move- Failure to Patrol ment to maneuver quickly and efficiently win battles in both conventional and COIN environments. Although battle drills play a We were taught young to see the terrain, the enemy, and our- large part in this process, maneuver is much more than simply selves. The terrain is neutral, and although it may be an urban executing a series of battle drills. Gaining positional advantage jungle of six-million people, it remains as relevant today as it over an enemy in a city of six-million people is a difficult (but did at Gettysburg in July 1863. The key terrain at Gettysburg certainly not impossible) task, requiring judgment and multiple was not determined through a map reconnaissance but by mount- training repetitions in a setting that is as realistic as possible. ed patrols. Arguably, the battle is decided by the side with the If we are going to execute in an urban environment, we must most battlefield knowledge, and that knowledge is determined train in an urban environment. Sending soldiers to train or ma- by patrols. neuver on pristine ranges and open areas in designated “training When General Ridgway took command of the beaten 8th U.S. areas” does not train them for the task of maneuvering in large Army in Korea, he immediately ordered a major increase in pa- urban areas. Arguably, the toughest task a unit en- counters in combat is making a mounted 90-degree turn (in traffic and under fire) in an urban environ-

“To surrender contact is to surrender the tactical initiative, which, contrary to popular debate, does not contravene current COIN theory. This does not imply a “weapons free” situation, but rather an immediate, deliberate, and measured response, regardless of the type of contact, specifically for IED incidents.”

ment. Traditionally, there is a clean line between the “training area” and the “cantonment area.” Until we can build large urban training centers, we must consider training trols, not just to increase battlefield knowledge, but to increase in cantonment areas. We do an excellent job of touting the slo- his soldiers’ sense of purpose. Ridgway’s aggressive technique gan “train like you fight,” but are we living it? turned the 8th Army into a highly effective fighting force and should serve as a lesson for the ages. To surrender contact is to surrender the tactical initiative, which, contrary to popular debate, does not contravene current COIN If we fail to patrol, the enemy will emplace IEDs along our pro- theory. This does not imply a “weapons free” situation, but rath- spective lines of operation (if the enemy does intelligence prep- er an immediate, deliberate, and measured response, regardless aration of the battlefield), and when we use those lines again, of the type of contact, specifically for IED incidents. Deliberate we will have contact. Contact will come at a time and place of does not imply slow. The local population will understand our the enemy’s choosing and will meet his tactical purpose. We measured response and, at a minimum, know we will respond. have claimed for years to “own the night.” Do we actually; does There is (and always will be) the risk of being drawn into a near the enemy? Purposeful tactical movement through and around ambush; tacticians take risk because risk involves rewards. Al- the battlespace has positive second- and third-order effects, es- though many great units are executing this tactic, it does not ap- pecially at night. pear universal in application. Every patrol must have a definitive tactical task and associated purpose. Presence patrolling to “show our presence” is a lead- Become Risk Averse er’s sin. It is analogous to the order “move out and draw fire … Everyone grieves the loss of a soldier, but if that grief negative- and when they start shooting at you…” Orders of this nature do ly influences our tactical decision cycle, then we become inef- not instill confidence in one’s chain of command. Acceptable fective tactical leaders. The natural order of combat is: mission, tactical tasks include clear, control, disrupt, and defeat. Although soldiers, and self. Risk-averse leaders lead to avoid risk, which it would be easy to simply take Nike’s approach and “just do it,” in a COIN COE, plays directly into the enemy’s game plan. leaders must ensure we have clear tactical tasks and nested purposes during all patrols. One thing is certain, failure to patrol Not becoming risk averse during a year-long leader Army train- our battlespace leads to an emboldened enemy. ing and evaluation program (ARTEP) is extremely tough. This article barely touches on the difficulty of such a task. Leaders Logistics Bloat bond with soldiers, and the more tactical drama they share, the Logistics are critical and central to all combat operations, but closer they become. This is nothing new, and history is replete you have to know when you have enough. There is a point where with examples of both risk-averse and blood-thirsty leaders. logistics occurs in direct support of nothing but logistics. Viet-

8 — July-August 2007 “Every patrol must have a definitive tactical task and associated purpose. Presence patrolling to “show our presence” is a leader’s sin. It is analogous to the order “move out and draw fire … and when they start shooting at you…” Orders of this nature do not instill confidence in one’s chain of command. Acceptable tactical tasks include clear, control, disrupt, and defeat.”

nam is a classic example. At one point, the base at Long Binh, Failure to Train and Educate the Rules of Engagement Vietnam, occupied more than 25 square miles, had almost all The myths, war stories, and tall tales associated with the rules known amenities, and employed 20,000 Vietnamese. General of engagement (ROE) are legendary and are increasing faster Bruce Palmer commented on several occasions about the amount than gasoline prices. Soldiers use ROE to justify shooting, not of combat power required to support and defend these large lo- shooting, thinking about shooting, and a myriad of other cir- gistics-bloated areas, claiming this was even more troublesome cumstances. than one-year tours to our efforts in Vietnam. According to some estimates, in 1968, only 15 percent of the total force was avail- Training is reflexive in nature and provides specific responses able at any one time for sustained combat operations. to given stimuli. Education questions why we execute the drill Tooth-to-tail is a historical albatross, but nonetheless must be to compensate for stimuli; however, both are required with re- wrestled with and conquered. The raging debate is one of how spect to ROE. Soldiers in our current formations are the bright- well we treat our soldiers. We all want our soldiers to have the est and best educated our Army has ever known. They soak up very best, but at what cost? Many great soldiers believe that re- knowledge and ask for more, which is why education is the most enlistments are directly proportional to soldier comforts; others critical training we execute in preparation for deployment. Our will tell us “it has a dramatic negative impact on the mission.” soldiers will certainly be trained to execute the training effect Meanwhile, the debate continues. we desire, but in the enemy-induced ambiguous world of COIN, the enemy wants to create as much confusion as possible and Comfort aside, our Army, in its long and distinguished history, will readily use our ROE. has not won a war fighting from garrison. The more organizational energy we place into making our forward operating bases Training the ROE in a complex environment is not enough; we a garrison (supporting and defending that garrison) is organiza- must also plan and prepare soldiers by training them on the sec- tional energy we are not devoting directly to our primary mis- ond- and third-order effects of the decision to shoot or not shoot. sion. The “super FOBs” hold many great and disciplined sol- Going kinetic in combat is a life’s worth of training and experi- diers, but the enemy also knows the value (in terms of panic) of ence applied by a decision that will be made in milliseconds. We a well-placed mortar round. cannot afford to be undereducated in this protracted and ambiguous war. Current COIN theory encourages us to live among or as close to the population as possible. Building and maintaining super Leaders must also thoroughly study, intuitively understand, and FOBs (with requisite security requirements) is an extremely ex- educate to the same level of variations in response, which are pensive proposition in terms of soldiers. The “if we build it, based on the enemy’s forms of contact with us and our forms of they will come” mentality is good for contractors and logisticians contact with him. For example, if the enemy initiates contact who enjoy centralized planning, execution, and total and com- with an IED, we cannot respond with unguided direct fires in all plete control over their inventories, but it may not be the best directions as we attempt to break contact, even if the ROE allow long-term solution. The security brought by being surrounded it. As frustrating as it may be, a measured response commensu- by friends only makes us “feel” secure; it does not accomplish rate to both forms of contact is the correct tactical step on the the mission. path to victory.

July-August 2007 — 9 level operations. He is not required to truly trust that company commander because the circumstances do not demand actual trust. If a leader is uncertain about the accuracy of a report, he can simply go to that company’s command post and check. Leaders are on hand to receive information, and due to the management adage of old, can immediately and directly act on information they receive. The requirement to trust subordinates to do the right thing does not physically exist within consolidated units that are garrisoned out of a FOB, especially given garrison- like information requirements. Our Army and our Nation cannot afford even a stalemate in Iraq. At the tactical level, leaders can directly influence the outcome of this war “Training the ROE in a complex environment is not enough; we must also plan and prepare soldiers by training them on the second- and third-order effects of the decision to by playing to win, versus merely playing not to shoot or not shoot. Going kinetic in combat is a life’s worth of training and experience ap- lose. Playing to win is a challenging proposition, plied by a decision that will be made in milliseconds. We cannot afford to be underedu- though. It requires leaders at all levels to take cated in this protracted and ambiguous war.” risks, and within those risks, we will likely lose lives. Soldiers, however, will be working toward a deliberate decisive endstate for particular operations. Centralization Playing to win also requires taking risks with combat service Centralization, whether physical in terms of collocation of units support operations by placing a distribution burden on logisti- with shared or widely distributed battlespace or conceptual in cians as they supply smaller bases throughout the unit’s bat- terms of echeloned command and control and information re- tlespace. Soldier comfort will suffer in the short term, but we quirements for day-to-day operations, is at best counterproduc- will be working toward a clear conflict resolution. Leaders and tive, and more likely disruptive, to successfully executing tacti- soldiers in all units will need to execute frequent, decentralized cal operations. Centralization occurs to some extent because operations, and will need to be exceptionally disciplined, educat- leaders are attempting to take care of their soldiers by providing ed, and trusted in the execution of those operations to avoid tac- them with a safe and comfortable FOB. tical blunders that create strategic losses. From the physical perspective, centralization drives units toward super FOBs, which provide a very high level of soldier comfort, as well as the ability to distribute security requirements Colonel Jeffrey R. Sanderson is currently serving as commander, 4th across a larger pool of available soldiers. It is also arguably a Cavalry Brigade, First Army Division East, Fort Knox, KY. He received a much simpler process to supply the consolidated tactical units B.S. from Western Carolina University, an M.S. from Western Kentucky garrisoned at these bases. What is lost, however, is the signifi- University, and an M.M.A.S. from the School of Advanced Military Stud- cant ability to tactically prosecute the war. ies. His military education includes Armor Officer Basic Course, Armor Officer Advanced Course, U.S. Army Command and General Staff Col- The location of a large FOB results in isolation from the local lege, and School of Advanced Military Studies. He has served in various population that we are meant to secure and influence, and con- command and staff positions, including chief, Stryker Brigade Combat ducting patrol operations becomes difficult because of distances Team Transformation Team, TRADOC Systems Manager-Stryker, U.S. involved. Any operation outside the base requires a distinct move- Army Infantry Center, Fort Benning, GA; commander, 2d Battalion, 69th ment phase (during which we are very vulnerable to whatever Armor, 3d Brigade, 3d Infantry Division (ID), Operation Iraqi Freedom; form of contact the enemy chooses to bring to bear) before ex- S3, 1st Brigade, 1st ID (M), Fort Riley, KS; S3, 2d Battalion, 34th Armor, ecuting specific tactical tasks. We give the enemy ample oppor- 1st Brigade, 1st ID, Fort Riley; small group instructor, Armor Officer Ad- tunity to observe our movement, target our movement, or pre- vanced Course, Fort Knox, KY; commander, C Company, 3d Battalion, pare for the subsequent operation. In short, we compromise the 7th Infantry, 1st Brigade, 24th ID (M), Operation Desert Storm; and commander, D Company, 3d Battalion, 69th Armor, 1st Brigade, 24th ID (M), ability to effectively and continuously patrol within a zone be- Fort Riley. cause we do not live in that zone. We also increase the actual logistics burden because we make targeting our supply trains ex- Major Jay Miseli is currently an assistant professor, Department of Math- ceptionally easy. Logistics packages are not headed to new lo- ematical Sciences, U.S. Military Academy, West Point, NY. He received cations on differing routes; instead, they are generally limited to a B.S. from the U.S. Military Academy and an M.S. from the Georgia In- stitute of Technology. His military education includes Armor Officer Basic the handful of trafficable routes in and out of the FOB, which the Course, Airborne School, M1A2 Tank Commander Certification Course, enemy can readily target at leisure. Field Artillery Advanced Course, and Combined Arms and Services At the conceptual level, centralization is perhaps more dan- Staff School. He has served in various command and staff positions, to gerous. Trust of subordinates is lost not by intent, but physical include aide-de-camp to the superintendent, U.S. Military Academy, West Point, NY; commander, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Task proximity. Leaders may intend to trust subordinates, but they Force 2d Battalion, 69th (2-69) Armor, 3d Infantry Division (3ID), Fort may not actually trust them in practice. Leaders have the author- Benning, GA and Iraq; commander, C Company, 2-69 Armor, 3ID, Fort ity to check any operation at any given time. A task force com- Benning; battalion maintenance officer, 3d Squadron, 8th Cavalry, 1st mander can readily accompany a company team when he choos- Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, TX; and tank platoon leader, 3d Battalion, es because his task force is generally not conducting task force- 73d Armor (Airborne), 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, NC.

10 — July-August 2007 A Commander’s Guide to the Forward Support Company

by Major Trenton J. Conner

The Army is making great transforma- the battlefield logistically as needed with ified table of organization and equipment tion progress as it moves to a brigade-cen- assets and command and control (C2). (MTOE) will be used throughout the ar- tric organization, which includes creating This ensured that critical supply and main- ticle. forward support companies (FSC) that pro- tenance capabilities were forward with vide logistics support to battalions and supported battalions. The FSC was creat- The Forward Support Company operate as subordinate units of that battal- ed to provide all assets a battalion need- The FSC is a 233-soldier, multifunction- ion. Integrating these new companies has ed to be self-sufficient and the necessary al unit that includes a distribution platoon created a few challenges, many of which command, control, communications, com- and a maintenance platoon organized to stem from creating new doctrine and de- puters, and intelligence (C4I) to plan, syn- provide support to a maneuver battalion viating from the accepted norms of Army chronize, and control logistics operations. (see Figure 1).2 This is intentionally a very of excellence (AOE) doctrine. Battalion The FSC is a multifunctional unit that in- broad mission statement. The FSC pro- commanders and executive officers strug- cludes a distribution platoon and a main- vides each battalion a robust and flexible gle with the differences between the AOE tenance platoon organized to support a logistics capability to support both doc- doctrine they learned early in their ca- maneuver battalion.1 trinal and non-doctrinal missions in sup- reers and the emerging doctrine of the This article provides information on the port of full-spectrum operations. Although transformational Army. Many command- doctrinal composition, capabilities, and the FSC is organic to the brigade support ers across the Army do not use the FSC operations of the FSC, as well as doctri- battalion (BSB) due to Title IX consid- to its full potential because they do not nal and non-doctrinal tactics, techniques, erations, it operates under the command fully understand its capabilities and sub- and procedures (TTP) to both current and and control (C2) of the CAB command- ject-matter expertise. Most of these com- future combined arms battalion (CAB) er through attachment or operational con- manders have not yet been trained by the commanders and staff officers. It also trol. institutional Army on its new logistics focuses on the CAB FSC and not the Several sections provide the doctrinal doctrine. unique requirements of FSCs supporting missions and capabilities of the subordi- For many years, brigade-level logisti- reconnaissance squadrons and fires bat- nate elements of the FSC. These elements cians created forward logistics elements talions; however, the fundamental prin- include the company headquarters sec- (FLE) “out of hide” to augment existing ciples are the same for all FSCs. Also, for tion, the food service section, the distri- capabilities, such as the support platoon or the sake of discussion, the heavy brigade bution platoon, and the maintenance pla- battalion maintenance section, to weight combat team (HBCT), CAB, FSC’s mod- toon. Each section’s critical equipment,

July-August 2007 — 11 Forward Support Company (HBCT) Very small aperture terminal (VSAT). This system serves as the satellite com- CO HQ Distribution Maintenance munications system that allows the BCS3 Platoon Platoon and the maintenance platoon’s standard HQ Army maintenance system-enhanced Section Platoon HQ Platoon HQ Maintenance (SAMS-E) to transmit and receive data. Section Section Control Section Field Feeding CSS automated information systems in- Section Class III & Water Maintenance Field Maintenance terface (CAISI). This system is a secure, Section Section Teams wireless local area network (LAN), which (1 x CO) provides the “last mile” connectivity be- Service and General Supplies Recovery tween logistics automation systems and Section Section VSAT-type networks. CAISI provides wireless line-of-sight (LOS) transmission, Class V encryption on all wireless LAN links, Section and a digital subscriber line backup ca- Figure 1 pability for a non-LOS requirement within a 3-kilometer distance (extended version has greater distance). • military occupational specialties (MOS), Coordinating with the S3, S4, and Movement tracking system (MTS) con- and potential shortfalls are discussed be- headquarters company commander troller station low. . This system is a satellite- on CAB support area locations. based, messaging and mapping system The company headquarters. The FSC • Planning and executing contingency that provides asset visibility of and com- headquarters is similar to every other com- operations as required. munication with transportation assets. pany headquarters in the Army. The head- • Coordinating with the S3 and S4 on This system is designed to be integrated quarters section is responsible for the C2, primary and alternate routes into the with command post operations. supply, and administration of the compa- CAB support area. MTS vehicle mounted ny. The headquarters section also per- . This vehicle- forms logistics tasks that were previous- • Establishing and monitoring brigade mounted system provides the FSC com- ly performed by the battalion S4. Howev- and battalion logistics situation report mander with the same capability as the er, the battalion now has trained and ded- (LOGSITREP), logistics status (LOG- controller station while on the move. icated logisticians to coordinate and pro- STAT), and logistics spot reports in All of these systems combine to provide continuous support, which includes: accordance with approved standard vide the FSC and the CAB with a logis- • operating procedures (SOP). tics common operating picture (COP) and Coordinating and providing technical • support to the CAB. Planning future logistics operations a “reachback” logistics capability. When • in coordination with the S4. these systems combine with the CAB’s Advising the CAB commander on • Army battle command system (ABCS) sustainment requirements versus Developing and maintaining tactical suite, it creates a complete picture of the available assets. and CSS overlays. battlefield for the battalion commander. • Determining sustainment require- • Developing the CSS synchronization For example, a CSS communications ar- ments in coordination with the BSB matrix. chitecture would include the following operations section, CAB S4, and lo- • Keeping the BSB abreast of the lo- equipment: one M1068 carrier command gistics representatives from attached gistics situation and future support post; two Force XXI battle command bri- units. requirements.3 gade and below (FBCB2); 27 M249 squad • Providing input to the CAB logistics automatic weapons (SAWs); one MK-19; estimate and service support para- The headquarters section is also equipped two M1083 medium tactical vehicles graph of the operation order with unique communications equipment, (MTVs); and one M149 water trailer. Key (OPORD). which allows for theater-wide communi- personnel include: a multifunctional lo- • cations. These systems include: gistician commander; a mechanical main- Planning and monitoring support op- tenance supervisory first sergeant; and erations and making necessary ad- The battle command sustainment sup- a transportation corps executive officer. justments to ensure support require- port system (BCS3). This system is the The field feeding section. The FSC ments are met. Army’s maneuver sustainment C2 sys- • Planning and coordinating allocation food service section provides class I food tem. It aligns sustainment, in-transit, and service and food preparation. The food of available combat service support force data to aid commanders in making (CSS) resources. service section prepares and delivers hot critical decisions. This system capability meals to the maneuver company teams. • Tracking available assets through provides operators the complete logistics It distributes prepackaged food, prepared subordinate company teams, BSB picture in the form of a “running esti- food, or both. It provides one heat-and- support operations section, CAB S4, mate.” BCS3 provides a map-centric dis- serve meal and one cook-prepared (A or and other units. play on a commercial laptop, which pro- B ration) meal per day. • vides a thorough technical and visual Requesting backup support when picture of the battlefield; the ability to Central to the food service section’s mis- needed. plan, rehearse, train, and execute on one sion is its ability to task organize and de- • Recommending support priorities system; and a systems software that can ploy with company teams and support and enforcing priorities received operate on unclassified or classified net- remote feeding sites using the kitchen, from higher headquarters. works. company level, field feeding-enhanced

12 — July-August 2007 (KCLFF-E), as well as central feeding enemy, terrain, troops, time, and civilians ries fighting vehicles, construction equip- sites using the containerized kitchen (METT-TC). ment, tracked vehicles, wheeled vehicles, (CK). To operate to full capacity, the distribu- weapons systems, fire control systems, power generation equipment, communi- The CK is a mobile field kitchen that can tion platoon requires one FBCB2; one forward area water point supply system; cations equipment, specialty electronic support 800 soldiers with up to three hot, devices, utility equipment, and quarter- cook-prepared or heat-and-serve meals 12 M978 heavy expanded mobility tactical truck (HEMTT) fuelers; one M977 master and chemical equipment such as per day. One CK replaces two mobile pumps, hoses, and water/fuel systems. kitchen trailers and has a greater food- HEMTT cargo; five M1120 HEMTT load preparation capability. The CK is mount- handling systems; five M1075 palletized The platoon maintains limited quanti- ed on a tactical trailer and towed. Its loading systems (PLS); five M1083 MTVs ties of combat spares (prescribed load list major features include electrical power with ring mounts; five M2 .50-caliber ma- and shop/bench stock) in the maintenance from an on-board tactical quiet generator chine guns; one container handling unit control section. The platoon is also re- (TQG), an environmental control for heat- (CHU); one quartermaster corps platoon sponsible for the unit maintenance collec- ing and cooling, and 60 cubic feet of re- leader; one 92A40 automated logistics tion point. When a company is detached frigerated storage. The CK provides food specialist platoon sergeant; 13 petroleum from the battalion, the FSC commander preparers the options of roasting, grilling, specialists; one water treatment special- detaches a supporting maintenance pack- boiling, frying, and baking. It also has ist; 28 motor transport operators; and one age that includes personnel, tools, test running water, a protected serving line, automated logistics specialist. equipment, and prescribed load list (PLL) and ventilation to clear out exhaust and The real shortfall of the distribution pla- stocks necessary to support the company, cooking byproducts. toon is a lack of ammunition specialists which usually includes the habitual field (89B) within the platoon. The class V sec- maintenance team and any additional ca- The KCLFF-E is used for field feeding pabilities required by the mission. company-sized units. It is designed to tion is composed of only motor transport heat, deliver, and serve one heat-and- specialists and the battalion relies on these The maintenance platoon headquarters serve ration per day for up to 200 soldiers. specialists to get ammunition manage- section provides C2 and supervision for It also has a limited capability to provide ment on-the-job-training. all platoon administrative functions. With perishable and shelf-stable meals pre- Maintenance platoon. The maintenance guidance from the FSC commander, the pared by food preparers. The KCLFF-E platoon provides field maintenance to the headquarters section monitors established requires two food service specialists to CAB. With more than 140 soldiers, the maintenance priorities, provides recom- operate, with assistance from the sup- maintenance platoon is larger than most mendations for reinforcing support, and ported unit. The KCLFF-E is moved us- companies, consisting of nine sections, plans and conducts all necessary platoon ing a high mobility, multipurpose wheeled which include the platoon headquarters, training activities. vehicle (HMMWV) or larger vehicle. maintenance control, maintenance, ser- The maintenance control section is the To operate to full capability, a FSC field vice and recovery, and five company-lev- primary manager for all field mainte- feeding section requires: two CKs; five el field maintenance teams (FMTs). The nance in the HBCT CAB and serves as KCLFF-Es; one M2 .50-caliber machine platoon has a wide variety of military oc- the “nerve center” for the battalion’s gun; two MK-19 40mm grenade ma- cupational specialties, which provides a maintenance activities. The maintenance chine guns; three family of medium tac- robust maintenance capability. The main- control section performs all of the Ar- tical vehicle (FMTV)-series vehicles; five tenance platoon supports various systems, my maintenance management system HMMWVs; and 23 food service special- including M1-series tanks, M2/M3-se- (TAMMS) and dispatching operations, ists. and tracks scheduled services for the CAB using SAMS-E. All company team SAMS- Distribution platoon. The mission of E boxes and PLL clerks are collocated the distribution platoon is to provide sup- with the maintenance control section. ply and transportation support to the The maintenance control officer (MCO) CAB. The platoon is made up of a platoon manages all the SAMS-E operators. The headquarters section, a class III (POL) SAMS-E clerks operating each company transportation section, a general supply box process each DA Form 5988-E (equip- section, and a class V (ammo) transpor- ment inspection maintenance worksheet) tation section. The platoon receives, trans- completed by the operator or crew and loads, and distributes all classes of sup- verified by the FMT. U.S. Army Field ply with the exception of class VIII; how- Manual-Interim (FMI) 4–90.1, Heavy ever, the platoon may distribute class VIII based on battalion standard operating procedures (SOPs). The platoon is capable “The maintenance platoon provides field of distributing supplies via unit distribu- maintenance to the CAB. With more than tion (combat logistics patrols), supply 140 soldiers, the maintenance platoon is point distribution (forward operating base- larger than most companies, consisting of centric), or both. It also has the ability to nine sections, which include the platoon conduct simultaneous class III and V sup- headquarters, maintenance control, maintenance, service and recovery, and five port to line companies, headquarters com- company-level field maintenance teams panies, and the FSC. The platoon provides (FMTs). The platoon has a wide variety of its own security while conducting com- military occupational specialties, which bat logistics patrols or it can be augment- provides a robust maintenance capability.” ed by maneuver forces based on mission,

July-August 2007 — 13 Brigade Combat Team Logistics, defines port is required, FMTs request support The Role of the FSC during Counter- the responsibilities of the maintenance from the maintenance control section. insurgency (COIN) Operations con trol officer as: “…the principal assis- The maintenance section provides field tant to the commander, both battalion and The FSC fulfills its primary mission of maintenance for the HBCT CAB. This battalion-level support almost without fail FSC, on all matters pertaining to the field section primarily focuses on the head- maintenance mission. The MCO serves as at combat training centers and in theater. quarters company and the FSC. It also This is done through traditional methods maintenance officer for the maneuver bat- provides maintenance support to ele- talion and FSC. … He is responsible to of C2, distribution operations, and main- ments attached to the CAB and reinforc- tenance activities. However, the FSC has the commander for the management of ing maintenance to the FMTs. the combined efforts of the maintenance many other capabilities and possesses ar- control section, maintenance section, ser- Each FMT is tailored to support infantry, eas of expertise that are not being used. vice and recovery section, and the main- armor, and engineer companies. As the The following sections highlight tactics, tenance system teams.”4 FSC commander task organizes his com- techniques, and procedures to assist bat- pany, all or part of an FMT is assigned to talion commanders in exercising the ca- This eliminates the need for maneuver the company teams to maintain habitual pabilities of the FSC as it conducts both commanders to pull a battalion motor of- support doctrinally. The company com- doctrinal and non-doctrinal missions. The ficer (BMO) “out of hide.” Battalion commander is responsible for setting his com- FSC can perform valuable shaping op- manders now have a school trained main- pany’s FMT priorities; however, the FMT erations such as combat logistics patrols, tenance officer with supervision (the FSC operates under the control of the compa- assessment of essential services [sewer, commander) to manage their fleets! The ny first sergeant and is supervised by the water, electricity, academics, and trash MCO is also aided by a maintenance of- FMT maintenance noncommissioned of- (SWEAT)], and limited support and train- ficer, usually a warrant officer, and a ser- ficer in charge. FMTs carry limited on- ing for host-nation security forces logis- geant first class who serves as the main- board combat spares to help facilitate re- tics. tenance sergeant. The maintenance con- pairs forward. If inoperable equipment trol section must coordinate recovery of cannot be repaired by the FMT, due either Combat logistics patrols. The enemy the battalion’s equipment, evaluate and to METT-TC or a lack of repair parts, the seeks out the most visible and “easiest” ensure the quality of all maintenance com- FMT uses recovery assets to relocate the targets to exploit in the media. The enemy pleted by the maintenance platoon, mon- equipment to the unit maintenance collec- realizes the most vulnerable targets are itor the status of equipment undergoing tion point (UMCP) or designated linkup lightly armored logistics convoys. Noth- repairs, determine the status of the repair point. FMTs are fully integrated into the ing looks better on television than a blaz- parts required to complete repairs, and combined arms units’ operational plans ing fuel tanker in the middle of the day. perform maintenance according to the and their combined assets include one The Army is at its best at night, using priorities established by the maneuver FBCB2, three M88A1s, six M88A2s, two battalion commander.5 most of its assets watching, listening, and M984 HEMTT wreckers, one M1089 poised to attack. Since the enemy choos- The service/recovery section provides MTV wrecker, six M1075 PLS, six for- es to attack logistics targets, we should recovery support to elements of the CAB ward repair systems, 18 FMTV-series ve- operate them at night when we are best and limited reinforcing recovery support hicles, and 13 M2 .50-caliber machine prepared. Combat logistics patrols should to FMTs. When reinforcing recovery sup- guns to operate. not be used as “bait,” as some may suggest, but supplies must be moved across the battlefield, so we should force the enemy out of hiding on our terms. Assets should be positioned at critical points on the battlefield where they can best engage the enemy. The most common mission for the FSC is combat logistics patrols and much has been written on the subject of convoy security in the past few years. However, it is not the intent of this article to discuss convoy battle drills and things of that nature, but to discuss decisions that must be made by battalion commanders concerning security, air/ground integration, and setting the conditions for success. Security. Every unit rotating through the National Training Center has difficulty determining who has responsibility for the security of combat logistics patrols. Each unit struggles with convoy operating procedures and the allocation of combat forces to the FSC. The question of, “The service/recovery section provides recovery support to elements of the CAB and limited rein- “Who’s the convoy commander?” be- forcing recovery support to FMTs. When reinforcing recovery support is required, FMTs request comes a heated topic of discussion, the support from the maintenance control section.” answer to which is not clear and must be

14 — July-August 2007 settled by the unit through standard operating procedures. There are basically three methods of security for a combat logistics patrol: • Organic assets — the FSC uses organic assets to provide its own security. • Allocating external assets — roughly a platoon-sized element is temporarily attached to the FSC for the conduct of the mission. • Combination of both — platoon- sized elements secure the patrol through more dangerous terrain and the FSC secures itself through less dangerous terrain. This usually involves link up operations with multiple companies within the battalion area of operations. “Combat logistics patrols should not be used as “bait,” as some may suggest, but supplies must All three of these methods can be suc- be moved across the battlefield, so we should force the enemy out of hiding on our terms. Assets cessful; the decision comes down to should be positioned at critical points on the battlefield where they can best engage the enemy.” METT-TC and what levels of training soldiers assigned to the mission have. Air/ground integration for combat lo- ample of a conditions checklist that could tain job skills they can use after complet- gistics patrols. The use of Army aviation be helpful for battalion S3s and battle ing enlistments. These same skills can be is almost automatic when planning for captains during planning, coordinating, used to assist local populations during ground combat operations. Immediately, and tracking combat logistics patrols: counterinsurgency operations. Chapter 8 the battalion S3 contacts higher headquar- • of the new U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) Identify the mission, route, and fre- Counterinsurgency ters to schedule air assets for the next quency/call-sign of the combat logis- 3-24, , states: “In gen- cordon and search operation; but what tics patrol. eral, according to existing U.S. military logistics doctrine, there is no provision for about combat logistics patrols, especial- • Determine if aviation support is on ly if they are “self securing?” Is the use U.S. forces to become decisively or ex- station; identify frequency/call-sign. clusively engaged in providing essential of an air weapons team for convoy secu- • rity a good economy of force mission? Ensure the security force linked up services to the HN [host nation] popula- Aviation support provides valuable fire- with the FSC and completed rehears- tion during COIN operations. However, power and “eyes forward” for combat lo- als. this doctrinal position does not prohibit gistics patrols. They can detect impro- • Determine when the last route clear- units from using applicable skills and ex- vised explosive devices (IEDs) and other ance was conducted. pertise resident in their military organi- potential threats, and they can provide • Identify friendly operations in prog- zations to help assess essential HN ser- accurate fires for the convoy commander ress or planned during the combat vice needs. In conjunction with these as- as the unit moves through the kill zone. logistics patrol; determine if there is sessments, logistics and other units can a conflict. also be used to meet immediate needs Training FSC leaders is critical to inte- where possible and in the commander’s grating aviation; however, planning and • Ensure the quick-reaction force is interest, and to assist in the handoff of using close air support is not yet taught postured to support the combat logis- essential service functions to appropriate at the logistics schoolhouse. These tasks tics patrol. U.S. Government agencies, HN agencies, need to be incorporated into home-sta- • Determine if units have been notified and other civil support organizations.”6 tion training at least at the squad leader that a combat logistics patrol is mov- and above levels, and the use of air sup- ing through their area of operations. In other words, if you have the ability, do what you can with what you have un- port can be refined at combat training cen- • Confirm the latest intelligence for the ters by all elements within the battalion. til other measures can be implemented. route. By having a FSC within the battalion, Finally, on deployment, battalion S3s • should include combat logistics patrols Ascertain if the patrol will be travel- commanders have the ability to do more, into habitual aviation requests to brigade. ing through Tier I IED sites at prime and extending assistance to the local pop- hours. ulace will lend credibility to command- Setting the conditions. Much has been • Ensure the convoy commander turns ers. The FSC commander and the civil af- written on setting conditions for offen- fairs team leader/S5 can work together to sive operations. Terms, such as tactical in a final manifest and receives the latest intelligence update. build area assessments for the battalion patience and momentum, are often used, commander. Using the SWEAT frame- but we do not apply the same level of Assessing essential service requirements. work, the list of available capabilities in- thought and analysis for tactical logistics The FSC has a wide variety of military cludes: operations. More often than not, the bat- occupational specialties that can be read- tle captain does not even know when the ily applied on commercial equipment in • Sanitation — water treatment spe- FSC is on a mission because another op- civilian jobs. One of the primary reasons cialist and field sanitation expertise eration has his attention. Below is an ex- many soldiers enlist in the Army is to ob- in food-service section (along with

July-August 2007 — 15 headquarters company medical pla- security forces is enforcing accountabil- operating base (FOB)-centric counterin- toon). ity and curtailing corruption. To better il- surgency? • lustrate this point, FM 3-24 states: “Lo- Water — water treatment specialist. When a preponderance of maintenance • gisticians conducting such training should Electricity — power generation spe- expect to find themselves repeatedly em- personnel is sliced out to companies, de- cialists. phasizing the long-term benefits of sup- centralized maintenance activities occur, • Academic — all can aid in training ply discipline and materiel accountabili- as they should in a HIC fight; however, and education for critical job skills. ty and the importance of those practices for units operating on battalion or larger to the security and development of the sized FOBs, maintenance should be cen- • Transportation — assessment of rail/ tralized at the battalion level. This enables bus/ferry/port capacities and facili- host nation. For this reason, emphasis should be placed on inventory procedures. a number of capabilities. Firstly, the main- ties, and assessment of mechanical tenance control section has better visibil- maintenance of rail/bus/truck/ferry Simultaneously, the black market should be monitored for the presence of pilfered ity of the battalion’s non-mission capa- operating equipment. ble vehicles and parts statuses, which en- • military equipment as a means of deter- Food supply — food-service section mining the effectiveness of logistics pro- able the maintenance control officer to inspects packaging and facilities with cedures and accountability training.”7 better enforce maintenance priorities and veterinary assistance on food quality surge mechanics for high-priority efforts. and vector control. Other areas of logistics training may in- Secondly, maintenance personnel can bet- • Fuel — petroleum specialists inspect clude warehousing and transporting sup- ter sustain 24-hour operations. It is im- and test fuel facilities and storage. plies, combat logistics patrols, mainte- portant to remember than not only will nance, and recovery operations. Units may mechanics be performing their primary A good configuration for a SWEAT team also be called on to provide emergency duties, but will also have force protec- might include: a security team; a civil resupply to host-nation security forces. tion requirements and other details. His- affairs team; sanitation/water/fuel/food If so, then contingency stocks of Halal torically, 30 percent of personnel from crew with one 92W water treatment spe- (food permissible under Islamic law), support units provide force protection at cialist, two 92F petroleum supply special- meals ready to eat (MREs), bottled water, FOBs. Having all of the mechanics un- ists, one 63J quartermaster/NBC equip- and ammunition should be kept on hand. derneath the umbrella of the maintenance ment repairer, one 92G food-service spe- Ammunition can be obtained through platoon ensures both the force protection cialist, and one 68W (HHC) combat med- captured stocks. Overall, support to host- and maintenance missions. Thirdly, the ic; an electrical crew with one 52D pow- nation security forces should have mini- consolidation of maintenance personnel er generation equipment repairer and one mal impact; however, units will increas- in a FOB environment provides for both 52C utilities equipment repairer; an aca- ingly conduct joint patrols with host-na- the specialization and cross-training of demic crew with a civil affairs team; and tion forces, and are better postured to re- mechanics, leading to better efficiencies in a transportation crew with a distribution act quickly to urgent needs. the production capabilities of the platoon. platoon leader. Maintenance support to the combined A final recommendation for the employ- Host-nation security forces logistics. arms battalion. Current doctrine for main- ment of the FSC maintenance platoon is Since the advent of military transition tenance support to the CAB is written in to establish a “service station” for patrols teams, deployed units are not as involved the context of supporting high-intensity when they return to the FOB. This en- with the Iraq/Afghanistan security forces conflict (HIC) operations. FMI 3-90.5, sures combat vehicles are taken care of logistics operations as they once were; Heavy Brigade Combat Team Combined and returned to the fight in peak condi- however, units may still be called on to as- Arms Battalion, discusses allocating field tion. The service station is a one-stop shop sist these forces with training and/or lo- maintenance teams to CAB companies.8 for line companies returning from mis- gistics support. The most significant lo- During a HIC fight, this is perfectly logi- sions (see Figure 2). gistics challenge in training host-nation cal; but what about in the current forward The changing role of Army food preparers. Current field feeding is primarily performed by logistics contractors. These Battalion Service Station contractors provide quality meals for over 90 percent of coalition facilities in Iraq and Afghanistan. Contractor services limit the role of Army food preparers to only Tasks: MAINT PLT providing prepared meals for soldiers 1. Conduct after PMCS working in remote locations. When Army food preparers are not performing their 2. Report deficiencies to Fuel Pt mechanic primary MOS functions, they perform Distro MED security functions. The field feeding sec- PLT CL IV 3. Mechanic verifies fault PLT tion in the FSC has 23 soldiers, which and orders/installs parts CLI provides the commander with a good 4. Refuel H20 number of soldiers to accomplish many 5. Draw Class I, IV, V, and Staging tasks. The field feeding section can be Area VIII CL V trained to conduct: 6. Repack vehicle for • Convoy/area security — takes the se- combat curity burden off of line companies and ensures every combat logistics patrol has a maneuverable security element. This el- Figure 2 ement can also perform security for area

16 — July-August 2007 FSC/CTCP Integration assessment teams or medical civilian-assistance programs (MEDCAPs).

• Personal security detachment — train FBCB2/BFT/MTS/BCS3 REMOTE FU approximately 16 soldiers to provide per- SIO N! sonal security for the battalion command- ROLLING BUB er and other battalion leaders.

• Consider: Force protection for entry control BCS3 • One-stop SA for FSC S1 Operator points and other guard duty. CDR & S4 • Functional ALT TOC • Dislocated field feeding — the FSC • COP OPS • Synchronization should maintain a reserve of four food SGT • Centralized OPS preparers to operate two KCLFF-Es in RTO • Ability to best support case of unforeseen out-of-sector mis- RTO the TF S1 • Optimizes Comms MTS • Optimizes Comms sions. REP • Inter-Operability-Operability Operator • Inter-Operability The field feeding section should have S4 four M1114s, equipped with M2 .50-cal- REP

iber machine guns and multiband intra- FSC FSC S4 team radios (MBITRs) for dismounted CDR XO operations. The key to success for these security operations is home-station train- Figure 3 ing, followed by training at a combat training center prior to deployment. battalion and should be held fully respon- FSC can provide critical shaping and sus- Other nontraditional logistics missions. sible for the material readiness and sup- taining operations to be integrated with The FSC is also capable of performing ply status of the battalion. Additionally, the other lines of operations. The FSC com- the following nontraditional missions: FSC officers and soldiers should be held mander provides battalion commanders • Non-standard casualty evacuation. to the same standards as the rest of the an executive agent for all logistics mat- The FSC has 28 FMTV vehicles that can battalion. ters and ensures integration with higher mobilize to support casualty evacuation. Integrating the combat trains com- levels of support. After fully integrating mand post and FSC command post the FSC into the maneuver battalion, com- • Split-based operations. The FSC has . manders will see just how effective their enough communications equipment to Units are finding much success consoli- logistics systems are and how well they support logistics C2 in two nodes. dating combat service support C2 in one centralized command post. Many times, integrate with other combat operations. • Female search teams. Since the FSC the S1 and S4 operate independently of is the only unit that has females assigned the FSC commander, which creates a dis- at the battalion task force level, training jointed concept of support. Creating a “fu- all female soldiers in personnel search sion cell” combines the S1, S4, and FSC, Notes techniques allows units to search indige- providing a “one-stop” point for admin- 1U.S. Army Field Manual Interim (FMI) 4-90.1, Heavy Bri- nous female personnel without violating istration and logistics (see Figure 3). gade Combat Team Logistics, U.S. Government Printing Of- cultural norms. fice (GPO), Washington, DC, 15 March 2005. During battle tracking in the tactical op- 2Ibid. • 3 Captured ammunition/arms holding erations center, FSC operations, includ- FMI 3-90.5, Heavy Brigade Combat Team Combined Arms area (CAHA). The FSC should operate ing recovery missions and combat logis- Battalion, GPO, Washington, DC, 15 March 2005. the initial storage point for captured am- 4FMI 4-90.1, Heavy Brigade Combat Team Logistics. tics patrols, should be planned, coordi- 5Captain Eric A. McCoy, “Maintenance Management in the munition, arms, and equipment. This also nated, and tracked just as other battalion Heavy BCT,” Army Logistician, September-October 2006. provides for contingency stocks of am- operations. 6U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Counterinsurgency, munition, weapons, and armament repair GPO, Washington, DC, 15 December 2006. parts for host-nation security forces. Commanders should task the medical 7Ibid. platoon to provide at least one medic to 8FMI 3-90.5, Heavy Brigade Combat Team Combined Arms Battalion Commander Responsibilities support FSC missions. The FSC has no Battalion. Indeed, some battalion commanders organic medical capability and although the FSC will have first responders and place more emphasis on logistics than Major Trenton J. Conner is currently an observ- others. However, battalion commanders combat lifesavers, having a true medic er controller, Operations Group, National Train- can ensure FSCs operate to full potential saves lives. ing Center, Fort Irwin, CA. He received a B.B.A. and are full members of the battalion by FSC operations should be fully integrat- from North Georgia College. His military edu- following a few recommendations: ed in all battalion training. The FSC should cation includes the Combined Logistics Cap- not be allowed to just simply feed, fix, tains Career Course. He has served in various Integrating the FSC as a unit. This be- command and staff positions to include, forward gins with the type of relationship the ma- and supply the battalion while the line support company trainer, Light Infantry Task neuver battalion commander has with the companies train. The FSC should con- Force, National Training Center, Fort Irwin; com- FSC commander. For example, if the bat- duct convoy operations, tactical refuel mander, Company A, 25th Brigade Support and recovery missions, establish tactical Battalion, 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division talion commander does not respect the (SBCT), Operation Iraqi Freedom III; platoon FSC commander because of branch dif- feeding sites, and conduct crew-served and individual weapons training. leader, 1st Battalion, 187th Infantry, 101st Air- ferences, then the rest of the battalion will borne Division (Assault), Kosovo; and platoon not respect the FSC commander. The FSC The FSC provides each supported bat- leader, 626th Forward Support Battalion, 101st commander is the senior logistician in the talion a robust logistics capability. The Airborne Division (Assault), Kosovo.

July-August 2007 — 17 How Well Has It Held Up?

by Lieutenant Colonel Benjamin Harris

In 1989, Orr Kelly published the story mander’s integrated display for tactical capabilities and shortfalls much like the of the evolution of the Abrams tank, King situational awareness, and an indepen- 1972 team. Surprisingly, the composition of the Killing Zone.1 More than 18 years dent sight for “hunter-killer” capability. of the team today is quite similar, just a have passed since its publication, and it The Armor Center’s current task is to de- bit smaller.3 Key personnel at the Armor seems appropriate to evaluate the Abrams termine critical technologies required for Center, which includes the TRADOC Ca- program, review its progress, and see how the Abrams in 2016 and beyond. pability Manager for the Heavy Brigade far it deviated from the original plans first Combat Team (TCM HBCT) and Direc- started in 1972. It may seem unusual that Similar to the 1972 initiative by Lieuten- torate, Training, Doctrine, and Combat 2007 is a significant milestone to conduct ant General DePuy, assistant vice chief of Developments (DTDCD), are assisted by this analysis, but the Armor Center is con- staff of the Army, to establish the big five, acquisition officers with masters degrees ducting a major Abrams requirement anal- in September 2005, Lieutenant General and doctorates. The process is part sci- ysis, for only the third time in the Abrams Curran, director, Training and Doctrine ence and part art. In 1972, the team real- 30-plus years of development, to set the Command (TRADOC) Futures Center, ized they needed a better tank, with spe- plans for the next 30 years! directed the Armor and Infantry Centers cific weight restrictions, at an affordable to begin the process of sustaining and price. Those same constraints still exist, The first major upgrade to the Abrams modernizing Abrams and Bradley vehi- so how much progress have we made since in the mid-1980s included a 120mm can- cles for the next 20 years and beyond.2 non upgrade; a nuclear, biological, and the 1972 analysis? chemical (NBC) system; and armor en- Today’s initiative is called “the joint ca- Most believe the Abrams is a very ca- hancements. The second major upgrade pabilities integration and development pable tank; results from Operation Iraqi in the mid-1990s added another armor process.” To begin the new process, how- Freedom validate those opinions. The upgrade, a digital architecture, a com- ever, it is critical to analyze the required vulnerabilities of the Abrams are com-

18 — July-August 2007 mon to most modern tanks throughout the tection to stay under 70 tons, if the pro- price armor?”7 Using the relative share of world. Two recently upgraded and mod- jected threat allows. However, the Armor the gross domestic product conversion in ernized tanks, the Merkava and Leopard Center is not requiring the Abrams’ weight a 2005 cost projection analysis, today’s 2, have added belly armor and improved to be reduced to less than 70 tons. tank should cost around $5.1M. In actu- top-attack protection. But adding armor ality, the tank is closer to $7M. If viewed comes with a sustainability penalty. In A 70-ton vehicle comes with a huge price in terms of cost to weight, the goal was the United States, heavy equipment trans- tag. An M113A3, considered by many to around $88,000 per ton; today’s Abrams porters and tactical assault bridges are be too light for 21st-century warfare, has costs a little over $100,000 per ton. A 14- limited to 70 tons. So what should these one advantage over the Abrams — it op- percent cost growth seems reasonable, if limits be in 2016; in 2026? erates for about $50 dollars per mile, com- the Abrams achieved a 20-percent increase pared with $400 per mile for the Abrams. in weight/survivability, until viewed in Major General Desobry first imposed a Even the Bradley, now closer to 37 tons terms of total life-cycle costs. weight limit for the tank of 46 to 52 tons; can operate for about $168 per mile. Con- later, General Abrams set the upper weight sidering that the Abrams has grown less Track wear has been the Achilles heel of limit at 58 tons based on his personal ex- than 21 percent of its original weight, com- the Abrams tank program, as it is the sec- perience during World War II and analy- pared with the Bradley growing nearly 57 ond largest consumable expense in the sis of Chobham armor effectiveness pro- percent greater than its original weight, Army, only surpassed by meals ready to vided by Lieutenant General Depuy.4 The another few tons seems reasonable. Al- eat (MRE) consumption.8 Life-cycle costs added weight made it difficult to meet though both vehicles are expensive to op- not only include consumables, such as the $507,790 price tag in 1972 dollars.5 erate, they have improved in reliability track, batteries, shock absorbers, weap- The weight also made it difficult to meet and maintainability, mostly through ad- ons system barrels, and headset-micro- the 25-to-1 horsepower ratio established vancements in electronic technology. phones, but also repairable items such as by Major General Desobry.6 engines, transmissions, electronic units, The original M1 Abrams team was also Today, the tank weighs nearly 70 tons generators, and heaters. The cost to sus- challenged by the cost of the tank; how- tain the Abrams for one year is staggering when fully combat loaded. Recent surviv- ever, they appear to have focused on unit ability upgrades, such as the tank urban — in 2006, the top-10 consumption and cost rather than total life-cycle cost. For repair bills for the Abrams tank program survivability kit and contemplated mine- this reason, the Armor Center established protection kits, could push the Abrams’ exceeded $430M. Compared to that fig- a key system attribute, which mandates ure, the top-10 consumption and repair weight close to 74 tons. These upgrades that any future variant of the Abrams must only improve protection for specific ar- bills for the Bradley, the new M1068A3 be easier to maintain and more reliable, command post, the Paladin self-propelled eas and are projected to be required fu- with the assumption of lowering total ture key capabilities. howitzer, the M1064A3 mortar carrier, the ownership costs. M577A3 command post, and the M113 The argument in 1972 was that speed In chapter four of King of the Killing family of vehicles (FOV) totaled around and power saves lives equivalent to ar- Zone, Kelly raises the question: “What $255M. In 2006, the repair bill on the mor protection. Today, situational awareness is paramount and speed sometimes creates confusion. The challenge now is that the larger threat formations and systems common during World War II have been replaced with an asymmetric threat, which operates mostly as dismounts using remotely controlled devices elab orate ly hidden among the normal debris common in urban landscapes. Additionally, the lethality of these small, well-hidden devices greatly exceeds that of similarly sized items used during World War II. When situational awareness and early detection fails, only added armor can reduce the risk to crewmen. The Armor Center has concluded that if the Abrams must grow to 74 tons, then future tactics, techniques, and procedures will have to adjust to take the weight increase into account. This is a radical change in philosophy. Previously, nearly all Abrams variants focused on fron- “The true value of the Abrams can only be measured in terms of its lethality and survivability. That value tal protection and the Armor Cen- cannot be quantified, however, when compared to the countless lives the Abrams has saved, not only of ar- ter is proposing the tank deploy mor crewmen, but of other soldiers within the formation who know that when they call “9-1-1,” the Abrams with current levels of frontal pro- tank will bring the ‘HEAT.’ ”

July-August 2007 — 19 Abrams gas turbine engine alone was German tanks easily outmaneuvered by ics. These critical challenges led the Ar- $229M. lighter, more agile, American tanks. In mor Center to establish a key system at- 1972, the United States focused on tank- tribute mandating that any future variant When viewed in total, the Abrams re- on-tank warfare and mobility in the Ful- of the Abrams must be easier to maintain quires nearly 62 percent of the cost to sus- da Gap, and, in 1972, the enemy had light- and more reliable. tain a HBCT, but actually accounts for er and more mobile tanks. only 22 percent of the tracked vehicles There has been some argument that tank- within the HBCT formation. Viewed in It was as difficult then as it is today to ers are obese and too kinetic in their meth- terms of weight being the deciding cost predict the benefit and cost of a 58-ton ods. The misconception that tankers lack factor, experts underestimated the life-cy- tank. Is it any different today? I think it the social skills and grace required to win cle costs that added mobility, made pos- is. Urbanization is the wave of the future the hearts and minds in 21st-century war- sible with a gas turbine engine, would im- and urbanization means more roads. If we fare is ludicrous! Today’s soldiers are ca- pose throughout the tank program’s life. are trying to influence people who live in pable of quickly transitioning from “steely- The true value of the Abrams can only the city, then surely the Abrams of the eyed-killers” to humanitarians handing be measured in terms of its lethality and future will operate in the city. out bottles of water to children playing survivability. That value cannot be quan- soccer, even after one might have taken Today’s cities have much better road a shot at us with a paintball gun. Howev- tified, however, when compared to the standards than they did 60 years ago. If countless lives the Abrams has saved, not er, the tank is not nice; it does not “tran- the future area of operations has little road sition.” It is growing to 74 tons and car- only of armor crewmen, but of other sol- infrastructure, then it is debatable if it diers within the formation who know that ries over 40 high-explosive warheads that is a national security interest. Otherwise, can destroy nearly everything found in when they call “9-1-1,” the Abrams tank lighter, more mobile, forces, such as the will bring the “HEAT.” the urban jungle. It holds close to 11,000 82d Airborne Division, 101st Air Assault, rounds of 7.62mm machine gun ammu- The Abrams crewman is the cornerstone Stryker brigades, Special Forces, or light- nition (more than can be carried by a rifle of any future Abrams upgrade. For start- er allied formations, will be relied on to platoon). It shoots one 120mm canister ers, the tank is too hot to operate comfort- carry out operations. The only limitation round capable of dispensing 1,100 tung- ably for extended periods during sum- we face today is a chemical engineering sten balls with a lethality greater than that mer months. Modern technology is amaz- limitation; how much friction can track of 1,000 M4 rifles. It can crush a car and ing; however, it comes with two unavoid- rubber glued to metal withstand? If the will kill the enemy if someone “breaks able penalties — advanced electronics rubber fails, then we will have more fre- the glass in case of emergency!” It still is generate heat and consume electricity. quent track replacement. Until that dis- King of the Killing Zone! Overheating electronics are unreliable. A covery is made, the Armor Center is will- future key capability for the Abrams is to ing to accept a 70-ton tank, with add-on keep the crew capable of efficiently op- kits that make it closer to 74 tons, for one erating in all climates and, at the same reason — soldier survivability. time, provide greater reliability of its in- Notes ternal electronics. It is a very difficult chal- Loader’s Armored Gun Shield (LAGS) 1Orr Kelly, King of the Killing Zone, W.W. Norton and Com- lenge placed on our future materiel de- Abrams Reactive Armor Tile (ARAT) pany, Inc., New York, February 1989, p. 88. 2King of the Killing Zone, p. 90. Colonel Charles Heiden, velopers. A robust “cooling” system might Increasing soldier survivability is top Combat Development Command, led the initial effort for tank compete for electricity with the other re- requirements analysis in 1972. priority for the Armor Center which is 3 quired electronics on a platform that has in the process of evaluating the tank ur- Ibid. 4Ibid., p. 128. used nearly all available surplus electric- ban survivability kit (TUSK). TUSK I 5 ity. It may seem unimportant, but a gen- Ibid., p. 136. will be delivered during July 2007 to the 6Ibid., p. 98. erator capable of an order of magnitude Iraqi area of operations. As mentioned 7Ibid., p. 111. increase in available electrical power will in previous ARMOR articles, TUSK I will 8U.S. Army Materiel Command, data on consumable ex- enable the tank to add other technologies, include the improved loader’s armored penses for the U.S. Army in 2004. such as active protection systems, remote- gun shield (LAGS) and Abrams reactive ly controlled weapons that reduce sol- armor tile (ARAT), adding nearly two tons dier exposure to small arms, rearward or to the tank. A second iteration of TUSK Lieutenant Colonel Benjamin Harris is current- 360-degree closed-hatch/in-close situa- ly the assistant Training and Doctrine Com- is in its early stages of development and mand Capability Manager for Abrams, Fort tional awareness, helmet-mounted dis- may include additional belly armor simi- Knox, KY. He received a B.S. from the U.S. Mil- plays, threat warning and jamming sys- lar to that already in use by the Israelis itary Academy and an M.A. from Central Mich- tems, or possibly electromagnetic armor. and on Leopard 2 A6 tanks recently sold igan University. His military education includes Much of this new technology, such as an to Sweden. Airborne School, Armor Officer Basic Course, active protection system, comes with yet Armor Officer Advanced Course, and U.S. Army another huge weight penalty — close to Weight reduction is important, but is not Command and General Staff College. He has 1 ton! a critical area of concern. A target weight served in various command and staff posi- of 70 tons should be possible through ad- tions, to include assistant product manager for So what was the original team’s real is- vancements over the next 10 years in light- large caliber (Abrams) ammunition, Picatinny sue with weight? Was it the cost of armor er, more capable armor technology — key Arsenal, NJ; administrative contracting officer, or the limitation of bridges? I think it had is where to apply this extra armor capa- Lima Army Tank Plant, Lima, OH; combined more to do with mobility. Many tank bat- bility. Protection for the flanks and belly arms team armor advisor, 42d Army National Guard, Fort Dix, NJ; commander, Headquarters tles during World War II were cross-coun- are projected to be future key required ca- and Headquarters Company, 1st Battalion, 70th try dashes or occurred on unimproved dirt pabilities, as well as the capability to keep Armor, 194th Separate Infantry Brigade, Fort paths meant for horse-drawn wagons. Se- the crew efficiently operating in all-weath- Knox, KY; and scout platoon leader, D Troop, nior leaders directing the Abrams pro- er climates while simultaneously provid- 4th Cavalry, 197th Separate Infantry Brigade, gram during the 1970s had seen the heavy ing greater reliability of internal electron- Fort Benning, GA.

20 — July-August 2007 Integrating Armor into Personnel Recovery Operations by Captain Romeo P. Cubas, U.S. Marine Corps

The 507th Maintenance Company mis- would expand into personnel recovery Force (TF) Tarawa, 2d Marine Expedi- takenly entered the city of An Nasiriyah (PR) operations. tionary Brigade (MEB). This tank platoon, on the morning of 23 March 2003. Iraqi along with Marine artillery, aviation, force soldiers, al Quds militia, and Saddam Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff In- reconnaissance, and infantry, participat- Fedayeen fighters would ambush the lost struction (CJCSI) 3270.01A defines per- ed in a truly joint PR operation alongside unit, killing and wounding 21 sol diers sonnel recovery (PR) as “…the recovery special operations forces (SOF) from the and taking six prisoners. Over the next and return of U.S. Military, DOD civil- U.S. Army, Air Force, and Navy. Opera- week, while Task Force Tarawa continued ians, and DOD contractor personnel who tion Iraqi Freedom saw tanks exponential- to fight a determined resistance, the U.S. are isolated or missing while participat- ly prove their worth during urban opera- Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps ing in a U.S. Government-sanctioned mil- tions and expand their role to include PR. prepared to conduct what would be the itary activity or missions in an uncertain or hostile environment, or as determined Experience Context first successful rescue of an American 1 prisoner of war since World War II. Ma- by the Secretary of Defense.” The Ar- During Operation Desert Storm, Iraqi rine Corps M1A1 tankers contributed to my’s PR philosophy is one of leadership military commanders learned that in open this joint operation by bringing addition- and accountability and every command land warfare they could not match the makes every effort to ultimately recover al shock, awe, and firepower to an al- 2 technological superiority of the United ready impressive combined arms force. 100 percent of its personnel. States military machine. If the Iraqi army Operation Iraqi Freedom saw tanks ex- In April 2003, during the battle for An wanted a different outcome in a future ponentially prove their worth in the ur- Nasiriyah, Iraq, I commanded 3d Platoon, war, the fighting would have to be waged ban environment, and the role of armor Alpha Company, 8th Tank Battalion, Task in the streets of Iraqi cities. If Saddam

“We need to focus on Soldiers being able to take care of themselves, then able to take care of their buddies, then able to take care of their larger team…It’s all part of the Warrior Ethos: Place the mission first, never accept defeat, never quit, and never leave a fallen comrade.” — General Peter J. Schoomaker “If Saddam Hussein were to be removed from power, the U.S. military would have to move into Baghdad. Iraqi generals decided that the most logical defense along a southern approach would have to occur in Iraq’s fifth largest city and home of the 11th Infantry Division. An Nasiriyah would provide cover from U.S. air superiority, since Iraqi commanders seriously doubted that Americans would bomb 500,000 Iraqi citizens.”

Hussein were to be removed from power, had planned a deliberate defense and were olina, was tasked to conduct a relief in the U.S. military would have to move into ready to draw approximately 2,000 U.S. place (RIP) with the 3d Brigade Combat Baghdad. Iraqi generals decided that the forces into a deadly urban fight.5 Team (BCT) near Talill Air Base at 0430 most logical defense along a southern ap- Unfortunately, the first unit to face this hours on 23 March. The 3d BCT felt it proach would have to occur in Iraq’s fifth defense was a logistics company from was unnecessary to move north on High- largest city and home of the 11th Infan- 6 way 7 and clear the southern end of An try Division. An Nasiriyah would provide Fort Bliss, Texas. The 507th Maintenance Nasiriyah, as had been planned. Instead, cover from U.S. air superiority, since Company was part of an impressive U.S. it proceeded along Highway 1 to the Eu- Iraqi commanders seriously doubted that Army supply line, and its primary mis- phrates River and turned left on to High- Americans would bomb 500,000 Iraqi sion was to provide maintenance, sup- way 8 to continue its move toward the 3 plies, and support to a patriot missile bat- citizens. tery that would advance north toward west. The city of An Nasiriyah was heavily Baghdad with the 3d Infantry Division. The Army had not heard anything about defended by an entire Iraqi army brigade The 507th’s company commander en- a possible capitulation from the 11th In- along its southern portion bordering the tered the Army as a dental assistant and fantry Division and had no intention of Euphrates River. Another brigade dug eventually worked his way into com- going into the city to seize its eastern in inside the city, and a third brigade manding mechanics, cooks, computer bridges. Marine commanders were wor- was located north of the Saddam Canal. technicians, and clerks who lacked basic ried about the condition of the Highway Technicals, armored personnel carriers military fighting skills. He did not expect 1 Bridge located north of the Euphrates (APCs), mortars, artillery, anti-aircraft ar- these support troops to see combat and River, since it was a new highway with tillery (AAA) guns, and tanks were spread even had his soldiers’ hand grenades some portions still under construction. throughout the city in well-planned and and AT-4 antitank weapons collected and The 1st Marine Division had recently left well-fortified positions. Arms and ammu- locked up prior to combat operations.7 the southern Al Luhays oilfields and was nition caches were located in strategic lo- The 507th departed Attack Position (AP) charging toward Baghdad on Highway 1. cations and included mosques, schools, Dawson, just south of the Kuwait-Iraq The commander of I Marine Expedition- and hospitals. Five hundred of Uday Hus- border, at 0700 hours on 20 March. Due ary Force (I MEF) determined it was crit- sein’s fanatical henchmen, the Saddam to the rough cross-country travel, the unit ical to develop a second avenue of ap- Fedayeen, were sent to the city to ensure only moved 35 kilometers in 4 hours be- proach, in the event Saddam Hussein or- the 11th Infantry Division and the local fore stopping to rest. The next evening, dered an attack on advancing Marines, al Quds militia remained loyal and moti- they traveled 80 kilometers northwest and chose Route 7 as the second route.9 vated. across the barren desert and the convoy TF Tarawa was assigned as the main effort and ordered to seize the bridges along Members of the Ba’ath party militia also soon began to feel the effects of off-road travel in southern Iraq.8 Darkness, disori- that route by 230700Z (1000 hours local had a great deal at stake in defending the entation, soft sand, and flat tires mired the time). city, since they controlled and lived a lux- convoy causing it to drop farther behind urious life at the expense of the local Shia from the rest of the logistics train. The 507th Maintenance Company was population.4 In and around An Nasiriyah, to proceed north along Highway 8, “Route the combined strength of regular and ir- On the evening of 22 March, as the 507th Blue,” and turn left at the intersection with regular forces was somewhere between drew closer to An Nasiriyah, TF Tarawa, Highway 1, “Route Jackson,” avoiding An 6,000 to 10,000 men. Iraqi commanders 2d MEB, from Camp Lejeune, North Car- Nasiriyah altogether. A manned check-

22 — July-August 2007 point had been put in place to direct strag- Hospital. After 2 days of gathering intel- observe and listen to activity from the glers to the detour, but by the time the ligence, he brought five different and very Hussein Hospital grounds, and reconnais- 507th arrived, it had been abandoned.10 detailed maps that he and his wife had sance snipers were positioned to prevent made. The illustrations pointed out the enemy forces from thwarting the rescue. At approximately 0600 hours, the 507th’s exact room of the captured soldier. The convoy crossed over a railroad and trav- lawyer also provided the security layout, TF Tarawa began relentlessly attacking eled past a company of dug-in Iraqi tanks, reaction plan, and times of shift changes. the enemy with overwhelming artillery and an outlying industrial area composed Through his surveillance, he had count- and precision air strikes from AV-8B of oil storage tanks, power lines, a gas Harriers and Air Force Special Opera- ed 41 Iraqi soldiers or insurgents at the tions Command (AFSOC) AC-130 Spec- station, and a garbage dump. At a signif- hospital, with four in civilian clothes 16 icant intersection with clearly marked guarding the captured soldier’s room. He tre gunship howitzer rounds. By early signs, Highway 8 went off to the west mentioned that they were armed with Ka- morning on 1 April, civilian communi- through the southern portion of the city laschnikov AK-47 assault rifles and car- cations equipment, to include satellite 11 phones and computer connections, were toward the Highway 1 Bridge. The 507th ried radios. His reconnaissance further 17 determined that the building’s rooftop blacked out. Shortly before midnight, missed that turn, drove straight through electrical power was cut and only the hos- downtown An Nasiriyah, and was am- could support a helicopter landing.14 Af- 12 pital’s emergency generators provided bushed with a “torrent of fire.” Eleven ter all the human intelligence had been light. Real-time images of the area were members of the 507th would eventually received and authorization was granted provided by a Predator unmanned aerial perish as a result of combat actions that from the highest military authorities, prep- vehicle (UAV) circling overhead, improv- morning. Seven others would become arations for a personnel recovery opera- ing the situational awareness of the joint Operation Iraqi Freedom’s first prisoners tion were underway. The U.S. Army would 18 13 operations center. The battlefield had of war (POWs). take command of the rescue mission, turn- been prepared and the planning stages of ing TF Tarawa’s command post into a the POW rescue operation were nearly The PR Operation sophisticated reconnaissance operations 15 complete. While air supremacy and over- Within days, a concerned local Iraqi law- center. whelming reconnaissance was achieved, yer confirmed that an American POW A Marine 2d Force Reconnaissance team heavy armored combat power was still was being held at the Saddam Hussein moved in from the west close enough to lacking.

“At 1155 hours, Blue 4, assigned as the platoon’s plow tank for the operation, cleared a route near the Saddam Canal Bridge through cars that had been placed along the northwestern portion of Highway 7 earlier in the week to block enemy vehicles. As the plow tank pushed a disabled vehicle off the road, the remaining two tanks led the convoy across the Saddam Canal Bridge toward the Saddam Hussein Hospital, a distance of approximately 3 kilometers.” To fill this void, a tank platoon from Al- As soon as the Marine tank platoon was mander counted the vehicles as they pha Company, 8th Tank Battalion, was attached to the SOF unit, the tank com- passed by and quickly followed in trace needed to escort a convoy of 18 vehicles manders ensured they had positive com- to provide rear area security for the con- carrying elite forces from the U.S. Army munications with each other and the rest voy.20 and Navy into the center of the city. Due of the rescue team. Loading radio fre- to a shortage of readily available parts quencies onto three tanks would take ap- Near simultaneously in the southwest and continuous combat operations, the proximately 45 minutes, since the Army portion of the city, the 15th Marine Ex- maintenance status of tracked vehicles in Ranger radio operators were unfamiliar peditionary Unit (MEU) conducted a di- theater was less than desirable; however, with the Marine PRC119. Once radio versionary attack, along with Charlie Bat- with three tanks, Alpha Company’s 3d checks were performed, the tankers were tery, 1st Battalion, 10th Marines, on the Platoon (Blue) was provided enormous ready to lead the convoy. headquarters of Saddam’s Ba’ath party. combat power and shock effect. This massive eruption of firepower was Around 1130 hours on 1 April, a convoy used to deceive enemy fighters, causing As soon as the tank platoon received its of three M1A1s and four Pandar SOF them to think that an attack would occur warning order to conduct a POW mission, vehicles, 12 M1114s, and two Marine along the western Euphrates Bridge, the tankers began preparing their vehicles. seven-ton trucks carrying soldiers from while the main effort maneuvered from Marines immediately performed track the 75th Ranger Regiment, departed for the northwest. Marine and Air Force air- maintenance and refueled their vehicles. the northwest Saddam Canal Bridge near craft provided close air support (CAS) Tow bars were already in place and am- the intersections of Highways 7 and 16. while UAVs circled above the hospital, munition was evenly cross-leveled, but Alpha Company from 1st Battalion, 2d providing real-time data back to the joint nonessential items, such as rucksacks, Marine Regiment, was ready to assist the command center. Marine CH-46s ferry- meals ready to eat (MRE) boxes, and fuel main effort as a quick reaction force ing a company of Army Rangers, Army cans were unloaded to avoid any acciden- (QRF) to avoid a repeat of the Mogadi- CH-47s, and MH-6 Little Bird helicop- tal losses or fire hazards. shu disaster or the aborted rescue attempt ters from the 160th Special Operations 19 Special operations commanders coordi- in Tehran. Aviation Regiment rushed to their target. nated with tank platoon commanders to At 1155 hours, Blue 4, assigned as the After dropping their personnel, the Little seek advice on how to position vehicles platoon’s plow tank for the operation, Birds and Black Hawks stood ready to to effectively block enemy avenues of ap- cleared a route near the Saddam Canal provide additional CAS and evacuate proach from the center of the city. Satel- Bridge through cars that had been placed personnel. lite imagery aided the tank platoon in iden- along the northwestern portion of High- A dozen Navy sea, air, and land (SEAL) tifying possible individual vehicle posi- way 7 earlier in the week to block enemy sailors assaulted the six-story hospital, tions and gave direction on where to place vehicles. As the plow tank pushed a dis- encountering limited resistance from Iraqi target reference points to properly con- abled vehicle off the road, the remaining guards.21 Using explosive charges to dis- trol direct fire. Accurate imagery and thor- two tanks led the convoy across the Sad- orient any occupants, the SEALs moved ough map rehearsals allowed all three dam Canal Bridge toward the Saddam quickly through the hospital and found tanks to share a common operating pic- Hussein Hospital, a distance of approxi- the captured soldier.22 Within a matter of ture. mately 3 kilometers. The plow tank com- minutes, the soldier was quickly loaded

“Armor is a force protection asset clearly feared by the insurgents. Tactically, tanks in sector signify a powerful deterrent and provide additional ground combat elements the freedom of maneuver they need to conduct missions.”

24 — July-August 2007 onto the helicopter waiting on the roof- each branch’s capabilities. Regardless of Recommendation: Thermal receiving top and lifted into the sky. the technological supremacy of the U.S. units should be inspected and tested pri- military, it is ultimately the disciplined, or to any type of night operation. Critical As the aerial assault developed, vehicles innovative, and flexible nature of its sol- items, such as TRUs, should be readily from the ground combat element raced diers, sailors, airmen, and Marines that in- available rather than waiting for a tank to to their assigned positions, traveling at stills fear in the enemy. be deadlined before the part is ordered. approximately 45 kilometers per hour. The supply system is not being circum- Three tanks immediately secured the Lessons Learned vented to expedite delivery times; in- southwest, southeast, and northeast cor- stead, having readily available critical fire ners of the Saddam Hussein complex. The personnel recovery operation had the added benefit of lessons learned. system components, prevents cannibal- Gunners scanned assigned sectors of fire ization, and ultimately saves lives. and even picked up their wingman’s scan When shared with comrades in arms, when thermal receiver units (TRUs) over- these lessons are invaluable, especially heated. Loaders and tank commanders when they save lives. used night-vision goggles (PVS-7s and Notes 14s) to scan for potential targets. Breaching obstacles in an urban environment: 1Department of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Once the perimeter was secured, SEALs Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3270.01A, Personnel Recovery With- and Rangers spread throughout the com- Observation: A plow tank is an excel- in the Department of Defense, U.S. Government Printing Of- lent piece of equipment to breach through fice (GPO), Washington, DC, 1 July 2003. plex to search for more American sol- 2U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-50.1, Army Personnel Re- diers. The hospital’s staff informed the obstacles and move vehicles. covery, GPO, Washington DC, 25 September 1996. 3Richard S. Lowry, Marines in the Garden of Eden: The True search team that several Americans had Discussion: A plow tank moved vehi- Story of Seven Bloody Days in Iraq, Berkley Publishing, New been buried on the hospital grounds.23 As cles into position as part of an obstacle York, 2006, p. 94. the intelligence was shared on the com- 4Ibid., p. 97. plan to prevent insurgents from running 5 mand net, Blue 2 identified large mounds through blockades. When conducting the Ibid., p. 98. 6Rick Bragg, I am a Soldier Too: The Jessica Lynch Story, of dirt and immediately relayed the infor- personnel recovery mission, a plow tank Knopf, New York, 2003, p. 9. mation to the search team. The Marine was used to create a lane for SOF vehi- 7Lowry, p. 88. tankers directed the Rangers to the loca- cles to travel through en route to Saddam 8Ibid., p. 107. tion of what appeared to be freshly dug Hussein Hospital. 9Ibid., pp. 113-14. graves. The soldiers dug up the area us- 10Bragg, p. 66. Recommendation: In an urban environ- 11Lowry, p. 130. ing their hands and a large shovel given 12 ment, every tank platoon should have a Bragg, p. 12. to them by Blue 2. Once their task was 13 minimum of one tank plow to emplace Lowry, pp. 391-93. complete, SOF returned to their vehicles 14“Leave No Comrades Behind,” article available online at or breach obstacles. http://gipsverband.free.fr/jlyncheg.htm. and aircraft, and the tanks pulled out in re- 15 verse order, escorting ground forces north Lowry, p. 371. Personnel recovery: 16Ibid., p. 374. of the Saddam Canal. The mission con- 17Bragg, p. 129. cluded just before daybreak, with the con- Observation: When conducting a PR 18“Leave No Comrades Behind.” voy returning safely across friendly lines. mission, it is beneficial to carry equip- 19Lowry, p. 379. ment to potentially dig up the remains of 20Ibid., p. 377. That morning, seven Americans were soldiers. 21Ibid., pp. 378-80. un covered and two more were found in 22“Leave No Comrades Behind.” the hospital’s morgue. In the building’s Discussion: In An Nasiriyah, U.S. Army 23Lowry, p. 380. basement, SOF found rifles, ammunition, Rangers had to use their hands to dig up 24Bragg, pp. 133-34. the remains of soldiers outside the Sad- 25Department of the Army, Army Training and Evaluation mortars, maps, and a detailed sandbox il- Program (ARTEP) 17-237-10, Mission Training Plan for the lustrating the exact locations of Iraqi de- dam Hussein Hospital. Tank Platoon, GPO, Washington DC, 25 September 1996. fenses. There was clear evidence to sug- Recommendation: When preparing for gest the building had been used to shield a PR mission, SOF should carry shovels Captain Romeo Paolo Cubas is currently serv- 24 insurgents from American attacks. in their vehicles or tankers should bring ing as logistics officer, 2d Tank Battalion, 2d Armor is a force protection asset clear- extra shovels since they have room to car- Marine Division, II Marine Expeditionary Force, ry more equipment. Camp Lejeune, NC. He received a B.S. from ly feared by the insurgents. Tactically, the United States Naval Academy, Annapolis, tanks in sector signify a powerful deter- Scanning at night with defective ther- MD. His military education includes the Ma- rent and provide additional ground com- mal receiving units (TRU): neuver Captains Career Course, Armor Officer bat elements the freedom of maneuver Basic Course, Ground Supply Officers Course, they need to conduct missions. At the op- Observation: When a tank commander’s and the Marine Air-Ground Task Force Fire Sup- erational level, tanks are a reflection of TRU overheated, his wingman expanded port Course. He has served in various com- serious combat power; their presence res- his sector of fire while the tank command- mand and staff positions, to include headquar- onates across military lines, allowing hu- er’s TRU cooled down. ters company commander, logistics officer, and man intelligence teams and civil affairs supply officer, Weapons Training Battalion, Ma- Discussion: Loaders and tank command- rine Corps Base Camp Lejeune; platoon com- units to shape and stabilize areas of re- mander, 3d Platoon, A Company, 8th Tank Bat- sponsibility. ers used their NVGs to provide additional observation. As expected, drivers also talion, Task Force Tarawa, Iraq; aide de camp Personnel recovery is not a task normal- continued to use their enhanced night-vi- to the assistant division commander, 2d Marine 25 Division, II MEF, Camp Lejeune; executive offi- ly assigned to a tank platoon. However, sion sights to scan the tank’s frontage. cer, D Company, 2d Tank Battalion, 2d Marine tank, infantry, and air integration, espe- After continuous night operations, TRUs Division, II MEF, Camp Lejeune; and platoon cially in the joint environment, has im- would eventually overheat and require a commander, 3d Platoon, B Company, 2d Tank proved and is continually evolving. These minimum of 5 minutes “cool down” time Battalion, 2d Marine Division, II MEF, Camp changes are built on doctrine and enhance to once again receive a clear image. Lejeune.

July-August 2007 — 25 RRetakingetaking Sa’ad:Sa’ad: SSuccessfuluccessful Counterinsurgency in Tal Afar by Major Niel Smith

Counterinsurgency is difficult. As a force, we have only begun to rediscover and process the hard lessons of the past, which we largely discarded in our march to build the perfect maneuver and combat force. As a result, the Army is struggling with “nonkinetic” operations — the Army’s entire force structure is designed for kinetic operations, leaving commanders at all levels with few “nonkinetic” tools at their disposal. During 2006, Team Battle, 2d Battalion, 37th (2-37) Armor successfully set conditions that resulted in pacifying insurgent-dominated territory without fighting any major pitched battles in Tal Afar. The soldiers of Team Battle applied principles learned from training, scholarship, and hard experience to achieve short-term, and hopefully long-term, success in one of Iraq’s most difficult cities. Retaking Sa’ad: Successful CCounterinsurgencyounterinsurgency iinn TTalal AAfarfar Following Operation Iraqi Freedom, the northwestern border local populace and tribal sheiks in our sector. Fox Troop had and farming city of Tal Afar was a relatively peaceful and stable also established U.S./IA platoon-sized patrol bases at strategic haven in Iraq. During 2004 and 2005, the city emerged as both locations throughout its sector. By combining aggressive patrol- a hub of insurgent infiltration from Syria to Mosul and as a ref- ling, engagement of local leaders, and development of human uge for insurgents fleeing the campaigns in Anbar province. The intelligence (HUMINT) from the local population, 3d ACR vir- city was cleared during a major operation in November 2004 by tually eliminated insurgent control in the southern and extreme 2d Squadron, 14th Cavalry Regiment, and again in September western parts of Tal Afar, and had began building inroads to the 2005 by the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR) accompa- mixed tribal and sectarian neighborhoods of central and north- nied by the 3d Iraqi Army (IA) Division. The 3d ACR followed ern Tal Afar at the time of their relief in place. up on its success by establishing company- and platoon-sized As a new commander, I was faced with a number of opportu- U.S./IA outposts throughout the city to restore order and allow nities and potential courses of action to build on Fox Troop’s the reformation of civil government and security forces to re- success. It appeared there were three possible directions to take. build. The conflict also included a bitter campaign by Sunni su- The first involved continuing efforts in the mixed Sunni/Shia premacists to exterminate the Shia presence in town, which had central area, known as the Wahda neighborhood. Although Fox the effect of polarizing the populace along sectarian lines. Troop had some measure of success in that area, there were lim- Our unit, Team Battle, 2-37 Armor, assumed responsibility for ited options to improve the situation, other than increasing Iraqi west and southwest Tal Afar on 14 February 2006. It consisted of Security Forces (ISF) presence. Additionally, the neighborhood a motorized tank platoon, a dual-purpose tank/motorized platoon, was difficult to isolate and was bordered by insurgent support a mechanized infantry platoon, and a combat engineer platoon. zones to the north and east. The neighborhood was almost fully The team’s specific tasks included ensuring mobility on the al- occupied with a mixed population of 60 percent Sunni and 40 ternate supply route (ASR) in its sector, developing IA and Iraqi percent Shia, which resulted in a great deal of tension. Fox Troop Police (IP) capabilities, and defeating the insurgents’ ability to managed to largely pacify the neighborhood and ISF managed operate in its area of operations (AO). Approximately half of the to maintain the uneasy peace between the tribes and sects. Al- sector was occupied by friendly tribes, mostly Shia, who formed though the temptation to expand the “oil spot” was extremely a partnership with coalition forces to protect their interests and tempting, focused effort in that area would not have lead to ma- restore a fair government to Tal Afar. jor gains elsewhere in sector. We were fortunate to take over from Fox Troop, 2d Squadron, The second option was to begin operations in the central por- 3d ACR; they had developed extraordinary relationships with the tion of our sector, a heavily Sunni area known as Rubiyah, where

“Once we decided where to act, the question turned to strategy. First, we knew intelligence would be key to success and allow us to conduct targeted operations. With a neighborhood of displaced people, HUMINT would be critical to discerning AIF from intimidated civilians. We needed to disrupt the insurgents’ ability to counter our initial actions by clearing the area prior to follow-on operations. Otherwise, we risked losing any initial toeholds into the neighborhood.”

28 — July-August 2007 there was a strong insurgent cell focused on attacking the Iraqi which was fortunately intercepted and detonated prematurely police. One of the greatest advantages in this area was a local due to an alert Iraqi army soldier. Following the VBIED attack, sheik who was willing to cooperate with coalition forces behind the base was removed and the unit returned to regular patrol- closed doors. However, intimidation was high and local support ling in the neighborhood and prepared for relief in place with was not especially strong. Complicating the situation even fur- 2-37 Armor. ther was the difficult task of isolating the area and limiting insurgent freedom of movement. What really tipped the scale was the risks-and-benefits analysis of investing fully in each neighborhood. The analysis was The third neighborhood was known as Sa’ad, a mostly empty conducted using three main criteria: the effect on insurgents if we battleground neighborhood that had seen extensive fighting over succeeded/the effect on insurgents if we failed; suitability of the the past year. The neighbor houses were nearly two-thirds emp- urban and cultural terrain; and the ability to execute with forces ty and the remaining residents were almost all Sunni, after the available. When applied against these standards, completing suc- Shia residents had been displaced during the fighting. It was a cess in Wahda would consume too many resources without sig- known hotspot of insurgent activity and support. However, it was nificantly affecting insurgents’ ability to conduct operations else- easily isolated, bordered the other two neighborhoods, and we where in sector. could leverage existing tribes to remigrate into the neighborhood, if we provided adequate security. A plan to enter this Rubiyah’s chances of success were assessed as low due to the neighborhood was not to be undertaken lightly; many coalition lack of ability to rapidly “change” the cultural terrain, which was forces and ISF casualties had been taken. Additionally, there based on a populace that supported the anti-Iraqi forces (AIF) were few local informants or residents to co-opt. and the difficultly of controlling access in and out of the area. Of the three options, we decided on Sa’ad because it possessed Despite its status as the most dangerous area in our AO, Sa’ad some unique characteristics that could be exploited. First, the was our best chance for success. First and foremost, insurgents neighborhood could easily be isolated using existing barriers and security forces, and the natural wadi system reinforced the obstacle plan. “We had little chance of winning popular support without becoming a Geographically, the neighborhood was tri- constant part of the neighborhood. We also lacked sufficient combat angular shaped and slightly less than a 1- power to permanently invest in the neighborhood and maintain securi- kilometer square. The ASR bordered on the ty across the zone, which made handing off to ISF a necessity. This also west; the main supply route, a major east- supported the theater goal of enabling ISF to take the lead; however, west city road, bordered on the south; and the real problem was ensuring ISF was competent and capable of con- a deep, but passable, wadi system provided ducting local counterinsurgency operations.” easy infiltration from the insurgent-dominated neighborhood of Quadisyah from the east. A further analysis of the human terrain was also striking. The would lose a major support zone, which would limit their abil- neighborhood was once almost evenly divided between Sunni ity to maneuver in the northwest part of the city, store tactical and Shia families. The neighborhood originally began in the caches, and use bed-down locations. It would also remove the late 1980s as an upscale area for Baathist supporters and their “support zone” for AIF operations in the Wahda neighborhood families. During 2004 and 2005, insurgent and sectarian ten- to the south, and limit the AIF’s ability to destabilize that neigh- sions caused all but a handful of Shia families to flee the neighborhood. Finally, it would remove the IED threat from approx- borhood after an intense sectarian intimidation campaign. Many imately a kilometer of our ASR, increasing the security of coali- Sunni families fled to avoid being caught in the ensuing cross- tion forces and logistics convoys. fire between insurgents, police, U.S. Army, and sectarian groups. By October 2005, the neighborhood was approximately 65 per- Visualizing the Fight cent abandoned. These structures allowed freedom of move- Once we decided where to act, the question turned to strategy. ment, bed-down locations, meeting rooms, and cache storage for First, we knew intelligence would be key to success and allow insurgents. The neighborhood also bordered ASR Santa Fe, the us to conduct targeted operations. With a neighborhood of dis- main logistics line to forward operating base (FOB) Sykes and placed people, HUMINT would be critical to discerning AIF from an improvised explosive device (IED) hotspot. intimidated civilians. We needed to disrupt the insurgents’ abil- The history of the area also affected the unit’s mission. The 3d ity to counter our initial actions by clearing the area prior to fol- ACR patrolled the neighborhood regularly, but the density of low-on operations. Otherwise, we risked losing any initial toe- empty houses occupied by an intimidated populace allowed the holds into the neighborhood. enemy to operate relatively freely in the area. Numerous armored vehicles were lost or damaged in the neighborhood and imme- Following my first tour in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), the diate vicinity due to large IEDs. Houses that may have been used emphasis became withdrawing to larger bases further removed as ISF outposts or by Shia supporters to meet with coalition from the population with the intent of taking away the “irritant” forces were often destroyed using bags of urea nitrate fertilizer. of coalition force presence. While well meaning, in practice, we The city’s fledgling Iraqi police force refused to operate in the abandoned many areas to insurgent patrols by failing to provide neighborhood due to the perceived strength of insurgent forces daily security before ISF were capable of standing up. there. A lone Iraqi army patrol base occupied the area, but was We had little chance of winning popular support without be- largely ineffective at curbing insurgent operations in the area coming a constant part of the neighborhood. We also lacked due to its small size and isolated location. One abortive attempt sufficient combat power to permanently invest in the neighbor- in late 2005 at establishing a second U.S./IA patrol base in the hood and maintain security across the zone, which made hand- neighborhood resulted in a vehicle-borne IED (VBIED) attack, ing off to ISF a necessity. This also supported the theater goal of

July-August 2007 — 29 “In coordination with our tactical HUMINT teams (THT), we slowly developed a more specific intelligence picture of the neighborhood, but still did not have the details required to begin operations effectively. To compensate, we increased patrolling in Sa’ad, attempting to elicit information from its residents. Despite great effort, it was apparent that the residents were unable or unwilling to cooperate with us due to terrorist domination of the area.”

are the most dangerous. We implemented an aggressive reconnaissance and surveillance plan to learn the neighborhood while conducting patrols throughout the AO. Using established relationships from Fox Troop, enabling ISF to take the lead; however, the real problem was en- we spread the word that we were seeking knowledgeable indi- suring ISF was competent and capable of conducting local coun- viduals who knew the Sa’ad neighborhood and its resident in- terinsurgency operations. The Iraqi army was largely tasked out surgents. To directly reach the people, we identified areas maintaining their existing operational set, given their liberal where displaced Sa’ad residents resided and spread the word leave policy. Fortunately, the city was in the process of receiv- during dismounted patrols that we were seeking information to ing over 1,500 new Iraqi police officers who were trained at the drive out the insurgency. In coordination with our tactical HU- Jordanian police academy. Once established, they would be the MINT teams (THT), we slowly developed a more specific intel- focus of our main security force, since they were drawn from the ligence picture of the neighborhood, but still did not have the local community and some were displaced residents of Sa’ad. details required to begin operations effectively. To compensate, Our task would be to ensure they were well prepared and equipped we increased patrolling in Sa’ad, attempting to elicit informa- for the task at hand. tion from its residents. Despite great effort, it was apparent that Finally, we realized that the ultimate goal and arbiter of long- the residents were unable or unwilling to cooperate with us due term stability in the sector would be the return of displaced fam- to terrorist domination of the area. ilies. Besides being a humanitarian and positive information op- A breakthrough success occurred when a new informant con- erations goal, the remigration of friendly families under an um- tact was introduced through a friend. He heard we were seeking brella of joint security would prevent terrorists from using neigh- to clear the neighborhood and represented a loose coalition of borhoods to support their purposes. To do this, we had to lever- 20 displaced families. The informant produced a spectacular age relationships established with local tribes. hand-drawn map of the neighborhood, identifying each house. After considering the above, we settled on the following cam- Annotated in Arabic were the locations of known AIF support- paign strategy: ers, possible cache locations, and friendly residents. We were ex- • cited to get this information, but wary of its details, especially Phase I included recruiting and developing local informants from a first-time informant. In conjunction with our other infor- from the displaced populace to provide an accurate picture mants and the S2 shop, we were able to substantially confirm of AIF supporters, safe houses, and cache locations. the information’s validity. • Phase II consisted of a cordon and search of the neighborhood to locate insurgents and disrupt insurgent logistics in With information in hand, we began to set the tactical condi- the neighborhood. tions by reinforcing an obstacle plan set by 3d ACR in the neigh- • borhood. We reinforced existing obstacles and blocked all exit Phase III established a platoon-sized U.S. patrol base in the routes from the neighborhood, with the exception of one, which sector to provide continuous presence and security to the was manned by an Iraqi army checkpoint. This operation forced populace. all vehicles to be searched before they entered or exited the • Phase IV consisted of establishing an Iraqi police station neighborhood. Isolating the neighborhood allowed us to bet- and transitioning daily security to ISF. ter cordon the area and at least restrict infiltration of more weapons to the neighborhood. • Phase V was to convince the tribes representing displaced families and civilians to return to their old neighborhoods under the new security umbrella. Phase II: Cordon and Search Phase I: Building the Picture There is some argument in the military community over the applicability and usefulness of large scale “cordon and search” Developing our intelligence picture was the first major hurdle. or “cordon and knock” techniques. However, we found that when This usually difficult task was made easier for us by our prede- properly executed, they are useful tools during counterinsurgen- cessor unit. We were fortunate to inherit a large network of in- cy operations when combined with intelligence, a clear task and formants and contacts developed by 3d ACR during their opera- purpose, and targeted information operations. We envisioned an tions. Despite this, we lacked a cohesive current intelligence pic- initial cordon and search as an enabler that would allow us to po- ture of the threat facing us in the Sa’ad neighborhood. In fact, we tentially trap known terrorists inside the neighborhood and flesh knew very little about the insurgents in that area. We were also out existing caches. The disruptive effect would provide us the reluctant to rush into a dangerous area until we felt comfortable opportunity to establish our operations base inside the neighbor- operating in our sector — the unit’s first and last 30 days in Iraq hood.

30 — July-August 2007 Having an intelligence picture provided us with the ability to into three categories: AIF leaders, AIF soldiers, and common plan a detailed cordon and search of more than 200 houses. We criminals. The leaders were taken into immediate U.S. custody, integrated with 1st Battalion, 2d Iraqi Army Brigade, 3d Divi- the soldiers into IA custody, and the criminals were handed over sion to execute the operation. The battalion’s acting commander to the police. The breakdown was 11 into U.S. custody, 20 into planned the operation in strict secrecy, in conjunction with Bat- IA custody, and 32 into police custody. Statements were imme- tle Company, beginning two weeks from execution. We decided diately solicited from the detainees. to conduct the operation on a Friday to catch as many people at Following the operation, we circulated names and photos of the home as possible and selected 10 March as our target date. detainees to ISF, who provided witness statements regarding The plan was relatively straightforward. Three U.S. platoons, the detainees. Almost one-half of the detainees, including 9 of integrated with three IA companies, would establish a cordon at the 11 U.S. detainees, were sent to prison for eventual trial by 0630 hours around the neighborhood to prevent possible escapes. Iraqi authorities. Among the detainees were alleged financiers, Once established, two IA companies, accompanied by one of IED manufacturers, and direct-action cell leaders. our infantry platoons, would conduct a deliberate block-by- block clearance of all houses. All males between ages 13 and 70 The operation achieved its intended purpose — disrupting in- would be directed to report to the centrally located primary surgents operating in the neighborhood. The time provided by school, which would serve as the command post for the opera- this operation would allow us to occupy a patrol base in the neigh- tion. Having the males report to the school served two purposes: borhood. There was not an enemy-generated significant event it prevented terrorists from maneuvering inside our cordon; and in the neighborhood for the next 7 days. alerted search teams to regard any male found in a house, on the Phase III: Building the Patrol Base streets, or hiding as suspect after the cordon was in place. With the insurgent leadership and direct-action cells disrupted One of our tank platoons and the company trains were assigned in the Sa’ad neighborhood, we had a small window of opportu- to secure and operate the screening process. A carefully select- nity during which to establish our patrol base. A patrol base es- ed panel of informants, in conjunction with our “blacklist,” would tablished in the heart of the neighborhood would allow constant identify insurgents and their supporters for further questioning patrols and limit insurgent freedom of movement. It was also a by a mobile interrogation team (MIT), which was on site to gain visible demonstration of our commitment to win over insurgents actionable intelligence. Those not identified as insurgents would and provide security in the neighborhood. be given the opportunity to speak with a THT. On 14 March, we established Patrol Base “Battle Dwarf” (be- Tactical psychological operations (PSYOPS) teams would pro- cause of its small size), which was occupied by our infantry pla- vide initial broadcast messages and later help distribute infor- toon. Located in the most dangerous section of the neighbor- mation operations (IO) messages to screened personnel for ef- hood, we emplaced barriers along three sides of the patrol base fects mitigation. An explosive ordnance detachment and mili- and a wire/spike-strip combo to protect against VBIED attacks tary working dog team would assist in detecting and reducing such as the one Fox Troop endured. We reinforced our building’s any ordnance found. Finally, aviation would provide support and windows and roof with sandbags. Kevlar blankets were draped observation during the cordon and search process, especially in against the windows to guard against shrapnel from mortar at- the critical early phase. We planned to screen 200 to 300 males, tacks or VBIEDs. A platoon quick-reaction force (QRF) was based on our population estimate in the neighborhood. maintained and on standby for quick response to any attack. We A detailed combined arms rehearsal was secretly conducted in rehearsed multiple routes and alternate entry locations to rein- an empty warehouse at our joint U.S./IA company base. Each par- force the base, attempting to avoid “first responder” attacks. ticipating element and IA commander rehearsed their roles in The platoon primarily conducted dismounted operations from the mission, which later proved invaluable during the critical the patrol base at random intervals. The patrols conducted thor- cordon establishment phase. Having had coordination difficul- ough searches of empty houses, drank chai (tea) with locals, and ties in prior operations with our IA counterparts, the detailed re- distributed the IO message that we were there to stay and to rehearsal proved vital in ensuring IA leaders understood their roles move insurgent forces. In the first 3 days, major weapons and in the plan. IED caches were found, including Motorola radios, homemade The raid was executed as planned at 0630 hours on 10 March. rocket-propelled grenades, and plastic explosives. Tactical surprise was achieved as the cordon was emplaced, ef- On 18 March, the enemy struck for the first time. A dismount- fectively sealing the neighborhood. The search forces deployed ed patrol had just returned and noted that there was no one pres- while the school was being set up as a processing center. Our in- ent on the streets. Several adjacent houses and a small store had fantry platoon and the IA companies began their search in con- closed down midday. Our S2 also reported that an attack was junction with the tactical PSYOPS team’s broadcasts. By the underway somewhere in the city. This information led to an in- end of the search, more than 500 males had been processed, creased awareness and alerted the guards at the patrol base. which nearly doubled our estimate. Screening and processing Suddenly, the roof guards indicated that some children, who the males took more than 8 hours at the school and we kept the usually played along the protective wire on the mounted avenue cordon in place the entire time. As it turned out, we severely un- of approach, pulled back two strands of concertina to create a derestimated the number of residents and the time it would take small opening in the wire. Immediately, a small car drove at high to process them. An IED cache and a 500-pound unexploded joint speed through the hole and across the protective spike strip em- direct-attack munition (JDAM) were discovered during the op- placed about 70 meters from the patrol base, which failed to eration. Although we learned many lessons for future cordon and stop the car. The car was immediately engaged from the rooftop search procedures, the basic template used during this operation with M240B machine gun fire. The car hugged the extreme side was the foundation used for operations elsewhere in the city. of the near wall as it approached, allowing the rooftop gunner to A grand total of 63 detainees were identified for further inves- engage only the passenger side. The soldiers on guard called for tigation regarding insurgent activity. We subdivided the group everyone to take immediate cover. As they did, the VBIED rolled

July-August 2007 — 31 “One of the most complex aspects of the operation was the intense negotiations surrounding the return of residents to the neighborhood, which began shortly after the original patrol base was established. The sheiks were very cautious about encouraging families to return for fear of insurgent attacks. As a result, they initially made some unreasonable demands such as maintaining a militia in the streets to provide security.”

to a stop near the front door of the base and after a 2 to 3 second from A Company, 2-37 Armor provided initial security during the pause, detonated. The blast collapsed the outer wall and shat- establishment of our new base, aptly named “Battle Phoenix.” tered every window on the block. The enemy did not expect us to re-establish so quickly. They Thankfully, all the carefully emplaced force-protection mea- likely anticipated that we would withdraw from the area, as their sures held. The Kevlar blankets draped over the windows stopped attack in December had achieved. Patrols immediately resumed, the shrapnel, and the sandbags and concrete construction pro- and they located caches and IEDs almost daily. A HUMINT tip tected the soldiers from the explosion. Due to the alert guards, led to a suspected IED on 21 March, and as it was being explored, everyone was able to seek some measure of protective cover. it detonated and caused minor injury to one soldier and destroyed Pieces of the car were found more than 100 meters from the point a multifunctional agile remote-controlled robot (MARCBOT). of detonation. On 25 March, our infantry platoon was conducting a routine pa- The company QRF responded to the event, as rehearsed, with- trol when a homemade IED exploded against a dismounted pa- in 5 minutes, and assisted in establishing a perimeter around the trol, causing minor injuries to a soldier’s hand. In this case, the site. The remainder of the company quickly followed and near- patrol identified the triggermen and chased them as they fled by units from Company A, 2-37 Armor responded immediately. across the wadi to the east. The IA apprehended the individuals The IA and IP closed all checkpoints into the area to prevent a and turned them over to our patrol. One of the two individuals possible secondary attack on the responding elements. Post-blast was a battalion target and an IED cell organizer. Their detention analysis indicated that the explosive was a combination of mili- resulted in a quiet phase in the neighborhood and we continued tary rounds and homemade explosives. to expand patrol frequency and duration, resulting in the discov- ery of several caches. Other significant finds included a cell mem- No one was killed in the explosion, but four soldiers received ber who later provided critical information leading to the deten- minor wounds. We immediately began reconsolidating the gear tion of other high-value targets. and equipment inside. After consulting with the battalion commander, we decided to immediately re-establish a new base to On 6 and 7 April, the base received 60mm fire from a mortar reinforce the message that we would not be deterred. The new team in response to the arrival of IP to our patrol base. On 8 base would be manned by our engineer platoon while the infan- April, a patrol was sent to establish an ambush on the likely point try reorganized from the blast and took a break. Prior to estab- of origin (POO). A buried 120mm mortar, with homemade ex- lishing Battle Dwarf, we had explored several houses as poten- plosives, exploded against a dismounted patrol that was sent to tial base locations and chose one of these as our new base, which investigate the POO, killing one soldier and severely wounding was located about a block from the VBIED site and provided a another. commanding view of the area. The battalion headquarters com- The enemy patterned us and used our tactics, techniques, and pany brought an emergency class IV push, and reinforcements procedures (TTP) against us. Another IED attack, against an

32 — July-August 2007 M113 sent to investigate a possible IED, wounded one of our though we initially doubted the effect of the barrier, we were soldiers. We did not let these tragic events deter us from the ob- pleasantly surprised when the locals reacted positively to the jective; however, we evaluated and shifted our tactics to better wire and insurgent activity dropped measurably. employ IED countermeasures, reduce predictability, and increase ISF cooperation. On 22 April, we began transitioning Battle Phoenix to the IP following two weeks of joint train-up. The IP continued con- At this stage, we began to notice subtle changes in the neigh- stant mounted and dismounted operations around the area while borhood. People were becoming friendlier and more receptive, we supported daily from Combat Observation Post (COP) Bat- although HUMINT tips were not increasing. Our company lead- tle. Their independent operations resulted in many additional ers determined that we had reached our limit with U.S.-only forc- cache finds and a few detentions, but most importantly, we had es and more ISF were needed to move the project forward from achieved a major goal — transitioning primary responsibility to its current tense stalemate, which was consuming one-third of ISF while supported by U.S. forces. This had major positive ef- the company’s combat power that was beginning to be needed fects in the community and among the local police forces. The elsewhere in sector. only remaining challenge was to convince the displaced populace to return home. Phase IV: Transition and Partnership with Iraqi Security Forces Phase V: Returning Displaced Civilians After nearly a month of operations, we were setting the conditions for the IP to re-enter the neighborhood. When we began One of the most complex aspects of the operation was the in- operations, the city was still receiving, equipping, and integrat- tense negotiations surrounding the return of residents to the ing new police. Additionally, they had very few officers and ex- neighborhood, which began shortly after the original patrol base perienced police; however, by mid-April, enough police had ar- was established. The sheiks were very cautious about encourag- rived to establish operations in Sa’ad under our supervision and ing families to return for fear of insurgent attacks. As a result, support. The city police chief arranged for an initial force of 50 they initially made some unreasonable demands such as main- IP to conduct joint operations. We established a police outpost taining a militia in the streets to provide security. on 4 April, which was collocated with Battle Phoenix. The local police station chief ensured his most experienced and aggres- Convincing local sheiks that the area was safe was no small sive police officers occupied the base, even replacing those who undertaking. In Iraq, perception is reality and the locals heard failed to perform to standard. They soon began combined pa- about casualties and car bombs, but not about the enemy fleeing trols with U.S. forces several times a day. the area in response to our operations and that ISF were controlling the neighborhood. This was another one of those areas Given the largely Sunni neighborhood and mostly Shiite police in which the local chief of police played an invaluable role. Since force, there existed a large possibility for sectarian tension, re- he was a local resident and related to several powerful local per- venge attacks, or further violence. We were extremely fortunate sonalities, his assistance was critical in gaining support from the to work with someone of the caliber of the local police chief. He tribes. He did so at considerable risk to his own prestige; if the deftly walked the tightrope of being firm, but fair, with the residents, and disciplined the police if they operated inappropriate- ly. He was a local from the neighborhood and was well respected in the community. More importantly, he sincerely cared about bringing security to Tal Afar and wanted his neighborhood families to return to their homes. Over a two-week period, we shifted from U.S.-led and -dominated patrols to independent IP patrols. We noticed residents becoming more positive and we soon began receiving tips and intelligence from them. Initially wary, the locals soon warmed and later embraced the new IP presence once it was established that they were not a sectarian hit squad. We once again saw progress in the neighborhood after stalling in early April. The police chief was so enthused by the success in Sa’ad that he moved his police headquarters into the neighborhood. He re- quested we place a triple-strand concertina barrier across the eastern wadi to cana- lize AIF movement to the north or south, where he would establish IP checkpoints. “Maintaining our success was as big a challenge as achieving it. Securing the neighborhood required daily attention from the unit. In mid-June, we felt security conditions were permissive We resourced the wire and emplaced it as enough to conduct a town hall meeting, with leaders from the neighborhood, to elect a muktar a joint operation with the IA and IP to (mayor) and address any grievances that local leaders may have. We conducted our first meeting build cooperation between the forces. Al- on 20 June with great success.”

July-August 2007 — 33 endeavor failed, his position in the community would be reduced the site to immediately resolve any problems. Fortunately, the and his job imperiled. entire move took place without incident. During the initial two After some intense negotiations between security forces, the weeks, we maintained constant vigilance in the neighborhood, city mayor, and the sheiks, an agreement was reached. The per- especially cautious about sectarian violence or retribution be- suasive arguments by the police chief and mayor won the day. tween the returned residents. Only males would return to a limited portion of the neighborhood in the beginning to “test the waters.” The IA, IP, and U.S. forces Continuing Stability would provide route security to the neighborhood (a concern for Maintaining our success was as big a challenge as achieving it. residents), and the residents were allowed to keep AK-47s in their Securing the neighborhood required daily attention from the unit. homes to protect themselves. If the neighborhood was as secure In mid-June, we felt security conditions were permissive enough as they were told, they would return more people and families. to conduct a town hall meeting, with leaders from the neigh- Our first attempt at moving in individuals on 18 April was a borhood, to elect a muktar (mayor) and address any grievances failure. The males that returned brandished their weapons in the that local leaders may have. We conducted our first meeting on streets and caused some trouble with local residents. A severe 20 June with great success. sandstorm and IED reduced the number of forces we were able Fortunately, none of our fears came to pass. AIF activity re- to provide. The sheiks, angered by a perceived lack of support mained minimal to nonexistent in the neighborhood. As word and under pressure about the weapons incidents, withdrew from spread, families arrived daily, with some returnees traveling over the area. 150 kilometers to reoccupy their homes. The ISF maintained a Negotiations over returning the residents soon began again and constant presence and manned checkpoints in the neighbor- after some delays and mediation, a more detailed and specific hood. U.S. forces maintained almost daily joint patrols in the agreement was reached. Heavy security would be provided by area, but refocused on developing the logistics and administra- U.S. and ISF forces units for the first 48 hours, and in return, the tive skills of the IP and IA bases. The ongoing security of Sa’ad returning residents agreed not to brandish weapons or cause any now rests almost entirely in Iraqi hands with U.S. forces provid- trouble with existing residents. The chief of police proved crit- ing “overwatch.” ical to reassuring the Iraqis about providing enough security The operation had great second- and third-order effects in the from ISF. Wahda and Rubiyah neighborhoods. Removing the insurgent On 27 April, approximately 50 males returned to the south- base in Sa’ad denied insurgents easy entry into Wahda. In Rubi- west portion of the neighborhood under heavy U.S. and ISF se- yah, residents petitioned for a police base similar to the one in curity, including aviation. Eager to avoid a repeat of the attempt Sa’ad. Our unit and the local police were happy to comply and nearly 10 days earlier, I collocated with the main Shia Sheik at the program was expanded in other company sectors.

“To win in counterinsurgency, the local population must execute the long-term answer; our role is to set conditions that allow Iraqis to independently succeed. In Sa’ad, we set conditions for the return of ISF, who were fearful of operating in a dangerous neighborhood, which, in turn, set conditions for the return of displaced residents. The continued peace in the neighborhood is a testament to what ISF can do when U.S. forces serve in a committed support role.” Strategically, the operation became well known throughout Tal tal. Iraqi army forces in our sector were great for operations but Afar and the reputation of the local IP and IA were enhanced by weak in daily counterinsurgency. Iraqi police were highly effec- its success. We began focused civil-military operations (CMO) tive in the daily fight, but due to discipline and equipment prob- projects to support returning residents, which included “start up lems, were incapable of undertaking large operations. Joint pa- money” to repair homes damaged by heavy fighting over the trols and training at all levels reinforce their legitimacy and en- past year. We paid nearly $15,000 in claims to assist the families sure their balance regardless of sectarian orientations. Taking courageous enough to return. ISF key leaders to bilateral meetings (BILATs) and developing Currently, employment projects are underway with the support direct relationships with local leaders resulted in major atmo- of the muktar and the ISF to provide an economic base for resi- spherics improvement in our area. Some Iraqi army leaders are dents, including a water well, school refurbishment, and street not accustomed to “answering to” or “working with” civilians. lighting. Despite this progress, gaining reconstruction dollars is Direct contact between local sheiks and Iraqi leaders eliminated a slow and bureaucratic process, and often the expectation of potential sectarian differences and resolved issues much more the Iraqis cannot be met by U.S. forces under the current fund- effectively than playing the “middle man,” which allowed both ing model. sides to scapegoat U.S. forces and avoid accountability. Some- times compromise with Iraqi leaders may be necessary to accom- Lessons Learned plish the objective — even using methods you may not agree Like most successful operations, a clear commander’s intent with. Keep in mind that the Iraqis have to live with the result; al- was vital to our success. When the intent is practical and clear, lowing the Iraqis to “design the solution” creates ownership and soldiers can tailor their actions to achieve the mission. Likewise, facilitates success. a clear vision in the commander’s mind of what he expects the To win in counterinsurgency, the local population must execute endstate to be assists in evaluating and processing variations the long-term answer; our role is to set conditions that allow and changes to the tactics while maintaining the overall strate- Iraqis to independently succeed. In Sa’ad, we set conditions for gic focus. the return of ISF, who were fearful of operating in a dangerous The presence of force in neighborhoods and communities is neighborhood, which, in turn, set conditions for the return of dis- fundamental to a successful counterinsurgency. By living among placed residents. The continued peace in the neighborhood is a the people and learning their way of life, we gained credibility testament to what ISF can do when U.S. forces serve in a com- and demonstrated resolve to stay and solve problems. The ene- mitted support role. my expended great effort to expel us from the neighborhood be- Finally, economic prosperity is the motivator for maintaining cause we were a threat to their operational base. Once the ter- success in a counterinsurgency environment. A competent and rorists and residents realized we were not leaving, we gained the targeted CMO effort to reward those who took risks and gave confidence of the people, who trusted we could protect them information helps win the fight. To paraphrase, dollars are the from the terrorists. Eventually, we transferred that confidence to same as bullets in counterinsurgency, but are often extremely dif- their local police force, which was a huge change. If we had not ficult to get quickly. A colleague summarized it well, “I have al- established bases inside the neighborhoods, we could not have most unlimited capacity to employ violence, but little ability to achieved as much as we did. employ nonviolence.” Gaining nonkinetic economic support re- Living in the city requires careful assessment of how to protect mains the biggest challenge to commanders throughout Iraq, and soldiers against the threat. As demonstrated by patrol base Bat- will continue to be a major issue until there is an improved pro- tle Dwarf, force protection can be underestimated and the ene- cess that empowers front-line commanders to employ dollars as my will analyze and target your weaknesses. The structure of easily as they employ bullets. urban neighborhoods and houses make it nearly impossible to The Sa’ad neighborhood campaign was an ambitious attempt guard against every threat — from a thrown hand grenade a few to re-take ground held by the enemy. The success of the opera- houses over to a suicide VBIED attack. Operating inside a neigh- tion required us to “break the FOB” mentality and live among the borhood assumes some soldier risk in the short term for long- people. Respectable locals will unhesitatingly support U.S. and term security. When casualties began to mount, I doubted the ISF forces, if they are provided security. It is correct to say that wisdom of the strategy. Perhaps sensing my unease, a young in- Tal Afar had a unique set of circumstances that assisted in our fantry soldier told me: “Sir, if we weren’t in the neighborhood, unit’s success. Deployed units can help themselves by assessing we’d just be getting blown up more outside it.” His comment un- ethnic and tribal histories and dynamics to shape a strategy for wittingly framed the issue perfectly. success. I hope commanders and planners can apply the princi- There are key measures ground commanders can take to mini- ples we learned at a heavy cost in Tal Afar to protect other areas mize risks and casualties. Commanders must understand and from insurgent control. employ their IED countermeasure systems properly. These systems must be strategically placed in all patrols — planned and deliberately placed much like a crew-served weapon. We also learned that a .50-caliber machine gun is required at all entry Major Niel Smith is currently the operations officer, Army-Marine Coun- terinsurgency Center, Fort Leavenworth, KS. He received a B.B.A. from control point (ECP) locations or potential VBIED sites. Barriers James Madison University. His military education includes Armor Offi- and other obstacles must be reinforced; local residents must be cer Basic Course, Armor Captains Career Course, Airborne School, briefed and warned of the potentially lethal consequences of tam- and Combined Arms and Services Staff School. He has served in var- pering with defensive obstacles. Children must be ruthlessly kept ious command and staff positions, to include assistant S3, 1st Brigade, away from all ECPs and guard points. Finally, dismounted pa- 1st Armored Division, Ramadi, Iraq; commander, Team Battle, 2d Bat- trols and mounted patrols must vary routes, times, and move- talion, 37th (2-37) Armor, Friedberg, Germany, and Tal Afar, Iraq; S4, ment methods such as wall-hopping, bounding teams, and roof- 2-37 Armor, Friedberg, Germany; AST commander, Camp Vitina, Koso- top jumping. vo; assistant S3 plans, 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division, Friedberg; XO, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 25th Infantry Division The ISF was key to our operational success. Understanding the (Light), Hawaii; and platoon leader, Apache Troop, 3d Squadron, 4th Cav- capabilities and limitations of the Iraqi forces in your area is vi- alry, Hawaii.

July-August 2007 — 35 So You Want to Train An Iraqi Mechanized Brigade?

by Major William T. Nuckols Jr.

U.S. Army military transition teams Brigades. The 3d Brigade had just imple- (MOD). Somewhere along the way, the (MiTTs) are preparing and training Iraqi mented force generation when our team definition of “re-conditioned” must have army (IA) units for combat. MiTTs ad- graduated from the Phoenix Academy in been misunderstood; basically, the bri- vise Iraqi forces in the areas of intelli- November 2006. gade received newly painted, well used gence, communications, fire support, lo- The 3d Brigade consists of one T-55 tank and worn BMP-1s. Just to give an indi- gistics, and infantry tactics. Once trained, battalion and two BMP-1 mechanized in- cation of their serviceability, out of the Iraqi forces will be self-sustainable tac- fantry battalions, with the standard head- first batch of 64, 28 of them had bad en- tically, operationally, and logistically, quarters and headquarters company, scout gines. which will enable them to take responsi- platoon, and three line companies in each The tank battalion consists of 35 T-55 bility for their battlespace. The MiTTs are battalion. The brigade did not have any tanks scavenged from the scrap piles of trained to conquer obstacles, such as for- intelligence, surveillance, and reconnais- Saddam’s army. They were also re-con- eign language barriers, radically differ- sance (ISR) capability assigned to its mod- ditioned, but in slightly better condition. ent cultures, lack of resources and doc- ification table of organization and equip- MOD has a contract with the national trine, 40-year-old equipment, and the oc- ment (MTOE). This deficiency was cor- tracked maintenance depot at Taji to con- casional mortar attack. These obstacles rected by taking a small number of scouts, duct repairs and overhaul tracked vehi- can be overwhelming; however, MiTTs up-armored gun trucks (M1114s), snip- cles. Fortunately for us, the supervisor of reach varying degrees of success in Iraq ers, and motorcycles from each battalion this facility is a crusty old retired tank every day. This article illustrates how one to create a brigade ISR platoon. This is master gunner who knows his business. MiTT team planned to handle these daunt- very similar to what the U.S. Army did a While they certainly were not new, they ing challenges. few years ago when it reduced the size of are all serviceable. Background battalion scout platoons to create the bri- The soldiers of the brigade are like any Our team was assigned to the 3d Bri- gade reconnaissance troop (BRT). soldiers the world over. If properly trained, gade, 9th (3/9) Iraqi Army Division in Each mechanized infantry battalion is equipped, and led, they are capable of do- Taji, Iraq. The 9th Division is the only equipped with 44 BMP-1s, which were ing great things. However, the focus of mechanized division in the Iraqi army. purchased through foreign military sales. the article is on how a training plan was The division is well established and is cur- The first delivery of BMP-1s from Greece crafted for the brigade, so it does not fo- rently conducting combat operations in had been “re-conditioned” with a con- cus on the myriad challenges faced in the Baghdad with elements of the 1st and 2d tract from the Iraqi Ministry of Defense areas of basic life support and supplies.

36 — July-August 2007 The Mission lead, 2-8 Cavalry viewed this relation- fits in the area of operations once train- Brigade leaders had 3 months to prepare ship more as a partnership and invested ing was complete and the IA battalions the brigade for counterinsurgency com- heavily into the training plan. The com- occupied battlespace alongside the sol- bat operations. Therefore, life support and mander of 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry, im- diers of 2-8 Cavalry. Although painful up logistics challenges aside, the MiTTs and mediately bought into the concept and front, the wisdom of this arrangement is their IA counterparts had to develop a provided much-needed professional sol- inarguable. plan with limited resources as quickly as diers from his brigade to make this con- possible. The MiTT worked hand in hand cept a reality. The Training Plan with the brigade S3 and brigade com- The 2-8 Cavalry partnered one U.S. The training plan was developed using mander during this effort. The brigade Army company with each Iraqi battalion the tenets of U.S. Army Field Manual commander was a dedicated, patriotic, for training and validation. That compa- (FM) 7-0, Training the Force, and lessons and professional military officer — as the ny would conduct joint combat opera- I learned while serving as the S3, 4th former 9th Division G3 for training, he tions once training was complete. The Squadron, 7th Cavalry, in Korea.1 It is took the subject of training his brigade U.S. Army company immediately felt it particularly important in the Arabic cul- very seriously. had a vested interested in its IA battalion ture to conduct repetitive hands-on train- Most of the tank crewmen had graduat- and in the quality of training being con- ing. Classroom training must be avoided ed from a 3-week “armor school,” which ducted. In other words, the MiTT was whenever possible. was taught at Taji. It focused on the very supported through partnership relation- basics of driving a tank, shooting the main ships rather than the more commonly used The scout platoons were not included in gun, and using the old Soviet model high- practice of “augmentation.” our overall training plan; however, thanks frequency (HF) radios. There was little Each battalion was training sequential- to the 2d Mechanized Battalion MiTT hands-on training conducted at the school ly with the tank battalion in the lead, fol- Chief, our team was able to leverage an — soldiers did not fire live rounds and lowed by 1st Mechanized Battalion. The existing training asset in the form of the only drove the tanks approximately 200 2d Mechanized Battalion was further be- Macedonian Special Forces (MSF) to as- meters. Except for senior officers at bat- hind in fielding personnel and equipment. sist with this effort. The 2d Mechanized talion and brigade levels, there were no This arrangement enabled 2-8 Cavalry to Battalion had spent most of their tour seasoned tankers to mentor new soldiers. conduct combat operations while simul- training a local special troops company Regarding mechanized battalions, there taneously supporting 3/9 IA. (STC) and had a good working relation- was no established mechanized infantry ship with the MSF. Since the 2d Mecha- training course for the Iraqi army. In the short term, this loss of combat nized Battalion would not be training power severely stretched the resources of for several weeks, they were tasked with The MiTT realized it would be neces- 2-8 Cavalry; however, it paid huge bene- training the brigade’s scout platoons and sary to begin training the very basics and build from there. It also acknowledged that the tankers would need to train on basic infantry tasks and drills. In addition, every IA soldier was paid monthly in cash and took at least one full week of leave every month to deliver his pay to his family. The Challenge In a nutshell, the MiTT’s challenge was to get a brigade full of privates, with a sprinkling of experienced officers, from individual training through crew collective training, gunnery, platoon-level training, and a company-level exercise, as well as some multiechelon battalion- and brigade-level training, within 9 weeks. Partnership Concept To help accomplish this mission, we were fortunate to have a U.S. brigade commander and brigade combat team (BCT) that stepped up and made it happen. Af- ter training, the plan required our IA brigade to occupy the battlespace controlled by 1st Brigade, 1st Cavalry Divi- sion. Our IA brigade was tactical control (TACON) to 2d Battalion, 8th (2-8) Cav- “For the tankers, this meant a 3-day crash course on the Iraqi T-55, its machine guns, and other alry, and conducted joint operations at pla- equipment. We coordinated with the Iraqi armor school for each U.S. armor trainer to attend the toon and company levels. Understanding course and learn the technical aspects of the T-55’s driver’s station, gunner’s station, and basic the importance of getting the IA in the preventive maintenance checks and services.”

July-August 2007 — 37 “One of the properties was a large compound that had been used for storing rockets. It was extensively bombed during the invasion and consisted of two large derelict hangar-type buildings, dirt roads, and smaller bermed areas where rockets were stored. With the exception of the two destroyed hangars (for more of an urban setting), it was an excellent area for tank driver training and a dry fire TCPC range.”

used the same training model used very ment, escalation of force, urban patrol- ing, which consisted of TCP operations, successfully with the STC. ling, and basic communications using the “snap” TCP operations, and convoy op- The brigade training plan also had to in- handheld and base station Motorola ra- erations. Phase three culminated with a clude all of the other low-density mili- dios, which were issued to most IA units. 3-day mission rehearsal exercise (MRX) tary occupational specialties and special- • Tank crew proficiency course (TCPC)/ with battalion and brigade multiechelon ty platoons, which obviously was a re- maintenance included driver’s training, involvement. source challenge. In every area, U.S. train- snake board drills, crew chair drills, tank Prior to the start of the MRX, the brigade ers had to understand not only the basic crew drills, and tank maintenance. and battalion staff conducted a military principles of what they would train, in • decisionmaking process (MDMP) exer- which they were well versed, but also the Tank crew skills training was very sim- cise, which focused on a notional opera- Iraqi army system and all technical as- ilar to our tank crew gunnery skills test tion in Taji. The battalion staff had com- pects of the equipment on which they (TCGST) and included boresighting the mand and control (C2) of the operation, were training. Therefore, we had to “train T-55, DiSHKA machine gun training, pre- requiring each company to conduct mul- the trainers.” paring the gunner’s station, preparing the tiple platoon missions. Key tasks for the loader’s station, preparing the driver’s sta- staffs included reporting and battle track- For the tankers, this meant a 3-day crash tion, loading the 100mm main gun, and ing. For example, 1st Company was re- course on the Iraqi T-55, its machine guns, mounting the DiSHKA machine gun. quired to establish a 4-hour platoon TCP and other equipment. We coordinated • Combat lifesaver training was mod- while another platoon conducted a patrol. with the Iraqi armor school for each U.S. eled after our week-long training event. Intelligence determined how and where armor trainer to attend the course and learn the battalion commander would use his the technical aspects of the T-55’s driver’s Phase-two training. This phase was scout platoon to help shape the fight and station, gunner’s station, and basic preven- conducted at Besmiyah (Butler) Range, develop the overall picture. He was also tive maintenance checks and services. which is a modern multipurpose range introduced to the concept of task organiz- The brigade training plan was divided complex located east of Baghdad. Train- ing for specific missions. into three distinct week-long phases with ing events focused on small arms and 1 week of leave between each phase. tank gunnery and consisted of the fol- Most of the training was conducted on lowing 5-day training blocks: local “training” areas in East Taji. In real- Phase one focused on individual skills; ity, with the exception of three small- phase two focused on crew collective • Tank driver training/convoy operations. skills and gunnery; and phase three fo- arms ranges, there were no official train- cused on platoon- and company-level • Small arms training, including sus- ing areas in Taji, to include tank ranges. training with a refresher on small arms tainment training with AK-47s and train- With the high frequency of improvised ing on the PKC machine gun. explosive devices (IEDs) and other insur- (repetition): gent activity surrounding the base, train- Phase-one training. This training phase • Tank tables IV through VIII, which ing areas were created on base to support consisted of 4 blocks of 5 training days were similar to our tank tables with few- the training. and included: er targets and more emphasis on machine gun engagements. • Rifle marksmanship/infantry skills/ Training Areas communications included zeroing, qual- Phase-three training. This phase in- Fortunately for 3/9 IA, Taji possesses ification, reflexive firing, rules of engage- cluded 2 weeks of platoon collective train- a large number of areas that have not

38 — July-August 2007 changed since the war began in 2003 and ers and wire. The other defensive engage- trained Iraqi army and police force. One many former Iraqi army compounds re- ment was a notional hasty or “snap” TCP. mistake our team realized not long after mained unchanged after the fall of Sad- The two offensive engagements were con- it arrived in Iraq is that many IA units are dam. We took advantage of these proper- ducted while the tank was on a notional pushed into combat before they are ready. ties and created training areas, which were patrol. Target signatures for the targets To make matters worse, they cease train- used for training phases one and three. were very simple: blank AK-47 fire for ing once they assume battlespace. If the Tracked vehicle training range the small-arms targets and hand-grenade German army of World War II continued . One training while locked in mortal combat of the properties was a large compound simulators for the RPG targets. Driver’s training with Russia, then surely we can coach the that had been used for storing rockets. It . Prior to the crew con- Iraqi army to do the same. was extensively bombed during the inva- ducting TCPC, the tank drivers used the sion and consisted of two large derelict same area to practice and refine driving With more partnerships, such as the one hangar-type buildings, dirt roads, and skills. While conducting patrols on the between 2-8 Cavalry and 3/9 IA, we will smaller bermed areas where rockets were narrow streets of Baghdad, the tankers see a more rapid maturing of a profes- stored. With the exception of the two de- from 1st and 2d IA Brigades shared the sional Iraqi army. At some point in the stroyed hangars (for more of an urban set- common problem of colliding with civil- near future, we will see 3/9 IA success- ting), it was an excellent area for tank driv- ian vehicles. While turns and dips in the fully take the lead in their shared battle- er training and a dry fire TCPC range. road alone made the course challenging, space and free up combat power for U.S. forces. Tank crew proficiency course. With the we decided the drivers needed practice help of a company of IA engineers at- on weaving in and out of traffic. To rep- tached to 3d Brigade, we transformed one licate the streets of Baghdad, the engi- of the desolate areas into a valuable train- neer company towed several old IA trucks ing resource. A dirt road was cut around onto a flat stretch of road, forcing the tank Note drivers to successfully weave their way 1U.S. Army Field Manual 7-0, Training the Force, U.S. Gov- the outside of the area and weaved in and ernment Printing Office, Washington, DC, 22 October 2002. out of the bombed buildings. Targets were through “traffic.” cut from plywood and were raised and Urban lane. We took advantage of a de- lowered by IA soldiers who communicat- serted and run-down complex that includ- Major William Nuckols is serving as staff ma- ed with the range officer in charge with ed a long three-story barracks building, neuver trainer/executive officer, Military Transi- handheld radios. Only 10 targets were a large three-story factory building, and tion Team, 1st Brigade, 2d Army Division, Iraq. needed to support the range and included several small buildings that were arranged He received a B.S. from the University of Ala- two car targets with a sniper signature, along a paved road. This was the perfect bama and an M.S. from Troy State University. His military education includes Armor Officer two sniper targets, three rocket-propelled place to train mounted and dismounted Advanced Course, Air Assault School, and grenade (RPG) targets, and three insur- patrolling, raids, traffic control points, and U.S. Army Command and General Staff Col- gent squad-sized targets. cordon and searches. For more advanced lege. He has served in various command and The TCPC included two offensive and training, we added IEDs, civilian role staff positions, to include XO, 5th Squadron, players, and weapons caches. 15th Cavalry, Fort Knox, KY; S3, 4th Squadron, defensive engagements. The defensive en- 7th Cavalry, Camp Garry Owen, Korea; com- gagements included one pre-set TCP lo- The Way Forward mander, Headquarters and Headquarters Com- cation for a stationary engagement. The pany, 1st Battalion, 67th (1-67) Armor, Fort idea was for the tank to support a static It is clear that our Nation’s exit strategy Hood, TX; and commander, C Company, 1-67 TCP with permanently emplaced barri- out of Iraq depends on a strong and well- Armor, Fort Hood.

“While conducting patrols on the narrow streets of Baghdad, the tankers from 1st and 2d IA Brigades shared the common problem of colliding with civilian vehicles. While turns and dips in the road alone made the course challenging, we decided the drivers needed practice on weaving in and out of traffic. To replicate the streets of Baghdad, the engineer company towed several old IA trucks onto a flat stretch of road, forcing the tank drivers to successfully weave their way through ‘traffic.’”

July-August 2007 — 39 Falklands Armor

by Retired Brigadier General Raymond Bell Jr.

Twenty five years ago, the British armed lands it is appropriate to reprise the ef- called his colonel, who designated 3 and forces took back the remote Falkland Is- forts and impact of the small, but signifi- 4 Troops, B Squadron (the same as a U.S. lands from their Argentine foes. In late cant, addition of armor to Britain’s land armored cavalry troop), Blues and Roy- May 1982, some 9,000 United Kingdom combat power during the campaign. als, as the two platoon-sized organiza- servicemen descended on the islands to tions that would deploy to the South At- wrest control from a large force of Ar- The Call Comes lantic and the Falkland Islands as part of gentine soldiers, marines, sailors, and air- the Falkland Island Task Force. men. In the British contingent were 28 For the armored cavalrymen of the Blues officers and men of the “Blues and Roy- and Royals (a combination of two fa- Now, in 1982, the British Army and its als,” one of Britain’s most distinguished mous cavalry regiments, the Royal Horse strong armor component were oriented amalgamated cavalry regiments, and one Guards and 1st Dragoons) it all started on potentially conducting combat in Ger- of the two mechanized formations of the with a telephone call. It came from an of- many against the Soviet forces positioned British royal household cavalry. ficial in the War Office in London to the in East Germany. Armor and armored re- weekend duty officer on 1 April 1982, at connaissance units rotated from the Unit- The troopers brought with them mounts the Windsor barracks of the medium re- ed Kingdom to stations in the former of metal and tracks — four Scorpions, connaissance regiment, which is located British occupation zone in northern Ger- four Scimitars, and a Samson. They were close to the royal residence at Windsor many periodically as part of the British the only armor troops accompanying the Castle in Berkshire County. The regiment, Army of the Rhine (BAOR). The mecha- British infantry force, consisting of elite equivalent to a U.S. Army battalion, is the nized troops thus trained to meet a mas- paratroopers, Royal Marine commandos, closest armor unit stationed near London, sive Warsaw Pact invasion if it should Welsh and Scots Guardsmen, and Nepal- has a rapid response mission, and thus occur, and as a result, the BAOR was on ese Gurkhas. There came a time soon af- was the appropriate unit to contact in case constant alert and highly trained to deter their arrival, however, when these in- of an emergency requiring armored troops. fend its area of operations in northwest fantrymen earnestly wished for the pres- The caller from the War Office asked the Germany. Armored formations stationed ence of more than just eight tracked ar- lieutenant on duty, Lieutenant M. Coreth, in Great Britain trained to take their place mored fighting vehicles to accompany how long it would take the regiment to with their counterparts on the European them into battle. The story has been told mobilize a couple of mechanized cavalry continent. Combat on a group of small is- before, but on this 25th anniversary of the troops — the equivalent of a couple of lands located thousands of miles from successful reclaiming of the Falkland Is- U.S. Army platoons. Coreth immediately Great Britain, therefore, could hardly have

40 — July-August 2007 been expected to be even a secondary mis- son,” deployed with a crew of two vehi- chute Regiment, disembarked to join their sion for the British mounted arm. cle mechanics, a turret mechanic, and a vehicles on the island. This took some recovery specialist to provide limited doing as there were no beaches to satis- The Mechanized Steeds maintenance support to the fighting ve- factorily disembark or re-embark the ar- hicles. The Samson was a modification of mored vehicles. The senior armor officer Although armored cavalry troops were the CVR-T, using the same chassis and present, Lieutenant Coreth, who had re- not expected to fight effectively in the also having the advantage of making a ceived the initial War Office inquiry, had remote Falklands, the deployed tracked light imprint on the boggy Falklands ter- to convince authorities ashore that it was fighting vehicles did turn out to be ideal rain. The low ground pressure of the Sam- necessary to boresight the vehicles’ weap- for combat operations on the islands. The son made it valuable for not only recov- ons, which could not be done at sea. At medium reconnaissance regiment was ery operations, but enabled it to serve the same time, the Scimitars had to test equipped with combat vehicles, recon- many other logistics needs when it came fire the 30mm APDS ammunition, which naissance-tracked (CVR-Ts). There were to maneuvering cross country. The Sam- had never before been fired. two configurations of CVR-Ts organized son and its crew were the only mainte- into troops of four vehicles, with two of nance elements capable of keeping the After boresighting on Ascension, ar- each configuration per troop. fighting vehicles operational. The Sam- mored cavalry troopers tested the feasi- One CVR-T, constructed of steel and son carried a limited supply of replace- bility of firing their main armament from aluminum, was named the “Scorpion” ment parts and the skill level of the me- utility landing craft (LCU) by lowering and weighed some 8 tons combat load- chanics was such that they were not ex- the craft’s ramp enough to clear the can- ed. As such, it could be lifted by a CH-47 pected to perform complicated repair non’s line of fire over the ramp. This test helicopter, while two could be carried by tasks with the tools at hand. was to see if the cannons could be em- a C-130 Hercules aircraft. The Scorpion ployed to support an If the tracked fighting vehicles selected assault during was armed with a 76mm medium veloc- to deploy to the Falklands turned out to ity gun, which fired high-explosive squash an opposed be the proper ones because of their beach head (HESH), high-explosive (HE), can- low ground pressure, the main ar- ister, smoke, and illumination rounds. mament initially proved to be a Maximum effective range of the main gun challenge. This was because was 5,000 meters. the weapons had not been The second CVR-T was the “Scimitar,” test fired or boresighted which was built on the same chassis as the since November of the Scorpion, weighed about the same, and previous year. There was

“One CVR-T, constructed of steel and aluminum, was named the “Scorpion” and weighed some 8 tons combat loaded. As such, it could be lifted by a CH-47 helicopter, while two could be carried by a C-130 Hercules aircraft. The Scorpion was armed with a 76mm medium velocity gun, which fired high-explosive squash head (HESH), high-explosive (HE), canister, smoke, and illumination rounds. Max- imum effective range of the main gun was 5,000 meters.”

mounted a high-velocity 30mm Rarden no time before the vehi- cannon. The 30mm fired armor-pierc- cles embarked to accom- ing, discarding sabot (APDS), high-ex- plish these required tasks, plosive, and an armor-piercing special- and innovative means had effect (APSE) round, which could easily to be sought to remedy the penetrate an infantry fighting vehicle or situation. It was not until the armored carrier. task force assembled at Ascen- landing. sion Island off the west coast of Other similarities between the two ar- The tank Africa, several thousands of miles from gun ners had a mored reconnaissance vehicles were a the British Isles, that the challenge could 7.62mm coaxial-mounted machine gun; rare opportunity be addressed. Complicating the matter to display their marksmanship as they full nuclear, biological, and chemical was the lack of an established tank gun- (NBC) protection; and a second-genera- fired at floating 40-gallon steel drums. nery range on Ascension Island where the The target practice also resulted in some tion passive sight on the gunner’s posi- entire task force had to stop to reposition tion. Each vehicle had a three-man crew amusement as the gunners had to con- men and equipment before proceeding on tend with the antics of the lurching craft. made up of a driver, gunner, and vehicle south to the Falkland Islands. commander. One of the major character- Luckily, the LCUs suffered no damage and it was determined that the vehicles istics of the CVR-T, which proved to be On arrival at Ascension Island en route very valuable in traversing the many peat could provide fire support to disembark- to the Falklands, the Scimitars and Scor- ing infantry, if only tenuously. bogs in the Falklands, was the vehicle’s pions were off loaded from the roll-on very low ground pressure of 4.9 pounds roll-off ship, MV Elk, and married up with The Skeptics per square inch. the vehicle crews. The troopers, who had With the small armored cavalry con- In addition to the eight CVR-Ts, a tracked embarked on the SS Canberra with para- tingent’s quick mobilization and relative recovery vehicle, designated the “Sam- troopers of the 3d Battalion, The Para- unpreparedness for combat, the outlook

July-August 2007 — 41 vehicle was impossible in the Falklands. This misconception was passed along to apply to tracked armored fighting vehicles as well. Not until the expeditionary force got on the ground did commanders come to terms with this misunderstand- ing. Reality set in after the experiences at Goose Green/Darwin; however, there was no more combat until the final attack on Argentine positions around Stanley in June, so the Blues and Royals had to prove themselves in other ways.

Mastering the Terrain In an effort to remove the unjust skepti- cism placed on the tracked vehicles, the Blues and Royals set out to master the terrain. The area of operations had two key “...the “Scimitar,” which was built on the same chassis as the Scorpion, weighed about the same, and mounted a high-velocity 30mm Rarden cannon. The 30mm fired armor-piercing, discard- terrain components. The first component ing sabot (APDS), high-explosive, and an armor-piercing special-effect (APSE) round, which was the heights or low mountain ranges. could easily penetrate an infantry fighting vehicle or armored carrier.” The lower reaches proved to be less of an obstacle to tracked vehicles, except in places where the low water table made the ground soft and large boulders were en- for successful employment of even light- ed on East Falkland Island, the CVR-Ts countered. The highest reaches were only weight tracked vehicles looked pretty grim were not employed in any role. traversed on foot. The second component on the Falkland Islands. Indeed, there were was the virtually treeless terrain covered many who were skeptical about having The 2d Battalion of The Parachute Reg- with peat bogs and fields of rocks called any armor at all along for combat opera- iment was charged with attacking the Ar- “stone runs.” The runs were often hun- tions. The Falklands were not deemed gentine garrison at its location on the dreds of yards wide and went for several “tank country,” much like terrain in South southwest tip of East Falkland Island 7 miles with boulders ranging in size from Vietnam was once considered by many days after it landed on the island 21 May that of a man’s head to that of an auto- Americans to be inappropriate for ground 1982. With minimal helicopter and artil- mobile. The stone runs could be navigat- armor operations. lery support (limited by the number of air- ed by the tracked vehicles relatively eas- craft and availability of appropriate am- ily, while the peat bogs provided a spe- Part of the mindset of British military munition), the paratroopers went into bat- cial challenge. leaders in the Falklands campaign result- tle on foot. The battalion commander was ed from deploying the type of combat killed along with 16 of his paratroopers, The tracked vehicle drivers learned that troops initially involved. The first infan- but after a short stiff fight, the Argentine the way to master the bogs was to drive trymen engaged in battle were from 3 force, which included a large contingent aggressively, always seeking to maintain Royal Marine Commando Brigade, which of their air force personnel, surrendered. their forward momentum. They compared consisted of three battalion-sized Royal No armor was present. the experience to “driving on a large wa- Marine infantry units (commandos), plus ter bed.” The drivers also learned to look two battalions of paratroopers from the Although the battalion commander re- well ahead as they moved forward. They 2d and 3d Battalions of The Parachute quested the assistance of the Scorpions watched out for green moss, which they Regiment. All five battalion-sized forma- and Scimitars, he was told by higher head- knew covered the softest patches of ter- tions were light infantry, which seldom quarters they were unavailable. Chalk one rain. When a patch could not be avoid- were expected to fight as mounted troops. up to inexperience; the paratroopers con- ed, the driver drove straight ahead, avoid- They might easily fly by helicopter or sidered the misconception about the em- ing turns, or as they called it, “sticking” parachute into battle, but riding in armor- ployment of armor as “an extraordinary (changing direction with the vehicle’s protected vehicles was not their usual mo- piece of misinformation.” steering levers). Changing direction on dus operandi. Indeed, the mix of Royal Prejudices about employing light armor the soft turf caused the CVR-T’s track to Marine commandos and paratroopers in the Falklands were primarily based on tear the fragile ground, which damaged proved to be just the type of infantry force the terrain encountered. The road network the route for a following tracked vehicle. best suited for operations in the Falklands, on East Falkland Island, the principal area If the driver was not traveling fast enough, but they were going to fight on foot, not of operations, was virtually nonexistent the CVR-T would sink to the top of its from armored personnel carriers. except around the capital town, Stanley, road wheels. Since the infantry usually did not fight on the eastern end of the island. In addi- Recovering the bogged-down vehicles alongside tanks, higher headquarters ini- tion, the overall trafficability on East Falk- was also a trafficability hazard; however, tially did not express an appreciation for land was poor. The native population used a simple recovery remedy, not previous- correct use of the armor. At best, the wheeled tractors and four-wheel drive ly tested, was at hand. Each tracked ve- tracked fighting vehicles would be em- vehicles to conduct business, but stuck hicle carried what was called a “kinetic ployed on an ad-hoc basis, at least until principally to unimproved tracks to move energy tow rope.” The idea was to use the they had a chance to prove themselves in about. They had little need to maneuver rope, which was made of a highly elas- battle. At the fight for the building com- cross-country off these tracks. tic nylon material that stretched to twice plex of Goose Green/Darwin, initiated a There was a misconception in the Unit- its normal length, to “pop” a sunken vehi- week after 3 Marine Commando had landed Kingdom that movement by wheeled cle out of the mushy terrain onto firmer

42 — July-August 2007 “Just before the bitter diversionary fight for Goose Green on 28 May, 3 Marine Commando had begun the trek on foot and by helicopter east toward its final objective, the port and capital of the Falkland Islands, Stanley. The armor, having not been considered appropriate for combat with the 2d Battalion of the Parachute Regiment, went forward with the commandos and other paratroopers on their “yomp” (an extreme foot march) eastward, which they made, packing heavy loads of equipment, ammunition, and weapons.”

ground. The rope was first tested on a civilian tractor that had gotten stuck in a peat bog. Lieutenant Coreth, in testing the rope, had his driver gingerly back up to the sunken tractor until the two vehicles almost touched, while the driver made sure he did not break ground surface and get stuck. The tow rope was coiled on the ground and attached between the two vehicles. Coreth then ordered his vehicle to drive “like a bat out of hell,” which stretched the rope, causing the tractor to loads of equipment, ammunition, and trek. Especially welcome was the heat giv- leap out of the bog. The rope quickly won weapons. en off by the vehicles’ engines to dry the many earnest adherents. Number 3 Troop with four CVR-Ts wet boots of the slogging foot soldiers While the soft ground proved to be a moved in support of the 45 Commando and commandos during rest halts. major hazard, especially if a vehicle got unit along the northern route to its final For more senior commanders, proper stuck and sank in the peat, there was one objective jump-off position via the settle- appreciation for the various capabilities good feature about operating on such ter- ment of Douglas, which was located on of the accompanying armor was soon rain. During the final assault on the port the bay of Port Salvador. Number 4 Troop achieved. At Teal Inlet Settlement, for ex- city of Stanley, Coreth’s Scorpion ran accompanied the 3d Battalion of The Para- ample, Lieutenant Coreth was given the over an Argentine mine that was laid in a chute Regiment in its yomp along a par- additional task of air defense officer in bog beside a track alongside which the allel route to Teal Inlet Settlement, which charge. The Scimitar gunners found it rel- vehicle was traveling. When the tracked also lay on a spur of the Port Salvador atively easy to track the slower-moving reconnaissance vehicle ran over the mine, Bay. Partly, as a result of the prevailing Argentine Skyhawk and Pucara aircraft it exploded, throwing the vehicle into the prejudices about the ground mobility of with their 30mm Rarden guns and coax- air and severely damaging its right front the tracked vehicles, the 2d Battalion of ial-mounted general purpose machine running gear. However, the mine also The Parachute Regiment’s advance east guns. The combination of main gun and made a big hole in the bog, which ab- from Goose Green was not to be support- machine gun fire proved effective in not sorbed a good part of the shock thus ame- ed by armor. It was on the long trek in the only scoring a number of hits, but also liorating the amount of damage done to north, however, that the Blues and Roy- forcing enemy aircraft to fly higher so the Scorpion. als began to earn their reputation for be- they would not be engaged by ground-to- ing a key ingredient in the ground battle air missiles. Becoming Believers campaign. The two troops of the Blues and Royals But the real eye opener to the tracked quickly made the commandos and para- Moving the tracked vehicles across the reconnaissance vehicles’ capabilities on troopers believe in the armored troopers’ northern part of East Falkland Island went the Falklands Islands terrain came about capabilities, and they soon became sought without incident. The vehicle drivers took when the newly arrived 5 Infantry Brigade after by various unit commanders. Just advantage of the excellent opportunity to was established at Fitzroy on the south- before the bitter diversionary fight for gain experience negotiating the terrain east coast of East Falkland. The Blues Goose Green on 28 May, 3 Marine Com- and its vagaries, thereby gaining confi- and Royals were detached from 3 Com- mando had begun the trek on foot and dence in their ability to operate with a mando Brigade and moved the tracked by helicopter east toward its final objec- minimum of difficulty. reconnaissance vehicles south to bolster tive, the port and capital of the Falkland If there were any doubts about the need the infantry brigade’s position against Islands, Stanley. The armor, having not for aggressive first-echelon maintenance, an Argentine counterattack at Fitzroy, a been considered appropriate for combat they were soon dispelled. At the same journey estimated to take approximately with the 2d Battalion of the Parachute time, armored cavalrymen proved to be of 2 days over hardly passable and virtually Regiment, went forward with the com- great assistance in moving heavier items trackless terrain. mandos and other paratroopers on their of equipment for supported units. They The trip, however, took only 6 hours, “yomp” (an extreme foot march) east- also gave lifts to footsore and heavily bur- much to the astonishment of Brigadier ward, which they made, packing heavy dened infantrymen struggling on the long Anthony Wilson, commanding 5 Infan-

July-August 2007 — 43 try Brigade, who was quoted as saying, off Bluff Cove to a battalion aid station fire support to the guardsmen. Once on “I never expected them to make it so following a successful Argentine air strike Tumbledown, the troopers quickly ad- quickly over the difficult ground. When I on the ships. vanced on Sapper Hill overlooking Stan- looked and saw them winding down the ley, leading the infantry to the top of the side of the mountain toward us, their lead- The stay of 3 Troop with 5 Infantry Bri- hill mass. ing troops mud-spattered and rain-soaked gade, however, was short, as on 8 June, and their commanders half-frozen in the the reconnaissance unit was ordered north The 2d Battalion of The Parachute Reg- turrets of their vehicles, it was one of again to rejoin 3 Royal Marine Comman- iment up north was happy to see 3 Troop those moments I am not likely to forget.” do Brigade for the final showdown with arrive to support its final attacks. Deprived Coming from the commander of a bri- the Argentines around Stanley. At the be- of armor support at Goose Green/Darwin, gade composed of two infantry battalions, ginning of the move north, the troop lost the unit was now determined to maxi- the newly arrived 1st Welsh Guards and the temporary use of a Scimitar when a mize the capabilities of the Scorpions 2d Scots Guards, which normally fought gearbox broke and the vehicle had to be and Scimitars. This not only meant using from armored carriers, this was a com- left behind until a replacement could be the vehicle’s fire power, but also its night- pliment indeed. obtained. The CVR-T turret, nevertheless, fighting ability. The passive night sights, remained operational and the crew fired which the battalion commander referred Lieutenant Coreth noted that the jour- its 30mm cannon successfully against to as his “eyes,” proved invaluable in lo- ney was made under appalling weather attacking Argentine Skyhawks at Bluff cating enemy positions. and terrain conditions over a route very Cove. The gearbox failure was the only high and very steep. The contoured map major assembly to malfunction during the During the parachute battalion’s attack indicated the going was impassable to ar- entire campaign, attesting to the rugged- on Wireless Ridge, the CVR-T guns were mored vehicles. Using his initiative, how- ness of the vehicle. particularly effective when using a firing ever, Coreth obtained the services of a technique called “zapping.” Similar to the local citizen who grabbed his motor bike, On 11 June, the three-phase operation to technique of reconnaissance by fire, the threw it on the Samson recovery vehicle, re-take Stanley and defeat the foe was crews would fire their coaxial machine and set off to guide them on the “impos- launched. 3 Troop, with its Scimitars load- gun at a suspected enemy position, hop- sible” journey. They arrived at their des- ed to their double capacity with 30mm ing to elicit a response. The less highly tination, having traveled through a sus- ammunition and making full use of their disciplined Argentine defenders usually pected Argentine minefield and with noth- night sights, supported the 2d Battalion opened fire, revealing their locations. The ing worse to wear than a thrown track of The Parachute Regiment’s attack on reconnaissance vehicle’s crew immedi- and a broken sprocket. The place of the Wireless Ridge during the last two phas- ately zeroed in on now-exposed enemy Blues and Royals in the campaign’s his- es. The troop’s CVR-Ts provided cover- positions, hitting them with 76mm gun or tory was now well established. ing fire to paratroopers as they moved to- 30mm cannons. The 30mm Rarden was ward Stanley, and then joined the battal- The Final Assault favored as a response weapon because of ion, being among the first to enter the its high velocity and great accuracy. Having successfully transferred to the town. 4 Troop, similarly stocked with am- command of 5 Infantry Brigade, the troop- munition, provided support to the 2d Bat- In the final attacks by the Scots Guards, ers spent the next few days, until the fi- talion of the Scots Guards. The troop first the troopers of 4 Troop in the south had a nal assault on Stanley, performing main- saw action in a diversionary role on 13 different battle experience than their com- tenance, escorting Scots Guards recon- June while providing fire support to a patriots to the north. During the night pa- naissance soldiers to a forward position, Scots Guards night patrol who was prob- trol action, the lead Scorpion, with Lieu- escaping frequent Argentine air attacks, ing the Argentine defenses around Tum- tenant Coreth on board, encountered a and finally, on 8 June helping to evacuate bledown Mountain. The troop lost a Scor- huge crater in the trail on which the troop wounded from the logistics landing ships, pion to a mine, but during the action, the was advancing. Being impassable and Sir Galahad and Sir Tristram, anchored unit was able to provide effective night still short of his designated firing position, Coreth decided to maneuver off the road to bypass the obstacle. It was then that the vehicle hit an antitank mine. The CVR-T rose 3 to 4 feet in the air with a blinding flash. Coreth later described the accompanying sensation as “being hit on either side of my helmet with heavy ham- mers.” His first reaction was to get himself and his crew out of the Scorpion, which they quickly accomplished. Much to the relief of the men, they were not wounded, although there were some ring- ing heads and jumbled nerves. The remainder of the troop went on to support the infantrymen’s attack. Coreth, who was to be decorated for his part in the campaign, directed his remaining vehicles to continue firing while under heavy “Having successfully transferred to the command of 5 Infantry Brigade, the troopers spent the next Argentine artillery fire. Because the trail few days, until the final assault on Stanley, performing maintenance, escorting Scots Guards recon- on which they were advancing was so naissance soldiers to a forward position, escaping frequent Argentine air attacks, and finally, on 8 narrow and the off-road area was heavily June helping to evacuate wounded from the logistics landing ships, Sir Galahad and Sir Tristram, an- mined, only one vehicle’s weapons could chored off Bluff Cove to a battalion air post following a successful Argentine air strike on the ships.” initially be brought to bear on the desig-

44 — July-August 2007 Driver’s Seat from Page 5 • Soldiers should rest before and in between strenuous exercise. • Soldiers should loosen clothing while resting. • Soldiers should report when they are not feeling well, especially before, during, or after strenuous exercise. • Soldiers should wear light clothing whenever possible. • Soldiers should not be allowed to wear unnecessary layers of clothing. First Aid Heat-related illnesses can usually be reversed in the early stages by following these steps: • Get the victim out of the heat. • Loosen any tight clothing and apply cool, wet clothes. • Give cool water if the victim is con- scious, about one glass every 15 minutes. “The Blues and Royals added the bright laurels of the Falklands campaign to their illustrious • history. Not only was their participation an important part of the British task force’s victory, it If the victim refuses water, vomits, was also a personal victory for the troopers, corporals of horse, and lieutenants who were part or loses consciousness, call 9-1-1. of the fighting. These armored cavalrymen fully proved their ability to effectively do battle under Immediate first aid and evacuation of a the worst combat conditions.” soldier suffering from a heat injury is critical. Leaders must know his soldiers’ weak- nated targets. Coreth, sitting on the out- horse, and lieutenants who were part of nesses to minimize their risk of heat inside of his remaining CVR-Ts, alterna- the fighting. These armored cavalrymen jury. The key to preventing heat injury tively brought each vehicle forward to fully proved their ability to effectively do is knowledge and education on the risks, fire its onboard weapons. In his personal battle under the worst com bat conditions. causes, and preventive measures. When diary, Coreth described his activity as Perhaps more importantly, they proved training in a hot and humid environment, participating in “a crazy shoot from one the naysayers wrong on the subject of em- leaders are reminded: vehicle, sitting on the outside, reverse ploying armor effectively on the Falkland • him, climb onto another, bring him for- Islands. For 28 junior officers and men, Soldiers should rest in a cool or ward, fire him, and so on till the last.” this was, in itself, a major accomplish- shady environment. ment of which their armored cavalry peers • Concurrent hydration is critical. Victory and superiors, as well as the entire British • High air temperature, high relative The overall performance of the Scimi- Army, could rightfully be very proud. humidity, and exposure to the sun tars and Scorpions was considered one make it difficult for soldiers to regu- of the real success stories of the Falk- Bibliography late their body temperature. lands campaign. Not only were they val- • Excessive clothing prevents heat Mark Adkin, Goose Green: A Battle is Fought to be ued members of the combat team, their Won, London, L. Cooper, 1992. from being lost to the environment. presence proved to be a major education- • Editor, “Armour in the Falklands,” Guards Maga- Heat injuries are commonly associ- al experience for the light infantry units zine, Winter 1982/1983, pp. 164-172. ated with hard work in hot weather; they fought beside. For instance, it was William Fowler, Battle for the Falklands (I) Land how ever, they can also occur in rela- the first time the Royal Marine comman- Forces, London, Osprey Publishing, 1982. tively cool conditions when soldiers dos had the opportunity to see how effec- Andrew Jones, “British Armor in the Falklands,” are dressed in heavy protective tive light armor could be used in future ARMOR, March-April 1983, pp. 26-30. clothing. operations. Because 3 Royal Marine Com- • mando Brigade had a NATO mission in These same principles apply at northern Norway where tracked vehicles night. If there is inadequate cooling were employed extensively on snow and of the body during physical exertion ice, gaining an appreciation for fighting Brigadier General Raymond E. Bell Jr., U.S. at night, heat injuries can occur. Army, Retired, is a 1957 graduate of the United with similar vehicles armed with power- States Military Academy. He received an M.A. Again, when heat injury occurs, it is an ful cannons proved to be a valuable les- from Middlebury College and a Ph.D. from New indication of failure of one or more com- son. York University. His military education includes ponents of the prevention system. Re- The Blues and Royals added the bright the U.S. Army War College and the National sponsibility for soldiers’ health and well War College. As an armor officer, he served in being depends heavily on vigilant and in- laurels of the Falklands campaign to their the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment, 32d Armor, illustrious history. Not only was their par- stinctive leaders; however, safety is ev- 15th Armor in Korea, and 5th Cavalry in Viet- eryone’s job. ticipation an important part of the British nam. His last two assignments included the U.S. task force’s victory, it was also a person- Army Reserve’s 5th Psychological Operations “Teach our young Soldiers and leaders al victory for the troopers, corporals of Group and its 220th Military Police Brigade. how to think; not what to think.”

July-August 2007 — 45 Winning in Degraded Mode by Wakeland K. Kuamoo and Sergeant First Class Brian Reel

It is well established that the Abrams gunnery performance through the use of ly operational system.”2 This degradation main battle tank is the finest armor fight- manual controls and the gunner’s auxil- can be caused by a fault in the fire con- ing vehicle in service today. The Abrams iary sight (GAS), which will enhance full- trol system or by environmental condi- offers invaluable armor protection to up gunnery proficiency. tions. Faults in the fire control system crews and incredibly overwhelming fire- Fighting with a full-up system is the pre- could force the crew to use manual con- power. During combat operations, reports ferred method of engaging targets. How- trols and/or the GAS. Combat reports in- have shown that the Abrams tank can en- ever, due to continuously changing bat- dicate some tank crews are closing their gage and destroy targets in urban environ- tlefield conditions, using degraded mode ballistic doors (dog house) to prevent in- ments, as well as at extended ranges, us- gunnery techniques may be required. Dur- surgent attacks against primary sighting ing both precision and degraded mode ing the quick tempo of urban conflict, it systems, again relying on the GAS to en- gunnery techniques. may be necessary to engage targets using gage immediate threats and allow con- The majority of the tank’s lethality de- battlesight techniques. Many targets are tinued scanning. Top attacks, snipers, and pends on how well its crew is trained to only visible within a 2- to 5-second win- environmental conditions have also forced perform under various conditions. Cur- dow of opportunity, necessitating a “quick- tankers to fight from the closed-hatch po- rent armor doctrine, U.S. Army Field shot” technique to effectively place fire sition. Always remember that anything Manual (FM) 3-20.12, Tank Gunnery on these targets. Extended operations less than a 100-percent situational aware- (Abrams), provides guidelines for a mul- in a 360-degree threat environment, with ness of the crew’s surrounding area will titude of different types of tasks, condi- limited ability to pull back and make re- limit its overall effectiveness. pairs, may force units to continue the fight tions, and standards that our tankers could Crew-level tank tables prescribe a pro- encounter on the battlefield.1 while maintaining the momentum of the battle. This fight includes completing the gressive training method toward crew Expertise in target acquisition, sensing, mission, protecting the Abrams’ technol- qualification. Based on this method, crews and subsequent round adjustments are ogy, and movement to maintenance or re- should move from basic tables, only af- critical elements of overall gunnery pro- supply points. ter mastering all tasks, to intermediate ta- ficiency. However, to avoid writing a 200- bles. Basic tables (with or without simu- page publication, this article simply ex- FM 3-20.12 describes degraded-mode lations) include manipulation and track- amines methods to develop and sustain gunnery as “fighting with less than a ful- ing exercises that assist in developing hand “Fighting with a full-up system is the preferred method of engaging targets. However, due to continuously changing battlefield conditions, using degraded mode gunnery techniques may be required. During the quick tempo of urban conflict, it may be necessary to engage targets using battlesight techniques. Many targets are only visible within a 2- to 5-second window of opportunity, necessitating a “quick-shot” technique to effectively place fire on these targets.”

and eye coordination, which forms the monitoring these difficult tasks (or oth- Train for the fight, any fight, any where, basis for gunner firing techniques. ers like it) may force leaders to integrate under all conditions — these are the min- Unit leaders must take advantage of ear- more of these tasks in the lower tables imum standards tankers need to achieve ly opportunities to train crews how to use to ensure satisfactory proficiency dur ing and guarantee victory. the vehicle’s onboard GAS. Tank table crew qualification. IV’s laser rangerfinder (LRF) failure task Our tankers are deployed worldwide and provides the initial opportunity for this must have the capability to successfully training. Successful completion of this fight in both urban and open areas. Given Notes

task is critical for continued training pro- the ever-changing battlefield, while pre- 1U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-20.12, Tank Gunnery ficiency. Tank tables V thru VII provide ad- cision gunnery is the preferred fighting (Abrams), U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, ditional tasks of degraded-mode gunnery posture, degraded-mode gunnery could 15 August 2005. that incorporates the GAS. Tank crews become the norm very quickly. 2Ibid. allowed to proceed to the crew-qualification course without successfully mastering the GAS increase their risk of failing the course. Never allow a weak crew to move forward without mastering all re- Master Sergeant Wakeland Kuamoo, U.S. Army, Retired, currently provides contractor quired skills (with emphasis on the GAS) support for large caliber ammunition to Fort Knox, KY; Picatinny Arsenal, NJ; and Rock Is- of the previous tables. land Arsenal, IL. He served in various duty positions, to include senior live fire train, Bos- nia and Herzegovina; chief, master Gunner Branch, Fort Knox, KY; first sergeant, A Com- The key to any successful gunnery pro- pany, 2d Battalion, 35th Armor, Fort Carson, CO; senior armor trainer, Technical Assistance gram is properly building and monitor- Field Team, Republic of Yemen; and division master gunner, 2d Infantry Division, Korea. ing the overall tasks. In this case, degrad- Sergeant First Class Brian Reel is a senior doctrine writer/developer, Directorate, Training, ed-mode gunnery must be properly built Doctrine, and Combat Development, Fort Knox, KY. His military education includes the and closely monitored to ensure crews Advanced Noncommissioned Officer Course and Master Gunner Course. He has served are meeting required levels of proficien- in various positions, to include platoon sergeant, Mobile Gun System, 1st Battalion, 23d cy before moving forward in the training Infantry, 3d Brigade, 2d Infantry Division, Fort Lewis, WA; brigade operations sergeant, 3d cycle. Range time can hinder a success- Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, Vilseck, Germany; tank platoon sergeant, B Company, 1st ful program, which is why early training Battalion, 35th (1-35) Armor, 1st Armored Division (1AD), Baumholder, Germany; and and successfully executing these difficult master gunner, B Company, 1-35 Armor, 1AD, Baumholder. tasks at home station is critical. Closely

July-August 2007 — 47 My Kingdom for a Proper Fitting Fan Belt

by Lieutenant Colonel Scott Fowler

In the northeast corner of the Patton vision (dismounted). Close at hand was nance Depot in bad condition and need- Museum, there once was a display (until the 29th Infantry Regiment on Okinawa ing extensive repairs, including rebuilt en- 2006) on the subject of ill-fitted engine and the 5th Regimental Combat Team in gines. The repair work began at once and fan belts for the M26 Pershing tank dur- Hawaii. The only other ground unit in the was completed on 13 July. The three tanks ing the early days of the Korean conflict. Pacific area was the 1st Marine Division were shipped to Pusan where they arrived One had to search for the display because in California. on 16 July, the first American medium it was tucked in behind an M47 tank. The U.S. Army units in Japan were at ap- tanks in Korea. Arriving with the tanks, As the Army underwent its postwar re- proximately 70 percent of their combat Lieutenant Samuel R. Fowler and 14 en- duction at the end of World War II, from strength. They had no where near their listed crew members, trained to operate eight million men and 89 divisions to full complement of recoilless rifles, mor- M24 light tanks, were expected to be- 591,000 men and 10 divisions, it also un- tars, and machine guns. The units were come familiar with the Pershing tank. derwent numerous structural changes.1 also lacking in anti-tank mines and did The tanks experienced mechanical dif- After detonation of the atomic bomb, not have the new 3.5-inch bazookas. Since ficulties because their ill-fitted fan belts strategists determined that conventional it was feared heavier tanks would tear up would stretch, causing their motors to warfare was obsolete, which resulted in Japan’s roads and cause its lightweight overheat. Belts made in Japan were either personnel and equipment being reduced bridges to collapse, the divisional tank too short or too long despite emergency to a minimum. To build back the Army’s units were equipped with M24 light tanks orders to have them corrected. Eighth Ar- instead of the heavier M4 or M26 medi- my hoped to use the M26 tanks to help strength after these massive cuts, the Ar- 3 my downplayed its combat role and em- um tanks. stop North Korea’s drive in the southwest phasized its career and training opportu- On 25 June 1950, North Korea’s army and sent the tanks by rail to Chinju where nities. This carried over to training, where invaded South Korea on multiple fronts they arrived at 0300 hours, 28 July. They recruits were given a much reduced regi- with eight full divisions, two half divi- were unloaded at the rail transportation men, as opposed to the strict discipline re- sions and 120 T-34 soviet-made tanks office on the south side of the Nam River quired of an Army in the field. By 1950, against a poorly armed Republic of Ko- where they awaited new belts. the Army seemed to have forgotten that a rea (ROK) army. Armed with obsolete When the North Korean 6th Division en- soldier’s job was to fight.2 37mm anti-tank guns and 2.36-inch ba- tered Chinju on the morning of 31 July, zookas, the South Koreans were unable to 4 the M26 tanks took no part in the battle. 25 June 1950 stop the armored monsters. Flatcars from Pusan to evacuate the tanks At the time of the North Korean inva- passed through Masan the morning of 31 sion, there were no U.S. combat troops 28 June 1950 July, but never got beyond Chungam-ni, in Korea. The closest combat troops to On 28 June 1950, the fourth day of the about 25 miles short of Chinju. A rail Korea were four divisions on occupation war, Colonel Olaf P. Winningstad, Eighth traffic snarl caused by evacuation of the duty in Japan, the 7th, 24th, and 25th In- Army ordnance chief, found three M26 19th Infantry’s supplies blocked the way. fantry Divisions, and the 1st Cavalry Di- Pershing medium tanks at the Tokyo Ord- At daybreak, Lieutenant Fowler went to

48 — July-August 2007 Colonel Ned D. Moore, the 19th Infan- try’s commander, for instructions. Moore told him that if the enemy overran the 19th Infantry’s positions on the northwest side of Chinju and he could not evacuate the tanks on their own power, he was to destroy them and evacuate his tank crews by truck. Lieutenant Fowler telephoned Masan and apparently learned that the flatcars had departed for Chinju to get the tanks, so he decided to stay. Gradually, the firing in Chinju died down. A ROK soldier who passed the rail station about noon told Fowler that only very few ROK soldiers were still in the town. Sometime later, William R. Moore, an Associated Press correspondent, suddenly appeared and suggested that Fowler “...three tanks were shipped to Pusan where they arrived on 16 July, the first American medium check out a group of men coming up the tanks in Korea. Arriving with the tanks, Lieutenant Samuel R. Fowler and 14 enlisted crew mem- rail track. It was now perhaps an hour past bers, trained to operate M24 light tanks, were expected to become familiar with the Pershing tank.” noon. Fowler had an interpreter call to the approaching men — they were North Ko- reans. Fowler ordered his tank crews to open fire. In the fire fight that immedi- Two miles down the road, the tanks came (Silver Star recipient), the only tanker ately flared between the tanks’ .30- and to a blown bridge. The men prepared to manning the tanks, opened fire with the .50-caliber machine guns and the enemy’s abandon the tanks and proceed on foot. .30-caliber machine gun. A North Kore- small-arms fire, Fowler was hit with a They removed Fowler from his tank and an called out in English for the men to bullet on his left side. During this close- made a litter for him. Fowler ordered the surrender. range fight, the tanks’ machine gun fire men to destroy the tanks by dropping gre- killed or wounded most of the enemy nades into them. As soon as three crew- Shrader left the machine gun and start- group, which was about platoon size. The men started for the tanks, an enemy force ed the tank, driving it as close as he could tankers put Fowler in his tank and began lying in ambush opened fire. A number to one of the other tanks. He dropped the moving the three M26 tanks east on the of men got under the bridge with Fowl- escape hatch and took in six men. He then road to Masan. er. Master Sergeant Bryant E.W. Shrader drove back toward Chinju and stopped

“...on their arrival in Korea, these Pershing tanks were the only allied tanks on the Korean Peninsula that could rival the North Korean T-34 tank, so they were pushed to the front line quickly, despite their shortcomings. There must have been a great sense of urgency inside the Pusan perimeter and U.S. commanders needed tanks that could stop North Korea’s T-34.”

July-August 2007 — 49 the tank a few feet short of the bridge over the fan belt problem with their Pershing Notes the Nam, undecided whether to cross to tanks, or if they even had the capability to 1Brigadier General William A. Stofft, Army Historical Se- the other side. There, the overheated en- apply measures to overcome the problem. ries, American Military History, Office of the Chief of Military History, U.S. Army Center for Army Lessons Learned, Wash- gine stopped and would not start again. I would venture to say they did what they ington, DC, 1989, p. 540. The seven men abandoned the tank and could under the circumstances. 2Jim Mesko, Armor in Korea: A Pictorial History, Carroll- ran into the bamboo thickets bordering ton, Squadron/Signal Publications, February 1984, p. 6. Today, we use a pre-combat inspection 3 the river. After many close calls with en- (PCI) sheet that lists all the items needed Ibid., p. 7. emy forces, Shrader and his group final- 4Ibid., p. 6. prior to movement. A leader’s initial in- 5 ly reached safety and passed through the Roy E. Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, spection includes preventive maintenance Department of the Army, U.S. Government Printing Office, lines of the 25th Division west of Masan. checks and services (PMCS), followed by Washington, DC, May 1998, pp. 231-233. 6 The men back at the blown bridge had the DA Form 5988E, the dispatch, and Armor in Korea, p. 13. no chance. Some were killed or wound- technical manual (TM). However, on their ed at the first fire. Others were killed or arrival in Korea, these Pershing tanks Lieutenant Colonel Scott K. Fowler is serving wounded under the bridge. A few ran into were the only allied tanks on the Korean as executive officer, Office of the Special As- nearby fields trying to escape, but were Peninsula that could rival the North Ko- sistant to the Commanding General, Fort Knox, rean T-34 tank, so they were pushed to the KY. He received a B.A. from Northern Kentucky killed or captured. One captured soldier University. His military education includes the later recalled that he saw several bodies front line quickly, despite their shortcomings. There must have been a great sense U.S. Army Command and General Staff Col- floating in the stream and recognized two lege, the Armor Officer Basic and Advanced as Fowler and Moore.5 The only medium of urgency inside the Pusan perimeter, and Courses, and Combined Arms and Services tanks in Korea were lost.6 U.S. commanders needed tanks that could Staff School. He has served in various com- stop North Korea’s T-34. Without being mand and staff positions, to include executive Studying this part of the Korean war there, I will probably never know how officer, 4th Battalion, 85th Training Support Bri- some 57 years later, I pondered what was much attention was pushed higher about gade (4/85 TSB), Fort Knox; plans officer, 4/85 going through the minds of Fowler and the condition of the M26 tank’s fan belts TSB, Fort Knox; S3, 103d Chemical Battalion, his soldiers during their departure from and thus the future operation of the tanks. Ken tucky Army National Guard (KYARNG); Japan, their arrival at the Pusan port, and However, I can safely assume that, at the commander, University of Kentucky, Army Re- their movement to the front line at Chin- time, the mission was to get the tanks to serve Officer Training Corps, Lexington, KY; company commander, 3d Battalion, 123d Ar- ju. There is not enough written about this the front to help slow down the armor at- mor, KYARNG; platoon leader, A Troop, 1st particular part of history to get into the tacks until additional allied medium tanks Squadron, 4th Cavalry, 1st Infantry Division (For- details of what Fowler and his soldiers arrived. ward), Boeblingen, Germany; and tank platoon experienced. For instance, we have no leader and company XO, C Company, 4th Bat- idea how much the soldiers knew about talion, 37th Armor, 2d Brigade, Fort Riley, KS.

LETTERS from Page 3

This brief review showcases two important al rifle company. Because Delta Troop (air) was We were given replacements from a corps tank points: that the wrong questions have been assigned to our squadron, we normally had destroyer battalion, which was being dissolved, asked about cavalry needs for six decades (at about an hour to get ready for UH1 pickup. My and were given the new M36 tank destroyer least), not four; and it is clear — and this is biggest concern was indirect support, so my with the 90mm anti-tank gun. LTC Kojro’s implicit point — the main reason supply sergeant did some “trading” for 61mm the Army keeps asking and answering the mortars and ammunition, so our mortar crew The 5th Armored Division, having been in Hurt- wrong questions is because it seeks to fit doc- could support us when we hit the ground. If my gen Forest, was given the mission of anchor- trine to available technology instead of tailor- memory is still good, C Troop, 1st Squadron, ing the bulge near Monschau and backing up ing available technologies to doctrinal needs. 10th U.S. Cavalry, only conducted five airmo- the four infantry divisions that were anchoring bile assaults (only one hot) in my 11 months in the bulge on the Elsenborn Ridge. They were As a professional military historian, it pains command. the 2d, 1st, 9th and 99th Infantry Divisions. me to see that this still appears to be the case These divisions did such a great job that 5th as we transform from the current force (mount- WILLIAM A. BRINKLEY Armored was never completely committed. ed in HMMWVs and Bradleys), through the in- COL, U.S. Army, Retired terim force (HMMWVs and Strykers), and ulti- My unit was temporarily transferred from the mately to the future force (Future Combat Sys- 5th AD at St. Vith: Could the Battle 5th Armored Division and attached to the 82d tem). Airborne Division, which was adjacent to the of the Bulge Have Been Prevented? ABRAHAM J. EDELHEIT 7th Armored Division, to assist in their anti- Dear ARMOR, tank defense. The German forces were blunt- ed and stopped before reaching the Meuse Riv- “Riding to the Sound of the Guns” I thoroughly enjoyed Captain Borows’ article, er and driven back across the border. “Armor’s Stand at St. Vith,” in the March-April Dear ARMOR, 2007 issue of ARMOR. An interesting article was reprinted in March I enjoyed reading “Ground Cavalry Troop in My unit, Company C, 628 Tank Destroyer Bat- 2007 in the 5th Armored Division’s newsletter Afghanistan,” by Captain Mike O’Neil in the May- talion, probably owes much to Colonel Bruce that presupposes if our penetration of the Sieg- June 2007 issue of ARMOR. I was especially Clarke, his combat command of the 7th Ar- fried Line by CCR, 5th Armored Division in interested in the organization. Some of your mored Division, and the other unit stragglers September 1944 had been acted on by Corps readers don’t realize how much the cavalry has he was able to enlist to help defend at St. Vith or Army, there might not have been a Battle of changed since Vietnam. Our squadron com- and delay the German advance. the Bulge. mander believed in “riding to the sound of the guns,” so he would call and tell us to leave one We were attached to CCR, 5th Armored Divi- ROBERT W. HERMAN crewman per vehicle and become a provision- sion, and had just come out of Hurtgen Forest. LTC, U.S. Army, Retired

50 — July-August 2007 The Wolves of Islam: Russia and the garding how we view the war in Iraq. He also decisions during the March 2003 offensive, Faces of Chechen Terrorism by Paul gives too much credence to the Chechen’s ca- give depth to Conroy’s narrative. Charlie Com- Murphy, Brassey’s Inc., 2004, 268 pp., pability to produce nuclear weapons. Accord- pany first arrived in Kuwait in September 2002 $27.95 (hardcover) ing to researcher Andrew McGregor of the on a scheduled peacekeeping mission — Op- Jamestown Foundation, a non-profit organiza- eration Desert Spring. Nevertheless, the world tion whose mission is to inform and educate political climate changed and Charlie Com- Dr. Paul Murphy’s The Wolves of Islam is an policymakers and the broader policy commu- pany had to adapt its task and purpose to a new elementary introduction to the other half of the nity about events and trends in countries stra- training focus — preparing to attack. Global War on Terrorism: the Russo-Chechen tegically important to the United States, espe- conflict. Not only does this conflict pre-date the cially Eurasia, “Murphy appears especially ea- Though Heavy Metal immediately thrusts the United States’ 11 September 2001 entry into ger to promote Chechens as a source of ‘nu- reader into the ultimate street fight — between the global conflict, but it is beyond the pale in clear terrorism.’” The evidence cited by Mur- the M1A1 Abrams and Iraqi T-72s in Mahmudi- its savage brutality. Murphy’s 268-page book phy appears to be more media sensationalism, yah, a town just south of Baghdad, it quickly takes the reader from the breakup of the Sovi- rather than hard facts. loses its fire. “The Wait in Kuwait,” Chapter 5, et Union, through the turmoil of the Russian pretty accurately describes the feeling when Federation, and finally up to the current Global Additionally, the author fails to cite references reading the next five chapters. But just when War on Terrorism. Although the book provides for many of his facts and figures. Although Mur- you’ve had enough redundant shout-outs from a detailed timeline of the war, it lacks a number phy does acknowledge this issue in the open- Conroy to his soldiers, March 2003 arrives, and of fundamental academic prerequisites to be a ing pages, his lack of citations leaves the read- a Tomahawk cruise missile flying above Char- useful reference, and sometimes overstates the er feeling dubious about the events described. lie Company, now at its final staging position capabilities of the Chechen terrorists. Another annoyance, but one that would help near the Iraq-Kuwait border, signals that nego- the reader better understand the conflict, is a tiations have failed, an ultimatum was ignored, The Russo-Chechen war is perhaps one of lack of detailed maps. Murphy provides only and a fight is coming. Conroy blends personal the most misunderstood conflicts of the early one map, on page 3, which gives the reader lit- perspectives of his soldiers with a command- 21st century. What started out as a war of na- tle in Chechnya’s geographic relationship to other’s keen overall awareness into a solid ac- tionalism by independent-minded Chechen cit- er countries in the region. Although the Chech- count of his company’s actions under fire. Still, izens morphed into a war of Islamic extremists en conflicts have been in the news for a num- taking nothing away from Charlie Company’s who wanted to reestablish historically based ber of years, most Western readers are not as accomplishments, anyone who’s driven the independent Islamic states in the Caucasus re- familiar with the Caucasus region as they are highways in Iraq knows that the, “ten-mile run gion of Russia. Led by Chechnya’s first pres- with the geography of Afghanistan or Iraq. into the heart of Baghdad,” which the Cobras ident, former Soviet Air Force General Djokhar executed along Highway 1, is a bit exaggerat- Dudayev, the first Chechen war (1994-1996) Dr. Murphy is a former U.S. senior counterter- ed. While Charlie Company’s story doesn’t end started as a nationalist movement against the rorism official who lived and worked through- there, the story line continues along in the same Moscow government when Dudayev declared out Russia and Central Asia between 1994 and manner. Chechnya an independent state from the Rus- 2004. He is also a university professor and sian Soviet Federated Socialist Republics. television commentator who has lectured in Prior to the ground war, nobody could have Chechnya’s oil-rich land and population of over the United States, Australia, and Russia. In predicted how urgent the need for American one million was a major prize Russia could ill 2002, he was a congressional advisor on Unit- tanks in urban terrain would become. But cer- afford to lose. The Chechens won the first war ed States-Russian counterterrorism issues. His tainly no one can dispute the Abrams’ signifi- with Russia when a settlement was reached other works include: Brezhnev: Soviet Politi- cance not only then, but currently as well. It’s with Moscow. The second Russo-Chechen war cian, The Soviet Air Forces, and Naval Power really not until the Epilogue that Conroy’s stron- began in 1999 when Chechen warlord and ter- in Soviet Policy. gest contribution to the book emerges — a rorist Shamil Basayev, accompanied by a col- thought-provoking reflection and criticism of the Murphy’s credentials and background should lection of Islamic terrorists, invaded Russian- future of armored forces in the urban fight. controlled Dagestan to establish a Taliban-like have resulted in an excellent book on the his- state and an idealistic “Allah’s land” (Murphy’s tory of Russo-Chechen conflict. However, read- While Heavy Metal isn’t a definitive work, it is words) from the Caspian to the Black Sea. This ers who desire to learn more about the war a relevant and timely text, written in the tradi- situation concerned the Russian government should use The Wolves of Islam as a primer tion of Platoon Leader. For the armor commu- enough to move large numbers of military and for the major events, but seek readings that pro- nity, especially company grade officers seek- state security troops to put down the invasion. vide a balanced approach, with sources, to the ing to understand leadership lessons not taught After a few months of intense fighting, the Rus- deeper causes of the conflict and the decisions in the classroom, this book is both compelling sian government sustained enough victories of both sides. and insightful. on the battlefield to force Chechen fighters to JAYSON A. ALTIERI GEOFFREY HEIPLE adopt terrorist tactics targeting Russian schools, LTC, U.S. Army CPT, U.S. ARMY hospitals, and public gathering places in neigh- boring states and in Moscow. The conflict continues to this day, with news stories of bomb- Heavy Metal: A Tank Company’s Battle The New American Militarism: How ings and attacks on civilian centers still ema- to Baghdad by Captain Jason Conroy Americans Are Seduced by War by An- nating from Russia. with Ron Martz, Potomac Books, Inc., drew J. Bacevich, Oxford University Press, New York, 2005, 270 pp., $28 (hardcover) Although Murphy provides a good historical Dulles, VA, 2005, 288 pp., $26.95 (hard- summary of the conflict and is sensational in his cover) Many learned academicians and pundits will description of the well-known attacks on Mos- review this new book by Professor A.J. Bace- cow’s Dubrovka House of Culture Theater in Heavy Metal follows the story of C Company, vich. Bacevich, a former soldier and officer, has October 2002 and massacre of school children Task Force 1st Battalion, 64th Armor Regiment, written an important book. I write from the per- at the Beslan School in 2004, he fails to pro- 3d Infantry Division, from its arrival in Kuwait spective of a soldier and an officer of 28 years vide a balanced view of the war. He glosses to its fight through Operation Iraqi Freedom as of service and will explore what fellow profes- over the state-sponsored assassinations and told by its company commander, Captain Ja- sional officers can learn from reading this book. attacks by Russian soldiers in the same con- son Conroy. Conroy, “Cobra 6,” vividly recalls The New American Militarism is a book that flict. His use of the terms “wolves” to describe the series of events, with assistance from Ron should be studied as our Republic enters the all Chechens — soldiers, politicians, terrorists, Martz, an embedded journalist from the Atlan- 21st century. I agree with the purpose of his diplomats, businessmen, women, and children ta Journal-Constitution. Eyewitness accounts book. Bacevich cites President Madison, who — is a dangerous form of cultural elitism that from his soldiers, contributions from his superi- wrote that the most dreaded enemy of public has implications here in the United States re- ors, and background information behind the liberty is war, “No nation could preserve its

July-August 2007 — 51 freedom in the midst of continual warfare.” Bace- he explores the military experience of the Amer- Bacevich concludes his book with 10 princi- vich’s purpose in writing is to invite Americans ican soldier from the Vietnam era to the pres- ples that he asserts would cause the militaris- to consider the continued relevance of Madi- ent. The most powerful statement in the pas- tic tendencies within our society to abate. These son’s warning to our time and circumstances. sages on the efforts of soldiers in the period “principles” are interesting and I offer many tru- comes in the opening pages. Bacevich writes, ly are worthy of debate. Lately, Ms. Susan Ven- I agree with both Madison’s warning and Bace- “Thus, as we shall see, military professionals nochi, an editorial writer for the Boston Globe, vich’s purpose, but I do not think his conclusion, did regain something approximating the stand- penned an essay on why her son should not that our society is seduced by war, is at all cor- ing that they had enjoyed in American society serve in the Army, though she would applaud rect. I do believe some of the insights he offers prior to Vietnam. But their efforts to reassert other citizens’ sons and daughters who might on contemporary history are valid and should the autonomy of that profession backfired and serve. “Anyone but my son,” she said. Bacev- inform various debates that are ongoing in both left the military in the present century bereft of ich calls for a revival of “the moribund concept the fields of political science and history, and meaningful influence on basic questions relat- of the citizen-soldier.” He says that the day of more importantly, in the here and now of poli- ing to the uses of U.S. military power.” I abso- the all-volunteer force is over and the Army cymaking. The book also points out valid warn- lutely agree with this statement. must ensure it has deep roots among the peo- ings for officers serving the Republic. ple. The Army must also be an army of the peo- Many people, including soldiers, will point to Historians can set the stage for policy by ple and thus mirror society. He writes that gov- opinion polls that place the military as one of ernment ought to be “creating mechanisms that showing previously unforeseen second- and the most respected professions in our Repub- third-order effects of past policy decisions due will reawaken in privileged America a willing- lic. While that may be true, it is also ephemer- ness to serve.” I cannot disagree with that. to the advantage of historical perspective. Pol- al. What is enduring is the role serving officers icymakers must have a sense of history to en- play as respected players in the formulation of gage in the continuous analysis and refine- These principles do deserve more than de- policy. Bacevich asserts that beginning with bate in the halls of academe and at conferenc- ment of a policy once a decision is made. Pol- Creighton Abrams linking the regular Army with icy is often made in the heat of the moment be- es of political scientists out of government. I the Reserves, senior officers attempted to di- offer these ideas really should be widely dis- cause no one wants to make tough, and likely rectly influence policy by limiting the ability of unpopular, decisions when there is no urgen- cussed. Army officers, indeed all officers, have the president as commander-in-chief to make the obligation to be engaged in the internal de- cy. Bacevich is trying to be both historian and use of the Army. Bacevich takes General Pow- policy commentator. bates, and must have informed positions. When ell to task as the real reason why we are at war we serve in the Pentagon, on the National Se- Bacevich opens the book by making four per- in Iraq now, because Powell prevailed on Pres- curity Council, in legislative liaison, and other sonal observations; he is a Vietnam veteran, a ident Bush to halt Operation Desert Storm be- positions, we must serve the Republic by ex- retired professional soldier, a latecomer to pol- fore the Iraqi army was completely defeated, plaining the ramifications of decisions, knowing itics, and has changed his personal under- thus eliminating the possibility of Saddam’s the history of past decisions, explaining what standing of history moving from the theory of overthrow in 1991. Bacevich also cites the well- risk really is, and more. Officers must under- “great men,” to seeing history as a force. These documented argument between then Secre- stand the when and how of government deci- observations, but especially his personal ap- tary of State Albright and Chairman of the Joint sionmaking, not to usurp the process, but to be preciation of politics and his experience in see- Chiefs of Staff Powell over the use of force in better engaged. The Republic needs to under- ing the feet of clay of the “great” men of Amer- the Balkans. All of these instances Bacevich stand just what kind of war we are in and de- ican politics, focus the development of his the- cites as military attempts at frustrating the chief termine what kind of measures we will take to sis that American society has been “militarized,” executive and his use of military power to pur- defend the Republic. in that the American body politic has grown ac- sue policy objectives. customed to a resort to arms as the final arbi- I return to point of exploration and just what a Bacevich’s “knock out” punch is his assertion professional officer can learn from reading this ter of policy problems. This tendency is not the that it was then General Wesley Clark’s poor result of any one administration, rather a trend book. Do I agree with Bacevich that our soci- handling of the Kosovo crisis during the Clin- ety has become militarized; in that, it is numb in American policy since the time of Woodrow ton administration that led the incoming Bush Wilson. Indeed Bacevich opines both Demo- to the use of force? No, I disagree. Do I agree administration policymakers to realize that se- with Bacevich that there is the appearance of crat and Republican administrations are neo- nior military officers were not very good at han- Wilsonian in their world views and approach- a divorce from the concept of all Americans dling military force and could not be trusted in serving the Nation in uniform as a responsibil- es to the Unites States’ dealings with other na- policy formulation. tions. Vietnam, as a national experience, was ity of citizenship and that supporting the troops a catalyst for our militarization. I agree with Bacevich that at some time in the is more than putting a yellow magnetized rib- aftermath of the Vietnam War, Army senior lead- bon on the car? Yes, wholeheartedly. Profes- Bacevich goes on to demonstrate, not very ers decided to focus on matters tactical and sional officers serving the Republic in the 21st strongly in my opinion, how the efforts of four operational, and left the world of strategy and century must have a grasp of strategy and the disparate groups: soldiers, intellectuals (right policy to the civilians. The notion of never again development of policy. We must know the ori- and left), strategists wrestling with the impli- allowing the Army to be committed to battle gin of ideas and concepts, if we are to serve cations of nuclear weapons, and conservative without the full support of the people is a noble both our soldiers and our Republic. We cannot Christians, conditioned the American body pol- concept. We are the Army of the Republic. Rest- merely state that the consequences of bad itic to military strength as the measure of great- ing on that concept and actively pursuing ex- policy is body bags, that is too pat. Before the ness and the use of force as a first resort to cellence in only the operational and tactical lev- decisions are taken, before subordinate staffs “solving” policy problems. Bacevich states, “The els of war put us on the path of ever-limited in- have to answer amazing questions, such as clamor after Vietnam to rebuild the American fluence in developing policy. I am not advocat- “We have a brigade on the ground, why can’t we arsenal and to restore American confidence, ing that the Army’s role is developing all secu- go NOW?” we must articulate what security pol- the celebration of soldierly values, the search rity policy; however, Bacevich does point out icy and preemption really means. Our chief has for ways to make force more usable: all of these that as officers serving the Republic, we are ob- written that courage is a requirement at the tac- came about because groups of Americans ligated to understand how policy is made, where tical level and it is also an absolute requirement thought that they glimpsed in the realm of mili- the decisions are taken, and the implications at the operational and strategic levels. tary affairs the solution to vexing problems.” of these decisions. I would offer a turn about of These “vexing problems” face the four groups Clemenceau’s statement that if war is too im- I end with the rejoinder to read Bacevich’s Bacevich outlines in the body of the book. There portant to be left to generals in the 21st centu- book, read other books, and enter the debate. are many instances in the passages ostensi- ry, policy is too important for generals and gen- We know the Army is at war. We must partici- bly supporting his premise where he cites opin- eral staff officers to ignore. Wars are won and pate in articulating the path to victory and the ion as evidence. I really had a difficult time es- the Republic is defended at the strategic and defense of the Republic. tablishing the difference between his opinions operational levels. If we ignore our duty to par- and the actual facts that support his assertions. ticipate in developing policy and strategy, we KEVIN C.M. BENSON The best written portion of the book is where will squander tactical success. COL, U.S. Army

52 — July-August 2007 The Modern Army Combatives Program

In 1995, identified weaknesses in the martial arts training a proven success and now includes a tournament that show- program of the time led to the formation of a committee of cases the combative skills of Fort Knox soldiers. These tour- U.S. Army Rangers chartered to build a more effective pro- naments encourage soldiers to train, provide an opportunity gram. By examining successful martial arts programs around for them to be recognized by their chains of command, and the world, the committee discovered that Russia’s success- allow commanders to view their unit’s ability in close quar- ful system of Som bo was developed specifically for the mili- ters combat. tary and combined the techniques of judo and Greco-Roman The Fort Knox combatives tournament, held prior to the 2007 wrestling. The success of Sombo was linked in its similarity Armor Warfighting Conference on 28 and 29 April 2007, used to wrestling, making its basic components easier to learn and a graduated set of rules that began with basic ground grap- less dependent on size and strength. It also had a competi- pling in the preliminary rounds, consisting of one 6-minute tive component designed to spur further training. round. The semi-finals rounds used intermediate rules that al- Realizing that Sombo instructors would be difficult to find, lowed competitors to use grappling, closed-fist strikes to the the committee began looking for a similar system as a base body, and opened-hand strikes to the face, and consisted for their program. Finally, af- of one 10-minute round. The ter looking at various systems, finals used advanced rules the Rangers sent several men where fighters use mixed mar- to train at the Gracie Jiu-Jitsu tial arts techniques. The final- Academy in Torrance, Califor- round fights consisted of three nia. 5-minute rounds graded by a panel of three judges using a Brazilian Jiu-Jitsu, as taught 10-point must system. at the Gracie Academy, fit almost every aspect of the mili- The next Fort Knox combat- tary’s needs. It was easy to ives tournament is tentative- learn, had a competitive form, ly scheduled for 15-17 Novem- and was proven effective in ber 2007. The event is open hand-to-hand combat. It did, to any unit that would like to however, have some problems; compete. The All-Army Tour- one aspect of Jiu-Jitsu was nament is scheduled for 12- principally designed for one- 14 October 2007 at Fort Ben- on-one arena fighting, and the ning, Georgia. The All-Army other, sportive Jiu-Jitsu, was not oriented toward fighting. Tournament is similar to Fort Knox’s combatives tournament; however, Fort Knox’s finals are fought in a cage and With actual combat experience as their guide, the Rangers Fort Benning’s finals are fought in a traditional boxing ring. designed a system using Brazilian Jiu-Jitsu as a technical The Fort Knox tournament provides soldiers an additional base and customized it to the needs of the Army. A system- venue to showcase their abilities and provides fighters who atic approach to training emerged, which detailed the tech- cannot compete at Fort Benning an opportunity to compete. niques that would be taught, and in what order. Rangers would start with the basics of Brazilian Jiu-Jitsu ground fighting, The Modern Army Combatives Program awakens the inner and progress into the throws and takedowns of Judo and warrior in soldiers. Warrior ethos is key to inspiring soldiers wrestling, and the strikes of boxing and Muay Thai. These to fight and provides them direction using battle focus, which martial arts elements, combined with weapons training, re- is what makes the Modern Army Combatives Program a suc- sulted in a totally integrated system of close quarters com- cessful program. For more information on how to become bat, which enabled Rangers to transition smoothly between ARMOR STRONG through the Modern Army Combatives ranges of combat, with or without weapons, individually or as Program, visit the Combatives School website at https://www. a group. benning.army.mil/combatives. As Rangers who were trained in this new system spread throughout the Army, the system spread with them. Colonel Michael Ferriter, who had learned of the system while com- What’s your story? How do you maintain your fitness? Bet- manding the 3d Ranger Battalion, integrated this program into ter yet, how do you maintain your unit’s fitness while deployed the programs of instruction at Officer Candidate School, the in a combat zone? ARMOR is pleased to present its newest Infantry Officer Basic Course, and the Infantry Captains Ca- section, ARMOR STRONG. Send us your stories and photos reer Course, thus laying the foundation for the Army’s train- (please keep them in good taste and 300 dpi or better qual- the-trainer program. ity). If you have a physical fitness story to tell, we will be glad to print it. With your help, today’s tankers and cavalrymen, and With strong support from the Armor Center’s leadership those who follow, will remain ARMOR STRONG! team, the Fort Knox-based combatives program has become

July-August 2007 — 53 PB 17-07-4 PIN: 084082-000

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