The Building of a Women's Movement in the Islamic Republic of Iran

Introduction Against All Odds: The Building of a Women’s Movement in the Islamic Republic of Iran By Homa Hoodfar Introduction Few would disagree that the question of women and gender has become amongst the most frequently discussed and highly charged and politicized in post-revolutionary Iran. Such debate in itself is viewed as a challenge to the Islamic Republic since it has made its own gender vision a central part of its identity as an Islamic regime. In its view, God has ordained women to be wives and mothers and to dwell primarily in the private sphere; and they are to be part of their father’s and husband’s fiefdom with very limited rights. An ideal Islamic society for many of the regime’s ideologues is a completely segregated society where women and men will not intermingle outside their immediate family. building block for those promoting gender equality The Context and social justice for women in Iran. Immediately after the overthrow of the Reza Shah Iranian women of various ideological tenden- Pahlavi by a popular movement in 1979, the new cies have challenged the state’s vision and its legal Islamic regime introduced a series of discrimina- manifestations. Women activists have made a care- tory laws, annulling the meagre rights that women ful analysis of the political context and have set an had secured in the previous seventy-five years. agenda based on their diagnosis of the rights and This was done despite the massive participation of the wrongs of women. Accordingly they adopted women in the revolution bringing about the newly a multi-pronged strategy that has created one of established regime. Although there was some pro- the most dynamic women’s movements in the re- test on the part of middle class women, mostly in gion (Hoodfar 1998, Najabadi 1998, Mir-Hossinie Tehran, the unbelievably discriminatory laws were 2001). They have given new meaning to the lexi- passed with ease. Among other things, the value con of social movements in the MENA region.2 It is of women’s lives legally became half that of men; a movement that is organizationally ephemeral and two women witnesses became equal to one man; in a constant state of flux -- and thus hard to sup- women were banned from becoming judges; and press. It is decentralized and its advocates view a notoriously misogynistic orthodox Muslim family it as a movement with a thousand-and-one think- law was introduced (Paidar 1995, Hoodfar 1998). ing heads, with many thousands ready to replace All this indicated that while women had acted as those who have been arrested or who needed political agents, the regime’s leaders were not pol- to take a break or had grown disillusioned. This iticized regarding the specific concerns of women.1 movement is not only multi–generational but also This realization became the starting point and a cuts across class and ethnicity. 1. Hundreds of thousands of women remained in the street after the success of the revolution and participated in various demonstrations to support the regime, particularly in its confrontation with the American government. Thus it would have been hard for the regime to introduce such laws if it had meant a change of heart and aliena- tion on the part of women. However, most women did not understand the implications of these laws, at least for themselves. 2. For a comprehensive discussion of the new social movement in the MENA region see Wickham (2002). 1 The context The irony is that the regime desperately claims Historical Development of the there is no women’s movement but only a few who have been bought or charmed by the western Iranian Women’s Movement, powers and, as such, pose a danger to the secur- 1900-1978 ity of the state. With this logic, the authorities jus- tify the arrest and harassment of the more visible Despite an ideology of gender segregation that women leaders. Similarly, many of the opposition views women’s role as lying almost entirely within leaders, while competing for women’s votes, find the family and private sphere, addressing Iranian it hard to overcome their patriarchal tendency to women’s rights and roles has been part of the devalue women’s achievements, not unlike what modernist project since the 19th century. Iranians men have done regarding women’s domestic con- also participated in the early modern urban polit- tributions for centuries. They, too, insist that there ical protests against the British monopoly on to- is no women’s movement in Iran.3 They claim that, bacco in 1887, and the constitutional movement politically, women have not yet “come of age “in that sought to end to the despotic rule of kings in terms of forming their own movement. Thus, by Iran and build a representative democracy (Keddie implication, they should support these opposition 1966, Afary 1996). However, following the consti- parties. Conventional scholars argue that a move- tutionalist triumph in 1906, the coalition of religious ment needs an organization, leaders, and a mem- leaders and modernists refused to give women the bership (Bayat 2007, Moghadam 2002, 2003). right to vote, arguing that this was against Islam. It Since in the context of Iran that is not possible, was at this stage that women tried to organize as they then claim there cannot be a women’s move- a constituency to struggle for their rights, focusing ment. Rather at best they would say that there is on education for women as a primary tool in the a woman’s “non-movement”, the very terminology fight against discrimination. of which belittles and, even if unintentionally, dies- empowers the movement (Bayat 2007). The establishment of the modernist Pahlavi dynasty (1924-1979) brought an expansion of In this paper we outline how women advo- education and promoted women’s labour mar- cates, through two decades of decentralized, in- ket participation (Amin 2005, Paidar 1995). How- formal and semi formal activities, and by reclaim- ever, despite introducing a range of modern legal ing traditional women’s social institutions, have reforms in many spheres, based on European worked toward mobilizing women and building models, the new regime codified the conservative a robust women’s movement. We examine the Muslim marriage laws giving men total authority evolving and diverse, multi-pronged strategies that over their wives and daughters, unilateral right to focus on politicizing the everyday forms of social divorce, and custody of children at divorce after a and legal discrimination against women -- and minimum age (2 for boys and 5 for girls). Men were render them unacceptable. While the 1979 revolu- allowed to marry up to four permanent wives with- tion enhanced women’s consciousness as political out the consent of their previous wives, and the actors, advocates of women’s rights guided them mobility of married women became subject to their into becoming gender conscious and rights-bear- husband’s permission. The only major change was ing persons who are united in their demands for the introduction of a minimum age of marriage and legal change and gender justice -- if not in their prohibition of the practice of temporary marriages.4 ideological perspectives. In a controversial move the new regime also out- 3. This discussion become so central to the public sphere discourse that Zanan, the most popular feminist maga- zine in Iran, ran a series of interviews with outspoken male opposition leaders and scholars in general to examine the question, “Is there a women’s movement in Iran” [see Zanan number 89, XX]. The male political leaders tended to give a negative answer while feminist scholars, who had been well versed in the theoretical debates on women’s movements, viewed the women movement as a social movement, unconventional and very vibrant. 4. In Shia Islam men are allowed to marry up to 4 permanent wives as well as to enter into unlimited “temporary” (pleasure) marriages which can last as little as one hour or as long as 99 years (Haery 1987). 2 The context lawed the veil, a traditional head cover - often head tion of black-veiled women in the daily demonstra- to toe - for women (Hoodfar 1997). tions. For many women of the non-veiled middle classes, the adoption of the veil was a temporary Given the despotic nature of the regime, it was action that symbolized their rejection of the shah’s not possible to build and promote an independent regime and all it stood for (Yeganeh 1982, Bet- women’s movement, even though none of women’s teridge 1983). Veiled women protesting became demands contradicted the overall goals of the state. icons of the revolution; the veil itself a symbol of The few active women’s organizations were co- the people’s movement, yet there was little real opted by the regime and ultimately reconfigured in engagement with women’s demands, per se, as 1966 as the Iranian Women’s Organization, head- participants assumed that a real democracy would ed by the sister of the Shah. Nonetheless, reform prevail and women, along with all other constitu- of Family Law and the enfranchisement of women encies, would ultimately benefit. However, despite remained the major foci of all those interested in their role in the success of the revolution, Iranian women’s rights. It was not until 1963, against the women were among the biggest losers with the strong opposition of religious leaders, that national advent of the new, theocratic Islamic Republic’s electoral rights were extended to women. In 1967 regressive gender ideology. the first Family Law reform, known as the Family Protection Law, brought minimal changes whereby Within two weeks of coming to power, the su- divorce and custody cases had to be decided by preme leader of the revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini, a family court and polygamous marriages required annulled the Family Protection Law.

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