Shareholder Activism at the Dutch East India Company 1622 – 1625 Redde Rationem Villicationis Tuae! Give an Account of Your Stewardship! Paper presented at the Conference on the Origins & History of Shareholder Advocacy, Yale School of Management, Millstein Center for Corporate Governance and Performance November 6 and 7, 2009. Preliminary draft. Please do not cite or quote without permission of the author. This version: 10 January, 2010. J. Matthijs de Jongh1 Keywords: Shareholder activism, legal history, VOC, East India Company, agency theory, societas, universitas, corporation JEL Classifications: B15, D23, K22, O10, O52 1 Research Department of the Supreme Court of The Netherlands (
[email protected]). This paper is a revision of a more concise article on the same subject (De Jongh 2009). I would like to thank the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences, as well as the Yale School of Management (Millstein Center for Corporate Governance and Performance) for their financial support. I also thank Daan Asser, Paul Frentrop, Oscar Gelderblom, Niels Huurdeman, Jan Lokin, Abe de Jong, Joost Jonker, Ralf Mehr, Ailsa Röell, Alexander Schild and Vino Timmerman for their helpful comments. The usual caveat applies. Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1496871 Abstract This paper explores the reason for the absence of control rights of shareholders in the Dutch East India Company (VOC) and the background of the conflict between shareholders and directors that arose in 1622/1623 when the VOC Charter of 1602 was extended. The VOC was the result of a merger between several companies that had been trading in the East Indies between 1594 and 1602.