The 2002 7-1 Erica Phillips

CASE STUDY #7-1 OF THE PROGRAM: "FOOD POLICY FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN THE GLOBAL FOOD SYSTEM" 2007

Ed ited by: Per Pinstrup-Andersen ([email protected]) and Fuzhi Cheng Cornell University

In collaboration with: Soren E. Frandsen, FOI, University of Copenhagen Arie Kuyvenhoven, Wageningen University Joachim von Braun, International Food Policy Research Institute Executive Summary

Famine has been described as "a catastrophic dis­ famine while meeting longer-term development ruption of the social, economic, and institutional needs—an effort that is necessary to prevent systems that provide for food production, distribu­ future and decrease poverty. It also tion, and consumption" [von Braun et al. 1998], explores how food availability and access can be Famines have occurred in every part of the world assured for remote regions and the poorest citizens throughout history, and the 21st century is no ex­ and considers whether government interventions ception. Millions of people, mainly in Africa, still or free markets offer the best approach to achiev­ suffer food shortages and occasionally face famine. ing short- and long-term national food sovereignty Famine can occur not only when insufficient food and household . is available, but also when people do not have ade­ quate "entitlements" to access food [Sen 1981). Your assignment is to assess the effectiveness of the actions taken by the government of Malawi in From its independence in 1964 through the 1980s, 2 0 0 2 , identify policy failures and successes, and Malawi was a self-sufficient producer of maize in suggest actions and policy measures that should be nondrought years [Oygard et al. 2003). Since 2001, put in place by the government, food aid donors, however, Malawi has depended on commercial im­ and the private sector to effectively prevent future ports and food aid to meet its national needs. famines while striving for long-term national food Although the 1991/1992 harvest was half the size of sovereignty and household food security.1 the 2000/2001 maize harvest, no food crisis oc­ curred in 1992. To understand what caused changes Background in national food sovereignty and household food security between 1991 and 2001 and the events of the 2 0 0 2 famine in Malawi, this case study reviews Between 2001 and 2 0 0 6 , six countries in Southern the decisions, events, and policies before, during, Africa— Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, and after the 2 0 0 2 famine from four angles: availa­ , and Zimbabwe— each contended with food bility of food, access to food, underlying poverty, shortages. In 2002 food shortage led to famine in and political and institutional issues. Malawi, its worst disaster since the Nyasaland famine of 1949 [Devereux 2002). Malawi was the The availability of food was affected by flooding, only country out of the six to report deaths transportation bottlenecks, the sale of the govern­ caused by hunger. ment's reserve grains in 2001, and poor crop esti­ mates. Access to food was restricted for some Malawi is a landlocked country of about 12 million because grain did not reach the most rural areas, people in Southern Africa. It borders Zambia, and prices soared, making white maize, the staple Tanzania, and Mozambique and is almost the size of food, too expensive for many to buy. Underlying Pennsylvania [CIA 2006). The population grows at poverty was also a factor: 65 percent of Malawians 2 percent annually, average life expectancy is 41 live below the poverty line, HIV/AIDS levels are years and declining, and the infant mortality rate is climbing, and purchasing power dropped in the 103 deaths per 1,000 live births. The literacy rate is 1990s, making many people more vulnerable to 62.7 percent, and 65 percent of Malawians live production shocks and overcoming their coping below the poverty line [Oygard et al. 2003). strategies. Finally, political and institutional issues, HIV/AIDS, with a prevalence of 14.2 percent such as liberalization of the grain parastatal, the among the adult population, is the cause of absence of safety nets, and strained relations between the government of Malawi and donors, 'National food sovereignty exists when a country has the contributed to the famine. means to acquire enough food, whether from national production or imports, to achieve household food This case study evaluates the best strategies to pur­ security. Household food security "exists when all people sue national food sovereignty and household food o f a household, at all times, have access to sufficient, safe security and analyzes policies that can prevent and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life" [FAO 2007). declining life expectancy. Per capita gross domestic Events of the Famine product [GDP] is U S$600, and overall GDP is In his 1981 essay "Poverty and Famines: An Essay on US$7,692 billion. Although real per capita GDP Entitlement and Deprivation," Nobel prize-winning rose throughout the 1990s, the level of poverty economist Amartya Sen redefined famine as a lack increased [Oygard et al. 2003], of "entitlements," not necessarily a lack of food. In his entitlement theory, Sen explains that a person Malawi is generally divided into three regions'— can starve not only when he or she cannot produce northern, central, and southern. The northern enough food, but also when he or she does not region consists of highlands and is less populated have the means to exchange labor, money, or other than the southern region, which contains the coun­ goods for food, or when he or she faces a combi­ try's highest population density [Malawi National nation of these circumstances [Sen 1981], With this Vulnerability Assessment Committee 2005]. The theory in mind, this case study considers the 2 0 0 2 central region, which contains the capital, Lilongwe, Malawi famine from four angles— availability of has a mix of rural and urban residents and contains food, access to food, underlying poverty, and most of the country's poor [Sahley et al. 2005]. political and institutional issues. The flooding and the famine deaths both occurred in the south and central regions. Availability of Food Agriculture is the foundation of employment and Malawi experienced good harvests in 1998/1999 and the economy. More than one-third of GDP comes 1999/2000, but the 2000/2001 maize harvest was from agriculture, and an additional one-fifth of 8 percent below the 10-year average [Figure l].2 The GDP is related to distribution and retailing of agri­ four main factors that led to reduced food availa­ cultural products. Eighty-five percent of the popu­ bility for some Malawian populations in 2 0 0 2 were lation lives in rural areas, and 75 percent of the poor maize production in 2000/2001, transport population relies on agriculture for their livelihoods bottlenecks for imported food, poor estimates of [Oygard et al. 2003], Landholding is split between alternative food levels, and reduced maize levels in smallholders, who typically own 0.23 hectare, and the Strategic Grain Reserve [SGR], large estate owners who grow tea, cotton, sugar, and burley tobacco for export. Agricultural Poor Maize Production. From independence in 1964 exports account for 90 percent of foreign through the 1980s, Malawi was a self-sufficient exchange earnings [Oygard et al. 2003], producer of maize in nondrought years [Oygard et al. 2003], In the 1990s, however, maize yields fell Although the majority of citizens grow and con­ owing to declining soil fertility. Maize is grown on sume white maize almost exclusively, most rural the same fields year after year with minimal organic Malawian households are net purchasers of maize or inorganic fertilizer, which causes soils to be [Sahley et al. 2005], About one-third of the popu­ stripped of their nutrients and, eventually, lation is perpetually unable to produce enough degraded. In February 2001 13 out of Malawi's 27 food to feed their families for a year and must seek districts experienced serious flooding, which was other sources of income to purchase food. Seventy also a factor in the decrease in production [Oygard percent of the average Malawian's diet consists of et al. 2003], white maize [FAO 2006]. Farmers produce one rainfed crop of maize a year. Planting takes place in Another factor leading to poor maize production November/December, and crops are harvested the was the fact that farmers reduced the amount of following April/May. The months before the har­ inputs they used because of lack of access to vest are called the "lean season" because this is credit, liberalization of the input market, and when households run out of the previous year's reduction of government subsidies on fertilizers grain and need to purchase grain on the market. and seeds. A program called the Starter Pack Pro­ This season is also when maize prices typically peak gram [later called the Targeted Inputs Program or because the previous year's stocks are running low and less maize is being sold on the market. 2 Agricultural years are typically written as "1998/1999," because the planting season begins in the third quarter o f the first year, but the crop is not harvested until the second quarter of the following year. Figure 1: Malawi Maize Production> 1 9 9 5 -2 0 0 5

3000000

2500000

g 2000000 o o 1500000

Je 1000000

500000

0 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Year

Source: FA O 2006.

TIP] was initiated in 1998/1999, with distribution to South African-Zimbabwe border disturbed train 2.8 million households. "Starter packs" were allo­ traffic for several weeks. Secondary and tertiary cated at no charge to farmers and contained roads in Malawi were also damaged by floods and enough chemical fertilizer and maize and pulse seed slowed the distribution of food to rural areas to cultivate 0.1 hectare [Rubey 2003], The program [Devereux 2002]. aimed to provide farmers with free inputs to ease the effects of reduced fertilizer subsidies, combat Poor Estimates o f Crain Production. Reliable statis­ soil degradation, increase yields, diversify planting tics on national agricultural production are neces­ with improved varieties, and lead to overall food sary so that the government, donors, and the pri­ security [Oygard et al. 2003], Owing to donor vate sector can make sound decisions about im­ concerns about the sustainability of the program, it porting, buying, and selling grain. The Malawi was downsized, and by 2001 only 1 million house­ Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation [MAI] and holds received these packs. the Famine Early Warning System Network [FEWS NET] funded by the U.S. Agency for International Low yields contributed to grain shortages as well. Development [USAID] both release figures on pro­ The area planted in maize in Malawi is between 1.3 duction of grains and roots. After the flood in and 1.5 million hectares. Yields are about 1,000 February 2001, FEWS NET and the MAI revised kilograms [kg] per hectare, meaning that between their maize crop estimates, showing a decrease in 1.3 and 1.5 million metric tons are produced each yields from the year before. In July 2001 FEWS year. This production falls short of the estimated NET predicted that Malawi would have a food sur­ 1.7 million metric tons needed for national con­ plus owing to high cassava and sweet potato pro­ sumption and results in chronic deficits [Devereux duction, which would compensate for the loss of 2002], maize due to the floods [Oygard et al. 2003], This prediction proved to be inaccurate and caused a Transportation Bottlenecks. Because Malawi is a critical delay in the government's and donors' reac­ landlocked country, all food imports must be tion to the crisis [Devereux 2003]. brought in by truck or train, and this situation delayed the arrival of maize imports in 2 0 02. The Reduced National Reserves. The National Food railway line between Mozambique and Malawi was Reserve Agency [NFRA] is responsible for stocking damaged by floods, and a train derailment on the grain and protecting Malawians against fluctuations in food production, availability, and prices [Sahley unemployment. Even though most rural Malawian et al. 2005). Since 1999 the NFRA has been an households are maize producers, they are net pur­ independent trust that runs the SGR on a cost- chasers of maize, because the amount they grow recovery basis. For three years before 2001, official does not meet their household's needs [Sahley et al. maize stocks were high, but the NFRA accrued 2005). In most years maize prices are lowest after millions of dollars in loans to buy and store this the harvest in June/July and rise about 5 0 -1 0 0 maize and was losing money by holding these percent through December. In December-February stocks. Storage of grain is costly, and losses from prices can spike even higher. Between May 2001 spoilage are high. The International Monetary Fund and January 2 0 0 2 , maize prices rose by 4 5 0 per­ [IMF] recommended that the NFRA sell about cent [Oygard et al. 2003). When people could 6 0 % of the grain from the SGR to repay some of afford to, they bought maize in a panic, driving up its loans and hold a smaller reserve so that the prices even more. Poor Malawians who could not large stockpile did not distort market prices afford to buy maize when their own supplies ran [Devereux, 2002). In addition, the IMF recom­ out were forced to sell assets, including livestock, mended that instead of dumping this excess grain to buy food. Table 1 shows the falling relative value on local markets and altering local prices, the of livestock between February 2001 and February NFRA sell its grain internationally. The NFRA fol­ 2 0 0 2 , which was one of the most critical months lowed this advice only partially. Instead of selling of the famine. half of the reserves, it sold almost all of them, on both domestic and international markets. In ADMARC. The Agricultural Development Market­ July/August 2000, the SGR held 175,000 metric ing Corporation [ADMARC), Malawi's agricultural tons, but by mid-2001 virtually all of its stocks had marketing parastatal, was established after World been sold [Sahley et al. 2005). War II and historically held a monopoly on selling inputs like fertilizer, seeds, and farm implements to Access to Food Malawians. In addition, ADMARC was the sole buyer and seller of maize. Prices were set jointly by According to Sen's entitlement theory, famine the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of occurs when people do not have access to food or Finance. In the 1970s and 1980s, ADMARC [and the means to buy it. The main problems behind the African parastatals in general) came under fire for inaccessibility of food in 2 0 0 2 were poor distribu­ being "corrupt, rent seeking and subsidizing indus­ tion, high food prices, and low purchasing power, try or cheap prices for urban consumers, while not which put maize out of reach for poorer paying farmers based on the actual production Malawians. costs" [Bates 1981, as cited in Sahley et al. 2 0 0 5 , 46). In 1987, based on pressure from the World Purchasing power for Malawians dropped in the Bank and IMF, the government of Malawi allowed 1990s, partly because of the devaluation of the private traders to sell maize, ending ADMARC's Malawi kwacha [MK), which increased domestic monopoly. prices of imports and led to higher prices for agri­ cultural outputs, higher food prices, and higher

Table 1: Livestock Prices, M chinji District, 2001-2002

Type of Livestock Price in February 2001 [MK] Price in February 2002 [MK] Chickens 90-150 25-70

Goats 500-1,000 150-500

Pigs 900-1,800 300-1,000

Cattle 6,000-15,000 1,500-4,000

Source: Kamowa 2002. ADMARC is still in a transition from having central the price it is eventually sold for in Malawian control over the maize market to operating within markets reflects the original cost of the product at a liberalized, free market system. In 2 0 0 2 port, plus the cost of transport into Malawi, mak­ ADMARC retained about a 10 percent market ing maize more expensive for Malawians than for share, but it has more influence in the grain market people in neighboring coastal countries. When owing to its historic role [Devereux 2002). In 2001 grain leaves Malawi, the price that export traders the government was forced to take on loans owed [only ADMARC in this case) pay sellers is lower by ADMARC and the NFRA, making up about than in coastal countries, because they must allow 2.75 percent of GDP [ 2003). for transport expenses to get it to port. "Import ADMARC decided not to buy maize from farmers parity prices in inland Southern Africa are double during the 2000/2001 season, because there had or more the local cost of delivery," according to been a bumper harvest in 1999/2000 and market Wiggins [2005,15). This price differential translates supplies had been high. In 2001, when the govern­ to lower prices paid to farmers for their produce ment realized that the initial reports of maize and and higher prices charged for imported produce, root production were inaccurate and that the SGR making food access an even greater obstacle. was low, ADMARC announced that it would inter­ vene and purchase maize from domestic and inter­ Underlying Poverty and Vulnerability national sources to resell it to those who needed to In 1991/1992 Malawi experienced a drought that buy maize. By the time ADMARC made this deci­ reduced maize production to 657,000 metric tons, sion, however, it had a difficult time locating maize less than half of the 1,589,440 metric tons pro­ for purchase, and it was forced to buy maize re­ duced in the 2000/2001 harvest [FAO 2006). Yet gionally at a higher price and ration the quantity there were no hunger-related deaths in 1992. What sold to citizens. It also faced transport problems changed between 1991/1992 and 2001/2002 to [Devereux 2002). make households less able to cope with production shocks and cause a famine in 2002? ADMARC also influences access to food by setting a standard market price for maize. In 2001/2002 Between 1996 and 2001, the poverty rate rose from ADMARC set a price of l7MK/kg for maize. This 60 to 65 percent [Bookstein and Lawson 2002). price was said to be too low to attract the private Some of the factors that contributed to the vulner­ sector to enter the market, leaving ADMARC to ability of the population were high HIV/AIDS act as the sole importer of maize. Additionally, rates, low education rates, declining agricultural government signals were unclear, and private productivity and soil fertility, limited off-farm traders were not sure when or if ADMARC was income-generating activities, low rural wages, going to import grain and sell it at a subsidized restricted access to agricultural inputs in the 1990s rate, cutting the private traders' potential profits. due to economic liberalization, maize production The coexistence of this public distribution channel levels that failed to keep pace with population alongside a free market created confusion between growth, and a decline in purchasing power. private grain traders and the government.

A large share of the population experienced a U rban Bias. Food access was most problematic for decrease in income. In the central region of Malawi, rural Malawians, because much of the imported more than 40 percent of farmers grow tobacco, maize remained in urban centers. Urban communi­ but in the northern and southern regions, less than ties have larger markets and higher purchasing 20 percent do [PMS 2 0 0 0 ). Smallholder revenues power than smaller rural communities. In addition, from tobacco, the primary export earner, dropped poor roads caused transportation problems, and nearly 50 percent from 2001 to 20 0 3 . This decline the low price of maize set by ADMARC dis­ was blamed on excess production growth over couraged traders from transporting it to remote demand growth and decreased quality of tobacco areas [Devereux 2002). due to new and marginal growers who entered the market (FAO 2003). Additionally, off-farm labor Because Malawi is a landlocked country, it contends opportunities decreased in urban areas, neighboring with large differences between export and import countries, and tobacco farms (Rubey 2003). One parity prices. When grain is imported into Malawi, Figure 2: Comparison o f Local M arket Maize Prices, February2001and February2002

Sources: 2001 data estimated from FEWS N ET 2002; 2 0 0 2 data from ReliefWeb 2003.

source of income that Malawians had relied on was region. Given that more than half of a household's remittances from mines in South Africa, Zambia, income is derived from food produced by the and Zimbabwe. Until the early 1990s, these remit­ household, land pressure can have serious implica­ tances provided mostly southern Malawians with tions for food security [Sahley et al. 2005]. money for household goods, agricultural inputs, and investments in livestock. The loss of these Political and Institutional Issues mining opportunities affected not only the families The final set of factors leading to the famine was who relied on remittances, but also the people political and institutional. The government of employed by these families, who, with this added Malawi was blamed for not ensuring entitlements income, could afford to pay hired ganyu, or paid to its citizens by being slow to react to the crisis agricultural labor, as well [Wiggins 2005]. Farmers and not having a contingency plan or an effective rely on g anyu to supplement their incomes for and timely safety net. purchasing household food, and it is critical for household food security. The average rate paid for In addition, donor-government relations were g anyu labor is MK 20/day.3 At the time of the strained at a critical time owing to corruption alle­ famine, food prices in some areas were as high as gations, which caused some donors to pull out of MK 4 0 /kg of maize [Devereux 2002]. the country and led to a delay in responding to the crisis. In November 2001 several major develop­ The HIV/AIDS rate is 14.2 percent for adults. The ment donors, including Denmark, the European epidemic exacerbates poverty, because AIDS- Union [EU], the , and the United affected households have fewer adults contributing States, all suspended aid operations. Donors claimed to productive activities and more time is allocated that they were unaware of the severity of the crisis to "nonhousehold" management activities. Increas­ until it was too late. They said they did not know ing numbers of sick family members, orphans, and about the sale of the SGR grain, they believed that foster children add more pressure to already ADMARC's commercial imports would cover the stretched resources of social networks [Oygard et gap in food needs, and they were unaware that the al. 2003], roots and tubers production estimates were inflated and inaccurate. Owing to mistrust of the govern­ Finally, availability of land has become a constraint, ment, donors insisted on trying to confirm reports especially in the more heavily populated southern of food shortages before acting [Devereux 2002]. Finally, it appeared contradictory to donors that they were asked for food aid in the same year that 3 In January 2002, M K 1 = US$0,016 or US$1 = M K 64.33. the SGR exported large amounts of grain. This situation supported donors' suspicions that there the government still relies on external funding was mismanagement and corruption in the from the World Bank, the IMF, and individual government, making it an unreliable partner. donor countries for many of its operations. Main­ taining relations with these donors is therefore Effects on Households necessary for essential programs related to food security. It was reported that between late 2001 and mid- 2 0 0 2 , as many as 3 ,0 0 0 people died from hunger Finally, Malawian civil society, including farmers [Devereux 2002). Toward the end of 2001, house­ and citizens, is a key stakeholder. It is the food holds resorted to eating low-quality foods, such a security [or insecurity) of these people that is criti­ maize husks, roots, and sawdust to survive cal for the functioning of the Malawian state. Since [Wiggins 2005). Rationing, which takes place in 9 0 percent of the population lives in rural areas, normal years during the lean season, went further farmers are scattered, and many live far from urban in 2 0 0 2 , as some families were forced to eat one centers, where decision makers reside. This disper­ meal every four days. Some families could not farm sion limits rural people's influence on policy mak­ because they were too weak or needed to look for ing. But given that more than one-third of Malawi's food elsewhere. School attendance dropped in GDP came from agriculture in 2005 [CIA 2006), affected areas. Deteriorating rates and farmers' needs cannot be ignored. heightened susceptibility to disease became a prob­ lem, and cholera caused thousands of deaths at the same time as the famine, because many people were Policy Issues and Options malnourished and weak. Mortality peaked in Febru- ary-March 2002 [Devereux 2002). The government of Malawi has said it is committed to ensuring food security [Sahley et al. 2005). With Stakeholders its restricted resources, however, the government is currently not capable of providing either national food sovereignty or household food security. The stakeholders in this case include the govern­ Therefore, adopting policies that ensure availability ment of Malawi, international nongovernmental of food and entitlements to access food is the gov­ organizations [NGOs), international donors, private ernment's most reasonable option. An appropriate grain traders, and the farmers and citizens of policy package should contain a balance of long- Malawi. The government is composed of numerous and short-term measures that help people through administrative offices and ministries, of which the and out of a crisis toward long-term development most influential in this case are ADMARC, the objectives. According to the International Food NFRA, and the Ministry of Agriculture and Irriga­ Policy Research Institute [IFPRI), longer-term plan­ tion [MAI). The MAI influences the production of ning can be achieved when relief, recovery, and grain, and ADMARC and the SGR manage that development projects are "combined and sequenced grain once produced. They also control and influ­ with each other in mutually reinforcing ways..." ence certain sectors of the agricultural input and [IFPRI 2 0 0 2 , 5). output markets. The overall goal of the govern­ ment of Malawi is to provide food security for its The following sections and Box 1 present multiple citizens, but it must figure out the best way to do policy issues and options that address the problems that, including how much, if any, government of food availability, food accessibility, underlying intervention is needed. Private grain traders are poverty, and institutional dilemmas. These policies eager to enter the grain market and are monitoring often have overlapping impacts— for example, poli­ the government to see where, how, and if they can cies aimed at improving food availability might also enter the grain trade as ADMARC pulls out. lead to poverty reduction. Conversely, the multiple effects of these policy decisions can cause unin­ International N GOs and donors had a large impact tended consequences for different social groups or on the Malawian government in the months leading other policy outcomes. This section analyzes policy up to and during the relief and recovery stages of options on a continuum of short- to longer-term the famine. Although the IMF's influence on the options. sale of the SGR grain proved to be controversial, Box 1: Policy Issues and Options by Category

Availability of Food 1 Liberalization of the market (A D M A R C versus the private sector) 2 Strategic Grain Reserve 3 Targeted Inputs Program 4 Regional maize trade 5 Crop diversification

Access to Food 1 Liberalization of the market (A D M A R C versus the private sector) 2 Price stability 3 Rural infrastructure 4 Trade; growing of cash crops for income

Underlying Poverty 1 Socioeconomic development (education, health projects, off-farm employment) 2 Access to credit 3 Trade; growing of cash crops for income 4 Long-term agricultural development 5 Safety nets Institutional Issues 1 Disaster planning and preparedness 2 Safety nets 3 Government transparency 4 Cooperation among stakeholders

Shorter-Term Food Security Strategies 2007,4 was distributed through a consortium of international and local NGOs. Other major donors Disaster Contingency Planning, Humanitarian Assis­ included the UK Department for International tance, and Safety Nets. A country must declare a Development (DFID), the EU, and USAID. Short­ state of emergency in order to obtain international term food aid helps avoid immediate hunger and humanitarian assistance. Malawi did not officially suffering, but long-term food aid can cause disin­ recognize the food shortage or declare a state of centives to farmers and markets. Many donors and emergency until late February 2 0 0 2 (Devereux development practitioners are concerned that a 2 0 0 2 ) . Until then, there was no disaster manage­ country and its food-insecure populations can ment plan at the state or regional level (Mano et al. become too dependent on food aid. In 2005, three 2003) . Soon after the president's declaration, the years after the 2002 famine, it was estimated that (WFP) launched an Emer­ the WFP was supplying food to II percent of gency Operation (EMOP) to feed 300,000 people Malawi's population (Sahley et al. 2005). (WFP 2007).

The WFP donated emergency food aid to Malawi 4In January 2007 the WFP continued non-emergency beginning in 2 0 0 2 and continued to operate relief activities targeting food distribution to persons with and recovery food aid programs through January HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis, mother and child health clinics, programs for orphans and other vulnerable children, food-for-work projects, and school-feeding activities. Since 2 0 0 2 Malawi has formed various task forces and possibly even make the SGR obsolete. Alterna­ and groups, including Vulnerability Assessment tives to storing grain are holding foreign currency Committees and the Joint Task Force [JTF] to reserves for buying grain, creating a strong system coordinate the humanitarian response for Malawi. of preparedness for food shortages, and using Another means of preparing for food shortage is futures markets (Mano et ai. 2003). creating more reliable information systems that compile local and regional crop estimates and Should the government of Malawi keep the grain market prices. Mali, for example, has invested in a reserve or get rid of it? Is it justifiable to use the strong agricultural market information system. SGR as a safety net? If retained, how can the SGR be made more efficient? Should it continue to be To mitigate potential food crises, the Malian gov­ subsidized? How could the government ensure ernment disseminates market information to part­ honest accounting mechanisms and a system of ners and private traders [Council on Foreign Rela­ checks and balances? tions 2005], Targeted inputs Program [TIP], TIP has been criti­ Even though the SGR, ADMARC, and TIP are cized as too costly, and its cost was the primary often considered safety nets, they proved unreliable reason it was scaled back in 2000/ 2001. TIP is in 2 0 02. Policies need to create effective safety nets funded mainly by external donors because the for food-insecure Malawians in the context of both public sector is facing other budget priorities, such rural and urban populations and limited govern­ as education and health. Some donors argue that ment resources. Programs such as local public free or subsidized input programs may have ham­ works and food-for-work programs that exchange pered the development of efficient input supply work for food or income to buy food are options. services because they interfere with incentives for The advantages of such programs are that they are private sector investment. Also, logistical, financial, relatively quick to establish, can be targeted to the and management delays in public programs caused poor, do not undermine development efforts, and the input packs to arrive late to farmers and incor­ do not distort market prices [Council on Foreign rect products to be distributed to certain regions, Relations 2005], which reduced the economic returns from these inputs [Oygard et al. 2003). The fact that funding Strategic Grain Reserve. The SGR is perceived as a for the TIP comes from donors raises questions of way to ensure food security in times of food stability and sustainability. shortages or when supply cannot be obtained though other reliable channels. Questions of The government has argued for maintaining TIP management, functioning, and financing, however, because it believes that increased yields are neces­ make the SGR an uncertain safety net during a sary for obtaining household food security. After food shortage. In the 2002 famine, there was not fertilizer subsidies were removed, fertilizer use enough grain left in the SGR to provide a safety declined, and so did yields. Because the input packs net to needy citizens. Additionally, grain storage is have the potential to increase yields by 100-150 kg expensive, and spoilage leads to large losses. Storing per hectare, they could increase household food grain for two to three years can double the real security (Oygard et al. 2003). Finally, proponents cost of stored grains (Wiggins 2005). argue that it is cheaper to distribute packs than to distribute food aid. Preserving large grain reserves can be a disincentive to private traders. Uncertainty about when grain Free-input programs can improve food security by will be sold or if it will be subsidized by the gov­ raising crop yields in the short term, but they can ernment has been shown to prevent private traders simultaneously inhibit long-term private market from storing grain (Oygard et ai. 2003). If private growth in the input sector. Should the govern­ traders were assured of their role in the market ment and donors continue to fund expensive input and had a better market information system, they programs? Do the benefits outweigh the costs? Is could be responsible for importing maize when TIP serving as a social safety net whose elimination needed. It is even argued that if there were no SGR would harm farmers? What kind of exit strategy or if the private sector were stronger, millers and for the input program is reasonable, and how can farmers would have more incentive to store grain farmers be provided with access to fertilizer and the parastatal exists and creates an uncertain envi­ improved seed varieties after the program? ronment for the traders.

Fertilizer Subsidies. In light of the high prices of ADMARC's policies not only affect private sector inputs, Malawi's declining soil fertility, and farmers' traders, but can also impact household production, weak purchasing capability, another option for purchasing, and consumption patterns. For exam­ making inputs more available to farmers is fertilizer ple, if the price of grain is set below the market subsidies. Such subsidies would benefit fertilizer equilibrium price, households might shift from suppliers and farmers who would otherwise not eating other staples like cassava to eating maize, or have access to fertilizers. “Fertilizer transfers are no they might be less motivated to plant or store longer viewed as an effective livelihood develop­ maize. If the price is too high, however, it would ment strategy. It has instead become a critical part exclude some consumers from the market. of the national safety net. The population is united in support of a fertilizer subsidy" [Sahley et al. Research has shown that countries in Southern 2 0 0 5 , 41). Africa with relatively open markets are better able to fill food gaps than countries where the govern­ Reducing fertilizer subsidies was part of a structural ment is directly involved or restricts private sector adjustment program, but it proved unpopular, so trade [Mano et al. 2003). The years after the 2002 the president at the time defied the conditions famine in Malawi support this theory. In 2 0 0 3 the imposed by the IMF and World Bank and main­ private sector imported as much as 200,000 MT tained fertilizer subsidies. Untargeted subsidy pro­ of maize, about 8 0 percent of the amount the gov­ grams like this one, however, are costly, have a less ernment imported that year [Mano et al. 2003). direct impact on poor households than targeted Thus, with the proper incentives [or lack of disin­ ones do, and limit private sector participation. centives), the private market can be quite active in Some experts have argued that in the long run, importing grain. investments in infrastructure and agricultural research to increase productivity have a stronger If the government fully liberalizes the market, it will effect on the cost of inputs than subsidies do. be difficult to guarantee that people in the most remote areas will have access to food, given that M arket Liberalization. Except for the government's incentives are low for the private sector to invest in intervention in maize [through ADMARC] and areas where transport costs are high, surpluses are fertilizer and seeds [through TIP), Malawi's agricul­ small, and purchasing ability is low. What role, if tural market has been liberalized. Because any, can ADMARC play in a fully or partially ADMARC is only partially privatized, however, liberalized market situation? What policies could "Malawi is suffering all of the instability of the the government pursue to promote the private market but reaping none of the benefits" [Rubey sector's diffusion into poorer, rural areas? 2 0 0 3 , 3). A chicken-and-egg scenario is being played out by the private sector and the govern­ Longer-Term Food Security and ment. The government is reluctant to fully privatize Development Strategies the parastatal until it knows that the private sector has the infrastructure and capacity to respond to Self-sufficiency versus commercial crops. Various demand. Government officials fear that if the strategies are proposed for achieving national food private sector is given complete control of the sovereignty and household food security. Some market, prices will be volatile and will increase and policy makers want to strive for national food there will be a lack of maize in parts of the country sovereignty by achieving self-sufficiency in cereals, at critical times of the year [Oygard et al. 2003). given that Malawi is a landlocked country in a Obviously, the government does not want to risk a politically unstable part of the world. Self-suffi­ shortage of staple foods, so in 2001/2002 it chose ciency in maize would mean improving maize to intervene, resulting in a budget deficit and high production and diversifying food crops by, for interest rates [RATES 2003). On the other hand, instance, increasing production of cassava, sweet the private sector is unwilling to invest heavily in potatoes, or potatoes. It costs three to four times storage facilities, trucks, or marketing as long as more to import maize than to produce it, so self- sufficiency could be an economically viable option [Devereux 2002). Other policy makers support market-based solu­ Malawi does not have a comparative advantage in tions or trade to ensure food access and availa­ growing maize, so some argue that trade policies bility. One option for achieving both national food that allow for efficient and timely transportation of sovereignty and household food security is to maize are best. As mentioned, current yields result expand the production of cash crops, like burley in chronic deficits (Devereux 2002). Maize is highly tobacco, cotton, sugar, and tea, for regional or drought sensitive, and given Malawi's agroclimatic international trade. This approach would increase conditions, other crops, such as millet, sorghum, incomes and allow people to buy more food, since cassava, rice, and potatoes, might produce higher rural households typically spend 8 0 percent of yields. These crops, however, may not be socially their income on food [Sahley et al. 2005], To be acceptable, and they lack markets and processing successful, however, farmers need technical facilities (Mano et al. 2003). knowledge about growing these crops, input and output markets for these crops, and infrastructure Countries with liberal trade policies appear better that could facilitate these markets. Remote areas of able to close food gaps through trade than those in the country have not attracted private traders to which the government is most involved (Sahley et replace ADMARC's closed markets, leaving some al. 2005). Regional trade possibilities exist with populations with no agricultural input or export Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. market. Poor infrastructure contributed to private Mozambique does not suffer the same land degra­ traders' reluctance to enter these rural markets dation or import-export parity that Malawi does, (RATES 2003). Another complication is that if so a trade relationship with that country could help small farmers believe growing cash crops will earn a smooth Malawi's markets [RATES 2003). If infra­ higher income than staple food crops, they may structure for the maize market between the two not plant staple crops, which could lead to further countries is improved, the tobacco market, food shortages (IFPRI 2002). Malawi's largest export income earner, could bene­ fit from spillover effects. In 2 0 0 2 and 2 0 0 3 , high Since household incomes, foreign exchange earn­ volumes of cross-border trade improved the ings, and the majority of jobs in Malawi all rely on availability of maize. agriculture, and given that most farmers are net food buyers, policy options that seek to improve Regional trade could also benefit Malawi. The household food security and stimulate the region's large size and agroecological and climatic economy should promote increases in agricultural variation all but guarantee adequate production, productivity (PMS 2 0 0 0 ). In the past donor which could be traded, in part of the region each programs and government policy focused on year (Mano et al. 2003). In some areas it may be increasing productivity of smallholders, who more economically beneficial to trade across produce 9 0 percent of Malawi's maize (Oygard et borders than domestically, given weak infra­ al. 2003). Improving poor farmers' access to tech­ structure. Northern Mozambique and southern nology that could reduce their costs and increase Tanzania are both areas of surplus production and their yields could lead to better household food could be reliable grain sources. security. Achieving this would require a long-term investment in agricultural research. Other policy Socioeconomic development to reduce livelihood options include promoting on-farm crop diversifi­ vulnerability. According to Wiggins [2005, 8), cation [for consumption or export), creating "Widespread poverty translates into vulnerability; farmer organizations, and strengthening rural insti­ poor households have fewer assets and restricted tutions. options to cope with shocks." To combat this vul­ nerability, multisector development programs are Trade. Policies that encourage trade can also help needed to raise incomes of the poor, stabilize food ensure access to and availability of maize. Cur­ sources and inputs, address HIV/AIDS, provide rently, however, food aid causes market distortions education, and promote off-farm employment. and, as mentioned earlier, private sector investment is lacking. As a result, some people ask if trade In 2 0 0 3 there were 8 4 ,0 0 0 AIDS deaths in Malawi; makes sense for a landlocked country in a food- the HIV prevalence rate is 14.2 percent for adults insecure region of the world. (UNAIDS). The effects of HIV/AIDS on food security are threefold: it affects farm production FAO [Food and Agriculture Organization of the and incomes, it undercuts the ability of households ]. 2003. Tobacco in Malawi. In to cope with shocks, and it affects national econo­ issues in the global tobacco economy. Rome. mies and governments. M ost studies conclude that ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/006/v4997e/v4 labor-saving techniques and diversification of food 997e0l.pdf. production and income are essential for farmers ------. 2006. FAOSTAT. http://faostat.fao.org and farm households affected by HIV/AIDS. [accessed March 10, 2006]. Assignment ------. 2007. The special programme for food security, http:/ /www.fao.org/spfs/ [accessed February 2007]. Assess the effectiveness of the actions taken by the government of Malawi in 2002, identify policy FEWS NET [Famine Early Warning System Net­ failures and successes, and suggest actions and work]. 2002. Government declares food policy measures that should be put in place by the security disaster. March 27. government, food aid donors, and the private http:/ / www.fews.net/docs/ Publications/Malawi sector to effectively prevent future famine while 200202en.pdf. striving for long-term national food sovereignty ------. 2003. Dry spells affect crop yields. March and household food security. 28. http:/ / www.fews.net/docs/ Publications/Malawi Additional Readings 200302en.pdf. ------. 2 0 0 6 . Malawi Center. Devereux, S. 2002. State o f disaster: Causes, conse­ http:/ / www.fews.net/ Pages/countrv.aspx?gb= quences, and policy lessons from Malawi. June mw&l=en [accessed 2006]. 13. http:/ / actionaidusa.org/pdf/THE%20MALA IFPRI [International Food Policy Research Institute], Fighting famine in Southern Africa: WI%20STATE%20QF%20DISASTER%20Final 20 0 2 . .pdf. Steps out o f the crisis Washington, DC. Living in the abyss: Hunger in Sen, A. K. 1981. Poverty and famines: A n essay on Kamowa, O. 2 0 0 2 . entitlement and deprivation. Oxford: M ch in ji. Lilongwe, Malawi: Save the Children Clarendon Press. [UK], Malawi National Vulnerability Assessment Com­ mittee. 20 0 5 . Malawi baseline livelihood pro­ References files, Version 1. Lilongwe, Malawi: Malawi National Vulnerability Assessment Committee Bookstein A., and M. Lawson. 20 0 2 . Briefing: in collaboration with the Southern Africa Famine in Southern Africa. African Affairs 101 Development Community [SADC] Food, Agri­ [405]: 635-641. culture, and Natural Resources [FANR] Vul­ nerability Assessment Committee. CIA [Central Intelligence Agency]. 2006. The http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf docs/PNADG538.pdf world factbook— Malawi. https: / / www.cia.gov/cia / publications/ factbook Mano, R., B. Isaacson, and P. Dardel. 20 0 3 . Id e n ti­ /geos/mi.html [accessed March 1, 2006]. fying policy determinants o f food security in response and recovery in the SADC region: Council on Foreign Relations. 20 0 5 . Interview with The case o f the 2002 food emergency. Key­ John M. Staatz on Niger's food crisis. note paper prepared for the Regional Dialogue http: / / www.cfr.org / publication / 8620 / intervie on Agricultural Recovery, Food Security and w with iohn m staatz on nigers food crisis.h Trade Policies in Southern Africa, sponsored tmi. by the Food, Agriculture, and Natural Resources Policy Analysis Network, Gabarone, Botswana, March 26 -2 7 . ODI [Overseas Development Institute], F orum fo r Sahley, C., B. Groelsema, M. Marchione, and D. Food Security in Southern A frice— Malawi. Nelson. 2005. The governance dimensions o f http: / / www.odi.org.uk/ food-security- food security in Malawi. Report for the U.S. forum/Malawi.htm [accessed March 10, 2006]. Agency for International Development, Washington, DC. Oygard, R., R. Garcia, A. Guttormsmen, R. Kachule, A. Mwanaumo, I. Mwanawina, E. Stevens, S., S. Devereux, and T. Ken nan. 20 0 2 . The Sjaastad, and M. Wik. 2 0 0 3 . The maze of Malawi famine o f 2002: More questions than maize: Improving input and output market answers Sussex, UK: Institute of Development access fo r poor smallholders in the Southern Studies. African region: The experience o f Zambia and UNAIDS [Joint United Nations Programme on M alawi. Report No. 26. As, Norway: Agri­ HIV/AIDS], M alawi. cultural University of Norway, Department of http:/ / www.unaids.org/en/CountrvResponses/ Economics and Resource Management. Countries/ malawi.asp [accessed March 15, PMS [Poverty Monitoring System]. 2 0 0 0 . The state 2006], o f Malawi's poor: Agriculture and making a von Braun, )., T. Teklu, and P. Webb. 1998. Fam ine living from the land. PMS Brief No. 7. in Africa: Causes, responses, and prevention. Washington, DC: International Food Policy Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. Research Institute. WFP [World Food Programme], 2007. W o rld Project for Economic Governance. M alawi. hunger: Malawi. http:// www.malawipublicfunding.org/demo/ba http://www.wfp.org/countrv brief/indexcount se.asp [accessed March IS, 2006]. rv.aspPregion=3§ion=9gfsub section=38ilc RATES [Regional Agricultural Trade Expansion ountrv=454. Support Program]. 2003. M aize m a rk e t assess­ Wiggins, S. 20 0 5 . Southern Africa's food and ment and baseline study fo r Malawi. Nairobi. humanitarian crisis of 2 0 0 1 -2 0 0 4 : Causes and ReliefWeb. 20 0 3 . FEWS Malawi food security lessons. Discussion paper, Agricultural Eco­ report mid-Feb to m id-Mar2003. March 28. nomics Society annual conference, Notting­ http://wwwnotes.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/9c60 ham, UK, April 4 -6 . fa02e9939e85cl2564f60053c47a / 6d3979bb3d World Bank. 2003. Malawi country economic 462cd649256cfaOQ223674?OpenDocument. memorandum: Policies for accelerating growth. Rubey, L. 2003. Malawi's crisis: Causes and solu­ Washington, DC. Draft. tions. Report for the U.S. Agency for Inter­ national Development, Washington, DC.