Meta-Theoretical Eclecticism in International Relations: the Limits of the “Neo-Neo Synthesis”1 Paulo Victor Zaneratto Bittencourt (DCP-USP)2

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Meta-theoretical eclecticism in International Relations: the limits of the “Neo-Neo Synthesis”1 Paulo Victor Zaneratto Bittencourt (DCP-USP)2

Abstract: Throughout the 1980s, two theoretical bodies in mainstream International Relations theory moved from a state of rivalry to an attempt of complementarity. These bodies are Kenneth Waltz’s theory of international politics (or “neo-realism”), and Keohane and Nye’s “liberal-institutionalism” (or “neo-liberalism”) (2012). At the end of the decade, Keohane (1988) proposed unifying Waltz’s theory and his own into a same “rationalist research program”, which would unite the structural aspect from the former to process aspects of the latter. Nevertheless, having noticed conceptual inconsistencies between Waltz’s and Kehane and Nye’s works, as well as different references on theory-building, it is worth asking: how is it possible to synthesize these two bodies? And what are the limits of the resulting synthesis?

1 Introduction Ever since the first attempts to grasp International Relations as an academic discipline, the point of how to best study the phenomena of such realm has been a case for discussion. Allocating it epistemologically under the study of politics (CARR, 2001) may have helped to cast light upon some of the phenomena studied, but it has also brought many different perspectives as well. After a dispute between “traditionalism” (BULL, 1966) and “scientific” approaches (KAPLAN, 1966), the methods for theory-building in International Relations experienced a more fruitful discussion during the 1970s and the 1980s, when three “paradigms” vied for primacy in the field, namely, Marxism, (neo-)Realism, and (neo-)Liberalism (especially under its institutionalist variant) (WAEVER, 2008). This moment is known in the literature as “the third debate” of the development of International Relations as an academic enterprise. It also coincides with the publication of Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye’s Power and interdependence (1977), and Kenneth Waltz’s Theory of international politics (1979). The latter interests us more directly in this paper, since it offers a discussion on the scientific-ness of theories, and puts forward an effort to develop such a scientific theory. As a consequence, it

1 Trabalho apresentado no 44º Encontro Anual da ANPOCS, no Simpósio de Pesquisa Pós-Graduada (SPG) 27 – Metodologia da Ciência Política: Novos métodos para superar velhos dilemas. Este texto foi produzido a partir do projeto fomentado pelo processo nº 2016/05352-0, Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP). 2 Bacharel em Relações Internacionais e mestre em Ciências Sociais pela Faculdade de Filosofia e Ciências da Universidade Estadual Paulista “Júlio de Mesquita Filho” (UNESP/Marília). Doutorando em Ciência Política pelo Programa de Pós-Graduação em Ciência Política da Faculdade de Filosofia, Letras e Ciências Humanas da Universidade de São Paulo (FFLCH/USP). A apresentação deste trabalho contou com o apoio da CAPES/PROEX. Contato: [email protected] 1 pushes the concern of how to develop scientific theories for international relations to the debate in the 1980s. Both works interest us because they represent different positions on the debate proposed by Waever (2008): namely, Waltz supposedly belongs to a neo-Realist position, emphasizing the role of material capacities and the persistent possibility of the use of force internationally; while, Keohane and Nye stressed the role of norms and institutions on states’ dealing with common interdependences. It seems, however, that the main point of this discussion should not be posed upon the role of institutions or material capacities, but on the way both Waltz and Keohane (especially, but also with his seminal works with Joseph Nye) intend to develop their ideas in a scientific fashion. These authors and their works turn out to be of utter importance to our research due to a theoretical and argumentative movement that synthesizes Waltz’s and Keohane’s theoretical developments. This movement (KEOHANE, 1988) is what Waever (2008) called “neo-neo synthesis”: no longer were realism and liberalism ‘incommensurable’ – on the contrary they shared a ‘rationalist’ research programme, a conception of science, a shared willingness to operate on the premise of anarchy (Waltz) and investigate the evolution of co-operation and whether institutions matter (Keohane) (WAEVER, 2008, p. 163).

Our point in this paper is that the references Keohane, Nye, and Waltz use for theory- building are different, and, (not necessarily, but) consequently in this case, they end up positioning their theories differently toward reality. What we mean by this is that they conceive differently the role of the theory, the way it should be constructed, and also the role and the limits of the theoretician themselves. Thus, our research question for this paper is roughly the same of its author’s Master Thesis, namely, is there a possibility of synthesizing Waltz’s theory of international politics and Keohane and Nye’s liberal-institutionalist approach, departing from their conceptions on theory-building? When we question the “possibility” of synthesis of the theories mentioned, we are referring to the eclecticism involved in such an operation. The characterization we give to this concept is proposed by José Jeremias de Oliveira Filho (1995), described as a methodological pathology: Eclecticism as a methodological pathology can be defined by the use of concepts out of their respective conceptual schemes and theoretical systems, altering their meanings. The occurrence of a term without a definition that reduced or precluded its ambiguity would not allow to know to which possible concepts it is associated. Inadvertently one frequently uses the signal that expresses the concept, but not the concept itself. (…) If such occurrence is serious at the theoretical level, it will be even more so at the meta-theoretical or at the meta-sociological level (OLIVEIRA FILHO, 1995, p. 263).

In order to address such a question, we have relied upon a vast bibliographical research, tracking the concepts the authors used and establishing their meanings, while also monitoring the permanence and modifications on the substance of these concepts. Once we have achieved this, we have tried to grasp how these concepts are held together and how they are related to one another so we could figure out what are the conceptions on theory building for the authors under scrutiny. In other words, we are concerned not only with the methodology of these theories, i.e., the inner consistence of the concepts of a given theory and how they relate to one another (JACKSON, 2011), but also with the references these authors use to construct their theories. Strategically, the research was divided into two parts: the first one on the works of Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye during the 1970s, and, separately, on the works of Kenneth Waltz, until the publication of his seminal 1979 Theory of international politics. Since this book seems to have pushed a more meta-theoretical debate on the field of International Relations, the second part of the research is focused on the 1980s, a period where the movements that would lead to a “neo-neo synthesis” took place. Therefore, we scrutinized the approximations of concepts, so we could address the question on the possibility of such a synthesis. We shall not discuss detailed findings during this paper due to space constraints, and also because they are already exposed in the Master Thesis mentioned. We stick to the most relevant aspects on theory-building, which is the concern of this discussion panel. Therefore, the next sections will deal with Kenneth Waltz’s conceptions of theory, and, in turn, Robert Keohane’s (and Joseph Nye’s when fit). A fourth section will hold a discussion on these aspects, and will be followed by a conclusion on this study.

2 Kenneth Waltz: theory as simplification Kenneth Waltz is unquestionably one of the main authors of International Relations. To be true, both Kenneth Waltz and Robert Keohane figure as the most relevant “sub-disciplinary leaders” in data presented by Robert Goodin (2011) in the Oxford Handbook of Political Science. Kenneth Waltz came to prominence in the study of International Relations after his Man, the state, and war, published as a book in 1959, but his seminal work on framing his ideas into a well-defined theory only came twenty years later, when Theory of international politics was first published. It is important to bear in mind that both books maintain an important dialogue, as noted by Griffiths (2001), for whom Man, the state, and war contained ideas that would be

3 fully developed in Theory of international politics. Despite agreeing with this point, we should stress that such dialogue exists not only in the themes approached by Waltz. Especially for our concerns in this paper, the dialogue between the two books is connected because of aspects of theory construction that are approached, and it will become clearer as we explore these points. In this sense, Theory of international politics would display a more sophisticated approach to theory-building than his previous works, which we call “methodological leap” elsewhere (BITTENCOURT, 2018). A criticism posed by Waltz is that in International Relations, the word “theory” would be used “often to cover any work that departs from mere description, seldom to refer only to work that meets philosophy-of-science standards” (WALTZ, 1975, p. 2). Such discomfort of the author with the theory of International Relations is evident when reading his opus magna: his Theory of international politics spends a good part of its volume setting the standards of a theory as proposed by Waltz. Its first chapter, “Laws and theories”, is exemplar of this concern, and its title can work as a good starting point for our arguments here. According to the conception of theory proposed by Waltz, there is a fundamental difference between what one conceives of as a “law” and what would be a theory. For Waltz, a “law” would be a regularity, something one is led to expect given certain circumstances (WALTZ, 1975; 1979). These observations, comprehended as “laws” can be proved either true or false, depending on how often certain expected outputs really result from the observed circumstances. It can be absolute, i.e., whenever we find given circumstances there will certainly result a given output; or it can be constant but not invariable, i.e, the result can be expected with a certain probability (WALTZ, 1975; 1979). His point is that in social sciences there is a myriad of possible circumstances and outcomes, which renders our observations always probable, or, in his words, these features turn our observations to “law-like” statements (WALTZ, 1979): the sense of being necessary is reduced, but the repetition, and the expectation of finding a certain outcome from the observed circumstances is maintained. In his own words, “a law is based not simply on a relation that has been found, but one that has been found repeatedly” (WALTZ, 1979, p. 1). Data are important for Waltz, since they offer a greater solidity for our observations. Nevertheless, they do not speak for themselves (WALTZ, 1979, p. 4), there being a need for establishing theories: finding more and more data will not automatically lead to a theory of any given realm of activity – it is an inductivist illusion (WALTZ, 1979). But the meaning of the data, and which ones are important for the theory is defined not by an inner characteristic of the them, but from the theory itself: “faced with an infinite number of ‘facts’ one must wonder,

4 however, which ones are to be taken as pertinent when trying to explain something. (…) Scientists and philosophers of science refer to facts as being ‘theory laden’ and to theory and fact as being ‘interdependent’” (WALTZ, 1997, p. 913-914). Theories are qualitatively different from laws because they cannot be proven true or false, since their purpose is not to describe observations, but to explain why these relations between observations are found (WALTZ, 1979). Thus, one should ask of a theory how great its explanatory power is, i.e., how well it provides an explanation for some recurrent observations: theories explain laws (WALTZ, 1979, p. 5). Theories also contain assumptions and theoretical notions. The former ones are not necessarily factual: one makes an assumption that is useful to explain a certain group of phenomena that take place in a given realm (WALTZ, 1975, 1979). The theoretical notions, in turn, are not discovered but invented with the purpose, again, of creating a theory that explains certain events (WALTZ, 1979). All these laws and theories refer to a given realm of activity, which should be comprehended as isolated from other ones. This isolation is not supposed to be realistic but useful. According to Waltz, one cannot access reality directly because, in this reality, everything is connected to everything else (HALLIDAY, ROSENBERG, 1998). Consequently, reality can only be accessed through theories, which must be simple in order to lay bare what are the most important aspects that affect the phenomena one studies (WALTZ, 1979; 1997). It is in this point that Waltz makes clear that his conception of theory construction finds its roots in his previous works. Twenty years earlier, in his Man, the state, and war, Waltz proposes analyzing theories of the causes of war by placing them under three different “images” (WALTZ, 2001). These “images”, according to his explanation, are “filters”, or “lenses”, with which one stares at the phenomena under observation, since it is not possible to look directly to “international politics” without them (WALTZ, 2001). By defining a realm of activity – international politics –, Waltz is making a case favorable to addressing it in its own terms: according to him, this is what Machiavelli did when explaining politics in reference to itself instead of other bringing observations from fields of knowledge (WALTZ, 1975; 1979). On the other hand, one not only defines the limits of a realm of activity, but also the main driving forces within it. The theory that results, then, is not a faithful description of reality, but the explanation of how things work in a limited part of reality; or, in his own words, theory is a picture, mentally formed, of a bounded realm or domain of activity. A theory is a depiction of the organization of a domain and of the connections among its parts (cf. Boltzman 1905). The infinite materials of any realm can be organized in endlessly different ways. A theory indicates that some factors are more important than others and specifies relations among them. In reality, everything is related to 5

everything else, and one domain cannot be separated from others. Theory isolates one realm from all others in order to deal with it intellectually. To isolate a realm is a precondition to developing a theory that will explain what goes on within it. If the precondition cannot be met, and that of course is a possibility, then the construction of theory for the matters at hand is impossible. The question, as ever with theories, is not whether the isolation of a realm is realistic, but whether it is useful. And usefulness is judged by the explanatory and predictive powers of the theory that may be fashioned. Theories, though not divorced from the world of experiment and observation, are only indirectly connected with it. (…) Theories do construct a reality, but no one can ever say that it is the reality (WALTZ, 1979, p. 8-9, stresses in the original).

All this point to the theory Waltz is trying to establish. By focusing on a particular kind of recurrence (balance of power), in a given limited realm of activity (international politics), Waltz develops an explanation for such a recurrence. But there is something even more important in his conception of theory. By bringing to his theory assumptions which may not be factual, but are necessarily useful to articulate his explanation, Waltz frequently recurs to the minimal behaviors one can expect from the actors of the realm being studied. For example, his assumption that states (actors) in international politics will necessarily look for their survival as an independent political unit is the minimal behavior one can expect: states may pursue a world hegemony, but they need first survive in order to do this. Other states, on the contrary, may pursue their integration to other political unit, but even if there are states that are looking for their survival, his theory is expected to work. This is the sense of utility of his assumptions and theoretical notions. There is one more thing one should be aware when analyzing Waltz’s references for theory construction: his theoretical notions are not expected to have meaning “outside of the theory in which they appear” (WALTZ, 1979, p. 11). Waltz’s theory is resistant to concepts developed outside of its propositions, while its concepts are also very sensitive when transplanted from their original theoretical proposal to other theoretical enterprises. One last point should be addressed and it refers to testing. As we mentioned previously, theories cannot be tested, because there is an interdependence between theory and facts, and the latter cannot be sources and judges of theories at the same time (WALTZ, 1986; 1997; 2003). It is possible, nevertheless, to test inferred hypotheses from the theory. These hypotheses may be proven false, and should that be the case, they can be fixed and undergo new tests. These new tests are not led with the intent of proving the theory false, but to fix eventual failures: according to Waltz, then, to test a hypothesis, one must 1 State the theory being tested. 2 Infer hypotheses from it. 3 Subject the hypotheses to experimental or observational tests. 4 In taking steps two and three, use the definitions of terms found in the theory being tested. 5 Eliminate or control perturbing variables not included in the theory under test. 6 Devise a number of distinct and

demanding tests. 7 If a test is not passed, ask whether the theory flunks completely, needs repair and restatement, or requires a narrowing of the scope of its explanatory claims (WALTZ, 1979, p. 13).

As we see, it is not a simple task to evaluate a theory according to Waltz. Furthermore, a theory – according to the standards he set – cannot be simply proven false, and even a flawed theory can only be substituted by a better theory, i.e., a theory that uses as few elements as possible, and has a greater explanatory power than the rival one for the same realm of activity. These propositions made by Waltz led to a debate during the 1980s on the features one should accept as valid for constructing new theories for International Relations (and, more specifically, for international politics). It is in this context that Robert Keohane and Waltz take forward a debate that resulted in a volume in 1986 – Neorealism and its critics. But, in order to understand the proposal by Robert Keohane for the role he conceived for Waltz’s theory, one should understand, first, the former’s theoretical proposal, to which we turn in the next section.

3 Keohane and the broadening of the theories of International Relations The attempts to broaden the studied elements in world politics owes a lot to Robert Keohane’s contribution to International Relations theory. Indeed, since his early works with Joseph Nye, Jr, in the beginning of the 1970s, much of his effort has been put towards enlarging the actors, processes and the focus on International Relations studies. It may not seem, but it has much to do with his conception of theory and its role. In 1971, while organizing a volume in the journal International Organization, Keohane and Nye (1971a; 1971b), advocated for an enlargement of the categories of world politics, proposing what they then called a “paradigm of world politics”, which would expand the observations of the “state-centric paradigm” beyond the action of states, focusing on the bargaining processes different actors, such as international foundations, private corporations, and civil society organizations engaged internationally. This perspective of enlargement took different outlines in their 1977 Power and interdependence, but it continued to operate. At this moment, world politics would swing from a pole of conditions of “realism” to a pole of conditions of “complex interdependence”, bringing about different processes on international agenda-setting, different actors participating in these negotiations, and different manners of bargaining (KEOHANE; NYE, 2012). Again, there would be conditions that could be grasped, described, and the consequent processes could be tracked departing from these conditions.

The development of these enlarging perspectives, the authors sustain, should not be understood as a rivalry between their theoretical constructs and what they called “realism”, or “state-centric paradigm”, but it should be seen as an attempt to complement, or even supplement, this paradigm (KEOHANE; NYE, 1987; 2012). Strictly speaking, it would not be until the 1980s that the issue of philosophy of science would be more urgent in Keohane’s work, but when it started to figure more explicitly, it walked deliberately in the direction of synthesizing his perspective on processes to Waltz’s structural- realist approach (KEOHANE; NYE, 1987). Perhaps one of the first explicit reference to philosophy of science that is of our interest in this paper is his text Theory of world politics: structural realism and beyond, that first appeared in a 1983 edition by Ada Finifter (Political science: the state of the discipline)3. In this incursion through philosophy of science, it is the work developed by Imre Lakatos (1970) that leads Keohane’s arguments. According to Keohane, there is a “realist tradition” in the studies of world politics that focuses on interests, power and rationality. This realist tradition would include authors from the Renaissance, balance of power theorists, and more recent authors, such as Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Waltz, and provided a sophisticated framework of hypotheses and initial questions (KEOHANE, 1986a). The hard core of these widely varied works would be based on three assumptions: a) the most important actors of world politics would be territorially organized entities; b) the behavior of these entities could be rationally explained; and, c) states seek power and calculate their interests in terms of power (KEOHANE, 1986a). It is upon this hardcore that one should construct in order to progress in their understanding of world politics. It is possible to identify the attempt, again, to expand the theoretical propositions of “realism” – as in the 1970s –, but now with help from philosophy-of-science apparatuses. Thus, Keohane’s proposal is developing a “modified structural research program”, departing from this hard core, but developing auxiliary hypothesis, in a progressive way, so one’s understanding of the phenomena studied could be improved. Since this discussion depends much on the comprehension of the methodology of scientific research programs proposed by Imre Lakatos, it would be convenient to bring these definitions. Keohane’s explanation is accurate enough for these purposes: theories are embedded in research programs. These programs contain inviolable assumptions (the ‘hard core’) and initial conditions, defining their scope. For Lakatos, they also include two other very important elements: auxiliary, or observational,

3 This text is reprinted in the book Neorealism and its critics, organized by Robert Keohane in 1986. It is to this reprinted version that we refer in this paper. 8

hypotheses, and a positive heuristic, which tells the scientist what sorts of additional hypotheses to entertain and how to go about conducting research. In short, a research program is a set of methodological rules telling us what paths of research to avoid and what paths to follow. (…) In the course of research, anomalies are bound to appear sooner or later: predictions of the theory will seem to be falsified. For Lakatos, the reaction of scientists developing the research program is to protect the hard core by constructing auxiliary hypotheses that will explain the anomalies. Yet any research program, good or bad, can invent such auxiliary hypotheses on an ad hoc basis. The key test for Lakatos of the value of a research program is whether these auxiliary hypotheses are ‘progressive’, that is, whether their invention leads to the discovery of new facts (other than the anomalous facts that they were designed to explain). Progressive research programs display ‘continuous growth’: their auxiliary hypotheses increase our capacity to understand reality (KEOHANE, 1986a, p. 160- 161, originally stressed).

This excerpt is very important for us to understand the movement Keohane is attempting to conduct in order to shape Waltz’s theory of international politics into a “structural realist” research program based on the hard core aforementioned. By proposing this methodology to approach Waltz’s theory, Keohane is opening a path so he could establish a common program upon which world politics students could develop their studies. Indeed, it is what we call elsewhere a “permissive movement” (BITTENCOURT, 2018) that will link Waltz’s (neo-)Realism to Keohane’s liberal-institutionalism, the “neo-neo synthesis” (WAEVER, 2008). Some years later, Keohane would refer to this linking as follows: Realist and neorealist theories are avowedly rationalistic (…). Adopting the assumption of substantive rationality does not commit the analyst to gloomy deterministic conclusions about the inevitability of warfare. On the contrary, rationalistic theory can be used to explore the conditions under which cooperation takes place, and it seeks to explain why international institutions are constructed by states. Even though the assumption of substantive rationality does not compel a particular set of conclusions about the nature or evolution of international institutions, it has been used in fruitful ways to explain behavior, including institutionalized behavior, in international relations. Its adherents are often highly self-conscious about their analytical perspective, and they have been highly successful in gaining legitimacy for their arguments (KEOHANE, 1988, p. 381).

But, besides providing us with some ground for understanding how Waltz’s theory could be complemented by an approach to international institutions, what other points on theory construction does Keohane’s work present? An answer to this question can be found in the same text we have just referred to: according to Keohane, no laws in world politics can be discovered (KEOHANE, 1988, p. 380). Some cracks in the synthesis between Waltz’s and Keohane’s theories start appearing from this, and the reason is evident: since, for Waltz, theories are developed to explain generalities that are similar to laws (because, again, given some circumstances, there is a probability that some outcome results – even though it may not necessarily occur), the theory loses its utility, or, what is more, it loses its very purpose once the possibility of finding these laws is taken to be precluded.

In 1984, when publishing his seminal work After hegemony, designed to explain the emergence of cooperative action among states and other actors in world politics, Keohane also presents some clues on his conception of theory construction. The theme of the book is placed in the borderline between world politics and world political economy and, with this theme, Keohane uses “concepts from economics to develop a political theory about cooperation and discord in the world economy” (KEOHANE, 1984, p. 12). By proposing what he calls a “functionalist theory of international regimes”, Keohane sets what are the facts that can falsify his theory: my theory can only be falsified if my estimate of future power realities turns out to be correct — that is, if hegemony is not restored. (…) My theory would also be falsified if cooperation were consistently to appear in the ‘wrong places’. (…) Finally, it would count against my theory if most agreements made among governments were constructed not within the framework of international regimes, but on an ad hoc basis (KEOHANE, 1984, p. 219).

More important than evaluating Keohane’s theory is understanding that his theory- building conception proposes a possibility for the process of falseability. It is possible to grasp echoes from the work of Karl Popper: “it must be possible for an empirical scientific system to be refuted by experience” (POPPER, 2002, p. 18). More details on how consistent this interpretation of Keohane’s theory building can be found in a text exactly on the methodology of social inquiry, which Keohane writes with Gary King and Sidney Verba, which is one of the major references for Political Science: we assume that it is possible to have some knowledge of the external world but that such knowledge is always uncertain. (…) Yet even though certainty is unattainable, we can improve the reliability, validity, certainty, and honesty of our conclusions by paying attention to the rules of scientific inference (KING; KEOHANE; VERBA, 1994, p. 6-7).

Again, it bears a lot of resemblance with Popper’s observation that science is not based upon certainties, but can be improved insofar as one continues exploring these uncertainties and providing them answers that, although may not be the best, provide basis to be improved (POPPER, 2002, p. 94). With these references, we are ready to understand that the construction of theories goes through developing tools to measure reality, to identify phenomena, and to test theories, which can indeed be proved false, but never to be utterly “true”. Thus, theories can be improved and complexity can be added insofar one gains more understanding on the reality being studied. Indeed, this is one point that Keohane advises for constructing theories under his “modified structural research program”, which departs from the “structural realist research program” in a synthesizing manner: “we should seek parsimony first, then add complexity while monitoring the adverse effects that this has on the predictive power

10 of our theory: its ability to make significant inferences on the basis of limited information” (KEOHANE, 1986a, p. 188). Analyzing the reality in such a way is still present in the author’s conception of theories some years later: “theory should be just as complicated as all our evidence suggest” (KING; KEOHANE; VERBA, 1994, p. 20). How this conception implies the possibility of a neo-neo synthesis in terms of eclecticism is a point that we explore in the next section.

4 Discussion: Theories, references, synthesis The process of synthesis the theories under scrutiny here undergo during the 1980s can be comprehended by the following excerpt: this emphasis on process as well as (rather than instead of) structure moves us toward a synthesis of, rather than a radical disjunction between, realism and liberalism. Neorealism is appropriate at the structural level of systemic theory; liberalism is most fruitful at the process level. We aspire to combine them into a system-level theory that incorporates process as well as structure (KEOHANE; NYE, 2012, p. 277).

The “structure” the authors mention, as well as the term “neorealism” is, undoubtedly, a reference to Waltz’s work, as observed by Waever (2008). The concept of structure, in isolation from units (nation-states, for Waltz) is distinctive for his theory and also a feature that made it known as “structural realism”. But are Waltz’s philosophy-of-science standards in accordance with those used by Keohane? This question is important not only because Waltz frequently expresses that his theory has important incursions in philosophy of science (HALLIDAY; ROSENBERG, 1998), but also because these references provide the basis upon which the author thinks his assumptions, theoretical notions, and his theory itself. When introducing the volume Neorealism and its critics, Keohane presents Waltz as being sympathetic to a vision of theory-building based on the methodology of scientific research programs in a Lakatosian fashion (KEOHANE, 1986b), and this fact would bring their theories closer together. As a matter of fact, Waltz’s response points to the opposite direction: “how one should test theories is the only question on which Keohane and I are far apart” (WALTZ, 1986, p. 334). Indeed, Waltz continues his response by stating his point: he believes to be difficult to test theories in social sciences, since there is an interdependence between theory and fact, there is no easy way a fact can represent a falsifying element to a theory (WALTZ, 1986). In this perspective, Waltz argues in a way that would approximate him from the ideas of Imre Lakatos’s: theories are not necessarily proven true or false in a simple manner, but the research programs they engage with can be evaluated as progressive or degenerative (WALTZ,

1997; 2003; LAKATOS, 1970). By “demolishing the simplistic notions about testing” theories, Lakatos’s claims should be taken seriously (WALTZ, 2003, p. vii). But the approximation between his ideas and Waltz’s end up in this convergence. In a series of arguments for not using Lakatos’s methodology, figure the problem of theories that do not follow exactly the same methodologies of the one that originated the research program; and the problem of “novel facts”, and how to determine which ones do count in favor of a theory and which do not (WALTZ, 2003). Whether falsifying a theory in a Popperian fashion or evaluating a series of theories (research programs) are problematic processes for Waltz (1986, p. 334). In short, he does not compromise to a Lakatosian methodology to develop his theory (BITTENCOURT, 2018). Waltz’s reference in philosophy of science is often present in his works, at least since his seminal Theory: the South-African philosopher Errol Harris (1970; WALTZ, 1979; 1986; 1997; 2003). According to Harris (1970), no theory presents facts that are external to it – if they do exist, it is because there is a rival theory that interpret them, or that order them in a different way: “we have found that no isolated fact or observation, however interpreted, is sufficient by itself to overthrow a well-established theory, and that what does not at first seem to fit can be, and is, usually ignored or explained away” (HARRIS, 1970, p. 353). It is in this sense that Waltz conceives facts as “theory laden” (WALTZ, 1997, p. 913), and this is the reason why facts cannot be at the same time sources and arbiters for theories. Furthermore, when Waltz says that, in reality, “everything is related to everything else, and one domain cannot be separated from others” (WALTZ, 1979, p. 13), he is once more echoing Errol Harris’s ideas: his knowledge theory “is not (…) a correspondence between ‘things’ and ‘ideas’ as single items, so much as a correspondence between entire relational wholes or situations in which the organism finds itself and the conscious elaboration of the emergent sentient awareness” (HARRIS, 1970, p. 384-385). Jackson (2011) refers to this point – although elaborated in a different way – as mind-world monism, in which both the observer and the world belong to the same relational whole. Jackson also identifies this meta-theoretical difference between Waltz and Keohane, although in a different way than the one we are putting forth here. From the previous discussion it becomes evident that there is a need for limiting a theory to a certain realm of activity, since “theories are about something, not about everything” (HALLIDAY; ROSENBERG, 1998). But Harris’s theory of knowledge does not give us any clue on what a theory specifically is, neither does it confront us with a separation of laws and theories as Waltz proposed. Indeed, this reference comes from Ernest Nagel:

theories are primarily logical instrument for organizing our experience and for ordering experimental laws. Although some theories are more effective than others for attaining these ends, theories are not statements, and belong to a different category of linguistic expressions than do statements. For theories function as rules or principles in accordance with which empirical materials are analyzed or inferences drawn, rather than as premises from which factual conclusions are deduced; and they cannot therefore be usefully characterized as either true or false, or even as probably true or probably false (NAGEL, 1961, p. 118).

Here we find the reference for the definition of laws and theories for Waltz. If theories, then, explain laws (NAGEL, 1961, p. 86; WALTZ, 1975; 1979), and one cannot expect them to be either true or false (NAGEL, 1961, p. 132), Nagel’s point is that theories are auxiliaries in the task of making inferences, and this is exactly what Waltz proposes in his aforementioned steps to creating hypotheses and submitting them to tests (WALTZ, 1979, p. 13). In this perspective, since reality cannot be directly accessed and is comprehended due to previous experiences (related to the “conscious elaboration of the emergent sentient awareness” of which Harris talks about), knowledge becomes scientific insofar it is systematic (HARRIS, 1970). But, again, how do these references preclude a synthesis between Waltz’s concept of “structure” and Keohane and Nye’s conceptions of processes? In other words, how does it affect the creation of a shared “research program”, or how such synthesis would be eclectic? The answer to these questions can be given in two parts. First, one must bear in mind Waltz’s definition of “international system”: “a system is composed of a structure and interacting units” (WALTZ, 1979, p. 79). Keohane and Nye (2012), on the other hand, would add a third, different element to this system: the processes. The point is not that Waltz’s theory does not accept any modifications: indeed, as we discussed earlier, theories can become more sophisticated by limiting their explanatory scope and by testing hypothesis. The point is that the references for theory construction are different, and, thus, the concepts are differently conceived and have different applications to reality, because reality is differently grasped by each of these groups of theory-construction references. This discussion explains why concepts such as “power”, “interdependence”, “international system”, and “rationality” have different meaning for both theories. And it leads us to the second part of this answer. The theoretical notions and assumptions in Waltz’s theory can only be understood in the context of such theory. Waltz himself states: “such notions have no meaning outside the theory in which they appear” (WALTZ, 1979, p. 11), and this theoretical stance finds ground, again, in Ernest Nagel’s work: (…) theoretical notions cannot be understood apart from the particular theory that implicitly defines them. This follows from the circumstance that, although the

theoretical terms are not assigned a unique set of determinate senses by the postulates of a theory, the permissible senses are limited to those satisfying the structure of inter- relations into which the postulates place the terms. Accordingly, when the fundamental postulates of a theory are altered, the meanings of its basic terms are also changed, even if (as often happens) the same linguistic expressions continue to be employed (…) (NAGEL, 1961, p. 87, emphasis added).

If we are to use Waltz’s concept of international system, we should be aware of its limits as well as of its composition. Adding an element that is not unit-level, nor structural, i.e., the element of processes and how they are shaped by the structure of the system introduces a modification in Waltz’s theory. This modification needs to take into consideration all these aspects of what constitutes reality, how theory is placed in it, and also the simplicity that would count for the theory’s power. The point is that Keohane’s (and, for that case, Nye’s) conception of theory development departs from different stances and, for them, simplicity is not as treasured as it is for Waltz. These observations lead us to argue, according to Jeremias Filho’s (1995) definition, that this is a case of eclecticism, and this eclecticism is placed at the meta-theoretical level of the theory.

5 Conclusion The point of this paper was not to evaluate the methods for theory-construction for the authors under scrutiny; it was neither to present what research methods would fit best for each of them. Neither was our purpose to develop this discussion by focusing on the conceptual apparatuses these authors used for explaining the phenomena they study, nor to determine how much of each theory was present in the “synthesis” we analyzed. Our aim was even more basic: to analyze the very references for theory-construction these authors use in order to account for the conceptual differences in their theoretical propositions and, from this, propose a deeper understanding on how the mentioned “neo-neo synthesis” developed between different theoretical bodies. The differences were only partly taken into account in the process of synthetization, and, thus, the problem of a meta-theoretical eclecticism emerges. Only recently has Jackson (2011) pointed to differences in the development of theories in the sub-disciplinary field of International Relations, and he as well perceives a difference between Robert Keohane’s and Kenneth Waltz’s procedures for establishing theories. He finishes his work by pointing to the pluralism present in these theories, and, after the study briefly presented in this paper, we tend to agree with him.

Many different phenomena occur internationally, and this perception can only exist due to different ways of grasping these phenomena. This paper tried to provide some understanding on two of these different ways.

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