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Mazepa's : Understanding Cossack Territorial Vistas Author(s): Zenon E. Kohut Source: Harvard Ukrainian Studies, Vol. 31, No. 1/4, POLTAVA 1709: THE BATTLE AND THE MYTH (2009-2010), pp. 1-28 Published by: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/41756495 . Accessed: 01/06/2014 01:47

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This content downloaded from 80.7.236.84 on Sun, 1 Jun 2014 01:47:42 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Mazepa's Ukraine: Understanding Cossack Territorial Vistas

Zenon E. Kohuť

According to PylypOrlyk, HetmánIvan Mazepa offeredthis explanation whenhe switchedhis allegiancefrom Peter I to CharlesXII ofSweden:

Andbecause this [matter] could no longerbe hiddenfrom you I attest beforeGod, for Whom there are no secrets,and swear that I wantto do thiswith God's help not for my own benefit, not for greater privileges, not forgreater enrichment, and not for any other desires, but for the sake of allof you, who remain under my authority and leadership, for your wives andchildren, for the common good of our mother my fatherland poor Ukraine,for all ofthe Zaporozhian Host and the Little Rossian nation, forthe elevation and expansion of the Host's rights and privileges, I want todo thiswith God's help so thatyou, with [your] wives and children and theFatherland with the Zaporozhian Host, would not perish because of theSwedish or Muscovite side.1

Thejustification for altering the 's political course contains references to "poor" motherUkraine, the fatherland,the Zaporozhian Host, and the "LittleRossian" nation- conceptsthat by the time of had become an integralpart of Ukrainianpolitical thought. But whatvision did Mazepa evokewhen he referredto Ukraine,the fatherland,the LittleRossian nation, and theZaporozhian Host? What territories were envisioned by these terms? Eventhough various aspects of Ukrainian political culture have been studied, theterritorial dimension has been poorlyunderstood. This study attempts to establishhow a territorialvision of Ukraineevolved from the establishment of the Hetmanatein 1649 by HetmánBohdan Khmel'nyts'kyito the end of therule of Hetmán Ivan Samoilovychand theassumption of the hetmancy by Ivan Mazepa in 1687.

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i. Ruthenian Regionalism and Identity Prior to Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi

Conceptsof a Ukrainianterritorial entity and ofa Rutheniannation had been wellestablished long before the 1648 revolt. They began to evolvesoon afterthe Union ofLublin (1569). At thattime, three Ruthenian palatinates- Volhynia, ,and Kyiv-were transferred from the GrandDuchy of Lithuaniato the Kingdomof .By the 1580sa regionalRuthenian political identity began to emerge,based on the threenewly incorporated palatinates and the Rus' (Galicia) and Podilliapalatinates that had longbeen partof Poland.For example,King Stephen Báthory addressed the "lords and knightsresiding in the Rus',Kyiv, Bratslav, and VolhynianUkraine."2 Toward the end ofthe sixteenth centuryan evolvinggenealogical program for the Princes Ostroz'kyi attempted to linkthem with the "princesof Old Rus'" and the "land of Rus'."This land provedto be theRuthenian territories of the Kingdom of Poland: Galician Rus', Volhynia,the Kyiv region, and Podillia.3 By the seventeenthcentury this growing political territorial identity was accompaniedby the articulation of the concept of a Rutheniannation ( naroď) as an equal partnerof the Polish and Lithuaniannations.4 This argument was also based on thealleged rights guaranteed at thetime of their incorporation intoPoland. For example, in theJustification ofInnocence (1623; attributed to MeletiiSmotryts'kyi), the author argues:

For thoseabove-mentioned honorable deeds and audaciousacts of couragethat the noble Ruthenian nation rendered to theGrand Dukes, theirLords, [and] Their Majesties the Kings of Poland, it has been given thefreedom by them to sitin senatorialdignity equally with the two, Polishand Lithuanian,nations, to givecounsel concerning the good oftheir states and theirown fatherland, and to enjoyall thedignities, prerogatives,the call to offices,freedoms, rights, and libertiesof the Kingdomof Poland. This was given to it as equalto equal and free [nation] tofree Polish nation, united and incorporated injoint honor and unity of corporatebody: to princesand nobles, the and knighthood, the clericaland lay estates. At the same time, the people of urban condition ofthat nation were also immediatelygiven their rights and liberties [in return]for their faithful submission and true benevolence.5

The issue ofterritorial identity and territorial-nationalrights based on the 1569incorporation is wellillustrated by Adam Kysil's presentation of the nobil- ity'sgrievances at the Sejm (Diet) of 1641.Kysil' equated thefour palatinates ofVolhynia, Bratslav, Kyiv, and Chernihivas Rus',considering them as a single territorialunit with rights and privilegesstemming from their incorporation

This content downloaded from 80.7.236.84 on Sun, 1 Jun 2014 01:47:42 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions MAZEPA'SUKRAINE 3 intothe Kingdom of Poland (the Chernihiv palatinate was createdin 1635from lands won fromMuscovy, and was giventhe same statusas the territories thatwere incorporatedin 1569).6Kysil's vision, therefore, does not include thenon-incorporated Rus' (Galicia), Beiz, and Podilliapalatinates. Neverthe- less, the persecutionof the OrthodoxChurch and populationanywhere in theCommonwealth was considereda violationof the rights of the Orthodox nobilityin theincorporated territories.7 Similarly, the violation of the rights of thenon-noble strata of the "Ruthenian nation" was a violationof the rights of theOrthodox nobility of the incorporated territories. Thus, Kysil' viewed the "Rutheniannation" as a communitycomposed of a numberof orders.

2. Cossack Ukraine and the Ruthenian Nation

These conceptswere very much presentduring the greatCossack revoltin the Polish-LithuanianCommonwealth. As a resultof the uprising,Hetmán Bohdan Khmelnyts'kyicleared much of Ukraineof Polishrule, and by late 1648 he had reachedthe Polish-Ukrainianethnic border and stoppedthere. The hetmánreturned to Kyivwhere he arrangeda triumphalentry for himself intothe city. Khmelnyts'kyi was greetedby the Patriarch of Jerusalem, Paisios, and the Kyivanmetropolitan, Syl'vestr Kosiv, with the honorifictitle "Most IllustriousRuler," or illustrissimusprinceps . The Kyivan academy called Hetmán Khmelnyts'kyi"Moses, savior, redeemer, and liberatorof the Ruthenian nation fromthe slavery of the Liakhs [Poles]."8 Soon Khmelnyts'kyihimself began to reiteratethe idea ofcomplete Ruthe- nianliberation. In discussionswith Polish envoys in Februaryof 1649 he defined whichterritories he had in mind:

I shallfight to free the whole Ruthenian nation from bondage! ...I willnot crossthe border to wage war! I willnot raise my sword against the Turks andTatars! I have enough now in Ukraine [Kyiv palatinate], Podillia, and Volhynia-there is nowenough time, wealth, and provisions in myland and principality- all theway to ,Kholm, and Galicia.And when I standon theVistula, I shallsay to theLiakhs beyond it: sit still and be quiet,Liakhs!9

Whatwas HetmánBohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi's vision of the territorial extent of his politicalentity and theRuthenian nation? It was limitedto theRuthenian palatinatesof the Kingdomof Poland. In 1649 Khmelnyts'kyipursued his Ruthenianproject with great enthusiasm. In Februaryhe toldthe senior Ortho- dox noblemannegotiating on behalfof Poland, Adam Kysil',and his familyto "renouncethe Liakhsand join the ,for the Liakhland will perish,

This content downloaded from 80.7.236.84 on Sun, 1 Jun 2014 01:47:42 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 4 KOHUŤ butall theRus' willrule - thisvery year, very soon"10 However, as theresult of betrayalby his Tatarallies, only six monthslater Khmelnyts'kyi had to settle forfar less than "all the Rus'." According to theZbořiv Agreement between the Cossacks and the Commonwealth,the Cossack lands (i.e.,accepted into the Cossack register)included the Kyiv,Chernihiv, and Bratslavpalatinates, but not Volhyniaand certainlynot Galicia- a modifiedversion of the territories thatwere incorporated in 1569.The boundarieswere defined as follows:

Beginningfrom the on this side [the Right Bank of the Dnieper- ZK] in Dymer,Hornostaipil, Korostyshiv, Pavoloch, Pohrebyshche, Pryluka[Stara Pryluka], , and Bratslav,and fromBratslav to Iampilas faras theDnister, and fromthe Dnister to theDnieper... and on the otherside [theLeft Bank of the Dnieper-ZK] in Oster, Chernihiv,Romen, and Nizhen, all the way to the Muscovite border and theDnieper.11

Since the ZbořivAgreement defined the Cossack lands withinthe Polish- LithuanianCommonwealth, the eastern border of the Cossack landswas the officialboundary between Muscovy and the Polish-LithuanianCommon- wealth.It hadbeen establishedby the Treaties of Deulino (1618) and Polianovka (1634),and the actual demarcationprocess had just been concludedby the mid-i640S.12Unlike the western borders that were frequently modified because ofwar and politicalexpediency, the eastern borders remained stable even after thenew Cossack politicalentity came underthe protection of the Muscovite .In fact,most subsequentUkrainian serving under Muscovy referredto the same easternborders: Iurii Khmelnyts'kyi (1659-60), Ivan Briukhovets'kyi(1663-68), Dem'ian Mnohohrishnyi (1669-72) and up to Ivan Mazepa (1687-1709).13 The ZbořivAgreement did not establisha principalityof the Ruthenian nation,but rathera legallydefined territory of the ZaporozhianHost. This territorywas dividedinto sixteen regimental units that administered the area. Thisregimental system was "laidout more or less equallyon bothbanks of the Dnieper":on theRight Bank there were nine regiments (, Cherkasy, Kaniv,Korsun, ,Uman, Bratslav, Kalnyk, and Kyiv),while on the LeftBank therewere seven (Pereiaslav,Kropyvne, Myrhorod, Poltava and Pryluka,representing the present-day Poltava region, as wellas theregiments of Nizhen and Chernihiv).14lhe regimentswere subsequently adjusted, but the regimentalsystem of administrationpersisted throughout the existence ofthe Hetmanate. The main pointsof the Treatyof Zbořivdealt with Cossack immunities, theright to recruitCossacks within these territories up to an armyof 40,000, royalpardons, and Cossackrights to distillalcohol (but not to sell).In addition

This content downloaded from 80.7.236.84 on Sun, 1 Jun 2014 01:47:42 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions MAZEPA'SUKRAINE 5 to meetingCossack demands,the liberties of the Rutheniannation were not forgotten:special privilegeswere accordedonly to adherentsof the "Greek religion,"special prerogativeswere granted to the Kyivanmetropolitan, and Ruthenianschools and royaloffices were limitedto OrthodoxRuthenians. Thus,on theterritory of the Zaporozhian Host there was indeeda fusionof the Hostwith the Ruthenian nation into a singlepolitical and socialstructure- the Hetmanate.With respect to the Rutheniannation now located outsidethe Hetmanate,the Zbořiv Agreement contained only a verymuddled point that hintsat the possibilityof consideringthe abolitionof the ChurchUnion in boththe Kingdom of Poland and theGrand Duchy of Lithuania. This provision echoesthe constitutional theory developed previously, according to whichthe Orthodoxnobility in the incorporatedareas had theright to speak on behalf of the Orthodoxpopulation in the entireCommonwealth, except that the nobility'srole was now assumedby the Cossacks. Withits confirmation by the Sejm, the Zbořiv Agreement was thefirst legal act thatestablished the administrativedivision and bordersof the Cossack- controlledlands. While Khmel'nyts'kyiconsidered the ZbořivAgreement as simplya humiliatingtruce forced upon himthrough the mediationof the Crimeankhan, the agreementsubsequently was considereda foundational documentof the Cossack state.In fact,these territorieswere regardedas the possessionof the ZaporozhianHost, irrespectiveof whatruler was the Host's protector.Consequently, Khmel'nyts'kyi was forcedto sign an even morehumiliating agreement restricting his polityonly to theKyiv palatinate (theTreaty of Bila Tserkva,1651). Nevertheless, the Cossacks looked at Zbořiv as grantingthem permanent possession. In thisrespect the ZbořivAgree- menthad to be a startingpoint and constantpoint of reference in thefuture, wheneverthe issue ofthe Hetmanate's borders was broughtup. Accordingto theUkrainian scholar Oleksandr Hurzhii, the Cossack-controlled lands were roughlyequivalent to thelater Kyiv, Chernihiv, and Poltavagubernias with an estimatedterritory of 180,000 square kilometers.15 It was thisCossack polity that was placedunder the protection of the Mus- covitetsar by the Pereiaslav Agreement of 1654. In thearticles of the Muscovite tsar'streaty with the Cossacks (13 March 1654) and the tsar'smanifesto to BohdanKhmel'nyts'kyi (27 March1654) there is no referenceto specificbound- ariesor territories(except for those awarded to thehetmán for his serviceto the tsar),but ratherreferences to "thehetmán," "Little Rus'," "Cherkassian [Cherkasskie]towns" and "theHost" being underthe Muscovitemonarch's scepter.16In essence,the western borders were no morethan military demarca- tionlines. Drawing from contemporaneous sources, Ivan Kryp'iakevych made an attemptto definethe borders of the Cossack-controlled territory in 1653-54. The borderwith Poland was establishedalong the line: Iaruha-Chernivtsi- Murakhva-Krasne-Vinnytsia-Pryluka(Podillia)-Sambil-Karpilivka, while the

This content downloaded from 80.7.236.84 on Sun, 1 Jun 2014 01:47:42 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 6 KOHUŤ borderswith the Muscovitestate and the Khanateof ("DykePole") remainedunchanged.17 In establishingthe ,Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyinever abandoned his Ruthenianproject- to bringall the Ruthenianareas of the Kingdomof Poland underhis rule.18The militaryoperations that took place betweenthe time of the Zbořiv Agreement and thePereiaslav Agreement were attemptsat gainingsome ofthese lands. Following his alliancewith Muscovy, Khmel'nyts'kyimade preparationsfor a large-scaleGalician campaign.19 He was preventedfrom carrying it out because Muscovymade the conquestof the Grand Duchy of Lithuaniaand the northernlands its priority.During the incursioninto the GrandDuchy, the Cossack commandersorganized a BelarusianCossack regimentand establisheda protectorateover the Slutsk principality,Stary Bykhaü, Pinsk, Mazyr, and Turaú.20These actions generated considerableconflict between the two allies, Muscovy and theHetmanate. Khmel'nyts'kyi'sactivities in southernBelarus raise questionsas to the natureof his Ruthenian project. Up untilthis time Khmel'nyts'kyi had claimed onlythe Ruthenian territories of the Kingdom of Poland. Did he havea larger Ruthenianproject that would include the Grand Duchy? Serhii Plokhy believes thatKhmel'nyts'kyi did have such a projectand thathis failureto announce suchintentions was largelytactical: to securethe neutrality of the Grand Duchy whilehe pursuedhis Polish policies.21 However, even during the Cossack incur- sioninto southern Belarus there was no callfor the liberation of the in the GrandDuchy. It is myconclusion that the claimsto southernBelarus werenot based on anyRuthenian project but on therights of the Zaporozhian Host.The territory was conqueredand organizedinto a Cossackstructure and subsequentlytreated as a possessionof the Zaporozhian Host. SinceMuscovy was lessinterested in pursuinga campaignagainst the King- dom of Poland and was in factnegotiating a trucewith the Commonwealth (Vilnius,1656), Khmel'nyts'kyi began negotiating the partition of the Common- wealthamong Transylvania, Sweden, and the Hetmanate.The stickingpoint was thefate of Galicia and Podillia(the Rus' and Belz palatinates).The Swedish envoyreported to theking that the Cossacks were refusing to negotiateuntil "YourRoyal Highness recognizes their right to theentire old Ukraine,or Rok- solaniia,[the territory] where there exists the Greek faith and theirlanguage [is spoken]up to theVistula."22 Sweden's refusal to concedethe western Ukrainian territoriesto Khmel'nyts'kyicaused the breakdownof Ukrainian-Swedish negotiations.It forcedthe king to dispatcha newmission to Khmel'nyts'kyiin 1657with more favorable terms.23 Khmel'nyts'kyi, however, was alreadyon his deathbed,but the treaty signed by his successor,Ivan Vyhovs'kyi, recognized notonly the western Ukrainian territories but also theBrest and Navahrudak palatinatesin theGrand Duchy as partof the Hetmanate.24 Thus, by the time Khmel'nyts'kyidied theideal territorialvistas of the Ruthenian-Cossack pol-

This content downloaded from 80.7.236.84 on Sun, 1 Jun 2014 01:47:42 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions MAZEPA'SUKRAINE 7 ityand nationwere clear: they encompassed the Ruthenianterritories of the Kingdomof Poland and theCossack possessions.

3. Cossack Ukraine, the Ruthenian Nation, and a Ruthenian-Ukrainian Polity

Increasingdissatisfaction with Muscovite interferenceled Hetmán Ivan Vyhovs'kyito breakwith Muscovy and returnto the suzeraintyof the Polish kingunder the Union of Hadiach (1658).In negotiatingthis union, the Cos- sack Council suggestedthe formationof a Grand Principalityof Rus' that wouldbe in a tripartiteCommonwealth with the Kingdom of Poland and the GrandDuchy of Lithuania. The GrandPrincipality of Rus' was to includeall theRuthenian palatinates of the Kingdom of Poland (Belz, Bratslav, Volhynia, Kyiv,Podillia, Ruthenia (Galicia), and Chernihiv)and thePinsk and Mstyslaů areasof the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Such a territorialexpanse would com- pletelyencompass the Rutheniannation and polityas envisionedby Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi.25 Theseproposals were not accepted by the Polish side, and theactual treaty limitedthe "Grand Principality of Rus'" withinthe borders of the palatinates ofBratslav, Kyiv, and Chernihiv- in essenceconfining the principalityto the bordersof the Zbořiv Agreement.26 The newstatus of Ukraine and theCossack Host,as reflectedin thehetman's new title, was establishedas "thehetmán of Rus' and thefirst senator of the palatinates of Kyiv, Bratslav, and Chernihiv."27 Therewas no detaileddescription of Ukraine'sborder (towns, rivers, etc.). However,it is clearfrom the articlesthat those three palatinates constituted "Ukraine,""Little Rus'," and the "GrandPrincipality of Rus'-Ukraine"as is evidencedby the hetman'stitle, "hetmán of the GrandRuthenian-Ukrainian Principality."28The ZaporozhianCossack Host was to have 60,000 (the actual figuredropped to 30,000), plus 10,000 hiredtroops, financedfrom the taxation,as approvedby the Sejm,from the palatinatesof Kyiv,Bratslav, and Chernihiv.29 Therewas anotherattempt to enlargethe territory of the Principality of Rus'. The membersof the largeCossack delegation(almost 300 people) attending theratification procedures in theSejm brought with them a documententitled "Provisionsfor the Implementationof the TreatyStatutes," which again sug- gested"that the Volhynia, Rus' [Galicia],and Podilliapalatinates be unitedto the GrandPrincipality of Rus',"thus reaffirming the idea of a largerpolitical entityconsisting of the Hetmanate and theRuthenian areas of the Kingdom of Poland.30The Sejm did notconsider such a proposition,and thePrincipality of Rus' was limitedprimarily to theterritory of the Zbořiv Agreement. In fact,all Cossackformations outside of the Principality were to be dismantled.Thus, the

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Hetmanateof the Zbořiv Agreement was confirmedby the Hadiach agreement as a polityof the and theRuthenian nation. The Unionof Hadiach did recognizecertain prerogatives of the Ruthenian nationand Orthodoxfaith living outside this polity. Some demands(e.g., free- dom ofreligion, church property (Eastern-rite and Roman,etc.) were included in a muchwider territory: the three palatinates mentioned above, the palatinate of Volhynia,and the palatinateof Podillia,as well as othersubjects of the "reestablished"Commonwealth (the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, Belarus, and theSiversk region).31 This again echoes the claims made for the Union of Lublin, namely,that the violation of certain religious and culturalrights anywhere in the Commonwealthwas a violationof the rightsof the Rutheniannation in theprivileged area - now theGrand Principality of Rus'. TheUnion of Hadiach had very little chance of success. It was notacceptable to Muscovy,the Polishszlachta , or manyrank and fileCossacks. Although Vyhovs'kyidecisively defeated the Muscovite forces at theBattle of , a revoltagainst him on the LeftBank of the Dnieper Riverresulted in the electionof another pro-Muscovite hetmán. In essence,the Cossack-Ruthenian polity- the Hetmanate- was dividedalong the Dnieper,each bank withits ownhetmán, army, and administration.The Right-Bankpolity recognized the Polishking, while Left-Bank Ukraine recognized the Muscovite tsar.32

4. The Emergence of a Ukrainian Fatherland

The Unionof Hadiach helped shape a newconcept: that of a Ukrainianfather- land.The agreementanticipated a triuneCommonwealth sharing a common fatherland.The text of the agreement (6 September1658) affirmed the creation ofa "commonfatherland," in whichits three components were to enjoyequal rights.33The "Cossackversion" of this treaty included the followingformula: "In the commonstate there will be commonprivileges and benefitsto both confessions."34It emphasized "the return" of the Cossacks to "theircommon fatherland,"stating that the Cossack hetmán,together with the entire Host of ZaporozhianCossacks, who had been separatedfrom the Commonwealth, was returningunder the power of His Majestythe King while renouncing the protectionof all otherrulers.35 While the pro-PolishRight-Bank hetmans had to utilizethe terminol- ogy of a common fatherland,the pro-MuscoviteLeft-Bank hetmán, Ivan Briukhovets'kyi,countered this concept with the idea of a "LittleRossian/ Ukrainianfatherland." For example, in July-August 1663 he issueda manifesto to thepopulace of Right-Bank Ukraine (under Hetmán Teteria's rule):

IvanBriukhovets'kyi, hetmán of the Zaporozhian Host, faithful to His

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Majesty,the tsar. Wishing the good health and brotherly union with us inthe name of Our Lord to all faithfulOrthodox Rossian people/nation ofboth lay and clerical status, all officersand commoners... our beloved brothers,who reside on theother bank of Dnieper's towns and villages, we wouldlike to informyou about the following. While observing with theknights of our Zaporozhian Host that our beloved fatherland, Little Rossia,because of domestic disputes and frequent Muslim, Polish, and otherforeign troops' [invasions], and discordamong the [Cossack] leadersis drawingnear the abyss... we... single-heartedly and withone brotherlythought and love, seek to achieve...good order in our suffering fatherland.36

Whatwas thisUkrainian/Little Rossian fatherland? It was theHetmanate, the Ruthenian-Cossackpolity of the ZbořivAgreement and the ratifiedversion of the Union of Hadiach. It was thisUkrainian fatherland that was splitby the armisticebetween Muscovy and the Polish-LithuanianCommonwealth (Andrusovo,January 1667). The thirdparagraph of the armisticeagreement stipulatedthat the Commonwealthceded the entireSiversk region with Chernihivand the Palatinateof Chernihiv;all of Left-BankUkraine; the city and area of Kyiv(the latter were to be returnedto the kingon 15April 1669) (paragraph7); theZaporozhian Sich Cossacks remained under the joint author- ityof the king and thetsar (paragraph 5). As themost noted authority on the agreement,Professor Zbigniew Wójcik, put it, the truce was nothingless than an agreementabout thepartition of Ukraine.37 It was a partitioningthat was not acceptableto theCossack elite.In breakingwith Muscovy, the Left-Bank hetmán,Ivan Briukhovets'kyi,explained:

It wasnot only because of our own decision, but after the advice, taken fromthe Cossack officers of the Zaporozhian Host, that we brokethe allegianceand friendshipwith . There were good reasonsfor doingso: ...theMuscovite envoys and the Polish commissars negotiated peacebetween them, and swore to plunderand depredate our beloved fatherland,Ukraine, from both sides, Polish and Muscovite.38

5. Uniting the Fatherland:

As Briukhovets'kyichanged his pro-Muscoviteorientation, he attemptedto lead an uprisingon the LeftBank in 1668. He enteredinto talks with Petro Doroshenko,hetmán of Right-BankUkraine, who had accepted Ottoman protection,and senta delegationto .By June 1668 Briukhovets'kyi's armieshad driventhe Muscovite garrisons from a numberof Ukrainian towns.

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As theRight-Bank regiments commanded by Doroshenko entered Left-Bank Ukraine,the Left-Bank Cossacks rebelled against Briukhovets'kyi, killed him, and electedDoroshenko hetmán of a unitedHetmanate.39 ForDoroshenko, the June 1668 election to a unitedhetmancy was theapex ofhis career. For a briefmoment, and in defianceof both major powers, Doro- shenkoachieved the single overriding purpose of his hetmancy:uniting both banks of the Dnieper underone rule.Doroshenko describes this event in a proclamationissued to theBaturyn Convent:

Becauseupon the death of thelate Briukhovets'kyi both sides of the Dnieperdue to God'sintercession came together as theyonce used to be,and that all ofthe Zaporozhian Host unanimously agreed upon this andhanded to methe office of hetmán of the Zaporozhian Host, then I haveto fulfillthe duties of my office so thatnobody suffers the slightest indignityora singleinfraction ofone's rights.40

Throughouthis strenuoustenure as hetmán(1665-76), PetroDoroshenko neverwavered from the goal ofuniting the Zaporozhian Host withinthe ter- ritorythat was rightfullyits own- the territoryof the ZbořivAgreement. However,he also consistentlymade claimson behalfof the Orthodoxfaith and the Rutheniannation residing in the Polish-LithuanianCommonwealth. The hetmánalso had ambitionsof carving out a specificRuthenian/Ukrainian politicalentity that would includea unitedHetmanate and all the Ruthenian areas ofthe Polish Crown. This vision was similarto BohdanKhmelnyts'kyi's originalRuthenian project and the Cossack proposalsfor Hadiach (see map at right). The firsttwo policieswere clearly enunciated in Doroshenko'snumerous and constantnegotiations with the Poles. In all the discussionsand treaty proposalsthere were two basic elements: the Zaporozhian Host and theRuthe- nian/Ukrainianpeople/nation. The ZaporozhianHost was to have control over the territoriesof Zbořiv as a minimum,and as a maximum- control over additionalterritories in Podilliaand the Belarusianregiment that had existedat the timeof Bohdan Khmelnyts'kyi. Of course,neither the Com- monwealthnor Doroshenkocontrolled all ofthese territories, because some ofthem were under the control of his opponent, the pro-Muscovite Left-Bank hetmán.Thus, the Host's territorialdemands were at timesadjusted in the negotiationsto reflectreality. Beyond the basic territoryof the Host, every negotiationincluded extensive provisions for the Ruthenian/Ukrainian nation (people)living not only in theterritory controlled by the Host but by the entire Commonwealth.These included the abolition of the Church Union, the rights of Orthodoxclergy, printing presses, schools, the Ruthenianlanguage, and otherpressing matters.

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The Cossack-Polish negotiations, which continued on and offfrom 1669 to the mid-i670s,reaching their pinnacle during the workof the so-called OstřihCommission (10 May-22December 1670) provide a good example.Even thoughthe negotiations ultimately failed, the twenty-four articles concluded by themembers of both the Ukrainian and thePolish delegations contain invalu- able informationregarding Hetmán Doroshenko's political outlook. Article 10 indicatesDoroshenko's consistency in upholdingthe politicalborders of Cossack Ukraineon the basis of the provisionsof the Treatyof Zbořiv,rul- ingthat the ZaporozhianCossack Host withall its memberswere to remain withinthe boundariesof the Kyiv,Chernihiv, and Bratslavpalatinates and to continueliving freely on thoselands as well as on thelands ownedby the crown,magnates, gentry, clergy, towns, and villages without any infringement ofthe Cossacks' rights.41 In addition,Hetmán Doroshenko continued upholding the rightsof the OrthodoxChurch and theRuthenian nation within the borders of the Polish- LithuanianCommonwealth. Article 1 of the documentstates: "The ancient GreekRuthenian Faith and ancientRus' itselfjoined the Polish Crown in order to retaintheir liberties and thefree use oftheir language as faras thelanguage ofthe Ruthenian nation is heardin all cities,towns, and villagesof the Polish Crown as well as in the GrandDuchy of Lithuania."42Article 2 ruled:"That GreekFaith [Church] is to possess property,freedom of expandingold and buildingnew churches and monasteriesas wellas freedomof repairing them," stipulatingthat no ancientOrthodox churches can be transferredto the fol- lowersof the Union.43Article 21 demandedthat the metropolitanof Kyivbe electedfreely by the Orthodoxclergy and laityof the Ruthenian/Ukrainian nation,the hetmán, and the ZaporozhianCossack Host. No intrusionin the electionwas to be permitted;no hierarchliving outside the Ukrainianlands was to takethe title of metropolitan of Kyiv.44 Issues of educationand nativelanguage were addressedin threearticles. Article5 notedthat an academywas to be establishedin Kyivand thatit had to functionfreely, teaching the Rutheniannation in the Greek,Latin, and Ruthenianlanguages; and it was to enjoyrights and privilegessimilar to the ones of the CracowAcademy.45 Article 6 ruledthat another academy was to be establishedeither in Mahilioú,the Belarusianlands, or "here"in Ukraine, ifa suitableplace werefound. The academywas to enjoythe same rightsand privilegesas theKyivan one.46 Article 7 specifiedthat both schools and print- ing houses were to be establishedand to functionfreely.47 Clearly, this was a verycomprehensive program for the Ruthenian/Ukrainiannation of the Commonwealth. Evenat theend ofhis career the embattled Hetmán Doroshenko was nego- tiatingwith the Poles on thebasis ofthe Zbořiv Agreement and theUnion of Hadiach.In February1675 he sentto KingJan III Sobieskiof Poland "articles"

This content downloaded from 80.7.236.84 on Sun, 1 Jun 2014 01:47:42 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions MAZEPA'SUKRAINE 13 based upon the Zbořivand Hadiach conditions.Article 3 of the document demandedthat the Zaporozhian Cossack Host was to receiveits own territory withinthe borders of the palatinates of Kyiv, Chernihiv, and Bratslav,as wellas an additionalregiment in Belarusand thecity of Mahilioů. Polish troops were notto be stationedthere, and Polishlandlords and officialswere forbidden to enterthose territories.48 As forthe "religious issue," the document went even fartherthan Doroshenko s previousdemands: as statedin Article 1, considering the factthat the ChurchUnion had become deeplyrooted and could not be undoneentirely, the Uniate Church had to unitecompletely with the Roman CatholicChurch, while all ancientOrthodox monasteries and churchesin the Crownand theGrand Duchy of Lithuania must be takenaway from the Uni- atesand givenback to theOrthodox according to theprivileges of Wfedyslaw IV (1632)as wellas theconditions of the Zbořiv Agreement and theUnion of Hadiach.49 Doroshenko'svision of a specificRuthenian/Ukrainian polity that would extendbeyond the Hetmanatecould hardlybe made partof Polishnegotia- tions,since such a politywas to be carvedout ofthe Polish Crown. Neverthe- less,the Polishauthorities were aware of Doroshenko'sexpansive territorial view and were leeryof dealingwith him. In the "Relacja"compiled by the Polishnegotiators (commissars), special attentionwas paid to Doroshenko's wishto "securefor himself the title of a dukeor a princeand upon subjugating the Cossacks to rule over Ukraine,"with its borderalong the borderof the Commonwealthrunning from "Cracow, at theconfluence of the river Wislok to Vistula,that is fromthis side ofthe Vistula directly to Kazimierz;then from Kazimierzthrough Lithuania to Belarusup to Samogitiaand Smolenskalong thisbank of the Dnieper."50During his speech to the Sejm in 1672the Crown hetmán,Jan Sobieski, noted Doroshenko's wish to "pushthe border of Rus' up to Lublinand Cracowreaching as faras thename [ofRus'] and theChurch of Rus' are to be found."51 The visionof a polityconsisting not onlyof the Hetmanatebut also the Ruthenianlands of the Kingdom of Poland was revealedin Doroshenko'sdeal- ingswith the Muscovites. In December1667 a residentof Novhorod-Siversk, FedirChekalovs'kyi, was sentby the Muscoviteboyar, Petr Sheremetev, to learnDoroshenko's views and plans.52Chekalovs'kyi returned to Kyivon 25 December1667 (Julian calendar) and submittedhis reportto theboyar:

PetroDoroshenko was sayingthose words to me,Fedir Chekalovs'kyi, inChyhyryn: ...I havegenuine trust in the Lord and the Holy Theotokos, thatfor the glory of His TsaristMajesty and through my effort not only thisside of Ukraine, where we live,will be placedunder the high hand ofHis Tsarist Majesty, but [also] all of the country, which is tobelong to us,that is, the Principality ofRus' within the limits: Przemyšl, Iaroslav,

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Lviv,Galicia, Volodymyr, allthose chief cities of the Principality ofRus', I placehope in the Lord and want to serveHis Majesty faithfully [adding] thatterritory tothe Principality ofRus's ancient capital of Kyiv, placing it underHis Majesty's high hand.53

Thisprospect was offeredto theMuscovites only months after the ratification of the Treatyof Andrusovo, which not onlynegated Doroshenko's claims to theRuthenian lands of the Kingdom of Poland, but split the Hetmanate itself. The adamantposition of the two majorpowers (Poland and Muscovy)made negotiationswith the Muscovites pointless. This situation changed somewhat afterthe Turks forced a humiliatingtreaty on thePoles. In theBuchach (Bucz- acz) Peace Treatyof 1672,Poland renouncedall claimsto Cossack Ukraine. Such a renunciationseemed to preemptpoint 4 ofthe Treatyof Andrusovo, whichhad leftthe Right Bank to Poland.The Muscovite official who had taken overthe Little Russian Department, Artamon Matveev, was preparedto test the limitsof the armistice.54As a result,there began protractednegotiations betweenMuscovy and Doroshenko.The chief sticking point in the negotiations was Doroshenko'sinsistence that there be one Hetmanateon both sides of the Dnieper,with himself as hetmán.55The tsar,showing loyalty to the Left- Bankpro-Muscovite hetmán Ivan Samoilovych, was onlywilling to recognize Doroshenkoas hetmánof the RightBank.56 On one occasion, in late June 1673,Doroshenko stated that "on both banks of the Dnieper theremust be one hetmánand I am readyto giveup myoffice if there is one who is better thanme, who would not let down His Majestythe tsarand would not allow perishingboth himself and Ukraine....[As ofnow] Our Lordhas bestowedthe hetman'soffice onto me formy [own] heavy sins for I haveno peace and calm whatsoever...[and] always have to thinkhow notto lose myselfor thiscorner ofUkraine."57 Thus, the unity of the Hetmanate was ofparamount importance to Doroshenko,who consideredthe territoryhe controlledonly a cornerof Ukraine. Doroshenko'svision of the territorial extent of Ukraine can also be seenfrom hisdealings with the Ottomans. On 10 (20) August1668 Hetmán Doroshenko completeda drafttreaty with the sultan.As expectedin such a document, Doroshenkoacts on behalfof the "Cossackhost" ("bomcko Ka3aijKoe") and "Rutheniannation" ("PycKiw HapoAt")-58 Article 6 of the treatymakes refer- ence to the Cossack "fatherland,"forbidding the Ottomanallies to persecute the Christianfaith and plunderthe Rus' churchesin "thefatherland and in theirlands and towns."59This was a referenceto thefatherland of the Host- the Hetmanateof both banksof the Dnieper.However, the drafttreaty also containsa muchbroader idea ofa Rutheniannation:

The Rutheniannation is nowdivided into different countries (lands),

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but sharesthe commonfaith with the Greeks,and not onlyamong themselvesin thosecountries, but also in theborderlands, first, from thecountry where Przemyšl, Sambir, and the city of Kyiv are located and thentwenty miles to the second country, from the river Vistula, and from thethird one, i.e., Memn [Nemunas], and from the fourth country, where Sevskand Putyvl are, all of them are Cossacks, we hope that they will join us in ourdecision and will be in agreementwith us... and will be freed fromtheir bondage... [for they are currently] subjects of the Poles and the Muscovites,and are enslaved by their rulers with persuasions and, even more,with punishments.60

Thus,in additionto theHetmanate, the Cossack core, Doroshenko was propos- ingto carveout a principalityfrom the Kingdom of Poland (Przemyšl, Sambir, thelands east of the Vistula) and Nemunas(the Cossack part of Belarus), and the Muscovitestate (Sevsk and Putyvl).In essence,the hetmán was makingthe tra- ditionalclaim for the Ruthenian lands of the Polish Crown and theHetmanate, includingthe BelarusianCossack lands.In thisvision, however, Doroshenko pushesthe very stable boundary of the Hetmanate with Muscovy further east (Sevskand Putyvl).

6. Uniting the Fatherland: Ivan Samoilovych

HetmánDoroshenko's archrival, Ivan Samoilovych, was electedas thehetmán ofLeft-Bank Ukraine in 1672.Unlike Doroshenko, who had been electedhet- mán of the RightBank withoutPolish approval and acted independentlyof thePoles, Samoilovych was completelycontrolled by his Muscovite overlords. The electiontreaty points with Moscow even acknowledgedthe partitionof Ukraine.According to Article5 (of the HlukhivArticles), "places [towns] beyond[the river] Sozh wereto be transferredto thePolish side in accordance withthe Treaty of Andrusovo."61 Althoughhe was loyalto thetsar and acknowledgedthe limitations of the Treatyof Andrusovo, Samoilovych de factosubverted that policy and believed as ferventlyas Doroshenkoin a unitedUkrainian Hetmanate. Samoilovych, of course,would liketo have been the hetmánof such a unitedcountry and greatlyfeared losing his hetmancyto Doroshenko.Samoilovych subverted the Muscovitenegotiations with Doroshenko and constantlyurged the tsar to defeatDoroshenko militarily. In January1674 Hetmán Samoilovych got his wish and, together with Prince GrigoriiRomodanovskii and 80,000 poorlyprovisioned troops, crossed the Dnieper River.Doroshenko immediately asked forhelp fromhis Tatarand Ottomanallies. Faced with such a largearmy, Doroshenko quickly lost control

This content downloaded from 80.7.236.84 on Sun, 1 Jun 2014 01:47:42 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions l6 KOHUŤ overmost of the Right Bank and was forcedto retreatto hiswell-fortified capi- tal,Chyhyryn. Muscovite and Ukrainianforces besieged the city but repeatedly failedto take it. On 15 March 1674,in Pereiaslav,a Council of Colonels of Right-BankUkraine, in the presenceof Muscovitediplomats, elected Ivan Samoilovych"hetmán of both banks of the Dnieper."62 The fatesof war negated this attempt at incorporatingRight-Bank Ukraine as a Muscoviteprotectorate. Doroshenko was able to hold onto his capital untilthe arrivalof his Tatarallies. Romodanovskii and Samoilovychquickly liftedthe siege and retreated.But Samoilovych would never give up his claim and titleof "hetmán of both banks." In thefollowing year, while he was again besiegingDoroshenko's capital, Chyhyryn, on 6 November1675 Samoilovych issueda manifestoto theresidents of the town, encouraging them to convince Doroshenkothat he had to surrenderto Samoilovych:

Andwe desire that Doroshenko arrive in Baturyn and submit an oathof allegianceto us...for not only he, but all of you know that two years ago in Pereiaslav,I, with God's grace and the grace of His TsaristMajesty, waselected hetmán, on mypart unwillingly and unexpectedly, owing to theconsent of the officers on bothsides of the Dnieper and peopleof lowerranks, and was investedin thisoffice by His Majesty'sdecree. In viewof this... we persuade you to advise[Doroshenko] that... if he wants ourfatherland Ukraine to enjoy peace without bloodshed and calamities, thenhe must come to us... with an announcementofhis allegiance to His Majestyand to us.63

Samoilovychviewed Doroshenko's surrender to himas a finalvindication of his claim of beinghetmán of "bothbanks." In his correspondencehe never tiredof declaring that "to us, theZaporozhian Host belongsto theother side of the Dnieper."64In a letterto Illia Novyts'kyi(8 September1676) Samoilovychdeclared that he "bringsour fatherland, torn apart Ukraine, under one monarchand regiment[that is, thehetman's rule- ZK] in unity."65 Assumingand retainingthe title of "hetmán of both banks" were a fareasier task than controllingthem. In fact,Samoilovych's policy of reunitingboth banksunder his authoritywas opposed by all majorpowers. Both the Com- monwealthand theOttoman Porte (based on Doroshenko'ssubmission to their authority)had claimsto Right-BankUkraine, while Muscovy was notwilling to riskabrogating completely its very tenuous truce with the Commonwealth. Samoilovychdevoted considerable effort to subvertingor, at least,modify- ingthe Muscovite position in the on-and-offnegotiations between the tsar's envoysand the king.For example,in 1677,along with a petitionprepared by his officer'scouncil, Samoilovych sent a personalmessage to thetsar, advising thatthe Muscovitesshould not even discusswith the Poles the surrenderof Right-BankUkraine, particularly Kyiv and Chyhyryn.66

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In additionto thesediplomatic maneuvers, Samoilovych made an extremely bold move. In the late 1670s,as part of the anti-Ottomancampaign, Sam- oilovychoccupied the RightBank. In his effortsto deny support to the Ottomans(who were promotingtheir puppet hetmán, Iurii Khmel'nyts'kyi, as Doroshenko'sreplacement) as well as to the Poles, Samoilovychpursued probablyhis mostcontroversial policy: the forced resettlement of population fromRight-Bank Ukraine to the LeftBank. In two waves,one in 1678 and anotherin 1679,he forcednot only the Right Bank regiments to crossover but also theentire population, burning towns and villagehomesteads. It was this populationtransfer policy that completed the devastation of the RightBank, turningit intoa wasteland.67 Havingdeprived both the Ottomans and thePoles of the human and physical resourceson theRight Bank, Samoilovych favored a Muscovitesettlement with theOttoman Porte rather than the "Eternal Peace" withthe Commonwealth. Samoilovych'sefforts in thatdirection were so intensivethat the Ukrainian scholarV'iacheslav Stanislavs'kyi considers Hetmán Ivan Samoilovych a major contributorto the conclusionof the Peace of Bakhchisarai(1681), which was signedby the tsarand the sultan.68Apparently, Samoilovych expected to be rewardedwith those territories on theRight Bank. He was bitterlydisappointed whenthe Peace ofBakhchisarai assigned the "barren territories" to theOtto- man Porte.In his letterto the tsar (August1682), Samoilovych wrote that the concludedtreaty was not in the best interestseither of Muscovyor the Hetmanateand requestedthat the "barren territories," ceded to theOttomans, shouldbe grantedto him,the hetmán,for his faithfuland perpetualservice and also in orderto reversethe loss ofhonor; for, even though he was hetmán ofboth sides ofthe Dnieper, part of that honor was transferredto thesultan. In thehetman's words, "the tsar should order that the entire nation be united underhis, the hetman's, authority and mace."69 Not onlydid Samoilovychfail to establishhis authorityover the "barren areas,"but Muscovyand the Commonwealthwere inchingtoward signing a comprehensive"Eternal Peace" and forgingan anti-Ottomanalliance. Attempt- ingto intervenein thosenegotiations, Samoilovych continued to plead three issuesbefore the Muscovite monarch: the Right Bank, the position of Orthodox Rutheniansin theCommonwealth, and thesmall Belarusian territory beyond the Sozh Riverstill held by the Cossacks despiteearlier accords between the Muscovitesand thePoles.70 In thisrespect, Samoilovych's requests very much reflectedthe traditionalviews of hetmán- fromBohdan Khmel'nyts'kyito PetroDoroshenko, who had consistentlydefended the rights of the Ruthenian faithand nationin the Commonwealthand the territorialintegrity of the Hetmanate. Samoilovychattempted one more adjustmentto the boundariesof the Hetmanate,shifting his attentionto theCossack state'seastern border. Some of the populationfrom the RightBank had settledon territorybelonging to

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Muscovy- .On thatbasis, Samoilovych initiated a projectto incorporatethe Cossacks of Sloboda Ukraineinto the Hetmanateunder his authority.It was an attemptto shiftthe territory of the Ukrainian fatherland eastward.In late1680 and early1681 Samoilovych sent Ivan Mazepa to Moscow to conductnegotiations on thismatter.71 Muscovy had no intentionof transfer- ringthe Cossacks of Sloboda Ukraineto thejurisdiction of the Hetmanate, and theproject became moribund. Samoilovych'scontinued attempts to securethe RightBank also ended in failure.The "EternalPeace" was finallysigned in Moscow in April1686. It did indeedpermanently split the Hetmanate between Muscovy and theCommon- wealthmore or less alongthe Dnieper River.72 It assignedto thePolish king the lands beyondthe Sozh River(the smallarea aroundtoday's border between Ukraineand Belarus),still being held by the Cossacks as partof the Hetmanate. Samoilovych'sdesiderata did have some impacton thepeace agreement:the cityof Kyivand a considerablechunk of surroundingterritory on the Right Bankwere granted in perpetuityto the tsar;the ZaporozhianSich Cossacks wereassigned solely to thedomain of the tsar, and thetreaty contained provi- sions whereby"His Majestythe Kingwould not forcethe Roman Catholic faithand the Union upon the Lord'sGreek-Rus' [Orthodox] faith, churches, and bishoprics:[the bishoprics of] Lutsk,Galicia, Przemyšl, and Belarus."73 HetmánSamoilovych's greatest impact on the agreementwas the following provision:

Regardingthose desolate towns and places,from the town of Staiky, downstreamthe Dnieper, along the river Tiasmyn, namely: Rzyshchiv, Trakhtemyriv,Kaniv, Liushny, Sokolnia, Cherkasy, Borovytsia, Buzhyn, Voronkiv,Kryliv, and Chyhyryn... those envoys and agreed upon and ruledthat those towns must remain empty [desolate] as theyare now.74

Thus,although these areas were recognized as thedomain of the king, he was deniedany use ofthem. Such tacticalvictories were insufficientto assuage Samoilovych.He was allegedly"very sad" upon thesigning of the "Eternal Peace."75 The membersof thehetman's family described Samoilovych's attitude as follows:"Our Ivan is veryangry and blamesMoscow profoundly;but he willnot act theway [the late]Ivan Briukhovets'kyidid."76 WhileSamoilovych did notbreak his lifelong allegiance to thetsar, neither did he acceptthe "Eternal Peace." In a memorandumto thePolish king, Sam- oilovychstates that

on theChyhyryn side of the Dnieper those lands and beyond belonged

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to themace of the Zaporozhian Host from the first hetmans and were fromtime immemorial our strength; however, according to thecurrent peaceagreement, which was allowed by our sovereigns, these lands were passedto the king's side, which we have implemented without complaint, butthese lands were really subordinate and belong to us.77

The hetmáncontinues petitioning, claiming that "these lands shouldremain withus foralthough they are now barren,they still belong to us and should be ours"78 These actions,words, and activitiesof Ivan Samoilovychcontributed to his ousterand arrestin 1687.Among the chief proofs of the hetman's alleged treasonwas that"he spoke fiercelyabout the lands on the otherside of the Dnieper:it will not be as the Muscovitesand the Poles have determinedin theirtreaties. We willact in accordanceto our [own]needs."79 It is clearthat Hetmán Samoilovych had a precisevision of the territorial extentof the Cossack UkrainianHetmanate. In fact,he attemptedto enlarge itby incorporating such Muscovite territories as Sloboda Ukraine.Moreover, he also held onto the conceptof the hetmánas a protectorof the Ruthenian faithand nationin the entireCommonwealth. However, did Samoilovych have a conceptof a Ruthenian/Ukrainianpolity that would extendbeyond theHetmanate? As the hetmánof Left-BankUkraine and as the resultof the officialtruce betweenthe Commonwealth and Muscovy,Samoilovych had no basisor occa- sion to discussthe fate of Lvivor Volhynia.In practice,he was totallypreoc- cupied withreconstructing the Hetmanateof both banks. Nonetheless,he was wellaware that the Hetmanate was partof a muchlarger Ukraine, and he triedto makethat clear to theMuscovite government, which was negotiating an "EternalPeace" withthe Commonwealth.In early1685 Samoilovych sent a petitionto Moscow, in whichhe recommendedthat the Commonwealth returnall landsinhabited by , because

allthat side of the Dnieper, and Podillia, Volhynia, Pidliashshia, Pidhir'ia andall of Chervona Rus' with the glorious cities of Galicia, Lviv, Przemysl, Iaroslav,Lublin, Lutsk, Volodymyr, Ostřih, Zaslavl, Korets, and other ones,from the beginning of the existence of our peoples to [thetime] of theRus' monarchs [had been in our possession] and only some hundred yearsago the Polish kingdom took hold of them.80

Thus,Hetmán Ivan Samoilovychalso had a conceptof a "GreaterUkraine" thatwould includethe Hetmanateand the Ruthenianlands of the Kingdom ofPoland.

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7. The Ukrainian Fatherland and the Sich Cossacks

Anystudy of earlymodern territorial visions of Ukrainewould be incom- plete withoutconsidering the role of the Lower Zaporozhian Host, or the Sich Cossacks. These Cossacks,who providedBohdan Khmel'nyts'kyiwith militarybacking for the 1648 uprising, continued to existas a separateentity beyond(below) the Dnieperrapids; hence the LowerZaporozhian Host. As such,the Sich Cossacks were partof the politicalentity created by Hetmán Khmel'nyts'kyi,and the hetmánwas able to exerthis authorityover them. Subsequenthetmans were not able to maintaintheir control over the Sich Cossacks, and underthe leadershipof an elected chieftain(koshovyi), they became important,independent political and militaryplayers in thesouthern steppe.Thus, the Sich Cossacks de factowere not withinthe boundariesof theHetmanate. Nevertheless,the Sich Cossacks continued to be inherentlyintertwined with theHetmanate. Most hetmans attempted to asserttheir authority over the Sich. Attimes they were successful. For example, Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyis successor, IvanVyhovs'kyi (1657-59) received assurances from the Sich Cossacks that they recognizedthe hetman's authority and did not"harbor any disobedience," but were"obeying [their] lordship's will."81 The Sich Cossackswere also a focalpoint for uprisings against the hetmán and wereused as a powerbase bythose aspiring to thehetmancy. For example, HetmánIvan Briukhovets'kyi(1663-68) firstestablished himself at the Sich and thenused hisposition to capturethe hetmancy on theLeft Bank. However, once he was in controlof both the LeftBank and the Sich,Briukhovets'kyi movedimmediately to curbthe power of the Sich Cossacks, breaking up their settlementsinto smaller units and forbiddingthem to deal directlywith the Muscovites.In hisnote to Moscow Briukhovets'kyiinsisted that the Sich Cos- sacks wereto "reportto the hetmánregarding all mattersand not deal with Moscow withoutthe hetman'sconsent," just as it used to be duringthe time ofHetmán Vyhovs'kyi.82 The relationshipof the Sich Cossackswith the Hetmanatewas, ofcourse, greatlycomplicated by the partitioning of Ukraine and theemergence of com- petingRight- and Left-Bankhetmans with their opposing protectors and alli- ancesystems. This gave the Sich Cossacks greater opportunities for independent action.For example, the chieftain, ,maneuvered between hetmans Doroshenkoand Samoilovych.In themid-i66os he supportedDoroshenko's attemptto throwoff Polish protection on theRight Bank and to unifyUkraine. However,Sirko was an opponentof Doroshenko's1668 Ottomantreaty, and withhis attackson the Tatarshe dealta deathblow to Doroshenko'sefforts. Sirkofavored a pro-Muscovitecourse. Despite his opposition to Doroshenko, Sirkomaintained a relationshipwith him. He was even godfatherto one of

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Doroshenko'schildren,83 and whenDoroshenko was forcedto capitulate,he insistedthat he would do this onlyin frontof Sirkorather than the hated Samoilovych.84 Sirko'srelations with Hetmán Samoilovych were strained.Nevertheless, he endorsedSamoilovych's consistent pro-Muscovite stance and recognized his authorityas hetmán.In a letterdated 14 December 1677 Sirkoassures Samoilovych:"We all do not separateourselves from you, for this would do greatharm to our beloved fatherland,but ratherseek unityand yourguid- ance,which under the present circumstances we findnecessary for the entire ZaporozhianHost, and to thiswe trulyvouch.85 Sirko also recognizedthat the Sich Cossacks were linkedto a Ukrainianfatherland. In July1677 Sirko wroteto Samoilovych,informing him that "it is wellknown to yourlordship thatwe arewaging war, our only craft, where it is necessaryfor the protection and unityof our bewailed fatherland Ukraine."86 He did nothesitate to express similarviews either to the tsaror to Muscoviteofficials. In one of his letters to PrinceGrigorii Romodanovskii, Sirko writes: "Beseeching Your Princely lordship,our benevolentpatron and His Majesty,I am askingfor your kind- ness to our fatherland,Little Rus', and to us, the ZaporozhianHost."87 On 14 December1677 Sirko wrote a letterto theMuscovite tsar, saying: "Even though we concludedthis truce during the infidels' attack on Ukraine,our fatherland, we believethat we havedone no harmto anyoneby taking this step, for it was a necessaryone."88 Althoughthe Lower Zaporozhian Host was defendingthe Ukrainian father- land, it remainsan open questionwhether it considereditself part of that fatherland.In analyzingthe eighteenth-centuryCossack chronicles,Frank Sysynhas shown that the Lower Zaporozhian Host Cossacks considered themselvesas originatingfrom the fatherlandbut havingemigrated beyond its borders.Thus, they could have been defendersof the fatherlandwithout beingpart of that fatherland.89 Nevertheless,from the time of Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi to Ivan Samoilovych, theLower Zaporozhian Host Cossackswere very much part of the territorial visionof Cossack Ukraine,as an autonomousappendage connected to the Hetmanate.

Conclusions

In thefour decades since the 1648 revolt, the territorial vistas of the Ukrainian Cossackswere remarkably consistent. At itscore were the possessions of the ZaporozhianHost thatincluded the areas covered by the Zbořiv Agreement, a smallpart of conquered Belarus, and thesemi-independent Lower Zaporozhian Host (Sich Cossacks).These territories were united as a singlepolitical entity

This content downloaded from 80.7.236.84 on Sun, 1 Jun 2014 01:47:42 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 22 KOHUŤ underHetmán Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi, but subsequently were fragmented into a Right-BankHetmanate, a Left-BankHetmanate, and the Sich Cossacks. It was thisHetmanate that was viewedas thefatherland- a fatherlandthat was tornasunder by the Muscovite-Commonwealth accords of 1667 and 1686. The secondterritorial delineation was thatof "Greater Ukraine" combining Cossack Ukrainewith the Ruthenianlands ofthe Kingdomof Poland.It was vigorouslypursued as a politicalproject by HetmánBohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi, was includedin the proposalsfor the Union of Hadiach, and held by both Hetmán Petro Doroshenko and Hetmán Ivan Samoilovych.The "Greater Ukraine"idea predatesthe Cossack revolution and was alreadypresent in the latesixteenth century. The consistencyof this territorial delineation for over a centuryis, in myopinion, indicative of the development of a specificUkrainian political-territorialidentification that separated Ukraine from Belarus. These two territorialdelineations were linked to a specificconstitutional interpretation.The originalincorporation of the Ruthenianlands into the Kingdomof Poland in 1569 guaranteedcertain prerogatives to the Ruthe- niannation. While these rights were supposedly guaranteed to theRuthenian nation(the Orthodox nobility) of the incorporated lands, their violation any- wherein the Commonwealthwas considereda violationof the rightsof the nobility(and, later, of the Cossacks) in theincorporated territories. Thus, the Orthodoxnobles and, subsequently, Cossack hetmansacted as protectorsof Ruthenianreligious and culturalinstitutions in the entireCommonwealth. The responsibilityfor the OrthodoxRuthenian faith and culturethroughout the Commonwealthdelineated the thirdmost expansive territorial vista of the Cossacks,encompassing the entire Kyivan metropolitan see (see map on p. 11,above). It is in exercisingthis responsibility that Doroshenko defended theuse ofthe Ruthenian language within the entire Commonwealth, or Sam- oilovychpressed so hard to have some guaranteesfor the Orthodoxof the Commonwealthincorporated into the "Eternal Peace" betweenMuscovy and thePolish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Thesewere the territorial vistas of the Cossack administrationwhen Ivan Mazepa became hetmánin 1687.Was he awareof them? Mazepa almostcer- tainlywas. He had servedboth hetmans, Doroshenko and Samoilovych,and would have been aware of Doroshenko'snegotiation points with the Poles. In addition,as chiefnegotiator with the Tatars,he would have knownof the 1668treaty with the Ottomans, in whichDoroshenko's territorial vistas were outlined.90Moreover, while in the serviceof HetmánSamoilovych, Mazepa traveledto Moscowwith proposals to expandthe hetmans authority to Sloboda Ukraine,and he was also involvedin Samoilovych'snegotiations to alterthe "EternalPeace" of1686.91

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Notes

1. OrestSubtel'nyi, Mazepyntsi : Ukrainskyi separatyzm na pochatkuXVIII st.(Kyiv, 1994), 170. For further discussion of the term "Rossian," see note 4 below. 2. NataliaYakovenko, "Choice ofName versusChoice of Path:The Names ofUkrainian Territories from the Late Sixteenthto theLate Seventeenth Century,"in A Laboratoryof Transnational History : Ukraine and Recent UkrainianHistoriography , ed. GeorgiyKasianov and PhilippTher (Buda- pest;New York,2009), 135. 3. Ibid.,123. 4. The termnarod can mean a groupof people or a nationin the cultural- linguisticsense. Polish usage influenced Ukrainian usage in thesixteenth and seventeenthcenturies. As DavidAlthoen has shown,the predominant use of narod in Polish was fora cultural-linguisticand not a political group(thus, Italian or Germannation and almostnever Venetian or Wür- tembergiannation). In thisway, Ruthenian (rusky i) narod refersto the communityof Ruthenians (Belarusians-Ukrainians) that was seen as such a communityor nation.After 1569 theCommonwealth was referredto as "ofthese two nations," referring to theKingdom of Poland and theGrand Duchyof Lithuania- i.e., political entities, but ones thathad a dominant or titularnation as itscore. In anyevent, as theuse of"Ruthenian nation" after1569 and Althoensresearch demonstrate, narod continued to be used morecommonly for cultural-linguistic nations. No similarresearch has beendone on theuse ofnarod in Ukrainianand inthe Cossack Hetmanate. Thus,in some instancesthe meaningof narod is clear: e.g., Orthodox people,not nation. However, whenever narod is precededby an adjectival form,such as "Rus',""Ukrainian," or "LittleRossian," it may signify a nation or people ofa specificland. It is clearthat the adjectival form of Rus' gen- erallyrefers to theRuthenian nation. It is less evidentwhether adjectival formsof Little Rossia or Ukrainerefer to a culturalethnic nation or to the inhabitantsof those lands. In instanceswhere "Little Rossian" or "Ukrai- nian"is an obviousreplacement for the olderterm "Ruthenian," one can talkabout a Ukrainianor LittleRossian nation. See David Althoen,"That Noble Quest: FromTrue Nobilityto EnlightenedSociety in the Polish- LithuanianCommonwealth, 1550-1830," 2 vols.(Ph.D. diss.,University of Michigan,2000; rev.for DMA Printingand Publishing,2001), 1:152-217; and FrankSysyn, "Concepts of Nationhood in UkrainianHistory Writing, 1620-1690,"Harvard UkrainianStudies 10, nos. 3-4 (December1986): 393-423. Thereis a problemin translatingvarious adjectival forms of Rus'. In the CommonwealthRus and Rusynywere used in describing the Rutheniannation. In the seventeenthcentury a Hellenizedversion,

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Rossiane, displacedRusyny and was renderedrossiiskyi in the adjectival form.Thus, rossiiskyi narod still designated the Ruthenian nation (meaning Ukrainians,possibly Belarusians, but not Russians).However, rossiiskyi was also beingintroduced to designatethe Muscovite tsar and his realm: e.g.,the rossiiskyimonarch. In translatingvarious forms of rossiiskyi, I use "Rossian"when it refersto Ukraine,and "Russian"when it refersto thetsar. See Hans Rothe,"What Is theMeaning of 'Rossijski' and 'Rossija' in the Polishand RussianConception of the Statein the 17thCentury?" Ricercheslavistiche 37 (1990): 111-21. 5. SerhiiPlokhy, The Originsof theSlavic Nations: PremodernIdentities in Russia, Ukraine,and Belarus (Cambridge,2006), 188-89. Cited in MykhailoHrushevs'kyi, Istoriia ukraïns'koï literatury, vol. 6 (Kyiv,1995), 295. See also an Englishtranslation of this account in Meletii Smotryts'kyi, Rus' Restored:Selected Writings of Meleti; Smotryc'kyj, 1610-1630, trans. David Frick,(Cambridge, Mass., 2005), 330. 6. FrankE. Sysyn,"Regionalism and Political Thoughtin Seventeenth- CenturyUkraine: The Nobility'sGrievances at theDiet of1641," Harvard UkrainianStudies 6, no. 2 (June1982): 175 -76. 7. Ibid.,176-80. 8. MykhailoHrushevsky, The Cossack Age, 1626-1650, vol. 8 ofHistory of Ukraine-Rus',trans. Marta Daria Olynyk(Edmonton; Toronto, 2002), 517. 9. Ibid.,535. 10. Hrushevsky,-Rus', 8:534. 11. Ibid.,593; DmitriiBantysh-Kamenskii, Istochniki malorossiiskoi istorii (Moscow,1858), 19. 12. MykolaVasylenko, "Terytoriia Ukraïny XVII viku,"luvileinyi zbirnyk na poshanuD. I. Bahaliia, vol. 1 (Kyiv,1927), 112. 13. Ibid.,116-17. 14. Hrushevsky,History of Ukraine-Rus', 8:641-47. 15. OleksandrHurzhii, Ukraïnska kozatska derzhava v druhiipolovyni XVII- XVIII st. (Kyiv,1996), 20. 16. Bantysh-Kamenskii,Istochniki malorossiiskoi istorii, 58-62. 17. Hurzhii,Ukraïnska kozatska derzhava,24. 18. DokumentyBohdana Khmel'nyts'koho,ed. I. Kryp'iakevych(Kyiv, 1961). See documentsno. 264, 271,and 273. In his introductionto theEnglish editionof vol. 9 (pt.2) ofHrushevs'kyi's History of Ukraine-Rus' (Edmon- ton,2010), IaroslavFedoruk argues against Hrushevs'kyi's assertion that afterthe Battle of Zbořiv (1649) the hetmán did not return to thatintention until1655, supposedly under the stimulus of the Swedish king's incursion intothe Commonwealth.

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19. DokumentyBohdana Khmel'nyts'kohotnos. 264, 271,and 273. 20. "WhenGod gracefullyallowed for the unification of the county of Pinsk with us, which happened willinglyand wholeheartedly."See Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi'smanifesto to thenobility of Pinsk county (28 June1657) inPamiatniki, izdannye Kievskoiu komissieiu dlia razboradrevnikh aktov , vol. 3 (Kyiv,1848), 245-49. See also MykhailoHrushevs'kyi, Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy, vol. 9, pt. 2 (New York,1957), 961-65, 52-59, 1257-77; SerhiiPlokhy, Origins of the Slavic Nations , 320, 327-28. 21. Plokhy,Origins of the Slavic Nations , 238. 22. ValeriiSmolii and ValeriiStepankov, Ukraïns'ka derzhavna ideia XVII- XVIII stoliť: problémyformuvanniat evoliutsiï, realizatsiï (Kyiv, 1997), 93. 23. Pamiatniki,izdannye Kievskoiu komissieiu , 3:238-40; Hrushevs'kyi,Isto- riia Ukrainy-Rusy, vol. 9, pt. 2, 1394-96. 24. Hrushevs'kyi,Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy , vol. 9, pt. 2, 1404-05, 1429, 1435; Plokhy,Origins of the Slavic Nations , 238. 25. Vasyl'Herasymchuk, "Vyhovshchyna i Hadiats'kyi traktat," Zapysky nau- kovohotovarystva im. Shevchenka(hereinafter ZNTSh ) 89 (Lviv,1909): 82. 26. Hurzhii,Ukrainska kozatska derzhavat37. 27. "Universalyukraïns'kykh het'maniv vid Ivana Vyhovs'kohodo Ivana Samoilovycha(1657-1687)," in Universalyukraïns'kykh het'maniv: Mate- rialydo ukraïns'kohodyplomatariiu , series I (Kyiv;Lviv, 2004), 47. 28. "IeTMaHyBeAMKoro khhjkchíh PyccKoro YKpawHCKoro." See Universaly ukraïns'kykhheťmaniv , 46-47. 29. Universalyukraïns'kykh heťmaniv , 42. 30. Tetiana Taïrova-Iakovleva[Tat'iana Tairova-Iakovleva],"Hadiats'ka uhoda- tekstolohichnyianaliz," in Hadiats'ka uniia 1658 roku (Kyiv, 2008): 38-39. 31. Universalyukraïns'kykh het'maniv , 44-45. 32. Politicaldevelopments in Ukraineduring this historical period are also discussedin PetroSas, Politychna kul'tura ukraïns'kohosuspil'stva (k. XVI-pershapol. XVII st.) (Kyiv,1998); TetianaIakovleva [Tat'iana Iak- ovleva],Heťmanshchyna v druhiipolovy ni 50-kh rokivXVII stolittia: prychynyi pochatok Ruiny (Kyiv, 1998); ViktorHorobets', Elita kozats'koï Ukraïnyu poshukakhpolitychnoï lehitymatsiï: stosunky z Moskvoiuta Varshavoiu(1654-1665) (Kyiv,2001); Valerii Smolii and ValeriiStepankov, Stanovlenniaukraïns'koï dyplomatychnoï sluzhby: Zovnishnia polity ka uriadu B. Khmel'nyts'koho(1648-1657) (Kyiv,2001); V. A. Smolii,ed., Istoriiaukraïns'koho kozatstva, vol. 1 (Kyiv,2006). 33. Universalyukraïns'kykh heťmaniv , 34.

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34. Akty,otnosiashchiesia k istoriiIuzhnoi i Zapadnoi Rossii: Sobrannyei izdannyearkheograficheskoi kommissiei (hereinafter AIuZR) (St. Peters- burg,1862-92), 4:141-44 (on p. 142). 35. Ibid.,143. 36. Universalyukrainskykh heťmaniv , 291-94. 37. ZbigniewWójcik, Traktat Andruszowski 1667 rokui jegogeneza (Warsaw, 1959),255. 38. Universalyukraïns'kykh heťmaniv , 353. At this time "Ukraine" was becom- ingthe more popular designation for the territory of the Hetmanate, and "Ukrainianfatherland" was becomingthe most common designation. However,various formsof Rus' were also utilized,particularly "Little Rus'"or "Rossia."The latterappeared more frequently in associationwith Muscovyand probablyreflects official nomenclature after the addition of "LittleRussia" to thetsar's title. As a consequenceof theseterminologi- cal changes,the term "Ruthenian nation" was beginningto be displaced by "LittleRossian" or "Ukrainiannation." The terminologicalshifts are explainedwell in Serhii Plokhy'sstudy, Origins of the Slavic Nations, 161-202; and NataliaIakovenkos Narys istoriï Ukraïny z naidavnishykh chasivdo kintsiaXVIII stolittia(Kyiv, 1997), 430-38; see also herarticle "Choiceof Name," in Laboratoryof Transnational History , 131-32. 39. TheEyewitness Chroniclef Harvard Series in UkrainianStudies, vol. 7, pt. 1 (1878;reprint, Munich, 1972), 97-100. See also VitaliiEingorn, Ocherki iz istoriiMalorossii v XVII veke:Snosheniia malorossiiskago dukhoven- stvas Moskovskimpravitelstvom v tsarstvovanieAlekseia Mikhailovicha (Moscow,1899), 416-19. 40. Universalyukraïns'kykh heťmaniv , 411. 41. AIuZR, 9:200-201. 42. Ibid.,196-208 (on p. 197). 43. Ibid.,195. 44. Ibid.,204. 45. AIuZRt9:199. 46. Ibid. 47. Ibid. 48. DmytroDoroshenko, Heťman PetroDowshenko : ohliad ioho zhyttiai politychnoïdiiaVnosty (New York,1985), 535. 49. Ibid.,534. 50. Smoliiand Stepankov,Ukrains'ka derzhavna ideia , 159. 51. Ibid,159-60. 52. AIuZRt6:240. 53. Ibid.,241. 54. VitaliiEingorn, "Otstavka A. L. Ordina-Nashchokinai ego otnosheniek malorossiiskomuvoprosu," Russkaia mysl (September1901): 102-3.

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55. Doroshenko,Heťman PetroDowshenko , 461. 56. Ibid. 57. Eingorn,Ocherki iz istoriiMalorossii , 918. 58. Bantysh-Kamenskii,Istochniki malorossiiskoi istorii , 208-10. 59. Ibid.,209. 60. Universalyukraïns kykh heťmaniv, 381. 61. Bantysh-Kamenskii,Istochniki malorossiiskoi istorii , 15. 62. EyewitnessChronicle , 116. See also Taras Hunchak[Taras Hunczak], ed., ' Tysiacharokiv ukraïns koïsuspil 'no-politychnoï dumky: u dev'iatytomakh , vol. 3, bk. 1, Tretiachverť XVII st. (Kyiv,2001), 585. 63. Universalyukraïns kykh heťmaniv , 697. 64. TarasChukhlib, "Osoblyvosti zovnishnoï polityky I. Samoilovycha ta prob- lemamizhnarodnoho stanovyshcha ukraïns'koho het 'manatu v 1672-1686 rr."Ukraïns kyi istorychnyi zhurnal , no. 2 (2005): 48-67, here52. 65. Akty,otnosiashchiesia k istoriiZapadnoi Rossii(hereafter AZR ), vol.5 (St. Petersburg,1853), 140. 66. Chukhlib,"Osoblyvosti zovnishn oï politykyI. Samoilovycha,"53. 67. EyewitnessChronicle , 147. See also Taras Chukhlib,Heťmany i monar- khy:Ukraïns 'ka derzhavav mizhnarodnykhvidnosynakh 1648-1714 rokiv (Kyiv;New York,2003), 206, 294-95. 68. V'iacheslavStanislavs'kyi, "'Stattť heťmana IvanaSamoilovycha shchodo Vichnoho myru,'"Ukraina v tsentraVno-skhidniiEvropU no. 1 (2000): 348-85, here349. Stanislavs'kyi'sarticle includes several original docu- mentsdetailing Samoilovych's interventions with the Muscovites on the issue of the "EternalPeace" betweenMuscovy and the Commonwealth; ibid.,357-85. 69. Chukhlib,"Osoblyvosti zovnishn oï politykyI. Samoilovycha,"56. ' 70. Stanislavs'kyi,Stattť heťmana Ivana Samoilovycha, 350; Chukhlib, "Osoblyvostizovnishn oï politykyI. Samoilovycha,"58. 71. OleksanderOhloblyn, Heťman Ivan Mazepa ta iohodoba , ed. Liubomyr Vynar[Lubomyr Wynar] (New York;Kyiv; Lviv; Paris; Toronto,2001), 65-66. 72. See Polnoesobranie zakonov rossiiskoi imperii (hereafter PSZR1), vol. 2 (St. Petersburg,1830), 770-86. 73. Ibid.,777. 74. PSZRIt 2:776. 75. CompareHetmán Samoilovych's reaction to thatof PetroDoroshenko: Afterthe latter learned about the Muscovite-Polish settlement at Andru- sovo (1667), he was ill fortwo days.See Bantysh-Kamenskii,Istochniki malorossiiskoiistorii , 298. 76. Ibid. 77. Chukhlib,"Osoblyvosti zovnishn oï politykyI. Samoilovycha,"63.

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78. Ibid. 79. Bantysh-Kamenskii,Istochniki malorossiiskoi istorii, 302; SergeiS olov'e v, IstoriiaRossii s drevneishikhvremen , vol. 7 (Moscow,1962), 397; Chukhlib, Heťmanyi monarkhy,302. 80. ValeriiSmolii, "Pravoberezhna Ukraïna druhoï polovyny XVII-pochatku XVIII st.: provintsiiaRechi Pospolytoïchy chastynasamostiinoï der- zhavy?"Pol's'ko-ukraïns'ki studiu no. 1 (1993): 118;Smolii and Stepankov, Ukraïns'kaderzhavna ideia , 181-82; Chukhlib,Heťmany i monarkhy, 299. 81. AIuZR, 4:60. 82. Eingorn,Ocherki iz istoriiMalorossii, 246. 83. Doroshenko,Heťman PetroDowshenko, 31-32. 84. Ibid.,573. 85. LystyIvana Sirka: Materialydo ukraïns'kohodyplomatariiu , ed. lu. A. Mytsykand M. V. Kravets'(Kyiv, 1995), 45-47 (on p. 46). 86. LystyIvana Sirka, 43. 87. Ibid.,16. 88. Ibid.,47-50 (on p. 48). 89. FrankE. Sysyn,"Fatherland in EarlyEighteenth-Century Ukrainian Politi- cal Culture,"in Mazepa and His Time:History, Culture, Society , ed. Gio- vannaSiedina (Alessandria, 2004), 51-52. 90. Ohloblyn,Heťman Ivan Mazepa , 63. 91. Ibid.,66.

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