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Germany and Direct Defense V3 The Return of Direct Defense In Europe: The Challenges for Germany March 5, 2019 Version 3 BERLIN, GERMANY AND THE INTERNATIONAL FIGHTER CONFERENCE 2018: A LOOK BACK 4 THE RETURN OF DIRECT EUROPEAN DEFENSE: THE GERMAN CHALLENGE ........................... 7 GERMANY, ITS MILITARY AND SHAPING A WAY AHEAD: STRATEGIC FOCUS, ALLIES AND CREATION OF AN APPROPRIATE FORCE STRUCTURE .................................................................. 8 GERMANY AT THE CENTER OF EUROPEAN DIRECT DEFENSE: WHAT ROLE WILL IT PLAY? 11 GERMANY, DIRECT DEFENSE AND RESHAPING COALITIONS .................................................... 13 GERMANY AND ITS STRATEGIC FUTURE: A PERSPECTIVE FROM THE GERMAN MINISTRY OF DEFENCE ON EVOLVING SCENARIOS ............................................................................................ 17 GERMANY AND DEFENSE: A MILITARY READINESS CRISIS? ..................................................... 24 DIRECT DEFENSE AND GERMANY: REBUILDING THE BUNDESWEHR ....................................... 25 THE RETURN OF DIRECT DEFENSE AND THE GERMAN CHALLENGE: THE PERSPECTIVE OF GENERAL (RETIRED) EGON RAMMS ............................................................................................... 28 THE CHALLENGE FACING A GERMAN RESET ON DIRECT DEFENSE: THE PERSPECTIVE OF LT. GENERAL (RETIRED) KLAUS-PETER STIEGLITZ ..................................................................... 32 THE STRATEGIC SHIFT AND GERMAN DEFENSE: THE PERSPECTIVE OF BRIGADIER GENERAL (RETIRED) RAINER MEYER ZUM FELDE ....................................................................... 34 A BUILDING BLOCK IN ENHANCED EUROPEAN DEFENSE CAPABILITIES: THE GERMAN- NORWEGIAN COMMON SUBMARINE BUILD ................................................................................... 39 FRANCO-GERMAN INITIATIVES AND THE NEXT PHASE OF EUROPEAN CONSTRUCTION ..... 40 THE SIGNING OF THE AACHEN FRANCO-GERMAN TREATY: TOWARDS MORE OR LESS EUROPEAN DEFENSE INTEGRATION? ............................................................................................ 42 Joint (and concrete) Projects ........................................................................................................ 43 Enhanced Military Co-operation .................................................................................................... 44 Enhanced Common Strategic Culture .......................................................................................... 44 Conclusion .................................................................................................................................... 44 GERMANY, FIGHTERS AND THE FUTURE OF AIR COMBAT: PERSPECTIVES FROM THE INTERNATIONAL FIGHTER CONFERENCE, 2018 ............................................................................ 45 THE NEXT PHASE OF FCAS: DASSAULT AND AIRBUS LAUNCH A JOINT CONCEPT STUDY . 52 THE LUFTWAFFE SEEKS A TORNADO REPLACEMENT: THE RAFS TORNADO REPLACEMENT IS ALREADY INTEGRATED INTO THE FORCE ................................................................................ 55 THE LUFTWAFFE AND TORNADO TRAINING IN THE UNITED STATES: THE CHALLENGE OF PREPARING FOR CONFLICT IN THE EXTENDED BATTLESPACE ................................................ 59 Training and Development for the Kill Web or an FCAS ............................................................... 60 The Euro-Hawk Case .................................................................................................................... 63 What All of This Means for the Tornado Replacement ................................................................. 63 GERMAN DEFENSE POLICY AT A CROSSROADS: THE TORNADO SUCCESSOR ISSUE ......... 64 THE EUROPEAN AIR GROUP AND THE EUROPEAN AIRPOWER TRANSITION .......................... 68 NATO’S AIRPOWER COMPETENCE CENTER ON THE EUROPEAN AIRPOWER TRANSITION .. 73 CREATING A 21ST CENTURY NATO DETERRENT APPROACH: THE ROLE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS ........................................................................................................................................... 78 2 Table of Figures Figure 1 German Chancellor Angela Merkel (R) and Lieutenant General Rainer Glatz, Commandant of the Bundeswehr Operations Command speak at the Bundeswehr Operations Command in Geltow, eastern Germany on April 10, 2010. One day after the funeral service of three German soldiers, killed in a Taliban ambush in Afghanistan on April 2, Merkel informed herself at the command center of the German Bundeswehr about the current situation in Afghanistan. AFP PHOTO DDP/ MICHAEL KAPPELER GERMANY OUT (Photo credit should read MICHAEL KAPPELER/AFP/Getty Images) .................................................................................................... 26 Figure 2 USAF Joint Command commander, Lt. Gen. David M. Rodriguez, greeting German Gen. Egon Ramms during a visit to ISAF Joint Command at Kabul Afghanistan International Airport in Kabul, Afghanistan in 2009. ........................................................................................................... 29 Figure 3 Franz Josef JUNG l CDU federal minister of defence is together with general Klaus Peter STIEGLITZ on April 2, 2007 when the Tornado bombers of the German Air Force are sent to their mission to Afghanistan. .......................................................................................................... 33 Figure 4.. Brigadier General Meyer zum Felde (now retired0> ............................................................. 37 Figure 5 Conceptualizing the Extended Battlespace Operating Against a Peer Competitor .................. 52 Figure 6 Conceptualizing the Future Combat Air System ...................................................................... 53 Figure 7 Conceptualizing the F-35 Global Enterprise ............................................................................ 58 Figure 8 Moving a Tornado to a New Mexican Fair Grounds Prior to Moving to the New Mexico Museum of Space History ............................................................................................................... 60 Figure 9 Air Chiefs of the Luftwaffe Discuss the Tornado Replacement Issue ..................................... 65 Figure 10 Slide from EAG Briefing on Airpower Transition ................................................................. 70 3 Berlin, Germany and the International Fighter Conference 2018: A Look Back 11/22/2018 By Robbin Laird I spent a good deal of the 1980s traveling within and dealing with German security issues. A key challenge in the early part of the decade was the Euromissile challenge and working common positions among European partners and with the United States to deal with Soviet intrusions and policies towards Western Europe. I lectured on these issues and wrote several books on the subject as well. It was a tough political environment, for President Reagan certainly was winning no popularity contests in Western Europe at the time. At the Fighter Conference, we heard that we unexpectedly won the Cold War and were unprepared for the consequences. I get the point but in 1985 I formed a working group at the Institute for Defense Analysis with both government and non-governmental experts to look at the prospects and possibilities for German unification and how we might deal with the Soviets to achieve this outcome. Several future members of the Clinton Administration were in that group and we discussed quite often what role might a unified Germany play in Europe and would it act like a “normal” state after unification. Several of us cautioned the more optimistic members that dealing with East Germany would take time for West Germany to pay for and culturally integrate. Others were more optimistic and expected the pace of change to be rapid and the emergence of the new Germany to be a significant player in the rebuild of Europe more generally. When the moment came, we could provide inputs to the process and again I wrote several pieces, including a couple of books on the subject as well. So when I returned to Berlin for the international fighter conference this month, naturally thoughts of the 1980s and then the 1990s came flooding back into my mind, notably as I was not too far from Checkpoint Charlie, which is a museum for the current generation, but a fact of life for mine. What then ensued in the 1990s would set the stage for where we are now. 4 Germany along with most European states in the wake of the collapse of the Wall and the emergence of collapsed Soviet Union, celebrated their good luck with a defense holiday. And with this defense holiday, direct defense became a museum piece along with Checkpoint Charlie. After the Crimean takeover by the Russians in 2014, the beginning of a new phase was emerging, one where direct defense had to now be considered as a realistic challenge for Europe, NATO and the United States. But the Cold War required one type of political-military structure but now is required a quite different one. How to build a relevant direct defense structure for Europe is not consensual and some states are more advanced in dealing with the challenges than others. Notably, Northern Europe is accelerating their concern with direct defense. This leaves a fundamental question with regard to Germany. What is the direct defense strategy of Germany today? Notably with European disaggregation and conflict with the US President, how is German to shape a realistic and resourced defense strategy? What is the relationship of Germany to Poland in central
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