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brallos and the thermopylae pass (22-24 april) 425

Chapter Fifteen

Brallos and the Thermopylae Pass (22-24 April)

The morning of 22 April saw plans for the imminent W Force evacuation from finalized. After returning to Anzac Corps headquarters at Leva- dia from his late roadside night conference the previous night, Blamey gave verbal orders for the evacuation to Mackay and Freyberg (via a runner) at 8.00 a.m. The plan was to form a corps rearguard at Erithrai (Kriekouki), south of Thebes, based on the 4th NZ Brigade, which was tasked to deny the Athens road to the Germans until the early hours of 26 April.1 Blamey further instructed that on the night of 23-24 April one brigade group from each of his divisions was to move to concealed pre-evacuation assembly areas at and Marathon. The following night these two groups would embark, while the remaining brigade group in each division (the 6th Aus- tralian Division was to reform into two brigade groups, while the 4th NZ Brigade was the designated corps rearguard) moved into their assembly areas. On the night of 24-25 April this second wave would then depart, with the Erithrai rearguard itself evacuating 48 hours later. With no time to spare, Mackay and Freyberg immediately began issuing their own orders.2 Blamey exhorted his troops: ‘This is a time when all our training and control must be exerted to the full. Duty is duty ... Every officer must pull his weight, using all his initiative, energy and courage to carry out this movement in military order. Cool heads!’3

1 Excluding this rearguard force, all subsequent W Force withdrawals were to be restricted to carrying only what equipment and weapons that could be manhandled. All other material, non-troop carrying vehicles, and even guns were to be disabled or destroyed in place (although the order pertaining to guns was later countermanded). Anzac Corps Operational Order No. 2, 22 April 1941, AWM 54, 534/2/30. 2 War Diary HQ 1 Aust Corps Campaign in Greece, AWM 3DRL 6643; I. Mackay, ‘Cam- paign in Greece’ [transcript], 15 June 1941, AWM 27, 116/1; ‘Miscellaneous papers of Greece and ’, ANZ ACGR 8476, PUTTICK2/4/6; letter, Charrington to ‘Cynth’, 29 April 1941, LHCMA Charrington 4/75a; Anzac Corps Operational Order No. 2, 22 April 1941, AWM 54, 534/2/30; ‘Report on operations in Greece, 4 Inf. Bde.’, 30 April 1941, ANZ ACGR 8476, PUTTICK4/2/4; diary of Brigadier E. Puttick (24 March – 3 August 1941), ANZ ACGR 8479, PUTTICK7/1/1; G. Long, Greece, Crete and , pp. 143-5. 3 Draft Middle East Public Relations Pamphlet: ‘The Twenty Days in Greece’, AWM 3DRL 6643, 1/37. 426 chapter fifteen Within the New Zealand Division Freyberg chose Hargest’s 5th NZ Bri- gade to embark first, followed by the 6th NZ Brigade. The former was to begin withdrawing along the coast to Ayia Konstantinos on the night of 22 April, and to the Marathon beaches the following night in accordance with Blamey’s plan, while Barrowclough’s brigade remained in place at Thermo- pylae with all divisional artillery. Contrary to corps’ orders, Freyberg in- structed all New Zealand units to retain their heavy weapons and fighting equipment until embarkation. A small divisional rearguard, based on the NZ cavalry regiment, was raised by Freyberg to take up position west of Cape Knimis. For his part Mackay chose first to withdraw a composite bri- gade to be known as ‘Allen Group’, consisting of Brigadier Allen’s depleted units and Brigadier Savige’s 17th Australian Brigade. The 19th Australian Brigade group, which included the 2/1st Australian Battalion, would follow the next night. Unlike the New Zealanders, Mackay’s troops set about de- stroying their heavy equipment as ordered.4 Wilson’s instructions to Blamey were also replicated to all W Force units not under the Anzac Corps’ direct command. As a consequence large num- bers of Allied administrative and medical units, for example, began leaving Athens on 22 April.5 At the same time Brigadier Parrington, in command of the 81st Sub-Base Area, began shepherding 5000 administrative and base troops across the Corinth Canal towards Argos in expectation of evacuation. Concurrently, Colonel J. Blunt, the British Military Attaché in Athens, set out touring the to arrange local Greek assistance to any W Force troops who found themselves unable to be evacuated. One group, however, that was apparently left out of W Force’s rapid evacuation plan- ning was the RAF. Just after midnight, 22 April, the senior RAF Administra- tive Officer in Greece, Group Captain A.S.G. Lee, complained that up to this point he had been given no information as to the evacuation of his

4 ‘NZ Div Operation Order No. 4’, 22 April 1941, ANZ ADQZ 18906, WAII8/2/10; Extract for 64 Medium Regiment War Diary, 22 April 1941, TNA WO 169/1492; ‘The 6th Division in action’, G Long, AWM PR88/72; NZ Division Operation Order No. 4, 22 April 1941, AWM 54, 534/2/26 [Part 3]; 6 Australian Division Operations Orders No. 6, 22 April1941, AWM 54, 534/2/30; letter, Seccombe to Wards, 25 May 1955, ANZ ADQZ 18902, WAII3/1/2; ‘Report on operations in Greece 16 Aust, Inf. Bde.’, 29 July 1941, AWM 3DRL 4142, 2/9 [6-14]; ‘Material copied for use in the compilation of New Zealand War History’, ANZ ADQZ 188999, WAII2 [Microfilm 3650]; ‘Report of activities in Greece Apr 41 by Lt. Col. R.R. Vial’, 12 January 1945, AWM 54, 534/2/32; ‘Chronology of Operations, 19 Aust Inf Bde – Greece’, AWM 54, 534/1/2. 5 In fact, the first vessel with 600 base troops aboard departed Piraeus on 19 April. ‘UK War Narratives – The campaign in Greece’, ANZ W3799/4; ‘British Narrative, “The Campaign in Greece”, April 1941’, ANZ ADQZ 188999, WAII2 [Microfilm 3618]; McClymont, To Greece, p. 367.