J. S. Asian Stud. 03 (01) 2015. 15-27
Available Online at ESci Journals Journal of South Asian Studies ISSN: 2307-4000 (Online), 2308-7846 (Print) http://www.escijournals.net/JSAS THE MODERN ROOTS OF THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL FRAGMENTATIONS IN BALUCHISTAN IN PAKISTAN Hoshang Noraiee* Independent Professional Researcher, 10 Durants Park Avenue, London, Enfield EN3. United Kingdom.
A B S T R A C T
Baluchistan is a marginalized area in Pakistan. During the last decade, the amount of chaos, lawlessness, rivalries, conflicts and conspiracies has reached an alarming level, which has severely affected the entire social and political life of this area. The troubles have evolved in a specific historical context that of the colonial legacy of borderland policies, in a complex process of interaction between the weak Pakistani state and security-oriented policies on one hand, and tribally-based structures on the other. The purpose of this article is to explain the historical roots of current rivalries and conflicts in Baluchistan, which reflect the interests of different factions of tribes andsub-tribes who have redefined their identities with hybrid patterns of tribal nationalism. Keywords: Baluchistan, Bugtis, Colonialism, Fragmentation, Hybrid, Indirect rule, Marris, Mengals, Nationalism Pakistan, Patronage, Sardar, Tribe.
INTRODUCTION one of the poorest countries in the world, but Baluchistan is a large area divided into three parts Baluchistan is the poorest province (UNDP, 2013) in the among Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan. Baluchistan is country. According to UNDP Human Development written in Baluchi, Farsi and Urdu in similar ways, but on Report (2013). Pakistan’s Human Development Index is the basis of dialects and accents in different local areas, 0.515 and its rank in the world is 146 (among 182 the words are pronounced differently. In the English countries). texts it has been written as Baluchistan, Baloochistan, In modern times, the British contacts with Baluchistan Beloochistan, Balochistan, Belochistan, etc. Recently, the started in 1809, when the British sent their officers, first nationalists in Pakistan have tried to standardize the Captain Grant and then Pottinger and Christie, to assess words as Baloch and Baluchistan. The biggest section of the geopolitical conditions of the area, in light of the Baluchistan is now part of Pakistan. Baluchistan threat of Napoleon to India. Three decades later, the Province is the largest in terms of the area, and the contacts led to real influence and control of the entire smallest in terms of the population, in the Pakistani area, particularly after the killing of the Khan of Kalat, federal system. The federal system replaced the “one Mir Mehrab Khan, who was the most powerful chief in unit” system introduced by General Ayub Khan in 1955. Baluchistan, in December 1839. This was the beginning Baluchistan Province constitutes about 43% of the of a new era of control by the British, as the most whole Pakistan’s territory of 796,095 square kilometers, powerful colonial power in modern history. The Khanate but it is the most desolate part of the country, with just of Kalat was a tribal confederation ruled by a Brahui about 5-7% of the whole Pakistan’s population of 179 dynasty of Ahmadzai, and was functioning as a “proto- million people (BBC, 2013). It is a mineral-rich area state”, with certain obligations imposed by the British (particularly in copper and gas), but struggles with Empire. This relationship was frequently defined and ______problems of poverty and underdevelopment.______Pakistan is redefined over time, but evolved into different examples * Corresponding Author: of indirect rule, which were supposed to be more Email: [email protected] effective and much cheaper for the British, while still © 2015ESci Journals Publishing. All rights reserved. enabling them to establish a degree of control and
15 J. S. Asian Stud. 03 (01) 2015. 15-27 stability in the area, and to keep away other rival been much simpler: a section of people who live in powers. Particularly in the context of the “Great Game” Baluchistan, as tribe or non-tribe, have immigrated with (Hopkirk, 1992), in order to tighten the security belt different cultural, ethnic, linguistic backgrounds, from further, from 1876 onwards the northern strip of different areas. These considerations question a simple Baluchistan came under the direct control of the British; historical account based on possession of “land”, but in many aspects indirect rule, at a lower level, was “natural” rights and purity of the race. Baluchistan is still exercised there. even a heterogeneous area in religious terms (mainly Baluchistan became part of Pakistan in 1948. Whether Sunnis, Shias, and Zegris, but also some Hindus and Pakistan occupied Baluchistan by coercive means or Christians). Baluchistan joined Pakistan voluntarily are still very Now, for more than a decade, Baluchistan has been controversial issues. While the nationalist Baluch argue entangled with further conflicts and widespread human that Pakistan had occupied Baluchistan by force, many rights abuse (HRW, 2010, 2012; International Crisis Pakistani sources believe that Baluchistan had joined Group, 2007; Amnesty International, 2011a, 2011b; Pakistan, following decisions in favor of incorporation by CRSS, 2012), but this article has no space for dealing the Khan of Kalat and many other sardars, voluntarily. with these issues. This article is rather an attempt to The modern history of Baluchistan has been presented highlight some aspects of internal socio-political by the colonial British writers, and more recently by the problems, such as the resistance of social fragmentation Baluch nationalists, as a continuous process involving of and tribal-sardari conflicts in Baluchistan. Sardar, hundreds of tribes and sub-tribes, reified by kinship and particularly in Pakistan, has a wide meaning which existing as quite independent socio-political entities. includes tribal chiefs, feudal and even influential local Many tribes have existed for a long time and acted as bosses. In Baluchistan, they are also called mir, khan, independent or semi-independent socio-political units, nawab, sardarzadah, nawabzadas, malik (pashtun) etc. but many of them were invented and reinvented in the These internal socio-political problems will be explained process of political conflicts and formation of new by a complex process of interaction between tribes and alliances (Pehrson, 1979). the external powers who entered and controlled the In terms of demographic structure, Baluchistan is a area: first the British Empire, then Pakistan. It will be significantly pluralistic society. Baluchistan is a multi- explained how this process has shaped the structure of cultural, multi-linguistic and multi-ethnic area, in which the tribal systems and influenced tribal politics, which the Baluchi speakers (excluding Brahuis) are very likely has led to fragmented and hybrid social and political to be less than 50% (possibly about 35-40%) of the relations. This research is based on a literature review. province’s population. Baluchistan is also inhabited by FROM THE BRITISH FORWARD POLICY TO Brahuis, Lasi,Jats (Jamotes), Dehwaris (Farsi Speakers), ENCAPSULATION OF BALUCHISTAN BY PAKISTAN Pashtuns, and also Hazarhs, Seraikis, Punjabis and For the British Empire, Baluchistan had no economic Sindhis who have immigrated to Baluchistan and settled significance, and as a whole was not worth political there for generations. It should be borne in mind that integration. But for geopolitical and military reasons, it even the Baluch historians believe that the “Baluch”, as was closely watched as a buffer zone. This was seen as “Rind” and “Lashari” tribes, entered this area from necessary to protect the Indian borders from any surrounding areas in the 15th century. There is no possible invasion by rival powers, who could approach agreement as to where their original point of departure through Iran or Central Asia. The British authorities was (Syria, North Iran or Central Asia?). If it is true, then undertook some measures to protect the administrated it is very likely that they entered this area and areas, particularly Sind, from the neighboring Baluch “occupied” the land by force, and suppressed “others”. tribal invasions and predatory incursions. At an earlier They possibly adopted the previous “native” cultures stage, in 1840-1876, the British pursued a “close border” and language or imposed their own. Even so, it is more policy, which started from the storming of Kalat and the likely that the result was a hybrid of two or more killing of the Khan of Kalat, Mir Mehrab Khan, the most cultures. The primordialistic obsession of the influential chief in Baluchistan, in 1839. nationalists, to find pure ethnic roots of the “Baluch”, is This was a fatal blow to the Khanate authority in entirely based on myths. Reality is more likely to have controlling the tribal sardars. Then the sardars, not only
16 J. S. Asian Stud. 03 (01) 2015. 15-27 among the Baluch tribes in Makran, but also among explained by a broader policy identified as the “three- Brahui tribes in Sarawan and Jahlwan, just in the fold frontier” by Lord Curzon in India (Embree, 1977), backyard of Kalat, became more reluctant to obey the consisting of the Kalat Khanate, British Baluchistan and Khan of Kalat, and strengthened their autonomy. In spite the leased areas (Agency Territories). Kharan and of British expectations, the subordination of Khan to Lasbela sometimes were considered as separate “states” British authority did not strengthen the Khan’s authority and Gwadar was also an area leased to Masqat. At the and did not lead to further centralization of the area; it same time, in each division of Baluchistan there were ended in insurgencies, chaos and insecurities (Gechki, varied forms of administration and political controls. For 1982)i.Obviously, this policy failed;andthe British had no example, the political agent in Sibi district, which was intention (and even could not afford) to fight with part of British Baluchistan, politically controlled the insurgent tribes and pay for the building of a “state” for autonomous tribal areas of Marris and Bugtis, as well as the Khan. tribes in the Lahriniabat of Kalat (The Imperial Gazetteer As a consequence of this failure, the British adopted of India Baluchistan, 1906). Sandeman’s “forward policy” (Bruce, 1900), which was a The Kalat Khanate, as a confederacy and the biggest softer policy designed to take more responsibility to section in Baluchistan, remained under the indirect rule facilitate more peaceful penetration in Baluchistan. of the British. British Baluchistan, in a broader sense According to Lord Roberts, in a speech in 1898, as the included the leased areas, such as Quetta and Chagai, Russians were approaching closer to the Indian border, was a narrow strip that emerged in 1876, and the British needed to see the other side of the “hills” permanently came under direct control of British India. where the enemies could use the passes (Frontier and This part was controlled by a more sophisticated, multi- Overseas Expeditions from India (III), 1910). Lord layer administration, in which the British Political Roberts was quoting the Duke of Wellington, who said agents had the most important roles, but Jirgas, Shahi that “we must be able to see the other side of the hill”. Jirga, levy, police, headmen etc.all played different, but For Lord Roberts, the “Forward policy” was an attempt important rolesin assuring law and order. As Embree to extend the British influence over, and establish law commented, the British aims were strictly limitedto and order along the border, where anarchy, murder, and imposinglaw and order; and a level of social reform, robbery had reigned. He believed that the policy of non- rather than social change (Embree, 1979). interference with the tribes, as far as they did not make Since these forms of political arrangements were trouble, was wise forty year earlier, although it was associated with different forms of authorities, even selfish, and not worthy of a great “civilising power”. But British Baluchistan was not fully an administrated area. lately,this policy had become most unwise and Therefore, the creation of the bureaucratic system was imprudent (Frontier and Overseas Expeditions from India very much mixed with semi-bureaucratic and traditional (III), 1910). organizations.However the purpose of the British was By bringing the sardarsin direct contact with the British not political integration, the power of the sardars was political agents, the sardars directly benefited from the weakened to some extent, but was not seriously British financial and political support and contributed to challenged.Because of this weakness, there were more maintaining a level of law and order in their own opportunities for internal competition and more constituencies. In terms of peace in the whole area, the possibilities for able, influential and effective chiefs to forward policy was more successful; nevertheless, this play important roles as member of Jirgas or ShahiJirgas undermined the power of the Khan of Kalat and and act as headmen etc. But since the effectiveness of restructured the system of sardari confederation under the roles in the new context could only be realized by colonial control (Swindler, 1996, p. 181; Spain, 1979). accepting the superiority and supervision of the British This process of restructuring in Baluchistan gave clearer officers, the patron-client relationships were delimitation and demarcation of the borders, but created strengthened. even more layers of controlled fragmentations. In the With direct contacts with the chiefs, the British directly early 20th century, three or even more political paid them subsidies or kept and paid levy corps, as they arrangements across geographical divisions could be did in Makran, and paid the chiefs for protecting the identified in Baluchistan. These arrangements could be telegraph line. Kharan’s chief Noushirwani, as a semi-
17 J. S. Asian Stud. 03 (01) 2015. 15-27 independent state, also received 6000 Rs per annum India: Baluchistan, 1906). According to the same source, (The Imperial Gazetteer of India: Baluchistan 1906, p. the revenue of the Kalat was based on 3 principle 177). For the protection of the Bolan Pass, the British sources: subsidies and rents paid by the British also directly paid money to the Mazarani Marris and Government, interest from investment, and land Kurds (Bolan, 1986). revenue. Subsidies included RS 1000,000 paid under The sardars, to a large extent, offered their loyalty, treaty of 1876, and rents included: RS 30,000 for the obedience and services directly to the British, while Bolan Pass, and RS 151500 rent for the leased areas. drawing patronage from them.Through Since 1893 a surplus of 41.5 lakhs has been invested in gainingfurtherpolitical support and economic resources, Government securities and received 1.5 lakh interests the main sardars strengthened their political and per year. From this revenue maintenance of the former economic power, which changed their behavior in their Khan, Mir Kodadad Khan, subsidies to Jhalawan chiefs, own tribes and communities as well. In the context of the Brahui Thanas, and the expenses of the Makran erosion of traditional functions such as incursion and administration were paid. The total revenue was warfare, sardars had to redefine their new roles. On one estimated to be 7.5 and 8.5 lakhs. Expenditure amounted hand the sardars had to sell their image as powerful and to 3.5 or 4 lakhs. A sum of RS 53, 000 annually was capable representatives of their tribes to the British, and expended by the British in shape of telegraph subsidies on the other hand they had to regulate the tribal paid to chiefs for controlling their tribesmen and the practices, to meet the requirements of the colonial maintenance of levies. Then 1.2 lakhs per annum was power. However, sardars could not achieve this paid for the Makran Levy Corps (Imperial Gazetteer of effectively without a degree of consent of the tribal India: Baluchistan,1906). members.Gaining consent, under relatively new and The sardars failed to build infrastructure and uncertain conditions, in which authority of the sardars promotenew methods of production and trade, but they had also been damaged,was dependent on the ability of were enjoying the consumption of relatively more the sardars to obtain support, other than that they luxurious goods. Under the Kalat Khanate, for example, traditionally had. education, health and security system remained much Previously, manytribes obtained booty through the very more backward than in most parts of British dangerousprocessesof fighting, looting and robbery, in Baluchistan, particularly where areas were directly which all male and ambitious tribe members could administered. participate and gaina reasonably fairshare of personal After the emergence of Pakistan, in 1947, in spite of the status through their bravery, but now hardly any could formation of a new “nation state”, the colonial legacy of have such an opportunity. Now the injection of money the frontier structure strongly continued to exist.Some from the British, allocated to the sardars, partly scholars have even traced the segmentary system in compensated for the losses of the traditional income Pakistan back to Mughal empire a few centuries ago from raiding and banditry, but could not completely (Embree, 1979; Lindholm, 1979; for recent compensate for the psychological and sociological status developments see Lieven, 2011).This meant that indirect they had. The money, directly handed to the sardars, was rule associated with tribal sardari leaderships and used by them as a new means of strengthening their patron-client relationships limited the process of power. Further access to money also increased the integration of Baluchistan inPakistan. In a new context, sardars power of consumption, in growing trading later on, particularly when some Pakistani central markets in tribal communities. governments, such as that of Ayub Khan with his one By adopting the forward policy, the British maintained unit policy and Bhutto with his agenda of the abolition of an acceptable level of peace, but the sardars, not just in sardari system, attempted to enhance their control on the tribal areas and the Kalat Khanate, acted as “rentier” Baluchistan, the sardars in Baluchistan strongly resisted “classes”, and so their power, status and prestige were in order to maintain their autonomy. Because of fewer accordingly transformed. The Khan of Kalat, for example, resources, and less prestige and power than the colonial had high revenue in the early 1900s, but instead of British,Pakistan had no choice other than accepting investing in Baluchistan, he invested much money in the some forms of indirect rule. British banks, to gain interest (Imperial Gazetteer of In the face of the resistance of the sardars and the
18 J. S. Asian Stud. 03 (01) 2015. 15-27 changing balance of power, the Pakistani central the Government; second, he was a mediator, attempting government had to define and redefine their to bring the tribe and the representatives of the relationships with the sardars, to maintain a degree of Government to some mutually agreeable position in their loyalty/obedience and reduce the level of tension regard to various kinds of policy matters and their with them. What has been called the “encapsulation” of administration; third, he was a broker, attempting on the tribes, by anthropologists (Baiely, 1969; Salzman, behalf of the tribe to acquire advantages of resources 1974; Swindler, 1979),has adequately explained the from the Government (Salzman, 1974). process of interaction between the central government Control of resources strengthened the position of a and the sardars, which has provided the sardars, as sardar as a patron and his tribesmen as his clients. This middle men, with some resources and the space to resulted in a differentiation in political authority and maintain their autonomy. This line of argument has also economic power within the tribe. As far as a tribal sardar been taken by the Baluch intellectual nationalists, for economically became independent from his tribe’s example Janmohammad Dashti (1982) and Enayatullah people he would shift to a higher class status. Now it is Baloch (1987), who have romanticized the pre-colonial quite obvious that, as Salzman, (1973, 1974), had era. A more profound argument was put forward by a suggested, the gap inside tribes in Baluchistan, Pakistani Marxist, Aijaz Ahmed (1973), from a historical hascreated some choices for some other tribal members materialism point of view, who argued that colonialism to challenge the main chief who has lost his traditional had frozen the transformation of Sardari-tribalism into credibility among the tribes' people. This process leads feudalism to undermining of tribal authority (Pehrson, 1979). Nina Swindler (1979) suggested that the Pakistani In local literature, the progressive poets have widely Government, to a large extent, was uncertain about using used the concept of “Dallal” in Baluchi. This concept sardar as middlemen in a tribal society, which could closely overlaps that of the “middleman”. In modern strengthen sardars further. The process of encapsulation poetry a number of anti-sardar poets such as Gul Khan might have been inconsistent, but in reality, it has Naseer, AzatJamaladini and Adam Haqqani have created a space which has facilitated negotiations considered sardars as Dallal. But in their poems Dallal between sardars and the bureaucracy of Pakistan. Both also means “traitor” and “predator” Adam Haqqani in a civilian and military Pakistani governments, to a large poem, “parangi” (westerners or imperialism here) extent, encouraged a patronage system in which the (1979) and also in another poem called “Zamaanag but local sardari powers, could mutually serve them. Badal” (the time changed) (1972), describes new It seems that since Swindler wrote her very stimulating sardars as poisonous “cobra”, changing positions to articles, many changes have happened in the ways that deceive people (Haqqani, 1987).It seems that Haqqani the Pakistani Government exercises power. The even believed that rebellious nationalist sardarswere intention and power of the central government to made by the westerners as Nawabs and sardars, and enhance the rationalization of the society in Baluchistan now wanted to cheat people to sustain their sardari have become weaker and the clusters of local patronage statuses (Haqqani, 1987). networks have increased. These have led to a weaker, There have been some other political and economic more inefficient, more fragmented and more corrupt transformations in Pakistan, which have affected the system, which is less capable of allocating resources to traditional role of sardars inside their tribes and the sardars, who have many more expectations than insociety. At the political level, the formation of before for a very recently updated analysis (Lieven, federalism in Pakistan, and some regional and global 2011). shifts during and after the cold war; and at the economic Drawing from some wider cases in the Middle East, level, the importance of further local energy sources, for including the encapsulation of the Yarahmadzai tribe in both the local sardars and Pakistan, has been very Iranian Baluchistan, Salzman (1974) suggested that crucial factors. indirect rule puts the chief in a position of a middle man The emergence of the federal system in the 1970s in to fill at least three functions: First, he was an Pakistan had a complex influence on tribal relations in intermediary acting as the channel through which Baluchistan. On one hand, it facilitated allocation of information and resources flowed between the tribe and resources more fairly and pushed the bureaucratic
19 J. S. Asian Stud. 03 (01) 2015. 15-27 system to spread and reach more isolated areas. On the etc. This helped sardars to act as a new entire class and other hand, it weakened the power of the central they have had many opportunities to define and redefine government, by creating strong intermediate institutions their roles withPakistan’s central power, as the evidence such as the provincial government and parliament. This in the mass media clearly shows (The International system in reality redefined and strengthened the level of News, 2010)ii. Many sardars gained, to some extent, more indirect rule by creating a bigger distance between independence in their relationship with the Pakistani central authorities and provincial and local powers. The central government (Wirsing, 2008).But they also had to huge gap between the “core” and the “margin”, in the negotiate with Pakistan over the nature of contracts, context of the tribal structure, to a large extent brought royalties, and access to profitable markets. As it will be bureaucratic institutions at local levels, as another shown later, these sources of energy and natural wealth source of power, in control of sardars. However, the intensified the intra-tribal tensions. provincial government and parliament to some extent These changes provided the sardars with resources to downgraded the tribal autonomy and pushed the strengthen their local patronage networks. At the same sardarsto exercise their authority through new channels. time, Pakistan’s central government, which has been However, while this opened the space, in many areas, for desperately dependent on energy from Baluchistan, used some severe intra and inter-tribal rivalries, it did not zero tolerance policies (Wirsing 2008)to physically stop sardars from controlling resources and power at eliminate the radical separatists by using extra-legal and provincial and local levels. Concentration of resources in coercive means to maintain its energy security provincial government, either in parliamentarian or strategies. On the basis of the relatively lower shares of military appointed ones, jobs and political positions, Baluchistan from these resources and the higher degree became important channels for gaining economic of poverty in this province, sardars have been able to sources and prestige for the sardars. Sardars even present the case as a popular issue. In the context of a reconstructed, in some ways, their traditional roles, to widespread sense of deprivation, the coercive policies, mobilize their tribal members and gain political particularly during the last ten years, have promoted a positions, particularly through parliament. In the context sense of alienation among the ethnic nationalists. of the weakness of traditional chiefdom, strong market- The impacts of these societal issues cannot be fully oriented demands, as well as the application of the old captured without understanding the influence of policy of “divide and rule” by the Pakistani security globalization and regional problems, which have led, forces, rivalries inside and between tribes intensified. even in developing countries, to a greater consciousness In this way, sardars gained an opportunity to minimize about global events and also further uncertainty the damaging effects of the bureaucratic system on their (Giddens, 1999; Scholte, 2005; Bauman, 2007). The own power by channeling resources for their own combination of Mojahedin-Taliban Jihadist dilemma, benefit and expanding their own local/provincial with the post 11thSeptember events in the area, as well patronage networks. Through adopting a seclusion as the failure of the policies that Pakistan adopted, have strategy, the sardars, to a great extent succeeded in resulted in devastating effects on traditionally weak and controlling the process of building infrastructure and fragmented political systems in Pakistan. This situation modernization, particularly in education, migration and has developed into a fertile soil for ideologically diverse urbanization, and maintaining the loyalty of a big section radical insurgents in the country. In response to these of tribal members, mainly through sharing resources multilayer challenges, however, despite being much with the influential clients inside their tribes. divided in their strategies, many factions of the sardars Discovery and excavation of the sources of energy and have adopted more aggressive and localized approaches natural wealth in Baluchistan, started in the 1950s, and in order to reassert their tribal values and to maintain has been another important factor in defining the nature their authority, power and resources. of sardari relationships with the central government on The relation between tribal and national identities, in one hand, and with their tribal members and the Baluch Baluchistan, has not always been antagonistic, but, in on the other. Tribal sardars, particularly in Bugti, Marri certain historical times, partially or totally, and Mengal areas gained access to massive economic hastakenforms that involved compromises. The close resources from theroyaltiesfromcoal, gas, petrol, marble connection between the Baluch Student Organization
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(BSO), and BSO-Azat, with the tribal political figures is a important for the nationalists to choose a specific day as good example. Internally, moving to more hierarchical a “martyrs day”. Because of tribal-sardari rivalries, structures has also weakened the authority and modified identifying a “national” hero as a “martyr” has created the functions of the sardars. In a very complex process, many tensions between the nationalists. While Brahuis on one hand, these factors have facilitated dual or hybrid mainly consider Mehrab Khan, as the main martyr, identities; on the other hand, they have carried all along Marris place the emphasis on Balach and BNP Mengal on tensions, instability and rivalries. The sardars have Habib Jalib. Mehrab Khan was killed by the British in succeeded in controlling the political arena and benefit 1839; Balach was mysteriously killed or died in 2007. from combining their tribal position and a nationalist Habib Jalib was shot dead in 2010. There is a strong approach. Sardars/Nawabs, relying on their tribes or belief that Pakistani security forces have been behind sub-tribes, are still the key players in the politics of the recent killings (Wirsing, 2008). Baluchistan, but are heavily involved in rivalries and In some mine-rich areas, such as Marris and Bugtis, conflicts. intra-clan rivalries reflect severe competition over Particularly, in the post cold war era, when there was no controlling land to benefit from royalties. The longer support of the Russian hegemonic power in this rivalrieshave widely taken political dimensions and have area (Noraiee, 2014), in many respects the level of been linked to the different strategies the sardars have fragmentation, and the inter and intra-clan conflicts adopted in their nationalist-tribal agenda. have further escalated all over Baluchistan. Inter-clan Now, to have a better understanding of the nature of the and intra-clan rivalries have been big problems among conflicts and political strategies that the sardars are Bugtis (Matheson (1980), Marris (Pehrson, 1977; involved in, four case studies are presented: Harrison, 1981; Axmann, 2008), Zehris (see for example CASE STUDIES inter and intra-clan conflicts among Zehris and between Case study 1: The conflicts over sardarship and control Zehris and Mengals), the Mengals (Manan, 2013), of land between the Gazzenni and the Bijjarani factions Raisani and Rinds (Ansari, 2003), but definitely not of the Marritribe were highlighted once again when limited to them. Justice Muhammad Nawaz Marri was shot dead on 7th For example, the level of rivalries between the Gazzenni January 2000 in Quetta. and Bijjarani inthe Marri tribe has reached a highly The Bijjarani faction of the Marri tribe, according to destructive level. Many Bijjarani Marris such as Hazar Axmann (2008), revolted against Nawab Khair Bakhsh, Khan Ramkani and the late Sher Mohammad Marri, had the main chief from the Gazzenni faction, in December a significant role in founding and leading theParari 1991. Following a decision made by the Bijjaranis in a Guerrilla movement (later the Baluch People’s council of the elders, they invited the government to Liberation Front (BPLF), in the 1970s (Harrison, 1981). start oil exploitation in their area. This was strongly Now these figures, who abandoned armed struggle, are opposed by Khair Bakhsh Marri and led to an considered as traitors by the radical intensification of intra-tribal conflicts. After the nationalists/sardars. Even inside the Gazzenni tribe, assassination of Justice Muhammad Nawaz Marri, an there is much tension between Jangayz Marri, due to his eminent figure of the Bijjarani faction and a senior judge cooperation with the Pakistani government, and his of the Baluchistan High Court, Khair Bakhsh Marri was other brothers, particularly Hyrbyar Marri and Mehran arrested on 14th January 2000 on a charge of ordering Marri, the leaders of BLA. Similar conditions can be seen this killing. In the first half of the same year the between Akbar Khan Bugti’s descendants who are Baluchistan Liberation Army (BLA) started bombing. deeply divided and fighting against each other. However, However, later on, as a political deal, Khair Bakhsh was some skeptics believe that these tensions are not real released by the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP). Axmann and are seen as part of the games played by the leaders believes that there is likely to be a link between the BLA, to gain more resources and not to destroy all their Khair Bakhsh and this killing. On the basis of an bridges behind them. interview with Khair Bakhsh, on 30th December 1999, To illustrate the dimensions of tribal sardari rivalry Axmann suggested that Khair Bakhsh had considered the among the nationalists it may useful to point out that preservation of the mineral wealth of the Marri tribal during the last few years it has become symbolically area as his life mission. He had firmly stated that in his
21 J. S. Asian Stud. 03 (01) 2015. 15-27 life he would do his utmost to prevent any such could not win more than one seat in the provincial exploitation (Axmann, 2008). assembly. So Sanaullah Zehri was appointed as Most of Khair Bakhsh Marri’s sons (apart from Mehran), Economic Minster in Dr. Malek’s provincial cabinet (Butt, in different periods, have been the Provincial Parliament 2013). Since then there has been more bloodshed in this MPs from the Marri area, and also members of the conflict. provincial cabinets. Jangayz Marri, as the Khair Bakhsh’s Case study 3:The feud between the Raisani and the Rind eldest son and acting sardar, is a member of MLP is another story. Ansari quoted Abdul Ghaffar Abbassi, a (Sharif), a provincial MP and member of the provincial sociologist in Karachi, that in tribal zones in Baluchistan, cabinet. After the death of Khair Bakhsh Marri in 2014, “it is always the word of the tribal chief that is law; laws it is very likely that the conflicts among his sons will of the state are secondary," and half-jokingly had added intensify. that "Even a sparrow cannot fly in a tribal area if it's not Case study 2: This incident is about the conflicts allowed by the tribal head," (Ansari, 2003). between Zehri and Mengal tribes which have taken a When the Jarriges, a French archaeologist, arrived in political dimension. Sardar Sanaullah Zehri, once Baluchistan, the area around Merhgarh was controlled claimed that he had killed 43 people, and that his father, by the Raisani tribe. The local chief, Nawab Ghaus while he was alive, had kept him in his private prison Bakhsh Raisani, granted the archaeologist’s team a plot (see Weaver 1990). Sanaullah has been president of of land near his compound in Merhgarh village. It was Pakistan Muslim League-Nawazshrif (PML-N) in claimed that later GhausBakhshRaisani was killed by the Baluchistan. Akhtar Mengal is as on of Ataullah the chief Rind tribe. of Mengal tribe, and also leader of the Baluchistan Twenty years later, following local elections, the Raisani National Party-Mengal (BNP-M). On 16th April 2013, it tribe clashed with the Rinds. Nine Rind tribesmen were was reported (The Express Tribune 17 April 2013) that killed, and the dispute eventually engulfed the entire after returning from the election campaign in Khuzdar, area. The Rind and Raisani have been fighting and killing Sanaullah’s convey of more than 20 vehicles, each other ever since. accompanied by private and government security forces, Following Pakistan's military coup in 1999, the situation was targeted by a bomb blast in Zehri area. As a result exploded in November 2001, when five people, including four people, including Sanaullah Zehri’s son Sikander the six-year-old son and father-in-law of SardarYar Zehri, his brother Mir Mehar and nephew Mir Zaid, were Mohammed Rind, chief of the Rind tribe, were killed in killed and at least 25 people were also injured. This an alleged Raisani ambush near Mehrgarh. Two months incident turned into a crisis for Nawaz Sharif when he later, the Rind started their revenge. According to tried to make a deal with BNP-Mengal on seat Ansari, scores of tribesmen, armed with AK-47s and adjustment, because Sardar Sanaullah Zehri accused the rocket-propelled grenades, attacked the Raisani- BNP-M chief over the murder of his son, brother and dominated village of Mehrgarh. The tribes clashed for nephew. Sanaullah Zehri, expressed his great concern three days while the village women and children hid in about Nawaz Sharif’s plan and considered it as taking bunkers. Finally, the Rind offered the villagers an the side of the murderer of his family. He had warned ultimatum: Leave Mehrgarh or die. the party leaders that if they insisted on this deal, then The Raisani leader and his tribe left for Quetta, and Rind he would quit PML-Nawaz Sharif. tribesmen moved in and looted the abandoned houses. These conflicts are also related to wider intra-tribal They demolished the Raisani chief's compound with a conflicts between different factions of Zehri. Sanaullah bulldozer and torched more than a hundred other Zehri’s sardarship is challenged by Mir Amanullah Zehri, houses in the vicinity. Buildings in the excavation camp an active member of BNP-M’s Central Working were also attacked, and the scientific instruments they Committee, who has also announced himself as the housed looted (Ansari, 2003). sardar of the Zehri tribe. Amanullah’s son Riaz Zehri was Nawab Muhammad Aslam Khan Raisani, chief of the killed in 2009 by unidentified attackers in district Raisani tribe, has been a leader of the PPP and was Chief Khuzdar, but he pointed the finger at Sanaullah Zehri for Minister of Baluchistan from 2008 to 2013. His brother this tragic incident (Manan, 2013). However, this crisis Nawabzadah Lashkari Raisani left the PPP and joined for PML-N did not last for a long time because BNP-M PML-N in 2013. From the rival tribe, Sardar Yar
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Muhammad Rind, Rinds chief, is affiliated to PML and newspapers on Baluchistan. Some similar stories also have been a senator, MP and also a Federal Government happen in other parts of Pakistan, but Baluchistan is a minister. special place in terms of the dimensions, political Case study 4: This story happened about 7 decades ago, direction and widespread nature of such episodes. but is still similar to the stories that frequently occur in These case studies clearly demonstrate an amalgamation today’s Baluchistan. of hierarchy, authoritarianism, feuds, tribal and Bugti is one of the largest tribes in Baluchistan and was nationalist politics in Baluchistan.At least since the led by Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti until 2006. In 1946, 1920s, with the emergence of some elements of when Sylvia Matheson met Nawab Bugti, he had just left nationalist awareness, the tribal structures and values the Aitchison College in Lahore, which was famous as the faced with new challenges. Giving priority to national Princesses College related to Oxford University. Nawab loyaltycould undermine tribal loyalty, and this was an Bugti had said to Matheson that he had killed the first alarming threat for the power of the sardars. Choosing man when he was just 12 years old. She asked him why? the nationalist label, tactically or strategically, in any He replied that the man had annoyed him, although he form, at least could serve nawabs and sardars, to had forgotten the cause. He admitted shooting the man, minimize the damaging effects of so much division and due to his hasty temper. He stated that it was not a suspicion. For many decades, rarely a sardar, in capital offence under tribal law, but anyway as an eldest Baluchistan, has refrained from being called or calling son of a chief he was entitled to do as he pleased in his him a nationalist. As result, a section of sardars and own territory. He claimed his family enjoyed absolute nawabs, have adopted a hybrid identity, combining sovereignty over the people, who accepted this as their nationalism and tribalism. tradition. THE NATURE OF NATIONALISM IN BALUCHISTAN Nawab Bugti went on to say that his own father had Nationalism,as anywhere else,is a modern phenomenon been poisoned and that his uncle, currently acting as in Baluchistan. The Baluch nationalism, both as a regent during his college studies, was responsible. movement and an ideology, has kept strong links with The author asked the Nawab what he planned to do the interests and power of the sardars and nawabs, about it and if he wanted to poison his uncle. He had whose older generations were supported by the British replied that poisoning was too good for such a man political and military agents. Since the emergence of and he didn’t want a blood feud on his hand. He would Pakistan, foreign interests in conflict with Pakistan, wait until he could discretely get rid of the whole particularly India and Afghanistan, have significantly family (Matheson, 1967). influenced the nature and the process of development of After partition, his uncle was killed in 1951 in nationalism inBaluchistan (Titus & Swindler, 2000). Jocobabad. Nawab Bugti for a short period became the The earlier Baluch nationalists were working together defence minister of Pakistan in 1958. He was arrested on with the Pashtun. For example “Baluchistan and All India charges of killing Sardar Haibat Khan, uncle of his wife Baluch Conference” (the Conference) in which Yusuf Ali and father in law of his brother, Ahmmad Nawaz Bugti, Khan Magsi was a leading activist, mainly focused on the in 1959.As an influential political figure, he cooperated “oneness” of Baluchistan and people as “Baluchistani”, to with Bhotto’s Government against his previous be a unit of Federal India (Baluchistan and All India colleagues and friends, who had formed the first Baluch Conference, 1stMay1933).In some ways, later in provincial Nationalist government in 1973.Then many the 1970s, this quite liberal political alliance continued nationalists considered him as a “traitor” and he was under the flag of National Awami Party under the appointed by Bhotto as provincial governor. Again he leadership of Wali Khan. The Pashtun nationalist party, became Chief Minister of Baluchistan in 1989. In the the Pakhtoonkhawa Milli Awami Party (PMAP), led by early years of 2000s, he revolted against Musharraf, and Achagzai argued for the separation of Pashtun areas eventually he was killed by military forces, or some say from Baluchistan and for them to join the North West he died mysteriously, in August 2006, but by this time he Frontier Province (NWFP) (now Khyber and was a great hero for the nationalists. Pakhtunkhwa Province). These are just a few examples of real incidents which are From the early stage of the cold war and emergence of frequently covered by the local and Pakistani national Pakistan, a considerable number of the earlier Baluch-
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Brahui intellectuals considered themselves as Mahtak Balochi in Quetta. progressive and revolutionaries and had quite a strong This ideological framework has not been entirely anti-sardari approach. However, this approach was inconsistent with the methodologies and primordial mixed with nationalism, tribal and socialist values. For assumptions that the Baluch nationalist scholarshave example, Gul Khan Naseer, Azat Jamaldini and many applied.These assumptions in some respects, have been other poets reflected this approach in their poems. They influenced by Stalin’s criteria of defining nationhood and strongly criticized the sardars and nawabs as nationalism, developed in his famous book: Marxism and “bloodsucker”, “puppet”, “scavenger”, “oppressor”, the National Question (Stalin, 1913).Using a “exploiter” etc. (Jamaladini, 1985a; Naseer, 2011). Many primordialist approach, for example, Naseer Dashti of these intellectuals, in the1950s, had very close suggests that it is in nature of human beings to be always relationships with the Punjabi and other non-Baluch proud of his national conscious and remembrance of his intellectuals and benefited from their support, roots” (Dashti, 2002). Naseer Dashti also argues that experience and other resources to organize Baluchi according to history, the Baluch are free-natured people cultural activities. Latt Khana in Quetta was a good and they have never accepted to be dominated by aliens. example of these broad-minded intellectuals, socialised His love for his land is part of his faith (Dashti, 1982; in this cultural-political association (Jamaladini, 1985b). Enayatullah Baloch 1987; Swindler, 1996; Dashti, 2002; On the basis of persuasion and support of this cultural Dashti, 2012). association, Azat Jamaladini published Mahtak Balochi in Normative perspectives, which ignore diversity and Karachi in 1956. For this wave of intellectuals, freedom historical reality, form the integrated elements of the was mainly about freedom from sardars rather than nationalists’ arguments. Such perspectives hardly allow territorial independence.This approach put enormous them to investigate profoundly and critically the pressure on sardarsin the area. complex social, political and economic conditions in In spite of all these activities andpressures, theculture of Baluchistan. This has lefta comfortable space for enlightenment among the Baloch and Brahui population powerful sardars to justify their traditional behavior, remained very weak. The parochial values embedded in including rivalries and conflicts between tribes or sub- the culture of the tribesto some extent diluted overtime, tribes. There is a little doubt that these rivalries, to a but “kinship” loyaltiesremainedhighly strong. From a some extent, have been the result of manipulation by tribal perspective, nationalism has been perceived as a the Government of Pakistan, particularly by security cultural tradition, a matter of tribal honor for a young or forces through patronage ties, but they can’t be an old male to protect and celebrate. Almost all completely and simply reduced to conspiracies. dominant political organizations in Baluchistan were Historical, structural, and economic reasons are some formed on the basisof tribal and traditional values and fundamental factors in explaining the current conditions. structures which intrinsically promoted social and These conditions have influenced the nature and political fragmentation and rivalries. Traditional values functions of the current political organizations in such as “nam-o-nang” and“rasm-o-rawaj” were Baluchistan. The political parties in Baluchistan, interpreted in primordialist manner to help sardars in a regardless of their names, have to a great extent nationalist context. In this way, sardari relationships, functioned as the extensions of the tribal and kinship feuds, rivalries and also discrimination against women organizations. In a modern rational sense, there is no and lower classeswere justified. influential political organization built on the basis of Ablended brand of nationalism/sardarship has, to a voluntary professional political cadres. These large extentbeen processedand legitimized, through organizations have no clear and effective written widespread, unreliable and even fictional political constitutions based on profound social, economic and judgments,not much different from other parts of political analysis. Even if there are any written Pakistan,based on conspiracy theories (Lieven, 2011). statements, regardless of their contents, they simply The attraction of fantasies in the Baluch political life is remain on paper as highly abstract, meaningless, not very strange, and in many ways they are similar to irrelevant and empty words.Lack of clearly defined the excellent stories of a Baluch satirist Mohammad Baig strategies have made it easy for many sardars to act in Baigal (2014), who writes for the monthly magazine of an ad hoc manner, and in averyopportunistic way,
24 J. S. Asian Stud. 03 (01) 2015. 15-27 switching sides from one end of the spectrum to another. disappearances and alleged extrajudicial and In the process of the frequent conflicts, nationalismhas unlawful killings in Balochistan, October 24, 2010- widely spread but has not emerged as a forceto February 20, 2011’. Retrieved from overcome or challenge tribal loyalties and sardari http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/REG0 structures. In spite of the early optimism expressed by 1/001/2011/en/9b6e31cb-ef5f-4d99-ad6a- Harrison (1981), intra and inter-tribal conflicts have not 17bd3af35661/reg010012011en.pdf gone away, but intensified. As the evidence shows, at Ansari, M. (2003, March/April). ‘The guns of least at organizational and political levels, there is not Mehrgarhassoud’. Archaeology, 56(2). Retrieved much transformation in tribal divisions. from Database Academic Search Complete, HTML CONCLUSION Full Text.. The current situation in Pakistani Baluchistan, in which Axmann, M. (2008). ‘Phoenix from the ashes? The Baloch inter and intra-tribal feuds and rivalries, amalgamated national movement and its recent revival’. In C. with nationalist insurgencies occur, has to some extent Jahani, A. Korn & T. Paul, (Eds.),The Baloch and deep roots in the social and political structures inherited others: Linguistic, historical and socio-political from the British direct rule in this area. This historical perspectives on pluralism in Balochistan. (pp. 261- context reflects not only a weak and highly fragmented 292). Wiesbaden: Reichert Verlag Wiesbaden. state in Pakistan, but also weaker tribal systems in Baiely, F. G. (1969). Stratagems and spoils. Oxford: Basil Baluchistan. The fragmented political structure in Blackwood. Pakistan has been associated with strong elitist security- Baigal, M. B. (2014 and various years). Satirical articles military institutions. With the further weakness of the (Baluchi Language). Mahtak Balochi. Pakistani state during the last two decades, the conflicts Baloch, I., 1987. The problem of 'Greater Baluchistan': A and rivalries in Baluchistan, as a marginalized area, have study of Baluch nationalism. Stuttgart: Steiner increased, and as a result coercive measures by the Verlag Wiesbaden GMBH. security forces, have intensified. Baluchistan and all India Baluch conference. (1933, May The fragmented political structures, which are seen as 1st). A brief summary of evidence from the working main sources of autonomous power of the sardars, are committe of Baluchistan and all India Baluch very likely to continue for a long period .When there is conference. Karachi: Daily Gazette Press Ltd.. no strong culture of enlightenment and a hegemonic Bauman, Z. (2007). Liquid times: Living in an age of power, from inside or outside; rivalries and bloodshed uncertainty . Cambridge: Polity Press. are more likely to continue. Rivalries among the sardars BBC. 2013. Pakistan Profile. Retrieved from on one hand, and coercive measures by the security http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia- forces on the other, have created a vacuum of power, 12965781 which can create a fertile ground for the further Bolan (1986). The Gazetteer of Baluchistan (2nd ed.) (1st influence of radical religious forces that widely use anti- edition 1906)(p. 14). Quetta: Gosha-e-Adab. corruption, egalitarian and anti-injustice rhetoric, and to Butt, Q. (2013). Balochistan condundrum: Face to face some extent benefit from the support or sympathy of the with a son of the soil. Retrieved from security forces. http://tribune.com.pk/story/551022/balochistan REFERENCES -condundrum-face-to-face-with-a-son-of-the-soil Ahmad, A. (1973, May). ‘The national question in Butt, Q. (2013, 22nd April). Princely liaisons: The Khan Baluchistan’. Pakistan Forum: Focus on family controls politics in Kalat. The Express Baluchistan, 3(8/9), 4-18. Tribune. Amnesty International.(2011a). Pakistan must CRSS.(2012). ‘Kidnappings in Balochistan: The new provideaccountability for rising atrocities in source of sustenance for criminals and militants’. Balochistan. Retrieved from Retrieved from http://crss.pk/story/- http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and- 2900/kidnappings-in-balochistan-the-new- updates/pakistan-must-provide-accountability- source-of-sustenance-for-criminals-and-militants/ rising-atrocities-balochistan-2011-02-23 Dashti, J. (1982). The Baloch cultural heritage. Amnesty International. (2011b). ‘Victims of reported Karachi: Royal Book Company.
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i In his rare Book, written in Baluchi and Farsi, Kamalan Gechki, in 1880s, clearly reflected the weakness of the Kalat Khan, widespread insecurity, oppression and lawlessness in Makran. He wrote in Baluchi that “there is not one man in our Makoraan, everybody hits and goes, nobody cares, and the reality is that the country has no master (government). If the country had a master, the poor people would not have been in these conditions. The powerful people have made the country terrible. The Khan Saheb does not care about the areas, he does not know that he has a country as the British do not instruct. Kamalan Gechki who had strong sympathy to the British, dedicated his book to Colonel Miles in 1885. Kamalan wished that the British had occupied Makran and had brought an end to lawlessness, oppressions and conflicts between authorities. ii For example, according to an anonymous source (August 2013), it is estimated that Shahzain Bugti, son of Talal Bugti and a grandson of Nawab Akbar Bugti, in one case, had received about half billion (about 48 Kror) Pakistani rupees from Akbar Bugti’s Bank account. Before settlement of this case, Malik Rahman, Zardari’s interior minister at that time, had asked Shahzain Bugti to pay him 50 million Pakistani rupees, to release money from a bank account. Possibly it is the same news which was seen in a different way in the “a news weblog” of The International News. The settlement of this case happened when Shahzain was Nawaz Sharif's special guest. According to the news, Shahzain returned to Quetta, after the payment of Rs506 million royalty of natural gas from the Uch Gas Field belonged to his father, Talal Bugti, the second son of the deceased Akbar Bugti, was ordered by the Lahore High Court (LHC). Interestingly a few days later, on 22 December 2010, Rahman Malik acted swiftly, and Shahzain with his 26-27 guards, on charges of smuggling arms, were arrested and sent to a “guesthouse”, by the Frontier Corps (FC). This action of the Government was strongly condemned by Nawaz Sharif and he started a campaign to release him. However sometimes later, in mid-January 2011, they were released. This indicates how powerful the sardars are, politically and economically, in a highly corrupted system in Pakistan.
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