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American Air Campaign Planning Before Pearl Harbor Author(S): Mark Clodfelter Source: the Journal of Military History, Vol

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American Air Campaign Planning Before Pearl Harbor Author(S): Mark Clodfelter Source: the Journal of Military History, Vol Pinpointing Devastation: American Air Campaign Planning before Pearl Harbor Author(s): Mark Clodfelter Source: The Journal of Military History, Vol. 58, No. 1 (Jan., 1994), pp. 75-101 Published by: Society for Military History Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2944180 . Accessed: 28/08/2011 13:04 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. Society for Military History is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Journal of Military History. http://www.jstor.org PinpointingDevastation: American Air Campaign Planning before Pearl Harbor* Mark Clodfelter AT exactly three o'clock in the morning on 17 January 1991, Air Force Major GregoryA. Feest released a 2000-pound laser-guided bomb fromhis F-117 stealth fighterand began directing it towards a command post in the cityof Baghdad.' The Allied air campaign against Iraq had begun. Detailed planning for that remarkablysuccessful air war had startedshortly after Saddam Hussein's August 1990 invasion of Kuwait,with much of the workbeing done in a remote officeknown as "Checkmate" in the Pentagon basement. Yet the true roots of the conceptual design forthe Desert Storm air campaign are spread much deeper than the Pentagon's bowels. They extend to the Chateau de Chamarandes near Chaumont, France, in late 1917; to the stucco and brick classrooms of Maxwell Field's Air Corps Tactical School in the 1930s; and to the swelteringpenthouse of the old MunitionsBuilding in Washington,D.C., in August 1941. Those underpinningsreveal a profounduniformity of thoughtabout the decisiveness of air power. The men who molded American air strategyin the decades beforePearl Harborwere convinced thatstrategic bombing, preciselyaimed at a nation's economic "vitalcenters," could * For comments,suggestions, and insight,the author wishes to thankMr. Walter Clodfelter,Dr. AlexanderCochran, Major Peter Faber, Colonel Ken Feldman, Dr. David MacIsaac, Dr. PeterMaslowski, Colonel PhillipMeilinger, Dr. David Mets,Dr. RobertPape, Jr.,and the studentsof Classes I and II at the School of Advanced AirpowerStudies. 1. James P. Coyne, "A Strikeby Stealth,"Air Force Magazine, March 1992, 38, Al3 The Journal ofMilitary History 58 (January1994): 75-101 ? Societyfor Military llistory * 75 MARK CLODFELTER destroyits war-making capability and willto resist.World War II provided that theory with a stern test. Still, despite the difficultiesinvolved in conducting "precision" bombing, most air leaders emerged fromthe conflictbelieving that the ordeal had vindicated the prewar planning. The notion thatvital centers were vulnerable to a preciselydelivered air attackendured, and became a cornerstoneof officialAir Force doctrine once the new service began committingits principles to paper in the early 1950s. By 1991 the semantics had changed slightly,but the idea remained the same. The four-phaseplan for the Persian Gulf air war, stressingthe destructionof Iraqi "centersof gravity" through unrelenting precision bombing, was the logical outgrowthof the planning process thatpreceded World War II. The earliest example of American planning foran "independent" air campaign-that is, one having objectives distinctfrom those sought by land and sea forces-was a proposal for"strategical" bombing com- pleted by Lieutenant Colonel Edgar Staley Gorrell and his staffon 28 November 1917. That plan called foran "around the clock" air offensive against German commercial centers and lines of communication "to wreck the points aimed at and cut offthe necessary supplies without which the armies in the fieldcannot exist."2 General John J. Pershing, Commander in Chief,American ExpeditionaryForces (AEF), approved Gorrell'splan "in full"on 5 January1918.3 Althoughaircraft production difficultiesprevented all but the most meager implementation of the Gorrell scheme,4 the ideas contained in it persisted. His arguments would reappear twenty-fouryears later in planning for another air campaign against Germany. The genesis of Gorrell's plan was a 6 May 1917 request by the commander of the French NortheastArmy Group, who saw America's entryinto World War I as an opportunityto obtain material supportas 2. "Gorrell: StrategicalBombardment," in Maurer Maurer,ed., The US Air Service in WorldWar I, 4 vols. (Washington:GPO, 1979), 2: 143. 3. L. S. Kuter,Air Corps Tactical School Lecture text,"American Air Power- School Theoriesvs. WorldWar Facts," 1937-1938, 23, AirForce HistoricalResearch Agency (hereafterreferred to as AFHRA), MaxwellAir Force Base, Alabama, file number248.11-2. 4. At the time of the Armistice,the Air Service possessed only one night- bombingsquadron, consistingof obsolete DH-4 and FE-2 aircraft.It had flownits firstmission on 9 November1918. Americanday bomberoperations had begun on 12 June 1918, but all day-bombingmissions occurred against targetsin France, and most of the missions were "tactical"-designed to support troops on the battlefield.See I. B. Holley,Ideas and Weapons (New Haven,Conn.: Yale University Press,1953; reprinted., Washington:Office of Air Force History,1983), 157-58; Bruce C. Hopper, "American Day Bombardmentin World War I," Air Power Historian 4 (April1957): 87-97. Holleyoutlines the various reasons forthe produc- tion failurein Chapters3 and 8. 76 * THE JOURNAL OF PinpointingDevastation well as manpower. The commander asked the French Ministerof War for an initial American force of roughlyforty-three hundred aircraft, plus an additional two thousand replacement airplanes per month, to support a projected Allied offensivein the spring of 1918.5 Major William "Billy" Mitchell,who had been on the WesternFront reviewing Allied aviation units since April, claimed that he collaborated on the request, which was matched by a similar appeal fromthe General Staff of the French Army.6These solicitationsbecame the basis fora formal request to Washingtonby French PremierAlexandre Ribot on 23 May. As a result of the "Ribot cable," Congress quickly approved a 640 milliondollar aircraft production program-a massiveamount offunding, considering that the Signal Corps' aviation branch had possessed only six aircraftin 1912. Inexplicably,the Ribot cable did not mention what types of aircraftthe United States should produce. To determine those requirements,Secretary of War Newton D. Baker sent Air Service major and formerU.S. Steel lawyerRaynal C. Bolling to Europe witha team of militaryand civilian engineers in June 1917. One member of thisgroup was Captain Gorrell, a 1912 West Point graduate who had flownwith the 1st Aero Squadron in Pershing'sMexican PunitiveExpedition, and who had recently completed a Master's degree in science from the Massachusetts Instituteof Technology.7 In thirty-fivedays, Bolling's group visitedBritain, France, and Italy. General David Henderson, Britain'sDirector-General of MilitaryAero- nautics,suggested that the Americans concentrate exclusively on bomber production and not tryto develop a balanced forceof fighters,bombers, and observationaircraft.8 Henderson's remarksmay have been triggered by the firstattack on London by German Gotha bombers a fortnight before the Bolling Mission arrived. In two minutes, the Gothas had dropped nearly two tons of bombs, killing 162 people and injuring 432.9 The bombers had attacked in daylightand with impunity;none fellto antiaircraftfire or fighters. In Italy,members of the BollingMission observed bombing operations from the "giving" rather than the "receiving" end. The Italians had begun a long-range air campaign against targets in Austria,and were, at the time, the only Allied nation conducting strategicbombing. Their air offensive,sporting as many as 250 Caproni bombers in a single 5. AlfredF. Hurley,Billy Mitchell: Crusaderfor Air Power (New York:Franklin Watts,1964; reprinted., Bloomington:Indiana UniversityPress, 1975), 27. 6. Ibid.; Holley,Ideas and Weapons, 42. 7. Who Was Whoin America,2 vols. (Chicago: A. N. MarquisCompany, 1950), 2:215-16. 8. Hurley,Billy Mitchell, 31. 9. David Nevin, Architectsof Air Power (Alexandria,Va.: Time-LifeBooks, 1981), 27. MILITARY HISTORY * 77 MARKCLODFELTER raid,10impressed the Americans. Bolling's group was also impressed by the man who had molded the Italian bomber force, the designer and theoristGianni Caproni. Gorrellin particularwas inspiredby Caproni's vision of air power, which paralleled the thoughtsof Giulio Douhet, Caproni's close friendand confidant.11Caproni maintained that for bombing to be effectiveit had to be "systematic,thorough, and con- sistent."12 This assertion would become a cornerstone of Gorrell'splan. On 15 August 1917, Bolling submitted his initial report to Wash- ington. In it,he called forthe production of trainingaircraft, aircraft to support American troops in the field, and "aircraftin excess of the tactical requirementsof the Armyin France." 31Bolling recommended that the United States build as many airplanes as possible. He believed that the number of airplanes needed to support the ground forces depended on the size of the Armyand would vary in proportion to it. Combat aircraftin excess of those required for Army support
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