Pinpointing Devastation: American Air Campaign Planning before Pearl Harbor Author(s): Mark Clodfelter Source: The Journal of Military History, Vol. 58, No. 1 (Jan., 1994), pp. 75-101 Published by: Society for Military History Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2944180 . Accessed: 28/08/2011 13:04

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http://www.jstor.org PinpointingDevastation: American Air Campaign Planning before Pearl Harbor*

Mark Clodfelter

AT exactly three o'clock in the morning on 17 January 1991, Air Force GregoryA. Feest released a 2000-pound laser-guided bomb fromhis F-117 stealth fighterand began directing it towards a command post in the cityof Baghdad.' The Allied air campaign against Iraq had begun. Detailed planning for that remarkablysuccessful air war had startedshortly after Saddam Hussein's August 1990 invasion of Kuwait,with much of the workbeing done in a remote officeknown as "Checkmate" in the Pentagon basement. Yet the true roots of the conceptual design forthe Desert Storm air campaign are spread much deeper than the Pentagon's bowels. They extend to the Chateau de Chamarandes near Chaumont, France, in late 1917; to the stucco and brick classrooms of Maxwell Field's Air Corps Tactical School in the 1930s; and to the swelteringpenthouse of the old MunitionsBuilding in Washington,D.C., in August 1941. Those underpinningsreveal a profounduniformity of thoughtabout the decisiveness of air power. The men who molded American air strategyin the decades beforePearl Harborwere convinced thatstrategic bombing, preciselyaimed at a nation's economic "vitalcenters," could

* For comments,suggestions, and insight,the author wishes to thankMr. Walter Clodfelter,Dr. AlexanderCochran, Major Peter Faber, Ken Feldman, Dr. David MacIsaac, Dr. PeterMaslowski, Colonel PhillipMeilinger, Dr. David Mets,Dr. RobertPape, Jr.,and the studentsof Classes I and II at the School of Advanced AirpowerStudies. 1. James P. Coyne, "A Strikeby Stealth,"Air Force Magazine, March 1992, 38, Al3

The Journal ofMilitary History 58 (January1994): 75-101 ? Societyfor Military llistory * 75 MARK CLODFELTER destroyits war-making capability and willto resist.World War II provided that theory with a stern test. Still, despite the difficultiesinvolved in conducting "precision" bombing, most air leaders emerged fromthe conflictbelieving that the ordeal had vindicated the prewar planning. The notion thatvital centers were vulnerable to a preciselydelivered air attackendured, and became a cornerstoneof officialAir Force doctrine once the new service began committingits principles to paper in the early 1950s. By 1991 the semantics had changed slightly,but the idea remained the same. The four-phaseplan for the Persian Gulf air war, stressingthe destructionof Iraqi "centersof gravity" through unrelenting , was the logical outgrowthof the planning process thatpreceded World War II. The earliest example of American planning foran "independent" air campaign-that is, one having objectives distinctfrom those sought by land and sea forces-was a proposal for"strategical" bombing com- pleted by Lieutenant Colonel Edgar Staley Gorrell and his staffon 28 November 1917. That plan called foran "around the clock" air offensive against German commercial centers and lines of communication "to wreck the points aimed at and cut offthe necessary supplies without which the armies in the fieldcannot exist."2 John J. Pershing, Commander in Chief,American ExpeditionaryForces (AEF), approved Gorrell'splan "in full"on 5 January1918.3 Althoughaircraft production difficultiesprevented all but the most meager implementation of the Gorrell scheme,4 the ideas contained in it persisted. His arguments would reappear twenty-fouryears later in planning for another air campaign against Germany. The genesis of Gorrell's plan was a 6 May 1917 request by the commander of the French NortheastArmy Group, who saw America's entryinto as an opportunityto obtain material supportas

2. "Gorrell: StrategicalBombardment," in Maurer Maurer,ed., The US Air Service in WorldWar I, 4 vols. (Washington:GPO, 1979), 2: 143. 3. L. S. Kuter,Air Corps Tactical School Lecture text,"American Air Power- School Theoriesvs. WorldWar Facts," 1937-1938, 23, AirForce HistoricalResearch Agency (hereafterreferred to as AFHRA), MaxwellAir Force Base, , file number248.11-2. 4. At the time of the Armistice,the Air Service possessed only one night- bombingsquadron, consistingof obsolete DH-4 and FE-2 aircraft.It had flownits firstmission on 9 November1918. Americanday bomberoperations had begun on 12 June 1918, but all day-bombingmissions occurred against targetsin France, and most of the missions were "tactical"-designed to support troops on the battlefield.See I. B. Holley,Ideas and Weapons (New Haven,Conn.: Yale University Press,1953; reprinted., Washington:Office of Air Force History,1983), 157-58; Bruce C. Hopper, "American Day Bombardmentin World War I," Air Power Historian 4 (April1957): 87-97. Holleyoutlines the various reasons forthe produc- tion failurein Chapters3 and 8.

76 * THE JOURNAL OF PinpointingDevastation well as manpower. The commander asked the French Ministerof War for an initial American force of roughlyforty-three hundred aircraft, plus an additional two thousand replacement airplanes per month, to support a projected Allied offensivein the spring of 1918.5 Major William "Billy" Mitchell,who had been on the WesternFront reviewing Allied aviation units since April, claimed that he collaborated on the request, which was matched by a similar appeal fromthe General Staff of the French Army.6These solicitationsbecame the basis fora formal request to Washingtonby French PremierAlexandre Ribot on 23 May. As a result of the "Ribot cable," Congress quickly approved a 640 milliondollar aircraft production program-a massiveamount offunding, considering that the Signal Corps' aviation branch had possessed only six aircraftin 1912. Inexplicably,the Ribot cable did not mention what types of aircraftthe should produce. To determine those requirements,Secretary of War Newton D. Baker sent Air Service major and formerU.S. Steel lawyerRaynal C. Bolling to Europe witha team of militaryand civilian engineers in June 1917. One member of thisgroup was Captain Gorrell, a 1912 West Point graduate who had flownwith the 1st Aero Squadron in Pershing'sMexican PunitiveExpedition, and who had recently completed a Master's degree in science from the Massachusetts Instituteof Technology.7 In thirty-fivedays, Bolling's group visitedBritain, France, and Italy. General David Henderson, Britain'sDirector-General of MilitaryAero- nautics,suggested that the Americans concentrate exclusively on production and not tryto develop a balanced forceof fighters,, and observationaircraft.8 Henderson's remarksmay have been triggered by the firstattack on London by German Gotha bombers a fortnight before the Bolling Mission arrived. In two minutes, the Gothas had dropped nearly two tons of bombs, killing 162 people and injuring 432.9 The bombers had attacked in daylightand with impunity;none fellto antiaircraftfire or fighters. In Italy,members of the BollingMission observed bombing operations from the "giving" rather than the "receiving" end. The Italians had begun a long-range air campaign against targets in Austria,and were, at the time, the only Allied nation conducting strategicbombing. Their air offensive,sporting as many as 250 Caproni bombers in a single

5. AlfredF. Hurley,: Crusaderfor Air Power (New York:Franklin Watts,1964; reprinted., Bloomington:Indiana UniversityPress, 1975), 27. 6. Ibid.; Holley,Ideas and Weapons, 42. 7. Who Was Whoin America,2 vols. (Chicago: A. N. MarquisCompany, 1950), 2:215-16. 8. Hurley,Billy Mitchell, 31. 9. David Nevin, Architectsof Air Power (Alexandria,Va.: Time-LifeBooks, 1981), 27.

MILITARY HISTORY * 77 MARKCLODFELTER raid,10impressed the Americans. Bolling's group was also impressed by the man who had molded the Italian bomber force, the designer and theoristGianni Caproni. Gorrellin particularwas inspiredby Caproni's vision of air power, which paralleled the thoughtsof , Caproni's close friendand confidant.11Caproni maintained that for bombing to be effectiveit had to be "systematic,thorough, and con- sistent."12 This assertion would become a cornerstone of Gorrell'splan. On 15 August 1917, Bolling submitted his initial report to Wash- ington. In it,he called forthe production of trainingaircraft, aircraft to support American troops in the field, and "aircraftin excess of the tactical requirementsof the Armyin France." 31Bolling recommended that the United States build as many airplanes as possible. He believed that the number of airplanes needed to support the ground forces depended on the size of the Armyand would vary in proportion to it. Combat aircraftin excess of those required for Army support could conduct "independent" air operations,such as nightraids on Germany. Bolling suggested a precise apportionment of aircrafttypes for this independent force:37.5 percent of itsaircraft should be fighterscapable of escorting bombers, 25 percent should be day bombers, and the remainder should be Caproni nightbombers. 14 He found the prospects of a night air offensiveespecially appealing, and noted that if night bombing were conducted "on a sufficientlygreat scale and kept up continuously fora sufficienttime, there seems good reason to believe thatit mightdetermine the whole outcome of militaryoperations." 15In the UnitedStates, however, Bolling's "third-place mention ofthe strategic forcewas apparentlytaken to mean thatit was thirdin order of relative importance."16 American officials did not include bombers in the immediate manufacturing program, and Pershing did not initially endorse an independent bombing force. Billy Mitchell had no intention of allowing the strategicbombing notion to wither,much less die. In May, he had met BritishMajor General Hugh Trenchard, Commander of the Royal Flying Corps. Trenchard's belief in an "air offensive"to destroythe German army's

10. Holley,Ideas and Weapons, 55. 11. J. L. Boone Atkinson,"Italian Influenceon the Originsof the American Concept of StrategicBombardment," Air Power Historian 4 (July1957): 142. At thetime of the BollingMission, Douhet was servinga prisonterm for his outspoken denunciationof Italian militaryleadership. 12. Quoted in Holley,Ideas and Weapons, 55. 13. "Bolling Report,15 August1917," in The US Air Service in World War I, 2: 131. 14. Ibid., 133. 15. Ibid., 132. 16. Holley,Ideas and Weapons, 56.

78 * THE JOURNAL OF PinpointingDevastation

"means of supply,subsistence, and replacements" strucka responsive chord in the American major.17Soon afterthe June arrivalof Pershing and his staffin France, Mitchell proposed organizing American air forcesinto two categories-one supportingthe ground forces,the other conducting "strategicaloperations against enemy aircraftand enemy material,at a distance fromthe actual line." This "independentmission," he insisted,could have "a greaterinfluence on the ultimate decision of the war than any other arm." 18 Pershing'sfailure to approve the proposal caused Mitchellto redouble his efforts.Appointed Chiefof the Air Service, he asked AEF Intelligence in August1917 to provide informationon strategictargets in Germany. He also created a staffthat would explore the possibilitiesof bombing Germany in more detail. To direct the Air Service's Technical Section, Mitchellpicked the twenty-six-year-oldGorrell, who had just completed his workwith the Bolling Mission. Gorrell'sjob would be to determine Air Service requirements,including the various typesof aircraft needed. In tryingto estimate the correct number ofbombers, he would consider the prospects of strategicbombing, and, ultimately,produce America's firstplan for a strategic air campaign. He would develop this plan in relative splendor, for Mitchell chose the Chateau de Chamarandes, a magnificent hunting lodge built by Louis XV, as his headquarters. Located within a mile of Pershing's headquarters at Chaumont, the chateau provided both livingquarters and officespace. It continued to serve as Air Service headquarters afterMitchell moved on in October to become Air Service Commander in the Zone of the Advance. 19 Assisting Gorrell in his endeavor were Majors Harold Fowler and Millard F. Harmon.20 Fowler had flown with the Royal Flying Corps before America's entryinto World War I, while Harmon had served as an Air Service pilot in the Philippines before the war. Gorrell also received a large measure of support from two individuals uniquely qualified to help develop an air campaign plan-Wing Commander Spencer Grey of the Royal Naval Air Service, and Gianni Caproni. Grey,a liaison officerattached to Air Service Headquarters,had partici- pated in raids against German inland targets fromthe RNAS base at Dunkerque, and had worked to develop a 1,650-pound bomb. Gorrell

17. Quoted in Hurley,Billy Mitchell, 26. 18. Quoted in Holley,Ideas and Weapons,47; quoted in Hurley,Billy Mitchell, 29. 19. William Mitchell,Memoirs of World War I (New York: Random House, 1960), 153-54. Thisbook containsa seriesof articles published in Libertymagazine in 1928. 20. RobertF. Futrell,Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: Basic Thinkingin the United States Air Force, 1907-1984, 2 vols. (MaxwellAir Force Base, Ala.: Air University Press 1989) - 1 25.

MILITARY HISTORY * 79 MARK CLODFELTER

considered him the "world's greatest authorityon air bombing" and relied heavily on his expertise.21 Caproni, who continued to design bombers, met frequentlywith Gorrell in the autumn of 1917. Besides providing Gorrell with a list of Germany's major industrial targets,22 Caproni also sent him an English-textcopy of a new book, Let Us Kill the War; Let Us Aim at the Heart of the Enemy,by the Italianjournalist Nino Salveneschi. The book was a compilation of Caproni's major thoughtson how air warfarecould achieve an independent victoryin WorldWar I, and Gorrell embraced its message enthusiastically."I have read withgreat interestyour book entitled 'Let us Kill the War; Let us Aim at the Heart of the Enemy', whichyou so kindlygave me," he wrote to Caproni on 31 October. "May I ask you to let me have halfa dozen copies of this book and I will guarantee to spread the gospel in all directions."23 By the end of November,Gorrell had incorporated Grey's expertise and Caproni's gospel into an air campaign plan for an American bomber force. The plan also reflectedMitchell's ideas, gleaned largely from Trenchard, about air power's potential to destroy the German army's means to fight.Gorrell noted: "There are a few certain indis- pensable targetswithout which Germany cannot carry on the war."24 The German army,he asserted, could be likened to a drill,whose point could continue to bore only ifthe shank-the German national effort- remained durable. Four target groups were essential to keeping the shankstrong: the industriessurrounding Dusseldorf, Cologne, Mannheim, and the Saar. Ifthose vital industriesand theirtransportation links were destroyed,the drillwould become impotent. "German shells are being firedat Allied troops and positions over a large area of the Front," he observed, "but the manufactureof these shells and bombs is dependent upon the output of a fewspecific, well-knownfactories turning out the chemicals forthem.... If the chemical factoriescan be blown up, the shelland bomb outputwill cease, to a greateror lesser degree,dependent upon the damage done these chemical plants."25 The belief that the essence ofan enemy nation's war-makingcapability consisted ofcertain key components linkingtogether its industrialcomplex was the crux of Gorrell'sproposal. It would also serve as the foundationof America's air campaign plan forthe Second World War.

21. Quoted in Thomas H. Greer,The Developmentof Air Doctrine in theArmy Air Arm,1 91 7-1941 (Washington:Office of Air Force History,1955, 1985), 11. 22. Atkinson,"Italian Influence,"147. 23. Letter, Major E. S. Gorrell to Signor Jean Caproni, 31 October 1917, AFHRA,file number 168.661-83. 24. "Gorrell:Strategical Bombardment," 143. 25. Ibid., 142-43.

80 * THE JOURNAL OF PinpointingDevastation

Gorrell estimated that between three thousand and six thousand American bombers would be required to wreck German war-making capacity, provided that the force received adequate logistical support and aircrewtraining.26 This armada would concentrate on destroyinga particular group of targets completely before assaulting a different target group. The continuous, systematic nature of the air offensive would overwhelm German defenses while it unnerved workers and preventedthem frommaking repairs. Yet the Germans, Gorrellwarned, also realized the potential of strategicbombing, and could be expected to launch a similarlarge-scale effortagainst the Allies. Thus, the sooner the American campaign began, the better. "This is not a phantom nor a dream," he wrote in October, "but is a huge realitycapable of being carried out with success if the United States will only carry on a sufficientlylarge campaign fornext year,and manufacturethe typesof airplanes that lend themselves to this campaign, instead of building pursuitplanes already out of date here in Europe." 27 BrigadierGeneral Benjamin Foulois, who became Chiefof the AEF Air Service in November, approved Gorrell's plan in December and sent it to General Pershing.Foulois also placed Gorrell-now a lieutenant colonel-in charge of StrategicalAviation in the Zone of the Advance. Persuaded that an independent bombing force would not deprive him of air support forAmerican ground troops, Pershingapproved the plan in early January. Gorrell then moved up to Pershing'sstaff as the Air Service's G-3 (War Plans) representativeto oversee the plan's implemen- tation, but he remained attuned to Pershing's concern that the Air Service might neglect American armies. To assuage this fear,Gorrell pointedlyincluded the followingstatement in the firstparagraph of his writtenanalysis of his plan for Pershing's staff:"The Air Service is an integralpart of a homogeneous team, no portion of which,working by itself,can alone decisivelydefeat the enemy."28 As Gorrell worked to implement his scheme at AEF Headquarters, Lieutenant Colonel Ambrose Monell took over in late Januaryas Chief of Strategical Aviation in the Zone of the Advance. An ex-presidentof the International Nickel Company, Monell was assisted in his new endeavor by Gorrell'sformer compatriots Fowler and Grey.Meanwhile, Gorrell helped create an Office of Air Intelligence in the G-2 (Intel- ligence) Section of the AEF staff.This division contained a "bomb targetunit," described by historianThomas Greer as the "prototypeof the organizations which played such an importantrole in the strategic

26. Holley,Ideas and Weapons, 135. 27. Quoted in ibid. 28. E. S. Gorrell,"The FutureRole of American BombardmentAviation," [c. February-March19181, AFHRA, file number 248.222-78.

MILITARY HISTORY * 81 MARK CLODFELTER operationsof World War ll."29 The unitproduced targetmaps, antiaircraft defensemaps, maps ofkey German railroadsand industries,and objective folders. Despite the extensive planning, Gorrell's proposal did not bear fruit.General Foulois had agreed in December 1917 that American bombers could flywith the Britishuntil American numbers increased sufficientlyto allow separate bombing operations. However,the creation of the British Independent Force in June 1918, which received its orders fromthe BritishAir Ministryrather than fromSupreme Allied Commander Ferdinand Foch, caused Pershing to veto furtherjoint venturesby the fewAmerican day bombardment squadrons that had arrived at the front. Pershing remained concerned that Air Service leaders mightoverlook what he considered to be theirprimary mission- supporting the Army. His Chief of Staff,Major General James WK. McAndrew,stated: "All [Air Service officers]must be warned against any idea of independence and all must know fromthe beginning that every force must be closely coalescent with those of the remainder of the Air Service and those of the Ground Army."30 The Strategical Aviation Branch changed its name in June 1918 to the General Head- quarters Air Service Reserve to reflect this concern of the AEF Com- mander. But in the finalanalysis, the key reason that the United States could not mount an air offensiveagainst Germany was industrialineffi- ciency. America's failure to gear its industryto bomber production foredoomed the Gorrell plan. The inabilityto agree on a single type of bomber (Caproni versus Handley Page) and the conflictingnumerical requirementsprovided to the JointArnmy-Navy Technical Board resulted in no American-made nightbombers ever reaching the front.31 By the summer of 1918, Gorrell's scheme fora massive American air offensivehad atrophied. Colonel Monell had, in Gorrell's words, worked on developing a strategicair force foronly "a month or so,"32 and Major Fowler left Air Service Headquarters to command the American air units operating with the British. Discouraged by the production deficiencies and convinced that an American campaign would never materialize, Wing Commander Grey returned to a Britishassignment. Monell succeeded during his tenure as Chief of the Strategical Section/General Headquarters Air Service Reserveonlv in selectin-6nrosnective airfields for his nhantom force.33

29. Greer,Development of Air Doctrine, 10. 30. "Gorrell:Strategical Bombardment," 153. 31. Holley,Ideas and Weapons, 138-46. 32. "Gorrell:Strategical Bombardment," 155. 33. Ibid., 155-56.

82 * THE JOURNAL OF Pinpointing Devastation

Yet the failureto implement Gorrell's proposal did not lessen the value of his effort.The air power principles articulated in his scheme were, like the theories of Douhet, Mitchell, and Trenchard, untested assertions that could be proven only throughan extensive trialby fire. In the meantime, they could be argued, refined, and espoused by a generation of American air officersseeking service autonomy and certain of strategicbombing's independent ability to win a war. Billy Mitchell,by farthe most vocal proponent of Air Service independence, did not hesitate to insist that bombing could have single-handedly achieved victory. "I was sure that if the war lasted, air power would decide it,"he concluded.34While those officerssharing Mitchell's convic- tion in the immediate aftermathof WorldWar I also endorsed the ideas contained in Gorrell's plan, they usually did so by spouting similar views rather than by specific reference. Gorrell leftthe Air Service in March 1920 to tryhis hand as a corporate executive, ultimatelyserving forsix years as directorand presidentof the Stutz Motor Car Company. Meanwhile, his proposal "was allowed to gatherdust in the War Depart- ment Archivesduring the peace-time years" untilan enterprisingofficer resurrectedit in 1935.35 That individualwas Captain Laurence S. Kuter, a new instructorin the Air Tactics and Strategybranch of the Air Corps Tactical School at Maxwell Field, Alabama-and destined to become one of the fourprincipal architectsof the 1941 air war plan AWPD-1. Kuter later deemed Gorrell's plan "the earliest, clearest, and least known statementof the American conception of the employmentof air power."36 He was determined to make it familiarto studentsat the Air Corps Tactical School. The school provided an intense, year-long,air power-focused curriculumto the Air Corps' top mid-levelofficers, and would graduate 261 of the 320 generals servingin the ArmyAir Forces at the end of World War 11.37Kuter devoted an entire lecture at the school to analyzing Gorrell's plan, emphasizing to students in no uncertain terms that Gorrell's proposal corresponded to current Air Corps Tactical School theory.He stated: Thisplan of Colonel Gorrell'sis takenfrom 18-year old filesof the War Department. It was approved by General Foulois. It was

34. Quoted in Isaac D. Levine,Mitchell: Pioneer ofAir Power (New York:Duell, Sloan, and Pearce, 1943), 148. 35. Laurence S. Kuter,"Air Power- The American Concept," [c. 19431, 12, AFHRA,file number 167.6-50. 36. Ibid. 37. RobertT. Finney,History of the Air Corps Tactical School, 1 920-1 940 (MaxwellAir Force Base, Ala.: Air University,1955), 25. Of the three-stargenerals in theArmy Air Forces at theend ofthe war, eleven ofthirteen were Tactical School graduates,and three four-stargenerals-Joseph McNarney,,and -graduated fromthe school.

MILITARY HISTORY * 83 MARK CLODFELTER

approvedby General Pershing. And it is thecurrent schoolroom theoryof the employment of air forces.No principleor doctrine in theConfidential Air Force Text that is beingwritten today was missedin thatplan. We may return to oursteel desks considerably refreshedby the knowledge that our school plans and ourtheories are not only supportedby, but identicalwith the plans of the level-headedcommanders in thefield when the grim realities of actualwar demanded effective employment.38 Gorrell's plan did indeed mesh well with the Air Corps Tactical School's view of strategicbombing. His belief in the efficacyof concen- trated, systematic attacks on the key nodes of an enemy's industrial establishmentparalleled the Tactical School's "industrialweb theory." That theory,jointly developed by an array of brilliant young officer- instructors,was the essence of a uniquely American philosophy of strategicbombing. Its main points were: (1) In "modern warfare,"the military,political, economic, and social facets of a nation's existence were so "closely and absolutely interdependent" that interruptionof thisdelicate balance could sufficeto defeatan enemy state; (2) strategic bombing,precisely aimed at these "vitalcenters" of an enemy's industrial complex, could wreck the fragileequilibrium and hence destroy the enemy state's war-makingcapability; and (3) such destruction would also wreck the enemy nation's capacity to sustain normal day-to-day life,which would in turndestroy the will of its populace to fight.39With the development of the Norden bombsightin 1931 and the Boeing B-17 bomber in 1935, Tactical School instructorsbelieved that they now possessed the means to validate theirprecision bombing theory. In contrast to Douhet and Trenchard, instructorsat the Tactical School stressedattacking a nation's industrialapparatus ratherthan its civilian work force. Captain Harold Lee George, who would direct the AWPD-1 planning team in August 1941, stated in a 1934 lecture: "It is possible that a moral collapse brought about by disturbances in this close-knitweb may be sufficientto forcean enemy to surrender,but the real target is industryitself, not national morale."40 Major Muir S. Fairchild elaborated in 1938: "The direct attack of civilian populations

38. Kuter,"American Air Power-School Theoriesvs. WorldWar Facts," 23-24. 39. WesleyFrank Craven and James Lea Cate, The ArmyAir Forces in World War II, 7 vols. (Chicago: Universityof Chicago Press,1948-58; reprinted., Wash- ington: Officeof Air Force History,1983), 1: 50-52. See also , "Origin of a Theory forAir Strategy,"Aerospace Historian 18 (March, 1971): 19-25. Wilson servedas Chiefof the "Air Force" section from1931 to 1934, and Directorof the Departmentof Air Tactics and Strategyfrom 1936 to 1940, at the Air Corps Tactical School. He was a key force in developingthe industrialweb theory. 40. Quoted in ibid.,52.

84 * THE JOURNAL OF PinpointingDevastation is most repugnant to our humanitarian principles,and certainlyit is a method of warfarethat we would adopt only withgreat reluctance and regret.... Furthermore, aside from the psychological effects on the workers,this attack does not directlyinjure the war making capacity of the nation." He instead advocated attacks against an enemy's "National Economic Structure,"and exhorted his students to find those targets whose destructionwould produce industrialcollapse.41 To illustratea modern nation's vulnerabilityto a well-conceivedair offensive,Fairchild offered the example of "the greatestindustrial nation in the world"-the United States.42He noted thatwithout adequate raw materials and the power to drive machinery,the American industrial complex could not function. Even in peacetime, a precarious balance held the system together; a strike in a small factoryproducing door latches for automobiles had halted production in many automobile factoriesacross the country.The demands of war strained thatbalance to the utmost,as could be seen fromthe failureof American industryto provide more than token support to the Allied cause in 1917-18. Fairchild asserted that the key elements of American production were 11,842 "critical" factories,almost half of which were located in New York, Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts. The factories in those three states were "a concentrated objective which one might not suspect existed in this great continental industrialized nation of ours." Their destruction, or that of the transportation or power systems linking them, would "apply tremendous pressure to our civilian population while at the same time seriouslyimparing [sic] our abilityand capacity to wage war."43 The message of Fairchild's lecture was twofold:all modern states were vulnerableto air attack,but to determinehow theywere vulnerable took time. "If there is any one point that the studyof air attack on the National Economic Structureimpresses upon us," he insisted,"it is that the objectives to be attacked in thistype of an air offensiveare not to be selected on the morning of the attack. . . . Only by a careful analysis- by a painstaking investigation,will it be possible to select the line of action thatwill most efficientlyand effectivelyaccomplish our purpose, and provide the correct employment of the air force duringwar. It is a studyfor the economist-the statistician-the technical expert-rather than forthe soldier."44

41. Muir S. Fairchild,text of ACTS lecture, "National Economic Structure," 5 April1938, 3-5. AFHRA,file number 248.2019A-10. 42. Ibid., 8. 43. Ibid., 24. 44. Ibid. 10

MILITARY HISTORY * 85 MARK CLODFELTER

Despite Fairchild'sadmonition, it was indeed a soldier who began to analyze the "industrialweb" of ,America's likelyenemy in the late 1930s. The soldier was also a fighterpilot, and he was a fighterpilot with a bent for numbers and technical detail-Captain Haywood S. "Possum" Hansell. Hansell's scoop-shaped nose and pointed chin had earned him the nickname as a child, and the label had stuck. The red-hairedson of an Army surgeon had graduated fromGeorgia Tech in 1924 and entered the Air Corps fouryears later. Afterearning his wings, he demonstrated his considerable skill as a fighterpilot duringperformances with Captain Claire Chennault's "Three Men on a FlyingTrapeze" in the early 1930s. As a firstlieutenant instructor at the Air Corps Tactical School from 1935 to 1938, however,he embraced the school's notion of strategic bombing and became an articulate spokesman for it. In 1940, with the looming prospect of American involvement in the war in Europe, Major General Henry H. "Hap" Arnold tapped him to workin the newly created officeof StrategicAir Intelligence in Washington. Hansell gathered informationabout the economic structure and air forces of potential enemies, receiving minimal help-and even active resistance-from individualsin the War Department's intelligence office.45Frustrated, he turned to specialists fromthe civilian communitywho had recentlyentered the militaryin the wake of Hitler'saggression. Hansell relied on "the services of a Ph.D. in industrialeconomics and an expertin oil" to pinpoint the vital linksconnecting the German war machine.46He also benefittedfrom the suggestionof Major Malcolm Moss, a formerinternational businessman who had traveledextensively. Moss knew that American banks had provided the Germans withmost of the capital to constructtheir electric power system,and thoughtthat those banks mightpossess drawingsand specificationsof the German facilities.The hunch proved correct, and also yielded diagrams of oil refineries.Using those materials,as well as informationfrom scientific journals, the advice of his experts,and his own detailed knowledge of productionrequirements, Hansell preparedtarget folders for the German electric power and petroleum systems. In the summerof 1941, as a resultof the "ABC" discussions between Britishand American militarystaffs at the start of the year, Hansell visited intelligence officesin Great Britain. There, he exchanged informationon German targets. He found that his studies on oil and electric power were superiorto the RAF's,but thatthe British

45. James C. Gaston, Planning the American Air War: Four Men and Nine Days in 1941 (Washington:National Defense UniversityPress, 1983), 30. 46. Haywood S. Hansell, Jr., The Air Plan That Defeated Hitler (Atlanta: liggins-McArthur/Longino& Porter, Inc., 1972), 51.

86 * THE JOURNAL OF Pinpointing Devastation informationon transportation,aircraft production, and Luftwaffeorgan- ization eclipsed his own findings.The Britishallowed him to take copies of their reports,and Hansell eagerly did so. He departed in mid-July with a collection of target folders weighing almost a ton, which he crammed into an American bomber. Upon returningto Washington,he foundhimself assigned to General Arnold's staffas a member of Lieutenant Colonel Harold Lee George's new , whichhad responsibilityfor constructing a prospective air campaign. On 9 July,while Hansell was still in Britain, President FranklinRoosevelt had sent a letterto the Secretaries of War and the Navy requesting their estimate of production requirements should the United States fightthe Axis. The President had earlier conveyed strongsignals thathe would endorse strategicbombing ifwar came. In the aftermathof the 1938 Munich crisis,he had called foran American air forceof ten thousand planes withthe capacity to produce another ten thousand each year; in May 1940, he jumped the yearly production goal to fiftythousand after the German blitzkriegbegan rolling through France; and in May 1941 he directed an increase in heavybomber production to fivehundred per month.47George viewed Roosevelt's Julyrequest to the service secretaries as an opportunityto guarantee the independent employment of air power in a potential conflict. He asked Arnold-who had become Chief of the Army Air Forces when the Air Corps changed its name in June-to obtain permis- sion forthe Air War Plans Division to draftthe air portion of the plan. Arnold agreed that the time was ripe to make a bid forthe independent application of air power. He convinced Brigadier General Leonard T. Gerow, chief of the Army'sWar Plans Division, that George's officewas the best suited to determine ArmyAir Forces requirements. The significance of Arnold's action was not lost on those around him. "We realized instinctivelythat a major milestonehad been reached," Hansell recollected. "Suddenly, withoutanywhere near the opposition we expected, we found ourselves able to plan our own future.How well we would plan and what success we would have in gettingthat plan past the Army General Staffremained a matter of uncertainty,but forthe moment one of our fondestdreams had been realized."48 On Monday, 4 August, Lieutenant Colonel George informed his officersthat they

47. Michael S. Sherry,The Rise of American Air Power: The Creation of Armageddon (New Haven, Conn.: Yale UniversityPress, 1987), 79, 97. JefferyS. Underwood'sThe Wingsof Democracy: The Impact ofAir Power on theRoosevelt Administration,1933-1941 (College Station: A & M UniversityPress, 1991) presentsa convincingargument that the threatof war with the Axis, combined with the "extraordinarypolitical acumen" ofair leadersduring the late 1930s, persuaded a pragmaticRoosevelt to emphasizeair poweron the eve of Pearl Harbor. 48. Hansell,Air Plan, 65-66.

MILITARY HISTORY * 87 MARK CLODFELTER would develop a plan fora prospective air war against Germany and Japan-and that theywould complete the plan in nine days. To guide the effort,George assembled an extraordinarygroup of talented men. Lieutenant Colonels OrvilAnderson, Max F. Schneider, and ArthurW. Vanaman, and Majors Hoyt S. Vandenberg and Samuel E. Anderson were among the individualswho workedon developing the plan's eighteen separate tabs.49 Yet the responsibilityfor the most importantof those tabs, analyzing such topics as "Bombardment Opera- tions against Germany" and "Bombardment Aviation Required for Hemispheric Defense," went to George himself and the three men whom he handpicked to guide the plan's development: Lieutenant Colonel KennethN. Walker,Major Haywood Hansell,and Major Laurence Kuter. George, Walker, Hansell, and Kuter knew each other well. All had taught at the Air Corps Tactical School, and all were stalwart disciples of the school's strategicbombing theory."We had one valuable asset going forus," Hansell recalled. "We embraced a common concept of air warfareand we spoke a common language."50 Arnold had asked George to come to Washingtonfrom Langley in early July to establish the Air War Plans Division. At age forty-eight, George possessed a wealth of "bombing expertise": he had flownwith the 163d Day Bombardment Squadron in France during World War I, bombed the Ostfriesland during Billy Mitchell's "battleship tests" in July1921, served as a bomber test pilot at Aberdeen ProvingGround, directed the Tactical School's Department of Air Tactics and Strategy, and commanded the 2d Bomb Group, America's firstB-17 outfit.He also possessed a law degree from George Washington Universityand had won a national competition in typingand shorthand.On 10 July- the day after the President had sent his request to the Secretary of War-George notifiedArnold that the Air War Plans Division was open forbusiness. It contained a grand total of fourpeople.51 George divided his "staff"into a "Projects Group" and a "War Plans Group," placing his good friendKen Walker in charge of the "Plans" subdivision.Walker had taughtGeorge at the Tactical School in 1931-32 and recommended that George remain at Maxwell as an instructor followinggraduation. A quick-temperedchain-smoker from Cerrillos, New Mexico, Walkerhad barely missed combat in World War I, earning his wings nine days before the war ended. Priorto joining the Tactical School faculty,he had served as operations officerof the 2d Bomb

49. Futrell,Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine, 1: 109. 50. Haywood S. Hansell, Jr.,"USAAF Plans and StrategicEffects," in Impact: The ArmyAir Forces' Confidential Picture History of World War II, 8 vols. (Harrisburg,Pa.: HistoricalTimes, 1982), 4: v. 51. Besides George, Lieutenant Colonels Howard Craig, OrvilAnderson, and KennethWalker comprised the divisionon its firstday. See Hansell,Air Plan, 3-4.

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School faculty,he had served as operations officerof the 2d Bomb Group at Langley, where he developed formationtactics forbombers. AfterMaxwell, he attended the Army Command and General Staff School, and then had flyingassignments in California and Hawaii. He began work for George convinced that bombing could independently win a war,and certain of "the virtualinvincibility of a properlyexecuted bomber offensive."52 George considered him "one of the most brilliant and far-sightedofficers in the ."53 Providingstark contrast to the nervous intensityof Ken Walkerwas the restrained Larry Kuter, the last to join George's inner circle of planners. A 1927 West Pointer who sported a Clark Gable mustache, Kuterhad been responsible forthe emphasis placed on Gorrell'splan in theAir Corps Tactical School curriculum.He also possessed considerable experience in bombers. He had followed Walker as operations officer for the 2d Bomb Group before-graduating firstin his class (which included Hansell) as a Tactical School student.After teaching at Maxwell, he became the sole Air Corps officerassigned to the G-3 (Operations and Training) Section of the Army'sGeneral Staff.There he workedon triplingthe size of the Air Corps into a fifty-five-hundred-planeforce adequate to defend the Western hemisphere. Walker deemed Kuter's expertiseessential to designinga viable plan fora potential air war with the Axis. He persuaded BrigadierGeneral Carl "Tooey" Spaatz, Arnold's Chief of Staff,to request Kuter's temporary release from the Army's General Staff.54Spaatz obtained approval, and Kuter reported forduty to the Air War Plans Division on 4 August-the date George notifiedhis staffof theirnine-day deadline. George and his staffaccomplished theirmarathon planning session in the recentlyconstructed penthouse on top of the eighthwing of the old Munitions Building, located on ConstitutionAvenue between the Washington Monument and Lincoln Memorial. Hastily constructed during World War I as a temporaryfacility, the three-story,steel and concrete structurecontained cramped officesseparated by numerous partitionsand concrete pillars.The daytimetemperature in Washington that August hovered near 90, and the penthouse absorbed the heat.55 Oscillating fans did little to relieve the oppressive conditions. Hansell later described the penthouse as "intolerably hot," and recalled that "literally,when you put your hand down on your desk, your papers would stick to it."56 Despite the heat, the short deadline kept George

52. Gaston, Planning theAmerican Air War,74. 53. Hansell,Air Plan, 4. 54. Ibid., 67. 55. Gaston, Planning theAmerican Air War,22. 56. Quoted in ibid.,21-22.

MILITARY HISTORY * 89 MARK CLODFELTER and his staffworking in the penthouse until nearly midnight every night,and on two evenings they did not go home.57 The heat and the long hours frayed nerves and led to angry confrontations. On one occasion, Walker railed at George that he could no longer work with Hansell,precipitating a similaroutburst from Hansell.58 George managed to smooth the ruffledfeathers, and throughoutthe nine-day ordeal he workedto promote harmonythrough a mixtureof humor,aplomb, and dogged determination. According to President Roosevelt's directive, George and his staff were to determine Army Air Forces requirements that would guide American industryif war occurred between the United States and the Axis powers. The only restrictiongiven George was that his proposal had to conform to Rainbow 5, the overall war plan agreed to by the Britishand American staffsduring the "ABC" discussions in May 1941. Rainbow 5 designated Germany as the major Axis threat,and stated that Anglo-American effortswould focus on defeating Germany first while maintaining a strategic defensive against Japan in the Pacific. Like Gorrell in 1917, George realized that he could not estimate the number of aircraftneeded without firstdetermining how air power would be used. In that regard,he faced a dilemma. Althoughhe and his staffwere convinced thatstrategic bombing could independentlydefeat Germany, they also had to submit a plan that was palatable to Army Chiefof StaffGeorge Marshall. Justas Pershinghad expressed concern over the airmen's emphasis on independent air operations in World War I, Marshall was likelyto reject a plan making no reference to air supportfor the ground forces.Accordingly, George listed the American air mission as: "To wage a sustained air offensiveagainst German militarypower, supplemented by air offensivesagainst other regions under enemy control whichcontribute toward that power; to supporta final offensive,if it becomes necessary to invade the continent; in addition, to conduct effectiveair operations in connection withHemi- sphere Defense and a strategicdefensive in the Far East."59 By statingthat an invasion of Europe mightnot be required,George acknowledged the planners' faiththat strategicbombing would obviate the need forit. Yet George also acknowledged that air power would be available to guarantee its success if the need arose. Almost a decade earlier,as a Tactical School instructor,he had told his students:"Whether air power can, by and of itself,accomplish the whole object of war is certainlyan academic question; but that the air phase of a futurewar

57. Ibid., 16. 58. Ibid., 58. 59. "AWPD-1:Munitions Requirements of the ArmyAir Forces," 12 August 1941, Tab No. 1, 1, AFHRAfile number 145.82-1. Emphasisadded.

90 * THE JOURNAL OF PinpointingDevastation between major powers will be the decisive phase seems to be accepted as more and more plausible as each year passes."60 George's careful delineation of objectives enabled him to design a proposal that would put the Tactical School's strategicbombing theoryto the test. Ifthe test proved successful,the air offensivewould yield victory-and serve as a vindication foran independent service. Having determined that strategicbombing would be the essence of America's air effort,George and his planners worked to identifythose partsof Germany's"industrial web" thatcontributed the most to Hitler's wareffort. Hansell's studieswhile assigned to the StrategicAir Intelligence officewere invaluable in thisendeavor. Using them,planners concluded that the electric power, transportation,and oil production systems were the key components of the German economy. They decided that those systems could be wrecked by destroying 124 vital targets-50 electric -power plants, 15 marshalling yards, 15 bridges, 17 inland waterwayfacilities, and 27 petroleum and syntheticoil plants.61This bombing would not only destroy German war-makingcapability, but would also destroythe "means of livelihood of the German people."62 George's group noted thatcivilians might also be attacked directlyonce theirmorale had weakened due to sustained sufferingand a lack of faith in Germany's ability to win the war. "However, if these conditions do not exist," the planners cautioned, "then area bombing of cities may actually stiffenthe resistance of the population, especially ifthe attacks are weak and sporadic."63 If the industrialweb theoryproved correct, German morale could be expected to crack withoutthe targetingof residentialdistricts. George and his planners realized thatthe destructionof Germany's industrialapparatus would be no easy task. German air defenses were formidable,causing the group to list "neutralization of the German Air Force" as an "intermediate objective, whose accomplishment may be essential to the accomplishment of the principal objectives." 64 Without achieving what Douhet called "command of the air," the ability to wreck German war-makingcapacity remained problematic; moreover, the invasion of France could not occur unless the Allies firstobtained air superiority.George's planners deemed that air supremacy through attritionwas unlikely.Many industrialtargets lay beyond the range of escortfighters, requiring bomber squadrons to relyon Walker'sformation tacticsas theyfought their way across Germany."We knewthat defensive

60. Quoted in Hansell,Air Plan, 34. 61. "AWPD-1,"Tab 1, 3-7. 62. Ibid., 2. 63. Ibid., 7. 64. Ibid., 2.

MILITARY HISTORY * 91 MARK CLODFELTER firepowerin the air would not sufficeto defeat the ,"Hansell recalled.65 Neitherwould attacking German air bases, which were well dispersed and heavilydefended. As a result,planners decided to attack the Luftwaffebefore it leftthe assembly line. They designated eighteen aircraftfactories, six aluminum plants, and six magnesium plants as essential to aircraftproduction, and added them to the list of vital centers earmarked fordestruction. Untilnegated, German air defenseswere certainto hamperbombing accuracy, and accurate bombing was essential to wreck Germany's industrialweb. Marginalweather also threatenedto disruptthe precision bombing effort.Based on weather studies that Hansell had obtained fromthe British,George's group estimated that an average of only five days a monthwould be suitable fordaylight operations over the Reich.66 The best weatheroccurred between Apriland September. The prospect of stiffdefenses and poor flyingconditions, combined with George's own experience fromAberdeen Proving Ground, caused planners to predict that raids on Germany would be 2.25 times more inaccurate than peacetime practice bombing.67 George demanded that bombers had to attack each target in sufficientforce to achieve a 90 percent probabilityof destroyingit-the same percentage deemed acceptable in similar problems at the Air Corps Tactical School.68 In addition-as Gorrell had pointed out in 1917-bombers would have to attack many targets more than once to prevent the Germans from repairing the damage. The planners anticipated that the Germans could repair most targets other than electric power facilities within two to four weeks; power plants would take longer to restore.69 George's group next calculated the number ofbombers required to guarantee a 90 percent level of destruction to the 154 key targets selected, giventhe expected accuracy and the need forrepeated attacks. They determined that eleven hundred bombers were necessary to ensure a 90 percent probabilityof destroyinga single 100-footby 100- foottarget under combat conditions.70A like number of aircraftwould have to return to that target in two weeks to keep it out of action. Planners quickly realized that an enormous number of bombers would be needed to destroyHitler's war machine throughthe constantpounding that they believed was necessary. George thought that to dismantle German industrywould requireat least six monthsof non-stopbombing,

65. Hansell,Air Plan, 83-84. 66. Ibid., 86. 67. Ibid. 68. Gaston, Planning theAmerican Air War,56. 69. Hansell,Air Plan, 86. 70. Gaston, Planning theAmerican Air War,56-57.

92 * THE JOURNAL OF PinpointingDevastation and planners anticipated an April-Septemberoffensive to coincide with the most favorable flyingweather. Given weather, maintenance, and crew rest limitations,they estimated that a Bomb Group containing seventyaircraft could send thirty-sixof its bombers against Germany eight times a month.71Thus, to wreck the 154 key targets in a six- monthspan wouldrequire ninety-eight Bomb Groups-or 6,860 bombers- at the start of the offensive. These bombers would consist of: ten groups of B-25s and B-26s, twentygroups of B-17s and B-24s, twenty-fourgroups of B-29s, and forty-fourgroups of B-36s. Planners noted thatthe ideal typeof bomber forthe offensivewas the B-29; B-25 and B-26 "medium bombers" would suffice"only because they were available."72 The vast numbers would swamp airfieldsin Great Britain,which would serve as home base for the B-17s,B-24s, B-25s, and B-26s. B-29s would operate against Germany from Northern Ireland and the Middle East. The B-36, a proposed behemothwith a four-thousand-milerange, could flyfrom Newfoundland, Greenland, Africa,India, or the northeasternUnited States. George's staffanticipated that each group engaged in combat would lose 20 percent of its aircraft (and 15 percent of its flyingpersonnel) per month, which could create a requirement for an additional 1,272 bombers.73 Although the estimate of bombers needed to assault Germany dwarfedprevious aircraftprojections forthe entire ArmyAir Forces,74 those bombers were by no means the only airplanes envisioned by George and his planners. The massive air offensiveagainst the Third Reich would require escort fighters,fighters to defend air bases, and supportaircraft. Moreover, substantial numbers of fightersand bombers were needed to defend the Western Hemisphere, and the teeth of the strategic defensive in the Pacific would consist of B-29s and B-32s operating frombases in Alaska, Siberia, and the Philippines. All told, George'sgroup calculated that239 groupsand 108 observationsquadrons were necessary to defeat the Axis-a grand total of 63,467 airplanes. If the United States began fighting,as anticipated, in the springof 1942, planners thought that the nation would be hard pressed to produce such an armada beforethe end of 1943.75 Still,they believed thata land invasion of Germany in less than three years was unlikely,which would

71. Ibid., 57. 72. Futrell,Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine, 1: 111. 73. Gaston, Planning theAmerican Air War,25. 74. In July1941, Arnold'sstaff had projectedfifty-four combat groups, containing fourthousand bombers and fightersand 218,800 men. See Cravenand Cate, eds., ArmyAir Forces in World War II, 1: 105. 75. Futrell,Ideas, Concepts,Doctrine, 1: 110-11. The B-36groups were unlikely to be fullyoperational before 1945.

MILITARY HISTORY * 93 MARK CLODFELTER give air power a chance to achieve an independent victory.76A limited air offensivewould startas soon as America entered the war, and the six-monthaerial pounding of the Reich would occur from April to September 1944. Kuter, charged with estimating manpower require- ments,determined that by the startof the offensivethe ArmyAir Forces would have expanded from its authorized limit of 152,000 men in August 1941 to 2,164,916. The latter figurewould give the Army'sair arm a halfmillion more men than were in the entireArmy at the end of 1941.77 On the afternoon of 12 August 1941, an exhausted Hal George delivered a copy of "AWPD-1:Munitions Requirementsof the ArmyAir Forces" to the ArmyWar Plans Office.The plan's appearance reflected the rushed nature of the project. "It was not an impressive looking document," Hansell remembered. "The pages were typed and mimeo- graphed. Corrections were made in ink. The charts were black and white, hastily prepared and crudely pasted together."78 Nevertheless, despite swelteringconditions and flaringtempers, George's group had completed theirtask on schedule. Next came the job of persuading civilian and militaryleaders that the proposal was sound. George had submitted the plan to the Army War Plans Officewithout having it approved by Hap Arnold, who was attending the Argentia Conference in Placentia Bay, but he knew that Arnold would have no qualms in endorsing it. Sterner challenges were on the horizon. In the followingmonth, the planners briefedAWPD-1 to Robert Lovett, Assistant Secretary of War for Air; General George Marshall, Army Chief of Staff;and Henry Stimson, Secretary of War. Lovett received the briefingon 13 August, accompanied by General Gerow fromthe ArmyWar Plans Division and General Spaatz. A World War I Navy pilot and an outspoken air power advocate, Lovett avidly supportedthe proposal. Arnold heard the briefingwith General Marshall on 30 August. The Army Chief of Staffsaid nothing until after the presentationwas over and discussion had ceased. Then he commented that the plan had merit,and the next day he scrawled "Okay, G. C. M." on the cover of the copy that he received.79George's staffculminated their "selling" of AWPD-1 on the afternoon of 11 September and the morningof the 12th,when George, Walker,and Kuterbriefed Secretary of WarStimson in his officein the MunitionsBuilding. Stimson accepted the plan as "a matter-of-factstatement of the air forces required to

76. "AWPD-1,"Tab 1, 2. The plan stated:"If the air offensiveis successful,a land offensivemay not be necessary." 77. Gaston, Planning theAmerican Air War,42. 78. Hansell,"USAAF Plans,"viii. 79. Ibid.; quoted in Futrell,Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine, 1: 111.

94 * THE JOURNAL OF PinpointingDevastation defeat the Axis." Yet he noted that the enormous number of men and planes that would be required to implement the scheme "depended entirelyupon the nation being in a war spiritor at war."80 With the Japanese in December, America acquired the martial spiritthat Stimson thoughtnecessary to spur the large-scale production of combat aircraft.The turmoilcreated by Pearl Harbor canceled a scheduled briefingon AWPD-1to the President,and Hansell later termed the lost opportunity"a cruel disappointment" because he believed thatit preventedbombing advocate Rooseveltfrom fullyunderstanding the value of a concentrated air offensive.81Yet the seemingly inevitable march towards war in the late summer of 1941, with the Japanese defyingRoosevelt's oil embargo as they advanced across China, and the Germans threateningAtlantic sea lanes while theyplowed towardsMoscow, was likelya key reason thatboth Marshall and Stimson endorsed AWPD-1without complaint. As historianMichael Sherry has observed, "Strategy,then, along with Roosevelt's wishes about how to fightthe war, made the War Department amenable to a vision of air war that would have seemed repugnant and fancifula few years earlier."82 Marshall was not a man to put parochial concerns ahead of sound strategy.Although he demanded air support forground forces,he was not opposed to the concept of strategicbombing. Throughassociation withairmen such as Arnold and Major General FrankAndrews, Marshall had gained a healthyrespect forair power's potential. Andrewsbore a large measure of responsibilityfor shaping Marshall's views. Marshall had served as chief of stafffor Andrews's father-in-law,Major General Henry T. Allen, and had firstmet Andrews, the Commander of the General Headquarters Air Force, in August 1938. Marshall left the encounter tremendouslyimpressed by the bomber pilot and his pitch for Air Corps autonomy. Afterbecoming Acting Chief of Staffof the Armyin July1939, Marshall made Andrews his AssistantChief of Staff for Training and Operations-the firsttime ever that an airman had become one of the top fourassistant chiefs.83Marshall would continue

80. Futrell,Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine, 1: 111. 81. Hansell,"USAAF Plans,"ix. 82. Sherry,Rise ofAmerican Air Power, 100. OfficialArmy Air Forces historians Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate offerthis explanation: "Perhaps its [AWPD-1'sJready acceptance was partlydue to thepressure of time in meetingthe President'sdirective, for irrespective of the intrinsicmerits of AWPD-1,the views expressedtherein were not whollyconsistent with those of the War Department." See Cravenand Cate, eds., ArmyAir Forces in World War II, 1: 146. 83. DeWittS. Copp, "FrankM. Andrews:Marshall's Airman," in JohnL. Frisbee, ed., Makers of the United States Air Force (Washington: Officeof Air Force History,1987), 43-60.

MILITARY HISTORY * 95 MARK CLODFELTER to back Andrews's career until its tragic conclusion in a B-24 crash during World War II. In the autumn of 1941, Andrews's air power convictions helped to assure thatthe ArmyChief of Staffwould endorse AWPD-1. Marshall realized that,if war came in early 1942, the invasion of Europe could not occur immediately,and Germany could not go unscathed during the buildup for the ground offensive.If strategic bombing could topple Hitlerand eliminate the need fora riskyamphib- ious assault, Marshall was willingto give it a try. Marshall'sapproval ofAWPD-1 on the eve of Pearl Harborguaranteed that the ArmyAir Forces would use it as a blueprint once war began. That blueprintwas not perfect,but many of its flawscould be seen only in retrospect. For instance, George and his planners concluded that German industrywas runningat fullbore in the wake of the assault on the Soviet Union. They believed that the taut nature of the German economy would increase itsvulnerability to a preciselyaimed air offen- sive,because no reservecapacity would be available to make up forthe damage caused by bombing. This assumption proved false.As historian Eric Larrabee has noted: "Two mythscoincided. Everyone knew that Germans are efficientand everyoneknew that dictatorships are efficient; therefore,if Hitler says Germany is totallymobilized forwar, Germany must be totallymobilized forwar."84 The view that Germany had fully mobilized was also due to mirror-imaging.The planners, especially Kuter, were acutely aware of America's failure to flex its economic muscle in WorldWar I. They believed thatAmerican industrywould not allow them to wage total war for two years, and they knew that the Germans were already wagingwar on a global scale. The logical conclu- sion was that German factoriesmust be producing at peak capacity. In fact,they would not do so until afterStalingrad. The planners also had difficultyin predictingthe nature of the war theywould face in other theaters.They allocated too many aircraftfor defense of the WesternHemisphere, and devoted scant attentionto air needs in the Pacific. "The allowances fordefensive measures in the Far East were skimpy, to say the least," Hansell later observed. "It was presumed that the U.S. Navy would be the primary agency for this requirement."85 While working in the StrategicAir Intelligence section, Hansell had tried to identifyJapanese vital centers, but the attempt provedfruitless. "The Japanese had establishedand maintaineda curtain of secrecy thatwe found absolutely impenetrable. There were not even any recent maps available," he recalled.86 The lack of informationon

84. Eric Larrabee, Commander in Chief: Franklin Delano Roosevelt, His Lieutenants,and Their War (New York:Simon and Schuster,1987), 232. 85. Hansell,"USAAF Plans,"viii. 86. Hansell,Air Plan, 50.

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Japanese production capabilities would plague air leaders throughout thewar, and Hansell would learn thatfrustration firsthand as commander of XXI Bomber Command in late 1944. Yet the greatestflaw in AWPD-1was not the absence of data, but the preponderance of it. The plan reflected the "American propensityto see war as an engineering science," observed militarytheorist and retiredAir Force Lieutenant Colonel BarryWatts.87 With the precision of a lead bombardier operating his Norden bombsight on a cloudless day over an undefended target,George and his planners cranked their Monroe calculators to yield the exact number of bombers needed to destroy German war-makingcapability in a six-monthair campaign. But the skieswould oftenbe cloudy,the flakthick, the fightersrelentless, and the targets dispersed. Although planners tried to allow for this "friction"-Clausewitz's term for the factors distinguishingreal war fromwar on paper-they failed to give it adequate heed. The belief that German industrycontained no slack, and the uncertain evaluation of Japan's internal economic structure,reflected a view of war that was more abstract than concrete. The same can be said about the meager provision for fightersto escort bombers to German targets.The planners allocated twenty-one groups of fightersto support the ninety-eightBomb Groups that would attack Germany,and called forthe development of only thirteenexperi- mental escorts. (Lieutenant Colonel Clayton Bissell,an airman assigned to the Army'sWar Plans Division, pointed out to George afterthe plan's completion the incongruityof requesting3,740 B-36s that had not left the drawingboard whilesimultaneously asking forjust thirteen proposed escorts.88)Unescorted bombers proved incapable of winningair super- ioritythrough attacks on aircraftfactories and air bases. The Allies did not obtain the control of the sky needed to launch the Normandy invasion until early spring 1944, when the combination of hurriedly developed long-rangefighters and bombers servingas "bait" decimated the Luftwaffe'salready depleted pilot force.89 The planners'conviction that bombing could collapse civilianmorale by wreckinga fragileeconomic web rather than by directlytargeting the populace was also a reflection of faith. Pinpointing vital centers proved enormously difficultin practice. Technological limitations

87. BarryD. Watts,The Foundations of US Air Doctrine: The Problem of Friction in War (MaxwellAir Force Base, Ala.: Air UniversityPress, 1984), 47. 88. Futrell,Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine, 1: 111. 89. Stephen L. McFarlandand WesleyPhillips Newton, To Command the Sky: TheBattlefor Air Superiority over Germany,1 942-1 944 (Washington:Smithsonian InstitutionPress, 1991), providesa thoroughanalysis of the attritionalstruggle for daylightair control.

MILITARY HISTORY * 97 MARK CLODFELTER combined with frictionto dilute the "precision" aspect of precision daylightbombing. To maintainair pressureon Germanyduring overcast winterweather, American air leaders turned to radar to locate targets throughclouds, and radar bombing was anythingbut accurate. Eighth Air Force operations analysts estimated that on the twenty-sevenradar bombing missions between the end of September 1943 and January 1944, only fivepercent of the bombs dropped fellwithin one mile of the aiming point.90Radar bombing accuracy did not significantlyimprove forthe duration of the war.91 To the German civilian, the rationale behind such raids mattered little,for in terms of results they mirroredthe Royal Air Force's area attacks. Even when key industriallinks were destroyedwith a minimum of civilian casualties, the impact on German morale was ambiguous. As the war progressed,the demands of unconditional surrender,the desire to end the war quickly, and the hope that air power's performance would justifyair forceautonomy eclipsed some of the qualms displayed at the Air Corps Tactical School about attacking targets that would cause large numbersof civilian deaths. HistorianRonald Schafferfurther asserts thatthe "plenitude of resources" available to air commanders in the closing stages of the European war, and American racism and desire for revenge in the Pacific, helped prod air leaders to condone indiscriminateassaults on cities.92The exact motivesbehind the raids during the war's last year likelydiffered for each individual involved in the decision-makingprocess. Whatcan be said withcertainty is thatthe moral dilemma about bombing civilians loomed large throughoutthe American air campaigns in both Europe and the Pacific,and could not be resolved by applying mechanistic solutions. AWPD-1 displayed an abstract view of war because George, Walker, Hansell, and Kuterhad committed themselvesto provingthe Air Corps Tactical School's untested theoryof strategicbombing. They laid the groundworkfor an independent air campaign that,once accomplished, would present a strong argument forair force autonomy. Hap Arnold shared theirfaith that high altitude, daylightprecision bombing could destroya nation's war-makingcapacity-and he also passionatelydesired an independent air force. He did all that he could to transformtheir vision of AWPD-1into reality. In the final analysis, George and his planners proved remarkably

90. Charles W. McArthur,Operations Analysis in the U.S. ArmyEighth Air Force in World War II (Providence,R.I.: American MathematicalSociety, 1990), 109. 91. Ibid., 294. 92. Ronald Schaffer,Wings of Judgment:American Bombing in World War II (New York:Oxford University Press, 1985), 103-6; 152-55.

98 * THE JOURNAL OF PinpointingDevastation prescient and remarkablyfortunate. Their estimate of 6,860 bombers to assault Germany compared very favorablyto the 7,177 American bombers in the European theater in March 1945.93 All told, they predicted that the ArmyAir Forces would need 239 Combat Groups, 63,647 aircraft,and 2,164,916 personnel; actual numbers were 243 Combat Groups, almost 80,000 aircraft,and some 2,400,000 men and women. Their projected timing for the "all-out" air offensiveagainst Germany,April-September 1944, closelyparalleled the September 1944- April 1945 brunt of the Combined Bomber Offensive,during which allied air forcesdropped 60 percent of the total bomb tonnage thatfell on Germany.94 The intensive assault against the Reich could have begun sooner but forthe diversionof many bombers to supportground campaigns in North Africa and Normandy. By the time the massive pounding began, Hitlerhad finallygeared up the German economy to wage total war, and its overtaxed industrialcomplex-combined with significantlosses to itsresource base and workforce-made itparticularly susceptible to attacks against oil and transportation. The proposed offensiveagainst electric power never occurred. War- time analysts deemed its destructionwould have had a meager impact on the German war effort.Hansell later disagreed withthat assessment and quoted Albert Speer, Hitler'sMinister of Armaments,on the value of the electric power system: "The destruction of the power plants would be the most radical measure as it would at once lead to a breakdown of all industryand public life.Destruction of fifty-sixtargets would produce this effect."95Yet as AlfredMierzejewski has cogently argued in The Collapse of the German War Economy, 1944-1945, coal, not electric power,was the key ingredientof Hitler'swar machine, and the destructionof railroad marshallingyards prevented coal from reaching the factories.This effectof the final assault against German transportationwas fortuitousrather than intentional.Thus, Mierzejewski concludes, itmaybe contended that strategic bombing can makea significant contributionto victoryin war. But it is not a substitutefor a balanced strategyencompassing every component of a nation's militarypower. It is peculiarlyreliant on accurateintelligence, sensiblyinterpreted. Above all, strategic bombing is nota cheap, easy,or quickavenue to success.It involvesa majorinvestment of national resourcesto build a forcepowerful enough to be effective.To be successful,strategic bombing requires simultan-

93. Gaston, Planning theAmerican Air War, 108. 94. David MacIsaac, gen. ed., The UnitedStates StrategicBombing Survey,10 vols. (New York:Garland PublishingCompany, 1976), 1:37. 95. Hansell,"USAAF Plans,"xiii.

MILITARY HISTORY * 99 MARK CLODFELTER

eousand repeatedstrikes against a smallnumber of indispensable sectorsof the enemy economyafter air superiorityhas been won.96 Afterthe war, American air leaders realized that theirapplication of air power had not been withoutflaws, but theyalso emerged fromthe conflictbelieving thattheir fundamental concept of air power had been proven correct. The emphasis on strategic bombing remained, and comments such as Speer's furtherjustified the industrialweb theoryas the cornerstone of the American approach to strategicbombing. Seem- inglyvalidated, the tenets of AWPD-1 became a blueprintfor future air campaigns. The individuals who developed that plan were brilliant men, operating under a severe time constraint, and their vision ade- quately guided the ArmyAir Forces in World War II. Yet a key reason forthe success of AWPD-1 was that, in the main, the Axis powers and the war they fought conformed to the Air Corps Tactical School's notion of modern warfare.The next enemy would not be so accom- modating.

A tapestryof American air campaign planning before Pearl Harbor depicts recurringimages. Air planners fromGorrell to George tried to determine the best way to use the air weapon, and all chose to stressair power'spremier "independent" application-strategic bombing-rather than focusing on support for land and sea forces. This emphasis on strategicbombing was shaped to some degree by the desire to create an independent Air Force, but also stemmed fromthe sincere conviction that air power could single-handedlyachieve victoryby destroyingan enemy's war-makingcapability and willto resist.Having concluded that a nation could not fightif its economic fabric were shredded, and believing that air power, pinpointed against the economic web, could cut the key threads binding together the enemy state, air planners searched for the proper threads to attack. Based on their view of "modern" war, they determined that production centers and their means of distributionwere the essence of war-makingcapability, and that the destruction of those links would also wreck the will of the enemy populace to keep fighting.Accordingly, George and his planners focused on destroyingindustry, while also stressingthat air superiority was a prerequisitefor a successfulair offensive.

96. AlfredC. Mierzejewski,The Collapse ofthe German War Economy,1944- 1945: AlliedAir Power and the German National Railway (Chapel Hill: University of NorthCarolina Press,1988), 186.

100 * THE JOURNAL OF PinpointingDevastation

In advocating strategicbombing, air planners firsthad to show that their proposals would not neglect the air needs of Army or Navy commanders, who were oftenskeptical of air power's abilityto achieve victoryalone. Gorrellhad to convince Pershingthat the plan forbombing Germany would not deny air support to ground forces,and AWPD-1 stated that air power would support an invasion of Europe if such an invasion were necessary. Many airmen viewed the obligation to demon- stratethat theywould support theirsister services as genuflection. Yet air planners could not ignore the concerns of the theatercommander or Chiefof Staff,who had to consider the possibilitythat independently applied air power might not prove decisive. That airmen received the green lightto conduct strategicbombing was a tributeto the vision of Armygenerals like Pershingand Marshall, who cast offtheir parochial shackles to concentrate on the goal of victory. In the end, individuals, as well as ideas, were the indispensable elements of American air campaign planning before Pearl Harbor. Althoughconcepts such as the industrialweb theoryhelped guide plan- ning, the men who translated those ideas into workable designs on paper, and who convinced others to back theirproposals, provided an essential impetus that launched the American air assault on Nazi Germany. The unique backgrounds of George, Walker,Hansell, Kuter, and countless other planners contributed directly to the conduct of America's World War II air offensives.The contributionsof those indi- viduals were not lost on Air Force Colonel John Warden and his ad hoc Checkmate team as they developed the concept of operations forthe Desert Storm air campaign. On the eve of the air assault against Baghdad, a visitorsearching forWarden's planners would have walked past piles of discarded desks and chairs littering a hallway in the Pentagon's basement until arrivingat a door marked: "USAF Air War Plans Division, 1941-1991."

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