BETWEEN CONFORMING AND CONSERVING: THE TIGHTROPE WALK OF THE DUTCH NOBILITY

Nina IJdens

A thesis submitted for the degree of Master of Science

July 2017

Department of Sociology University of Amsterdam Supervisor: Dr. Kobe de Keere Second reader: Dr. Alex van Venrooij

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Abstract

Research has shown that the Dutch nobility has adapted to modernisation processes and continues to disproportionately occupy elite positions. This thesis builds on these findings by raising the question: (1) How does the Dutch nobility aim to maintain its high status position? Secondly, this thesis builds on a growing concern within studies of social stratification on how elite positions are legitimated in a highly unequal context. It investigates the nobility’s legitimation by raising the further questions (2a) How does the nobility legitimate itself through its organisations?; and (2b) How do members of the nobility justify their manifestation as a separate social group? The dataset consists of two sources: fourteen nobility organisations’ websites and fifty-two newspaper articles from 1990 until today, that contain interviews with members of the nobility. This research conducts a qualitative content analysis of these sources, looking for discursive hints of position maintenance, organisational legitimation, and justification. It shows that nobles maintain exclusive social networks that organise interesting networking opportunities; that the nobility copied modern organisational structures through which it could manifest itself as a social group; and that nobles justify their networks by appealing to a collective identity with a right to self-realisation. Moreover, the interviewees constantly both assert and downplay differences between themselves and the general public. They emphasise the nobility’s ordinariness, while also framing the separate noble identity as culturally valuable. Nobles have thus not only practically adapted to changing social circumstances, through engaging in certain practices, but they also morally adapt, by appealing to the norms and values of the audience that is to recognise and appreciate them, and by tapping into the discourse of identity politics.

Keywords: nobility; reconversion; position maintenance; legitimation; justification

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Contents

Introduction: The Enigma of Modern Society ...... 3 The Dutch Nobility: A Brief History ...... 3 Research Questions ...... 4 Theoretical Framework ...... 7 Position Maintenance ...... 7 Legitimacy ...... 14 Research Design ...... 19 Study Corpus ...... 19 Content Analysis ...... 21 Research Findings ...... 22 Position Maintenance ...... 22 Organisational Legitimation ...... 33 Moral Legitimation ...... 42 Discussion ...... 52 References ...... 55 Appendix ...... 60

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Introduction: The Enigma of Modern Society

Until the 1980s, many historians believed that European nobilities’ social power had officially dissipated, that their lifestyle had quickly and quietly disappeared in bourgeois society, and that the nobility as such no longer constituted a separate social group. The era between the French Revolution and WWII brought industrialization, democratization, and meritocratization – conditions under which the nobility could not possibly survive. Since the 1980s, and the appearance of Arno Mayer’s book The Persistence of the Old Regime (1981), more specifically, historiography has taken a turn. Mayer argued that the old regime lasted longer than historians liked to believe, and that traditional elites had since the French Revolution still managed to occupy elite positions in which they actively resisted modernisation processes. In other words, he argued that previous historiography of the nobility stressed rupture, while interesting continuities were overlooked. This thesis builds on the continuity approach in nobility research, by applying it to the Dutch nobility and raising the questions: how does the nobility attempt to maintain its position?; and how does it legitimate itself as a separate social group? The thesis is structured as follows. This introductory chapter sketches a brief history of the Dutch nobility and presents the research questions. In the second chapter I will lay out my theoretical framework, which includes relevant theories of position maintenance and legitimation. The third chapter describes my method of inquiry by outlining the research process, describing the data, and explaining coding and content analysis. Research findings are presented in the fourth chapter. The fifth chapter summarises conclusions of the research and reflects on the research, its theoretical framework, methods and findings.

The Dutch Nobility: A Brief History

Nobilitation has historically been a tool for monarchs to bind powerful individuals to the state. As Montesquieu (2001/1748) stated: “no monarch, no nobility; no nobility, no monarch” (book 2, section 4, para. 2). During the middle-ages, nobility was granted to warriors and counsellors. These in turn constituted knighthoods that played an important role in political decision-making. With the establishment of the Dutch Republic in 1581, the old nobility kept its politically prominent position, yet new noble titles were not given out. With the invasion of the French revolutionary army in 1795, all noble privileges were abolished.1 Yet nobilitation

1 For an elaborate historical study of the nobility’s legal position, see Wolleswinkel (2012); see also Coenraad for a more concise overview (2004).

BETWEEN CONFORMING AND CONSERVING 4 practices flourished again when the Dutch monarchy was established in 1814. William I (1772- 1843) and William II (1792-1843) vastly expanded the nobility, granting a title to those who had been meritorious to the nation. During the following decades, the Dutch nobility had “more influence than it had ever had in the Republic” (Bijleveld, 2015, p. 99). However, the revision of the constitution in 1848 officially brought an end to the nobility’s political privileges. In the following decades, the nobility still disproportionately occupied the highest political ranks (Kuiper, 2011), yet the 1919 introduction of universal suffrage again weakened the Dutch nobility’s position (Bijleveld, 2015). Finally, the twentieth century brought democratisation, informalisation, and increasing social mobility, which came to fruition in the growing wealth and political initiative of the middle classes. Status anxiety among old elites increased in this period of heightened interdependency (Bijleveld, 2015; Wouters, 2007b). The sixties and seventies brought a cultural revolution in which the established order and everything that reeked of elitism was publicly criticised. Finally, in 1994, the nobility was legally reduced to an ‘historical institute,’ yet people of noble descent kept the right – the plight, even – to bear a title or predicate. Kees Bruin (1992) writes that nobility titles “remain an affair that is difficult to rhyme with democratic thought2,i” (p. 121). Surely, he writes, adding ‘CM’ – criminal milieu – in the birth-certificates of ex-detainees’ children and grandchildren would cause public outrage (p. 122). Today, nobilitation can only occur through ‘elevation’, ‘incorporation’, or ‘recognition’. Elevation is reserved to new members of the royal family; incorporation denotes the nobilitation of nobles from a country with a similar nobilitation policy who apply for Dutch citizenship; and recognition refers to the nobilitation of people who can demonstrate genealogical ties to an old – that is, before 1795 – noble family. Today, the Dutch nobility consists of approximately 10.000 to 11.000 people, spread over 325 noble families.3 Today as in the past, only men can pass on their noble titles. The High Council of Nobility still keeps up a filiation register [filatieregister] in which members of the nobility are registered. The genealogical records of Dutch noble families continue to be published in the Dutch Nobility Book [Nederlands Adelsboek].

Research Questions

While Mayer carried the old regime into the early twentieth century, many researchers today demonstrate the continued existence of the nobility in a modern society dedicated to equal opportunity, and averse to privilege (Bruin, 1992; Dronkers, 2000; Kuiper et al., 2006; Moes, 2012). In the British context, Kuiper (2015) calls it the ‘riddle’ of modern society (p. 9); Ursula

2 My translation from Dutch. See the endnotes for original text. 3 https://www.hogeraadvanadel.nl/adel/nederlandse-adel-van-1814-tot-nu

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Den Tex (2003) speaks of the nobility’s “mysterious ‘out-of-reachness’” [raadselachtige ongenaakbaarheid] (back cover). Indeed, contemporary nobility researchers – anthropologists, historians, sociologists alike – demonstrate the continued high social positions of contemporary ‘nobles’ and the continued sense of a ‘noble identity’, and investigate how such positions and identities could have been maintained for so long. Most of these contemporary studies into the nobility have an historical outlook; few provide insight into the nobility’s current position. This is partly due to the problem of access: as a sociological scholar, it is difficult to get access to members of the nobility (Kuiper, 2015, p. 7) This thesis wishes to contribute to the continuity approach in nobility research by broadly exploring both the position maintenance and legitimation strategies of the Dutch nobility. This is especially relevant since the popularity of television shows on the nobility and interviews with members of the nobility suggest that the nobility has experienced a ‘coming out’ of sorts since the 1990s. The establishment of The Association of Young Dutch Nobility in 1991 is a case in point. Among the studies that investigate the current position of the Dutch nobility are two nobility surveys, conducted in 2005 and 2016. These surveys, initiated by the Dutch Nobility Association, provide some demographic information and offer some insight into the attitudes of the nobility towards their identity. While these surveys suffer some issues of representativeness, they nonetheless constitute a rare goldmine into the demographic situation and identity of the nobility (Dronkers et al., 2006; Kuiper & Schijf, 2017). Other important studies on the nobility’s contemporary position were conducted by Jaap Dronkers (2000; 2003; also see Unger & Dronkers, 2014), who demonstrated that being noble is still an advantage on the labour market. Besides Dronkers’ systematic study on contemporary elite positions of the nobility, there is not much to be found on how the nobility aims to secure its high status position today. Nobility studies need an update to consider the current state of affairs. I wish to point out and describe some of the strategies that are used by the Dutch nobility to maintain its high status position, whether that be through securing economic, social or cultural capital:

RQ1: How does the Dutch nobility aim to maintain its high status position?

Furthermore, while many nobility scholars mention the tension between the existence of nobility and the egalitarian, meritocratic, and democratic society, this tension has mostly been researched in terms of adaptation strategies. In other words, the central question scholars have addressed is how noblemen have acted so as to go along in societal transformations. Yet the nobility’s public manifestation is as important for them to stay ‘on top’ (Kuiper, 2012). In order for the title to mean something, the nobility must also have a public face. As the British aristocrat and writer Nancy Mitford warned her peers in her book Noblesse oblige (1956): “Be careful not

BETWEEN CONFORMING AND CONSERVING 6 to overdo the protective colouring. An aristocracy cannot exist as a secret society” (as cited in Kuiper, 2003, p. 61). Therefore, the nobility must legitimate itself as a social group. The second question raised in this thesis is then:

RQ2: How does the nobility aim to legitimate itself as a separate social group?

Legitimacy has many definitions, forms, and can be achieved through a wide variety of strategies (Suchman, 1995). The legitimacy issue will be broken up into two questions. One key pathway to legitimacy is organisational practice, which gives the nobility public relevance. In the first section of the second chapter, the question thus raised is:

RQ2a: How does the nobility legitimate itself through its organisations?

Finally, legitimacy also has a moral dimension. Legitimacy is not only about being perceived but also about being appreciated. The premise of the second section is that the nobility’s renewed self-awareness is at odds with egalitarian values in society, and that the nobility therefore has to justify itself for treating itself as a separate social group. The third question thus raised is:

RQ2b: How do members of the nobility justify their manifestation as a separate social group?

Freely transferring Erving Goffman’s dramaturgical metaphor to this context, we could say that the first question regards the nobility’s backstage strategies, while the latter two on legitimacy concern its frontstage strategies.4 In The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (1956), Goffman makes a distinction between ‘front stage’ and ‘back stage’ behaviour. The front concerns an individual’s behavior before a set of observers, by which she tries to manage the impression others will get of her (p. 13). The back stage is the realm of behavior in which “the performer can relax; . . . drop his front, forgo speaking his lines, and step out of character” (p. 70). Goffman’s framework is a descriptive account of individual behaviour, whereas I am seeking to explain group behaviour. Nonetheless, I believe this distinction clarifies the project at hand: I am trying to consider both strategies of position maintenance and organisational and discursive tools of impression management. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, data sources to study these issues were

4 This idea is not my own. In Onder Aristocraten (2012) Jaap Moes has used Goffman’s dramaturgical sociology to study the nobility’s reconversion strategies.

BETWEEN CONFORMING AND CONSERVING 7 somewhat limited. Looking for traces the nobility leaves behind in public media, I conducted a qualitative content analysis of two data sources: nobility organisations’ webpages; and existing interviews with Dutch nobility in newspapers and magazines from the 1990s onwards.

Theoretical Framework

Position maintenance and legitimacy are the key concepts in the theoretical framework of this research. I discuss the first concept by building on Bourdieu’s notion of reconversion strategies, Tilly’s theory of categorical inequality, and Lamont’s notion of boundaries. I discuss the latter concept by drawing on sociological conceptions of legitimacy and justification, including the views of Bourdieu, Weber, and Boltanski and Thévenot.

Position Maintenance

The first research question concerns the Dutch nobility’s strategies of position maintenance:

RQ1: How does the nobility aim to maintain its high status position?

In the context of the nobility, inequality and position maintenance have mostly been studied through a Bourdieusian lens focused on reconversion strategies. I will first describe this scholarship and then extend this framework by including the comprehensive work on categorical inequality of Charles Tilly and Michele Lamont’s work on social and symbolic boundaries.

Reconversion

Reconversion strategies are the dominant theme in contemporary nobility studies. Bourdieu (1996/1984) coined the term reconversion to describe the manner in which people in high status positions adapt to the circumstances to ensure the continuation of their positions:

Reconversion strategies are nothing other than an aspect of the permanent actions and reactions whereby each group strives to maintain or change its position in the social structure, or, more precisely – at a stage in the evolution of class societies in which one can conserve only by changing – to change so as to conserve. (p. 157)

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Two questions emerge from this: changing how and conserving what? If we are to investigate the nobility’s position, surely we must have an idea of what the nobility is. De Saint Martin (2015) raises this problem as well, and argues that the nobility, because of these reconversions, cannot be defined by referring to a set of unchanging, essential features. In her article on contemporary French members of the nobility, she nonetheless states that a marked heterogeneity among members of the nobility does not mean that “there is nothing that can keep the descendants or members of the nobilities together as a whole, given certain contexts” (2015, p. 306). She then proceeds to list some characteristics. First, the nobility’s symbolic capital, especially family names symbolizing the family lineage and noble titles: “[t]his symbolic capital is what sustains the distance from commoners and acts as the foundation for the social power of the nobility” (p. 307). She further mentions the nobility’s obsessive relationship with history; recognition by other social groups, e.g. through media representation; and “mobilization in exclusive groups” (pp. 307-308). Naturally, in a Bourdieusian perspective these characteristics are not strictly distinguishable: rekindling social ties contributes to the maintenance of social capital; fostering a noble identity through genealogies strengthens symbolic capital and cultural capital; and these forms of capital are ultimately resources facilitating the acquisition of social power and economic capital. As Christian Smith (2003) states: “With Bourdieu, culture turns out to operate always within a political economy that is invariably reward seeking, and human action is expressed in strategies concerned with the ‘maximizing of material and symbolic profit.’” (p. 129) What is continuous about the nobility, then, is not the prevalence of a particular characteristic but the strategic adaption and allocation of symbolic, social and cultural capital to maintain a high-status position. Still, other groups may also strategically manage to occupy high social positions. Hence, something other than the nobility’s continued occupation of high social positions allows us to continue to speak of ‘the nobility’. The key feature of the nobility is its being recognized as nobility and hence depends on its symbolic capital, its nobleness; and on its social capital, its network. As De Saint Martin (2015) states: “Social capital . . . and symbolic capital are the two essential components for understanding what binds the nobility together” (p. 311) The fact that the nobility is no longer the political and landed elite of a bygone era, does not mean that she has lost all her privileges. Wouters (2007a) states:

In the course of this development, [democratisation and nationalisation] royal families, as well as the nobility as a whole, have lost their power but not their prestige . . .; when power is lost, symbolic value is gained. (p. 249)

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Although prestige is thus generally conceptualised as a derivative of other forms of capital, (cf. Tilly (1998) on the difference between ‘autonomous’ and ‘relative’ goods, p. 25-26), several thinkers have argued that prestige can function as an independent source of power. Gerhard Lenski (1966) has referred to prestige and status as “frozen power” (as cited in Szirmai, 1986); Jaap Moes (2012) speaks of an “asymmetrical capital structure” (p. 37). I will henceforth refer to the maintenance of both symbolic and social capital as the activity of cultural self- preservation.

A review of Dutch nobility scholarship on reconversion strategies along these lines first requires an idea whether the nobility has actually successfully reconverted its capitals, that is: have members of the nobility indeed managed to occupy high-status positions? This question has been answered positively by various Dutch nobility scholars (Kuiper et al., 2006; Bruin, 1992; Dronkers & Schijf, 2004; Dronkers, 2000; Dronkers, 2003). These scholars have empirically demonstrated the continued elite positions of individual members of the nobility, due to resources that are exclusive to the nobility’s inherited capital. ‘Invisible, but noticeable’ [niet meer zichtbaar, wel merkbaar] summarises this state of affairs (De Smeth van Alphen, 2006). An important voice in this research is Jaap Dronkers, who mostly builds on quantitative data analysis to show that members of the nobility continue to occupy elite positions in Dutch society. He addresses the following ‘puzzle’: “Why did membership of the Dutch nobility remain an advantage in achieving elite positions in the Netherlands in the 20th century, while the importance of other ascriptive characteristics (e.g. class and gender) for social mobility in society as a whole declined in the same century?” (2003, p. 81) In other words: how, in a meritocratic society dedicated to achievement, can a social group stay disproportionately advantaged? Building on the work of Leon Mayhew (1970), Dronkers (2003) solves this puzzle by suggesting that especially in a modern, fairly egalitarian society, the ascriptive characteristic of a noble title can help employers to make a choice between their equally competent applicants. This argument resembles Charles Tilly’s (1998) explanation of categorical, durable inequalities: they persist as employers rely on heuristics in solving organisational problems. Since ascriptive characteristics are associated with achievement, members of the nobility are – albeit unconsciously – given more chances to achieve. Important to restate here is that symbolic capital only exists if it is recognised. Dronkers (2003) concludes: “[T]here is no reason to assume that ascriptive characteristics will become irrelevant in modern societies” (p. 94). In the same vein, Eric Hobsbawm (1996/1962) wrote:

The chief result of the Revolution in France was to put an end to aristocratic society. Not to 'aristocracy' in the sense of hierarchy of social status distinguished by titles or other

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visible marks of exclusiveness, and often modelling itself on the prototype of such hierarchies, nobility 'of blood'. Societies built on individual careerism welcome such visible and established marks of success. (p. 182)

For Dronkers, ‘modern nobility’ is thus no longer an oxymoron when one considers the persistence and importance of symbolic power in a society dedicated to personal achievement. I have pointed out one form of continuity: the occupation of high social positions. As stated above, these positions depend in large part on the continued relevance of ‘being noble’. I will now review the literature on how the Dutch nobility maintained its nobleness and its network in a society dedicated to egalitarianism and personal achievement. As this scholarship covers centuries of Dutch history and stresses different aspects of continuity, it is useful to roughly divide it into two streams. Some scholars stress the maintenance of symbolic capital; others stress the maintenance of social networks. These streams are by no means mutually exclusive; rather, it is a matter of emphasis.

The Modernisation of Symbolic Capital. Several researchers have investigated changes in cultural practices and self-conceptions of the nobility. Such research is mostly based on ego- documents of noble persons, such as novels, (auto)biographies and, occasionally, interviews. An important voice in this stream of research is Yme Kuiper, an historical anthropologist who has published many articles on the nobility’s cultural practices and identity formation. Kuiper (2003) advocates an Eliasian approach: to explain changes in the activities, rituals, and conventions of the noble ‘subculture’ the researcher is to locate them in the context of the underlying changes in social figurations (p. 169). Kuiper’s research agenda thus mostly concerns how nobility ‘subculture,’ [subcultuur] (p. 169) ‘mentality,’ [mentaliteit] (p. 183) and ‘lifestyle’ [levensstijl] (p. 183), in sum, its habitus, can be analysed in the light of social relations, and shows how noble identity has waxed and waned depending on the social circumstances. Building on De Saint Martin, Kuiper (2015) writes that “[i]t has become increasingly difficult to identify distinctive aristocratic practices and habits. Have the lifestyles of the upper middle classes and the nobility not by now become so intertwined that the difference between them is barely perceptible?” (p. 7) Yet, according to Kuiper (2003), the noble identity did not completely disappear since the noble identity became internalized and the nobility became more of a secret society (p. 182). Moreover, a survey distributed by the Nederlandse Adelsvereniging (NAV) in 2005 among members of the nobility, indicated that strong noble attitudes and lifeforms were still prevalent among the surveyed, while many of the surveyed also claimed that the nobility ‘no longer exists’ (Kuiper et al. 2006, p. 45).

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This research stream thus shows the nobility’s maintenance of symbolic capital, albeit in an adapted form – secretive – to match the social conditions of the time. It is unclear whether such behavioural changes can be interpreted as reconversion strategies, or as more unconscious adaptations to the reigning morals of the time. It is likely, however, that internalizing the noble identity has contributed to its maintenance, since ostentatious status display might have led to public indignation. This mechanism can be theorised by referring to the informalization process as envisioned by Cas Wouters (2007b): in times of increased social integration and interdependency, it was simply not done to display signs of superiority. This would also turn the contradiction between the nobility’s view that ‘the nobility no longer exists’ and its continued experience of nobility into a paradox.

The Modernisation of Social Capital. Other research shows how the nobility has ‘saved itself’ by maintaining exclusive social networks and by reproducing through homogamy. This research focuses on maintaining esprit de corps in order to ensure status position and recognition. Nikolaj Bijleveld (2015) has shown how members of the Dutch nobility ‘revitalised’ themselves around 1900, by forming several institutions, such as chivalric orders, genealogical institutions and the Dutch Nobility Association. Kees Bruin (2006) conducted a case study of the revitalisation of the Johanniter Orde, a chivalric order for philanthropic activities that is exclusively accessible to members of the nobility. While such exclusive, aristocratic orders seem out of place in a modern society, Bijleveld (2015) states that “[t]his reinvention of Dutch nobility was also characterised by a modern form of national self-organisation and self-mobilisation typical of the era.” (p. 115) In other words, class consciousness was not only on the rise among the working classes. In sum, while the Dutch nobility is no longer the ruling class of old times, individual members and noble families have nonetheless adapted to the changing social circumstances in several ways in order to maintain their elite status. The discussion is still riddled with contradictions. One question that emerges from the above discussion is whether the Dutch nobility became more (Bijleveld, 2015) or less (Kuiper, 2003; Den Tex, 2003) ‘class-conscious’ in the twentieth century. This question is related to two contradictory views of what happens when status is endangered. According to Weber, “the more elites . . . are threatened, the more assertive their display of status honour becomes” (Frankenberg, 2002, p. 252). Yet Wouters (2007b) and Den Tex (2003) report a decline in ostentatious status display during the process of social integration. Ostentatious status display was for the wannabes, for the nouveaux riches (see also Veblen, 1994/1899) Notwithstanding these contradictions, the studies do converge on the point that the nobility modernised but did not disappear; or rather, that the nobility did not disappear, but modernised.

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Inequality and Boundaries

As we have seen above, reconversion studies are based on the insight that social groups are not substances characterised by unchanging attributes. According to this view, the nobility re-establishes itself under changing social circumstances by reallocating their capitals in new social spaces. To study the nobility’s position maintenance, I wish to take this processual and relational approach to categorical inequality. The main premise of such a view is that inequality based on social categories may be persistent, but it is not a given. It emerges in a web of social relations, and is reproduced through cultural processes. Charles Tilly (1998) and Michele Lamont (e.g., Lamont & Fournier, 1992; Lamont & Molnár, 2002; and Lamont & Pierson, 2009) are important social theorists that have also researched this dynamic. One may wonder why inequality so often unfolds along the same categorical lines. In his book Durable Inequality (1998), Charles Tilly sets out to answer exactly this question. He seeks to explain why objectified inequality in the form of the unequal distribution of goods, almost universally matches “socially organised differences” (p. 6), or categories. Tilly states that “[c]ategories are not specific sets of people or unmistakable attributes, but standardized, movable social relations” (p. 66). According to Tilly, there are two types of socially constructed categories that serve as a basis for stratification: interior and exterior categories. Interior categories are those that originate within an organisation, such as “faculty versus students, management versus workers, and so on.” (p. 58) Exterior categories are those social categories that exist outside organisations, but that “install systematic differences in activities, rewards, power, and prospects within that organisation.” (p. 58) Tilly demonstrates that members of firms often match interior categories to exterior categories to “ease their organisational work,” (p. 80) thereby strengthening categorical inequality. The nobility is an example of an exterior category: one that does not originate inside an organisation but that may nonetheless affect the hierarchy in a wide range of social settings. Tilly describes four mechanisms that contribute to the instalment and maintenance of categorical inequality: exploitation, opportunity hoarding, emulation, and adaptation. While the first two create categorical inequalities, the latter two entrench categorical inequality further into the social fabric. First, exploitation “operates when powerful, connected people command resources from which they draw significantly increased returns by coordinating the effort of outsiders whom they exclude from the full value added by that effort” (p. 10). In other words, exploitation is the extraction of surplus created by the labour of outsiders who do not get a share in that surplus. Secondly, opportunity hoarding is the mechanism by which insiders seek to secure advantages to the members of their social category, by maintaining a distinctive network that

BETWEEN CONFORMING AND CONSERVING 13 holds valuable monopolised resources that are sequestered (p. 10). The maintenance of these networks is enhanced by the “creation of beliefs and practices that sustain network control of these resources.” (p. 155) Opportunity hoarding is thus very similar to Weber’s notion of social closure. Tilly indeed refers to the Weberian notion of social closure in his book, and builds on his insight that networks may become more open or closed depending on the additional advantages such a strategy may provide:

If the participants expect that the admission of others will lead to an improvement of their situation, an improvement in degree, in kind, in the security or the value of the satisfaction, their interest will be in keeping the relationship open. If, on the other hand, their expectations are of improving their position by monopolistic tactics, their interest is in a closed relationship. (Weber, 1968, as cited in Tilly, 1998, p. 7)

Moreover, building on the work of Roger Waldinger, Tilly (1998) argues “that each category's coping strategies and relations to opportunities at a given time significantly constrain its available strategies and opportunities in the next round” (p. 161). In other words, opportunity hoarding does not always rest on the same strategies: modes of opportunity hoarding may change over time. In this historicist light, it is thus interesting to pay attention to the when and how of opportunity hoarding. Opportunity hoarding is especially prevalent within families and kin groups, in which inheritance is the primary mode of opportunity hoarding: “Opportunity hoarding emphatically includes the deliberate transmission of wealth and other advantages to children and other recognized heirs.” (p. 191) The nobility is traditionally occupied with the preservation of bloodline and inheritance. As such, we can expect to see discursive hints of this mode opportunity hoarding in the interviews. The third mechanism identified by Tilly is emulation, which is the transferral of existing organisational models, including its ‘categorical arrangements’ (p. 96), to new settings. In the case of the nobility, this would mean that there are hierarchical organisations in which the nobility is assigned a higher rank than others. This mechanism does not create categorical inequality but “multiplies” it. (p. 190) Finally, adaptation is the mechanism by which people reinforce existing categorical divisions by acting on them in everyday social interaction. As such, adaptation is an illustration of the Thomas theorem: If a situation is defined as real, it is real in its consequences. Tilly states that adaptation consists in two processes: “the invention of procedures that ease day- to-day interaction, and the elaboration of valued social relations around existing divisions” (p. 97). In other words, the organisation of social relations around the noble identity, as manifested in homogamy, membership of a nobility organisation, friendship, or mutual solidarity, would be

BETWEEN CONFORMING AND CONSERVING 14 indications of noble adaptation. According to Tilly (1998), adaptation “locks categorical inequality into place” (p. 190). Tilly’s framework bears resemblance to Michèle Lamont’s work on ‘boundaries.’ Lamont is interested in how macro-social processes of inequality relate to social categories ‘inside of the head’ (CID Harvard, 2017). She does so by first making a distinction between symbolic and social boundaries. First, “[s]ymbolic boundaries are conceptual distinctions made by social actors to categorize objects, people, practices, and even time and space” (Lamont & Molnár, 2002, p. 168). Thus symbolic boundaries help to make sense of reality, by dividing that reality into categories. Secondly, “[s]ocial boundaries are objectified forms of social differences manifested in unequal access to and unequal distribution of resources . . . and social opportunities” (Lamont & Molnár, 2002, p. 168). Social boundaries are created through social closure and opportunity hoarding. For example, homogamy is one way in which social boundaries are created; spatial segregation is another. In sum, symbolic boundaries exist at the intersubjective level as sociomental representations, whereas social boundaries are symbolic boundaries materialised. Like Tilly, then, Lamont is interested in how mental categories come to stand at the basis of social inequality. Moreover, we can draw a parallel between Lamont’s and Tilly’s terminology by viewing symbolic boundaries as exterior categories, and social boundaries as the visible manifestation of symbolic boundaries as they become institutionalised through the four mechanisms identified by Tilly. However, they differ in their views on the direction of the relation between categories and categorical inequality. According to Lamont and Molnár (2002) “symbolic boundaries can be thought of as a necessary but insufficient condition for the existence of social boundaries” (p. 169). For Tilly, the relation between categories and categorical inequality is a more dialectical one. For instance, adaptation is a mechanism by which people internalise the categories that they are labelled with, and consequently develop their social relations around it. In this way, social boundaries, such as nobility organisations, can also strengthen the subjective experience of a noble identity.

Legitimacy

In the previous section, I laid out the theories by which I will investigate the contemporary nobility’s ‘backstage’ strategies of position maintenance. For the nobility to keep its status position, it is equally important that it publicly manifests itself. As Eckart Conze stated: “Nobility were not possible without the belief in the existence of nobility in its surrounding societyii” (as cited in Kuiper, 2012, p. 63). Symbolic capital – prestige – only has meaning when it is recognised as such. Prestige exists by virtue of a perceiving and appreciating public. To maintain its symbolic capital, then, the nobility is to be perceived and appreciated. Consequently, legitimacy is a

BETWEEN CONFORMING AND CONSERVING 15 necessary condition for the maintenance of symbolic capital. The second chapter raises the question:

RQ2: How does the nobility aim to legitimate itself as a separate social group?

Legitimacy is a rather fuzzy concept, of which the content is often determined by the context under study (Suchman 1995). This has lead to many ‘sub-debates’ within legitimacy scholarship, with scholars talking ‘past one another’ and practicioners not finding their way to important insights. If we understand legitimacy as a legal concept, we could conclude that the nobility has since 1814 managed to maintain its legitimacy, although its legal status was devaluated from ruling class to ‘historical institute.’ Yet legitimacy is also, fundamentally, a social process (Johnson et al., 2006) and has as such drawn considerable attention of sociologists (Zelditch, 2001). In his article on organisational legitimacy, Suchman (1995) brings the existing legitimacy literature together by distinguishing three types of legitimacy: pragmatic; moral; and cognitive. First, pragmatic legitimacy “rests on the self-interested calculations of an organization's most immediate audiences” (p. 578). An organisation achieves pragmatic legitimacy if its policies successfully cater to its constituents’ interests. Secondly, moral legitimacy “reflects a positive normative evaluation of the organization and its activities” (p. 579). As such, moral legitimacy depends on “judgments about whether a given activity is ‘the right thing to do’ . . . as defined by the audience’s socially constructed value system” (p. 579). Finally, cognitive legitimacy depends on “passive acquiescence” (p. 575) rather than “active support” (p. 575). This can be obtained by either being comprehensible through the “availability of cultural models that furnish plausible explanations for the organization and its endeavours” (p. 582); or by being taken for granted, so that “for things to be otherwise is literally unthinkable” (Zucker, 1983, p. 25). Consequently, legitimacy may be threatened in several ways: pragmatic legitimacy is destabilised when an organisations’ activities run counter to its constituents’ interests; moral legitimacy is endangered by moral criticism; and cognitive legitimacy is threatened by historicisation. To be sure, these forms of legitimacy are not strictly separable. For example, embeddedness in tradition ensures cognitive legitimacy, but an organisation’s public appeal to tradition may as well serve as a moral legitimation in a context where tradition is valued for its own sake.

Legitimising Inequality: Practice and Morality

While Suchman (1995) writes in the context of organisational studies, his model can also be applied to other research fields. Since I am interested in the nobility’s legitimation, I will now

BETWEEN CONFORMING AND CONSERVING 16 briefly consider how theorists of social stratification have conceptualised legitimacy. Political sociologists are concerned with the interrelated questions of how the social order is legitimated; how power is legitimated; and how inequality is legitimated.

Practice. The notion of cognitive legitimacy is similar to Bourdieu’s conception of legitimacy. Bourdieu (2000/1997) states that “the work of legitimation of the established order is extraordinarily facilitated by the fact that it goes on almost automatically in the reality of the social world” (p. 181). The social order is legitimated “by fostering the misrecognition of the arbitrary that founds it” (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1993, p. 25). In other words, legitimation is achieved through naturalisation. According to Bourdieu (2000/1997), legitimacy does thus not consist in the conscious acceptance of a certain state of affairs:

Recognition of legitimacy is not . . ., a free act of lucid consciousness: it is rooted in the immediate agreement between the incorporated structures, turned into practical schemes . . ., and the objective structures. (p. 177)

Following Bourdieu, the nobility’s legitimacy should then be studied by looking at how it manifests itself through practices. Viewing the nobility’s organised activities as an important kind of group practice, the second chapter considers how the nobility obtains legitimacy through its organisations. With the loss of its public position as the dominant political class, the nobility could only maintain its status as a separate social group by giving itself a new role to play in the public field. A role that is no longer political, but important nonetheless. As Zelditch (2011) states: having “a goal justif[ies] the existence of [a] group” (p. 262). Moreover, taking up a public role is facilitated by the existence of comprehensible and taken-for-granted organisational structures. In this way, organisations and their goals may serve as tools to legitimate the group united in the organisation. The first question raised by the legitimacy chapter is thus:

RQ2a: How does the nobility legitimate itself through its organisations?

Morality. However, merely organising in a legitimate form is not enough to legitimate the nobility’s ‘coming out’. Exclusivity based on birth, let alone a title, is at odds with the norms and values of a democratic and egalitarian society. As such, I expect that the nobility is subject to an imperative of moral legitimation. Nobles must publicly make sense of their acting as a separate social group. In the second section, I will look into how the nobility morally legitimates the activities that contribute to its status as a separate social category. While the focus of the first

BETWEEN CONFORMING AND CONSERVING 17 section is then on practices that cognitively legitimate the nobility as a separate social group, the second section investigates expressions that morally legitimate the nobility’s actions by appeal to norms and values. Another word for morally and discursively legitimating certain actions is justification. I will use the terms moral legitimation and justification interchangeably throughout. Within sociology, Boltanski (2011/2009) and Boltanski and Thévenot (1999, 2006/1991) have written extensively on justification. Boltanski (2011/2009) distinguishes two ‘registers of action’ (p. 83). First, the practical register is characterised by a mode of action that is nonreflexive, and “primarily directed towards something ‘to be done,’ a task to be performed, with the concern of ‘getting by’” (p. 63). Such nonreflexive action – practice – is disrupted in the face of a critical moment, ranging from a more informal discussion to a legal dispute. Actors then enter the metapragmatic register (p. 67-73). Boltanski (2011/2009) writes that metapragmatic moments are “marked by an increase in the level of reflexivity during which the attention of participants shifts from the task to be performed to the question of how it is appropriate to characterize what is happening” (p. 67). In other words, those involved “are subjected to an imperative of justification” (Boltanski & Thévenot, 1999, p. 360). There is an important requirement to these justifications:

In order to criticize and explain to somebody else what is going wrong, one has to bring together different sets of people and objects and to make connections between them . . . The operation of bringing together different items or different facts must be justified with reference to a principle of equivalence which clarifies what they have in common. (p. 361)

In other words, when you try to seek out the common denominator of a wide range of perceived ‘wrongdoings’ so as to be able to convey the wrongdoing to the wrongdoer, you are looking for a principle of equivalence. Moreover, such a principle of equivalence must rest on a ‘convention of equivalence’ (p. 361) – established values, ‘common goods,’ ‘legitimate worth’ (p. 364) – external to the people involved. Since we live in a complex society, there is a variety of ‘worlds of worth’ that one may appeal to. In sum, the imperative of justification arises when there is a tension between actions and the norms and values of a relevant public. While Bourdieusian studies of legitimacy then consider the ‘practical register,’ Boltanski’s writings on justification concern the ‘metapragmatic register,’ the realm of discursive reflection on a particular action. The key words for Bourdieu are acquiescence, practice, implicity and normativity; for Boltanski they are tension, reflection, explicity and morality. Another important difference is that Boltanski and Thévenot’s approach to justification is situational (1999, p. 365). They do not focus on group differences, but on concrete moments in which people’s critical capacity comes to the fore. As such, group interests are not taken into

BETWEEN CONFORMING AND CONSERVING 18 account as an explanatory factor for the kinds of justifications used by people in conflict. Rather, Boltanski and Thévenot (1999) emphasise the flexibility of justifications, stating that one person may base her justifications on different worlds of worth in different situations, even on the same day. Yet I believe their situational analysis falls short. According to Weber, moral legitimation is a psychological necessity to those who occupy the higher ranks of society. In The Social Psychology of the World Religions, Weber (1946/1915) writes:

The fortunate is seldom satisfied with the fact of being fortunate. Beyond this, he needs to know that he has a right to his good fortune. He wants to be convinced that he “deserves” it, and above all, that he deserves it in comparison with others. . . . Good fortune thus wants to be “legitimate fortune.” (p. 271)

Indeed, justification is a central issue in sociological research on elites (Lewis, 1978; Sherman, 2017; Markovits, 2019; Mijs, 2019; Hecht et al. 2020). Such studies focus on how telling stories of self embedded in a larger social narrative plays a role in legitimating inequality. For example, Rachel Sherman corroborated Weber’s insight as she found that wealthy New York families constantly justified their purchases to themselves, by using a middle-class rhetoric. Jonathan Mijs (2019) has shown how enormous wealth in a highly unequal context is justified by appealing to personal merit, which is embedded in a larger meritocratic narrative. In another study on business elites, MacLean et al. (2011) argue that “it is through stories and self-narratives that business leaders lay claim to legitimacy, which they need to function effectively within the field of power” (p. 18). They find that scripted expressions such as ‘defying the odds,’ or ‘commitment and hard work’ return in several life-histories of business elites. Similarly, Creed et al. (2002) found that “legitimating accounts are intertwined with the construction of social identities” (p. 475). A technical and situational account like Boltanski’s does not do justice to the class-based prevalence of justifications. Notwithstanding this limitation, Boltanski and Thévenot’s conceptual framework is useful, especially their notions of the metapragmatic register and the critical moment. I will use these concepts in my later analysis. Moreover, I will build on Boltanski’s and the elite scholars’ idea that the types of justifications and self-conceptions are both informed and constrained by the larger moral framework of which one is part. In the context of the nobility, narratives must also be ‘morally acceptable,’ that is, an identity may be asserted, but signals of superiority must be avoided. As Wouters (1997) states:

BETWEEN CONFORMING AND CONSERVING 19

They [noblemen] need to be careful with their exemplary function. From the moment it degenerates into a form of superiority, noblemen will lose their advantage. They can cash in on their noble status, but if they emphasise it too much, their status works like a boomerang.5,iii

The crux of the problem is thus: how can the nobility publicly manifest itself as a separate social group without rubbing people the wrong way? Their justifications should somehow aim to resolve the tension between exclusivity and legitimacy:

RQ2b: How do members of the nobility justify their manifestation as a separate social group?

Research Design

Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, this research could not follow the preconceived research plan. My initial idea was to describe how the nobility had justified its high status position after the loss of formal privileges, throughout the long twentieth century. The bulk of this research was intended to take place at the National Archive in The Hague, yet while I was writing the thesis proposal, measures were announced and public institutions were closed. As historical sources were now difficult to gain access to, my supervisor suggested other possibilities to continue pursuing my initial interest in a slightly altered form. While the research lost its historical angle, the new data also raised new research questions about strategies of position maintenance and the legitimating role of organisations. Together, the new data-set thus enabled me to broadly investigate the contemporary Dutch nobility’s public manifestation.

Study Corpus

With archives closed and live interviews difficult to organise, I started browsing online to look for ‘traces’ the Dutch nobility leaves behind in the public media. I then drew a convenience sample by selecting sources that were both ‘trace-dense’ and accessible online. The Dutch Nobility Association’s website served as a reference point. This webpage has published a document called The Small Vademecum of The Dutch Nobility [klein vademecum van

5 ‘Jonge adel leeft in vrij land’, NRC 1997

BETWEEN CONFORMING AND CONSERVING 20 de Nederlandse adel], which provides an overview of existing nobility organisations, and functioned as a guide to finding other nobility organisations’ webpages. I merely focused on exclusive nobility organisations and left organisations that are related to the Dutch nobility, such as fan pages and scholarly journals, out of the picture. Undoubtedly the latter category of organisations, such as the information website Nobility in The Netherlands [Adel in Nederland], also contribute to the legitimation of the nobility as a separate social category, yet this research strictly focuses on the nobility’s own initiative. I thus selected the following fourteen nobility organisations to constitute the first part of my dataset.6

• The Dutch Nobility Association (NAV) [Nederlandse Adelsvereniging (NAV)] • The High Council of Nobility [Hoge Raad van Adel] • The Association of Young Dutch Nobility (VJAN) [Vereniging voor Jongeren van Adel in Nederland (VJAN)] • The European Commission of the Nobility (CILANE) [Commission d’information et de liaison des associations nobles d’Europe (CILANE)] • The Johanniter Order • The Order of Malta • The Teutonic Order Bailiwick of Utrecht (RDO) [Ridderlijke Duitsche Orde Balije van Utrecht (RDO)] • The knighthoods of Gelderland, Groningen, Holland, Noord-Brabant, Overijssel, Utrecht, and Zeeland

The organisations’ websites provide information about the organisations’ goals, activities, and histories. These websites are aimed at prospective members and the general public. Some of the information on the websites could only be accessed behind an inlog-page, such as photo albums of activities, and nobility calendars that list the yearly group events. The second part of my dataset consists of fifty-two interviews with nobility members in newspapers and magazines, from 1990 until today.7 These were accessed through online news databases Nexis Uni and Delpher. Search terms included ‘nobility’ [adel]; ‘high council of nobility’ [hoge raad van adel]; ‘knighthood’ [ridderschap]; ‘chivalric order’ [ridderorde]; ‘nobility law’ [wet op adeldom]; ‘baron’; and ‘squire’ [jonkheer]. From the articles that were yielded by these search terms, I drew a purposive sample, selecting those articles that included interviews with noblemen

6 See Appendix for an overview of the organisations’ websites 7 See Appendix for an overview of the selected newspaper articles

BETWEEN CONFORMING AND CONSERVING 21 and -women or fragments in which members of the nobility were asked to reflect on their noble status and their group activities.

Content Analysis

I conducted a qualitative content analysis of these two data sources to answer my three research questions. Since each question required a slightly different methodological approach, I will in this section describe the coding process for each separate research question. The websites and newspaper articles are both outlets of public communication. As such, these sources did not allow me to directly investigate strategies of position maintenance. However, the nobility’s communication with the public contains discursive hints of such strategies. For the first chapter on position maintenance, I thus relied on both the websites and the interviews. First, the interviews may contain discursive hints to mechanisms of position maintenance. Secondly, the websites provide information about the nobility’s exclusive group activities, possibly signalling the kinds of strategies used by the nobility to secure its advantages. Since Tilly (1998) offers a comprehensive account of the mechanisms through which categorical inequality is reproduced, I coded the text on the websites and in the interviews deductively, using ATLAS.ti software for qualitative content analysis. I used the four mechanisms as my codes: ‘exploitation’; ‘opportunity hoarding’; ‘emulation’; and ‘adaptation’. To discover how the nobility organisations contribute to legitimating the nobility as a separate social group, I mainly relied on the websites. Coding the websites was partly deductive and partly inductive. As stated in the theory section, a social group may legitimate itself by giving itself a public goal and by uniting in an embedded organisational form. Two codes were thus created beforehand: ‘mission statement and activities’ and ‘organisational form’. Yet I did not want to brush over other potentially relevant information. I thus also browsed all the websites with an open mind, systematically clicking every link on the webpage. I then inductively categorised recurring information by creating the following additional codes: ‘description of the organisation’s history’; ‘membership criteria’; ‘type of documents published on the website’; and ‘links to other organisations’. Finally, I noted other important aspects that only pertained to certain specific organisations, such as the chivalric orders’ statement to beware against ‘fake’ chivalric orders. I occasionally used interviews with the spokesmen of organisations to clarify and elaborate on the websites’ information. For the section on moral legitimacy, I relied on the newspaper articles. The articles were coded using ATLAS.ti software. Coding was both deductive and inductive and proceeded in two steps. First, I coded fifteen articles in vivo, since I had no clear expectations as to how members of the nobility morally legitimate their continued occupation with their noble status. In my

BETWEEN CONFORMING AND CONSERVING 22 theoretical framework, I showed that there are two ways in which sociologists have studied justification: by analysing the specific worlds of worth on which explicit justifications are founded; and by analysing identity narratives that more implicitly contribute to the justification of inequality or practices that contribute to inequality. As such, I paid attention to the explicit moral grounds on which the nobility justifies its exclusive practices, but also highlighted rhetorically interesting passages in which noblemen define what it means to be noble. From the recurring codes, I derived larger themes, such as ‘noblesse oblige’; ‘social network’; ‘democratic values’; and ‘relativising differences’. I then deductively ran these codes for all of the fifty-two articles.

Research Findings

In the following sections, I will describe the research findings, centred around the key questions of position maintenance, organisational legitimation, and moral legitimation.

Position Maintenance

In this chapter I describe how the Dutch nobility aims to secure its high status position, by referring to discursive hints to any of the mechanisms pointed out by Charles Tilly (1998). To provide a fuller view of these mechanisms, I will extend my findings by existing nobility research. This investigation into the nobility’s ‘backstage’ strategies is by no means representative for the nobility as a whole, nor does it measure the scale or intensity of the mechanisms at work. First, let me briefly restate the four mechanisms outlined by Tilly (1998). Recall that exploitation consists in extracting surplus value from resources through the labour of outsiders who do not share in the returns; opportunity hoarding is the seclusion of outsiders from a monopolised resource through social closure; emulation denotes the copying of existing blocks of social structure, such as organisational structures, to a new setting; and adaptation refers to the mechanism by which categories become internalised, affecting social behaviour and social relationships. All of these mechanisms contribute to the objectification and stratification of symbolic boundaries.

Exploitation

There were no discursive hints signalling the mechanism of exploitation. A plausible explanation for this is simply that the data sources do not suffice to investigate such a mechanism. The data do demonstrate that the nobility attempts to maintain its exceptionality by the

BETWEEN CONFORMING AND CONSERVING 23 mechanisms of opportunity hoarding, emulation, and adaptation. I will consider these three mechanisms separately below.

Opportunity Hoarding

A classical mode of opportunity hoarding is inheritance that runs through the bloodline. The contemporary nobility has the monopoly on two valuable resources: the noble title; and to a lesser extent, the estates. Opportunity hoarding then happens through the sequestering of the ‘intangible resource’ of the title; and more sporadically through sequestering the family estate from non-noble families. Moreover, there are many exclusive nobility organisations that provide interesting social networking opportunities to its members, such as group activities like hunting and traditional balls. While these activities are not exactly ‘monopolised resources,’ they are only accessible to members of the nobility, and they may provide certain advantages, such as a valuable social network, and the acquisition of cultural capital. Let me focus on each of these resources separately.

The Noble Title. The noble title and the family name are arguably the most important ‘resources’ of the nobility since they constitute the most visible marker of status. Historically, there have been two ways in which members of the nobility have attempted to ‘control’ access to the title: through homogamy and through the prevention of legal reform. Homogamy is a classic example of cultural reproduction. Increasing social mobility would suggest that the practice of homogamy has become an aberration in our modern society. However, Dronkers and Schijf (2005) showed that while noble homogamy significantly declined during the period between 1910 and 1940, this declining trend flattened after this period. The nobility survey of 2005 gives us more insight into the contemporary nobility’s marriage practices. Respondents were asked whether their partner was of noble descent. Of those who were married, only 9 percent indicated that they married a noble partner. This may seem like a negligible percentage, yet it means that the nobles represented in this survey are twenty times as likely to marry a noble partner than their non-noble counterparts with a similar socioeconomic background (Dronkers et al., 2006). Moreover, Kuiper and Schijf (2017) show that women are two times more likely than their male counterparts to marry a noble partner. This may be explained by the fact that the mother’s noble title cannot be passed on to her children. As such, there is more at stake for women in finding a partner: marrying a non-noble partner means that the noble title will not be passed on to offspring.

BETWEEN CONFORMING AND CONSERVING 24

The practice of homogamy also returns in several newspaper articles. Some of the interviewed affirm that homogamy still occurs:

We form a close group with a distinctive background. Many are related through marriages in previous generations.8,9,iv

Most of the interviewees who mention marriage, however, emphasise that homogamy is no longer a widespread practice, or that it is just a coincidence when two nobles marry each other.

Von Maltzahn is in his thirties and is married to a non-noble woman. ‘That is very common among the nobility nowadays. We have had enough inbreeding in the past.’10,v

The baroness married a baron in 1985. That she took fancy to a blue-blooded man was a pure coincidence. Laughing: ‘That absolutely wasn’t a preconceived plan, of course not. I met him through one of my best friends.’11,12,vi

In addition to homogamy, the prevention of legal reform provided another way in which the noble title could be sequestered from outsiders. The High Council of Nobility plays a key role in this history. The High Council was established in 1814 as an advisory organ to the government regarding nobility issues and heraldry. People could make a request to the High Council to grant them a noble title or predicate, after which the Council could suggest to the minister of Home Affairs which people’s requests to honour. As such the High Council has throughout history played an important ‘gatekeeping’ function as to which persons could be granted access to the nobility. Kees Bruin (1987) looked into the history of these nobilitation practices during the nineteenth and twentieth century. He writes that one cannot really speak of a coherent policy. Rather, policies changed when social circumstances did. For instance, in the early nineteenth century the High Council only considered for nobilitation those families that had occupied important political positions for three generations or longer. During the nineteenth century the High Council started to consider citizens that were ‘industrially meritorious’ as well (Bruin, 1987, p. 3). An example of such an applicant was Peter Regout, a wealthy pottery manufacturer. While

8 ‘Adellijke afkomst zie ik als voorrecht’, Reformatorisch Dagblad 2008 9 Also see ‘Adel in Nederland: Van Verschuer en Van Kinschot’, De Gelderlander 1997 10 ‘Het edele deel, Quote 2006 11 ‘Het kapitaal van de adel’, Reformatorisch Dagblad 2008 12 Also see ‘Uitstervende adel niet meer dan een groep titels’, Leeuwarder Courant 2002

BETWEEN CONFORMING AND CONSERVING 25 the Council unanimously acknowledged his societal merit, his request was nonetheless rejected on the ground that his personality did not quite ‘fit’ the noble mould. To the Council, ‘cultural’ nobility was as important as, or more important than, societal merit. In other words, one had to already behave noble by the Council’s standards in order to become officially noble. According to Bruin (1987), this suggests that the Council’s esprit de corps significantly influenced its decisions. During the twentieth century the High Council returned to a more conservative stance regarding nobilitation practices. Nobility was almost exclusively granted to people who could demonstrate genealogical links to an old prominent family of which three generations occupied ruling positions before 1795. One nobleman criticised the High Council’s conservatism and referred to the ‘nobility diploma’ [adelsdiploma] as “a certificate of a genealogical bureau” (as cited in Bruin, 1987, p. 6). However, towards the end of the 1930s, members of the High Council became aware that this rigid policy led to the nobility’s stagnation: something had to change. In 1939, the nobility criterion loosened somewhat: from then onwards, only two generations of the family had to be politically prominent before 1795. Twenty years later, continued stagnation fuelled the discussion on whether to become more lenient and consider societally meritorious people again. Consequently, the new plan was to nobilitate families that had delivered three generations of societally meritorious people, such as scientists, officers, or important people in the private sector. One of the Council’s members spoke out against this idea: “such a system will open up wonderful perspectives to those who are fortunate, vain, and hungry for decorationsvii,” (as cited in Bruin, 1987, p. 7) again indicating a desire to keep the ranks closed. Today, the discussion regarding nobilitation criteria surfaces in some of the interviews:

I think the idea of nobilitating people who have been meritorious to society is an interesting one. I immediately think of Johan Cruijff. But I know that many nobles fear that this new nobility will not immediately experience the same family feeling.13,viii

This expression suggests that today, as in the nineteenth century, the nobility’s esprit de corps weighs more heavily than the desire to breathe new life into the nobility by granting nobility to outsiders. Another legal discussion that pertains to social closure, concerns the question whether to end the patrilinear inheritance of the title, and enable women to pass on their titles. In the 1990s, this discussion was triggered by a newly passed law that enabled parents to choose whether their children would carry the mother’s or father’s last name. While noble mothers could now also pass on their family name to their children, their noble title could not be passed on, even though the

13 ‘Het edele deel’, Quote 2006

BETWEEN CONFORMING AND CONSERVING 26 title is officially part of the last name. A Working Group Nobility and Family Law [Werkgroep Adel en Familierecht] was established to fight for the right of noble women to pass on their title.14 The majority of the Dutch House of Representatives [Tweede Kamer] supported this reform, yet the bill was rejected by a veto of the Cabinet. In a letter to the House of Representatives of 15 May 1997, Minister Dijkstal of Home Affairs offered two main reasons for this decision. First, he argues that modernising the nobility through enabling matrilinear inheritance of the title would conflict with the Nobility Law of 1994. This law constituted a middle-way between abolishing and modernising the nobility by preserving it as an ‘historical institute’. Secondly, he points out the contradictory logic of modernising an institute based on privilege, in the name of equality. Equality before the law is inherently at odds with the institution of nobility. To further research these accordionesque nobilitation politics, Weber’s insight that socially bounded networks may open and close their boundaries depending on their interests and opportunities at that moment, may be especially relevant.

The Estate. Another classical type of opportunity hoarding is practiced by noble families, and pertains to the conservation of the family estate. According to the 2016 survey, five percent of the surveyed still lives on the family estate (Kuiper & Schijf, 2017, p. 181). This research thus shows that nobles are no longer the landowners of a bygone era, suggesting that opportunity hoarding in this manner is limited and only happens on a small scale. However, some interesting correlations were found between ownership of the family estate, embeddedness in social nobility networks, and financial wealth (Unger & Dronkers, 2014). The nobility survey of 2016 showed that a significantly higher percentage of members from the Dutch Nobility Association still lived in the family house than of non-members (Kuiper & Schijf, 2017). Moreover, Unger and Dronkers (2014) found a correlation between landownership and financial wealth, but they did not find such a correlation with annual income. Since landownership is not correlated with income, Unger and Dronkers (2014) suggest that “land is typically inherited” (p. 141). In some of the interviews, signals of opportunity hoarding through inheritance come to the fore. Estate managers speak in a very similar manner about their estate and about the importance of conserving it. Consider, for example, the following two passages:

‘My current ex-wife, who is also of noble descent, inherited part of the family estate. It was a logical obligation that we would manage it together.’ Of course this is a privilege of the elite, he realises. ‘During Den Uyl’s days only forty years ago, large landownership was

14 See for example ‘Strijd voor doorgeven adellijke titel via vrouw’, De Stem 1997; ‘Titels alleen in mannelijke lijn overdraagbaar’, Parool 1996; and ‘Barones mag haar titel niet doorgeven’, Volkskrant 1996

BETWEEN CONFORMING AND CONSERVING 27

absolutely not done, but you can see a clear shift in this regard as well. Understandably so, because landownership means conservation. You can temporarily look after something to pass it on in a better shape to the next generation. Then you’re talking about sustainability, and that is a popular concept nowadays . . . By now I’m in a divorce, so I have had to move on to new preoccupations. As an estate coach, I can use my experience of the past years to help the current generation of landowners. I notice that many proprietors put off their financial issues, while it’s better to consider new business models as soon as possible. I am thinking of recreation, but also of processing biomass or placing telecom masts or windmills, and there are tens of other options that I am happy to offer to them, all the while considering which measures fit which property. When those tools are picked up, I am genuinely happy. Yet another estate in safety!’15,ix

Of course De Weichs de Wenne (62), who is one of the bigger landowners, can sell everything and enjoy life. He will certainly get millions for it. But not this baron. Geysteren will be passed on to his children. The nobility may not be what it used to be, but this gentleman absolutely does not want to break this century-old tradition. ‘You shouldn’t become a victim of your property,’ the baron argues in his office with an exquisite view on the Maas. ‘But we do everything to conserve Geysteren. It is a moral duty. This estate has been developed and passed on with care. Who are we to cash in on it?’16,x

The noblemen express the absolute desire and sense of plight to keep their estates in the family, even if the costs of maintaining the estate surpass the profits. The first nobleman even made a career out of helping other nobles keep their estates inside the family, by finding modern ways to keep the land profitable. The above quotes thus show that the management of estates is a traditional mode of opportunity hoarding, and especially illustrate the importance of beliefs that sustain the practice. According to Tilly (1998), “beliefs in wealth as property, in the inviolability of property rights, and in the priority of interpersonal ties based on birth and marriage all reinforce the centrality of inheritance as a mode of opportunity hoarding” (p. 156). The estate management of the nobility and the attempt to keep the estate in ‘the inner circle’ is sustained by the strongly held belief that the family is the primary unit through which the noble culture can be transmitted. Morally infused notions of ‘passing on’ further entrench the practice. First, the focus of preserving the family history is expressed in many interviews.

15 ‘Adel anders’, Het Financieele Dagblad 2014 16 ‘De moderne adel is nuchter en breed inzetbaar’, Volkskrant 1996

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We support the traditional way of life. Family is the most important in this regard.17,18,xi

The importance of the family and honouring the deeds and of the forefathers through active remembrance is also corroborated by the 2016 surveys. Respondents were asked whether they knew the family names of their great-grandparents: 59 percent confirmed this. Kuiper and Schijf (2017) consider it likely that this percentage is much lower among non-nobility. Moreover, the percentage that positively answered this question was much higher among members of the Dutch Nobility Association than among non-members. Secondly, the notion of ‘passing on’ [doorgeven] also reinforces the practice of opportunity hoarding. This notion is expressed in moral terms. In the quotes above, managing the estate is expressed as a matter of ‘sustainability’; it is a ‘moral duty’; it is about ‘conservation’. The interviewees stress that they could have sold their estates, and that their maintenance costs more than it raises, yet that it is a ‘tradition’ that should not be broken. John Töpfer is an amateur nobility connoisseur who runs the website Nobility in the Netherlands [Adel in Nederland], which posts occasional updates on the nobility and its history. He appreciates the nobility’s sense of ‘doorgeven’: “I think the nobility can be an example . . . How you are a link in a chain and carry responsibility for the next generations, inspired throughout by your family history.”19,xii Together, the notions of ‘passing on’ and ‘conserving the family history’ sustain the practice of opportunity hoarding in this particular mode of opportunity hoarding through inheritance. As Jaap Dronkers states in one of the newspaper articles:

Noble self-consciousness is about passing on the family line, in a way that normal citizens cannot imagine. Material heritage, but also the family’s name and fame. They see themselves as a link in a chain of generations, not as an individual that should realise himself. That makes them so strong.20,xiii

Opportunities Through Networks. So far we have considered the role of the noble family and the High Council of Nobility in opportunity hoarding. Besides these, there are several exclusive networks that hoard opportunities. The Dutch Nobility Association asks contributions from its members in order to provide funds to members who are in financial problems. It also

17 ‘Familie het belangrijkst’, De Telegraaf 2016 18 Also see ‘Titels alleen in mannelijke lijn overdraagbaar’, Parool 1996; and ‘Orden en ridderschappen: gezelligheid en goede doel’, Elsevier 2008. 19 Adel in Nederland: verleden tijd of onsterfelijk?, Adel in Nederland 2018 20 ‘De middelmaat regeert’, Volkskrant 2006

BETWEEN CONFORMING AND CONSERVING 29 provides scholarships to young members of the nobility. As the spokesman of the organisation says in an interview:

We want to foster the mutual contacts and support the nobility’s position . . . We were originally more of a fund that exclusively supported poor noblemen. Throughout time this fund was elaborated with a scholarship programme. On top of that, we have now become a real association, with members.21,xiv

This mode of opportunity hoarding is sustained by the belief that members of the nobility deserve a ‘fitting’ and ‘dignified’ place in society. This is mentioned on the NAV’s website as one of the aims: “Offering help to those members of the Dutch nobility that need funding to obtain or maintain a worthy position in Dutch society”22,xv (emphasis added). It is considered a bit ‘wry’ to be both noble and poor, and the NAV is there to solve this discrepancy between symbolic and economic capital. The idea that stemming from a noble family gives people a sort of plight to be in the upper ranks, or at least not the bottom ranks, of society, returns in several interviews:

It may be hard to imagine, but there are lots of poor nobles. There are plenty of baronesses who cannot afford a new washing machine. Fortunately there is the Dutch Nobility Association, a socially oriented association with funds to help these people.23,xvi

There is no point in bearing a title when you’re a ditchdigger. You need to have the ambition to publicly bear your title. By living a bit in the style of the forefathers, for example.24,25,xvii

Another organisation that hoards opportunities is CILANE, the European nobility commission that consists of national nobility associations. Seeking to ‘support the traditional norms and values’ of the nobility, and to rekindle the ties between European nobles, CILANE organises international exchanges for young members of the nobility, and international weekends with cultural programmes and balls. The exchanges are arranged for school-going youth between 13 and 18 years of age, enabling them to “discover their foreign counterparts from a similar background, discover their different cultures while being similar to each other.”26,xviii

21 ‘Orden en ridderschappen: gezelligheid en goed doel’, Elsevier 2008 22 https://adelsvereniging.nl/ 23 ‘Lang leve de ondeugendheid’, Het Parool, 2011 24 ‘Adel heeft nog steeds flair’, Provinciale Zeeuwse Courant 2014 25 See also ‘De Hoge Raad van Adel gaat zuinig te werk’, Leeuwarder Courant 1987 26 https://cilane.eu/

BETWEEN CONFORMING AND CONSERVING 30

These activities help to strengthen the international nobility network, as well as the young nobility’s cultural capital, in the form of conversational skills and cosmopolitan attitudes. As one of the young attendants at an international ball states:

I am grateful that I was raised multilingually, that my parents taught me to have an open and international orientation. When I was young, I often attended international balls with my parents. In the Czech Republic, Germany. There I experienced how easy and fun it is to make friends with people you don’t know, and in a playful way you also learn the art of conversation. Besides, at a ball the dancing is also one of the ways in which it is easy get in touch with people.27,28,xix

Furthermore, some of the knighthoods, for example the knighthood of Overijssel and Zeeland, also offer scholarships to young nobles and provide funds to members who need financial help. Now, apart from the funds that quite literally advantage group members, do the social networks, its activities and its exchanges contribute to the nobility’s ‘continued advantage’ (Dronkers, 2003)? The newspaper articles and nobility websites do not suffice to fully explore this question. Unger and Dronkers (2014) argue that “the formation of [nobility] networks . . . proves to be a very real advantage on the labour market” (p. 148). According to Dronkers (2003), “[a] title of nobility offers an advantage, but only together with other achieved characteristics, such as a university degree” (p. 94). As such the scholarship programmes and exchanges facilitated by the NAV, CILANE, and the knighthoods, represent opportunity hoarding through the modernisation of cultural capital by combining ascription with achievement. Moreover, in this light, it is interesting to consider the timing of the Dutch nobility’s international networking activities. The NAV joined CILANE in 1994, by the initiative of the VJAN, which may be related to the increasing internationalisation of the contemporary labour market. Rather than treating cosmopolitanism as an ideal in a more globalised world, sociologists have in recent years begun to critically investigate how cosmopolitanism is ‘implicated in stratification’ (Igarashi & Saito, 2014, p. 224). Igarashi and Saito (2014) argue that cosmopolitanism is an emerging form of cultural capital, that is “convertible into ‘profits’ on labour markets,” (p. 231) as international competencies have become a valued asset on an increasingly global labour market (p. 232). Moreover, the acquisition of this ‘global cultural capital,’ (Kim, 2011) is not a matter of choice, but itself facilitated by one’s social position.

27 ‘Jonge adel’, Het Financieele Dagblad 2015 28 See also ‘Jonge adel leeft in vrij land’, NRC 1997

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According to Craig Calhoun (2008), “[w]hat seems like free individual choice is often made possible by capital – social and cultural as well as economic” (p. 433). The moment of joining CILANE, and the fact that it was joined by the youth association’s initiative, suggests that CILANE is about more than enjoying cultural events, but that it also provides the opportunity to create an international network in an increasingly global labour market that values international experience. As such, joining CILANE may be regarded as a reconversion strategy. Young nobility members can use the network’s resources to modernise their cultural capital in order to preserve a high position in a changing social structure.

Adaptation

The mechanism of adaptation also contributes to the nobility’s continuity as a social category. Adaptation works through the organisation of social relations around the nobility category. Membership of an exclusive nobility organisation is a good indicator of this mechanism. According to the numbers provided by the High Council of Nobility, the Dutch nobility counts approximately 10.000 to 11.000 members. The NAV consists of approximately 1400 members (Kuiper & Schijf, 2017) of which 300 are united in the VJAN29; the Johanniter Orde counts around 600 members30. These data thus suggest that approximately 15 percent of the Dutch nobility actively seeks noble company. Moreover, 89 percent of NAV members indicates to meet nobles outside of the own family ‘sometimes’ or ‘often’, as opposed to 42 percent of non-members. Another interesting statistic is that 53 percent of NAV members agree or strongly agree with the statement that being noble requires a special lifestyle, as opposed to 28 percent of non-members. Kuiper and Schijf (2017) conclude that the NAV “attracts the most motivated part of the Dutch nobility” (p. 180). Signs of adaptation also return in the interviews. Some of the interviewees state that they seek friendships within the noble group. They mention that they feel more at ease in the company of people who have similar backgrounds and manners:

29 ‘Je mag nu weer een jonkheer zijn’, De Stentor 2014 30 ‘De échte Nederlandse ridders verrichten hun werk in stilte’, Volkskrant 2018

BETWEEN CONFORMING AND CONSERVING 32

Ever since I was young I identified with other nobles. It is hard to pinpoint why exactly. It has to do with the way you were raised, manners, norms and values that used to be self- evident but not anymore. I do not mean to disqualify non-nobles, but this is how it is.31,32,xx

Interestingly enough, in some cases the organisation of social relations around the noble identity is also formulated as a reaction to experiencing stigma and prejudice. I will go deeper into this issue in the final section on moral legitimation. While some nobles then organise their social life around existing categorical divisions, others state they have no interest in meeting people of the same social category:

Van Rappard is surprised about the fact that young nobles frequently seek each other’s company at special events. ‘If you’re crazy about playing tennis, you can become a member of a tennis club. But what does one do in a nobility association? Does one play ‘noble’? I wouldn’t know what to imagine. The mere fact that somebody is of noble descent would be no reason for me to get in touch with him.’33,34,xxi

According to Tilly (1998), adaptation “locks categorical inequality into place” (p. 190). We cannot verify this statement with a collection of quotes. What can be noted, however, is that there seems to be a conscious identification with nobles or a conscious rejection of socialising with other nobles. According to Tilly, adaptation is the mechanism by which social categories are more or less reinstated, unconsciously, in everyday interactions. Similarly, work floor inequality persists because it becomes part of the organisational routine (p. 190), making categorical inequality increasingly difficult to replace. In the nobility’s case, however, it is unlikely that nobles meet each other on a daily basis in organisational setting. Seeking noble company seems to be a matter of choice, and the phenomenon is especially present in interviews with young nobility members. Historian Ileen Montijn comments on the self-consciousness of the young nobility:

Many people with a specific cultural background want to trace their roots. Jewish youth, for example, but also noble youth. It is a modern phenomenon to explore your identity and this has also affected the nobility.35,xxii

31 ‘Adel anders’, Het Financieele Dagblad 2014. 32 See also ‘Jonge adel leeft in vrij land’, NRC 1997; ‘De middelmaat regeert’, Volkskrant 2006; ‘Jonge adel’, Het Financieele Dagblad, 2015. 33 ‘Adel zal op den duur uitsterven’, Reformatorisch Dagblad 2008 34 Also see ‘Jonge adel’, NRC 1997; ‘Het edele deel,’ Quote 2006 35 ‘Je mag nu weer een jonkheer zijn,’ De Stentor 2014

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Emulation

Finally, emulation is “the reproduction of organizational models already operating elsewhere” (Tilly, 1998, p. 95). It can be any type of borrowing of “chunks of social structure that happen to include unequal categories” (p. 95). The borrowing of existing organisational forms to new settings naturalises the new organisations due to their familiarity (p. 96). Tilly (1998) argues that emulation multiplies categorical inequality, as external categories come to serve as a basis for the hierarchy within public organisations. Yet emulation does not only multiply categorical inequality. It also legitimates the social categories themselves, since it enables social groups to publicly manifest themselves within ‘taken-for-granted’ organisational structures. Thereby, the mechanism of emulation is also a mechanism of cognitive legitimation. Since these mechanisms are so closely related, can indeed not be separated, I will go deeper into both emulation and legitimation in the following chapter.

Organisational Legitimation

In the previous section, we have considered how the nobility attempts to maintain its position today. Yet an aristocracy cannot hide behind ‘protective colouring’ if it is to maintain its prestige. In this section, I will focus on organisations as one pathway to legitimacy.

Nobility Organisations

According to Nikolaj Bijleveld (2015) “self-organisation within noble circles was an international trend” during the nineteenth century (p. 107). During this period, Germany and Denmark, for example, saw an increase of nobility organisations. Baron Zytphen-Adeler (1851- 1915), a Danish nobleman, expressed the importance of self-organisation as follows: “The nobility should organise itself – it should create its own union – this is how the working class has won its place in a relatively short time and subsequently succeeded in maintaining it – let us learn from it” (as cited in Bijleveld, 2015, p. 108). The nobility in the Netherlands did not lag behind its European counterparts in this regard. Several important Dutch nobility organisations were (re-)established around 1900 and took on modern organisational forms. In this section, I will extend Tilly’s argument that emulation multiplies categorical inequality, by describing how copying organisational forms also contributes to the nobility’s legitimacy as a separate social group. The key argument here is that organising in typically modern, comprehensible, and ‘taken-for-granted’ organisational forms

BETWEEN CONFORMING AND CONSERVING 34 enables the nobility to publicly manifest itself as a separate social group. The Dutch nobility in this way achieves cognitive legitimacy. Dutch nobility organisations can be distinguished into three formal types: associations; philanthropy organisations; and clubs. These are all non-profit organisations relying on voluntary membership, but their goals differ. Associations typically serve the enhancement of group interests (Smith et al., 2016b, p. 1392); philanthropy organisations serve some public good; and clubs generally have “sociability as [their] primary purpose” (Smith et al., 2016b, p. 1394). Since most nobility organisations have multiple goals, there are overlaps between these forms within the same nobility organisations. For example, all organisations aim to reconnect the nobility through group activities and as such function as social clubs. Yet for the sake of clarity and due to space limitations, I will per ideal-typical organisational form consider the nobility organisation(s) that use this form and describe their struggles and strategies. Finally, I will briefly discuss how this relates to legitimacy as discussed by Suchman and Bourdieu.

Associations. First, let me consider the NAV, the Dutch Nobility Association. Smith et al. (2016b) define an association as a “relatively formally structured non-profit group that depends mainly on volunteer members for participation and activity and that usually seeks member benefits, even if it may also seek some public benefits” (p. 1392). According to Smith et al. (2016a), the national association is a typical product of the nineteenth century, as nation-state formation, technological innovation, and the emergence of separate social collectives facilitated the institutionalisation of social boundaries. Indeed, Smith et al. (2016a) argue that the industrial revolution was accompanied by an associational revolution. By now, the association has become embedded in the organisational fabric of societies. As such, it is rather ‘natural’ for an interest group to organise by means of an association. The Dutch Nobility Association was founded in 1899, going along with the ‘associational revolution’. One of the spokesmen in the interviews speaks of a ‘union’ [vakbond].36 As stated in the previous chapter, approximately 10 percent of the nobility is united in the NAV today. The website’s home page invites interested noblemen to the ‘subscribe and become a member’ page with the question: “Why should you become a member?” This then leads you to the official mission statement, which reads as follows:

i. Establishing ties between members of the Dutch nobility, to enhance their position in Dutch society;

36 ‘Orden en ridderschappen: gezelligheid en goede doel’, Elsevier 2008

BETWEEN CONFORMING AND CONSERVING 35

ii. Offering help to those members of the Dutch nobility that need funding to obtain or maintain a worthy position in Dutch society iii. Promoting the conservation of and knowledge about Dutch noble heritage37,xxiii

The website states that in previous years, the association was mainly concerned with the second objective, while today it is more oriented towards rekindling the ties between members and creating a sense of community through group activities. According to Aldrich (1979) this kind of function change is a general phenomenon among modern organisations. ‘Goal succession,’ as organisational scholars call it, can have a wide variety of reasons. For example, as organisations age, social conditions change. Consequently, an organisation may need to update its missions to stay relevant within the particular field or sector. In the NAV’s case, the assocation seeks new ways to stay relevant to its members by offering them interesting activities and networking opportunities. Information about the kinds of group activities is limited: the ‘nobility agenda’ and other posts can only be accessed through an inlog-page. One of the events organised that is publicly featured on the webpage is the Oranjebal, a yearly recurring ‘traditional’ ball to which members of all national nobility organisations are invited. A key feature of these balls is a fundraiser, indicating that the NAV also pursues public benefits. The NAV funds members in need of financial help. The Fund for Dutch Nobility [Fonds Nederlandse Adel, FNA] has an ANBI status, which means that it is publicly recognised by the Tax Administration [Belastingdienst] as an organisation that serves the public good.

Philanthropic Organisations. Most nobility organisations engage in some form of charity or philanthropy. Yet, there are only three nobility organisations that have philanthropy as their primary aim. These are the three so-called chivalric orders: the Johanniter Orde, the Orde van Malta, and the Ridderlijke Duitse Orde van Balije Utrecht (RDO). These differ in terms of their organisational structure and their confessional character38, but are similar in several important respects: (1) they are exclusive nobility organisations; (2) they are active in the field of charitas, offering help to the poor, sick, and elderly; and (3) they strongly emphasise their historical roots and actively reject the legitimacy of ‘fake orders’. In the following section I will describe the orders by these characteristics and argue that the chivalric orders are key ‘legitimators’. The Johanniter Orde is a protestant chivalric order that was established in 1099 during the crusades, but reanimated in 1909 as a consequence of Prince Henry’s own legitimacy

37 https://adelsvereniging.nl/over-ons 38 See Van Winter (1998).

BETWEEN CONFORMING AND CONSERVING 36 offensive and his rather arbitrary liking for both formality and philanthropy (Bruin, 2006). While working with volunteers to perform their good deeds, full membership of the order is reserved to protestant nobility members who moreover ‘conform to the conditions imposed by the board’39. For members, there is a ridderdag during which new members are knighted in a highly ritualised manner. The Order of Malta is historically and structurally similar to the Johanniter Order. Like the Johanniter Order, it was established during the crusades, but revived in 1910. Moreover, the order relies on a vast body of volunteers to work towards their charitative goals. Until 2003, membership of the Dutch branch of the Order of Malta was reserved to catholic nobility, yet the magistrate of the organisation seated in Rome had ordered all of its national associations to become open to non-nobility. However, non-nobility cannot apply to become member to the Dutch branch of the order: they must be invited. Moreover, after enabling non-nobility to become members, a hierarchy within the organisation was established, that excludes non-nobility from achieving the highest ranks. Noble members can either be a knight of Honor and Devotion [Eer en Devotie] or of Grace and Devotion [Gratie en Devotie]. Non-noble members may be honoured as well, but only as members of Magisterial Grace [Magistrale Gratie].40 The introduction of new ranks within the organisation shows emulation at work: in the Order of Malta, external categories are ‘matched’ to interior categories, objectifying symbolic boundaries by turning them into social boundaries. The Order of Malta also organises yearly ridderdagen during which new members are welcomed into the organisation as knights. As such, the Order of Malta and the Johanniter Order are professionally functioning philanthropy organisations in which the nobility can legitimately maintain its status aparte through a member-volunteer hierarchy; and through a hierarchy in kinds of distinguished membership. Finally, the RDO is the most exclusive and least public of these orders. In contrast to the Johanniter and Maltese Order, it works as a fund, run by a group of approximately 25 exclusively male noblemen.41 The website does not provide any information on membership policies, but a spokesman of the organisation lifts a veil in one of the interviews:

To become a member, one initially had to have four noble quarters with two grandfathers that had belonged to the nobility before 1795. Due to this policy, the pool of potential

39 https://www.johanniter.nl/orde/ 40 https://ordevanmalta.nl/over-ons/orde-van-malta-nederland/over-de-orde-in-nederland/categorieen-en- onderscheidingen-binnen-de-orde/ 41 ‘Orden en ridderschappen: gezelligheid en goede doel’, Elsevier 2008

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members shrank, which is why the Order decided to compromise. Now members are required to have one patrilenear noble quarter of before 1795 and one matrilinear noble quarter without an age limit.42,xxiv

The Johanniters are active in the charitas, helping the sick, the elderly, the handicapped, the poor and the lonely to participate in society by running nursing homes and organising vacation weeks. In doing so, they “enrich the lives of all people involved.”43 Likewise, the Order of Malta seeks to improve the lives of the poor, the needy, and the helpless by organising pilgrimages, summer camps and other activities. In contrast to these member-volunteer organisations, the RDO operates as a fund to which other charity and cultural organisations may apply. The spokesman of the RDO formulates the target group as follows:

People who do not get a chance generation to generation. We call it the fourth world. The mission statement goes: offering help to the sick, the wounded, and others in need.44,xxv

The website of the RDO explicitly mentions that they do not offer ‘structural support’ [structurele ondersteuning].45 It still owns land and real estate throughout The Netherlands, but in the media they do not wish to speak of their property. They do state that the property is an important source of revenue which is then put back into the fund to keep supporting good causes: “We need to maintain our capital, so we can offer help as long as possible.”46,xxvi Like the Dutch Nobility Association, these philanthropic organisations must have a clear goal in order to stay relevant in the philanthropic field, and change these goals as well. One of the Johanniters’ spokesmen formulated this as follows:

We didn’t use to have hospices, no shelters for the uninsured, no elderly homes. We play into changes in society and try to help everywhere the best we can . . . It is of course a typically Dutch thing that there are so many different institutions, but each of these has its own accents and hence its own added value.47,xxvii

42 ‘Orden en ridderschappen: gezelligheid en goede doel’, Elsevier 2008 43 Johanniter.nl/wie-zijn-wij/doelstelling 44 ‘Na de kruistochten de goede doelen’, NRC 2013 45 https://rdo.nl/explore-view/individuele-hulpverlening/ 46 ‘Na de kruistochten de goede doelen’, NRC 2013 47 ‘Hulpverlening en rituelen’, IJmuider Courant 2009

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Kees Bruin (2006) historicises the nobility’s commitment to charitas. He states that the nobility’s commitment to charitas should be regarded in the light of their diminished public relevance after the dissolution of the formalised class society. Charitas was the field par excellence in which the nobility could take up a public function, while maintaining its exclusivity (Bruin, 2006, p. 138). As the spokesman of the Dutch Nobility Association formulated his engagement: “[W]hile the nobility no longer has any societal importance, the moral mission remains. It is a shame if this would be lost.”48,xxviii This also explains the fact that the orders were revived around the turn of the century, when the nobility was pushed to the edges of the public sphere. According to Bourdieu (2000/1997), the social order’s legitimacy erodes when its arbitrary roots are made visible. While the re-establishment of the orders is a quite recent phenomenon, the chivalric orders strongly emphasise their historical roots. Each order’s website provides extensive information about the order’s history. The focus on history and tradionalism also comes to the fore in rejecting other philanthropic institutions, most notably elite service clubs such as the Rotary. From these service clubs, ‘fake’ orders are most vehemently rejected. These are orders of non-nobility that copy the aesthetic, rhetoric, rituals and decorum of the noble orders, including their knightly titles and royal ties. For example, the ‘fake order’ Sovereign Order of St. John of Jerusalem and Malta claims to have ties to the Romanian royal family.49 While the Rotary’s mission is similar – its motto is ‘service above self’ – and was founded in 1905, the spokesmen of the chivalric orders clearly wish to distinguish themselves from, and even discredit the elite service clubs and the ‘fake orders’ by appealing to their own ‘real’ traditions:

We distinguish ourselves from service clubs like Rotary and Lions with a spiritual language and christian knightly traditions. We don’t do snob appeal.50,xxix

According to Lohman it is problematic that a ‘false order of real estate knights’ is imitating the noble knights’ rituals. It annoys him that some of the board members have a bad reputation, but that they still emphasise their good deeds.51,52,xxx

48 ‘Titels alleen in mannelijke lijn overdraagbaar’, Parool 1996 49 ‘Riddertje spelen,’ Volkskrant 2006 50 ‘De échte Nederlandse ridders verrichten hun werk in stilte’, Volkskrant 2018 51 ‘Riddertje spelen,’ Volkskrant 2006 52 See also ‘Eén grote familie – en machtig bovendien’, NRC 2005

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According to Bourdieu (1993), “the structure of the field of power depends at every moment on the forms of capital engaged in struggles of their respective weight within the structure” (p. 24). Transferring this logic to the philanthropic field, we can conceptualise the chivalric orders’ resistance to the new philanthropists as a legitimacy struggle between economic and cultural capital. This struggle is triggered by a desire for status and distinction. The richness of history and tradition is invoked to draw boundaries between themselves and the money- orders. In other words, history is used to take the moral high ground vis à vis parvenu philanthropists. Contamination fear seems to play a role here, a fear to be associated with charity without integrity: They are doing it because they are vain; we are doing it because we care for people and for our traditions. The struggle against the ‘fake orders’ is also waged on the orders’ websites. The Order of Malta devotes a part of its website to raising awareness about the unlawful activities of the fake orders, referring to a document with “juicy, historical details”.53 If only the good works mattered, there would be no such ‘struggle’ against the fake orders; as there would not be a nobility criterion. This indicates that the philanthropy organisations are important vehicles for the nobility’s cultural self-preservation. In sum, the chivalric orders help to legitimate the nobility’s status as a separate social group through their modern organisational structure, and their relevance in the public sphere. Francie Ostrower (1995) aptly summarises this state of affairs in her book on elite philanthropy:

Elites take philanthropy and adapt it into an entire way of life that serves as a vehicle for the cultural and social life of their class, overlaying it with additional values and norms. Philanthropy thus comes to function as a mark of class status that is connected to elite identity . . . The widespread esteem enjoyed by philanthropy makes it a particularly appropriate mark of class status for an elite in a society that stresses democratic, egalitarian values. (p. 133)

Clubs. Finally, clubs are associations that have sociability as their primary purpose, while some clubs may also pursue other goals such as charity. They are generally locally based (Smith et al., p. 1394). The Association of Young Dutch Nobility and the knighthoods are typical nobility clubs. The VJAN aims to unite young members of the nobility through group activities. Founded in 1991 as a separate division within the NAV, its goal is “to foster the connections between young members of the nobility and to promote their interests.”54 Like the mission statement, the kinds

53 https://ordevanmalta.nl/over-ons/niet-erkende-ordes/ 54 https://www.vjan.nl/

BETWEEN CONFORMING AND CONSERVING 40 of activities organised by the VJAN are very similar to the NAV’s: “Members are offered the opportunity to take part in activities of a social, cultural, and charitative nature.”55 The website uses a ‘noble’ aesthetic: its logo is a crown, the wallpaper is marked with old automobiles and castles, and the front page features a large chandelier. As the youngest of Dutch nobility organisations, is establishment may be seen as a revival of noble self-consciousness among young members of the nobility. The knighthoods are also typical examples of social clubs. In the middle ages the knighthoods were influential political organs that represented the prominent and landed nobles of a province. When the knighthoods lost their political influence in 1848, they also lost their significance and their members. As such, they needed to reinvent themselves if they were to survive. Bijleveld (2015) describes how the knighthood of Overijssel introduced new membership requirements and social activities to draw new members. Yet the knighthoods did not really revive until the turn of the nineteenth century, in line with the re-establishment of other nobility organisations. Bijleveld (2015) suggests that this had something to do with the growing interest in regional history and folklore, which was used by the knighthoods to manifest themselves as cultural-historical hobbyclubs. As in the case of the other organisations, the knighthoods were subject to goal succession to stay relevant to their members and legitimate as institutions. As the spokesman of the knighthood of Gelderland stated in an interview:

Traditionally, the knighthoods own capital, which needs to be allocated. We used to spend a lot of money on helping the weak, but as this task was steadily taken over by the government, people no longer came to us for help. Now we use it for the restauration of manors and paintings, and for publications. This is regionally bounded, corresponding to provincial borders. 56,xxxi

Today, there are eight active knighthoods in The Netherlands, each representing a province. All of these knighthoods revolve around two goals: facilitating ‘the encounter’ [de ontmoeting] and financially supporting cultural heritage, such as (natural) monuments, and other artistic projects that are regionally bounded. Some of these, especially the knighthood of Holland, are primarily concerned with ‘reuniting’ and instilling a ‘sense of community’ between noble families; others, such as the knighthood of Groningen and Utrecht primarily manifest themselves as philanthropic organisations where the community aspect is of secondary importance. All knighthoods hold ‘ridderdagen’ which take place once or twice a year, during which new

55 Idem 56 ‘Orden en ridderschappen: gezelligheid en goede doel’, Elsevier 2008

BETWEEN CONFORMING AND CONSERVING 41 members are welcomed. Usually, this ritual is followed by a lecture on a cultural-historical topic. Once every four years a ‘toogdag’ is organised, on which all knighthoods come together to discuss their activities of the past years. Membership is reserved to male nobles older than 21 years of age. Now, let me consider the knighthoods’ main philanthropic activity: the protection of cultural heritage. We have already discussed the general importance of philanthropic activities for the nobility as a group. By being active as a philanthropic institution, the nobility organisations maintain a relevance in a society that does no longer formally acknowledge the worth of this social group. Moreover, philanthropy provides a meaningful and legitimate reason for the nobility to maintain its distinctive group identity. Now, how does this specific form of philanthropy, supporting provincial cultural heritage, contribute to the legitimacy of the nobility as a social group? Ostrower (1995) argues that not only philanthropy in general, but the specific goals that are selected by elite philanthropists must be regarded in the light of class-based interests (p. 25). The knighthoods define their philanthropic activities as the protection of ‘historical and cultural heritage’. On a closer look, the cultural heritage they refer to is their own. The knighthoods contribute to the restauration of art works and manors that were in the possession of noble families, and to the publication of historical studies regarding these cultural products. Presenting their own historical material as general cultural heritage, a rather specific part of history is neutrally presented as heritage with national value. In this way, the specific group interests that underlie this philanthropic activity are blended out. Detaching themselves from their own history by presenting it as the general public’s history, the knighthoods display a disinterestedness that increases their legitimacy. What binds the networks together is the general occupation with maintaining the noble group and identity in contemporary society. As such, a final important aspect of the knighthoods is that all of their websites link to other knighthoods and nobility organisations. Similarly, the Dutch Nobility Association has published a list of nobility organisations, the ‘Small Vademecum of the Dutch Nobility’. In sum, the nobility organisations, and the knighthoods in particular, together form a network of smaller networks that sustain each other.

Self-Organisation and Legitimacy

Exclusive, aristocratic organisations seem out of place in a modern society. However, as this section shows, modern and aristocratic can go hand in hand. Emulation, as defined by Tilly, does not only contribute to categorical inequality. More fundamentally, it legitimates the symbolic boundaries that are objectified in these organisations, by virtue of the organisations’ comprehensible and taken-for-granted structural characteristics. One can be indignant over the

BETWEEN CONFORMING AND CONSERVING 42 fact that the nobility still unites in organisations, yet the fact that the organisations as such are not questioned contributes to the nobility’s realness as a social group. As such, emulation provides a way to cognitive legitimacy as discussed by Suchman, and to legitimacy as naturalisation as discussed by Bourdieu. For example, one of the VJAN’s members compared the organisation to a hockey club, to suggest that the VJAN is just a normal social club.57 However, such a statement is itself a consequence of the realisation that it is not, or may not be perceived as such. What quite obviously makes the nobility organisations different from other organisations is that they are exclusive. The premise of the next section is that merely organising in a legitimate form is not enough to grant the nobility networks legitimacy. Exclusivity based on birth, let alone a title, is at odds with the norms and values of a democratic and egalitarian society. The next section investigates how the nobility attempts to resolve this tension by morally legitimating itself.

Moral Legitimation

I will divide the findings on moral legitimation into two sections. First, I want to show the motivations for group membership. These are more explicit types of justifications that offer (moral) reasons for joining an exclusive group. Secondly, I want to show how the nobility characterises the nobility. These characterisations serve to justify the nobility’s occupation with keeping its status aparte more subtly and implicitly. But before presenting these findings, a remark is needed on the specific context from which the newspaper articles were drawn to clarify the background against which public utterances must be understood. Yme Kuiper (2003) refers to the sixties and seventies as ‘The Big Hiding’ [Het Grote Wegkruipen] (p. 183). Many members of the Dutch nobility indeed narrate the sixties and seventies as a period of ‘repression’ during which they faced prejudices and discrimination to the extent that they hid their title. It is striking how frequently this narrative returns in different interviews:

Let’s face it: in the sixties and seventies the nobility was simply discriminated against. You were judged and condemned for something you couldn’t change: your background.58,59,xxxii

57 ‘Jonge adel leeft in vrij land’, NRC 1997 58 ‘De adel sterft langzaam uit’, De Gelderlander 2004 59 See also ‘Orden en ridderschappen: gezelligheid en goed doel’, Elsevier 2008; ‘Jonge adel leeft in vrij land’, NRC 1997; ‘Het kapitaal van de adel’, Reformatorisch Dagblad 2008; ‘De vergeten bovenklasse’, Vrij Nederland 2010; ‘Helpen maakt gelukkiger’, Reformatorisch Dagblad 2009; ‘Overweldigd door liefde voor de wereld’, Vrij Nederland 2014; ‘Ridders, kruizen en goede werken’, Algemeen Dagblad 2009; ‘Je mag nu weer een jonkheer zijn’, De Stentor

BETWEEN CONFORMING AND CONSERVING 43

The nobleman quoted above represents the sixties and seventies as a period of repression, in which the nobility was treated unjustly. Another interviewee mentions that she was considered ‘unfit’ for a PR job, since she would not be able to connect with the general public.60 An esquire mentions that he was in the run to become the leader of a prominent political party, but that there was a longstanding debate within the party whether having a noble leader would not damage the party’s image.61 Another interviewee refers to those days as a ‘class struggle’62 [klassenstrijd]. In contrast to those days, members of the nobility state that they can now ‘breathe’ again. Today, the nobility seeks the spotlight a bit more. Moreover, Dutch television shows like Blauw bloed and Hoe heurt het eigenlijk suggest a growing interest in and acceptance of the nobility. Interviewees indicate that they are happy and relieved to be able to outlive their noble identity. Again, this sense of being liberated from repression returns in many interviews:

‘Our society gives the impression that being noble is allowed again, De Beaufort says. ‘We can tell from the influx of new members. In the past more people passed away than signed up, today it is exactly the reverse. People apply and show up again.’63,64,xxxiii

However, some state that their position is still ‘precarious’. Nobles display an awareness that others may still be critical of their titles and their activities, stating that they still face prejudices and discrimination in everyday life.65 Some express that they need to be careful not to emphasise their noble backgrounds too much; others state that they are done saying sorry for who they are:

‘I am of noble descent, so what,’ van Panhuys says. ‘It’s just the way it is and why is it wrong? I don’t feel like apologising for it my entire life.’66,xxxiv

2014; ‘Adel zal op den duur uitsterven’, Reformatorisch Dagblad 2008; ‘De adel sterft langzaam uit’, De Gelderlander 2004 60 ‘Jonge adel leeft in vrij land,’ NRC 1997 61 ‘De adel sterft langzaam uit’, De Gelderlander 2004 62 ‘Adel verplicht. Maar waartoe?’, Vrij Nederland 2005 63 ‘Orden en ridderschappen: gezelligheid en goede doel’, Elsevier 2008 64 See also ‘Het edele deel’, Quote 2006; ‘Hulp van adel’, De Telegraaf 2009; ‘Adel anders’, Het Financieele Dagblad 2014; ‘Na de kruistochten de goede doelen’, NRC 2013; ‘De échte Nederlandse ridders verrichten hun werk in stilte’, Volkskrant 2018 65 ‘Adel verplicht. Maar waartoe?’, Vrij Nederland 2005; ‘Adel in Nederland: Van Verschuer en Van Kinschot’, De Gelderlander 1997 66 ‘Jonge adel leeft in vrij land’, NRC 1997

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‘Nobility is accepted and appreciated again, but we need to be careful,’ De Savornin Lohman notes. ‘We are dancing on a tightrope. When we start strutting like a peacock, it may easily capsize.’67,xxxv

These quotes show that there is, despite the nobility’s ‘liberation’, still something uncomfortable about being noble and expressing it. The first interviewee states she is fed up with having to constantly justify herself; the second interviewee describes the nobility as a group of tightrope dancers. As such, these quotes suggest that the nobility constantly finds itself in what Boltanski and Thévenot (1999) call a ‘critical moment’. For Boltanski and Thévenot, this is a clearly demarcated moment in time in which some action is criticised and must be morally defended on the basis of shared moral worths. However, I would like to employ the concept of the critical moment more broadly. In the context of New York elites, Rachel Sherman (2017) used the term “uneasy street” to denote the conflicting experience of having an expensive lifestyle while wishing to conform to egalitarian norms and values. This suggests that the critical moment may not simply be a brief moment in time, but that as conflict becomes internalised, the imperative of self-justification becomes constantly present. Similarly, the nobility walks on a tightrope, which can be conceptualised as an elaborated and internalised critical moment. This elaborated critical moment is the background against which the nobility’s public utterances must be understood.

Justifying Membership

Let me now focus on how the nobility walks down the tightrope by morally legitimating its organisations, and how members justify their joining a club.

Noblesse Oblige. First, the notion ‘noblesse oblige’ figures very strongly in the members’ narration of their motivations for joining a nobility organisation. A vast range of moral duties are expressed in the interviews, such as the plight to transfer norms and values to younger generations68; to take care of the family estate instead of cashing in on it; to behave decently69; to

67 ‘Je mag nu weer een jonkheer zijn’, De Stentor 2014 68 ‘Jonge adel leeft in vrij land’, NRC 1997 69 Adel in Nederland: Verleden tijd of onsterfelijk?, Adel in Nederland 2018

BETWEEN CONFORMING AND CONSERVING 45 help those in need70; to take up public functions71; to be a good citizen72; to conserve cultural heritage73; and even the plight to use the title in public.74 There is thus no clear-cut definition of the exact duties that having privilege puts on the noble bearer of it. In the context of the chivalric orders and CILANE the credo most notably takes the form of caring for others. Aware of their privilege and heritage, members express their sense of plight to commit themselves to those who are in need:

I have been playing with the idea of joining the order for a while, but it isn’t until now that I feel I have reached the necessary spiritual maturity. Nobility obligates – noblesse oblige – was my father’s adage. That’s the way I see it as well. When you’re of noble descent, you ought to carry out certain norms and values and stand up for those in our society who struggle.75,76,xxxvi

We can see the credo as the need to ‘give back’. Being of noble descent is a privilege that should be deserved after the fact by doing good deeds, thereby creating a sense of being worthy of the title. MacLean et al. (2011) had a similar finding. They conducted a study of how elite business careers are narrativised and legitimised by business leaders, and identified four ‘modes of legitimising’ in which life stories were narrated. One of them was ‘giving back’. According to MacLean et al. (2011), the notion of ‘giving back’ was invoked to morally legitimate the business leaders’ careers, as it “allowed [them] to draw in their storytelling on broader societal norms, tapping into discourses of social inclusion/exclusion” (p. 33). In the interviews, the nobility organisations’ good deeds are indeed narrated as part of a larger moral revival in which the nobility can play an important and leading role. The organisations are actively seeking gaps to fill: they are looking for a kind of moral relevance. Recurring in the interviews with spokesmen of the three orders and in the CILANE’s ethical code is their sense of promoting a ‘moral revival’ based on Christian values. The Johanniter Order’s spokesman states that the order helps to fill gaps the government has created by neglecting her

70 ‘Adel anders’, Het Financieele Dagblad 2014 71 ‘De middelmaat regeert’, De Volkskrant 2006 72 ‘Adel verplicht. Maar waartoe?’ Vrij Nederland 2005 73 ‘Adel verplicht. Maar waartoe?’ Vrij Nederland 2005 74 ‘Uitstervende adel niet meer dan groep titels’, Leeuwarder Courant 2002 75 ‘Riddertje spelen’, Volkskrant 2006 76 See also ‘Helpen maakt gelukkiger’, Reformatorisch Dagblad 2009; ‘Na de kruistochten de goede doelen’, NRC 2013; ‘De adel is springlevend’, Elsevier 2005

BETWEEN CONFORMING AND CONSERVING 46 duties77; another nobleman argues individualisation and secularisation have made people feel lost in this world78; yet another criticises ‘me-culture’ and envisions the chivalric order as an antidote79. In the CILANE’s ethical code, moral disintegration is effectively treated as an opportunity to create a moral role for itself:

On the moment in which Europe is taking crucial steps towards its unification and in which a breeze of liberty allows Central and Eastern European countries to reconnect with their historical roots, the nobility of European countries simultaneously finds itself confronted with a challenge as well as an opportunity: it is about reformulating the values that constitute its raison d’être and take up its plight for the good of a European society in full transformation.80,81,xxxvii

Operating as a counterweight to an individualised society or as a safety-net in areas where the government neglects her duties, the chivalric orders and CILANE tell a story of moral revival in which they have a special role to play. Moreover, according to MacLean et al. (2011), the notion of ‘giving back’ does not only legitimate the exclusive social network, it also serves as a boundary drawing mechanism, since it is “itself an indicator of success, signifying the relative distance from necessity that economic capital provides” (p. 33).

Social Network. A second recurring motivation for joining the nobility networks is the value of forming social relations around the noble identity. Some state it is important for them to be among people that share the same cultural and historical background; some state it is nice to see old familiar faces again; others state it is simply ‘fun’ and ‘gezellig’ to spend time in other nobles’ company:

I myself joined because of the social inspiration and I just think it’s convivial [gezellig]. You’re with soulmates. My grandfather spent his childhood with someone else’s grandfather, you know, that idea.82,xxxviii

77 ‘Hulp van adel’, De Telegraaf 2009 78 ‘Wij zijn de kraamkamer van nieuwe, Europese waarden’, Groene Amsterdammer 2004 79 ‘Aanvulling op de ik-cultuur’, Volkskrant 2011 80 Excerpt of CILANE’s Code Éthique. The code can only be accessed behind an inlog-page, but a small excerpt was published on Google Books. 81 See also ‘Aanvulling op de ik-cultuur’, Volkskrant 2011; ‘Hulp van adel’, De Telegraaf 2009; ‘Eén grote familie – en machtig bovendien’, NRC 2005 82 ‘Hulp van adel’, De Telegraaf 2009

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In the above quote, membership of an exclusive nobility organisation is justified by appealing to the value of experiencing a collective identity together. In this way, the clubs are justified by characterising them as any other social club in which people with a shared network and interest look for each other’s company. It is fun, ‘gezellig’, and ‘inspirational’. One nobleman even suggests that the nobility organisations are some kind of safe spaces in which the nobility can outlive its identity without running the risk of being misunderstood or ridiculed:

‘People often try to get higher up the social ladder by taking other people down. Here we realise, maybe unconsciously, that when we support each other in our development, we will profit as a group,’ Stoop says, who realised that his open and friendly approach in daily life was experienced by others as ass-kissing. ‘My manners can be wrongly interpreted.’83,84,xxxix

In this way, this (young) member feels that the nobility organisations and events are spaces where they can be their true self, where they are supportive of each other, and where their manners are appreciated as genuine.

Freedom and Self-Realisation. Relatedly, an interesting recurring motivation in the interviews is the need for personal fulfilment and self-realisation. Getting together is here defended not simply as something harmless and fun, but as a right.

During the monthly drinks, Van Voorst regularly sees new members hesitantly looking around. “Are we actually allowed to get together?,” they wonder. “Why not?” he then answers. “We live in a free country, right? You can shoot as much heroin as you please. You can pick any religion you like. But if nobles get in touch, it apparently crosses a boundary.”

85,xl

83 ‘Jonge adel’, Het Financieele Dagblad 2015 84 See also: ‘Jonge adel leeft in vrij land’, NRC 1997; ‘De middelmaat regeert’, Volkskrant 2006; ‘Orden en ridderschappen: gezelligheid en goede doel’, Elsevier 2008; ‘Adel verplicht. Maar waartoe?’, Vrij Nederland 2005; ‘Gezag? Nee, dat hebben we niet’, Volkskrant 2017; ‘Ridderschap draait om historie en verbondenheid’, Provinciale Zeeuwse Courant 2018; ‘De wondere ridderwereld’, Dagblad van het Noorden 2018; ‘De adel is springlevend’, Elsevier 2005 85 ‘Jonge adel leeft in vrij land’, NRC 1997

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Dijkstal does not want the Dutch nobility to expand. This remark rubs Floor baroness van Dedem the wrong way. “That’s something. If Dijkstal were to say that about another group – for example the red-haired – it would cause quite a stir.”86,xli

The final quote is especially interesting. The expression of minister Dijkstal refers to the previously mentioned law that would make it possible for noble women to pass on their noble title to their children, which would result in a significant expansion of the nobility. Dijkstal’s cabinet vetoed the law. The baroness here makes a very odd equation between having a noble title and having red hair. By this she implies that being noble is a natural fact. Consequently, not allowing the noble title to be passed on would mean the end of a certain ‘breed’ of people. Similarly, the former quote implies that nobility organisations are just like any other social clubs, where a shared interest or group feature serves as the basis for group activities. These group activities are defended as a human right: you may choose to shoot heroin; you may choose to be religious; you may choose to get together with peers. The social networking organizations are thus morally legitimated by appealing to a modern rhetoric of self-development, and of the freedom to find one’s identity and unite with people of the same heart and mind. In sum, by appealing to the nobility’s dedication to morality and the value of the social relations, the interviewees appeal to a collective identity to justify their social boundary drawing. Moreover, aware that this may not suffice as a justification, they are emphasising that they have the freedom to self-realisation, especially after experiencing stigma. In this way, the practice of elitist reproduction is phrased in non-elitist, modern terms.

Justifying Nobility

Let me now consider how the nobility defends the nobility’s right to exist in general, through characterising it in a morally uncontroversial way. The nobility has a difficult task to accomplish. A superior appearance must be cultivated in order to maintain prestige, yet there are moral boundaries that limit the extent to which the nobility’s unicity can be emphasised. These moral boundaries are set by the norms and values of the audience that needs to recognise the nobility as a separate social group. In the interviews, we see the characterisations play out in a constant shifting between asserting and relativising differences. On the one hand, difference is asserted and characterised as a fun source of diversity, as something that gives colour to the social world. On the other hand, difference is downplayed to avoid judgments of elitism and superiority. Let me first focus on the assertion of difference.

86 ‘Strijd voor doorgeven adellijke titel via vrouw’, De Stem 1997

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Asserting Differences. When interviewees stress the differences between nobles and others, these differences are framed as culturally valuable. The nobility represents a part of Dutch history, tradition, and diversity. The rhetorical question implied here is: ‘Why not cherish the nobility?’

I think it would be a shame when the nobility dies out, because society will lose folklore. It makes everything a bit more grey. And I don’t like grey. Grey doesn’t stimulate the brain.87,xlii

I emphasise the difference between nobility and bourgeoisie a bit more nowadays. I feel connected to my name and my family history. As long as you try to stay nice, it’s fun to be just a bit different than someone else, right?88,89,xliii

Difference is effectively asserted: the contrast between bourgeoisie and nobility is emphasised. Yet these symbolic boundaries are not drawn by appealing to a qualitative difference. The nobility is here characterised as an historical group that is to be valued not because it is better but because it is different. Social differences are to be cherished: they give colour to the social world. In this way, difference is emphasised while superiority is only implied. Abram de Swaan (2005) has commented on the way in which class differences are expressed in a society committed to egalitarianism. He writes that the awareness of status is still prevalent in our society, but that status differences can only be formulated in “veiled and indirect terms” (para. 11). He refers to this egalitarian pretence as a “societal-neurotic trait” (para. 11).

Downplaying Differences. On the other hand, difference is downplayed in areas that are associated with elitism or superiority: wealth, exclusivity, and decadence. People in the interviews emphasise that the nobility is no longer the landed and rich elite of a bygone era, and that they do not wish to go back to the old days.90 Moreover, several interviewees stress that the nobility has ‘moved with the times’ by reaching out more to media outlets91, and emphasise how

87 ‘Lang leve de ondeugendheid’, Het Parool 2011 88 ‘Jonge adel leeft in vrij land’, NRC 1997 89 See also ‘Hulp van adel’, De Telegraaf 2009; ‘Toekomst van de orde’, Haarlems Dagblad 2009; ‘Ik word vaak oververweldigd door liefde voor de wereld’, Vrij Nederland 2014; ‘Adellijke afkomst zie ik als voorrecht,’ Reformatorisch Dagblad 2008; 90 ‘We zijn de kraamkamer van nieuwe, Europese waarden’, Groene Amsterdammer 2004 91 See for example ‘Aanvulling op de ik-cultuur’, Volkskrant 2011; and ‘Eeuwenoude Duitse Orde van de Balije in openbaarheid’, RTV Utrecht 2015

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‘middle-class’ the nobility has become.92 Finally, interviewees across the board emphasise that they do not wish to place themselves above others because they have a title.93 Consider, for example, the following statement:

‘We are broadly deployable,’ he states modestly. ‘We represent all ranks in society, there are also housepainters and milkmen among us. The days in which being noble was an advantage, to become a diplomat for example, are over. You need to find your place through your own efforts.’ 94,xliv

The interviewee presents the nobility as a down-to-earth group of people. He appeals to the typically meritocratic ideal that everyone can ‘make it’ by working hard, but is therefore also absolutely responsible for one’s own success. Moreover, the normality of the nobility is stressed by stating that there are also noble housepainters and milkmen. Another interviewee mentions that he knows “a baron from a very respectable family who just sells T-shirts at the market” and a “mailman” as well.95 In sum, including housepainters, milkmen, market vendors and mailmen, the nobility is has become normal, modern, and middle-class. Jean-Pascal Daloz (2010) writes that “the cultivation of a superior appearance regularly entails substantial constraints and unceasing self-observation” (p. 123). This especially applies to the tightrope walking nobility. De Saint Martin (2015) similarly concluded her study of the contemporary French nobility’s sense of group identity:

If the descendants of the nobility were to state categorically, ‘I am a nobleman’, this would be considered intolerable and not supported but rejected; they have to resort instead to formulas denying nobility but recognising it at the same time in the form of ‘I am not a nobleman, but I still am’, which better enables them to be recognised and accepted as being special and different from other people. (pp. 313-314)

Tensions. The interviewees seem to struggle with their desire for distinction and their awareness that they may be judged for displaying elitist behaviour or carrying feelings of superiority. We can see this struggle play out in the interviews where ‘being the same but different’ returns in one sentence. It is striking how often this rhetoric returns, expressed in the

92 ‘Gezag? Nee, dat hebben we niet’, Eindhovens Dagblad 2017 93 ‘Ridderschap draait om historie en verbondenheid’, Provinciale Zeeuwse Courant 2018 94 ‘De moderne adel is nuchter en breed inzetbaar’, Volkskrant 1996 95 ‘Gezag? Nee, dat hebben we niet’, Eindhovens Dagblad 2017.

BETWEEN CONFORMING AND CONSERVING 51 formula: ‘Asserting difference … but downplaying difference’. Several tensions can be pointed out: shame and pride; universality and particularism; modernity and traditionalism. A tension that frequently returns in the interviews is the tension between taking pride in or being ashamed of one’s noble background.

You shouldn’t be self-satisfied because it is all so very noble, but neither should you shove the knighthood aside. The same goes for a title.96,97,xlv

The tension between universality and particularism comes to the fore when interviewees state that the nobility is unique in some regard, but then add that this is actually not really unique to the nobility:

There exists among nobles the feeling that you should take public responsibility. Of course we all should, but I think you can really expect it from the nobility. 98,99,xlvi

Finally, there is a tension between modernism and traditionalism. Nobles want to move with the times, yet they also want to maintain the status quo.

While the enthusiasm to partake in the Order of Malta is growing, the board wrestles with the question who is allowed to enter the inner circle and who isn’t. ‘We want to be open,’ says René ridder van Rappard, ‘but we’re also not supposed to turn into a korfball club’.100,101,xlvii

96 ‘Adel verplicht. Maar waartoe?’, Vrij Nederland 2005 97 See also ‘Lang leve de ondeugendheid’, Het Parool 2011; ‘Het kapitaal van de adel,’ Reformatorisch Dagblad 2008; ‘De adel sterft langzaam uit’, De Gelderlander 2004 98 ‘Het edele deel’, Quote 2006 99 See also ‘Regering traag met wet op adeldom’, Leeuwarder Courant 1991 100 ‘Eén grote familie – en machtig bovendien’, NRC 2005 101 See also ‘Wij zijn de kraamkamer van nieuwe, Europese waarden’, Groene Amsterdammer 2004.

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Discussion

Arno Mayer’s book on the persistence of the old regime has triggered research into the nobility’s continuity as a social group. The central insight of consequent nobility research is that nobles have adapted to changing social circumstances so as to conserve their high status position. This thesis has updated the findings of this research, by illustrating how the contemporary nobility has found modern pathways of position maintenance and public legitimation. Social events offer interesting networking opportunities to members; international exchanges help to cultivate young nobles’ global cultural capital; an estate coach emphasising sustainability assists in keeping estates in noble families’ hands. Moreover, through uniting in recognisable organisational forms such as the association, the philanthropic member-volunteer organisation, and the social club, the nobility has found distinctly modern pathways to legitimate its status aparte. Especially the chivalric orders, with their emulated member-volunteer structures, and their emphasis on good works and traditional values, have provided the nobility with a public face after the loss of formal privileges. The nobility’s adaptation to modernisation processes has predominantly been described in terms of activities and strategies. This thesis has elaborated on nobility scholarship by raising issues of moral legitimation and self-presentation – issues that are increasingly addressed in elite scholarship, but that have not been taken up by nobility scholars. We have seen the paradox of reconversion between conforming and conserving return in the way nobles discursively justify their social and symbolic boundary drawing. Portraying themselves as a collective identity with a right to self-realisation, nobles morally legitimate their exclusivity. Meanwhile, they distinguish themselves from non-nobles by both downplaying and asserting differences. There are many things to discuss, but I will keep it short. First, I want to make note of some limitations of this study. One important limitation consists in the combination of broad research questions, a largely inductive method, and a rather versatile dataset. The limitation of available data sources significantly steered the direction of the research, resulting in this rather broad exploration of the Dutch nobility in this day and age. Moreover, this study is limited by the lack of diversity in the sample. The interviews often include spokesmen of the same organisations, and the same people often return in different interviews. Consequently, the results may have reflected the opinions and attitudes of merely the most motivated part of the nobility. The findings of this research can hence not be generalised to the nobility as a whole. Rather, we should interpret the results as a case of elite groups re- establishing themselves under changing social conditions, strategically adapting to new social structures as well as discursively adapting to reigning norms and values.

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This brings me to a further limitation, pertaining to the choice of literature to study the phenomenon of position maintenance. Tilly outlines four cultural processes that sustain categorical inequality, and stresses their unintentional character (p. 108). They are mechanisms, after all, not strategies. However, the nobility’s discursive hints of opportunity hoarding and adaptation paint a different picture: one in which people consciously steer these mechanisms. In this sense, the Bourdieusian picture of reconversion strategies seems to be more applicable to describe the persistence of the nobility category. The noble category is not preserved by impersonal cultural processes. Rather, individuals with noble titles preserve the noble category by using individual, family, and group resources, oriented as social actors are towards “the maximizing of material and symbolic profit” (Bourdieu, 1990/1980, p. 16). This is not to say that nobles plan the consequences of their adapted conduct. This view of the dynamic social actor relating to the actual opportunity structure also helps to interpret the findings on nobles’ moral legitimations. We have first seen that nobles justify their exclusive groups by referring to the experience of stigma in the sixties and seventies and to their right to outlive their collective identity. Interestingly, this logic resembles the logic of identity politics, as defined by Nancy Fraser (1995). Identity politics responds to a kind of repression that Fraser (1995) defines as “cultural or symbolic” injustice (p. 71). Symbolic injustice involves ‘disrespect,’ subjecting people to prejudice, discrimination, and stereotypical characterisations (p. 71). Identity politics then aims to achieve social justice through recognition, as opposed to redistribution. According to Bernstein (2005), public and scholarly debates about ‘identity politics’ or the ‘politics of recognition’ have risen significantly in the 1990s (see for example Taylor, 1992; Fraser, 1995; Honneth, 2001). Concurrently, the nobility feels free to express its identity again, and in so doing, discursively mirrors the logic of identity politics. In other words, the nobility, a historically privileged group, seeks recognition by making use of the rhetoric of disadvantaged minority groups. This can be conceptualised as a discursive strategy in an opportunity structure in which pathways to self-assertion are limited. We have also seen that the nobility morally legitimates itself by downplaying and emphasising differences. In an historical-sociological study on the British nobility’s recreative activity, Friedman and Reeves (2020) show a similar picture of the nobility’s moral legitimation, one that is “marked by the twin pursuits of distinction and ordinariness” (p. 343). Interestingly, they argue that this emphasis on ordinariness significantly increased from the 1990s onward, coinciding with growing income inequality. They speculate that the appeal to ordinariness may thus stem from a more urgently felt imperative of moral legitimation among elites (p. 343). In the same vein, the interviewees in this study point out that they constantly sense the imperative of justification. However, this study also suggests that nobles have exhibited a renewed self- awareness since the 1990s. We may solve this riddle by viewing anti-elitist sentiments both as a

BETWEEN CONFORMING AND CONSERVING 54 challenge and an opportunity for the nobility. On the one hand, the nobility constantly downplays associations with superiority, snobbery, and money to prevent public condemnation. On the other hand, it sees an opportunity in presenting itself as the ‘morally right elite’: the chivalric orders reject the moral worth of ‘real estate’ orders while the difference with the general public is framed as culturally valuable. Rachel Sherman (2017) writes that New York elites describe “right and wrong ways to inhabit wealth” (p. 232). Paraphrasing Sherman, we could state that the Dutch nobility makes a distinction between right and wrong ways to inhabit privilege. Future research could compare how different types of elites justify their positions in their respective fields. Do they make use of a similar legitimating rhetoric? Do they refer to other elites’ behaviour, achievements, and moral worth? Moreover, to develop a full picture of the legitimation process, additional studies will be needed to describe the nobility’s audience. Research points out that “working class groups in particular, often distinguish between elites whom they see as ‘decent’ . . . and elites they see as ‘snobbish’” (Friedman and Reeves, 2020, p. 343). Who is the nobility’s audience, clapping or booing as they walk down the tightrope? Which people are to recognise their moral worth? Is there a longing for elites in general and for traditional elites in particular? An interesting starting point would be amateur-historian John Töpfer’s information website Nobility in The Netherlands [Adel in Nederland]. To conclude, the main contribution of this research is that the nobility not only promotes itself through practical adaptation, by hoarding opportunities and organising in historically fluctuating ways, but also through moral adaptation, appealing to prevalent norms and values, and tapping into the increasingly widespread discourse of identity politics. In sum, when society changes, so do the practices, attitudes, and expressions by which the nobility asserts itself.

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References

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Appendix

Newspaper articles

Author unknown. (1987, January 31). De Hoge Raad van Adel gaat zuinig te werk. Leeuwarder Courant. Author unknown. (1991, January 17). Baron van Lynden: ‘Regering traag met wet op adeldom.’ Leeuwarder Courant. Van Zalinge, E. (1996, August 29). Titels alleen in mannelijke lijn overdraagbaar. Het Parool. Ramdharie, S. (1996, December 14). Barones mag haar titel niet doorgeven. De Volkskrant. Ramdharie, S. (1996, December 31). De moderne adel is nuchter en breed inzetbaar. De Volkskrant. Chorus, J. (1997, January 23). Jonge adel leeft in vrij land. NRC Handelsblad. Koesen, J. (1997, February 1). Adel in Nederland: Van Verschuer en Van Kinschot. De Gelderlander. Van der Steen, P. (1997, May 29). Strijd voor doorgeven adellijke titel via vrouw. De Stem. Powel, H. (1997, November 12). Jonkheer Meyer (Senioren 2000) vreest uitsterven adel. Trouw. Author unknown. (1999, July 30). De adelstand is nog lang niet uitgestorven. Leeuwarder Courant. Author unknown. (2002, January 30). Uitstervende adel niet meer dan groep titels. Leeuwarder Courant. Fogteloo, M. (2004, December 17). ‘We zijn de kraamkamer van nieuwe, Europese waarden.’ De Groene Amsterdammer. Klein Beernink, P. (2002, February 12). Adel gooit de benen los. De Telegraaf. Berends, R. (2004, November 27). De adel sterft langzaam uit. De Gelderlander. Van Bosch Rosenthal, E. (2005, March 5). Adel verplicht. Maar waartoe? Vrij Nederland. Hooghiemstra, D. (2005, May 14). Eén grote familie – en machtig bovendien. NRC Handelsblad. Hooghiemstra, D. (2005, September 12). De adel heeft vooral plichten. NRC Handelsblad. Wytzes. L. (2005, October 1). Samenleving: de adel is springlevend. Elsevier. Dekker, W. & Van Raaij, B. (2006, May 6). De middelmaat regeert. De Volkskrant. De Beaufort, B. (2006, October 31). Het edele deel. Quote. Haan, F. & Rengers, M. (2006, November 4). Riddertje spelen. De Volkskrant. Tramper, B. (2008, May 9). Het kapitaal van de adel. Reformatorisch Dagblad. Tramper, B. (2008, May 23). ‘Adellijke afkomst zie ik als voorrecht.’ Reformatorisch Dagblad. Tramper, B. (2008, June 6). ‘Ik voel me omringd met voorouders.’ Reformatorisch Dagblad. Tramper, B. (2008, June 13). ‘Goede manieren geven iemand uitstraling.’ Reformatorisch Dagblad. Tramper, B. (2008, June 27). ‘Adel zal op den duur uitsterven.’ Reformatorisch Dagblad. Wytzes, L. (2008, September 27). Orden en ridderschappen. Elsevier.

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Postmaa, C. (2009, February 11). Ridders, kruizen en goede werken. Algemeen Dagblad. Author unknown. (2009, June 6). Hulp van adel. De Telegraaf. Dommerholt, A. (2009, June 19). Jhr. mr. De Savornin Lohman: Helpen maakt gelukkiger. Reformatorisch Dagblad. Author unknown (2009, June 20). Hulpverlening en rituelen. IJmuider Courant. Author unknown (2009, June 20). Toekomst van de orde. Haarlems Dagblad Rengers, M. (2009, June 22). Niet anders dan andere verenigingen. De Volkskrant. Van Heemstra, M. (2010, April 3). De vergeten bovenklasse. Vrij Nederland. Moll, M. (2011, March 12). Lang leve de ondeugendheid. Het Parool. Author unknown. (2011, September 26). Adel houdt rituelen hoog. De Telegraaf. Huisman, C. (2011, October 18). 'We zijn een aanvulling op de ik-cultuur'. De Volkskrant. Author unknown. (2012, May 26). Mr. J.J. baron van Wassenaer voorzitter van de Nederlandse Adelsvereniging. Rotterdams Dagblad. Van Steenbergen, E. (2013, August 7). Na de kruistochten de goede doelen. NRC Handelsblad. Van Damme, J. (2014, February 22). Adel heeft nog steeds flair. Provinciale Zeeuwse Courant. Donkers, S. (2014, April 26). ‘Ik word vaak overweldigd door liefde voor de wereld.’ Vrij Nederland. Van de Sande, M. (2014, June 14). Adel anders. Het Financieele Dagblad. Wassenaar, S. (2014, June 21). Je mag nu weer een jonkheer zijn. Tubantia. Harmsen, F. (2015, June 13). Jonge adel. Het Financieele Dagblad. Author unknown (2015, August 15). Eeuwenoude Duitse Orde van de Balije in openbaarheid. RTV Utrecht. Author unknown. (2016, August 17). ‘Familie het belangrijkst.’ De Telegraaf. Schapendonk, N. (2017, July 27). ‘Gezag? Nee, dat hebben we niet.’ De Stem. Dobber, L. (2017, December 9). ‘We doen mooi werk, daar moeten we de boer mee op.’ Trouw. Van Walsum, S. (2018, January 4). De échte Nederlandse ridders verrichten hun werk in stilte. De Volkskrant Borst, M. (2018, January 20). De wondere ridderwereld. Dagblad van het Noorden. Bouwman, M. (2018, August 29). Ridderschap draait om historie en verbondenheid. Provinciale Zeeuwse Courant. Van Breda, I. (2018, November 9). Adel in Nederland: verleden tijd of onsterfelijk? Adel in Nederland. https://www.adelinnederland.nl/adel-in-nederland-verleden-tijd-of- onsterfelijk/

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Websites https://adelsvereniging.nl/ https://www.hogeraadvanadel.nl/ https://www.vjan.nl/ https://cilane.eu/ https://www.johanniter.nl/ https://ordevanmalta.nl/ https://rdo.nl/ http://www.ridderschapvangelderland.nl/ http://www.ridderschapvangroningen.nl/ http://ridderschapvanholland.nl/ http://www.ridderschapvannoordbrabant.nl/ https://www.ridderschapvanoverijssel.nl/ https://www.ridderschap-utrecht.nl/ https://ridderschap-van-zeeland.nl/

i Adeldom blijft een zaak die maar moeizaam met het democratisch gedachtengoed is te verenigen. ii Adel wä re nicht mö glich ohne den Glauben an die Existenz von Adel in der ihn umgebenden Gesellschaft. iii Ze moeten oppassen met die voorbeeldfunctie. Zodra die ontaardt in enigerlei vorm van superieurisme, dan verliezen edelen hun voorsprong. Het is munt die ze kunnen kapitaliseren, maar als ze zich erop laten voorstaan, werkt hun adeldom als een boemerang. iv Wij vormen een hechte groep met een eigen achtergrond. Velen zijn met elkaar verwant door huwelijken in vorige generaties. v De dertiger Von Maltzahn is getrouwd met een niet-adellijke vrouw. 'Dat is bij de adel nu heel normaal, hoor. We hebben in het verleden genoeg inteelt gehad.' vi De barones trouwde in 1985 met een baron. Dat ze haar oog had laten vallen op een man met blauw bloed, noemt ze zuiver toeval. Lachend: „Dat was beslist geen vooropgezet doel, natuurlijk niet. Ik leerde hem kennen via een van mijn beste vriendinnen.” vii Anderzijds zal een dergelijk stelsel heerlijke perspectieven openen voor al dan niet gefortuneerde op eretekenen beluste ijdeltuiten. viii Als het aan de achterban van Van Wassenaer ligt, hoeft de adel niet te worden uitgebreid zoals in België. Zelf zegt hij: 'Ik vind het idee om mensen in de adelstand te verheffen die iets betekend hebben voor de maatschappij interessant. Ik denk dan direct aan Johan Cruijff. Maar ik weet dat bij veel adellijke mensen de vrees bestaat dat die nieuwe adel niet meteen hetzelfde familiegevoel zal hebben.' ix Mijn huidige ex-vrouw, die ook van adel is, erfde een deel van het familielandgoed. Het was een logische verplichting dat we dat samen zouden gaan beheren.' Natuurlijk is dat een privilege van de elite, beseft hij. `In de tijd van Den Uyl nog maar veertig jaar geleden was grootgrondbezit absoluut not done, maar ook daarin zie je nu een duidelijke kentering. Begrijpelijk, want landgoedbeheer betekent instandhouding. Je mag ergens een poosje op passen om het

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vervolgens in betere staat door te geven aan de volgende generatie. Dan praat je over duurzaamheid, en dat is tegenwoordig een populair begrip . . . Inmiddels lig ik in scheiding, dus ik heb moeten omzien naar andere bezigheden. Als landgoedcoach kan ik mijn ervaring van de afgelopen jaren gebruiken om de huidige generatie grootgrondbezitters te helpen. Ik merk dat veel eigenaren hun financiële perikelen jarenlang voor zich uitschuiven, terwijl je beter zo vroeg mogelijk wegwijs kunt raken in nieuwe verdienmodellen. Dan denk ik uiteraard aan recreatie, maar ook aan het verwaarden van biomassa of het plaatsen van telecommasten of windmolens, en zo zijn er nog tientallen opties die ik graag aanreik, steeds overwegend wat past bij ieders bezit. Als die worden opgepakt, ben ik oprecht blij. Weer een landgoed gered! x Natuurlijk kan De Weichs de Wenne (62), die een van de grotere adellijke landgoedbezitters is, de hele boel verkopen en lekker van het leven gaan genieten. Hij zal er zeker miljoenen voor krijgen. Maar niet deze baron. Geysteren wordt straks van zijn drie kinderen. De adel mag dan niet meer zijn wat het geweest is, met deze eeuwenoude traditie wenst deze heer absoluut niet te breken. 'Je moet geen slachtoffer van je bezit worden', betoogt de baron in zijn kantoor met riant uitzicht over de Maas. 'Maar we doen alles om Geysteren in stand te houden. Het is een morele plicht. Dit landgoed is met zorg ontwikkeld en doorgegeven. Wie zijn wij dan om het te verzilveren? xi Wij ondersteunen de traditionele levenswijze. Familie is daarbij het allerbelangrijkst. xii Ik denk dat adel een voorbeeld kan zijn . . . Hoe je een schakel bent in een keten en verantwoordelijkheid hebt voor de komende generaties, daarbij geïnspireerd door je voorgeschiedenis. xiii Het adellijk zelfbewustzijn draait om het doorgeven van de familielijn, in een mate die gewone burgers zich niet kunnen voorstellen. Materieel erfgoed, maar ook de naam en faam van de familie. Ze zien zichzelf als schakel in een keten van generaties, niet als een individu dat zichzelf moet verwerkelijken. Dat maakt ze zo sterk. xiv We willen de onderlinge contacten bevorderen en de positie van de adel ondersteunen,’ zegt Van Wassenaer. Dat is in de loop der jaren wel wat van karakter veranderd; van steunfonds werd het meer belangenvereniging. ‘We waren oorspronkelijk meer een fonds dat uitsluitend armlastige edelen ondersteunde. Dat is in de loop der tijd uitgebreid met een beurzensysteem. Nu zijn we daarnaast een echte vereniging geworden, met leden. xv Het verlenen van hulp aan leden van de Nederlandse adel die hieraan behoefte hebben om een waardige plaats in de samenleving te verkrijgen of te behouden. xvi Al heb je, misschien is het niet voor te stellen, ook heel veel ongelofelijk arme adel. Er zijn genoeg baronessen die geen nieuwe wasmachine kunnen betalen. Gelukkig is daarvoor de Nederlandse Adelsvereniging, een sociaal ingestelde vereniging met fondsen om deze mensen te helpen. xvii Het heeft geen zin om een titel te dragen als je putjesschepper bent. Je moet de ambitie hebben om je titel uit te dragen. Door een beetje in de stijl van de voorouders te leven, bijvoorbeeld. xviii Découvrir leurs homologues à l’étranger ayant un background similaire, découvrir leurs cultures différentes tout en se ressemblant. xix Ik ben wel dankbaar dat ik meertalig ben opgevoed, dat mijn ouders mij een open en internationale instelling hebben bijgebracht. Ik ben in mijn jeugd vaak met mijn ouders naar internationale bals geweest. In Tsjechië, Duitsland. Daar heb ik ervaren hoe makkelijk en leuk het is nieuwe vrienden te maken met onbekenden, je leert er spelenderwijs de kunst van het converseren. Op een bal is het dansen overigens ook een van de manieren waarop je makkelijk contact kunt maken. xx Van jongs af aan heb ik herkenning gevoeld bij andere mensen van adel. Waar dat precies in zit, is moeilijk te duiden. Het heeft te maken met opvoeding, omgangsvormen, normen en waarden die vroeger meer algemeen vanzelfsprekend waren, en nu niet meer. Daar wil ik niet-adellijken zeker niet mee diskwalificeren, maar zo ligt het wel.

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xxi Over het feit dat jonge edelen elkaar weer regelmatig opzoeken op speciale gelegenheden toont Van Rappard zich vooral verbaasd. ‘Wie verzot is op tennissen, kan zich aanmelden bij een tennisclub. Maar wat doe je als lid van een adelsvereniging? Houd je je dan bezig met ”adelen”? Ik zou niet weten wat ik me erbij moet voorstellen. Het enkele feit dat iemand van adel is, zou voor mij geen reden zijn contact met hem te zoeken.’ xxii Verder zie je veel mensen met een specifieke culturele achtergrond op zoek gaan naar hun roots. Joodse jongeren bijvoorbeeld, maar ook adellijke jongeren. Het is een modern verschijnsel om je identiteit uit te zoeken en te beleven en dit heeft ook de adel aangeraakt. xxiii (i) De aaneensluiting van de leden van de Nederlandse adel, om hun positie in de Nederlandse samenleving te bevorderen; (ii) Het verlenen van hulp aan leden van de Nederlandse adel die hieraan behoefte hebben om een waardige plaats in de samenleving te verkrijgen of te behouden; en (iii) Het bevorderen van de instandhouding van en de kennis over Nederlands adellijk erfgoed. xxiv Om er lid van te zijn, moest je oorspronkelijk vier adellijke kwartieren hebben met twee grootvaders die al voor 1795 tot de adel behoorden. Daardoor werd het aantal potentiele leden steeds kleiner, en zo besloot de Orde om wat water bij de wijn te doen. Nu is een adellijk kwartier van vaderskant van voor 1795 vereist en een adellijk kwartier van moederskant zonder ouderdomsgrens. xxv Mensen die van generatie op generatie geen kans krijgen. Wij noemen dat de vierde wereld. De doelstelling luidt; het verlenen van hulp aan zieken, gewonden en anderszins hulpbehoevenden. xxvi Wel moeten wij ons kapitaal in stand houden, om zo lang mogelijk hulp te kunnen bieden. xxvii Vroeger had je geen hospitia, geen opvanginstellingen voor onverzekerden, geen woon/zorgcentra. Wij spelen in op veranderingen in de samenleving en proberen overal zo goed mogelijk ons steentje bij te dragen . . . Het is natuurlijk typisch Nederlands dat er zoveel verschillende instellingen zijn, maar ieder daarvan legt zijn eigen accenten en heeft dus ook zijn eigen toegevoegde waarde. xxviii [H]oewel de adel verder geen maatschappelijke importantie meer heeft, is er toch die morele missie. Het is jammer als dat verloren zou gaan. xxix We onderscheiden ons van serviceclubs zoals Rotary en Lions met een spirituele taal en christelijke riddertradities. Wij doen niet aan snobappeal. xxx Volgens Lohman is het kwalijk, dat een 'valse orde van vastgoedridders' de rituelen van de adellijke ridders imiteert. Het ergert hem dat er klaarblijkelijk aan diverse bestuursleden van deze orde een 'smet kleeft', terwijl ook zij zich laten voorstaan op hun goede daden. xxxi Van oudsher hebben de ridderschappen een vermogen, en dat moet een bestemming krijgen. Vroeger besteedden we veel geld aan de zwakkeren, maar naarmate dat meer een overheidstaak werd, werd daarop bij ons minder een beroep gedaan. Nu gebruiken we dat onder meer voor de restauratie van havezaten en schilderijen, en voor publicaties. Dat is regionaal gebonden, waarbij de oude provinciale grenzen in acht worden genomen. xxxii Laten we eerlijk zijn: in de jaren zestig en zeventig is de adel gewoon gediscrimineerd. Je werd beoordeeld en veroordeeld op iets waar je niks aan kunt doen: je afkomst. xxxiii Je merkt aan de samenleving dat je weer van adel mag zijn,’ zegt De Beaufort. ‘We merken dat aan de toestroom van leden. Vroeger werd er meer overleden dan dat er werd aangemeld, nu is dat precies andersom. Men geeft zich op en men komt weer.’ xxxiv “Ik ben van adel, so what”, zegt Van Panhuys. “Het ís gewoon zo en wat is er nu eigenlijk mis mee? Ik heb geen zin mijn hele leven me ervoor te moeten verontschuldigen.” xxxv “Adel wordt weer geaccepteerd en gewaardeerd, maar we moeten wel voorzichtig zijn", tekent De Savornin Lohman aan. "Het is dansen op een dun koord. Als we met de borst vooruit gaan lopen, kan het makkelijk omslaan." xxxvi Ik speelde al langer met het idee om toe te treden, maar ik heb het gevoel dat ik pas nu de benodigde geestelijke rijpheid heb bereikt. Adel verplicht - noblesse oblige - was het adagium van mijn vader. Zo zie ik dat ook. Als je van

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adel bent, dien je bepaalde normen en waarden uit te dragen en moet je opkomen voor degenen in onze samenleving die het moeilijker hebben. xxxvii Au moment où l’Europe franchit des pas décisifs vers son unification et où un vent de liberté permet aux pays d’Europe centrale et orientale de renouer avec leurs racines historiques, la noblesse des pays européens se trouve confrontée à la fois à un défi et une opportunité: il s’agit de reformuler les valeurs qui constituent sa raison d’être et de s’engager pour le bien d’une société européenne en pleine transformation. xxxviiiZelf ben ik erbij ter sociale inspiratie en ik vind het gewoon gezellig. Je bent met zielsverwanten. Mijn grootvader heeft nog met iemand anders zijn grootvader in de box gezeten, dat idee. xxxix Volgens hem heerst er onderling geen competitieve sfeer, zoals dat in `de echte wereld' wel het geval is. `Daar proberen mensen vaak hogerop te komen door anderen naar beneden te halen. Hier beseffen we, misschien wel onbewust, dat als we elkaar steunen in elkaars ontwikkeling, we daar als groep meer aan hebben', vertelt Stoop, die in het dagelijks leven wel eens heeft meegemaakt dat zijn open en aardige benadering vooral als slijmerig werd ervaren. `Mijn manieren kunnen verkeerd worden uitgelegd.' xl Op de maandelijkse borrel ziet Van Voorst regelmatig nieuwe leden huiverig om zich heen kijken. ‘Mogen we eigenlijk wel bij elkaar komen’, vragen ze zich af. ‘Waarom niet’, antwoordt hij dan. ‘We leven toch in een vrij land? Je mag je hier volspuiten met heroïne. Je mag alle denkbare geloofsrichtingen inslaan. Maar als edelen elkaar opzoeken, gaat dat kennelijk te ver.’ xli Dijkstal vindt het bovendien onwenselijk dat de Nederlandse adel zich uitbreidt. Die uitspraak valt bij Floor barones van Dedem verkeerd. ‘Ik vind dat nogal wat. Als Dijkstal dat over een andere groep had gezegd - bijvoorbeeld de roodharigen -, had het voor flink wat opschudding gezorgd.’ xlii Ik zou het jammer vinden als de adel uitsterft, omdat de maatschappij dan folklore verliest. Het maakt het allemaal wat grijzer. En ik hou niet van grijs. Grijs stimuleert de hersenen niet. xliii Tegenwoordig benadruk ik het onderscheid tussen adel en burgerij een beetje meer. Ik voel me verbonden met mijn naam en mijn familiegeschiedenis. Als je maar probeert aardig te blijven, is het toch leuk om net iets anders te zijn dan een ander? xliv 'We zijn tegenwoordig breed inzetbaar', zegt hij relativerend. 'We vertegenwoordigen alle geledingen van de samenleving, er zitten ook schilders en melkboeren tussen. De tijd dat het een voordeel was om tot de adel te behoren, bijvoorbeeld om in de diplomatieke dienst te komen, is voorbij. Je moet je plaats vinden op eigen kracht.' xlv Je moet jezelf verder niet op de borst slaan dat het allemaal zo edel is, maar je hoeft zo'n Ridderorde ook niet opzij te schuiven. Voor een titel geldt hetzelfde. xlvi Er bestaat bij adellijken het gevoel dat je je publieke verantwoordelijkheid moet nemen. Natuurlijk moeten we dat allemaal, maar ik vind dat je van de adel mag verwachten dat ze het ook echt doen. xlvii Terwijl de animo voor deelname rond de Maltezers groeit, worstelt het bestuur ondertussen met de vraag wie er tot de echte inner circle mag toetreden en wie niet. ‘We willen open zijn’, zegt René ridder Van Rappard, ‘maar het is ook weer niet de bedoeling dat we een korfbalvereniging worden.’