THIS MANUSCRIPT HAS BEEN ACCEPTED FOR PUBLICATION AT THE JOURNAL OF COMMUNICA- TION.FOR THE PUBLISHED VERSION AS WELL AS CITATION INFORMATION, PLEASE CHECK: http://mako.cc/academic/ Laboratories of Oligarchy? How The Iron Law Extends to Peer Production Aaron Shaw (
[email protected]) NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY Benjamin Mako Hill (
[email protected]) UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON Abstract: Peer production projects like Wikipedia have inspired voluntary associa- tions, collectives, social movements, and scholars to embrace open online collabora- tion as a model of democratic organization. However, many peer production projects exhibit entrenched leadership and deep inequalities, suggesting that they may not fulfill democratic ideals. Instead, peer production projects may conform to Robert Michels’ “iron law of oligarchy”, which proposes that democratic membership organizations become increasingly oligarchic as they grow. Using exhaustive data of internal pro- cesses from a sample of 683 wikis, we construct empirical measures of participation and test for increases in oligarchy associated with growth in wikis’ contributor bases. In contrast to previous studies, we find support for Michels’ iron law and conclude that peer production entails oligarchic organizational forms. INTRODUCTION Commons-based peer production – the distributed creation of freely accessible informa- tion resources through the mass aggregation of many contributions – represents a model of collective action and public goods production that integrates the use of digital communi- cation networks and information technologies (Benkler, 2006). Peer production has gener- ated public goods of enormous economic, cultural, and political value – such as Wikipedia and GNU/Linux – and has transformed the way that firms in many industries do business, shifted how politicians campaign for office, and changed the way that individuals share in- 1 2 formation (e.g., Benkler, 2006; Karpf, 2012; Shirky, 2008).