Tulane Economics Working Paper Series Employees’ Performance Variation over Fixed-Term Contracts - Evidence from the National Hockey League Furmaco, L. Longley, N. Palermo, A. Department of Economics Department of Business Institute for Labour Law and and the Murphy Institute Nevada State College Industrial Relations in the Tulane University European Union IZA GLO
[email protected] Rossi, G. University of Birkbeck London Working Paper 2107 May 2021 Abstract We investigate whether employees vary their performance during fixed-term contracts. We follow National Hockey League players’ performance over ten seasons. We use a two-stage least square fixed effect model to address empirical limitations in previous studies. We find that players’ performance varies at the end of the contract depending on ability, tenure, and (geographical) willingness to move. In particular, long-tenure and low-ability short-tenure workers vary their performance, depending on their continent of origin; these results might be due to different willingness to move, at different stages of players’ career. Keywords: fixed-term contracts, incentives, shirking behavior, strategic behavior JEL codes: D82, J24, J33, M52, Z22 Employees’ Performance Variation over Fixed-Term Contracts - Evidence from the National Hockey League Fumarco, L.,1 Longley, N.,2 Palermo, A.,3 Rossi, G.4 1 Department of Economics and the Murphy Institute, Tulane University, IZA, GLO 2 Department of Business, Nevada State College 3 Institute for Labour Law and Industrial Relations in the European Union 4 University of Birkbeck, London Abstract. We investigate whether employees vary their performance during fixed-term contracts. We follow National Hockey League players’ performance over ten seasons.